Report Number: ICRR0023345

1. Project Data

Project ID	Project Name
P151832	BF-Transport and Urban Infras. Dev.
Country	**Practice Area(Lead)**
Burkina Faso	Urban, Resilience and Land

L/C/TF Number(s)	Closing Date (Original)	Total Project Cost (USD)
IDA-58590	31-Oct-2022	88,160,897.84
Bank Approval Date	**Closing Date (Actual)**	
13-Jun-2016	31-Mar-2022	

	IBRD/IDA (USD)	Grants (USD)
Original Commitment	100,000,000.00	0.00
Revised Commitment	92,890,450.00	0.00
Actual	87,974,407.98	0.00

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2. Project Objectives and Components

a. Objectives

According to the Financing Agreement (FA, p. 4) and the Project Appraisal Document (PAD, paragraph 17), the Project Development Objective (PDO) was "to improve mobility and access to infrastructure in target urban/rural areas and in the event of Eligible Crisis, Emergency, to provide immediate and effective response to an eligible crisis or emergency."

This review will assess the achievement of the following objectives:

- to improve mobility in target urban/rural areas.
- to improve access to infrastructure in target urban/rural areas.
- to provide immediate and effective response to an eligible crisis or emergency.

b. Were the project objectives/key associated outcome targets revised during implementation?

No

c. Will a split evaluation be undertaken?

No

d. Components

The project included five components:

1, **Inter-urban Infrastructure** (US$56.0 million in IDA, including US$3.1 million in Project Preparation Advance, US$52.97 million, actual). This component was to finance investments in roads and telecommunications to connect five targeted regional capitals and the rural hinterland in the south (Manga and Tenkodogo). Specifically, this component was to finance the following road upgrading: (i) roads between Manga and Zabré; (ii) the Dindéogo-Zonsé rural road connecting production areas to the Manga-Zabré main road; and (iii) construction of two toll stations and an axle load control station between Manga and Zabré. In addition, the component was to finance feasibility studies and engineering designs to; (i) upgrade existing rural roads, (ii) construct or rehabilitate culverts in the hinterland rural areas of Manga, Tenkodogo, Ouahigouya, Koudougou, and Dédougou, and (iii) internet connectivity along the Manga-Zabré road.

2. **Urban Infrastructure in Targeted Regional Capitals** (US$30.0 million equivalent in IDA, US$25.96 million actual). This component was to finance urban infrastructure investments in the five targeted regional capitals of Manga, Tenkodogo, Ouahigouya, Koudougou, and Dédougou. A pre-feasibility study was to be financed to assess institutional, socio-environmental, technical, and financial viability of all proposed investments. An indicative list of potential investments included: (i) asphalting of unpaved urban roads; (ii) construction of storm water drainage channels; (iii) rehabilitation and expansion of market gardens in Manga and Ouahigouya; (iv) upgrading of central bus stations in Dédougou and Manga; (e) construction of a market in Dédougou and a cattle market in Manga; and (f) upgrading of an abattoir in Manga (ICR, paragraph 14). This indicative list was to be refined based on a fixed investment ceiling for each city and in consultation with the local governments that were to be elected (ICR, footnote 7).

3. **Institutional Support and Sector Governance** (US$13.0 million equivalent consisting of US$10.0 million in IDA and US$3.0 million in counterpart funding, US$8.7 million actual consisting of US$6.8 million in IDA and US$1.9 million in co-financing). This component was to finance activities to improve the institutional and operational capacity of ministries through training and participation in seminars and workshops, equipment and implementation of sector reforms. These reforms were to include multiyear contracting of road maintenance activities; urban planning and management and improving statistics and management skills.

4. **Project Management** (US$6.0 million consisting of US$4.0 million in IDA and US$2.0 million in counterpart funding, IDA US$5.9 million, actual consisting of US$4.7 million in IDA and US$1.1 million in

counterpart financing). This component was to finance the cost of project management, monitoring and evaluation (M&E), technical and financial audits, and communication.

5. **Contingent Emergency Response Component (CERC)** (US$0 at appraisal, US$0 actual)**.** In accordance with OP/BP 10.00, this component would address major adverse economic and/or social impact from natural or man-made disaster by rapidly reallocating uncommitted project funds. In case of an emergency, the Government was to declare an emergency or justify the use of emergency funding. If the Bank agrees, the uncommitted project funds would be reallocated to finance a positive list of critical goods or the procurement of works and services to support rapid response and recovery. An Emergency Response Operations Manual was to detail financial management (FM), procurement, safeguards, and other implementation arrangements. The Permanent Secretariat of the Transport Sector Project (*Secrétariat Permanent du Programme Sectoriel de Transport*, or SP/PST) was to implement CERC. No crisis or emergency occurred to trigger this component (ICR, paragraph 7).

e. Comments on Project Cost, Financing, Borrower Contribution, and Dates

Project Cost: The original total project cost was equivalent to US$105 million. The actual project cost was US$87.97 million.

Financing: The International Development Association (IDA) financed the credit (appraisal estimate was US$100 million). The credit disbursed US$87.97 million. US$7 million was cancelled during the second restructuring (see below). Another US$4.9 million was cancelled at closing. According to the ICR (Annex 3) exchange rate fluctuations accounted for the balance.

Co-financing: The Swiss Development Cooperation (SDC) was to separately provide CHF 7 million in parallel to complement the project by financing high-intensity labor methods (HILM) to upgrade and rehabilitate roads, culverts, health and education centers. connect selected hinterlands agriculture production areas, and technical feasibility study for internet connectivity. There was no actual co-financing.

Borrower Contribution: The government committed contributions of US$5.0 million at appraisal and disbursed US$3.08 million. Out of the US$5.0 million, US$3.0 million was to co-finance activities under **Institutional Support and Sector Governance** component (see above). US$2.0 million was to finance the preparation and implementation of social and environmental safeguard instruments, and costs for focal points, and meetings of the steering and technical committees. The balance of US$1.92 million was unused.

Dates: The project was approved on June 13, 2016 and made effective on November 16, 2016. The Mid Term Review (MTR) was conducted on February 26, 2020. The original closing date was October 31, 2022 but the project closed earlier, on March 31, 2022. There were two level 2 restructurings reported in the ICR but three noted in the data sheet:

- **On November 11, 2020** to advance the original closing date from October 31, 2022, to December 31, 2021, change the institutional arrangements and the implementing agency, and introduce changes to the results framework. All key project activities were expected to be completed by the end of 2021. This first restructuring amended the FA to include two new implementing entities - the Burkina Faso Infrastructure Works Agency (AGETIB) to implement the construction of 20 km of urban roads and 2.5 km of storm water drainage channel, and the Urban Infrastructures and

Equipment Agency (ACOMOD) to implement 2 central bus stations, 1 animal slaughter facility and 3 markets.

