

Vulnerability, Shocks, and Coping Mechanisms in Libya

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1. Libya's political and economic situation remains complex and unpredictable, but there are signs of progress as warring factions have begun to communicate. In 2020, the Libyan economic performance was the worst in recent records. As the economy is mainly dependent on crude oil, the intensification of the conflict, the fall in oil prices, and a 9-month blockade of oil terminals and fields significantly shrank the economy. While previous attempts to unite the warring parties and create a national unity government were generally unsuccessful, in October 2020, all parties accepted a permanent ceasefire. Following the ceasefire agreement and parliamentary approval of the UN-backed Political Dialogue Forum, the oil sector recorded an instant rebound in oil production levels, leading to a rise in oil prices during the first six months of 2021.


2. Libya is recovering from a decade of conflict, but there is no official household data to plan a national social protection strategy. Although the ceasefire signed in October 2020 between the opposing parties improved security and reduced the number of displaced people, COVID-19 restrictions further deteriorated the already fragile economic situation. As thousands of people lose their livelihoods and purchasing power becomes eroded due to the conflict and Pandemic, it is expected that many households will struggle to meet basic needs. On top of that, the Government has not conducted an official household survey in the last ten years. The latest household survey was the 2007 Household Income and Expenditure Survey and the 2012 Labor force survey by the Libyan Bureau of Statistics and Census (LBSC). The lack of household surveys in the country results in a limited understanding of the basic needs and daily challenges faced by households, which hinders the smooth planning or adjustments of national social protection. While a new National Household Income and Expenditure (HIES) survey is in the field for 2022, this report provides an interim understanding of the challenges in Libya.

3. The Vulnerability, Shocks and Coping Mechanisms Survey (VSCM-S) provides valuable data to understand vulnerabilities and needs, which are relevant for the planning of social assistance programs and delivery in Libya. The VSCM-S was conducted in 2021 by the Libyan Bureau of Statistics and Census (LBSC) in collaboration with the World Food Programme (WFP) and the World Bank. The survey was the first of its kind undertaken in Libya in over a decade. The sample includes displaced, returnees, and non-displaced Libyan households. The survey objectives are to fill the data gap in the country, evaluate the access to the non-contributory social protection available in the country, and inform programs and delivery systems that would enhance the access and quality of essential services to the Libyan people. The VSCM-S was conducted using a High-Frequency Phone Survey method, with samples drawn from subscribers of the Al Madaar telecom company

in Libya. The data is not representative of the Libyan population, and information were collected from the household heads or their representatives. Despite these limitations, the VSCM-S survey provides helpful insights into the country's multiple misfortunes, vulnerabilities, and welfare challenges. These insights serve as a good benchmark for future evaluation of the rapidly changing conditions in Libya.

4. The VSCM survey shows that the many years of conflict in Libya, the shocks produced by the oil blockade, and the compounding effect of the COVID-19 Pandemic have affected almost all segments of society. About 70 percent of the surveyed households were hit by multiple misfortunes, which include having a direct experience of the violent conflict, economic shocks, and the COVID-19 Pandemic. A quarter of the VSCM-S respondents were directly impacted by violent conflict, while 22 percent experienced economic losses due to the conflict (Figure 0.1). Almost half of the households said the COVID-19 Pandemic impacted their well-being.

Figure 0-1 Share of respondents affected by misfortune




Source: VSCM-S, 2021.

5. From a physical and psychological standpoint, the prolonged conflict impacted most respondents in the form of losing a relative or a friend, destruction of properties, or forced displacement. One-third of VSCM-S respondents experienced significant shocks within the 12 months preceding the survey. About 14 percent of the VSCM-S respondents reported that their houses were destroyed or seized during the conflict. One in ten respondents said that they or their close relatives were forced to move elsewhere, while 8 percent said they lost their savings. From a well-being point of view, the conflict, the fall in oil price and production, and the poor economic performance in 2020 led to a sharp

decrease in government spending, a rise in unemployment, and salary disruption, which severely affected most of the respondents. About 6 percent of the respondents reported hardship due to increased fuel and food prices. In addition to this financial shock, several VSCM-S respondents were also experiencing shocks from other areas in their lives. For instance, 7 percent of the respondents reported shock due to the death of a working member, and 5 percent reported shock due to the household member being temporary or chronically sick or injured.


Figure 0-2 Share of respondents by shocks encountered in the previous 12 months



Source: VSCM-S, 2021.

6. As Libyans hoped that the end of the civil war was near, the emergence of the novel Coronavirus (COVID-19) Pandemic presented the country with a new source of worry and well-being challenges. A quarter of respondents said the COVID-19 Pandemic negatively influenced their economic and financial well-being, and 22 percent said it had a negative impact on their employment. Many people lost their jobs because of the Pandemic, and many households saw their income drop. Lockdowns enacted by various countries, notably Libya, during the peak of COVID-19 are thought to have impacted household finances and employment. The dread of contracting the virus and the lockdowns may have had an emotional impact on the household heads. COVID-19 also increased gender-based violence in 10 percent of homes surveyed, corresponding to global reports of rising gender-based violence during the Pandemic.


Figure 0-3 Share of the respondents by the impact of COVID-19 on your well-being



Source: VSCM-S, 2021

7. The multiple misfortunes – conflict, shocks, and COVID-19 had a disproportional impact on the populations of concern such as IDPs, female-headed households, and households with a large family size of more than 5 persons. About 96 percent of the currently displaced respondents were affected by these triple challenges. Half of them reported directly experiencing the violence crises, and 77 percent reported economic losses due to the crises. Female respondents were significantly more likely to experience these challenges than males. About 42 percent of female respondents reported shock compared to 30 percent of males. Currently displaced respondents were also worse hit by the misfortunes than the non-displaced and returnee respondents. Close to 80 percent of the currently displaced respondents reported economic losses due to COVID-19.

Figure 0-4 Share (%) of households impacted by multiple misfortunes



Source: VSCM-S, 2021

8. The improvement in the security situation led to the return of many IDPs, but the severely vulnerable households are still unable to return to their places of origin. The establishment of the reconciliatory Government of National Unity (GNU) in March 2021 was a cause for optimism that the security situation might become better. According to IOM¹, no major displacements were reported by September 2021. A record number of 650,000 IDPs returned within this period, but close to 200,000 were still displaced. Among the 25 percent of VSCM-S respondents that were IDPs, 70 percent have returned, while 30 percent are still displaced. Besides safety concerns, the currently displaced respondents experienced a larger share of the violence, including destruction of their houses that impacted their capability to return. Among the VSCM-S respondents, the female-headed households are most likely to be currently displaced.

9. Livelihood deteriorated under the triple challenges of civil conflict, economic shocks, and the COVID-19 Pandemic. According to the VSCM-S, the unemployment rate was around 17 percent. On the one hand, the labor force participation decreased, and on the other hand, there was a high level of unemployment, especially among women between 25 and 54 years old, where the unemployment rate reached 33 percent. Job security is also of concern as about 30 percent of working heads do not have a work contract, and more than 50 percent are working in the informal sector where they are not making social


¹ IOM-DTM Libya - IDP and Returnee Report 37 (May - June 2021) [Link](#)

security contributions. There is also a structural shifting of labor towards the blue-collar occupation class and self-employment. As several working-class people lost their employment in the oil sectors and in education and health services, which were shut down due to the crises, many took up self-employment as a coping strategy. Over 70 percent of working household heads in the survey were self-employed.

10. As a result of the conflict and economic challenges, the reported average monthly income level is very low, and there is a high level of inequality. The mean monthly income earned by the surveyed households was 260 Dinars, equivalent to 1.86 USD per person per day. There is equally compelling evidence of income inequality. For instance, the top 20 percent of income earners take in close to half of the total income earned in the sample, while the bottom 20 percent earn around 5 percent of the total income. Displaced households earned the lowest average per capita per month. Income earned also varied significantly by the gender of the head of household, with female households earning a lower average income than male-headed households. In general, gender of head, education level of head, age of head, household displacement status, employment status of head, location of households, conflict, and shock experience are significant predictors of household income.

11. Physical and mental health deteriorated due to the post-traumatic stress disorder triggered by the war and COVID-19. The prevalence of chronic illness is high among the poor, who cannot afford to seek medical care. One-third of the respondents have at least one household member who has one medical condition or illness. Chronic disease is the highest form of disease reported by most of the respondents, affecting close to half of the households that reported illness. This was followed by COVID-19, which affected a quarter of sick people during the survey period. Equally, 5 percent of the households with a sick member reported mental health conditions. In addition, more than a quarter of the poorest households with members with medical issues did not seek medical care because of a lack of money, and some displaced person said they were not provided medical service because of their status.


Figure 0-5 Share of illness reported by the respondents



Source: VSCM-S, 2021

12. The impact of crises on housing is quite daring as many properties were damaged during the conflict. Most of the respondents own their home (79 percent), 16 percent live in rented accommodation, and 5 percent share accommodation or live in an informal settlement. Many currently displaced respondents abandoned their homes and now live in rented accommodation or informal shelter in their host communities. Only 24 percent of currently displaced households are homeowners compared to 61 percent who were homeowners before the displacement. On the part of the returnees, several non-homeowners who have returned have now become homeowners. For instance, 67 percent of returnees owned a home before displacement, but up to 84 percent now own a home after returning. It is suspected that increased house abandonment due to the displacements may have increased the share of the returnee who owned homes. However, it was also reported that many of these homes are partly destroyed.


