Building Monitoring and Evaluation Capacity in Young Systems: The Experiences of Rwanda, Vietnam, and Yemen

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Acknowledgments

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3
Introduction

Purpose and Objectives
This study is funded by the Governance Partnership Facility to better understand country experiences with building M&E capacity to identify paths to success and obstacles to reform. For every country—whether recently emerging from conflict, low-income, or OECD—monitoring and evaluation (M&E) is critical to evidence-based policymaking, budget decisions, management, and accountability—all elements of good governance. Building M&E capacity in fragile and conflict-affected states is not a well-documented topic, although analysts generally agree that even in these challenging contexts, countries can set up monitoring capabilities, albeit with heavy donor support. This study aims to strengthen the knowledge base by synthesizing and comparing the experiences of Rwanda, Vietnam, and Yemen in building capacity for their recently established M&E systems. The study also draws comparisons with Mexico’s more well-developed M&E system.

This paper is directed to policymakers, development workers, donors, and other supporters of M&E research, operations, and activities. We envision that providing country case studies on implementing M&E programs in difficult circumstances will contribute to a South-South knowledge exchange for key stakeholders who are working to advance newly established M&E systems in their own countries.

Key Questions and Methodology
This paper examines the progress of M&E capacity-building in three very different countries and contexts; each country had its own unique mix of M&E champions, relationships, and donor collaborations; existing surveys and other data; and primary motivations for initiating M&E capacity-building. The paper addresses the following key questions:

1) What are the useful takeaways from the experiences of Rwanda, Vietnam, and Yemen?
2) What is the role of incentives in bringing about M&E systems?
3) What role does political economy play, and how will governments use the M&E information that is produced?
4) What challenges did the three countries faced during the capacity-building process?
5) To what extent will M&E capacity last after donor efforts and projects conclude or if M&E champions leave the government?

Vietnam was selected as a country case study because it has been relatively successful in developing a results-based M&E framework to monitor its national poverty reduction strategy. The Rwanda and Yemen case studies illustrate the challenges of M&E capacity-building in fragile and conflict-affected states. The addition of Mexico—a country with a well-developed M&E system—provides a useful point of comparison.¹ We note that the demand for M&E data from newly established governmental systems is often a donor-driven requirement for reporting

¹ For the Mexico comparison, the author used Gloria Rubio’s publications and presentations authored for the Mexican government. These are as follows:
and monitoring. Thus, in this paper, building M&E capacity predominantly refers to setting up monitoring and reporting capabilities, before undertaking the evaluation portion of the process. Although initially basic, the newly minted monitoring arrangements assist fragile and conflict-affected countries in supporting efforts to improve service delivery and government accountability.
### List of Acronyms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ADB</td>
<td>Asian Development Bank</td>
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<tr>
<td>AMT</td>
<td>Aligned Monitoring Tool</td>
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<td>CAS</td>
<td>Country Assistance Strategy</td>
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<td>CFAA</td>
<td>Country Financial Accountability Assessment</td>
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<td>CG</td>
<td>Consultative Group</td>
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<tr>
<td>CPIA</td>
<td>Country Policy and Institutional Assessment</td>
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<tr>
<td>CPRGS</td>
<td>Comprehensive Poverty Reduction and Growth Strategy</td>
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<td>CSO</td>
<td>Civil Society Organization</td>
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<td>DAC</td>
<td>Development Assistance Committee (OECD)</td>
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<tr>
<td>DFID</td>
<td>(UK) Department for International Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>DPPR</td>
<td>Fourth Development Program for Poverty Reduction (Yemen)</td>
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<tr>
<td>EC</td>
<td>European Commission</td>
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<tr>
<td>EDPRS</td>
<td>Economic Development and Poverty Reduction Strategy (Rwanda)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EFARO</td>
<td>Economic, Financial, and Administrative Reform Program (Yemen)</td>
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<tr>
<td>GFS</td>
<td>Government Finance Statistics</td>
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<td>GSO</td>
<td>General Statistical Office</td>
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<td>GTZ</td>
<td>German Agency for International Cooperation</td>
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<td>HCS</td>
<td>Hanoi Core Statement</td>
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<tr>
<td>HIPC</td>
<td>Highly Indebted Poor Country</td>
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<tr>
<td>IDA</td>
<td>International Development Association (World Bank Group)</td>
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<tr>
<td>IEG</td>
<td>Independent Evaluation Group (World Bank Group)</td>
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<tr>
<td>IMF</td>
<td>International Monetary Fund</td>
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<td>IMT</td>
<td>Independent Monitoring Team</td>
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<td>LDC</td>
<td>Least Developed Country</td>
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<td>LICUS</td>
<td>Low Income Country Under Stress</td>
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<tr>
<td>M&amp;E</td>
<td>Monitoring and Evaluation</td>
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<tr>
<td>MARD</td>
<td>Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development (Vietnam)</td>
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<td>MDG</td>
<td>Millennium Development Goal</td>
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<tr>
<td>MiDR</td>
<td>Managing for Development Results</td>
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<tr>
<td>MIS</td>
<td>Management Information System</td>
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<td>MOLISA</td>
<td>Ministry of Labour, Invalids and Social Affairs (Vietnam)</td>
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<tr>
<td>MOPIC</td>
<td>Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation</td>
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<td>MPI</td>
<td>Ministry of Planning and Investment (Vietnam)</td>
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<td>MSI</td>
<td>Management Systems International</td>
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<td>MTEF</td>
<td>Medium-Term Expenditure Framework</td>
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<td>MTR</td>
<td>Mid-Term Review</td>
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<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-Governmental Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Description</td>
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<tr>
<td>NPA</td>
<td>National Planning Authority (Uganda)</td>
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<td>NSDS</td>
<td>National Strategy for the Development of Statistics (Rwanda)</td>
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<td>NSIS</td>
<td>National Statistical Indicator System</td>
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<td>NSO</td>
<td>National Statistical/Statistics Office</td>
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<td>NSS</td>
<td>National Statistical System</td>
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<td>ODA</td>
<td>Official Development Assistance</td>
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<td>ODI</td>
<td>Overseas Development Institute</td>
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<td>OECD</td>
<td>Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development</td>
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<td>OPM</td>
<td>Oxford Policy Management</td>
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<td>PFM</td>
<td>Public Financial Management</td>
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<tr>
<td>PFM</td>
<td>Public Finance Management</td>
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<tr>
<td>PMU</td>
<td>Project Monitoring Unit</td>
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<td>PRGF</td>
<td>Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility</td>
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<td>PRS</td>
<td>Poverty Reduction Strategy</td>
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<td>PRSC</td>
<td>Poverty Reduction Support Credit</td>
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<tr>
<td>SEDP</td>
<td>Socio-economic Development Plan</td>
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<td>SFD</td>
<td>Social Fund for Development (Yemen)</td>
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<tr>
<td>TFYP</td>
<td>Third Socio-Economic Development Plan for Poverty Reduction (Yemen)</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Programme</td>
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<tr>
<td>USAID</td>
<td>United States Agency for International Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>VAMESP</td>
<td>Vietnam Australia Monitoring &amp; Evaluation Support Programme</td>
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<tr>
<td>VDG</td>
<td>Vietnam Development Goal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VDR</td>
<td>Vietnam Development Report</td>
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<tr>
<td>VHLSS</td>
<td>Vietnam Household Living Standards Survey</td>
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</table>
Chapter 1: Cross-Country Analysis for Building M&E Capacity in Fragile and Conflict-Affected States

The M&E implementation experiences of Vietnam, Rwanda, and Yemen illustrate paths to success as well as obstacles to reform. Each case study provides detailed information about M&E champions; the sequence of reforms; accountability relationships; system strengths, weaknesses, and usage; and some thoughts on next steps. This first chapter uses comparisons with Mexico as a benchmark to highlight commonalities and differences across all three countries. The comparisons with Mexico also raise leading questions about incentives, political economy, challenges countries are likely to face, and sustainability.

In presenting case studies of three countries with vastly different M&E experiences, this study aims to achieve the following:

- Provide useful takeaways from the experiences of three different countries.
- Increase understanding of the role and effectiveness of incentives in building M&E capacity. Explore how each country will use the information produced for decision-making and how information will play key roles in future similar initiatives.
- Raise awareness of the political economy implications of building an M&E system.
- Examine the challenges and obstacles each country faced along the way.
- Consider how sustainable M&E capacity is and how likely it will last after project and donor efforts end or M&E champions leave government.

What are some useful takeaways from the experiences of Mexico, Rwanda, Vietnam, and Yemen?

The comparisons across these four countries are summarized into two useful frameworks to help policymakers and other colleagues that work on the daunting and important task of building M&E capacity in young systems: mechanics and process of building M&E capacity.

The first framework revolves around the mechanics of building M&E capacity: documenting and comparing main activities, M&E champions, accountability relationships, and what information was produced. While there is no single correct path, the country cases illustrate the importance of utilizing what capacity exists, and for donors to aim to build local capacity and buy-in while striving to avoid proliferation of indicators and donor-driven reporting demands. Indeed, while donors played important roles in Rwanda, Vietnam, and Yemen, the focus of the case studies is more on the role that government and civil society played. Building statistical capacity is clearly also a key task, and it involved integrating the national statistics office as early as possible and clarifying roles and responsibilities between it and whatever government agency was overseeing the results of government programs and policies. For example, in Vietnam, the General Statistics Office has a clear mandate for monitoring poverty reduction, whereas the Ministry of Labor, Invalids and Social Affairs uses the information it generates for targeting. Along those lines, the need to work closely across line ministries to reduce the number of indicators is also illustrated in many of the country examples. While Rwanda’s Economic Development and Poverty Reduction Strategy had 93 indicators at the national level and 425 indicators across its 11 sectors, Yemen’s Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation held many workshops...
with line ministries to decrease its number of Fourth Development Program for Poverty Reduction indicators from 450 to below 200.

Mexico, Rwanda, Vietnam, and Yemen—countries with very different experiences, governments, and political cultures—illustrate what different key activities of advancing M&E capacity can look like. In the late 1990s, Mexico’s Oportunidades conditional cash transfer program had a rigorous impact evaluation component that became a model for Mexican public administration and paved the way for more social development programs to use impact evaluation methodologies in the future. While Rwanda set up a comprehensive and well-defined agency to oversee M&E activities, Vietnam built on past successes to inform future challenges. Yemen used South-South and North-South examples to avoid reinventing the wheel and learn from what worked for other countries. Donors played a key role, especially in Rwanda and Yemen.

The rest of this chapter will discuss the second framework, which is a comparison across the process of such an initiative, from incentives and political economy issues through to challenges faced and assessment of sustainability.

What are the incentives for building M&E capacity?

There are many different incentives for building M&E capacity, and the process is broad enough to accommodate them. A common theme of the country experiences in this study is that they all used high-quality data and information that came out of the M&E process to support national strategies and inform evidence-based policymaking; the fact that M&E-derived data will have practical applications is the heart of the process. If the data are poor quality, policymakers will not use the data. Ultimately, if the data are not being used, a country has no incentive to set up processes, tools, and capabilities to improve data quality. The countries in this study exemplify how considerable progress can be made to improve data quality and to ensure that information will be used. Their experiences can be summed up as follows:

- **In Mexico**, used as a point of comparison for the three country case studies, implementing incentives led to increased transparency and accountability, as well as improved efficiency and effective resource allocation. From 2000 to 2006, the government conducted more than 500 external evaluations, but used very little of this information. But in 2006, Mexico’s Federal Budget and Fiscal Responsibility Law established a government-wide performance evaluation system to strengthen transparency and accountability, in addition to assessing progress in meeting policy and program objectives that would inform performance-based budgetary decision-making.

- **Rwanda** demonstrated the importance of using M&E information for evidence-based policymaking.
  - Establishing upward accountability and supporting the government’s control were key to improving Rwanda’s M&E capacity.
• The line ministries received government incentives throughout the budget process. Indeed, the release of the Economic Development and Poverty Reduction Strategy report is strategically timed to influence the debate on resource allocations.
• The president’s office dispensed the incentives for building M&E capacity, leading to better implementation of policies and oversight of resource allocations.
• **Vietnam** shows how indicators can support a national strategy.
  • The government built M&E capacity to satisfy donor requirements, address system weaknesses, support better policy decision-making, improve effective resource allocation, and perhaps also to increase transparency.
• **Yemen** had to first address the proliferation of data, illustrating a common M&E challenge of “too much data, not enough information,” before incentives could be effective.
  • Donors led the initiatives to build M&E capacity, but the incentives included support to the government, as well as accountability to donors.
  • Although the topic of M&E had been raised in the country for several years before the grant approval, no policies or activities had been implemented.