- **On December 23, 2021** to extend the closing date to March 31, 2022, reallocate resources among disbursement categories, and cancel US$7 million equivalent (ICR, paragraph 19(c)). A 2-month extension was granted to complete the ICR and allow the team to retrieve unarchived data used for the economic analysis at appraisal.

Split Rating: No split rating of the outcome is made. There was no change in PDO. Changes made to the results framework did not affect the ambition or scope of the project and did not warrant a split rating.

3. Relevance of Objectives

Rationale

Country Context: Burkina Faso is a landlocked, low-income, mostly agricultural country in the Sahel. Eighty percent of the country's labor work in the agricultural sector. Sixty-one percent of rural households derive their income from agriculture. They rely on roads to bring their products to markets. The road network is underdeveloped. Secondary and tertiary rural roads provided mobility to 75 percent of the population. Majority of these roads were in bad condition. Only 20 percent of classified roads were asphalted. Over half of tertiary roads were impassable during the rainy season. Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) has a Rural Access Index average of 34 percent. Burkina Faso averaged 26 percent. In 2014, 38 percent of rural households were located more than an hour's walk from the nearest road, 33 percent more than an hour away from the market, and 51 percent more than an hour from a means of transportation. This lack of infrastructure and connectivity between regional capitals, larger cities and their rural hinterlands make it difficult for producers to send their agricultural surplus to markets. Meanwhile, economic opportunities in urban areas attracted rural migration. Over 70 percent of the country's urban population lived in its two largest cities, Ouagadougou and Bobo-Dioulasso spilling into outskirts that had inadequate road networks. Sixty percent lived in underserved informal settlements. The use of individual motorized transport rose, leading to traffic congestion and even poorer mobility. These and other cities lacked core infrastructure to meet the needs of a growing population. Cities lacked capacity, resources, and institutional framework for urban and transport planning.

The project development objectives (PDOs) were to link agricultural production areas and urban centers, and improve access to urban infrastructure by improving roads, investing in local service delivery, and boosting urban planning capacity. The objectives were outcome oriented, pitched at an appropriate level to match limited implementation capacity and development conditions based on its Fragile, Conflict, and Violence (FCV) category (see Bank strategy below).

Country Plans: The efforts to improve urban infrastructure, finance local government infrastructure, improve connectivity in agricultural zones of production by connecting the hinterlands and urban centers were reflected in the government's National Plan for Social and Economic Development (*Plan National de Développement Economique et Social* or PNDES) I and evident in PNDES II for 2021-2025. PNDES was to link the country to the global economy by improving transport and trade. Objective 4.4 aimed to improve accessibility to transport infrastructure, planning and management of urban mobility, develop urban and rural areas, and provide amenities to cities. PNDES II, by 2025, was to increase paved roads to 36 percent (from 27 percent in 2020). This meant 100 percent of urban roads (from 59 percent),

and 44 percent of rural roads (from 33 percent). In addition, PNDES II efforts aimed to achieve 60 percent of roads to be in good condition (from 24 percent) and rehabilitate 36 percent of paved roads (from 18 percent). PNDES II objective 4.3 was to ensure that everyone had access to safe, affordable, accessible, and sustainable transport systems by 2030. The PDOs were relevant to the objectives of the government outlined in PNDES II. For example, four of the six focus areas in the government's urban investment program to implement PNDES II constituted the preselected activities under component B.

World Bank Country Partnership Framework: At project closing, the World Bank's Country Partnership Framework (CPF) for FY18-23 highlighted three main priorities: (i) improving the management of natural resources; (ii) promoting skills development; and (iii) reducing gender bias against women. The second-tier priorities were: (i) building infrastructure to promote further local and regional integration; (ii) encouraging financial inclusion; (iii) increasing resilience through improved social protection of the poorest; (iv) ensuring fiscal efficiency and macroeconomic stability; (v) building up inclusive and transparent institutions; (vi) promoting competition and private sector development to stimulate efficiency and innovation; and (vii) managing urbanization with efficient urban centers.(CPF, paragraph 40). AThe PDOs were relevant to objective 1.3: Improve connectivity for better access to markets to achieve Focus Area 1: Accelerate sustainable private sector led growth for job creation. Hence, the project aimed to generate employment and promote small businesses along the improved roads. The PDO was also relevant to the approach adopted in the CPF to address deteriorating security due to the influx of over 34,000 refugees from the Sahelian sub-region.

World Bank Experience in the Country and in the Sector: The Bank has been engaged in the country and in the sector since 2003 (PAD, paragraph 39). Some of these projects included: Decentralized Urban Capacity Building Project (P084027, US$10 million IDA funds, closed January 2013); the Ouagadougou Transport Modal Shift Project (P087630, US$1 million Global Environment Fund, closed June 2015); and the Local Government Support Project (P120517, US$60 million IDA, closed December 2016). The latter was to support a revenue collection performance contract between the General Directorate of Tax and the local councils.

Overall, the project objectives were highly aligned with the country's own plans and the Bank's current country strategy. The objectives were to address the development problem brought about by the poor road network and unplanned urbanization. The government's plan acknowledges the need to rehabilitate and improve its road network. The objectives were also aligned with the Bank's one of three pillars and was noted to specifically contribute to achieving objective 1.3.

Rating
High

4. Achievement of Objectives (Efficacy)

OBJECTIVE 1
Objective

To improve mobility in target urban/rural areas.

Rationale

Theory of Change (TOC): No TOC was prepared at appraisal (ICR, paragraph 6) but the results framework in Annex 1 of the PAD provided the causal link between inputs, outputs, and expected outcomes. Investments in roadworks and telecommunications connectivity were to improve inter-urban connectivity between five targeted regional capitals and the rural hinterland in the south of the country (around Manga and Tenkodogo).

The **inputs** included technical design of road upgrading works of the RN29 between Manga and Zabré with two toll stations, an axle load control station, the rehabilitation of the Dindéogo-Zonsé road, and feasibility study of internet connectivity along the Manga-Zabré road. These inputs were to lead to **outputs** such as paved road between Manga and Zabré; rehabilitated rural road in the Dindéogo-Zonsé to connect production areas to the Manga-Zabré main road; and toll stations and an axle load control station on the road between Manga and Zabré.

These outputs were to lead to the **outcome** of improved mobility expressed as reduced travel time along the completed roads, improved urban services, increased access to markets, and improved living conditions in the long run. These outcomes were expressed as the number of gender-disaggregated direct project beneficiaries. No other indicators were provided to reflect the development outcomes of improved mobility, such as how these outputs improved the lives (access to health facilities, or lowered incidence of accidents, for example) and livelihoods of its beneficiaries (e.g., increase in income). These could have included, e.g., increase in marketed outputs and incomes of agricultural producers, frequency of transporting goods to markets, or efficient market prices of agricultural products.