Figure 0-6 House type by displacement status



Source: VSCM-S, 2021

13. Food insecurity generally increased across the Mantikas, driven by both the exposure to the conflict and the household characteristics. About 14 percent of households surveyed were food insecure, of which 2 percent were severely food insecure. However, two-thirds of respondents were found to be only marginally food secure. The average expenditure on food stood at 63 percent of total expenditure, suggesting significant vulnerability. Displaced households were over twice as likely (26 percent) to be food insecure than non-displaced households (13 percent). Food insecurity among returnee households stood at 17 percent. Households, where the head is educated below secondary tend to be more food insecure than households where the head has a university degree.

Figure 0-7 Food insecurity, by demographic indicators (percent)



Source: VSCM-S, 2021.


14. On the exposure to conflict, the result shows that the higher the food insecurity level, the higher the prevalence of households experiencing conflict-related problems such as personal or economic losses and external shocks during the last 12 months. Nonetheless, some Mantikas in the South have severe food insecurity but few conflict-related deaths. The Southern Region has a higher concentration of poorer households that work on farms. Despite experiencing lower conflicts, most households in the South reported higher food insecurity due to limited purchasing power and low food availability because most farmers were not going to farm during the conflict.

15. Many food insecure households adopt some stressed-level coping methods. These coping methods include:

- **Debt:** Around one-third (29 percent) of VSCM-S respondents reported incurring debt three months prior to the survey. Almost half of the displaced households incurred a debt (42 percent) compared to 25 percent of host and 38 percent of returnee households. Households being hosted as guests were found to be the most in debt (69 percent). The gender of the head of the household was not a factor affecting the decision to borrow. Households that incurred debt were more likely to be food insecure: 62 percent of households suffering from severe food insecurity and 52 percent of the moderately food insecure had incurred debt.

- Consumption-based strategies. Food insecure households are increasingly resorting to consumption coping strategies due to a lack of food or money, with 54 percent of households indicating they had adopted at least one coping strategy. These coping strategies can be as severe as reducing adult consumption so children can eat. The most adopted coping strategy is relying on less preferred or less expensive food, which is adopted on average around twice a week. Households also reduce the number of meals and reduce meal size once a week. The frequency of coping strategies is highest among households with moderate and severe food insecurity.
- Livelihood-based strategies. More than half (55 percent) of VSCM-S respondents resorted to livelihood-based coping strategies, of which 17 percent resorted to stress strategies, 25 percent to crisis strategies, and 13 percent to emergency strategies as their most severe coping strategies. Over half of displaced households (53 percent) adopted crisis and emergency coping strategies compared to 44 percent of returnee households and 36 percent of host communities. The most frequent stress strategies were borrowing money, spending savings, or reducing non-food expenditures. Crisis strategies included taking an additional job or reducing health expenditures. Emergency strategies included engaging in illegal work or selling houses or land.


Figure 0-8: Livelihood-based coping strategies in Libya (percent)



Source: VSCM-S 2021.

16. More than half of respondents (55 percent) reported deprivations in at least one of five multidimensional deprivation dimensions (education, food, housing, health, and safety). Prolonged conflicts and pandemics have caused severe deprivations by interrupting essential health and education services. Although several respondents suffered from more than one of the multiple deprivation dimensions, the most prominent deprivations are around their safety, education, and health, where over one-third of households reported deprivations in each of those dimensions. Deprivation in safety was driven by two key factors, direct experience of violent conflict (25 percent) and forced displacement in the last 12 months (25 percent). About 8 percent of the households with school-age children said that their children were not attending school even before the Pandemic due to safety and lack of money. When it comes to health deprivation, the key driver was having a household member experiencing any kind of disease during the previous year, including chronic diseases, infectious diseases, COVID, emergency medical care, mental health, maternity, and others. The prevalence of any household member experiencing such a disease was 35 percent.


Figure 0-9 Share of households by multidimensional deprivation



Source: VSCM-S 2021.

17. Despite these challenges, only a fraction of the respondents receive assistance. Only 4 percent of VSCM-S respondents said they received assistance. Sixty-nine percent of the assistance received was through WFP's General food assistance. A fewer share of the respondents that received assistance (8 percent) received cash transfers from the national programs (7 percent). Around 7 percent of those that received assistance received cash transfers from NGOs. Only 1 percent of assistance receiving respondents reported accessing school feeding.

Figure 0-10 Share of types of assistance received by respondents



Source: VSCM-S, 2021.

18. Libya is an upper-middle-income country; however, the vulnerabilities reported in the survey are typical of most FCV countries. Recent developments in 2022, such as the postponement of the National election, which was originally scheduled for December 2021, is likely to jeopardize the progress made in 2021. Secondly, the rise in food inflation in the aftermath of the Russian-Ukraine crisis may result in additional vulnerabilities. This is especially concerning because Libya relies heavily on Russia and Ukraine for wheat, barley, and maize import, which are national staples.

19. In conclusion, rebuilding Libya will require significant reforms in many areas, with prioritizations of assistance to the most vulnerable population as one way to begin. While the general humanitarian situation is improving, Libya is still in the transition and recovery stage. Even with some limitations from a phone survey, the VSCM-S shed light on the enormous welfare challenges and adverse coping strategies that these vulnerable unassisted groups adopt in the face of limited social protections. It is hoped that this evidence will encourage the Government and its policymakers to take appropriate social protection policies and actions to improve the well-being of the vulnerable groups.

1 INTRODUCTION


1.1 OVERVIEW OF SECURITY SITUATION IN LIBYA

Ten years after the Arab Spring and the collapse of the regime of Muammar Gaddafi in Libya, the destabilizing and deadly conflict between warring factions has not ended despite mediation efforts from the international community. Four periods of instability have characterized Libya's crisis. First, in 2011, having been influenced by revolts in other Arab countries, a popular uprising in Libya triggered a city-based revolt and the overthrow of the Qaddafi regime. From 2012 through early 2014, the transitional political process was driven by opposing armed factions, including the emergence of Islamist militants. The 'Second Libyan Civil War' started in 2014 when General Khalifah Haftar launched an insurgency against Islamist factions in Benghazi. In 2017, violence occurrences decreased considerably compared to 2016, owing mostly to the defeat of Islamic State (IS) terrorists. However, the advance of the Haftar Libyan National Army towards Tripoli in 2019 provoked more conflicts until the Haftar forces were driven by the UN-backed Government of National Accord in mid-2020.

Libya's economy, including oil production and GDP, has generally followed a multimodal pattern for much of the conflict period, declining during periods of intense fighting and increasing sharply during periods of relative peace. For most of the conflict era between 2011 and 2021, Libyan economic performance was the worst in recent country records. As the economy is mainly dependent on crude oil, the early stage of the uprising in 2011 resulted in a significant decrease in oil production and a sharp drop in GDP. There was a period of relative recovery from 2012, which ended during the Civil war in 2014. The fall in oil prices and a 9-month blockade of oil terminals and fields shrank the economy by 31 percent in 2020². The plunge in the Libyan economy exacerbated the impact of the conflict on the welfare and poverty outcome of the people. The reduction in oil revenue led to a sharp decrease in government spending and a rise in unemployment. Many health facilities were forced to close due to the violence or lack of medicines, supplies, and medical personnel. Many schools were closed, and there were increased commodity prices, disruption of salary payments, and hindered access to food and essential services.

² World Bank Economic Monitor: Libya Spring 2021 [Link](#)

Figure 1-1 Oil production, GDP, and timelines



Source: Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (Oli Production), World Bank (GDP), BBC News (chronology of key events).

The political and economic situation in Libya remains complex and unpredictable but shows signs of progress. There were three main warring factions – the UN-backed Government of National Accord (GNA) based in Tripoli, the Benghazi-based Libya National Army (LNA), and the Tobruk-based parliament. Previous attempts to bring the warring parties together and create a government of national unity were unsuccessful as warring sides consolidated their positions and established their governing institutions. In October 2020, all parties accepted a permanent ceasefire in all areas of Libya. Foreign fighters were given three months to leave the country. On March 10, 2021, the interim unity government nominated by the UN-backed Political Dialogue Forum received parliamentary approval to hold a vote of confidence election, formally ending the divide between warring factions in various parts of the country. The oil sector recorded an instant rebound in oil production levels following the ceasefire agreement. Oil production increased from an average of 121 thousand barrels per day in Quarter 3 (Q3) 2020 to 917 in Q4 2020 – a 658 percent Quarter-on-Quarter (Q-o-Q) production increase, leading to a rise in oil production and oil prices during the first six months of 2021 as well³.

Furthermore, as Libyans hoped that the end of the many-year civil war might finally be near, the emergence of the novel Coronavirus (COVID-19) pandemic presented the country with a new source of worry and uncertainty. Following the first confirmed case of COVID-19 in March 2020, there was a rapid increase in the number of infected persons

³ OPEC monthly reports, [link](#)

in the country. Report from WHO shows that between January 2020 and April 2022, there were over 500,000 confirmed cases of COVID-19, with over 6,400 deaths in Libya⁴. The Pandemic exacerbated vulnerabilities associated with conflict and fragility for many Libyans. Most Libyan households have now faced challenges due to instability and inter-related shocks from financial to the lockdowns due to the Pandemic. These three-pronged challenges severely affected the welfare of all population groups, especially the poorest segments of the population, the women and the IDPs.

1.2 THE SURVEY

In the effort to assist vulnerable people and to provide an update on current welfare challenges faced by Libyans, the World Food Programme (WFP) collaborated with the Libyan Bureau of Statistics and Census (LBSC) and the World Bank to implement the first Vulnerability, Shocks, and Coping Mechanisms Survey (VSCM-S). The VSCM-S survey was launched in response to the request of the Government of Libya together with several line ministries to assess households' vulnerability, shocks, and coping mechanisms of displaced and host Libyan households. The Government has not conducted any official household survey due to the protracted conflict. The latest household survey was the 2007 household budget survey and the 2012 Labor force survey by the Libyan Bureau of Statistics and Census (LBSC).