**What role does political economy play, and how will governments use the M&E information produced?**

As the political economic context is unique to each country, the role of M&E information and how it is used differs.

• **Mexico**’s fiscal concerns led to increased interest in having the Ministry of Finance promote public expenditure efficiency and effectiveness in 2006. Also, the Ministry of Finance and the National Evaluation Council entered into a strategic partnership in 2007. Both agencies worked closely with the Ministry of Public Management on a revised set of evaluation guidelines for regulating M&E activities, ensuring evaluation quality and usage, creating evaluation counterparts in line ministries, and setting up a systematic feedback mechanism.
• **Rwanda**’s political economy is unique because external donors fund most of the government’s budget, making the government more responsive to donors’ needs to report measurable results. M&E information also supports the president’s decision-making, and the president uses this information to review performance across all levels of government. The M&E information also supports the country’s decentralization process by strengthening accountability mechanisms between the central and sub-national governments.
• **Vietnam**’s government—while not democratically elected—enjoys uncontested legitimacy and effective control over its territories. It has a relatively high capacity to formulate and implement its policies, including taking long-run strategic perspectives.
The government is also highly committed to poverty reduction, as evidenced by its historically remarkable performance in reducing poverty. Vietnam’s development continues an egalitarian pattern, especially compared to development in many other fast-growing economies. The government has also effectively led the development agenda, while actively learning from and selectively applying lessons from donor support. Deeply entrenched institutions, including those in the planning system, provide stability and accountability, although operating through structures and processes that are quite unlike Western democratic models. Conversely, the deeply entrenched institutional arrangements, and the incentives generated for individual and organizational behavior, may militate against rapid and fundamental reforms.

- The World Bank project profiled in the Yemen section finished only a few months before unrest began in the Middle East. Therefore, we are not certain whether the suggested next steps to strengthen the sustainability of the M&E capacity were ever implemented. The Yemen example illustrates how progress can be interrupted by renewed instability; though we hope that the process will continue after hostilities end, including plans for the Fourth Development Program for Poverty Reduction to better integrate M&E.

What challenges were faced along the process of building capacity?

Not only does the process of building M&E capacity have many stops and starts along the way, but also there is no single, correct path given there will be challenges related to issues ranging from low statistical capacity to political incentives to be less transparent.

- **Mexico** expected that building a logical framework would help improve consistency and quality in program design.
  - In practice, however, the Ministry of Finance and line ministry budget officials struggled to take full advantage of the framework’s fairly comprehensive performance measurement, given the need to provide quarterly reports of indicators. Thus, programs were often discouraged from registering a broader set of indicators with the Performance Evaluation System that may take a year or more to be measured, even if they are necessary to fully account for program outcomes.
  - Setting meaningful targets for indicators resulting from strategic planning exercises was another difficulty. According to the 2008 specific performance evaluation, approximately 20 percent of the indicators achieved levels that were 20 percent higher than the established target values, raising questions about the merit of the target-setting process.

- **Rwanda**’s donors played a key role in supporting capacity building; however, in some sectors, such as the health sector, donor reporting demands reportedly overburdened the system.
• In Vietnam, while the Comprehensive Poverty Reduction and Growth Strategy contained a more developed and integrated M&E system, its system paralleled the existing planning system.
  • It is unclear how much the earlier strategy’s M&E system—as opposed to the policy matrix for the Poverty Reduction Support Credit—influenced government actions. The planning for the poverty reduction strategy influenced the planning process for the Socio-economic Development Plan, but the development plan’s approach remains only partially results-focused and its M&E approach does not amount to a fully developed “M&E system” as defined by the literature. The SEDP 2011–2015 preparation timetable did not appear to reorient the planning system toward a more thorough results-based approach.
  • The 2007 Vietnam Development Report 2007 (World Bank, 2006) noted that progress in reforming the strongly entrenched central planning system was partial and uneven. The report critiqued the “lack of a coherent conceptual and regulatory framework,” as well as the “confusion in ministries, agencies, and provinces on what the government can and cannot legitimately plan for.” It also noted that “no systematic or consistent guidelines” were tailored to specific needs at different levels of government. Official instructions are fairly general, which can contribute to innovation among supporters, but also contribute to stagnation to those who want to keep the status quo.

• Yemen’s government lacked capacity to actually implement the project and sustained political delays that set progress back. The World Bank worked very closely with the Yemeni authorities and the M&E unit of the Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation to carry out the project as best as possible under the circumstances.
  • Low project implementation capacity and political delays affected the implementation and some of the final project outcomes.
  • The local project coordinator initially faced a steep learning curve.
  • Although the grant was approved in March 2007, it did not become effective until October of that year. Eventually, a fully-staffed and Ministry-supported M&E unit was running. The project coordinator kept in regular contact with the team leader, submitting Terms of Reference and contracts for comments and approval, and the team leader’s regular supervisory missions took place during his regular biannual visits to Yemen. The project coordinator also worked closely with the Yemen Country Office on procurement and financial management issues.
  • The Yemeni Cabinet had to approve key reports before the project could commence. While the team understood the justification for approval, the process was lengthy and competed against other, perhaps more urgent, submissions. This step also contributed to the delays between project stages.
• It was often difficult to find and attract international experts—especially Arabic-speaking experts—to come to Yemen.

To what extent will M&E capacity last beyond the profiled donor efforts, projects, or if the M&E champions leave the government?

There are many unpredictable factors that could influence sustainability of M&E activities and agreement in place. However, a more useful way to look at this issue may be to see whether the process of building M&E capacity created a culture that prioritizes evidence-based policymaking. In that case, even if conflict arises, the M&E champions and/or donors leave, or there is a regime change, there is still a culture of using results to aid decisionmaking. As in the case of Yemen, this particularly important in fragile and conflict-affected states, as many of the program efforts are donor-driven.

• Many of Mexico’s elements for continuity and sustainability in building an M&E system rest on a fairly solid legal framework. Demands from civil society and Congress for accountability and performance measurement and the economic and political factors that contributed to this demand remain valid and are likely to persist. Moreover, M&E initiatives at the state level have increased. A number of states, regardless of their governing party, have created M&E institutions and systems resembling those at the federal level. Although some M&E institutionalizations have been achieved, progress to date relies heavily on key champions in the presidency, the line ministries (the Ministries of Social Development, Finance, and Public Management), and the National Evaluation Council.

• Rwanda made considerable advancements in building M&E capacity over the past 10-15 years. Rwanda’s system now has reporting structures, working groups, processes, and forms embedded across line ministries and at the sub-national government level.

• Vietnam’s incentives continue past the 2009 case study, because M&E capacity was a priority for better informed policy decision-making and to satisfy donor requirements. Vietnam’s experience shows the substantial institutional capacity that is required for moving toward a comprehensive and results-based M&E system, even in favorable circumstances. Vietnam’s experience also suggests that the system depends on finance and planning systems that link resource allocation to performance and provide sufficient autonomy and flexibility over resource use that public sector managers can genuinely be held accountable for performance.

• Yemen faced challenges to the sustainability of its M&E capabilities from the M&E unit’s relationship with country’s central statistical organization. Line ministries particularly lacked access to this data and experienced delays in data gathering and reporting. The cabinet passed a resolution to reinforce the statistical organization’s integration with the M&E capabilities of the Ministry of Planning and International
Cooperation and the line ministries, but at the end of the World Bank project, the resolution was not in full effect.

These comparisons are briefly summarized in Tables 1.1 and 1.2, on the following pages.
Table 1.1 Mechanics of Building M&E Capacity: Comparison of Mexico, Rwanda, Vietnam, and Yemen

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Key Activities</th>
<th>Mexico*</th>
<th>Rwanda</th>
<th>Vietnam</th>
<th>Yemen</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>- Government implemented Oportunidades in the late 1990s, which had rigorous impact evaluation built into project design that became a role model.</td>
<td>- Donors played key role supporting monitoring training and activities immediately after conflict ended.</td>
<td>- Government established monitoring and evaluation for the Comprehensive Poverty Reduction and Growth Strategy.</td>
<td>- Government and donors worked closely to develop the M&amp;E master plan and strategy</td>
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<tr>
<td>- 2006 Federal Budget and Fiscal Responsibility Law established government-wide performance evaluation system</td>
<td>- Rwanda implemented Vision 2020 and its Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper.</td>
<td>- General Statistics Office was tasked with conducting a biannual household living standard survey, while independent organizations interviewed citizens directly to gather information for analysis.</td>
<td>- Government and donors worked closely together to operationalize a M&amp;E unit in the Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation</td>
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<tr>
<td>- M&amp;E in Mexico evolved into the Performance Evaluation System, which aims to strengthen transparency and accountability, assess results in policy/program objectives to inform performance-based budgeting decisionmaking process.</td>
<td>- The government instituted the National Institute of Statistics in Rwanda as the leading statistical agency.</td>
<td>- Donors provided technical assistance to develop the Decision 555 M&amp;E framework for the Socio-Economic Development Plan 2006-10.</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| M&E Champions | - Presidency  
- Line Ministries, including Ministry of Social Development  
- National Evaluation Council | - President  
- Prime Minister  
- Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning | - Ministry of Planning and Investment  
- Legislative branch of government  
- Donors | - Former Deputy Prime Minister  
- Former Minister of Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation (and current Managing Director of Social Fund for Development)  
- Vice Minister of the Fourth Development Program for Poverty Reduction |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Accountability Relationships | - National Evaluation Council evaluates social sector programs  
- Performance Evaluation System coordinated by the Ministry of Finance, with technical advice by National Evaluation Council  
- Ministry of Finance is in charge of performance-based budgeting initiative | - President leads Annual Leadership Retreats that review the previous year’s performance of ministries, departments and government agencies.  
- Districts report to the President’s Office through the Imihigo process. | - Donors, the Ministry of Planning and Investment, sector ministries, and the legislative branch of government all utilize M&E information, though it is not yet used for budget allocation decisionmaking.  
- Ministries use M&E information to manage projects and programs. | - At time of analysis, the Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation coordinated the monitoring process and reporting to and from other sectors were aligned accordingly.  
- No specific accountability relationships were set up at time of analysis, as the aim was to operationalize and maintain an M&E system focused on poverty reduction. |
| Frameworks Used/M&E Information Produced | - Performance Evaluation System covers federal spending of executive branch agencies and federally funded programs administered at the local level. Its three main components are: performance indicator monitoring, evaluation, and a feedback mechanism. Requires programs to identify performance indicators through a Matrix of Indicators for results.  
- Annual Evaluation Program which specifies each year what evaluation tools will be applied to which programs.  
- Following annual evaluations, program managers, as well as planning, evaluation, and budget units within ministries, are required to provide an evaluation response document as feedback. | - Rwanda utilizes four sets of indicator matrices that are reported on biannually, used for donors and national and sectoral-level indicators.  
- Rwanda implements a number of national surveys to gather baseline demographic, economic, and social indicators.  
- At the district and sector levels, District Development Plans link subnational strategy and each ministry writes its own Sector Strategic Plan. | - Vietnam utilizes a number of frameworks: the Poverty Reduction Support Credit Matrix, Framework for ODA projects, Decision 555 M&E framework, and the Medium-Term Expenditure Framework  
- The National Statistical Indicator System defines a core list of statistics the General Statistics produces, through surveys including the biannual Vietnam Household Living Standards Survey. | - At time of analysis, Government of Yemen had agreements with line ministries on what information would be collected and reported, and had a partially completed indicator database. - At time of analysis, Government of Yemen had passed a resolution to incorporate National Statistics Office with the Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation, as well as line ministries and other agencies. |
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Table 1.2 Building M&amp;E Capacity Process: Comparison of Mexico, Rwanda, Vietnam, and Yemen</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Incentives for Building M&amp;E Capacity</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Increased transparency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Improvements to efficiency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Effectiveness resource allocation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Political Economy</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Fiscal concerns led to increased pressure for public expenditure efficiency and effectiveness in 2006.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- The National Evaluation Council, and the Ministries of Finance and Public Management worked together on a revised set of evaluation guidelines for regulating M&amp;E activities, ensuring evaluation quality and usage, creating evaluation counterparts in line ministries, and instituting a systematic feedback mechanism.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Challenges Faced</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- The first phase (2000–06) of M&amp;E system development lacked incentives and institutional arrangements.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
More than 500 external evaluations were conducted, but produced very little information that was used.