Three critical **assumptions** in the TOC to increase the likelihood that the outcomes would be achieved were (i) that newly elected officials would approve the investment activities; (ii) the completed investments have available resources for maintenance; and (iii) reforms were adopted and enacted. The assumptions did not include capacity of the implementing entities, or the revenues collected from operational toll roads or use of the axle load control station.

The TOC lacked indicators measuring road safety, quality of constructed roads and other infrastructure. The TOC did not include the factors the project identified as benefits in justifying the economic benefits of the project. These included the following:(i) time and cost savings due to improved connectivity and mobility; (ii) temporary and permanent jobs generated; (iii) lowered cost of agricultural produce in urban areas due to improved connections to the agricultural hinterland; (iv) reduced losses in transporting agricultural produce; and (v) increased economic activities and job creation along the rehabilitated roads. (see Section 5 Efficiency below). According to the Bank Team they did not use these outcomes because these were only estimated at closing.

OUTPUTS: The following outputs achieved or almost achieved its targets:

- 79.06 km of non-rural roads of R29 was paved, exceeding the target of 78 km.
- 289,062 person days of employment were created. The original target was 310,000 person days. The construction of a 9 km rural road between Dindéogo and Zonsé and other infrastructures were cancelled with no change in the number of target person-days of employment.
- A feasibility study of internet connectivity along the Manga-Zabré road was completed, achieving the target. The feasibility of including a digital connectivity activity or ICT services (e.g., fiber optic or

wireless antennae) in the road designs to avoid the 'digital isolation' of the agglomerations along these roads. However, the project was unable to incorporate physical connectivity into roadway design. This activity was dropped.

- Two toll and axle load control stations were constructed as targeted.
- The following feasibility studies were completed as planned - to upgrade 100 km of rural unpaved roads and build 40 culverts; extension of the national road network; and engineering designs for the remaining 24 km of the Manga-Zabré-Zoaga-Ghana border road (between Zabré and the Ghana border), 200 km of rural roads, 40 km of road between Dindéogo and Bagré, and 9 km between Dindéogo and Zonsé.

OUTCOMES:

- The completed Manga-Zabré road reduced travel time from a baseline of 130 to 80 minutes or by 50 minutes. The original target was to reduce this travel time by 60 minutes. The target was **almost achieved**. Residents requested safety measure in the villages adjacent to the road by installing speed bumps to reduce accidents, and due to the construction of these, the travel times reduced was less than the target. The reduced travel time between Manga and Zabré improved the transport of agricultural products to consumers and led to increased economic benefits for producers. However, baseline and the value of this increase in economic benefits was not measured or reported.
- 18,701 direct project beneficiaries were provided with access to all-season roads within a 500-meter range. The original target of 18,000 people was **exceeded** because an additional 800 m of asphalted road was constructed in densely populated areas. The target of 53 percent female beneficiaries was achieved.
- The ICR claimed that the rehabilitated RN29 improved safety conditions for vehicles and pedestrians and provided access to health and education centers. No indicator measured these aspects, particularly road safety. In addition, the project was to have contributed to an increase in the sustainability and integration of the road network. No data was provided but anecdotes were reported. A Mangan farmer and a merchant reported: “We ... needed the tar and the central bus station for our activities. With the paved road, I can easily go and sell my products or buy agricultural inputs” and “Before the road was built, it was not easy to get to Zabré, especially in the rainy season. .... Now, at any time we can take the road without being afraid [of vehicle breakdown]. I know people who even make two or three round trips a day” (ICR, paragraph 28).
- The completed infrastructures toll station and the axle load control station were to increase the sustainability and integration of the broader road network. The two newly built stations (only one was operational at project close) was to collect toll revenues to supplement the budget allocated to the Ministry of Transport (MOT) Special Fund for Roads (*Fonds Spécial Routier du Burkina*, or FSR-B) for road maintenance and contribute to the sustainability of this infrastructure. The project financed the toll road buildings to connect the RN29 between Manga and Zabré to a section of road between Zabré and the border with Ghana. At project closing, the staff and equipment were not yet in place. The road has not reached the minimum traffic threshold necessary to be financially viable but is expected to be reached after the construction of 24 km of road between Zabré and the border with Ghana, planned under the Lomé-Ouagadougou-Niamey Economic Corridor project (P168386). In the case of the axle load control station, this was to maintain the completed road (RN29) in good condition.
- The Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC) separately financed the construction of 100 km of rural roads and 40 culverts using employment-intensive method in coordination with this project. Neighboring rural hinterlands were opened. This activity was expected to benefit 30 percent of the local population to develop economic activities in the future. Some of the studies extending the

national road were used by the Bank-financed Secondary Cities Urban Mobility and Development project (P177918). The completed design to construct the road between Dindéogo and Zonsé showed a threefold increase in cost that the project could not afford to finance and was cancelled and transferred to another project.

Overall, the efficacy of the project to achieve this objective is rated **Modest** because only one of two outcomes was almost achieved, and other outcomes were not measured or supported by evidence.

Rating
Modest

OBJECTIVE 2
Objective
To improve access to infrastructure in target urban/rural areas.

Rationale
Theory of Change (TOC): No TOC was carried out at appraisal (ICR, paragraph 6) but the results framework in Annex 1 of the PAD provided the causal link between inputs, outputs, and expected outcomes. **Inputs** were to include a pre-feasibility study to assess institutional, socio-environmental, technical, and financial viability of all proposed infrastructure investments and reforms to improve capacity to monitor the implementation of policies for the transport and road sectors. Inputs also included the design and construction of infrastructure investments such as roads, markets, and other economic infrastructures such as bus stations, and abattoirs. **Outputs** were to include the implementation of sector reforms expressed as capacity to generate annual sector reports and the built infrastructure investments such as roads, bus terminals, markets, etc. Restructuring reduced the outputs from 8 to 7 infrastructure activities and the construction of two was cancelled. Outputs were also to include the number of businesses (the number of shops and economic activities) to be installed along the rehabilitated roads as an intermediate outcome.

Outcomes were to be expressed as the number of people in urban areas with access to all-season roads within a 500-meter range and those provided with access to other infrastructure. The **assumptions** identified for the first objective also applied to this objective. A gap in these assumptions was sufficient capacity of the implementation agencies. There were no other indicators to capture how the outputs (reforms) were implemented (beyond generating reports) and improved lives (access to health facilities, clean markets, safety features in bus terminals, or lowered incidence of accidents, for example) and improved livelihoods (e.g., increase in income or business ventures in markets and bus terminals) of the beneficiaries.