The survey had two main objectives. The first was closing the data gap in the country. The second was to assess the vulnerability, shocks, and coping mechanisms of the displaced, returnee, and non-displaced households. Several socioeconomic modules were included in the survey to achieve its broader goal of providing policy recommendations. These modules include shock and crisis experience, employment, income, assistance, food consumption, and health status. In addition to the questions on the impact of shocks on the households' well-being, the survey also included questions to examine the COVID-19 effects on welfare.

The violence and the movement restrictions to reduce the Pandemic spread made face-to-face surveys difficult. Therefore, building on World Food Programme's extensive presence on the ground and mature infrastructure developed for Mobile Vulnerability Analysis and Mapping (mVAM), and the World Bank's experience in conducting High-Frequency Phone Survey (HFPS), the VSCM-S survey was conducted using phone-based data collection. The mVAM/ HFPS survey approach allows for comprehensive geographic

⁴ World Health Organization - [Link](#)

coverage over a shorter period. However, the amount of information is limited by using short questionnaires administered by phone.

The sample for the VSCM-S survey was drawn from a subscriber phone database (the Al Madaar telecom company) based on respondents' location information (Mantikas). All respondents were selected by stratified random sampling based on the percent of each Mantika and the Al Madaar telecom company phone subscribers. Within each stratum, respondents were selected using a simple random sample. Calls were made by the Libyan Bureau of Statistics and Census (LBSC) staff using phone lines provided by Al Madaar telecom Company. The survey was administered from April 6, 2021, to April 19, 2021, with a median duration of 40 minutes. Only Libyan nationals at least 18 years of age were eligible for the interview, and household heads were the target respondents. A total of 2,297 call attempts were made, of which about 2 percent were made to ineligible respondents. These respondents include those who did not consent to the interview and non-Libyans. The spatial distribution of the final sample is very similar to that of the population and the phone subscriber database.

Table 1-1 Survey stratification by Mantika

S/N	Mantika	Population	Population proportion	Proportion of phone numbers (sampling)	Sampled data	Proportion of sampled data
1	Tobruk	202064	3%	3%	50	2%
2	Derna	206809	3%	3%	63	3%
3	Al Jabal Al Gharbi	367461	5%	4%	75	3%
4	Al Marj	162266	2%	4%	92	4%
5	Benghazi	849660	12%	12%	263	12%
6	Ejdabia	212363	3%	3%	18	1%
7	Alkufra	56727	1%	1%	11	0%
8	Sirt	151330	2%	2%	78	3%
9	Aljufra	59875	1%	1%	28	1%
10	Misrata	676706	10%	10%	247	11%
11	Almargeb	536255	8%	8%	160	7%
12	Tripoli	1220712	18%	19%	426	19%

13	Aljfara	551111	8%	8%	154	7%
14	Azzawya	365110	5%	5%	114	5%
15	Zwara	360769	5%	5%	125	6%
16	Al Jabal Al khdhar	242804	4%	5%	132	6%
17	Nalut	109484	2%	2%	42	2%
18	Sebha	168249	2%	2%	69	3%
19	Wadi Al Shatii	95563	1%	1%	31	1%
20	Ubari	92444	1%	1%	35	2%
21	Maszak	94609	0%	1%	35	2%
22	Ghat	28346	0%	0%	9	0%
	Total	6810717	100%	100%	2257	100%

Source: VSCM-S, 2021.

The final sample size is 2,257 respondents, mainly the head of households or their spouses⁵. Most respondents were living in the West (n=1,421), followed by the East (n=629), and then the South (n=207). The Mantikas with the highest number of respondents are Tripoli, Benghazi, and Misrata, which make up 42 percent of the total sample. The demographic composition of the household heads (Table 1.2) shows that 86 percent are male, and most are middle-aged between 25 and 54 years old (72 percent). About 66 percent of the household heads attended at least a secondary school. Most households have large household sizes with more than five people (67 percent), and about 69 percent of the households have at least one child. About 25 percent of interviewed households were currently or previously displaced due to the crisis.

⁵ The survey was to be answered by the household head. However, in some cases, the calls were made when the household heads were absent. In such cases, the most senior household member responded on behalf of the household head. About 66 percent of the respondents are the household head, 14 percent are the spouse, and 13 percent are the children. The other 7 percent are other relatives, including the parent and sibling.

Table 1-2 Sociodemographic compositions of sampled households

	East		West		South		Total	
	Freq	%	Freq	%	Freq	%	Freq	%
Gender of Head of Household								
Female	75	12	202	14	39	19	316	14
Male	554	88	1219	86	168	81	1941	86
Age of Head of Household								
Below 25	7	1	23	2	1	1	31	1
25 to 54	456	73	1002	71	157	76	1615	72
55 to 64	104	17	263	19	34	16	401	18
Above 64	62	10	133	9	15	7	210	9
Level of education of household head								
Below secondary	215	34	483	34	78	38	776	34
Secondary	165	26	303	21	48	23	516	23
University	249	40	635	45	81	39	965	43
Household size								
Large - above 5	435	69	938	66	141	68	1514	67
Small - below 5	194	31	483	34	66	32	743	33
Household with children								
No	195	31	450	32	60	29	705	31
Yes	434	69	971	68	147	71	1552	69
Displacement status								
Nondisplaced	524	83	1017	72	157	76	1698	75
Stilldisplaced	32	5	108	8	19	9	159	7
Returnee	73	12	296	21	31	15	400	18
Total	629	100	1421	100	207	100	2257	100

Source: VSCM-S, 2021.

1.3 DATA LIMITATIONS

While this data has some limitations, it also has some strengths. The first limitation is that the data is unweighted. There is no up-to-date sampling frame of the Libyan population from which samples could be drawn. Therefore, the high-frequency phone survey covered in this report is not nationally representative. Instead, the survey reflects respondents randomly selected from all 22 Mantikas, where spatial distributions of sampled respondents follow the same spatial distribution of the population. Statistics reported in this report are computed directly from the survey data without any sampling weights; thus, those estimates are for the collected sample only and are not representative of the country.

Second, there is also some inherent limitation in phone surveys. For instance, most phone surveys are affected by coverage selection bias. Areas or groups with limited network coverage or no access to phones, typically the poorest segments of the population, will be

under-covered in the sample. We relied only on the Al Madar subscribers, which have about 44 percent market share in Libya. There are also other mobile companies in the country used by many households, e.g., Libyana and LibyaPhone, whose subscribers were not included in the survey. There could also be gender bias. The phone survey targets the head of the household, of which women tend to be under-represented because they are less likely to be the head of households. In some cases, women are less likely to respond to an unknown caller. In addition, there are other limitations inherent to phone surveys, which are covered in Box 1.1.

Despite these limitations, the survey is important for several reasons. First, it is one of the first household surveys to explain the multiple misfortunes, vulnerability, and welfare situations in Libya since the start of the crisis in 2007. Second, it provides timely data that can serve as a benchmark for evaluating changes in the rapidly changing conditions in Libya, at least from the recent forming of the Government of National Unity (GNU). Third, the analyses done with the data show a picture of the severe vulnerabilities comparable to other MENA countries facing similar challenges since the Arab spring. Finally, the survey is conducted in collaboration with the Libyan Bureau of Statistics and Census (LBSC) office, giving the country some ownership of the survey.

The report is organized as follows: Section 2 discusses the multiple misfortunes such as conflict, shock, COVID-19 Pandemic, and displacement, and how they impact the well-being of the surveyed households. The welfare situations, including labor participation, income, and vulnerability outcomes like education, housing, and health, are presented in Section 3. Section 4 examines the food security situation and explains how vulnerabilities have affected the food security level of households. Section 5 looked at the level of multidimensional deprivations and support received by the affected households. Section 6 concludes the report. Throughout the report, the survey will be referred to as the Vulnerability, Shocks and Coping Mechanisms Survey (VSCM-S) 2021. The non-displaced households have been used interchangeably as host households in this report.

Finally, the information presented in the study reflects the situation as it existed at the time of data collection from the perspectives of the head of the households. Even in the few cases where a representative of the head of household, such as the spouse, answered the caller, all individual-level questions were answered in accordance with the situation of the head of household. As a result, the terms "respondents" and "heads of households" may be used interchangeably in this report.

Box 1-1 Limitations of Phone Surveys

Phone interviews have turned out to be a valuable alternative to primary data collection using face-to-face surveys – particularly during the pandemic. In normal circumstances, these surveys would be a useful complement to other ways of collecting data but would not be able to replace face-to-face surveys. This is because phone surveys come with a number of limitations.

First, areas or groups with limited network coverage or no access to phones, typically the poorest segments of the population, will be under-covered in the sample.

Second, indicators measured at the individual level (such as employment and unemployment) may be biased due to respondent selection. Especially in countries where the high-frequency phone surveys (HFPSs) are sampled from an existing nationally representative (pre-pandemic) survey, the respondent is often the head of household. Thus, some statistics (such as employment rates) would differ from those estimated by a conventional Labor Force Survey, which collects information from all household members.

Third, women tend to be under-represented because they are less likely to be the head of household, or, in instances where an RDD approach is used, they are less likely to own a phone or respond to an unknown caller.