- Another difficulty with SED is setting meaningful targets for indicators resulting from strategic planning exercises.

progress.

- Progress in reforming the strongly entrenched central planning system was partial and uneven.

- Line ministries in particular lacked access to statistical data and suffered delays in data gathering and reporting.

- Key reports had to be approved by the Cabinet before the project could move on to other activities.

**Sustainability**

- Although some M&E institutionalization has been achieved, progress to date relies heavily on key champions in the presidency, the line ministries (the Ministries of Social Development, Finance and Public Management), and the National Evaluation Council.

- Reporting structures, working groups, processes, and forms are embedded across line ministries and at the sub-national government level.

- Much of the demand for use comes from the President.

- Building M&E capacity was a priority for better informed policy decision-making and to satisfy donor requirements. Substantial institutional capacity was built to advance these goals.

- Unrest following the project hindered progress.

- Many of the government staff working on this initiative were fired.
### Chapter 2: Building M&E Capacity in Rwanda

| Incentives for Building M&E Capacity | - Decentralization  
|   | - Upward accountability  
|   | - Reporting to donors  
| Political Economy | - Most of the government budget is funded by donors.  
|   | - The president has a strong interest in using M&E information for decision-making and to support decentralization.  
| Challenges Faced | - Sectors such as the health sector are overburdened by donor reporting demands.  
| Sustainability | - Reporting structures, working groups, processes, and forms are embedded across line ministries and at the sub-national government level.  
|   | - Much of the demand for use comes from the President.  
| Key Activities | - Donors played key role supporting monitoring training and activities immediately after conflict ended.  
|   | - The government instituted the National Institute of Statistics in Rwanda as the leading statistical agency.  
| M&E Champions | - President, Prime Minister, and Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning  
| Accountability Relationships | - President leads Annual Leadership Retreats that review the previous year’s performance of ministries, departments and government agencies.  
|   | - Districts report to the President’s Office through the Imihigo process.  
| Frameworks Used/M&E Information Produced | - Rwanda utilizes four sets of indicator matrices that are reported on biannually, used for donors and national and sectoral-level indicators.  
|   | - Rwanda implements a number of national surveys to gather baseline demographic, economic, and social indicators.  
|   | - At the district and sector levels, District Development Plans link subnational strategy and each ministry writes its own Sector Strategic Plan.  

20
Lessons Learned from the Rwanda Experience

By identifying and building on existing M&E capacities and capabilities, rather than starting over, Rwanda was able to use limited resources wisely and ensure ownership and acceptance of the new systems. As this case study shows, Rwanda took the following actions:2

- Its capacity-building work adapted existing donor-driven M&E activities.
- Budgetary M&E provided a foundation for future M&E improvements and allowed those working on this initiative to develop capabilities gradually.
- To progress toward a full M&E system, it built up its statistical capacity, established a statistical baseline, instituted national surveys, and set up a national statistics office.
- It set up a central government agency (MINECOFIN) to coordinate and lead all M&E activities, including those within the line ministries and districts.
- The central agency selected and monitored statistical indicators and created high-quality reports about those indicators.

These processes were put in place gradually, as Rwanda simultaneously built capacity and M&E systems. Building capacity and M&E systems simultaneously increased the sense of ownership among staff, while at the same time reduced dependence on specific staff members to produce M&E information. Rwanda began with simple budget monitoring and expanded into more sophisticated M&E tasks.

Over time, accountability relationships developed among the top levels of government, MINECOFIN, the line ministries, and the districts. When relationships became formalized, each group provided monthly, quarterly, and annual reports to measure progress toward the Economic Development and Poverty Reduction Strategy targets. In Rwanda’s situation, a gradual approach made sense, since introducing overly complex systems that could not be implemented at the local level and used with local capacities would have discouraged local staff efforts. Without the participation of local staff, the overall M&E system-building process would have been undermined. Because the processes developed gradually, producing M&E information did not become a burden on small numbers of local staff members. Smaller agencies thus avoided the loss of skills that would result from high staff turnover.

2 This case study summarizes the main findings from a World Bank-commissioned report that the Overseas Development Institute (ODI) completed. The ODI team was led by Geraldine Baudienville and also consisted of Alexandra Murray-Zmijewski, and Charles Gasana, under the management of Kene Ezemenari, Helena Hwang, and Gladys Lopez-Acevedo at the World Bank. Keith Mackay also provided substantial comments. Helena Hwang summarized the findings and included them in the case study, with useful discussions with and comments from Birgit Hansl, Peace Aimee Niyibizi, Alex Kamurase, and Peter Isabirye from the World Bank office in Kigali, Rwanda.
Rwanda’s president and prime minister led the top-down process of building M&E capacity; because the highest levels of government used M&E information, they reinforced the importance of M&E activities. The highest levels of government—the president’s and the prime minister’s offices—drove the culture of performance, tracked progress toward the poverty reduction strategy goals, and held government staff accountable for achieving results. The directives from the top used incentives such as national pride, in combination with consequences for insufficient performance such as the potential loss of one’s job. Presenters at the formal Annual Leadership Retreat provided official reporting to peers and the president himself on performance measured against the poverty reduction strategy goals and progress on retreat-specific action items from the previous year. This public forum proved very effective in yielding results. For example, both the president and prime minister’s offices became increasingly involved in information and performance management of the district Imihigo contracts—performance agreements between the President and the mayors, which are now formalized around strategic indicators and targets linked to the poverty reduction strategy and the Millennium Development Goals.

The central coordinating agency, MINECOFIN, received training and technical assistance from donors to build capacity, and having an agency such as MINECOFIN responsible for the management and oversight of M&E activities enhanced sustainability. MINECOFIN’s Planning

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3 According to interviews, underperforming government staff may be transferred to a different and usually less prestigious post if results are not meeting expectations; in extreme cases, a staff member will lose his or her job.
4 These retreat-specific action items are generally associated with problem areas in reaching poverty reduction strategies or Millennium Development Goals. Challenging areas are heavily monitored by the prime minister’s and president’s office over the year.
5 Updated information kindly provided by staff from the World Bank’s Kigali office.
Department is the central authority for M&E for the Economic Development and Poverty Reduction Strategy and leads the national development strategy for planning and coordinating sectoral and sub-national planning. MINECOFIN’s Budget Department coordinates all sector and district budget reports and ensures that the budgeting and the medium-term expenditure framework are in line with national economic development and the poverty reduction strategy indicators. Within the Budget Department is a new unit, the Project Management and Monitoring Unit, headed by an M&E director, a newly created position. The unit manages, monitors, and reports on the implementation of development and investment projects. It works closely with the Directorate of National Development Planning & Research to provide progress reports for development projects. The External Finance Unit is the liaison between donors and MINECOFIN and monitors donor financial support, which affects budget and planning.

In January 2011, MINECOFIN began recruiting poverty reduction strategy facilitators who are based within line ministries and agencies. Facilitators are now placed in the agencies for Health, Agriculture, Trade and Industry, Education, Infrastructure, Information Communication Technology, Justice, Youth, and Kigali City, as well as for all provinces and the National Institute of Statistics of Rwanda. The facilitators partner closely with MINECOFIN to ensure that poverty reduction strategy priorities are reflected during implementation and that cross-cutting issues are integrated into poverty reduction strategy planning and M&E. The facilitators also assist sectors in establishing and overseeing the M&E system. Their additional responsibilities include ensuring that sector working groups and joint sector reviews are well organized and use accurate information.

Rwanda relied on key entry points in building M&E capabilities. M&E activities ideally are designed to support political priorities and national strategies to ensure relevant information is produced and used, as well as to strengthen ownership and sustainability of the M&E system. Despite obstacles, the importance of accountability was a key incentive that moved the process forward in Rwanda—a state recovering from a period of fragility and conflict. M&E systems furthered the state-building process in Rwanda by improving coordination and defining accountability relationships among different parts of the government. The four key entry points from these incentives that enabled progress are listed below:

**Entry point 1: Rwanda’s national strategy required M&E systems to improve understanding of the population’s needs and to collect baseline information for poverty reduction strategy planning.** The Vision 2020 plan for long-term economic development emphasized the importance of M&E, ensuring that “poverty reduction achieved through the medium-term expenditure framework will be monitored and will feed back into the elaboration of sector and provincial plans.”

Rwanda’s 2000 Interim Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper reaffirmed the government’s commitment to implementing M&E activities, stating that “statistics are essential to plan and monitor the poverty reduction strategies and to successfully implement a development framework.” The interim strategy also identified key priorities for the development of M&E systems and activities, including building statistical capacities and collecting baseline information through a national census and household living condition surveys.

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6 Republic of Rwanda, 2000a.
7 Republic of Rwanda, 2000c.
Entry point 2: Rwanda’s Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper began a concerted effort to create and implement a more formal M&E system, notably by outlining key indicators and identifying institutions responsible for collecting and monitoring overall progress. The second generation Economic Development and Poverty Reduction Strategy drew lessons from the process of drawing up the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper, in which some priority areas saw progress but others were hindered by implementation problems. The poverty reduction strategy would achieve greater efficiency from improving incentives to execute policy and relaxing the constraints that prevented policies from being carried out. From this perspective, policymakers implemented measures, including public administration reforms, increased alignment between donors and the poverty reduction strategy priorities, and improved monitoring systems at the sectoral and district levels to enable closer follow-up on progress.

Entry point 3: M&E became a political tool to support decentralization, a key component of Rwanda’s state-building process, through strengthened accountability mechanisms between central and sub-national governments. The Rwandan government transferred some funding and responsibilities for poverty reduction from the central government to the sub-national governments: It also introduced M&E activities to measure progress at the sub-national level and to support accountability mechanisms between central and decentralized entities. In 2000, MINALOC, a new ministry for local government, community development, and social affairs, was created to assist the central government in overseeing the activities and performance of sub-national governments. However, at this early stage, the lack of local administrative staff qualified to design and implement programs undermined decentralization efforts.

Entry point 4: Donors played a major role by demanding M&E information for their own reporting and also by providing technical assistance to help build local capacities. Donors have provided much technical assistance to all Rwandan government agencies. Donor support was crucial to restoring government functions, building statistical and reporting standards, and creating an opportunity for MINECOFIN to become a central leading champion for M&E. In 2008, the Rwandan government developed a Common Performance Assessment Framework for joint government and budget support and for donor monitoring of government programs. The performance assessment framework is the basis of support for donor disbursements to the government’s budget and is a subset of the government’s monitoring framework for the Economic Development and Poverty Reduction Strategy.

Country Context and Political Economy

Following Rwanda’s devastating 1994 genocide and civil war, the country has made substantial progress in stabilizing and rehabilitating its economy. Its first Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper, finalized in 2002, prioritized medium-term challenges and allowed the national priority areas of human development, economic infrastructure, governance, private sector development, institutional capacity building, rural development, and agricultural transformation to be adapted at the sectoral, provincial, and district levels. Since then, Rwanda has achieved major economic progress, led by the agriculture and services sectors. However, poverty reduction results have been disappointing, leading the government to prioritize this goal in the new Economic Development and Poverty Reduction Strategy, launched in 2008. In addition, Rwanda’s Vision
2020 plan puts forth the country’s long-term development goal of moving toward a knowledge-based, service-oriented economy by 2020.