Outcome in sector reforms could have captured zoning improvements by way of new business permits generated, for example. One outcome indicator, the number of sectors that would generate annual reports was a proxy for improved capacity but was more at an output rather than an outcome level indicator (see Section 9 Monitoring and Evaluation below). The TOC correctly identified the number of new businesses generated along the improved roads as an intermediate outcome. The ICR acknowledged that more specific indicators would have better targeted women beneficiaries to improve the gender equity of the project impact (ICR, paragraph 63).The Bank team clarified that these could have included targeting a majority of the shops

established around the roads to have been managed by women or gender disaggregating the indicators that applied to the number of jobs created, the number of people trained, or new business shop owners.

OUTPUTS:

- 19.34 km of non-rural roads - 7 km of road in Koudougou, 7.04 km in Ouahigouya and 5.3 km in Tenkodogo - were rehabilitated. The target of 20 km was **almost achieved**. All roads were equipped with solar-powered street lighting, which facilitated commercial activities after dark and helped creating safer streets at night, while having a low carbon footprint. Civils works in Koudougou also included the construction of two crossing structures, multiple culverts and a 2.5 km rainwater drainage canal.
- 7 economic and other infrastructure was constructed - a cattle market, an abattoir and a bus terminal in Manga, a market and a bus terminal in Dédougou, a market garden in Ouahigouya, and drainage canal in Koudougou. The original target of 8 was reduced to 7 and was **almost achieved**. The construction of two infrastructure was cancelled at restructuring - two gardening perimeters in Manga and Ouahigouya and a craft village in Ouahigouya. All completed infrastructure was accessible by mid-December 2022, seven months after the project closing date. Preparatory studies for two garden perimeters in Manga and Ouahigouya that were finalized but not constructed due to a lack of time were to be completed under the Burkina Faso Emergency Local Development and Resilience Project (P175382).
- 262 shops and other economic activities were installed along the rehabilitated non-rural roads (ICR, paragraph 32). The target of 300 was **almost achieved.**
- As targeted, staff from 12 cities were trained to implement urban master plans. Training included the preparation of a series of studies to enhance urban planning through demarcation zoning in major cities and improve urban mobility in Ouagadougou and improve storm water drainage in secondary cities (now used by the Burkina Faso Emergency Local Development and Resilience Project (P175382). The strengthened capacities for demarcating zoning designations were expected to address urbanization patterns. Regional capitals were provided with adequate demarcation equipment to complement their training and the city of Ouagadougou was equipped with vehicles, office furniture and the installation of traffic signs which contributed to improve traffic flow. The equipment was to support the recently created transport authority in Ouagadougou to implement the regulations developed by the project.
- 5 regulatory acts and policies were prepared. The target of 5 was **achieved**. The project supported the partner ministries in preparing regulations to improve the planning, implementation, and management of infrastructure and urban mobility. These regulations included urban planning and construction code, the law on real estate development, business licenses, a decree regulating road traffic in Upper Volta, and a decree on the organization of urban transport. All regulations were prepared, but four had not been adopted at project close due to the political situation.
- 80 percent of annual training plans were delivered through seminars and workshops on - construction and maintenance techniques for rural roads and hydraulic structures, paving and gutter construction; public policies; M&E; and results-based management. The target of executing 80 percent was **achieved**. Local authorities received specific training in managing local infrastructure assets and maintaining infrastructure to ensure the sustainability of investments. These benefited over 500 persons.
- 100 percent of grievances that were registered related to delivery of project benefits were addressed following the establishment of the grievance mechanism. The target of 90 percent was **exceeded**. There was no GRM in the first three years of the project. GRM was set up during the second half of

the project. GRM was limited to the committees set up as part of the Resettlement Action Plans (RAPs). The GRM was not fully functional until a few months before project closure. Without the GRM or RAP in the project areas during 90 percent of the project period, complaints in these areas were not properly recorded, including those related to GBV and sexual exploitation, abuse and harassment (SEA/SH). This was one of the main shortcomings of the project.

OUTCOMES:

- 23,442 people in urban areas were provided access to other infrastructure. The original target of 23,750 people was **almost achieved**. Two factors affected this outcome. First, the January 2022 coup replaced local governments with special delegations. The official start-up of the urban facilities was delayed because new local elections were yet to be held. Second, the PIU did not carry out census of beneficiaries. The estimated number of beneficiaries for these facilities at preparation was reported as achieved even with the cancelled construction of two infrastructures and seven of eight targeted infrastructures were built. The original target was not reduced at restructuring. The final tally of beneficiaries included beneficiaries of the market garden in Ouahigouya that was not included in the initial target at appraisal. The solar-powered street lighting in these roads facilitated commercial activities after dark, helped create safer streets at night, and a low carbon footprint.
- As targeted, two sectors (transport and urban) received training to improve their capacity to monitor the implementation of its policies and prepare statistical studies and annual reports. This improved capacity was expected to increase public awareness and inform future decision-making in these areas.
- 165,393 direct project beneficiaries (the target of 165,000 persons was **achieved**, of which 53 percent were female (the baseline was 51 percent, and the original target of 53 percent was **achieved**).
- The completed infrastructure was expected to allow the cities to increase their roles in commercialization of agriculture products and strengthen their local economies in the future. These claims were not supported by data.

Overall, the efficacy of the project to achieve this objective is rated **Substantial**. All target outcome indicators were achieved. The economic infrastructure and roads were built and beneficiaries were provided access. The Bank team confirmed that the project estimated some of the economic and social impacts of the completed projects although not all were captured in the beneficiary surveys (see Section 5 Efficiency).

Rating
Substantial

OBJECTIVE 3
Objective
To provide immediate and effective response to an eligible crisis or emergency.

Rationale

Theory of Change (TOC). This component was to provide immediate and effective response to an eligible crisis or emergency. According to the ICR, this component (Contingent Emergency Response Component or CERC) was not triggered (ICR, paragraph 7).

INPUTS: The inputs included identifying a positive list of eligible activities to be financed, a declaration of the emergency and a Manual of Operations to guide the disbursement of funds should CERC be triggered.

OUTPTUS: The outputs were to include the activities to be financed by CERC.

OUTCOMES: If CERC were triggered, this was the number of beneficiaries benefitting from emergency response and recovery activities. **CERC was not triggered.**

Rating
Not Rated/Not Applicable

OVERALL EFFICACY
Rationale
The efficacy of the project to achieve the first objective of mobility is rated modest because the outcome targets were almost achieved, however, there was a lack of data to support some of the reported results. The efficacy of the project to achieve the second objective of access is rated substantial with moderate shortcomings. All the outcome target indicators were achieved or exceeded but there was also a lack of indicators that would have better reflected the efficacy of the project to achieve this objective. The efficacy of the project to achieve the third objective is not rated because the activities to support this objective was not triggered. Overall efficacy of the project to achieve its objectives is rated Substantial with moderate shortcomings.

