



1. Project Data

Project ID P164762	Project Name Afghanistan Land Administration System	
Country Afghanistan	Practice Area(Lead) Urban, Resilience and Land	
L/C/TF Number(s) IDA-D4470,TF-A9598	Closing Date (Original) 30-Sep-2024	Total Project Cost (USD) 6,189,444.29
Bank Approval Date 25-Apr-2019	Closing Date (Actual) 30-Sep-2024	
	IBRD/IDA (USD)	Grants (USD)
Original Commitment	35,000,000.00	10,000,000.00
Revised Commitment	19,703,824.65	1,841,495.06
Actual	6,189,444.29	1,770,181.06

Prepared by Maria Shkaratan	Reviewed by Christopher David Nelson	ICR Review Coordinator Kavita Mathur	Group IEGSD (Unit 4)
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2. Project Objectives and Components

a. Objectives

The Project Development Objective (PDO) is (a) to support the development of the Afghanistan land administration system; and (b) to provide the population in selected areas with improved land registration services, including issuance of Titles and Occupancy Certificates.

The PDO was not revised.



For the purposes of this ICR review, the objective will be assessed as follows:

PDO1: to support the development of the Afghanistan land administration system; and

PDO2: to provide the population in selected areas with improved land registration services, including issuance of Titles and Occupancy Certificates.

b. Were the project objectives/key associated outcome targets revised during implementation?

Yes

Did the Board approve the revised objectives/key associated outcome targets?

Yes

Date of Board Approval

25-Jun-2020

c. Will a split evaluation be undertaken?

Yes

d. Components

1. Original components:

Component 1 – Land Policy and Institutional Strengthening (cost at appraisal: US\$ 5.3 million; actual cost: US\$ 0.08 million). The component was to help close gaps and further develop the policy, legal and institutional framework for land administration while building technical, institutional and citizen engagement and communication capacities. Component 1 comprised the following subcomponents:

- 1.1 Strengthening the Land Policy, Regulatory and Institutional Framework of the Ministry of Urban Development and Land (MUDL): support for policy, regulations, and human resources strategy.
- 1.2 Institutional and Technical Capacity Building: geo-spatial and training equipment; training and knowledge exchange; development of professional requirements and certifications.
- 1.3 Public Awareness Raising, Communication and Citizen Engagement: grievance redress mechanism (GRM), awareness raising, communication.

Component 2 – Developing Technological Capacity, Information and Systems for Land Administration (cost at appraisal: US\$26.3 million; actual cost: US\$ 0.84 million). The component is to support creation of a modern land administration system in Afghanistan: to develop a cadastre-based system capable of issuing and certifying map-based titling, dispute resolution, and recording and maintaining changes, which will lead to a State-guaranteed land registration system. Component 2 included the following subcomponents:

- 2.1 Developing Geo-Information Infrastructure: provision of technology and training.
- 2.2 Establishing a Land Information System (LIS): delivery of information technology support and equipment.



- 2.3 Supporting Cadastral Surveying and Land Registration in Selected Areas: building information systems, institutional development, provision of equipment and training, construction of facilities.
- 2.4 Supporting Issuance of Occupancy Certificates (OCs) in Selected Areas: institutional strengthening, creating information systems.

Component 3 – Project Management, Monitoring and Evaluation (cost at appraisal: US\$ 3.4 million; actual cost: US\$ 1.42 million). The objective of this component was to ensure adequate capacity for project implementation and oversight, monitoring and evaluation, compliance with fiduciary requirements and social and environmental safeguards, as well as adequate project risk monitoring and inter-institutional coordination.

2. Changes in components during implementation:

The components stayed the same during implementation.

In September 2020, the Bank approved the government's request to cancel and reallocate to COVID-19 response a part of the project funds in the amount of US\$10.0 million. The project's scope was reduced, and some activities were scaled down. The main impact was on land surveying and registration activities, which initially covered Kabul and Herat but now only covered Kabul, with a reduced scope. In addition, the scope of capacity building and knowledge exchange was reduced.

e. Comments on Project Cost, Financing, Borrower Contribution, and Dates

Project Cost: The actual project cost was US\$2.34 million, compared to the appraisal estimate of US\$35 million.