Decentralization, upward accountability, and control have all been instrumental in increasing the demand for and use of M&E information in Rwanda. The political commitment to decentralization has grown over time, as witnessed in the Economic Development and Poverty Reduction Strategy, which introduces district-level programs through the Vision 2020 Umurenge Programme.\(^8\) District authority has been strengthened with the 2006 introduction of the performance-based district Imihigo contracts between the president and the mayors and supervised by the prime minister. The Imihigo contracts attempt to accelerate the implementation of priority programs by reinforcing district accountability. The president’s and prime minister’s offices have become increasingly involved in the performance and information management of these contracts, which are now formalized around strategic indicators and targets. The Imihigo contracts were not initially based on specific indicators, but rather on a list of priorities. Now, specific indicators are more formally defined and linked to the Millennium Development Goals, the Vision 2020 plan, and Economic Development and Poverty Reduction Strategy indicators. The president uses M&E information to review performance across levels of government and to inform decision making.

**The Three Phases of Building M&E Capacity in Rwanda**

**Phase 1: The immediate post-conflict period (1994–99).**
Immediately after the end of the conflict, the Rwandan government made the delivery of basic services a priority. M&E at the time was very limited and mainly consisted of reporting ongoing activities. During this period, the MINECOFIN agency became the central coordinating body—in fact, MINECOFIN reported to the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF)—and donors supported improving the government’s statistical base and providing basic training for simple monitoring activities. Donor funding was backed up by World Bank and IMF M&E systems. The World Bank allocated funding to sectors and monitored basic status reports on procurement and disbursement, arrival and distribution of supplies, and progress of reconstruction activities. Procurement agencies prepared monthly and quarterly reports, and MINECOFIN reported quarterly on the execution of the economic recovery program. In comparison, the IMF’s M&E requirements focused on macroeconomic information and the assessment of public sector reforms; IMF staff assisted MINECOFIN and National Bank of Rwanda in compiling the data. Table 2.1 lists the M&E efforts related to the World Bank and IMF activities.

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\(^8\) Rwanda is now divided into five provinces (*intara*) (the Northern, Western, Eastern and Southern provinces and Kigali City) and subdivided into 30 districts (*akarere*). These are further divided into 406 *umurenge*, or subdistricts, which are subdivided into 2,150 cells (*akagari*) and finally 14,975 *umudugudu*, which represent the smallest administrative division.
Table 2.1. Phase I (1994–99): Key M&E Frameworks and Activities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>M&amp;E framework</th>
<th>M&amp;E activities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>World Bank program monitoring</td>
<td>Procurement and disbursement reporting by procurement officers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Execution of reports by MINECOFIN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Reports submitted to the World Bank</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IMF macroeconomic reporting</td>
<td>Macroeconomic reporting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Reform progress reports</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Reports submitted to IMF</td>
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**Phase II: The intermediate period (2000–04).**

Increased political stability enabled the Rwandan government to start planning a longer-term development strategy for the country. During this time Rwanda generated a nascent M&E system with a solid statistical baseline, targets linked to suitable country-specific strategies, and measurable inputs based on a budgeting system. The preparation of the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper and Vision 2020 planned Rwanda’s objectives, priorities, and major policies for the next five years to achieve the country’s long-term development goals. Rwanda provided a statistical baseline and strategic goals and established a medium-term expenditure framework for budget monitoring that was the backbone of the M&E system. The new framework linked policymaking, planning, and budgeting into the annual budgeting process. Table 2.2 details the six stages of the comprehensive medium-term expenditure framework. In addition, the Rwandan government created a planning unit within MINECOFIN. For the first time, line ministries became responsible for their own reporting in 2004. Table 2.3 lists the key M&E activities during this phase.
Table 2.2. The Six Stages of the Comprehensive Medium-Term Expenditure Framework

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>STAGE</th>
<th>CHARACTERISTICS</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I. Development of a Macroeconomic and Fiscal Framework</td>
<td>• A macroeconomic model that projects revenues and expenditure in the medium term (multi-year)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II. Development of Sectoral Programs</td>
<td>• Agreement on sector objectives, outputs, and activities • Review and development of programs and subprograms • Program cost estimation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III. Development of Sectoral Expenditure Frameworks</td>
<td>• Analysis of inter- and intra-sectoral trade-offs • Consensus-building on strategic resource allocation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV. Definition of Sector Resource Allocations</td>
<td>• Setting medium-term sector budget ceilings (with cabinet approval)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V. Preparation of Sectoral Budgets</td>
<td>• Medium-term sectoral programs based on budget ceilings</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VI. Final Political Approval</td>
<td>• Presentation of budget estimates to the cabinet and parliament for approval</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Table 2.3. Phase II (2000–04): Key M&E Frameworks and Activities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>M&amp;E framework</th>
<th>M&amp;E activities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Vision 2020</td>
<td>Set long-term strategy, baseline indicators (2000), and targets (2010 &amp; 2020)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interim Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper</td>
<td>Identified survey priorities for obtaining baselines including the Household Living Conditions Survey (EICV), the Census, the Demographic and Health Survey (DHS), the Core Welfare Indicators Survey (CWIQ), the Participatory Poverty Assessment Survey (PPA)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper</td>
<td>Annual reporting on 180 indicators for monitoring the impact of poverty reduction Annual budget reports (medium-term expenditure framework) for monitoring the budget inputs and outputs</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Rwanda took major steps to move toward a modern results-based M&E system. Phase III involved the government’s efforts to formalize M&E and to improve the statistical base by establishing the National Institute of Statistics of Rwanda (NISR) as the leading statistical agency in 2006. Rwanda’s objectives were to harmonize and raise statistical standards across government agencies, and the national institute has improved data quality and reporting standards for the statistics that it produces, as well as assisted other government agencies. The
iinstitute’s efforts have raised the statistical base for M&E. The Rwandan government began planning for the second generation Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper, with the introduction of the current Economic Development and Poverty Reduction Strategy in 2007. The institute was also central to the creation of the poverty reduction strategy’s flagship—the Vision 2020 Umurenge Programme—an important step for national strategies and M&E. The development of the poverty reduction flagship policy directly resulted from the outcomes of the national household living conditions survey, Integrated Household Living Conditions Survey 2, which was carried out with external technical assistance from the national statistics office, which at the time was under MINECOFIN. The government and the development community recognize that further leadership efforts will be required to continue to develop and maintain an effective system.

Table 2.4. Phase III (2005–10): Key M&E Frameworks and Activities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>M&amp;E framework</th>
<th>M&amp;E activities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Creation of the National Institute of Statistics of Rwanda</td>
<td>Producing statistics, standardizing the quality of statistics, conducting national surveys including the Integrated Household Living Conditions Survey 2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic Development and Poverty Reduction Strategy</td>
<td>Biannual reporting on 425 indicators (individual line ministry matrices, national results and policy matrices, CPAF, DPAF) Sectoral public expenditure reviews</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Imihigo</em> contracts</td>
<td>Monthly, quarterly, and annual performance reporting from the districts</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Overall M&E System Structure**

**M&E champions**
There were three M&E champions during this process: the president and prime minister, the donors, and MINECOFIN.

**The president and prime minister.** The president and prime minister were instrumental in developing an M&E system. The process of developing an M&E system benefitted from the strong leadership and support of the president and prime minister; the information generated was regularly sent to them for review and use in decision making. Because the top level of government reviewed and used the information generated through the M&E process, stakeholders in Rwanda had a strong incentive to move the process forward, as well as a continued incentive to keep improving the timeliness, quality, and reliability of information. The president and prime minister used the information to hold line ministries and district mayors accountable for results.

**Donors.** Donor support provided guidance in the development of M&E processes. Clear differences exist in the quality of information collected from sectors that received support and
those that did not. Donors build demand, increase local capacity, and often provide the framework and initiate the information gathering and usage that starts an M&E system. Out of eleven sectors, only the Health and Education sectors currently have a management information system, although management information systems for Agriculture and Labor are in progress. Donors use M&E information for upcoming rounds of budget support disbursements, which currently account for approximately half of the government budget in Rwanda. The budget heavily relies on donor grants, which in 2010–11 accounted for 39 percent of total expenditures.

MINECOFIN. MINECOFIN, which received training and technical assistance from donors to build capacity, also is a leader in the M&E process. Integrating the annual Economic Development and Poverty Reduction Strategy report results into the decision-making process for budget allocations has strengthened MINECOFIN’s leverage with other key actors to move the process forward and collaborate on improving M&E.

MINECOFIN leads and manages the M&E system and continues to coordinate the planning process, particularly for Vision 2020 and the Economic Development and Poverty Reduction Strategy; MINECOFIN, like all other line ministries, is accountable to the president. Following the end of the Rwandan conflict, MINECOFIN received technical assistance from the World Bank and the IMF to build M&E capacity. MINECOFIN carries out its leadership and coordinating role through three key departments (the Planning and the Budget Departments and the External Finance Unit), as illustrated in Figure 2.2. MINECOFIN also reviews a number of reports before transmittal to the president and prime minister.

9 Since 2000, the largest budget support donors have been the World Bank, the European Commission (EC), and Department for International Development (DFID) (Chiche, 2007; Republic of Rwanda, 2008a). As of 2009, there were nine budget support donors: six gave general and sectoral budget support (the African Development Bank (AfDB), DFID, EC, Germany, the Netherlands, the World Bank); one gave only general budget support (Sweden); and two gave only sectoral budget support (Belgium and Norway).

10 Republic of Rwanda, Figures provided by the World Bank’s Kigali office.
M&E Information Produced and Main Actors

**Surveys.** Vision 2020 and the Interim Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper expressed a need for Rwanda to establish a statistical baseline. Therefore, the government carried out a number of national surveys to gather baseline demographic, economic, and social data. These include the Integrated Household Living Conditions Survey, the Census, Public Expenditure Tracking Survey, the Demographic and Health Survey, the Core Welfare Indicators Survey, the Participatory Poverty Assessment Survey, and several annual agricultural surveys on food production. Phase III of Rwanda’s process involved the government’s efforts to formalize M&E and to improve the statistical base by establishing a national statistics office, the National Institute of Statistics of Rwanda to harmonize and raise statistical standards across government agencies. After the national institute became the leading national statistical agency in 2006, the government began planning for the second generation Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper, which culminated in the introduction of the current Economic Development and Poverty Reduction Strategy in 2007. The national institute has improved data quality and reporting standards for statistics production, and it also provides technical assistance to other government agencies, improving the statistical base for M&E overall. In keeping with national strategies and the importance of M&E, the national institute was central to the development of the flagship Vision 2020 Umurenge Programme. The flagship program directly resulted from the Integrated Household Living Conditions Survey outcomes and was carried out with external technical assistance by the national statistics institute, which was under MINECOFIN at the time.

**M&E Framework.** The 2007 poverty reduction strategy set a five-year plan to work toward the longer-term goals of Vision 2020 and the Millennium Development Goals. Under the poverty reduction strategy, the M&E framework uses four sets of indicator matrices, which are reported on biannually and provide information for donors as well as national- and sectoral-level indicators. Line ministries, districts, and donors have been harmonized into the framework, which using the following indicator matrices:
1. Economic Development and Poverty Reduction Strategy Results and Policy Matrix—This national level matrix summarizes the key poverty reduction strategy indicators from all sector matrices that the government and stakeholders use to monitor national development towards poverty reduction strategy goals. It includes 93 indicators. The release of the poverty reduction strategy annual report is strategically timed to influence the debate on resource allocation. In March and April of each year, all sectors undergo joint sector reviews that look back critically at performance over the past year and identify priorities and strategies for the years ahead. Based on this analytical work, the line ministries prepare annual progress reports and strategic plans in line with government priorities and budget requests.11

2. Sector-Specific Economic Development and Poverty Reduction Strategy Matrices—The poverty reduction strategy facilitators who designed and completed the sector logframes (logical frameworks) initially created these matrices. Each line ministry has a poverty reduction strategy logframe and an indicator matrix. Approximately 425 indicators exist for all 11 sectors. The government and stakeholders use the logframe approach to monitor sectoral development, and sector working groups review it for quality. Sector indicators are selected through a participatory process guided by the overarching priorities of the poverty reduction strategy and coordinated by the poverty reduction strategy facilitators based in line ministries, who follow the SMART12 guidelines. The poverty reduction strategy facilitators—semi-expert local contractors who were tasked with designing and completing the sector logframes—were key to the success of the logframes. The facilitators had some M&E skills, but also received on-the-job training and learned through the process of defining indicators, coordinating stakeholders’ views, and ensuring alignment with the poverty reduction strategy priorities. They were guided by the MINECOFIN Planning Department, which acted as a coordinator, guided the facilitators, who remained on contract to keep them incentivized. The facilitators also acted as M&E sector experts and trainers for the sectoral staff.13

3. Common Performance Assessment Framework—This framework is a subset of 47 indicators from the national-level Economic Development and Poverty Reduction Strategy results and policy matrix. The framework monitors government commitments that were made in budget support agreements to inform future disbursements. All budget support partners use the framework, which includes 45 indicators selected from sector indicators.14 The framework incorporates multiple data sources including sector information systems (e.g., the health information management system and agricultural crop assessments), MINECOFIN fiscal data, and Imihigo contract reports and surveys.