Fourth, the length of a phone interview is limited, making it challenging to design an effective survey. The number of questions that can be asked is small and because the questions need to be short and precise for easy comprehension. One implication is that in many instances, the ability to consider distributional impacts is limited. That occurs because the phone surveys cannot generate estimates of poverty (as doing so would require a long list of consumption questions for which these surveys lack sufficient time). To estimate distributional impacts, proxy variables would have to be calculated (such as wealth quintiles) from the (tiny) information on wealth collected in the phone surveys themselves. However, phone surveys that draw their samples from pre-existing welfare surveys could derive the pre-COVID poverty status.

Fifth, sample sizes are typically relatively small – often less than 1,500 – to allow for a rapid turnaround. Small sample sizes make it more challenging to have implications for breaking down results by sub-groups. Despite these limitations, phone surveys have demonstrated their ability to collect high-quality data. Their agility and ability to collect data rapidly without the need for personal presence by an enumerator makes phone surveys a valuable tool for specific situations, such as emergencies, dangerous situations, or situations in which the respondent is mobile.


Source: Acevedo G. & J. Hoogeveen (eds), 2021. *Distributional Impacts of COVID-19 in the Middle East and North Africa Region*.

2 MULTIPLE MISFORTUNES AND DISPLACEMENT

2.1 VIOLENT CRISIS, SHOCK, AND COVID-19 PANDEMIC

Libya has recorded about 24,000 conflict-related deaths and more than 1.4 million conflict-related internal displacements between 2011 to 2021⁶. New displacement and fatalities tend to increase as violence intensifies. The waves of armed conflicts affected the lives and welfare of millions of people in the country, including Libyans and migrants from neighboring countries. Violent and armed conflicts displaced many households and individuals from their homes. Many of them have experienced multiple instances of displacement. As the conflict situation in Libya reduces, many internally displaced people (IDPs) have started returning home, but some welfare challenges persist. According to an IOM report, by September 2021, over 650,000 IDPs had returned, reducing the number of IDPs to 200,000 people. Still, there are many challenges facing IDPs and returnees. Insecurity and pocket of violence, lack of social cohesion, financial vulnerabilities, damaged infrastructure, destroyed houses, limited access to health services, unavailability of basic services, and gender-based violence are critical issues affecting the welfare of IDPs and returnees⁷.

Figure 2-1: Number of conflict-related fatalities




Source: ACLED data (Fatalities) and IDMC data (New displacement).

⁶ iDMC Displacement data-Libya [Link](#)

⁷ IOM-DTM Libya - IDP and Returnee Report 37 (May - June 2021) [Link](#)

Since the conflict started in 2011, many Libyan households have faced multiple instances of violence or misfortunes that impact their welfare. These misfortunes include the conflict experience, shocks, and the COVID-19 Pandemic. The fighting led to the destruction of houses, loss of income sources, and severe displacements. The economic shock due to oil blockage led to increased food prices, affecting the low-income earners. The effect of the COVID-19 Pandemic exacerbated these misfortunes. A quarter of the surveyed respondents were directly impacted by conflict, while 22 percent experienced economic losses due to the conflict. Half of the respondents said the COVID-19 Pandemic impacted their well-being, and one-third experienced shocks or difficulties in the last 12 months. About 70 percent of the VSCM-S surveyed households were affected by the three multiple misfortunes of crises, COVID-19, and economic shock.

Figure 2-2 Share of respondents affected by misfortune




Source: VSCM-S, 2021

2.2 VIOLENT CRISIS EXPERIENCES

About 14 percent of the surveyed households reported that their houses were destroyed or seized during the conflict, and 9 percent reported physical torture or deaths among close relatives or friends. From the physical and economic standpoint, the crises in Libya impacted most of the respondents in the form of the death of a loved one, destruction of houses, being forced to leave home, physical torture, and loss of savings. One in ten household heads said that they or their close relatives were forced to move elsewhere, while 8 percent said they lost their savings. Indeed, many households were displaced and forced to move elsewhere when their houses were destroyed or seized. More than half of the currently displaced respondents (54 percent) said that their houses were either

destroyed or seized, 16 percent lost all their properties, including houses, animals, vehicles, and firms, while 28 percent lost all their properties plus their savings. Most returnee households (42 percent) also mentioned that their houses were seized or destroyed, while 23 percent reported losing all their properties and savings. The destruction of houses and infrastructure during conflict has a devastating effect on well-being. IOM report has shown that many returnee households in Libya have been forced to utilize alternative accommodation arrangements primarily because they could not return to their pre-displacement houses due to damaged buildings and infrastructure. Similar examples can be found in other countries affected by the Arab spring in the MENA region. For example, in Syria, a report by REACH and UNOSAT⁸ in 2019 showed that the large-scale destruction in Syria due to armed conflicts had created cross-sector challenges that have far-reaching effects on all elements of life.

Figure 2-3 Share of respondents by conflict experience and economic losses



Source: VSCM-S, 2021


2.3 SHOCK EXPERIENCES

Besides the COVID-19 Pandemic and pocket of violence, another event that caused a significant economic shock to the households was the oil blockage, which lasted nine months between January and September 2020. Since oil is the mainstay of the economy, the national GDP losses quickly trickled down at the micro-level, leading to increases in

⁸ REACH and UNOSTA (2019) Syrian Cities Damage Atlas - Eight Year Anniversary of the Syrian Civil War: Thematic assessment of satellite identified damage. [Link](#)

commodity prices and hardships. Ten percent of the households experienced shock or financial difficulties due to price fluctuation within the last 12 months following the survey. About 6 percent of the respondents reported hardship due to increased fuel and food prices. Beyond these financial shocks, there were equally other compounded misfortunes facing the households, such as the death of a working member (7 percent), household member temporary or chronically sick or injured (5 percent), insecurities (4 percent) as well as experiencing unusually high levels of diseases like the COVID-19 virus (3 percent). The other types of shocks like political problems, displacement, and lack or loss of employment were equally reported by 3 percent of the households. In general, the primary effect of these shocks is that they decrease the household's ability to produce or purchase food or other non-food items. Close to 50 percent of the households who reported shock said that these shocks impacted their households' ability to purchase food.

Figure 2-4 Share of respondents by shocks encountered in the previous 12 months




Source: VSCM-S, 2021

2.4 COVID-19 PANDEMIC

The COVID-19 Pandemic came in when most Libyan households were yet to recover from the conflict and economic shock, impacting the economic and financial well-being of a quarter of the respondents. About 22 percent acknowledged that COVID-19 impacted their employment. The Pandemic caused many people to lose their jobs, and it also reduced the income of many households. The impacts on the finances and

employment of the households are believed to be a result of the lockdowns implemented by several countries, including Libya, during the peak of COVID-19. These lockdowns and the fear of catching the virus may have also caused an emotional impact on the respondents. About 21 percent of respondents reported an impact of COVID-19 on their emotional well-being, and 15 percent reported an impact on health. COVID-19 also intensified gender-based violence in about 10 percent of households. Since the Pandemic, emerging reports have shown growing cases of gender-based violence worldwide. The already existing region-specific restrictive social norms and legal frameworks in Libya could have exacerbated the gender-based challenges women faced in the country⁹. Around one-third of displaced respondents said they feared gender discrimination during the COVID-19 Pandemic. In Libya, a recent report¹⁰ shows that gender stereotypes and social norms against women, such as preventing women from using public transportation unaccompanied, have continued to persist during the Pandemic. The UNWOMEN has labeled the intensification of gender-based violence during the Pandemic as a "shadow pandemic growing amidst the COVID-19 crises", which requires collective effort to stop¹¹.

Figure 2-5 Share of the respondents by the impact of COVID-19 on well-being



Source: VSCM-S, 2021

The currently displaced respondents, the returnees, female-headed households, and households with children are impacted more by the multiple misfortunes – conflict,


⁹ OECD Policy responses to Coronavirus (COVID-19) – Covid-10 crisis in the MENA region: Impact on gender equality and policy responses. [Link](#)

¹⁰ Haddad et al 2021 Who Is Bearing the Brunt? Impacts of War, Conflict, and COVID-19 on Women in Libya

¹¹ UNWOMEN: The Shadow Pandemic: Violence against women during COVID-19 [Link](#)

shocks, and COVID-19. Half of the currently displaced respondents had a violent experience with the conflict, 77 percent reported economic losses, 55 percent were impacted by COVID-19, and other shocks impacted 45 percent of this population group. Another group that was highly impacted was the returnees. Across socioeconomic dimensions, female-headed households were significantly more likely to experience shock than male-headed households. About 42 percent of female-headed households reported shock experiences compared to 30 percent of male-headed households who reported shocks. Households with children were also worse hit by COVID-19 than their counterparts.

Figure 2-6 Impact of multiple misfortunes on selected households




Source: VSCM-S, 2021

2.5 DISPLACEMENT

A quarter of the respondents are either currently or previously displaced due to the crises. As normalcy gradually returns to Libya, 70 percent of previously displaced respondents have returned, while the remaining are still scattered. These scattered households represent 7 percent of the sample, while 18 percent of the households surveyed are returnees. About 19 percent of currently displaced households in the sample are female-headed, slightly higher than the 15 percent of the returnee households headed by women.


Figure 2-7 Household profile by displacement status



Source: VSCM-S, 2021

The displacement pattern is predominantly characterized by intraregional movement, reflecting the decision to move quickly to the nearest Mantika during violent attacks. There is clear evidence of an intra-regional displacement pattern and movement towards the Western Region, especially Tripoli. The desire to stay close to family members and safety concerns influence the choice of location during displacement. More than half of the displaced households (56 percent) chose their location according to the level of safety. Thirty-eight percent said it was because they had family and friends already living there, while 3 percent said the presence of people from the same community influenced their location choice. Only 3 percent said good working opportunities are why they chose their displaced location.


Figure 2-8 Why did you choose your current location?