Overall Efficacy Rating
Substantial

5. Efficiency
Economic and Financial Efficiency: At appraisal, an economic benefit cost analysis used the Highway Development and Management for Roads Economic Decision (RED) Model. The Bank team clarified that the benefits were estimated and included the following: (i) time and cost savings due to improved connectivity and mobility; (ii) temporary and permanent jobs generated; (iii) lowered cost of agricultural produce in urban areas due to improved connections to the agricultural hinterland; (iv) reduced losses in transporting agricultural produce; (v) increased economic activities and job creation along the rehabilitated roads; (vi) improved service levels; (vii) improved access to urban services; (viii) improved local government revenues; and (ix) more efficient and effective urban planning and management in target cities. During appraisal, the Economic Internal Rate of

Return (EIRR) was estimated at 36 percent for the 78 km road with a Net Present Value (NPV) of US$45.4 million discounted at 12 percent. Financial analysis for the planned revenue-generating investments were to be carried out during the implementation.

At closing, the economic analysis used the same RED method at appraisal. However, with COVID19 and security constraints, onsite data collection was not carried out to have a comparable analysis using the method at appraisal, e.g., vehicle counting. The Bank team clarified that they used other methods to estimate comparable data and that some, not all of the benefits identified at appraisal were monitored through the beneficiary survey conducted at closing. Only the ex-ante financial analysis was carried out by calculating the benefits accruing from the rehabilitation of 78 km of RN29 Manga-Zabré inter-urban road. The project did not carry out an ex-ante financial analyses of the revenue-generating investments. None of the benefits identified ex-ante (beside the temporary and permanent jobs created and the increased economic activities and jobs created along the rehabilitated roads) were monitored. The RED Model was re-run and was adjusted for the travel time saved. Land appreciation next to upgraded urban roads was added using a benefit transfer to a hedonic method. A hedonic method uses the incremental cost of land associated with urban road improvement. The improvement reflects the economic opportunities derived from factors associated with time, services, access, dust, dirt, vector-borne diseases, etc. perceived by economic agents after enjoying paved and flood-proofed roads (ICR, Annex 4, paragraph 2). Additional income generated by labor-intensive work used the multiplier effect. At closing, using a discount rate of 12 percent, the same 78 km reached an EIRR of 22 percent with an NPV of US$26.4 million equivalent (FCFA15.6 billion).

Operational and Administrative Efficiency: The project design was simple, but the organizational arrangement was complex. The 2014 *coup d'état* dissolved the councils and affected the operations since local governments were part of the implementation arrangement. Complex institutional arrangements, lack of coordination among key stakeholders and delays in the recruitment of key staff led to project delays. For example, a month before the original deadline, construction of urban infrastructures had not yet begun, and most Component C activities were not ready for implementation (see Section 8 Assessment of Bank Performance below). An unqualified coordinator during the first three years of implementation led to low quality of reports, weak coordination, poor reporting; and implementation delays. A qualified coordinator was subsequently appointed but with insufficient time to simultaneously supervise several projects. Risks and mitigating measures were not sufficient to overcome operational and administrative inefficiencies. Shortcomings in the design and implementation of the M&E system further reduced project efficiency (see Section 9 M&E Design and Implementation below). Secondary activities and associated funds were cancelled further reducing operational efficiency. Low capacity and poor compliance with environmental and social (E&S) safeguards led to delays and cancelled activities that could not be completed on time. The PIU had high turnover in the case of the M&E specialist and hired the social specialist three years after project start, taking up his duties in June 2020.These recruitments affected project efficiency. Some of the activities could not be completed in time and were transferred to other Bank-funded projects.

Overall, project efficiency is rated **Modest**. The team estimated substantial economic efficiency of the project based on assumptions and not actual data, and also there was operational inefficiencies. Complex institutional arrangements, lack of coordination between key stakeholders and delays in the recruitment of key staff also led to difficulties in project implementation

Efficiency Rating

Modest

a. If available, enter the Economic Rate of Return (ERR) and/or Financial Rate of Return (FRR) at appraisal and the re-estimated value at evaluation:

	Rate Available?	Point value (%)	*Coverage/Scope (%)
Appraisal	✓	36.00	56.00 ☐ Not Applicable
ICR Estimate	✓	22.00	53.00 ☐ Not Applicable

* Refers to percent of total project cost for which ERR/FRR was calculated.

6. Outcome

The relevance of objectives is rated High. The efficacy of the project to achieve the first objective is rated Modest while the efficacy of the project to achieve the second objective is rated Substantial with moderate shortcomings. The efficacy of the project to achieve the third objective is not rated. The overall efficacy of the project to achieve its objectives is rated Substantial with moderate shortcomings. Efficiency is rated Modest. Outcome is therefore rated **Moderately Satisfactory**.

a. Outcome Rating

Moderately Satisfactory

7. Risk to Development Outcome

The following pose risks to the development outcome of the project:

- **Weak capacity and lack of ownership by the municipalities** pose a substantial risk to sustain the completed urban infrastructure investments. Municipalities do not have the resources or do not consider themselves responsible for maintaining the infrastructure delivered. Continuing training and reform of local government decentralization, accompanied by reforms in resource generation and allocation may mitigate this risk.
- **Insufficient budgets for operations and maintenance (O&M)** also pose a substantial risk to sustain the completed urban infrastructure investments. This risk may be mitigated by the generation of revenue through user fees and taxes on economic activity. Municipalities signed an agreement with the Permanent Secretariat of the Transport Sector Project (*Secrétariat Permanent du Programme Sectoriel de Transport* or SP/PST) committing to introduce management methods to collect revenues to sustain the use of the infrastructure. Municipalities also received short training sessions on infrastructure management, governance and financing. However, the centralized implementation of the project did not strengthen local government O&M management capacity for the infrastructure. The Special Fund for Roads (*Fonds Spécial Routier du Burkina*, or FSR-B) budget allocated to the Ministry of Transportation (MOT) was insufficient to cover the current and future needs of the sector. The toll revenues from the two newly built stations were to help fund road

maintenance and contribute to the sustainability of this infrastructure. But the staff and equipment for the toll stations were not yet in place. The minimum traffic threshold necessary to be financially viable has not been reached but is anticipated after the completion of 24 km of road between Zabré and the border with Ghana, under the current Bank-financed Lomé-Ouagadougou-Niamey Economic Corridor project (P168386).

