Can the provision of public goods strengthen the fiscal capacity of governments in developing
countries and move them toward an equilibrium of widespread tax compliance? We present
evidence of the impact of local public infrastructure on tax compliance, leveraging a large public
investment experiment and individual property tax records from Mexico City. Despite the
salience and large effects of these investments on access to infrastructure, property...
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DETAILS
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2025/03/20
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Working Paper
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198025
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1
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2025/03/20
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Disclosed
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The Fiscal Contract up Close: Experimental Evidence from Mexico City
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Citation
Anne Brockmeyer; Francisco Garfias; Juan Carlos Suárez Serrato.
The Fiscal Contract up Close: Experimental Evidence from Mexico City (English). Washington, D.C. : World Bank Group. http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/099032025152012502