Source: VSCM-S, 2021

About 91 percent of the displaced household heads said they fled with their families when they moved, while 4 percent joined their families that had already fled. The displaced households ensured that no family member was left behind during the movement, and most displaced households lived together. While the majority moved with their families, for the others, their families joined them later (3 percent). Only 2 percent of the household heads said they went alone.


Figure 2-9 Did you move with someone else?



Source: VSCM-S, 2021

There are three peaks where most households were displaced at one time. The first is between 2011 and 2012, during the anti-Gaddafi uprising. The second occurred during the 2014/2015 civil war. The war between Haftar Libyan National Army and the Government of National Accord around the East and in Tripoli in 2018/2019 also resulted in a significant displacement of households. The right tail of the Figure shows that the lockdowns due to the COVID-19 Pandemic in 2020/2021 slowed down the rate of return.

Figure 2-10 Displacement and returning timeline of the displaced respondents




Source: VSCM-S, 2021

COVID-19 Pandemic, multiple forms of displacement, and the pervasive fear of insecurity have caused the most vulnerable households to remain displaced for a long time. For instance, while 92 percent of returnee respondents returned within two years of displacement, more than 25 percent of the currently displaced respondents have been displaced for more than eight years. Besides safety concerns, the IOM showed that the currently displaced households had experienced significant socioeconomic challenges and housing damages that increased their vulnerabilities, preventing them from returning¹².

¹² IOM-DTM Libya - IDP and Returnee Report 37 (May - June 2021) [Link](#)


Figure 2-11 Displacement status of respondents by the number of years



Source: VSCM-S, 2021

Regionally, the West hosts the largest share of displaced respondents hosting about 68 percent of the currently displaced households in the sample. Tripoli and Misrata are the two main Mantikas hosting displaced households in the Western Region, hosting close to 50 percent of the sample's total number of displaced households. In the East, Benghazi came first, hosting about 13 percent of displaced households. Many of the displaced households, especially those hosted in Benghazi and Tripoli, face protracted displacement as they have been displaced since 2015 or earlier during the first civil conflict in 2011. Tripoli, Benghazi, and Misrata are also the top return Mantikas, holding more than 60 percent of returnees in the sample.

Figure 2-12 Share (%) of displaced and returnee households by location



Source: VSCM-S, 2021


3 WELFARE SITUATION

3.1 LIVELIHOODS

The ILOSTAT¹³ estimated a national unemployment rate of 19.4 percent in 2020, which had increased from 18.5 percent reported in the pre-crisis period in 2008. The unemployment rate among the sample is 17 percent. The respondents' labor force participation is 33 percent, representing a significant decline from 50 percent recorded during the pre-crisis period in 2008. The reduction in the labor force participation¹⁴ is not surprising considering that the Libyan conflict resulted in massive infrastructure destruction, with thousands of people losing their jobs. The enormous destruction, movement restrictions, and oil blockages, which significantly impacted the economy over the last ten years, may have discouraged people from searching for jobs. Equally, the gender-based violence that characterized the violent crises lowered the number of females participating in labor activities during the conflict.

At the same time, there was a rise in self-employment, which represented a survival mechanism for most people that lost their jobs. Over 70 percent of employed respondents between 15 to 64 years are self-employed. This result is twice the percent estimated by ILOSTAT in 2012. The structural shift in labor activities might be linked to the fact that the Government was not able to pay their salaries during the oil blockade. Moreover, as several working-class people lost their employment in oil sectors and in education and health services, which were shut down due to the crises, many took up self-employment as a coping strategy.

Figure 3-1 Labor force and the unemployment rate




Source: VSCM-S, 2021

¹³ ILOSTAT Explorer, see [link](#)

¹⁴ Labour force participation and the unemployment rate is calculated for the working population 15years to 64 years. Although percentages reported in this section give some snapshots of the unemployment situation during the data collection period, these percentages do not represent the general household unemployment rate since data was collected only from the household heads, and the assessment is not representative at the national level.

Unemployment is highest among females between 25 and 54 years old, affecting 33 percent of female respondents. In contrast, the unemployment rate among males is 16 percent. The unemployment rate for females 55 to 64 years is 14 percent, while that of male counterparts is 12 percent. Younger respondents were more likely to be employed compared to older ones. For instance, the share of males less than 26 years unemployed in the last week was just around 8 percent.


Figure 3-2 Share of unemployment by age and gender



Source: VSCM-S, 2021

The unemployment rate is highest in the East, where about 22 percent of the total labor force is unemployed. The high unemployment in the East is influenced by the large share of the unemployed labor force in Misrata, about 30 percent. Unemployment in the West is around 15 percent but primarily concentrated in Tripoli, where about 21 percent of the labor force is unemployed. About 16 percent of the labor force in the South are unemployed, with Sebha (19 percent) contributing the highest share.

Figure 3-3 Share of unemployed by region



Source: VSCM-S, 2021

The blue-collar occupation class¹⁵, which requires physical strengths such as skilled agricultural and forestry workers, craft and trade workers, plant and machine operators, assemblers, and elementary occupations, became the major employer of labor during the conflict. About 24 percent of the employed people work in this occupation class. This is followed by white-collar jobs like low-level professionals, technicians, clerical support workers, service workers, and sales representatives, which employ about 12 percent of the labor force. Those who worked at professional and managerial levels make up 11 percent, while those who worked in the army are 10 percent. Older males without secondary school education are more likely to work in blue-collar jobs. The share of women working at managerial and professional levels is higher than that of males working in this class. This may be explained by the fact that women almost work exclusively in the health and education sector. More so, most working males are employed in public sector employment, including white-collar jobs and the army. Education attainment tends to play a role in the occupational class of the working population. Twice the share of working people with university education is employed at a managerial and professional level (15 percent) than those with only secondary education (7 percent).

¹⁵ Occupational class is grouped as follows: Managers and professionals are self-explanatory. The white-collar class is low-level professionals, technicians, clerical support workers, service workers, and sales. The blue-collar class are skilled agricultural and forestry workers, craft and trade workers, plant and machine operators, assemblers, and elementary occupations; the armed forces are self-explanatory.


Table 3-1 Respondent's characteristics by occupational class

Groups	Variables	Blue Collar	Armed Forces	White Collar	Managers And Professionals	Others
Gender	Female	16	4	7	16	57
	Male	25	11	13	10	41
Age	Below 25	23	23	8	8	38
	25 To 54	23	11	12	10	44
	55 To 64	26	7	14	13	40
Level Of Education	Below Secondary	28	13	9	6	44
	Secondary	21	12	19	7	41
	University	23	8	11	15	43
Household Size	Large - Above 5	23	10	13	11	41
	Small - Below 5	25	10	10	9	46
Household With Children	No	28	7	14	10	42
All	Sample	24	10	12	11	43

Source: VSCM-S, 2021.

Job security is also of concern as about 30 percent of working household heads do not have a work contract, and more than 50 percent are not making social security contributions. Blue-collar jobs have the highest share of people who do not have job security. Only half of those employed in blue-collar jobs signed a contract, and a third are not paying social security. The armed forces jobs offer better job security than other occupational classes, explaining the unusually high share of working members working in this sector. About 85 percent of those working in the armed forces had a contract, and 67 percent are paying social security. The lack of a contract and social security contributions are signs of informalities, and it also comes with additional vulnerabilities such as the risk of exploitation. At least one in three working household heads do not have job security.

Figure 3-4 Share of working respondents by working formalities



Source: VSCM-S, 2021.


Family and friendship networks and national employment programs are the primary sources of information for job search. About 32 percent of the households who worked found their current job through friends and relatives, and 29 percent got information about the job through national employment programs. Another vital source of information during job searches was direct contact with business owners (14 percent). Whether via the internet or newspaper, recruitment companies and advertisement contributed only 5 percent.

3.2 HOUSEHOLD INCOME AND INEQUALITY

In the sample, the households' primary sources of income are labor and commerce, reported by 76 percent of the households, whereas the remaining 24 percent depend on other forms of income sources. In the absence of a standard consumption model for measuring poverty, the household income¹⁶ from all sources provides a rough estimate of the welfare situation of the respondents during the time of the survey. These include the 11 percent who depend on their savings, the 4 percent who depend primarily on a pension, the 2 percent who depend on gifts from family and relatives as the primary income sources, and the other 2 percent who depend on remittances. About 1 percent depends on organizations' assistance, and 1 percent sell their assets to earn income.

¹⁶ Household income is the total income earned by all working members of the household from any source within the last month. The income above the 99th percentile was replaced by the 99th percentile value to reduce the effect of outliers. 1 USD = 4.60 LYD

Figure 3-5 Share of respondents by primary sources of household income




Source: VSCM-S, 2021.

The mean monthly income earned by the surveyed households was 260 Dinars, equivalent to 1.86 USD per person per day. There is a significant disparity in income between the bottom 20 percent (also known as the poorest 20 percent) of income earners and the top 20 percent. The poorest 20 percent earned an average of 74 Dinars per person per month, while the wealthiest 20 percent earned up to 690 Dinars per person per month. Households currently displaced earn 36 percent less than the amount earned by non-displaced households and 25 percent less than the returnees' households. The survey also shows that respondents living in the Eastern and Western Regions earn almost 30 percent more than those living in the South. It is worth noting that the Tripoli-based Government has severely reduced the salaries of government employees in response to oil blockages¹⁷, which had a widespread impact on total household income in areas under their control.

¹⁷ Libya Herald - Further reduction in salaries by Tripoli based Government 2020 Newspaper publication: [Link](#)

Figure 3-6 Average household income per month (Libyan Dinars)




Source: VSCM-S, 2021.