4. Donor Performance Assessment Framework—This framework forms part of a mutual review process designed to strengthen mutual accountability at the national level. The donor framework assesses bilateral and multilateral donor and government performance against 31 indicators in the seven areas listed on the following page:

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11 Republic of Rwanda, 2007e.
12 Specific, Measurable, Achievable, Relevant, and Timebound.
13 Information on EDPRS facilitators was collected in interviews with MINECOFIN staff.
14 Common Performance Assessment Framework, April 28 2011 version, provided by the World Bank’s Kigali office.
• Financing national strategies in support of the Millennium Development Goals and Vision 2020
• Using national systems and institutions to strengthen ownership sustainability and reduce transaction costs
• Facilitating longer-term planning and implementation through predictable development financing
• Reducing transaction costs and strengthening partnerships through a coordinated approach
• Streamlining delivery at the sector level through the effective use of comparative advantage
• Providing sector-specific indicators
• Providing budget support that enhances ownership and predictability and reduces transaction costs

District-Level M&E. At the district level, District Development Plans were established to link sub-national strategy to the 2007 poverty reduction strategy. However, the Imihigo contracts are the main method of performance management at the district level and have recently been formalized around strategic indicators and targets linked to the 2007 poverty reduction strategy and the Millennium Development Goals. The Imihigo indicators—reported monthly, quarterly, and annually—are more comprehensive in capturing the 2007 poverty reduction strategy, the Millennium Development Goals, and sector- and district-specific priorities, and are used by the line ministries for district-level data. When the Imihigo contracts were first introduced in 2006, districts chose indicators, not all of which reflected key national priorities. By 2008, the line ministries demanded that the central agencies MINECOFIN and MINALOC develop new guidelines and reporting structures so that districts would provide required information.

District data collection comprises more than 100 indicators to compile three monthly reports for MINALOC and MINECOFIN. The Imihigo program requires annual plans (signed by the president) and monthly reports. Districts send monthly reports to MINALOC, which in turn submits quarterly reports to the Office of the Prime Minister. The quality of these reports is verified by quarterly visits from the prime minister and the line ministers to the provinces to review implementation and progress of strategic plans. MINALOC coordinates the substantive evaluation, with oversight from the Office of the Prime Minister, and presents a report to the president at an annual national evaluation event. At these events, district governors also present summary performance reports and strategic plans for the future. Throughout the rest of the year, the strategic policy unit in the Office of the President periodically requests information on different aspects of public policy development and implementation.

M&E for Sector-level and Line Ministries. Each ministry writes its own five-year sector strategic plan that is aligned with the 2007 poverty reduction strategy. They also write annual action plans that are based on the sector-specific matrix indicators and require biannual progress reports. The budget sets resources for strategy implementation and requires a quarterly execution report. The results of the progress of the poverty reduction strategy and budget execution are discussed in the joint sector and joint sector budget reviews. MINECOFIN coordinates and receives all reporting. The Education and Health sectors have been leaders in this process. The joint sector budget reviews occur twice a year, feed into the national budget review, and provide
a space for dialogue on performance and policy with all relevant stakeholders. The sector working groups develop the sector strategic plans that feed into the poverty reduction strategy. Poverty reduction strategy facilitators work with the sector working groups to ensure adherence to M&E best practices and to streamline M&E matrices across government. Sector working groups are an essential tool for informed dialogue on sector-specific technical issues and an important policy coordination mechanism between government, donors, and other stakeholders. Line ministries, coordinating with the MINECOFIN Planning Office, plan sectoral strategies in line with the poverty reduction strategy and prepare sector budgets in coordination with the MINECOFIN Budget Office. Their indicators, reports and reviews are linked to the strategy.

Accountability Relationships

Rwanda’s M&E system is producing information that has improved in quality and timeliness, which increases the government’s use of M&E information. The timing of the poverty reduction strategy report feeds into the budgeting process, allowing decision makers to use M&E information in the debate on resource allocations. As mentioned earlier, M&E has been used between the central government and the line ministries, as well as between the central government and the sub-national governments. This process of using M&E information is illustrated in the established accountability relationships.

Accountability to the President and Annual Leadership Retreats. The Annual Leadership Retreats (involving the president, prime minister, ministries, departments, and government agencies) began in 2005 to review the previous year’s performance and anticipate the subsequent year’s implementation. Attendees discuss performance against targets, and officials are encouraged to form strategic policy actions to counteract problems in struggling areas. The annual forum provides strong leadership for results-based M&E and a significant focus on meeting targets. Fear of being criticized in front of peers is a strong incentive for agency and department officials to show results. When a challenge is identified, the agency is required to regularly report to the Prime Minister’s Office. The continuous assessment ensures that agencies and departments adhere to recommendations, overcome challenges, and meet performance targets.

The Imihigo process characterizes the relationship between the Office of the President and the districts. District officials have incentives to consistently adhere to the targets: fear of disappointing the president, a financial reward of RWF5 million, and the pride associated with being the winning district (with widely circulated results). By 2010, the Imihigo contracts have sufficiently improved to become an effective M&E tool in the wider poverty reduction strategy M&E efforts. The contracts, signed between district mayors and the president, actually stimulate competition within and among local governments, and at the end of the year, the contracts are again presented to the president in a ceremony called kurata ibigwi, which is a day for mayors to show accountability in public and hold national dialogue over key issues. This annual ritual also opens up local authorities’ activities to public and central government scrutiny and ends with rewards for good performance and local innovation.

When the Imihigo contracts were first introduced in 2006, the districts chose indicators that did not always reflect key national priorities. By 2008, line ministries demanded that MINECOFIN and MINALOC develop new guidelines and reporting structures so that districts could provide
them with required information. *Imihigo* indicators are now more comprehensive and capture higher quality information. Most *Imihigo* contracts were conceptualized as annual rolling plans for the District Development Plans, so the indicators now strongly harmonized with the district plans. Over time, *Imihigo* evaluations have revealed the need for changes and adjustments, so at present, some *Imihigo* contracts are no longer fully aligned to the District Development Plans, except for select districts that have regularly updated their five-year plans.

**Strengths and weaknesses**

As noted earlier, a key strength of Rwanda’s M&E system was the role of donors in the early stages. Donors generated demand for M&E information and contributed to building capacity at a crucial time. Coordination between donors in the early stages provided relatively good aid harmonization and alignment, which helped to avoid overburdening limited local capacities or undermining local efforts to build M&E systems by imposing additional frameworks and requirements. However, having a Donor Performance Assessment Framework outside of the national framework is a weakness that needs to be addressed. The president and prime minister’s roles in the results agenda have been important, because as leaders in the highest levels of government, they have rewarded good performance and penalized poor performance and the failure to achieve goals, including demotion and firings.

While Rwanda has extensive monitoring and use of reporting in budget allocation decisions, it does not yet have the capacity for analyzing results and evaluating either planning or budgeting. Despite progress, Rwanda still faces a number of challenges, mainly related to M&E capacity limitations. Biannual Common Performance Assessment Framework and poverty reduction strategy matrix discussions lack baselines for some data and lack appropriate, reliable, and timely monitoring indicators. Examples of Common Performance Assessment Framework indicators that lack baselines and remain unmeasured include the following: “Under age 5 mortality attributable to confirmed malaria,” “The percentage of households in the bottom two categories of extreme poverty by UBUDHE15 classifications,” and “the number of new non-farm jobs created.”16 Also, Donor Performance Assessment Framework indicator 8, “The percentage of ODA united,” has not been assessed because of data unavailability; its discontinuation has been proposed.18 In planning, the annual progress report published for the poverty reduction strategy does not analyze the results, but simply examines what is on and off track and presents some ideas on how to amend problematic areas. The progress contains no further analysis to examine whether the policies are actually effective at reducing poverty. On the budget side, several sectoral public expenditure reviews have been conducted, as well as a public expenditure tracking survey. However, these assessments are not yet systematically carried out across all sectors and are conducted by consultants—who likely do not use or integrate the findings in the way that government staff would. A key challenge of the capacity

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15 “Ubudehe”, a traditional Kinyarwanda word that defines the collective effort employed towards solving social problems.
16 Common Performance Assessment Framework, April 28 2011 version provided by the World Bank’s Kigali office.
17 ODA stands for Official Development Assistance.
18 Proposed Donor Performance Assessment Framework targets for FY 2011/12 and FY 2012/13, provided by the World Bank’s Kigali office.
building process is when donors overburden the system with reporting demands, such as those in Rwanda’s health sector.

The strengths and weaknesses of the Rwanda M&E system are further illustrated in Figure 2.3 below.

Figure 2.3. Strengths and Weaknesses of Rwanda’s M&E System

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strengths</th>
<th>Weaknesses</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Top-down approach and strong involvement and usage from the highest level of government (the president and prime minister) made M&amp;E activities a priority.</td>
<td>• Overall M&amp;E capacity limitations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Strengthened accountability mechanisms between the central government and sub-national government and sectors.</td>
<td>• Uneven quality of statistics, relevance across indicators, reporting, and analyses vary across sectors.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Donor technical assistance is successful in increasing local capacity for information collected and generating initial demand for M&amp;E information.</td>
<td>• Lack of time and skills to evaluate information.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Relatively good aid harmonization and alignment.</td>
<td>• Inability to cope with reporting at district level.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Proliferation of indicators and “too much data, not enough information” (400 reports sent to the Office of the Prime Minister every year, 425 Economic Development and Poverty Reduction Strategy performance indicators).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• M&amp;E activities that occur outside of the national framework.</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Sustainability and Next Steps for Strengthening Results-Based M&E in Rwanda

This chapter illustrates the advancement of the past 10–15 years in building M&E capacity in Rwanda. Reporting structures, working groups, processes, tools, and templates embedded across line ministries and at the sub-national government level have contributed to the sustainability of the M&E systems. The use of data is at a high level, and the emphasis on results from the president’s and donors’ perspectives have significantly contributed to integrating this work.

During the 2010 field visit to Rwanda to gather information for this case study, the research team was able to observe how the government had begun additional programs to further M&E capacity. For academic education and public sector training, the Public Sector Capacity Building Secretariat worked with Rwandan academic institutions to develop and launch M&E training for government employees, as well as a degree course in the School of Finance and Banking. MINECOFIN also implemented several additional capacity-building efforts: it sponsored an initiative to house a planning department in each line ministry and a training of M&E trainers, at
which international staff trained 37 MINECOFIN staff and poverty reduction strategy facilitators to conduct future M&E training.
### Incentives for Building M&E Capacity

- Reporting to donors
- Support for government efficiency
- Feedback into policy and budgetary decision-making
- Somewhat provide transparency

### Political Economy

- A remarkable performance in poverty reduction and the continuing egalitarian pattern of development has fostered a keen emphasis on data.
- Deeply entrenched institutions provide stability and significant levels of accountability though operating quite unlike Western democratic models.

### Challenges Faced

- The timetable for the SEDP 2011–2015 did not reorient the planning system toward a more thorough-going results based approach.
- Progress in reforming the strongly entrenched central planning system was partial and uneven.

### Sustainability

- Building M&E capacity was a priority for better informed policy decision-making and to satisfy donor requirements.

### Key Activities

- Government established monitoring and evaluation for the Comprehensive Poverty Reduction and Growth Strategy.
- General Statistics Office tasked with conducting a biannual household living standard survey, while independent organizations interviewed citizens directly to gather information for analysis.
- Donors provided technical assistance to develop the Decision 555 M&E framework for the Socio-Economic Development Plan 2006-10.