Project Financing: The project was financed by an International Development Association (IDA) credit (US\$25.0 million at appraisal and US\$1.67 million at closure) and an Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund (ARTF) Grant (US\$ 10 million at appraisal and US\$0.67 million at closure).

Borrower/Recipient contribution: There was no Borrower contribution.

Changes in project financing due to restructuring:

- The project underwent one restructuring, in September 2020 when the amount of US\$10 from the project funds was cancelled and reallocated for the COVID-19 response, at the government's request. The amount disbursed at that time was US\$2 million or six percent of the original project funds.
- Reallocation of financing across components: in September 2020, the World Bank canceled the amount of US\$10.0 million from the project based on the government's request to reallocate those funds for the COVID-19 response. According to the ARTF and IDA legal agreements, the project was financed on a pro-rata basis: 71.4 percent by IDA and 28.6 percent by ARTF. Therefore, the canceled amount was proportionally distributed as follows: US\$ 7.14 million from the IDA Grant and US\$ 2.86 million from the ARTF Grant. There was a slight change in component financing as a share of total financing: the share of Component 1 financing decreased from 15 percent of the total at appraisal to seven percent of the total after the cancellation; the share of Component 2 financing



increased from 75 percent of the total to 83 percent of the total; and the share of Component 3 financing stayed at 10 percent of the total.

Project Dates: The project was approved on April 25, 2019 and became effective on May 13, 2019. The September 2020 restructuring did not involve an extension of closing date. The mid-term review (MTR), planned for 2022, was not conducted because the project was suspended prior to that. The original closing date was September 30, 2024. Due to the collapse of the government in August 2021 and the following political turmoil, the WBG's country portfolio, including the project, was suspended on February 17, 2022 and then phased out.

Split rating justification. Project's efficacy will be evaluated using split rating because the September 2020 restructuring involved a partial cancellation of the project's funding, reducing the project's scope. Further, it was not clear if the reduction of the scope was commensurate with the lower commitment size. Also, the restructuring affected the outcome targets under Objective 2. Therefore, this review will separately assess efficacy for the Original and Revised projects under Objective 2, but not under Objective 1.

3. Relevance of Objectives

Rationale

Country context: At project approval, Afghanistan was experiencing economic stagnation and deterioration, an increasing conflict, and deepening internal political fragmentation. Average annual GDP growth fell to 2.5 percent between 2015-2020, below the rate of population increase. The impact of COVID-19 was significant and led to a two-percent economic contraction and a sharp increase in poverty. An estimated 60-70 percent of the population lived in poverty at the end of 2020. The collapse of the government in August 2021 triggered further economic crisis and a withdrawal of most international aid.

Relevance to the national priorities at approval: The PDO was relevant to the country conditions and well-aligned with national priorities. Weaknesses in Afghanistan's land governance were a major source of conflict and poverty due to inequitable land distribution, land related conflict, and recurrent land-grabbing. Rapid urban growth was increasing land tenure insecurity in urban areas, where 61 percent of the housing stock was informal. Stronger property rights, a better land administration system, and a modern comprehensive land information system would have substantial social and economic impact. The project was aligned with the government's Institutional Development Program for Land Administration (IDPL), which was to establish transparent land services through legal, policy and institutional strengthening.

Relevance to the WBG's assistance Strategies at approval: The PDO was consistent with the FY2017-2020 Country Partnership Framework (CPF) for Afghanistan, which had three pillars: (i) building strong and accountable institutions; (ii) supporting inclusive growth; and (iii) expanding and deepening social inclusion. Pillars (i) and (ii) had an emphasis on improving land management. Transparent land administration would benefit the population by promoting the development of land markets, thus contributing to the government goals of state building and self-reliance.

The PDO remained relevant to the national priorities and the WBG's Assistance strategies until the takeover in August 2021. The IDPL's medium- and long-term objectives stressed the strengthening of land governance and the development of a land administration system in Afghanistan. The Performance and



Learning Review, which extended the FY2017-2020 CPF to FY22, emphasized the importance of land governance for economic growth.