A Lorenz curve generated from the data shows that the top 20 percent of income earners take in close to half of the total income earned in the sample, whereas the bottom 20 percent earn around 5 percent of the total income. Inequality is a well-known driver of violent conflict¹⁸. In the survey, the evidence is quite daring. The variations in income levels suggested high levels of inequality which could be the driver of the conflicts. Furthermore, the Government's inability to pay public employees, the emergence of new poor groups, such as currently displaced households, and the destruction of livelihoods during the conflicts may worsen inequality, leading to protests and further conflict. Beyond the destruction of infrastructures and the limitation of movement of goods and humans, which impacts household employment and income during the conflict, the regional power struggle and the attendant differences in policies could enormously impact household income and welfare.

¹⁸ Bircan et al (2010) Violent Conflict and Inequality IZA DP No. 4990 June 2010, [Link](#)


Figure 3-7 Lorenz curve showing income inequality



Source: VSCM-S, 2021.

A third of the lowest income earners in the survey took on new debt in the last 3 months. As income increases, the percentage of respondents that took new debt decreases. In general, about 28 percent of the households took on new debt in the last three months to cover basic needs; it is around 35 percent for households in the bottom 40 percent. Only 17 percent of the top 20 percent of households had new debts in the last three months. Considering that food and non-food commodity prices have increased due to the conflicts, most households, especially the low-income groups, are spending more than their earnings. This excess expenditure is accommodated by taking more debt.


Figure 3-8 Differences in median income, expenditure, and debt



Source: VSCM-S, 2021.

About 37 percent of the low-income households in the survey took on new debt within the last three months to buy food. The reasons for debt vary across income levels, but food, medical expenditure, and rent are the top reasons for taking debt. More than 65 percent of households that took debt said it is to buy food, cover health expenses, or pay rent. Buying food is the main reason for the bottom 40 lowest income earners. However, food is never an important reason for the top 40 percent who took debt. If the poorest households in Libya continue to take on debt as a food coping mechanism, there are chances that a time may come when they may no longer take on more debt, especially when they fail to repay previous debts. Vulnerabilities may increase significantly, resulting in more worrisome and more profound challenges for the Government.

Figure 3-9 Reasons for taking debt by income quintiles



Source: VSCM-S, 2021.

3.3 CORRELATORS OF HOUSEHOLD INCOME

Currently displaced households, households with female heads, households with unemployed heads, households with children, households that took new debt, and living in the South are indicators that correlate with low income. On the other hand, having at least secondary school-educated household heads and very large household size have a substantial positive correlation with income. Experiencing conflict does not correlate significantly with income; however, households whose income levels are more likely to be impacted during the economic shocks are the wealthy households. This result provides evidence of the unique income challenges the unemployed and displaced households face during crises. The VSCM-S shows that the currently displaced household respondents are most likely to work fewer hours without a contract than non-displaced and returnee household heads. Added to the fact that more than half of the currently displaced households are working in the informal sector where they do not have social security contributions, the vulnerability of this group may be aggravated by job insecurity.

Table 3-2 Correlators of household income

VARIABLES	
Female Head of Household	-0.21
Household Head	0.01
Household Head Age Square	0.00
Household size	-0.26
Household size squared	0.01
Household with children	-0.08
Secondary	0.14
University	0.26
New debt in last 3mths	-0.26
Unemployed household head	-0.15
Still displaced household	-0.18
South	-0.15
Experienced shocks	0.05
Constant	5.94
Observations	2212


Source: VSCM-S, 2021. Notes: Linear regression of log of monthly income model showing only significant variables.

3.4 EDUCATION

About 8 percent of households with school-age children reported that their child(ren) was not attending school due to safety and lack of money before the COVID-19 school closure. Although COVID-19 lockdowns led to schools' closure, the survey shows that

some school-aged children were already not attending school because of safety and lack of money. While safety (73 percent) is the main reason for not attending school, lack of money (3 percent) and sickness (3 percent) are additional reasons. Lack of money is a higher reason for the first quintile income group compared to other income groups. It affected 1 in 10 of the first quintile households with school-age children not attending school. In contrast, safety is the most concern for wealthier households, reported by 88 percent of non-school attending households in the fourth quintile and 100 percent in the fifth quintile.

Figure 3-10 Reasons for not attending school




Source: VSCM-S, 2021.

3.5 HEALTH

COVID-19 is the second most common disease affecting the respondent households during the survey period. It was reported by 27 percent of the households that experienced the illness of a household member. One-third of the households had at least one household member who had one medical condition or illness. Chronic disease is the highest form of disease experienced reported by households; it affected close to half of the households that reported illness, followed by COVID-19. The households also reported other infectious diseases and emergency medical care, including injuries and mental health (5 percent).


Figure 3-11 Type of diseases reported by households



Source: VSCM-S, 2021.

Many households did not seek medical care because of lack of money, and some displaced households were denied medical care because of their status. About a third of the poorest households (bottom 20 income group) did not seek care when a member was ill because of lack of money. In general, 28 percent of households with a sick member did not seek care. Several reasons prevented the households from seeking care, from lack of money, fear of contracting COVID-19, denial due to displaced status, to those that recovered at home. During the data collection period, the fear of contracting the COVID-19 Pandemic was the primary deterrent to seeking medical care, reported by 32 percent of the households that did not seek care. It is self-evident among the top income quintile; however, the lack of money is a primary reason for most low quintiles. It is of policy concern that 2 percent of households who went to hospital/ medical center were denied care because of their displacement status. Also, 5 percent said the health facility is too far. As Libya plans to recover from many years of violence, policy needs should go beyond the medical infrastructures' improvements and develop more inclusive medical care services.

Figure 3-12 Reasons for not seeking care when ill




Source: VSCM-S, 2021.

3.6 HOUSING

Five percent of the households share accommodation or live in shelters, and 16 percent live in rented buildings. Most of the respondents own their homes (79 percent). The impact of crises on the housing of the displaced households is quite daring, with many previous homeowners now staying in rented houses because their houses were destroyed or seized. For instance, while 61 percent of currently displaced households were homeowners before their displacement, only 24 percent are homeowners presently in their host community. Also, around 30 percent of displaced households lived in rented apartments before displacement, in contrast to 69 percent who started living in rented homes. On the returnees, several non-homeowners who have returned have now become homeowners. For instance, 67 percent of returnees owned a home before displacement, but 84 percent now own a home after returning. It is suspected that increased house abandonment due to the displacements may have increased the share of the returnees who owned homes. Some returnees who have returned several years ago found opportunities to buy a home and have now become homeowners. However, it was also reported that many of these homes are partly destroyed.

Figure 3-13 House type by displacement status




Source: VSCM-S, 2021.

4 FOOD SECURITY AND COPING PRACTICES

4.1 FOOD SECURITY LEVELS

Food insecurity levels¹⁹ vary widely across the geographical areas surveyed, with only one out of five households being food secure. Around 14 percent were found food insecure, of which 2 percent were severely food insecure. Two-thirds of households were marginally food secure. Prevalence of severe and moderate food insecurity was highest in the South, affecting 20 percent of households compared to 14 percent in the West and 12 percent in the East. Zooming in further to the Mantikas, Murzuq (34.3 percent), Sebha (27.5 percent), Nalut (23.8 percent), and Aljbara (21 percent) has the highest prevalence of food insecurity, followed by Sirt (19.2 percent), Alkufra (18.2 percent), and Zwara (17.6 percent). However, severe food insecurity was highest in Alkufra (9.1 percent), Sebha (7.3 percent), and Nalut (7.1 percent).

Figure 4-1 Prevalence of food insecurity among respondents




Source: VSCM-S, 2021.

19 Details on food security methodology can be found in Annex xx

Households with a head with low educational attainment, households in the South, and displaced households were the most food insecure. When looking at characteristics of households with higher food insecurity levels, it is evident that the higher the educational attainment of the head of the household, the more food secure the household is. For example, food insecurity levels among households where the head has educational attainment of below secondary level are much higher than among those with a university degree (18.7 percent vs. 11.5 percent). Additionally, when comparing by the size of households, it was found that food security among small households is much lower than that among larger ones (only 17.4 percent among small vs. 24.2 percent among large households). The highest food insecurity levels were found in the South (20.7 percent) vs. 14.4 percent in the West and 13.8 percent in the East. Households in the South primarily engage in agriculture; however, as the conflict intensifies, they are less likely to do farm work, potentially leading to higher levels of food insecurity. Data also showed that food insecurity levels among displaced households (26.4 percent) are much higher than among returnees (17 percent) and non-displaced households (12.9 percent).

Figure 4-2 Food Security by Demographic Indicators among respondents




Source: VSCM-S, 2021.

The economic status of a household is a determinant of its food security status, as food insecurity levels among indebted households almost double that of households that have no debt (21.5 percent vs. 11.8 percent, respectively). When households were asked about reasons why they were indebted, overall, 30 percent mentioned it was to buy food. This was the leading reason among large households of 5 or more members (33 percent), households that have children (33 percent), and households in the bottom 40 income

quintiles (34 percent). Additionally, the lower the income levels of households, the higher the food insecurity levels (ranging from 17.8 percent among the poorest income quintiles to 9.6 percent among the wealthiest quintile).

Figure 4-3 Food Security by Economic Status



Source: VSCM-S, 2021.