### M&E Champions

- Ministry of Planning and Investment, Legislative branch of government, and Donors

### Accountability Relationships

- Donors, the Ministry of Planning and Investment, sector ministries, and the legislative branch of government all utilize M&E information for project and program management, though it was not yet used for budget allocation decisionmaking.

### Frameworks Used/M&E Information Produced

- Vietnam utilizes a number of frameworks: the Poverty Reduction Support Credit Matrix, Framework for ODA projects, Decision 555 M&E framework, and the Medium-Term Expenditure Framework
- The National Statistical Indicator System defines a core list of statistics the General Statistics produces through surveys.
Lessons Learned from the Vietnam Experience

As this chapter will show, the process of strengthening results-based M&E is closely tied to strengthening and reforming the public finance and planning systems. Without a clear link between resource allocation and performance, there will be few incentives to encourage the systematic use of results-based approaches. In Vietnam’s case, engaging the Ministry of Finance to use M&E information in its project review and budget allocation decision-making processes became a priority.

While Vietnam’s M&E capacity is still low, the country has fairly successfully made initial efforts to strengthen M&E in response to donor requirements. Vietnam has implemented a range of parallel initiatives, including introducing innovations in the planning system, piloting a medium-term expenditure framework, and strengthening the statistical systems, which have increased the focus on results and on enhanced M&E systems. Vietnam adopted its first poverty reduction strategy when it had already made staggering achievements in bringing about poverty reduction in more than fifteen years of economic reform and in the absence of a comprehensive M&E system. The process of statistical system development—under way for almost two decades—is still not coherently managed, however. While Vietnam has made substantial progress, it still faces a significant agenda of capacity strengthening, particularly at the sub-national level.

The move toward a comprehensive and results-based M&E system requires substantial institutional capacity, even in a favorable environment. A successful results-based M&E system depends on finance and planning systems that provide incentives for performance information, link resource allocation to performance, and provide sufficient autonomy and flexibility over resource use so that public sector managers can genuinely be held accountable for performance. But this type of M&E system represents an unrealistic short- to medium-term objective in a fragile or conflict-affected state. In Vietnam, the key priority for an M&E system is to sharply focus on a small number of key indicators that are critical to achieving poverty reduction and sustained transition away from fragility. The system is also likely to focus on strengthening accountability systems to improve service delivery, where sources of information and the capacity to collect and interpret this information are both likely to be in scarce supply.

The type of M&E information that is potentially relevant to stakeholders depends on the degree of autonomy that resource users have. Within a strictly centrally planned system, resource managers are held accountable for outputs produced with the inputs that are supplied to them. Vietnam has made progress toward making information more publicly available, particularly through making information available online. Available information includes budget information that was until recently a state secret, data from the General Statistical Office, and some raw

19 This chapter summarizes a larger report on Vietnam’s M&E system, commissioned in August 2009 and managed by Vera Wilhelm in the Poverty Reduction and Equity Group. The report, authored by Vu Cuong and Stephen Jones of Oxford Policy Management, was researched and written in partnership with the Oxford Policy Management Group and the World Bank Vietnam Country Office. The study is based on interviews undertaken by a World Bank-OPM team in Vietnam during the week of April 6, 2009, as well as a review of documentation. The list of those who were interviewed and the documents that were consulted is attached at the end of the report. In addition, the team made a case study visit to Hoa Binh province. Information about the study was provided to interviewees by email (in English or Vietnamese) prior to the interviews. The full bibliography of the literature review that accompanied this report is in Appendix A. Helena Hwang conducted additional interviews and document reviews to supplement the report for this paper.
survey data for research and analytical purposes; however, this information is not consistently presented in a readily accessible or interpretable format.

Vietnam has taken steps to strengthen use of monitoring and evaluation (M&E) information and to move toward the use of results-based planning approaches. These actions are part of the process of moving away from an entrenched central planning system, where the demand for information and the realization of the need for evidence-based policymaking is strengthening. The country’s 2006–10 Socio-economic Development Plan sought to establish a comprehensive set of indicators within a logical framework; however, the framework is not being used for monitoring development plan performance. A number of key steps are illustrated in Figure 3.1.

**Figure 3.1. Building an M&E System and Capacity in Vietnam**
The Country Context and Political Economy
This study seeks to identify lessons for countries developing M&E in more fragile contexts. Vietnam’s situation is, in many senses, the polar opposite of a fragile context. The government, while not democratically elected, enjoys uncontested legitimacy and effective control over its territories. The country has a relatively high level of capacity to formulate and implement its policies, including taking long-run strategic perspectives. Vietnam also has a high level of commitment to poverty reduction objectives, as evidenced by its historically remarkable performance in bringing about poverty reduction and the continuing egalitarian pattern of its development, compared to that of many other fast-growing economies. The Vietnamese government has also demonstrated a strong capacity to exercise effective leadership of the development agenda while actively learning from and selectively applying lessons from donor support. Vietnam has deeply entrenched institutions—including those in the planning system—which provide stability and accountability, although operating through structures and processes that are quite unlike Western democratic models. Conversely, the deeply entrenched nature of the institutional arrangements—and the incentives that these generate for individual and organizational behavior—may militate against rapid and fundamental reforms. It is therefore difficult to draw direct lessons from Vietnam that parallel with more fragile contexts.

The Three Phases of Building M&E Capacity in Vietnam

Phase I: M&E of the Comprehensive Poverty Reduction and Growth Strategy (2000–05). Vietnam’s first poverty reduction strategy was the Comprehensive Poverty Reduction and Growth Strategy, which the Prime Minister approved in May 2002. Although the M&E system for the poverty reduction strategy was not integrated into the existing planning system, it only had limited influence on M&E practice within the government. Still, key stakeholders such as the World Bank thought of Vietnam’s poverty reduction strategy as an important first attempt in modernizing the country’s strategic planning process and a more extensive use of empirical evidence. The Comprehensive Poverty Reduction and Growth Strategy (with a three-year time frame) coexisted with the 2001–05 Socio-economic Development Plan which was prepared within the context of the 2001–10 Socio-economic Development Strategy.

The poverty reduction strategy’s monitoring system comprised a set of indicators based on the Vietnam Development Goals. The indicators included the following: “(i) indicators to monitor outputs of economic development and poverty reduction; (ii) indicators to monitor and evaluate inputs of resources for the Socio-economic Development Strategy; (iii) indicators to monitor and evaluate the achievements according to the targets laid out in the Socio-economic Development Strategy; and (iv) indicators to evaluate the impact of every program and strategy affecting the poor and the whole society. This system of indicators will be developed in detail by regions, provinces, rural/urban areas, and gender; and some indicators will be further disaggregated according to economic sector, social quintile, and ethnicity.”

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20 The Comprehensive Poverty Reduction and Growth Strategy qualifies as a poverty reduction strategy in the sense that it is a document accepted as such by the IMF and World Bank and used as the basis for, respectively, a Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility Program and a Poverty Reduction Support Credit, or, where relevant, for debt relief through the Heavily Indebted Poor Country process. Vietnam has had a series of socio-economic development plans that guided policy and investment during its most successful period of poverty reduction.

Within the central planning system, monitoring served as an (external) oversight and audit function through which higher levels of government exercised control over lower levels. This system encouraged a defensive approach to the supply of information; those supplying and those receiving information had a strong incentive to manipulate it. The changes to Vietnam’s planning and budgeting systems from 2004 (when the 2002 Budget Law was implemented) represent the first significant change in planning practice, with the provision of significant block grants to lower levels of government and agencies, making the detailed monitoring of inputs more difficult and less relevant.

To better produce and use M&E information, the General Statistical Office conducted a biannual household living standard survey; independent research organizations (nongovernmental organizations and universities) would interview citizens to collect and analyze data, and line ministries and provinces will report on implementation of the Comprehensive Poverty Reduction and Growth Strategy. The Ministry of Planning and Investment coordinates with the line ministries to prepare the annual reports on poverty reduction strategy implementation. Table 3.1 sets out the key M&E activities for Phase I.

**Table 3.1 Phase I (2000–05): Key M&E Frameworks and Activities**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>M&amp;E framework</th>
<th>M&amp;E activities</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Comprehensive Poverty Reduction and Growth Strategy</td>
<td>First initiative to modernize the strategic planning process and increase use of empirical evidence, established set of indicators to deepen analysis of impact of government policies (2002).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Socio-Economic Development Plan 2001–05</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002 Budget Law</td>
<td>Provision of significant block grants to lower levels of government and to agencies, making the detailed monitoring of inputs more difficult and less relevant.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
• Strengthened statistical agencies at various levels.  
• Promoted transparency and data quality.  
• Strengthened the statistical database.  
• Strengthened the national accounts within two years and improved budget data quality to correspond to the Government's fiscal statistical standards.  
• Presented a website of Vietnam in the International Fiscal Statistical Book published by the IMF.  
• Collected high quality data on the poverty situation and trends, and ensure that data and information is publicized and used regularly.  
• Implemented enterprise surveys to collect high-quality data on growth and employment trends and made it publicly available. |

In May 2007, the Ministry of Planning and Investment produced an M&E framework for the Socio-economic Development Plan 2006–10, known as the Decision 555 framework. The framework had a comprehensive set of targets, including a specific set of poverty reduction and social development targets by 2010, to implement commitments by the president at the UN Millennium Summit. Many donors provided technical assistance to create the Decision 555 framework, including the World Bank, the Asia Development Bank, the Department for International Development, and the United Nations Development Programme. A 2008 Asia Development Bank review found that, unlike Vietnam’s previous monitoring frameworks, the Decision 555 framework is a results chain that links the main goals to clear and specific objectives, and each objective is linked to specific input, output, and outcome indicators. The review also summarized data reporting responsibilities and assigned them to each ministry, central agency, and government agency for reporting.

However, because some ministries saw the Decision 555 framework as an output of donor technical assistance that was only institutionalized at the ministry level, it lacked the legal status or authority to guide other ministries or provinces or to replace existing reporting systems. In addition, the framework was “retrofitted” to the existing plan, meaning that an implicit logical framework was developed for each element of the Socio-economic Development Plan, drawing mainly on existing information sources as indicators. The indicators identified for donor-funded projects did not necessarily link with the indicators highlighted within the development plan’s monitoring system. The Ministry of Planning and Investment also lacked authority to initiate a new data collection for indicators in the Decision 555 framework that were not already part of the National Statistical Indicator System. Therefore, the Socio-economic Development Plan 2006–10 midterm review published in this format was not regarded as an official government document, and a separate report in the traditional official format was instead submitted to the Communist Party Central Committee. In addition, the Socio-economic Development Plan Annual Report and the main ongoing regular monitoring of development performance by donors did not use the Decision 555 framework. Donors mainly relied on the Poverty Reduction Support Credit policy matrix.

In 2007, the World Bank reviewed 21 countries and selected Vietnam as one of nine that had achieved significant progress in establishing an operational development strategy and a results-oriented framework.22 Vietnam was classified as having “largely developed” a unified strategic framework, a prioritized national development strategy, and a process of providing stakeholder access to information. Vietnam was also seen as having taken some action on the other criteria (establishing a strategic link to the budget, improving the overall quality of development information, and coordinating a country-led M&E).

Looking forward, the key test of progress is the extent to which the preparation process for Socio-economic Development Plan 2011–15 embeds the changes to M&E set out in the Decision 555 framework. While the poverty reduction strategy had a more developed and integrated M&E system, that strategy existed in parallel to the existing planning system, so it is unclear to what extent its M&E system, as opposed to the Poverty Reduction Support Credit policy matrix,

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influenced government actions. The process of developing the poverty reduction strategy certainly influenced the planning process for the Development plan, but fundamentally the approach remains only partially results-focused. The M&E approach for the development plan does not amount to “M&E system” development in the sense set out by subject matter experts.\(^2\)

The timetable envisaged for the preparation of the development plan did not provide much scope for reorienting the planning system toward a more thorough results-based approach.\(^2\)

Table 3.2 sets out the key M&E activities for Phase II.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>M&amp;E framework</th>
<th>M&amp;E activities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SEDP 2006–10</td>
<td>M&amp;E framework for Socio-economic Development Plan 2006–10, comprehensive targets including specific Poverty Reduction and Social Development Targets by 2010, to implement commitments by the president at the UN Millennium Summit. Results chain that links main overall goals to clear and specific objectives, and each objective is linked to specific input, output, and outcome indicators.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Overall M&E System Structure

M&E champions

There were three M&E champions during this process: the Ministry of Planning and Investment, the legislative branch of the government, and donors.