The PDO did not remain relevant at closing due to the government takeover in August 2021 and the following political turmoil and significant changes in the support provided to the country by the international community. On February 17, 2022, the WBG's country portfolio was suspended and then phased out. Two weeks later, the World Bank's Board endorsed the Afghanistan's Approach Paper 2.0, which prioritized protecting the vulnerable, preserving human capital and key institutions, reducing the need for future humanitarian assistance, and improving gender equality through Recipient Executed grants, decided by the ARTF, and made off-budget and outside of the involvement of the Interim Taliban Administration (ITA) with United Nations (UN) agencies and potentially international and national non-governmental organizations.

The relevance of objectives is rated **high** due to its full alignment with the country strategy and government priorities at appraisal and up to the suspension of the WBG's country program due to the August 2021 government takeover.

Rating

High

4. Achievement of Objectives (Efficacy)

OBJECTIVE 1

Objective

To support the development of the Afghanistan land administration system.

Rationale

The theory of change (ToC), developed for the PAD, showed a direct, logical causal chain from inputs to outputs. Key technical activities, updates and policy reforms were intended to result in greater awareness of land administration and the associated policy changes that would ensure an operational land registry and the issuance of legal title. The outputs were logically linked to the outcomes, and the ToC showed how the combination of outputs creates an improved system of (i) land administration (through the creation of legal framework, new standards, better government capacity, geoinformation assets, and land information system); and (ii) land registry services, such as issuance of titles and Occupancy Certificates (OCs) (through the creation of survey and registration processes, systematic land registration, and better tenure security of urban population in the targeted informal areas). There is one small limitation: the missing interlinks from specific outputs to outcomes. If the intermediate outcomes were presented in a separate column, it would be easier to establish those links.

Note regarding the Original and Revised projects: The revisions of the outcome targets made at restructuring affected only two outcome targets under Objective 2; they did not affect any of the outcome



targets under Objective 1. Therefore, this review will separately assess efficacy for the Original and Revised projects under Objective 2, but not under Objective 1.

Outputs

By the time of actual project closure, none of the outputs under Objective 1 were achieved, but the progress made was adequate considering expected project closure date. This relates to the following intermediate results indicators (IRIs):

1. One key law for land administration was drafted and went through the consultation process (the target was three);
2. Two curricula and training modules for land administration were designed (the target was four); and
3. Eighty-one percent of grievances related to the project were resolved within standards stipulated in GRM procedures (against 90 percent targeted).

The other two IRIs under Objective 1 were not achieved yet: the *Regulation for Land Dispute Resolution* was not approved (the target was to approve it by project closure) and *Strategic HR Plan* was not adopted (the target was to adopt it by project closure).

Outcomes

1. The Land Information System (LIS) was expected to be fully developed and operational by project closure and become available for usage both centrally and in project locations (PDO 1). This was not achieved by actual project closure. By the end of 2021, it was expected that 10 percent of the target would be reached, which did not happen at the time of project suspension in August 2021. However, the progress made by that time shows that the project was on track to reaching this outcome by the planned closure: the LIS design was finalized, 71 percent of the targeted parcels were completed, all land use maps were finalized, and a land price market database was prepared for 200 districts.

2. Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) and uniform service standards for the Deputy Land Ministry/MUDL were expected to be adopted and implemented through everyday operations (PDO2). This was not achieved by actual project closure. There was no target for 2021, therefore it is not possible to assess if the progress made by the time of the project suspension in August 2021 was adequate. However, the ICR reports that “good progress was made on this indicator, with several procedures completed, including those for cadastral surveying and geodetic services” (ICR, page 14).

Overall, under the original project, Objective 1, neither the expected outcomes, nor the expected outputs were achieved by actual project closure. Post-closure, the expectation was that some of the progress made by the project would be halted or lost (ICR, page 15).

Rating
Negligible



OBJECTIVE 1 REVISION 1

Revised Objective

To support the development of the Afghanistan land administration system.

Revised Rationale

No changes were made to this objective.