4.2 FOOD CONSUMPTION SCORE


Inadequate food consumption is prevalent in the South and the West of Libya. The food consumption score is a proxy indicator and the first building block to determine the overall households' food security status. About 8 percent of households had a poor food consumption score, meaning they could not consume an adequate diet to lead a healthy life. Another 6 percent of households had borderline food consumption and were barely meeting their adequate food consumption needs. Poor food consumption was most prevalent among households living in Murzuq (22.9 percent), Nalut (19 percent), Zwara (12.8 percent), and Aljara (11.7 percent). The Southern Region has a large population of displaced households and migrants and predominantly engages in agricultural activities. Preliminary results of the Libyan Population Multisectoral Needs Assessment (MSNA) 2021²⁰ shows that 38 percent of households abandoned agriculture in the past 12 months, mainly due to loss of productive assets and movement restrictions (mainly due to insecurity/ conflict). This greatly affected the availability of employment, and availability of food in the Region (leading to more costly items due to high transportation costs), affecting the ability to meet basic needs, including food, due to either lack of income or reduced purchasing power, making households in this Region more vulnerable. According

²⁰ [Libyan Population Multisectoral Needs Assessment \(MSNA\) 2021: Health & MHPSS Findings, March, 1st 2022 - Libya | ReliefWeb](#)

to the latest JMMI report in September 2021, the cost of the MEB across Libya increased overall by 3.4 percent between August and September 2021, with the highest increase in the South (7.7 percent in September, compared to August 2021). It is also worth noting that the cost of the MEB in September 2021 was 26.5 percent higher than pre-COVID levels in March 2020.

Displaced households were most likely to have poor or borderline food consumption scores. About 13 percent of displaced households had poor food consumption compared to 5 percent of host communities. Poor food consumption was also considerably high among returnees, at 9 percent. The high prevalence of poor food consumption among displaced households was mainly driven by lower consumption of meat, dairy, staples, and vegetables when compared to host communities and returnees.

Figure 4-4 Food consumption patterns by displacement status




Source: VSCM-S, 2021.

4.3 CONSUMPTION-BASED COPING PRACTICES

Food insecure households increasingly resort to consumption coping strategies due to a lack of food or money, with 54 percent of households indicating they had adopted at least one coping strategy. These coping strategies can be as severe as reducing adult consumption so children can eat. The most adopted coping strategy is relying on less

preferred or less expensive food, which is adopted on average around twice a week. Households also reduce the number of meals and reduce meal size once a week. The frequency of coping strategies is highest among households with moderate and severe food insecurity.

Figure 4-5 Consumption-based coping strategies by food security status




Source: VSCM-S, 2021.

Households living in the South, displaced households, large households, households with children, female-headed households, households with high dependency ratio²¹, households with a head having lower educational attainment and aged under 55 years, households hosted as guests, renting their homes, or sharing accommodation were the groups adopting the highest consumption-based coping strategies. Data shows that displaced households adopted much more coping strategies than others, with an rCSI of 11 in contrast to 8 for returnees and 5 for host communities. Households that have children (rCSI of 7.2 vs. 4.1 for households without children), often also large households (rCSI of 6.7 vs. 5.2 for small households of less than 5 members), are also adopting more coping strategies than others. Female-headed households had a slightly higher rCSI compared to male-headed. Education and age of the head of the household are directly linked to adopting consumption-based coping strategies. Data shows that a household whose head has secondary education (rCSI of 6.5) or below (rCSI of 7) adopts more coping strategies than one whose head is a university graduate (rCSI of 5.4). Households with older heads (55 and above) have a much lower rCSI than households with younger heads

²¹ Dependency ratio is calculated by dividing the number of dependents over the number of independents. Those are then classified as households with low (less than 0.5), moderate (0.5 to 1), high (1 to 1.5), and extremely high dependency ratio (more than 1.5)


(under 55 years). Data also shows that the higher the dependency ratio, the higher the rCSI. Consistently with the food consumption levels by house type, households hosted as guests (rCSI of 9.8), households living in rented apartments (rCSI of 9.6), and households sharing accommodation with other families (rCSI of 8.7) were also the households resorting more to consumption-based coping strategies. It is also worth noting that employment status did not impact the adoption of consumption coping strategies.

Figure 4-6 Reduced coping strategy index, by Mantika



Source: VSCM-S, 2021.

Figure 4-7 Reduced coping strategy index by demographic indicators




Source: VSCM-S, 2021.

4.4 LIVELIHOOD BASED COPING STRATEGIES

Most respondents resorted to some severe and difficult-to-reverse coping strategies that negatively impacted their coping capacity. These strategies vary from stress strategies, such as spending savings or borrowing money, to crisis strategies, such as selling productive assets and reducing health expenditure, and emergency strategies, such as begging and engaging in illegal work. More than half the population resorted at least to one livelihood-based coping strategy (55 percent) in the 30 days before the survey, of which 13 percent resorted to emergency strategies, 25 percent used crisis, and 17 percent used stress strategies as their most severe coping strategy adopted. Spending savings (25 percent) to cope with lack of food or lack of money to buy food was the most frequently adopted strategy as stress, taking an additional job (21.8 percent) as crisis, and engaging in illegal work (7.6 percent) as emergencies (Figure 4.9). All severely food-insecure households resorted to at least a stress strategy. Emergency coping strategies were more prevalent among households that have children (15 percent) vs 11 percent of households that don't have children, displaced (22 percent) vs 18 percent of returnees, and 11 percent of non-displaced households, residing in the South (23 percent) vs 14 percent in the West and 10 percent in the East, indebted households (23 percent) vs 10 percent of households that have no debt, and households with unemployed heads (19 percent) vs 11 percent among households with an employed head.


Figure 4-8 Livelihood based coping strategies in Libya (%)



Source: VSCM-S, 2021.

Over half of displaced respondents (53 percent) adopted crisis and emergency coping strategies compared to 44 percent of returnee households and 36 percent of host communities. From the Migration Pulse survey conducted in 2021, IDPs mainly relied on casual labor as their primary source of income, and 41 percent reported a total loss or reduction in income compared to one year ago, mainly attributed to either COVID-19, insecurity, or both, which affected their ability to afford their essential needs. This could have made IDPs more vulnerable and highly reliant on crisis and emergency coping strategies. Crisis and emergency coping strategies among households with an unemployed head were much higher than in employed ones (55.3 and 31.8 percent, respectively). Households with children adopted crisis and emergency coping strategies much more than those without children (41 percent vs. 32 percent respectively). By location, almost half the population in the South adopted crisis and emergency coping strategies (48 percent) compared to 38 percent in the East and 37 percent in the West. This can be explained by the evidence that by Region, households in the poorest income quintile reside more in the South (32 percent) vs. 25 percent in the East and 22 percent in the West. Additionally, the younger the age of the head of the household, the higher the prevalence of adopting crisis and emergency coping strategies.


Figure 4-9 Livelihood based coping strategy index, by demographic indicators



Source: VSCM-S, 2021.

The higher the food insecurity level, the higher the prevalence of households experiencing external factors such as personal or economic losses due to conflict, a negative impact from COVID-19 during the last 12 months, and external shocks during the last 12 months. When assessing households that experienced any of such external factors (multiple misfortunes), it is evident that more than three out of four food-insecure households (77 percent of severely food insecure and 78 percent of moderately food insecure vs. 63 percent of food secure households) went through any of those experiences (Figure 4.11). This indicates that conflict, COVID-19, and external shocks are all key drivers of food insecurity among sampled households.

Figure 4-10 External factors and Food Security²²



Source: VSCM-S, 2021.

4.5 FOOD SECURITY AND ECONOMIC VULNERABILITY

Among sampled respondents' households, most expenditures are dedicated to food, namely 63 percent of total expenditures, 14 percent to education, and 13 percent to health.²³ One of the angles to measure food insecurity is a household's economic vulnerability, which determines their coping capacity. In terms of food security, the higher the food expenditure share, the more economically vulnerable a household is to food insecurity. A proxy indicator used to measure economic vulnerability is the food expenditure share. This indicator is based on the premise that the greater the importance of food within a household's overall budget (relative to other consumed items/services), the more economically vulnerable the household is. Households spending more than 75 percent of their total expenditure on food are considered severely food insecure households, and those spending between 65 percent and 75 percent of expenditures on food are accounted for as moderately food insecure. The high levels of income spent on food are similar for all income quintile groups due to the problem of rising food prices. The


²² Experienced conflict includes those who were injured/beaten/tortured, having a close relative who was injured/beaten/tortured/dead, and those having close relatives who were forced to move elsewhere. Economic losses due to conflict includes households that had their house destroyed or seized, had their firm/shop/other economic activity destroyed or seized, lost all their properties (house, fields, animals, firm, vehicles, etc), and those that lost all their properties and all their savings. Impacted by COVID includes households that rated high or very high impact due to COVID from the different dimensions (economic and financial, health, emotional, employment, and gender-based violence). Impacted by shocks includes displacement, floods/drought, lack of agricultural inputs and high cost of seeds/fertilizers, household member temporarily or chronically ill or injured, unusually high level of human disease-Corona virus, lack or loss of employment, increase in fuel/food commodities prices, political problems, price fluctuations, insecurity, death of a working household member, theft of money/valuables, prison/detainment, fire, or any other shocks. Impacted by multiple misfortunes includes households that experienced any of the aforementioned misfortunes (conflict, losses due to conflict, COVID, or shocks)

²³ A short module for expenditures was used for this remotely collected survey, so the breakdown of expenditures was very limited in the data.

higher the food prices, the more likely households may reduce expenses on non-food to smoothen food consumption.


One-third (34 percent) are considered severely food insecure, whereas 16 percent of households are considered moderately food insecure. This means that half the population are economically vulnerable, with a low coping capacity to shocks. When zooming in by mantika, the prevalence of households that spend over 75 percent of their total expenditure on food (and are therefore considered severe food insecure from an economic vulnerability perspective) is highest among households residing in Nalut (55 percent) and Sebha (42 percent), and Al Marj (40 percent).