Ministry of Planning and Investment. Leadership is also seen in the Ministry of Planning and Investment, which has responsibility for the planning system, including the administration of Official Development Assistance projects. This agency led most of the initiatives to strengthen M&E systems within the Vietnamese government system, although its overall mandate and role are not fully established. While the ministry can provide guidance on planning systems and is responsible for preparing the Socio-economic Development Plan, the ministry does not have the authority to make cross-governmental changes and comprehensively revise the monitoring framework.

The Legislative Branch of the Government. Despite the continuing dominance of the executive, the legislative branch of Vietnam’s government plays an increasingly significant role in the policy process, both at the National Assembly level and in the People’s Councils at lower levels of government. The National Assembly Committees (which have received technical support from a number of donors) have been increasingly active in scrutinizing legislation. The National Assembly also debates and approves the Socio-economic Development Plan and receives reports on its progress. However, reports have not been made to the National Assembly.

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\(^2\) The prime minister was expected to set out by May 2009 preparation guidance with a view to getting submissions by September, and producing a first draft of the Socio-economic Development Plan by December 2009.
using the Decision 555 framework. Discussions suggest that National Assembly members—at least those actively engaged in the main committees dealing with economic and social policy issues—have a good understanding of the concepts and issues involved in evidence-based policy and have access to technical support to examine policy issues, and consider whether the available information is accurate and of high quality. However, the development plan’s M&E information does not appear to have been used to directly hold government to account, although the system of questions to ministers allows the Assembly to raise issues of concern that can attract media prominence. The capacity of the National Assembly to effectively scrutinize policy is constrained by some procedural factors, such as the very limited time available to review the budget.

**Donors.** Donors build demand, increase local capacity, and often provide the framework and initiate the information gathering and usage to begin an M&E system. In Vietnam, donors encouraged the renovation of the planning and public expenditure systems, and also continue to widen the policy discussion and engage the legislative branch of government and civil society around this issue. Donor accountability requirements have been a main driver of the development of M&E systems in Vietnam, and the Ministry of Planning and Investment’s initiatives in this area have responded to donor requirements. Graves (2008) discusses the accountability arrangements involving donors in Vietnam and identifies four “primary mutual accountability initiatives” and associated discussion forums:

- The Socio-economic Development Plan and the annual consultative group meeting
- The Hanoi Core Statement on Aid Effectiveness and the Partnership Group on Aid Effectiveness
- The Poverty Reduction Support Credit and its technical meetings
- Sectoral and thematic “partnership groups” with shared agendas

All of these arrangements heavily use M&E information, especially in relation to the Poverty Reduction Support Credit policy matrix.

**M&E Information Produced and Main Actors**
According to research concluded in late 2009, Vietnam was classified as in the process of developing an M&E system. Thus far, Vietnam has initiated parallel pilot programs which have yet to be fully institutionalized, except for the M&E system for Official Development Assistance projects, which is under the Ministry of Planning and Investment’s implementation authority. Vietnam has parallel systems for Poverty Reduction Support Credit monitoring, since the Socio-economic Development Plan monitoring framework is not institutionalized within government. Policy attention and performance assessment for donors has mainly focused on the Poverty Reduction Support Credit policy matrix. The 2011–15 Socio-economic Development Plan intends to make further progress toward a results-based M&E system, but has not specified how the system would be implemented. Currently, budget allocations are not clearly linked to any M&E information, and the Ministry of Finance lacks a system to assess the performance of public expenditure. Strengthening M&E systems and moving toward a culture of results-based management is seen as part of a long-term agenda for public finance reform to strengthen core public finance management and further reform the State Budget Law.

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25 Senior committee members interviewed were not aware of the Decision 555 framework.
Surveys

Various United Nations agencies\(^{26}\) as well as the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA), the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA), the French government, the Department for International Development (DfID), and the World Bank have provided donor support to these programs. The General Statistics Office regards the technical assistance as useful in building system and individual capacity,\(^{27}\) while a World Bank loan supported development of an information technology system and technical infrastructure for statistical activities. Table 3.3 summarizes the programs, progress, and main donors.

The General Statistics Office monitors poverty through the biannual Vietnam Household Living Standards Survey, under the authority of the 2003 Statistics Law. While the biannual information is of high quality, its availability is not always timely for policy purposes. Improved coordination between the General Statistics Office and Ministry of Labour, Invalids and Social Affairs (MOLISA) is needed, as each agency has been producing separate poverty rates since 1993.\(^{28}\)

The General Statistics Office focuses on monitoring poverty reduction, whereas MOLISA uses its information for targeting. Poverty information from MOLISA—based on preparing lists of households under the poverty line with local communities—is used for short-term monitoring and targeting. The General Statistics Office claims that MOLISA comes up with a slightly different poverty estimate at the provincial level that is below that produced by the statistics office, even if the two agencies produce the same national poverty line and poverty rate, because the MOLISA poverty line has not been sufficiently adjusted for inflation and for regional differences in living standards. To overcome this challenge, the Vietnamese government recently assigned the General Statistics Office to produce provincial-level poverty rates based on household surveys that MOLISA will use as indicative “quotas” for targeting.\(^{29}\)

The Decision 555 framework had a large degree of overlap with the National Statistical Indicator System, but included some indicators that were not part of the national system, particularly relating to governance. In the view of the General Statistics Office, the National Statistical Indicator System,—because it seeks to provide a comprehensive national system—should form the basis for monitoring the Socio-economic Development Plan, and if additional indicators are

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\(^{26}\) These include the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA), the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), the United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO), and the United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (UNESCAP).

\(^{27}\) For instance, support from United Nations Development Program and the Swedish International Development Coopération Agency is judged by the General Statistics Office to have significantly contributed to improving statistical products and developing statistical methodology and data systems, in addition to strengthening human resources for statistical activities.

\(^{28}\) September 2011 conversation with Nga Nguyet Nguyen, Senior Economist in Hanoi, Vietnam World Bank Office.

\(^{29}\) September 2011 conversation with Nga Nguyet Nguyen, Senior Economist in the World Bank’s office in Hanoi, Vietnam.
required for development plan monitoring, they should be incorporated within the National Statistical Indicator System, rather than collected through a parallel system. Other observers felt that the General Statistics Office’s capacity was likely to be overloaded and it was not well-equipped for particular forms of data collection, especially of a qualitative nature.

Vietnamese researchers and other stakeholders noted that they had increasing confidence in the information provided by the General Statistics Office and that the government’s approach to M&E is becoming less defensive. They added the office’s information needed to be produced in a more timely manner, although they saw the office as currently overburdened. The General Statistics Office needed to be more proactive in anticipating user demand for information; this should be a key focus of the office’s planning. The office’s activities could be supplemented by strengthening key information sources outside the office (such as information on the banking system) and by the use of other approaches (such as commissioning nongovernmental organizations to undertake qualitative surveys) in areas where the General Statistics Office does not enjoy a comparative advantage.
### Table 3.3. The Summary of Progress in Implementing the General Statistics Office Action Plan

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Program</th>
<th>Progress</th>
<th>Donor support</th>
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</table>
| (1) Improvement and strengthening of the legal environment for statistics | Completed:  
- Statistics Law issued in 2003, effective in 2004  
- Detailed implementation guidance issued in 2004 and 2005  
- Dissemination program for these legal documents completed in 2005 |               |
| (2) Improvement of statistical products and development of statistical information dissemination policy | - Many statistical products (socioeconomic statistical reports, survey results, etc.) have been improved and standardized  
- Mechanisms and policies for statistical information dissemination have been developed (with active support from donors such as UNDP/DfID, and SIDA)  
- Statistical information dissemination capacity (database/data warehouse, stat. services) have been strengthened | UNDP/DfID SIDA JICA/UNIDO |
| (3) Improvement of statistical methodology and data collection systems | - Statistical methodologies (including indicators) standardized, improved, and renovated (leading donor support: UNDP/DfID)  
- Statistical data collection (including reporting systems, surveys) have been improved and harmonized (with support from many donors: UNDP/DfID, UNICEF, UNFPA, JICA, UNIDO, SIDA) | UNDP/DfID UNICEF UNFPA JICA UNIDO SIDA |
| (4) Development and application of information technology in the statistical branch | - Information technology infrastructure has been improved for computerization of statistical activities (lead donor support: WB)  
- Statistical website has been developed  
- Central and regional computer centers have been strengthened | WB SIDA |
| (5) Strengthening of statistical organization and human resources for statistical activities | - Statistical system organization changed and has been improved (by the General Statistics Office itself)  
- Many training courses have been conducted, with strong donor support, to improve the capacity of statisticians conducted | UNDP/DfID UNICEF UNFPA JICA UNIDO SIDA France |
| (6) Improvement of technical and material facilities for statistical activities | - Working conditions for statisticians have been improved | WB |
| (7) Strengthening of international cooperation in statistics | | |

*Source: General Statistics Office*
M&E Frameworks

1. The Poverty Reduction Support Credit Policy Matrix
The Poverty Reduction Support Credit policy matrix used by donors organizes 42 indicators across the following 14 areas (with three indicators for each area): private sector development, infrastructure, education, health, social protection, gender, land and forests, water, environment, planning processes, public financial management, legal development, public administration reform, and anti-corruption initiatives.

2. The Framework for Official Development Assistance Projects
Decision 1248 (in October 2007) set out an action plan for implementing a comprehensive monitoring and evaluation framework for Official Development Assistance projects. This set seven strategic objectives:

- To develop a unified information system to ensure the operation of a national system of monitoring and evaluation of development assistance programs and projects.
- To select and adopt advanced methodologies and tools in the M&E of development assistance programs and projects in conformity with the Vietnamese situation.
- To professionalize staff working on M&E of development assistance programs and projects.
- To ensure a budget for M&E of development assistance programs and projects.
- To cooperate with donors on M&E of development assistance programs and projects.
- To use the results of M&E in management for development results.
- To integrate and use tools, skills, and experiences in the M&E system for development assistance programs and projects to develop an M&E system for public investment.

The process of developing a common M&E framework for Official Development Assistance projects is based on the development of the Aligned Monitoring Tool which has been adopted by the multilateral and bilateral development banks providing loans to Vietnam although implementation of the monitoring tool is still in a relatively early stage; the Independent Monitoring Team (2008) reported initial difficulties with implementation (it was not fully implemented at the time of the visit for this study). However, the Ministry of Planning and Investment intends to roll out the system across all government projects, including those not using Official Development Assistance. Further initiatives highlight the potential for a more systematic program evaluation, including selected in-depth program or sectoral evaluations with the support of the Vietnam Australia Monitoring & Evaluation Support Programme. The joint project is working with Ministry of Planning and Investment on an impact evaluation of rural electrification programs).

3. The Decision 555 M&E framework for Socio-economic Development Program 2006–10
The M&E framework had a comprehensive set of targets, including specific Poverty Reduction and Social Development Targets by 2010, to implement commitments by the president at the UN Millennium Summit. Many donors provided technical assistance to create the Decision 555 framework, including the World Bank, the Asia Development Bank, the Department for International Development, and the United Nations Development Programme. A 2008 Asia Development Bank review found that, unlike previous monitoring frameworks, Decision 555 is a results chain that links main overall goals to clear and specific objectives, and each objective is
linked to specific input, output, and outcome indicators. It also summarized and assigned data reporting responsibilities to each ministry, central agency, and government agency.