- **Technical risks.** In this project, local staff received training to establish zoning designations on proprietary software such as ArcGIS. Municipalities may have difficulty in assuming the high costs of license renewals and may lead to difficulties in updating the software. To mitigate this risk, local governments may be encouraged to use open-source software such as QGIS to limit dependence on proprietary software (ICR, paragraph 79).
- **Premature road deterioration.** There are currently no other Bank-funded projects that may support the maintenance of the road network in Burkina Faso. The lack of support to implement axle load limits presents a risk of early road degradation. To prevent premature road deterioration, the axle load control station financed by the project was expected to help mitigate axle overload and inadequate behavior of truck drivers. There is an international agreement that authorized axle load in West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU) countries. However, its application is controversial and subject to tension with truckers who are opposed to it due to the loss of revenue associated with compliance. Failure to enforce this law presents a significant risk of premature road deterioration. For opponents to adhere to these controls, better regulation of the truckers' working conditions may contribute to resolve the root cause of their opposition (ICR, paragraph 78).

8. Assessment of Bank Performance

a. Quality-at-Entry

The project was strategically aligned with the government's priorities in its Poverty Reduction Strategy (*Stratégie de Croissance Accélérée et de Développement Durable or* SCADD) to rehabilitate roads (PAD, paragraph 39). This project was also highly relevant to the Bank's own priorities in the country, citing this project to achieve Objective 1.3: Improve connectivity for better access to markets, to achieve Focus Area 1 Accelerate sustainable private sector led-growth for job creation. Lessons from prior similar projects in the country and in the region informed project design. These included sustained long-term engagement in the sector since 2003 (see Section 3 Relevance of Objectives above); regularly maintaining road systems by using toll road revenues; including a weighing station to address the impact of axle overload on its roads.

The Bank team outlined the institutional and financing arrangements for infrastructure investments to avoid breakdown and inoperability of investments financed by the Bank and completed in 2005. Completed projects, such as the sanitary landfill in Bobo-Dioulasso and a drainage canal in Ouagadougou, were not formally turned over to the local governments nor did they have financial means for its operations and maintenance (O&M). Design included beneficiary participation in selecting, designing, and prioritizing investments with corresponding institutional arrangements and O&M funding.

The Bank team identified substantial political and governance risks because Burkina Faso was exposed to Fragility, Conflict, and Violence (FCV). Mitigating measures were adequately identified for capacity and

fiduciary risks but proved insufficient at implementation (see below). For example, support from the experienced Permanent Secretariat of the Transport Sector Project (*Secrétariat Permanent du Programme Sectoriel de Transport*) and the early hiring of a technical assistant were to mitigate the lack of capacity of the implementing agency, the Ministry of Urban and Housing (MUH). Service and timed standards were to be implemented. The government committed to adopt incentives for technical project focal points. The project was to be coordinated with other donors - the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC), the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC), and the African Development Bank (ADB) - with ongoing activities in the country. Donor coordination was evident in efforts by the task team to work closely with the Bank-financed Burkina Faso Local Government Support Project (P120517) in building local government capacity to support decentralization (ICR, footnote 47). The Bank team confirmed strong donor coordination, particularly with the SDC because both teams were working on inter-related projects. The Bank team deemed the project implementation ready based on a list of pre-selected investments from the government investment plans to be confirmed by local officials after the elections scheduled for January 31, 2016. Additional preparations were to be completed during implementation. Most Component C activities proved to be not ready for implementation (ICR, paragraph 82). The project proved not ready for implementation because the election of local officials was postponed, delaying implementation. Local elections were initially scheduled for January 31, 2016. They were postponed to May 22, 2016, following a terrorist attack on January 15, 2016, in Ouagadougou (ICR, footnote 48).

Overall, the Bank performance at entry is rated **Moderately Satisfactory**. The project was highly relevant to both the country plans and the Bank's strategy. Design was informed by previous engagement in the sector and in the country. However, not all risks were captured, and mitigating measures proved inadequate to address capacity risks. The results framework also lacked adequate indicators to capture the achievement of the project objectives (see Section 9 M&E below).

Quality-at-Entry Rating
Moderately Satisfactory

b. Quality of supervision
The Task Team conducted 11 supervision missions over the six-year project period. High turnover in TTLs caused some delays in supervision support. Overlaps in TTLs and some team members were present from the start to help continuity. Two co-TTLs initiated project preparation and early implementation. A third TTL took over in 2018. Two new co-TTLs assumed the role in 2019 with one based in the field to expedite timely follow-up. Even with some members and a co-TTL in Ouagadougou, a number of decisions were delayed (e.g., reporting and issuing No Objection notices). No supervision missions were conducted between February 2020 and May 2021 because of the COVID 19 pandemic, outside the control of the Bank and the government. A one-day technical mission was conducted in June 2020. The Bank's Country Management Unit (CMU) provided additional support.

The Bank team included a legal covenant to hire a technical assistant for the MUH at project startup. However, the initially appointed unqualified coordinator hampered the Project Implementation Unit (PIU) from its leadership role. The MUH technical assistant was hired at the end of the third year of implementation (ICR, paragraph 73). Outside of the control of the Bank and the government was the coup in Ouagadougou that delayed local elections and caused further delays in completing design for the local

infrastructure investments. The Bank team proposed corrective measures to address the initial poor performance of the RN29 civil works contractor and overall implementation progress by extending the project period, but the initial implementation delays cascaded to cancelled activities that could not be completed by the time the project closed. Accompanying funds were cancelled (ICR, paragraph 72, see Section 5 Efficiency above). Some activities were transferred to other Bank-funded projects for completion. The Bank team did not use the restructurings to adjust the targets and indicators of the results framework.

Overall, the Bank performance at supervision is rated **Moderately Satisfactory**. The Bank team provided corrective measures to address capacity shortcomings but not all were taken up by the implementing agency. The coup and the impact of the travel restrictions due to the pandemic were outside the team's controls but the restructurings were not used effectively to make changes to the results framework.

Overall, with both entry and supervision rated Moderately Satisfactory, the quality of overall Bank supervision is rated **Moderately Satisfactory**.

Quality of Supervision Rating
Moderately Satisfactory

Overall Bank Performance Rating
Moderately Satisfactory

9. M&E Design, Implementation, & Utilization

a. M&E Design
The M&E system was built on the existing mechanisms used by the Permanent Secretariat of the Transport Sector Project (*Secrétariat Permanent du Programme Sectoriel de Transport* or SP/PST). The SP/PST M&E specialist, with the focal points, was to monitor, evaluate, and consolidate data. Small surveys were to be conducted. Baseline data was to be established before project start. Impact assessments were to be conducted for the mid-term review (MTR) and at closing. Surveys were planned to capture data on permanent employment generated, reduced losses of agricultural production, and beneficiary satisfaction. Technical audits were to verify the quality and cost-efficiency of the infrastructure investments. Data and reports were to be widely shared. The Bank team were to undertake M&E training.