Figure 4-11 Household Expenditure Shares



Source: VSCM-S, 2021.

Figure 4-12 Share of Food Expenditure by Mantika




Source: VSCM-S, 2021.

4.6 CORRELATES OF FOOD INSECURITY

Food insecurity is driven both by household characteristics and the state of the conflict in each Region. An overlay map of the number of fatalities and the proportion of households reporting inadequate food consumption (poor or borderline food consumption score) in each Mantika identifies five Mantikas – Sirt, Sebna, Al Jabal, Zwara, and Almargeb – as having a high number of conflict-related fatalities and a high percentage of households reporting inadequate food consumption. Nonetheless, some Mantikas in the South, such as Ejdabia, Tobruk, Alkufra, and Murzuq, have severe food insecurity but few conflict-related deaths. The Southern Region has a higher concentration of poorer households that work on farms. Despite experiencing lower conflicts, most households in the South reported higher food insecurity due to limited purchasing power and low food availability because most farmers were not going to farm during the conflict.

Figure 4-13: Overlay map of fatalities and food insecurity



Note: Food security is Low when the food security index is less than 0.119, otherwise High. Fatality is Low when number of fatalities is less than 490.

Source: VSCM-S, 2021.

Generally, regression results show that households that reported experiencing shocks in the previous 12 months face more food insecurity challenges than households that did not report experiencing shocks. Other key household characteristics that positively correlate with food insecurity are uneducated heads, unemployed household heads, households that took on new debts, and households that live in the South.

Table 4-1 Correlates of food insecurity

VARIABLES	
Secondary	-0.28
University	-0.53
New debt in last 3mths	0.56
Unemployed household head	0.26
Still displaced household	0.67
South	0.38
Experienced shocks	0.57
Constant	-2.19
Observations	2250

Source: VSCM-S, 2021. Notes: Regression model showing only significant variables.


5 MULTIDIMENSIONAL DEPRIVATION AND SOCIAL PROTECTION

5.1 MULTIDIMENSIONAL DEPRIVATION

Several households had experienced multiple deprivations in essential elements of human capital development as a result of the conflict, shock, and COVID-19 Pandemic. More than a half of sampled respondents (55 percent) indicated that their households are deprived in at least one of five multidimensional deprivation dimensions (education, food, housing, health, and safety). Around 14 percent of the respondents reported deprivation in at least one-third of the five dimensions, and 5 percent were deprived in at least half of the five dimensions.

Prolonged conflicts and pandemics have caused severe deprivations by interrupting essential health and education services. Although several respondents suffered from more than one of the multiple deprivation dimensions, the most prominent deprivations are around their safety, education, and health, where over one-third of households reported deprivations in each of those dimensions. About 20 percent of the respondents reported deprivation in the food dimension, and 5 percent reported deprivation in the housing dimension. Half of those respondent households who are deprived of food are also deprived in health or security dimensions. Half of those respondent households deprived of safety are also deprived in health dimension.


Figure 5-1 Share of households by multidimensional deprivation categories



Source: VSCM-S, 2021.

Deprivation in safety was driven by two key factors, direct experience of violent conflict (25 percent) and forced displacement in the last 12 months (25 percent). About 8 percent of the households with school-age children said that their children were not attending school even before the Pandemic due to safety and lack of money. When it comes to health deprivation, the key driver was having a household member experiencing any kind of disease during the previous year, including chronic diseases, infectious diseases, COVID-19, emergency medical care, mental health, maternity, and others. The prevalence of any household member experiencing such a disease was 35 percent.

Figure 5-2 Share of households by multidimensional deprivation indicators




Source: VSCM-S 2021.

5.2 ASSISTANCE AND SOCIAL PROTECTION

Despite the high levels of deprivation experienced by many households, only a small percentage of respondents received assistance from governments and non-governmental organizations. First, when asked how they coped during the COVID-19 Pandemic, the majority of respondents (93 percent) said they only received support from family and friends. Two percent received assistance from local NGOs, while the remaining five percent received assistance from other sources. Only 4 percent of respondents received assistance from the Government, NGOs, or UN agencies in the previous six months. Also, among those who benefited from assistance from the Government, NGOs,

and UN agencies, the General Food Assistance (GFA) provided by WFP was the primary type of assistance received (69 percent). The share that received a cash transfer from the Government and UN organization was low, only 8 and 7 percent, respectively. Six percent of those who received assistance received free health care from NGOs, 2 percent received cash transfers, and 2 percent benefitted from public works and Food for Assets (FFA) programs. Only 1 percent said they received school feeding. While a quarter of the households that received assistance do not know the names of the assistance provider, other households mentioned the Government, international NGOs like Red crescent organizations, Atta Alkhir Charity Association, Emdad Charity Organization, Kafaa Development Establishment, and United nation organizations like World Food Programme, IOM/DTM, UNHCR and UNICEF as their leading assistance providers.

Figure 5-3 What type of assistance did you receive?



Source: VSCM-S 2021.

Looking at the profile of households that received assistance, vulnerable households are more likely to receive assistance than their counterparts. For instance, being female-headed households, households with a head that did not attend secondary school, households with children, unemployed household heads, the bottom 20 percent income class, and currently displaced households are vital determinants of receiving assistance. Households who reported misfortunes, including conflict experience, shock, and COVID-19, stand better chances of receiving assistance. Therefore, the challenge of assistance is not correctly targeting the vulnerable households but on the value, volume, and the kind of assistance provided.

6 CONCLUSION

The decade-long conflict, followed by the outbreak of COVID-19 and other crises, had severe negative repercussions on the people of Libya. Household welfare has significantly deteriorated in the face of the violent conflict combined with economic shocks and the COVID-19 Pandemic. The loss of jobs and sources of income, combined with a series of reduced Government expenditures, means that many households can no longer afford basic needs. Food insecurity increased generally across the Mantikas, driven mostly by the household characteristics and the state of conflict in each area. There was a general reduction in purchasing power and limited food availability since most farmers were not going to farm during the conflict. Many households reported inadequate food consumption, predominantly the displaced, low-income earners, and people living in the South. The number of households owing debt is very high, and many households have adopted crisis or emergency coping strategies or exhausted them.

The conflict resulted in the death of thousands and displacement of hundreds of thousands, with many displaced people unable to return to their place of origin due to lack of financial capacity or because their houses were destroyed. In addition to death and displacement caused by the crises, there is evidence of destruction and deterioration of essential infrastructure, including schools and hospitals. Many school-age children were not attending school due to safety and lack of money before the COVID-19 school closure. Health care became too expensive for many households, with some reporting not seeking medical assistance when sick due to lack of money. There is evidence of health care discrimination as some IDPs reported being denied medical care because of their displacement status. More so, there are deprivations across all segments of human development indicators, with more than half of the sampled respondents reporting deprivation in at least one of the five crucial human development indicators- education, food, housing, health, and safety.

While Libya is an upper-middle-income country, the challenges reported in the survey reflect values typically found in countries in FCV setting. Vulnerability among the population is likely to increase as a result of the Russian-Ukraine crisis and its implications on the food security in the country. This is particularly of concern as Libya relies heavily on Russia and Ukraine for wheat, barley, and maize which are part of the national staples.

Despite the challenges, and provided stabilization efforts are sustained, Libya has the opportunity to exploit its oil wealth to achieve economic growth, and therefore undertake much-needed investments in its social sectors. While official national account data have been absent for much of the conflict period, estimates from the Macro Poverty Outlook of the World Bank using oil production and government spending reveal that the

economic growth often rebounds during each transitional period of relative peace²⁴. Libya may likely benefit from the rising global oil price if oil production and export continue without any extended disruption. The Government must use the proceeds from oil to rebuild critical service sectors such as education, health, and social safety nets to protect all groups of population.

Finally, rebuilding Libya will require significant social protection reforms, with prioritization of assistance to the most vulnerable population. Presently, social protection is minimal and rarely reaches most people who need it. In a report published by the UN Office of the Coordinator of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA, as of July 2021), more than 1.3 million Libyans, equivalent to 19 percent of the population, need humanitarian assistance²⁵. However, the VSCM-S survey shows that only 4 percent of the respondents received assistance, of which only 8 percent received Government Social Protection Assistance. In the case of policy support prioritization, the most vulnerable households identified in this survey include the displaced households, female-headed households, households with large families, and households living in the Southern Region.

²⁴ MPO Spring 2022 [Link](#)

²⁵ OCHA, Humanitarian Needs Overview – Libya, July 2021 [Link](#)

ANNEX

ANNEX 1: FOOD SECURITY CLASSIFICATION METHODOLOGY (CARI)

CARI is an approach used to aggregate different food security indicators into one index to report on the population's overall food security status. The Food Security Console (or CARI console) is the final output of the CARI and presents the food security indicators into a summary table that distributes the percentage of the population for each indicator based on a specific cut-off point. The console itself provides a clear snapshot of the rates of different types of a population's food security levels at a quick glance.

The CARI assesses availability and access to food by measuring the status of household consumption. The CARI measures the ability of a household to stabilize consumption over time by measuring the coping capacity through economic vulnerability and livelihood coping strategies. CARI has been calculated using the following combination of indicators:

	Domain	Indicator	Food Secure	Marginally food secure	Moderately food insecure	Severely food insecure
Status	Food consumption	Food consumption groups (FCG)	86.8%		6.6%	6.6%
Coping capacity	Economic capacity	Food Expenditure Share	27.1%	22.4%	16.3%	34.2%
	Livelihood Coping Strategies	Livelihood Coping Strategies Index	45.1%	16.7%	24.9%	13.3%
CARI			21.9%	63.5%	12.3%	2.3%