Revised Rating

Negligible

OBJECTIVE 2

Objective

To provide the population in selected areas with improved land registration services, including issuance of Titles and Occupancy Certificates.

Rationale

Please see the discussion of the ToC under objective 1.

Outputs

1. One zonal land registration office was established, compared to the target of six offices;
2. No parcels were covered by the cadastral survey, while the original target was 100,000 parcels; and
3. Training on women's land rights and the OC program was provided to 6,435 women (this was not a RF indicator, and no target had been established for it).

Outcomes:

OCs were expected to be issued to households based on systematic land registration. The target was not achieved: the number of benefiting households was 3,963 at actual project closure, compared to the original target of 220,000 households by planned project closure and 75,000 households by the end of 2021. The gender-based target was not achieved either: the number of women receiving the OCs (alone or jointly) by actual project closure was 3,150, as compared to the original target of 105,000 by planned project closure and of 52,500 by the end of 2021.

Overall, under the original project Objective 2, neither the expected outcomes, nor the expected outputs were achieved by actual project closure. Post-closure, there was a risk that some of the benefits obtained due to the project would be lost: and the OCs issued to women could become illegitimate.

Rating

Negligible



OBJECTIVE 2 REVISION 1

Revised Objective

To provide the population in selected areas with improved land registration services, including issuance of Titles and Occupancy Certificates.

Revised Rationale

At restructuring, the objective stayed the same, but two targets under Objective 2 were revised: a PDO target and an IRI target.

The revised PDO target: the target for the number of OCs that were expected to be issued to households based on systematic land registration was reduced from 220,000 to 185,000. This target was not reached: at actual project closure, the number of the issued OCs was 3,963, significantly below the revised number.

The revised IRI: the target for the number of *Parcels Covered by Cadastral Survey in Project's Selected Areas* was reduced from 100,000 at appraisal to 50,000 at restructuring. This target was not reached: none of the parcels was covered by the survey by actual project closure.

Overall, under the Revised project Objective 2, neither the expected outcomes, nor the expected outputs were achieved by actual project closure.

Revised Rating

Negligible

OVERALL EFFICACY

Rationale

For both objectives, the efficacy is Negligible: while an adequate progress was made toward outcome targets that were expected to be reached by the originally planned project closure date, none of those targets was achieved by the actual closure date.

The overall efficacy is negligible.

Overall Efficacy Rating

Negligible

Primary Reason

External shock

OVERALL EFFICACY REVISION 1

Overall Efficacy Revision 1 Rationale



For both objectives, the efficacy is Negligible: while an adequate progress was made toward outcome targets that were expected to be reached by the originally planned project closure date, none of those targets was achieved by the actual closure date.

The overall efficacy is negligible.

Overall Efficacy Revision 1 Rating
Negligible

Primary Reason
External shock

5. Efficiency

At appraisal, no economic analysis for the project was done. The project appraisal was based on the government’s IDPL, which the project supported, and the financial benefits from the fees related to the OC issuance. For IDPL, the Internal Rate of Return (IRR) was significant and amounted to 19.05 percent. Potential financial benefits to the government from the fees charged for issuing OCs under the project would be between US\$5.0 million and US\$7.0 million.

In preparation for the MTR in 2021, the economic benefits from the OC issuance were estimated using the Hedonic Price Model (HPM). They amounted to US\$13,500 - US\$14,500 per OC. The ICR provides no details about the methodology of the economic analysis or the project’s net benefits. At IEG’s request, the team has shared the economic analysis report prepared in June 2021. According to the report, the analysis used the following methods: (i) hedonic regression analysis, which provided data on what determines housing prices in Afghanistan; (ii) a phone survey of a sample of OC recipients, which collected such data as perceived value of the house, the size of the house, and construction materials used. Using a GIS software, the survey data, and the outcomes of the hedonic regression analysis, a change in property values due to the OC issuance and potential fiscal revenues from the OC fees were forecast. While the report provides an estimate of the gross benefits per issued OC (quoted above), it does not contain information about the project’s net benefits.