The objectives were simply stated. The results framework provided the causal link between the activities and outputs that would lead to outcomes. The intermediate results indicators were specific, measurable, achievable, time bound and relevant. However, the outcome indicators were at the output not outcome level and did not include development impact of the project on the lives and livelihoods of beneficiaries. Reduced risk of accidental death and injuries to humans and livestock, increase in the value of traded agricultural products, access to other factors of production, and increase in farmers' incomes were not included as outcome indicators. Some targets were overly ambitious. For example, an outcome target indicator estimated that vehicles would travel an average of 100 km per hour on open road and 50 km per hour in built-up areas to reduce travel time between Manga and Zabré by 60 minutes. This target did not anticipate that residents along built up areas would request safety measures (speed bumps). The outcome

target was therefore not achieved. In another example, 262 of a target of 300 shops along the rehabilitated roads (intermediate indicator 2.3) did not consider a period that businesses required to set up before taking advantage of the improved roads (ICR, paragraph 37).

b. M&E Implementation

The Ministry of Infrastructure (MI) implemented the M&E system. A high turnover rate of M&E specialists (6 throughout the life of the project) led to ineffective attention to M&E implementation. This meant unnoticed changes or inconsistencies in the results framework (e.g., target of 250,000 person-days of employment created instead of the original 310,000 in the PAD) or calculation methodologies. For example, how the outcome indicator measuring direct project beneficiaries was calculated was not recorded at appraisal (ICR, paragraph 64). Another target indicator proved to be ambitious (reduced travel time) and was not achieved. The lack of clear link between an intermediate indicator (number of economic and other infrastructures constructed) to project component led to lowering the target from 8 to 7 infrastructures during implementation. Weaknesses in M&E design, specifying indicators that would better capture the results of the project on the lives and livelihoods of beneficiaries, were not addressed at implementation. The ICR did not report if the planned baselines were undertaken. The Bank team indicated that no baselines were taken. According to the ICR, the PIU did not carry out a census (baseline) of beneficiaries (Annex 1). COVID-19 and security constraints did not allow any data to be collected for the benefit-cost analysis, e.g., vehicle counting. Poor involvement of beneficiaries at design stage was evident in the unanticipated inclusion of safety measures (speed bumps) along high traffic areas of improved roads that eventually led to not achieving the original target for reducing travel time.

A beneficiary satisfaction survey was conducted in March 2022, but did not capture all the required data to measure project results. The Bank team clarified that the survey used random sampling of 1,350 individuals from 813 beneficiary households. They also used 62 semi-structured interviews with 11 different types of beneficiaries (according to activities) and 8 focus groups from 4 different types of beneficiaries. 97 percent of respondents confirmed that the investments met their needs. The rest were disappointed with the lack of gutters, early deterioration of some asphalted areas, and the absence of cycle lanes. The ICR reported on data collected for jobs created (in person days) but not data for agricultural losses reduced.

c. M&E Utilization

M&E data was mostly used to monitor contractor performance of the Manga-Zabré road construction (component A). Contractor performance benefited from appropriate corrective measures informed by the M&E data, to complete the civil works on time. Components B and C, however, were poorly monitored. The implementing agency did not effectively use M&E data to formulate measures that would address implementation challenges. Some activities were cancelled because these would not be completed before the project closed. In addition, both the target values and the indicators in the results framework, were insufficiently used to guide the project progress to achieve the objectives. Some targets were changed, some methodologies were inconsistent, some indicators were not associated with the inputs (see Section 4 Efficacy above). M&E data was not effectively used to provide evidence of project outcomes, only the application of inputs and achievements of outputs. Implementation was delayed.

Some M&E data, in particular from the beneficiary survey, provided design considerations in future road projects, e.g., cycle lanes and roadside gutters.

The overall quality of M&E is rated **Modest**. Not all outcome indicators were captured in the results framework. Not all targets were adequately matched to the activities. Corrective measures were informed by the use of M&E data to complete component A. The other two components lacked effective use of M&E data to inform implementation. The M&E system had shortcomings in implementation and utilization.

M&E Quality Rating

Modest

10. Other Issues

a. Safeguards

Environmental safeguards: The project was rated Category B and triggered two environmental policies: Environmental Assessment (OP/BP 4.01), and Physical Cultural Resources (OP/BP 4.11). The project prepared an Environmental and Social Management Framework (ESMF) and a Physical Cultural Resources Management Framework (PCRMF). Design details were unknown at appraisal. The ESMF was designed to serve as a guide for developing Environmental and Social Impact Assessments (ESIAs) and Environmental and Social Management Plans (ESMPs) after project sites were selected. Companies responsible for building the urban facilities were recruited before the social and environmental studies were carried out. Environmental and social (E&S) clauses were not included in the contracts (see below, Procurement), resulting in non-compliance with several E&S aspects (ICR, paragraph 81). Poor compliance with E&S safeguards led to significant delays and the cancellation of some activities that could not be completed on time (ICR, paragraph 53). The quarterly Safeguard Monitoring Report was often late, of modest quality, and the PIU did not regularly follow up on the recommendations. Compliance with the E&S safeguards was rated Moderately Unsatisfactory from June to November 2019 and February 2020 to May 2021 or almost a third of the project period (ICR, paragraph 68).

Social safeguards. The project triggered Involuntary Resettlement (OP/BP 4.12). A Resettlement Policy Framework (RPF) was prepared. A social safeguard specialist was recruited in June 2020, four years into implementation. This absence contributed to implementation delays of the Resettlement Action Plans (RAPs) and construction work (see Section 12 Lessons below). At MTR, there was no final RAP. Some RAPs were still not finalized as the project was closing (December 2021). These delays led to the cancellation of activities that could not be completed on time.

With regard to the Grievance Redress Mechanism (GRM), complaints on working conditions were not adequately managed. By the time of the MTR, the GRM only applied to the RN29 activity. Until 3 months prior to project closure, the GRM was limited to civil work sites that were associated with an RAP. No mechanism existed to manage potential complaints regarding the substantial risk of gender-based violence (GVB) and sexual exploitation, abuse and sexual harassment (SEA/SH). According to the 2022 beneficiary survey, only 2.7% were aware of the GRM mechanism while 84 percent were not aware, and 12.5 percent not sure.

