household level panel data;long-run effect;rural credit market;household fixed effect;coverage rate;loan size;informal loan;higher interest rate;household borrowing;panel ...  See More + data set;family and friends;average coverage rate;pool of borrower;financial sector reform;sizes of loan;consumer price index;extent of coverage;development research group;economies of scale;government policy interventions;return to investment;amount of loan;primary level education;source income;panel data analysis;source of income;informal credit;exclusion restriction;household characteristic;treatment group;empirical analysis;landless household;selection bias;entrepreneurial ability;learning effect;instrumental variable;explanatory variable;risk aversion;identification approach;microfinance institution;total credit;estimation result;poor household;participation rate;repayment schedule;village characteristic;informal borrowing;cream skimming;alternative hypothesis;repayment rate;private information;Rural Poor;causal effect;econometric approach;poverty alleviation;productive potential;borrowing rate;empirical model;aggregate demand;risk preference;formal bank;rural area;household size;residual term;government intervention;demand shift;cultivable land;informal markets;undue influence;adequate power;large borrower;educated woman;loan demand;education level;base year;village school;micro-credit lending;outstanding loan;probit regression;public bank;learning difference;negative sign;empirical result;standard approach;negative effect;donor policies;explanatory power;total sample;general equilibrium;alternative specification;cut-off point;poverty targeting;unobserved characteristic;national survey;econometric analysis;credible evidence;informal lender;average propensity;Land Ownership;robustness check;path dependence;empirical research;small fraction;empirical issue;informal financier;multiple sources;moral hazard;adverse selection;downward bias;experimental data;vicious cycle;debt accumulation;threshold effects;inadequate infrastructure;causal impact;cross-section data;development policy;open access;debt settlement;credit cooperatives;rural bank;income variability;household use;household outcomes;occupational choice;learning capacity;loan disbursement;green revolution;functional form;nonlinear effect;potential borrower;negative implying;market center;common land;transactions cost;smaller number;risk premium;effective competition;land-poor household;government credit;null hypothesis;important component;estimation procedure;branch managers;standard model;empirical evidence;coverage area;donor funding;microfinance program;credit program;  See Less -