At closure, no economic analysis was conducted. Considering that the project did not achieve any of its expected outcomes by the actual closure, the expected benefits did not materialize. The ICR could have included a simple calculation of the level of net benefits achieved by actual project closure, based on the actual achievement of the OC target. However, the ICR contains no such calculations. IEG’s calculations, based on the ICR’s data - the number of OCs issued (3,963) and the lower end of the estimated benefits per OC (US\$13,500) - show that the total project benefit from OCs at actual project closure was US\$53,500,500, which is significantly above the amount that was disbursed at that time (US\$6,189,444). Therefore, the project’s net benefits at actual closure were positive.

Overall, while the ICR did not include a simplified version of the economic analysis, which was prepared for the MTR in 2021, or provide an estimate of the project’s net benefits, there was room for doing it. This would have helped to better understand the value for money of the project.

Administrative efficiency. The project experienced initial delays related to the procurement of key project elements such as the LIS design, the geodetic network, and the photogrammetry, as well as the contracting of international consultants and the PIU staff. The delays and high costs of hiring the international experts



resulted in significantly higher project management costs than originally expected, with 56 percent of those spent by project actual closure.

While the expected economic benefits of the project did not materialize, net economic benefits at actual closure were positive. Therefore, the project efficiency is rated **Modest**.

Efficiency Rating

Modest

a. If available, enter the Economic Rate of Return (ERR) and/or Financial Rate of Return (FRR) at appraisal and the re-estimated value at evaluation:

	Rate Available?	Point value (%)	*Coverage/Scope (%)
Appraisal		0	0 <input type="checkbox"/> Not Applicable
ICR Estimate		0	0 <input type="checkbox"/> Not Applicable

* Refers to percent of total project cost for which ERR/FRR was calculated.

6. Outcome

The **relevance of objectives is rated high** due to its full alignment with the country strategy and government priorities at appraisal and up to the suspension of the WBG's country program due to the August 2021 government takeover. For both objectives, as well as for both the Original and the Revised projects under Objective 2, the efficacy is Negligible: while an adequate progress was made toward outcome targets that were expected to be reached by the originally planned project closure date, none of those targets was achieved by the actual closure date. **The overall efficacy is negligible** for both original and the revised projects. While the expected economic benefits of the project did not materialize, net economic benefits at actual closure were positive. Therefore, the **project efficiency is modest**. The overall outcome rating is **Unsatisfactory**.

a. Outcome Rating

Unsatisfactory

7. Risk to Development Outcome

The ICR reports that the risk to development outcome is rated High due to factors outside the Bank's control, specifically, the shortened project implementation and the collapse of the government in August 2021. Under the circumstances, most initial project results are not expected to be maintained, and some, such as the modernization of the legal and policy framework, face a high risk of being undone. This applies particularly to



the changes related to women's land rights. The institutional capacity building results will be lost as many trained staff have left the country or their workplace (ICR, page 25).

8. Assessment of Bank Performance

a. Quality-at-Entry

The project was prepared with full understanding of the specifics of project design when facing complex challenges, such as those related to land governance in Afghanistan. It involved such mitigation measures as prioritizing interventions and combining institutional capacity building and technological innovations with raising awareness, gaining support of the population, and developing activities targeted at women. However, the ICR notes that "project design had some shortcomings, including the lack of readiness for implementation stemming from issues related to the Project Preparation Grant (PPG) implementation" and that "the project design was too complex, and some of its features could have been managed more sequentially" (ICR, page 24).

Quality-at-Entry Rating

Moderately Satisfactory

b. Quality of supervision

The project benefited significantly from having a stable task team, including the same task team leader (TTL) managing the project from appraisal to actual closure. The implementation was supported by technical specialists with specific knowledge of both the sector and the country, who worked diligently to find solutions, in coordination with the client. The team included a focal point in Kabul, who was providing advice to MUDL and the PIU and followed up on agreed actions and urgent matters. The team conducted four implementation missions and held weekly meetings with the PIU and field offices between missions. The missions were in-person prior to March 2020 and became virtual after that, due to the COVID-19 pandemic. The team reported on project's status and performance in aide memoires and implementation status reports (ISRs), highlighting the shortcomings, challenges, and actions required. The preparation of the MTR, which started shortly before the actual project closure, involved an in-depth analysis of the issues and potential adaptation measures (ICR, page 25).