Field missions noted several shortcomings in E&S monitoring of worksites. For example, months after civil works started on the Manga-Zabré, some workers had no copy of their contract, not signed the code of conduct, or were sensitized to safety, GBV, sexually transmitted infections (STIs) or the GRM. In September 2021, a few months before the project was to close, the Bank's mission noted absence of (i) safeguard personnel in some companies, (ii) Occupational Health and Safety (OH&S) measures; (iii) inadequate and/or nonexistent protective equipment for site personnel, (iv) poor management of access to sites, (v) unsanitary workplaces, (vi) unsecured open pits, and (vii) a failure to monitor and implement the ESMP. The project reinforced road signs and barriers to strengthen safety on site after a fatal accident on a portion of the RN29 that was closed during construction. The police reported that non-compliance with speed requirements and refusal to use the detour caused the accident. The quarterly Safeguard Monitoring Report was often late, of modest quality, and the PIU did not regularly follow up on the recommendations of previous missions.

b. Fiduciary Compliance

Financial Management (FM): At project closing, FM was rated moderately unsatisfactory, and the financial risk was deemed substantial due to several shortcomings. Over US$5.3 million equivalent remained outstanding (payable) two months after the contract was completed prior to project closure. The project bank accounts had about CFA francs 9 million to meet eligible invoices worth CFA francs 3.9 billion. This reflected poor cash flow management, and delayed payment to suppliers. From January 24 to May 14, 2022, disbursements across the country portfolio were suspended. In 2022. IDA funds (about US$ 21,000 equivalent) were used to pay for expenses payable by counterpart funds. Other deficiencies included missing documentation for some payment records, the absence of arrangements for transferring project assets to the government, and a discrepancy of approximately US$ 445,000 between the accounting position and the fixed asset register. There is no information in the ICR how these were satisfactorily resolved.FM demonstrated certain strengths such as the regular submission of reports and reimbursement requests. Financial management deficiencies included long delays in making checks available, recurring check cancellations, and delays between the date of invoice transmission and check remittance (ICR, paragraph 70).

Procurement: Shortcomings in procurement included delays in the contracting process due to multiple actors involved in the procurement, delays in the submission of TORs to the Bank, delays by the Bank in issuing No Objections, and lack of procurement staff to monitor a large number of contracts. A high cancellation rate of programmed activities also reflected shortcomings in the programming and maturation of activities. Delays in updating contracts through the STEP tool were regularly noted. Restructuring improved the procurement process and strengthened the contracts management. A change in implementing agencies and the adoption of an action plan advanced the closing date December 2021. However, not all activities could be completed by that time because the political situation had deteriorated. The project closing date was extended by three months. Despite this extension, some of the activities remained incomplete and were transferred to other Bank-funded projects (ICR, paragraph 60). In case of low capacity of the executing agencies or complex arrangements, the project also demonstrated that entrusting construction work to a specialized executing agency can expedite implementation. Specifically, the absence of an external approving entity results in fast-track procurement procedures that can significantly reduce procurement time (typically from 6-12 months to 2-3 months).

c. Unintended impacts (Positive or Negative)

There were no other unintended impacts reported by the ICR.

d. Other

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11. Ratings

Ratings	ICR	IEG	Reason for Disagreements/Comment
Outcome	Moderately Satisfactory	Moderately Satisfactory	
Bank Performance	Moderately Satisfactory	Moderately Satisfactory	
Quality of M&E	Modest	Modest	
Quality of ICR	---	Substantial	

12. Lessons

The operations identified **four** lessons (ICR, paragraphs 80-83). These are presented below with slight editing.

- **Covenants in legal agreements may be useful in synchronizing all components that would support readiness to implement.** In this project, the simplified project design focused on activities that were ready to be implemented. Counterpart financing was secured by a covenant in the financing agreement. This completed supporting studies for activities under the first component. However, a covenant or agreement with the local governments similar to how counterpart financing was secured for preparatory studies was not used. As a result of these shortcomings, targets were underachieved, and some activities were cancelled because these could not be completed on time or transferred to other Bank-financed projects in the country for completion. Future similar projects may consider covenants in legal agreements to synchronize all components' readiness to implement.
- **Early planning of safeguards may help identify risks that may be mitigated by including corrective measures in contracts.** In this project, contractors were hired before the environmental and social (E&S) safeguards studies were completed. Implementation revealed several E&S non-compliance. Good practice calls for identifying safeguards risks, proposing mitigation measures and instruments following the preparation of technical studies before firms are contracted E&S clauses may then be included such as stipulating the timely recruitment of safeguards specialists to monitor compliance. In this project, the social safeguard specialist was absent for four years. This contributed to delays in implementing the RAPs and construction work. An early assessment of Gender-Based Violence (GBV) risks may also outline an implementable GRM applicable to all activities.

- **Including periodic minimum performance standards/measures in construction contracts may be useful incentives in an FCV environment.** In this project, corrective measures in the first three years of the project (or halfway through project period) did not improve implementation. One road had a 46 percent completion rate one month away from the initial deadline, investment contracts under component B had not started, and component C activities were not ready for implementation. The task team recognized the institutional instability within an FCV context brought by a large influx of internally displaced persons and the constant demand to restore peace and security. Action plans were adopted to expedite project implementation by including clauses in construction contracts requiring a company to reach a minimum monthly progress rate under penalty of (recoverable) deductions. Bonuses rewarded exceeding performance targets. As a result, construction contracts met revised targets. A change in implementing agencies also facilitated implementation. Future operations in the country may benefit from adopting a similar clause in construction contracts.
- **Multi sector projects may require separate executing agencies to foster ownership of activities implemented by each agency.** In this project, the Ministry of Infrastructure was the home of a single Project Implementation Unit (PIU) with the Ministry of Transport (MOT) and the Ministry of Urban Planning and Housing (MUH) as members. This implementation arrangement did not encourage ownership by the line agencies of their respective activities (see Section 5 Efficiency above). One PIU in each line Ministry may encourage ownership and foster leadership in each executing agency. A coordinator devoted to the project in each PIU may be hired using performance-based contracts. Including performance measures in personnel contracts (e.g., standards to be met for completing specific tasks (preparing TORs, awarding contracts, recruiting staff, reporting to donors, addressing grievances), including regular coordination with key stakeholders and rating the quality of reports) may address challenges objectively based on evidence. Future operations may hire a technical coordinator exclusively committed to the project under the supervision of a strategic coordinator overseeing all activities to increase responsiveness and leadership.

13. Assessment Recommended?

No

14. Comments on Quality of ICR

The ICR was consistent with the guidelines and provided a picture of the operation with some shortcomings, except for rating the overall outcome. The ratings for relevance of objective, efficacy, and efficiency would have led to a Satisfactory rating of the outcome according to the guidelines but was reported as Moderately Satisfactory. The evidence of the outputs were strong, but outcome level data was weak and some results were not supported by evidence but by anecdotes. The project suffered from a high turnover of M&E staffing, which brought into question the credibility of the evidence offered to support outcomes. This shortcoming was addressed by useful annexes (Annexes 4, 5, and 6). Salient points were linked to the findings although there was very little information from the actual surveys. The Bank team confirmed that the reported outcomes were

not extracted from the beneficiary survey. The report was candid about administrative and operational inefficiencies. Lessons were based on project experience.

a. Quality of ICR Rating
Substantial