Quality of Supervision Rating

Moderately Satisfactory

Overall Bank Performance Rating

Moderately Satisfactory



9. M&E Design, Implementation, & Utilization

a. M&E Design

The results framework (RF) was designed using the SMART methodology: it was specific (linked to results), measurable (measured the results), adequate (provided sufficient information to assess the results), realistic (had a reasonable cost and measurement frequency), and targeted (covered the targeted population and area). SMART helped to support the link between the M&E and the ToC during implementation. SMART was also used when preparing the M&E Manual and the M&E plan, according to which each indicator was measured through Indicator Measurement Fact Sheets (IMFS), which was very detailed and included: the indicator's description, geographic scope, unit of measurement, formula, frequency, responsibility for data collection, source of information, means of verification, and data collection instruments (ICR, page 22). The RF was comprehensive and balanced across the PDO level indicators and IRIs. All indicators were quantitative, time-bound and had baselines and targets. The RF had a gender-disaggregated indicator.

b. M&E Implementation

Throughout project implementation, the IMFSs were monitored and updated quarterly. The M&E team within the PIU was collecting, consolidating, and analyzing data on project performance, and tracking progress to project targets. M&E data was used to inform the interactions with the stakeholders and the public awareness activities. The M&E data reported by the PIU satisfied the World Bank standards and was submitted on time. The semi-annual progress reports were of adequate quality and submitted on time. The project's M&E was rated Satisfactory until October 2020; then downgraded to Moderately Satisfactory due to the delays in recruiting two new M&E specialists; then, in April 2021, upgraded to Satisfactory, and stayed at this level for the rest of project implementation (ICR, page 22).

c. M&E Utilization

The M&E data was used for project management (including regular reports and project restructuring), decision-making, and communication with the stakeholders. Progress toward the RF targets was verified quarterly and during the World Bank's supervision missions. Throughout project implementation, the M&E information enabled the team and the stakeholders to identify challenges to the achievement of project objectives and to evaluate the results achieved (ICR, page 22-23).

M&E Quality Rating

Substantial

10. Other Issues

a. Safeguards

Environmental Safeguards. The project was classified as Category B and triggered the Environmental Assessment Policy (OP/BP 4.01). An Environmental Management Framework (EMF), including an



environmental assessment and generic Environmental Management Plan (EMP), were prepared. The EMF included guidelines to prepare Environmental Management Plans (EMP) for impacts related to civil works (mainly construction and rehabilitation of small office buildings). The EMF was made public in the country and on the World Bank's external website on January 1, 2019. The Project complied with the World Bank Environmental Safeguards Policies and the Government's environmental regulations. Compliance with OP/BP 4.10 was rated as Satisfactory throughout project implementation (ICR, page 23).

Social Safeguards. The Operational Policy on Involuntary Resettlement (OP 4.12) was triggered by the construction of six zonal offices, although no major resettlement was expected. The OC issuance program posed several potential social risks, and a Social Assessment (SA) was conducted. A Resettlement Policy Framework (RPF) and a Social Management Framework (SMF) were developed to comply with OP 4.12 and the national law. In addition to the RPF, MUDL prepared procedures for the OC Regulations that helped to address the gaps to minimize the risks. The project complied with OP4.12, and the rating for compliance ranged from Satisfactory to Moderately Satisfactory throughout project implementation (ICR, page 23-24).

b. Fiduciary Compliance

Financial Management (FM). The FM had some shortcomings, which caused its downgrading from Satisfactory to Moderately Satisfactory in December 2019 and to Moderately Unsatisfactory on August 12, 2021. This was due to the following: questionable expenditures identified during the reviews, low budget utilization, weaknesses in the record management, non-compliance with the legal covenants, and low progress in resolving external audit observations (ICR, page 24).

Procurement. Procurement processes were implemented based on the Project Implementation Plan, Annual Operations Plans, and annual procurement plans. The procurement plan was updated frequently. Due to the delays in the approval of procurement packages by the MUDL, the procurement rating was downgraded from Satisfactory to Moderately Satisfactory in February 2020, then to Moderately Unsatisfactory in November 2020. On August 14, 2021, the procurement rating was upgraded to Moderately Satisfactory, and it stayed at this level until closing. The improvement was due to the speed-up of the procurement of key packages, the hiring of procurement and project management specialists, and the preparation of the procurement manual (ICR, page 24).

c. Unintended impacts (Positive or Negative)

d. Other



11. Ratings

Ratings	ICR	IEG	Reason for Disagreements/Comment
Outcome	Unsatisfactory	Unsatisfactory	
Bank Performance	Moderately Satisfactory	Moderately Satisfactory	
Quality of M&E	Substantial	Substantial	
Quality of ICR	---	Substantial	

12. Lessons

The following lessons are based on the ICR, with minor adjustments.

- **Complex projects implemented in countries where institutional development is a challenging task benefit from taking full advantage of the World Bank’s analytical and technical expertise and being based on the World Bank’s long-term engagement in the country.** The project was developed following over a decade of World Bank involvement in the land sector in Afghanistan. The analytical basis for improving the legal and institutional framework for land administration and management was thus developed, institutional and legal weaknesses identified, and recommendations for priority reforms prepared. In addition, the World Bank’s prior development policy finance (DPF) projects had created incentives to promote key land governance reforms. While the project had to be discontinued due to the circumstances beyond the Bank’s control, the initial results were promising, and those could not have happened without the analytical basis and a long-term prior engagement.
- **The experience in Afghanistan and other countries with challenges to institutional development shows that gaining a broad support of the beneficiaries is as important as providing adequate technology and institutional capacity building.** The project involved participatory and consultation processes established to promote awareness and active participation of the beneficiaries responding to cultural and gender issues. The project’s technical and legal activities were embedded in traditional structures: council members and elders of the local community were consulted on planned activities prior to implementation to obtain their support and to request that they communicate project objectives to the community in the local language. It was planned to deploy a targeted communication campaign to inform women about their land property rights and develop gender-specific awareness-raising materials. While project implementation was cut short, project experience with beneficiary engagement proved to be positive.
- **Complex and transformational projects benefit from a well-applied programmatic approach.** The project was complex and overly ambitious considering the country’s institutional capacity, demand for expertise, and the ongoing conflict. The project’s design took the complexity of the objectives into account and applied a programmatic approach that included prioritizing and sequencing the tasks. However, such an approach could have been applied better, especially to transformational activities such as transitioning from deed



registration to parcel-based titling registration and transferring the responsibility for deed registration from the courts to MUDL. In particular, to better manage technical design and implementation capacity risks, a more incremental approach could have been considered.

- **Early and focused attention on capacity building is critical in FCV contexts.** Project design included an institutional capacity assessment and a capacity-building plan, and the need for that was underscored during project implementation. However, MUDL was unprepared for this because its organizational structure and internal workflows were in flux at the start of implementation. Engagement with MUDL during project preparation would be beneficial for the capacity building activities.

13. Assessment Recommended?

No

14. Comments on Quality of ICR

The ICR provides a detailed history of the project; a good justification of the PDO relevance; comprehensive and robust evidence; a clear linking of evidence to findings; and sufficient information to understand how the activities are linked to the expected outcomes and further to the intended impacts. The ICR has internal consistency. The lessons learned are linked to the narrative and the ratings and are useful for future lending operations. The sections on efficacy, risks to development outcome; M&E quality; environmental, social, and fiduciary compliance; and Bank performance are informative and contain useful analysis. However, the ICR's information regarding project efficiency is inadequate: a description of the economic analysis at MTR, which was a substitute for the missing economic analysis at appraisal, is almost absent (the methodology is not described, and the net benefits' calculations are not presented), and the calculation of the net benefits at closure, which could be easily done based on the data present in the ICR, was skipped. There was certainly room for including a simplified version of the economic analysis which would have help in better understanding the value for money of the project. Despite this weakness, the overall quality of the ICR is **Substantial**.

- a. **Quality of ICR Rating**
Substantial