4. Medium-Term Expenditure Framework

Critical to moving toward a more results-based planning and budgeting process has been a pilot initiative to develop a Medium-Term Expenditure Framework in four sectors and four provinces. The Country Financial Accountability Assessment considered this pilot to be a success that could be gradually scaled up, but that full implementation into the budget process required legal changes in the Budget Law. A review of the Medium-Term Expenditure Framework implementation issues (MTEF, 2008) identified several main challenges for the framework’s implementation in Vietnam (which can be seen as a necessary step toward results-focused public expenditures) including:

- The complex nature of intergovernmental fiscal relations with considerable delegation of expenditure decisions and discretion given to local governments, depending on their revenue generation effort.
- Incomplete budget coverage, budget rigidities, and a dual budgeting system for recurrent and capital expenditures.
- A planning process which is based on a fixed five-year period, rather than a rolling three-year framework, such as that used for the expenditure framework.
- The lack of aligned decision making on resources within the fiscal framework and the general availability of resources.

The Ministry of Finance also identified constraints on the implementation of the expenditure framework: difficulties in accurate forecasting of revenue and expenditures at the central and local levels; a lack of incentives for agencies engaged in the expenditure framework process to focus on it as a core activity rather than concentrating on annual budget negotiations; and a lack of information and control by budget units over key elements that would be included in an integrated budget.

5. Renovating Planning and M&E in the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development

The Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development has undertaken an initiative to “renovate” the planning process, with a substantial focus on strengthening M&E. The ministry intends to fully implement planning system reforms to integrate the 2011–15 Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development Five-Year Plan into the Socio-economic Development Plan. Table 3.4 below shows the specific reforms to the agricultural sector’s M&E system.
Table 3.4: Renovating the Agriculture Sector’s M&E System Plan

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<tr>
<th>Table 3.4: Renovating the Agriculture Sector’s M&amp;E System Plan</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Old System</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Formulation of M&amp;E plan</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Management Information System for M&amp;E</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Type of M&amp;E indicators and data sources</td>
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<td>Data collection and management methods</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Report templates</td>
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Source: Adapted from a presentation at MARD international workshop (26, February 2009) by Nguyen Van Ha

The ministry has identified more than 300 indicators in relation to its six strategic targets (operating with 64 programs). This number is considered appropriate since the indicators are largely focused on internal management requirements, with a smaller subset regarded as critical indicators for higher level monitoring. Three main sources of information have been identified: (i) information produced by the General Statistics Office as part of the National Statistical Indicator System; (ii) information produced from reporting systems within the ministry; and (iii) additional information to be obtained by supplementary surveys.

A ministerial decision was not sufficient to bring about changes in reporting systems; instead, the ministry launched a campaign to persuade provincial staff of the desirability of strengthening the reporting systems. Also, the M&E system only applies to the capital budget because the Ministry of Finance allocates recurrent and provincial budgets; hence the Ministry of Agricultural and
Rural Development cannot manage the entire agricultural sector budget. The ministry’s experience illustrates the need for several key factors to move the initiative forward:

- The agency for which an M&E system is developed must fully understand its requirements and identify the information needed.
- The agency must optimize its use of collected information because operating a comprehensive M&E system is expensive; and clear coordination mechanisms and allocation of responsibility are needed from all system users.

Provincial and Local Planning Systems

The main progress in moving toward a results-based M&E was in awareness-raising. The independent monitoring team review noted the following: “At the sub-national level, outcomes show that results-based practices are still emerging—54 percent of 48 provinces had developed a monitoring and evaluation system for the provincial five-year Socio-economic Development Plan and 49 percent had established monitoring and evaluation practices. The report shows that 84 percent of the provinces have started to use the Aligned Monitoring Tool (2008, 32–33).” This report also found that financial reporting at the provincial level is weak and focuses on tracking inputs, rather than tracking outcomes and results. In addition, the report noted that significant differences in the reporting formats and indicator definitions for data collected at different levels of government posed problems for establishing an integrated M&E system. The government tried a number of initiatives using participatory approaches to strengthen and develop planning systems at the village and commune level, however it has been difficult to integrate the results with the requirements of the Socio-economic Development Plan’s system.

Accountability Relationships

M&E information can only serve a useful function in the context of effective accountability relationships. These require:

- The production of relevant and timely M&E information in a form that is accessible to potential users.
- The ability of policy and planning stakeholders to use and analyze information and draw policy conclusions from it.
- The ability of stakeholders to influence the executive to address issues that are identified from the information, a process that requires incentive structures within organizations to encourage response to such information and pressures.

The main users of M&E information are donors, the Ministry of Planning and Investment, sector ministries, and, to an increasing extent, the legislative branch of government. However, M&E information is not yet linked to budget allocations. While traditional vertical accountability relationships remain strong, the incentives for using M&E information remain weak. The exceptions are projects and programs that are heavily dependent on donor funding, where results-based M&E is needed for continued resource availability.

Accountability within sector ministries. Ministries use M&E information that is produced as a management tool within the sector and in relation to particular projects and programs. The integration with results varies by sector. For example, the education and health sectors have the most systematic approaches to data collection, while data on the power and energy sector are no longer available after the breakup of the state monopoly in the sector. As discussed earlier, the
Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development has undertaken an initiative to “renovate” the planning process with a substantial focus on strengthening M&E. The intention is to fully implement reforms to the planning system to then integrate the ministry’s 2011–15 Five-Year Plan into the Socio-economic Development Plan.

The Legislative Branch of Government

The legislative branch’s role has been discussed earlier in the M&E Champion section, detailing accountability relationships at the level of the National Assembly. For the lower levels of government, the Hoa Binh case study found that the Provincial People’s Council played an active role in the planning and budgeting process, with the People’s Council reviewing and approving the annual Socio-economic Development Plan and the budget plan annually in December. Prior to the meeting session, the Economic Divisions of the Provincial and District People’s Councils, and the chairman and vice chairman of the Commune People’s Council review the reports of the People’s Committee before sending the reports to the plenary meeting session. Members of the People’s Council’s Economic Division are usually knowledgeable on planning and budgeting issues and work closely with their executive counterparts in developing the Socio-economic Development Plan and the budget plan. At the district and commune level, key members of the People’s Council usually play different roles at the same time, for example serving as a member of party bureau and an executive.

People’s Council divisions are active in overseeing the development plan and budget execution with diversified methods and increasingly standardized procedures. Previously, the operations of the People’s Council divisions relied on the direction of the People’s Council Standing Committee. Recently, the Economic Division and others sectors are more proactive in making oversight plans. Before plans are made, representatives often organize field visits to obtain better grassroots feedback. After oversight missions, the representatives send reports to the People’s Committee for solutions.

Strengths and Weaknesses

As noted earlier, donors are crucial in the early stages because they generating demand for M&E information and contribute to building capacity. Thus far, Vietnam has arrived at an initial starting point that can be adopted more broadly across government. First, consensus is needed to bring about more fundamental changes to the planning system, particularly to the relationship between planning and finance and how planning and public expenditure management systems function in Vietnam. The Socio-economic Development Plan’s five-year planning process is increasingly anachronistic. In addition, while the Ministry of Planning and Investment has been the main champion for M&E, it lacks the authority to impose progress across government, as evidenced by its limited success in establishing the Decision 555 M&E framework for the 2006–10 development plan. In fact, this study found the Poverty Reduction Strategy M&E system from Decision 555 is not functioning or fostering institutional demand for M&E information. In addition, capacity remains weak in the lower tiers of government. A case study in the Hoa Binh province found challenges in the lack of qualified staff and training. Hoa Binh lacked systematic technical training for public officers, had a shortage of qualified technical training schools, and had difficulty attracting capable staff because of the lack of incentives for a permanent position (e.g., low salary and no performance-based remuneration system).

30 The People’s Council is the elected legislative body and the People’s Committee is the executive body at each level of government (province, district, and commune) below the center.
While the Comprehensive Poverty Reduction and Growth Strategy had a more developed and integrated M&E system, the strategy existed in parallel to the existing planning system, so it is unclear to what extent its M&E system (as opposed to the Poverty Reduction Support Credit policy matrix) influenced government actions. The timetable for the preparation of 2011–15 Socio-economic Development Plan did not provide much scope for reorienting the planning system toward a more thorough results-based approach. A second challenge was articulated in The Vietnam Development Report 2007 (World Bank, 2006), which noted that only partial and uneven progress in reforming the strongly entrenched system of central planning had been made. The report criticized the “lack of a coherent conceptual and regulatory framework,” as well as “confusion in ministries, agencies, and provinces on what the government can and cannot legitimately plan for.” It also noted that there is “no systematic and consistent set of guidelines that not only is tailored to specific needs of different levels of government but also addresses coordination among them. Official instructions are regularly issued by the Prime Minister Directives for the preparation of annual and five-year plans. But they remain relatively general, which provides room for innovation among those who embrace the new approach, but does not contribute to change among those who do not.”

The strengths and weaknesses of the Vietnam M&E system are further illustrated in Figure 3.2 below.

**Figure 3.2. Strengths and Weaknesses of Vietnam M&E System**

**Strengths**
- Government has high level of commitment to and interest in results-based approaches and strengthening M&E
- Established framework for common M&E system for ODA projects under MPI.
- Information provided by GSO is increasingly trusted and used for policy purposes
- NSIS provides a coherent national statistical framework which has high-level political support.
- Used pilots to develop results-based planning and M&E in several ministries (notably MARD) and selected provinces and districts.

**Weaknesses**
- Approaches for PRS monitoring are not mainstreamed into government practice.
- MPI lacks authority needed to build M&E capacity across government.
- Ministry of Finance is not yet engaged and not utilizing the M&E information produced in its budget decision-making process.
- Capacity remains weak in sub-national government, due to lack of qualified staff and training challenges.
Sustainability and Next Steps for Strengthening Results-Based M&E in Vietnam

Vietnam has made a great deal of progress toward a results-based M&E system. M&E capacity was a priority for both government and donors for better informed policy decision making and to satisfy donor requirements. The system depends on finance and planning systems that provide incentives to respond to performance information, by linking resource allocation to performance and by providing sufficient autonomy and flexibility over resource use so that public sector managers can genuinely be held accountable for performance. To continue making progress, the country’s planning system should become more strategic, with a clearer vision of what government should control and how it can achieve its objectives and focus on a smaller number of high-level indicators. The government should concentrate on improving M&E quality and eventually work on evaluation capacity, when M&E information becomes sufficient to support evaluations.31

In addition, the Ministry of Finance focuses on building capacity for its core fiscal policy management functions, but does not advocate for using strengthened results-based M&E in its decisions and processes. However, if the Ministry of Finance used M&E information, it would greatly strengthen M&E efforts within the country. Other M&E champions and key stakeholders should engage the Ministry of Finance and address the need for the agency to assess the performance of public spending and use M&E information in allocating fiscal resources. As previously mentioned, improved coordination between the General Statistics Office and MOLISA for poverty monitoring and targeting is also needed.32

Lastly, high-level government support is needed to drive these reforms, especially to build on the Decision 555 Framework experiment and implement a government-wide results-based system of monitoring.

### Incentives for Building M&E Capacity

- Mainly donor-led efforts to support donor reporting needs
- Support to the government.

### Political Economy

- The unrest in the country and the Middle East only a few months later illustrates how progress can be interrupted by instability.
- The country had clear plans for the 4th DPPR to better integrate M&E, and we hope that the work will pick up where it ended and continue.

### Challenges Faced

- The M&E unit’s relationship with the Central Statistical Organization may challenge progress.
- Line ministries lacked access to statistical data and suffered delays in data gathering and reporting.
- Key reports had to be approved by the Cabinet before the project could move on to other activities.

### Sustainability

- Unrest following the project hindered progress. Many of the government staff working on this initiative were fired.

### Key Activities

- Government and donors worked closely to develop the M&E master plan and strategy
- Government and donors worked closely together to operationalize a M&E unit in the Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation

### M&E Champions

- Former Deputy Prime Minister, Former Minister of Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation (and current Managing Director of Social Fund for Development), and Vice Minister of the Fourth Development Program for Poverty Reduction.

### Accountability Relationships

- Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation coordinated the monitoring process and reporting to and from other sectors.

### Frameworks Used/M&E Information Produced

- Government of Yemen had agreements with line ministries on what information would be collected and reported, and had a partially completed indicator database.
Lessons Learned from the Yemen Experience

It was very helpful for the process of building M&E capacity to have a Minister of Planning and International Cooperation who fully and openly gave support to the project. Yemen’s experience illustrates the importance of having a powerful M&E champion to support such a significant initiative. This helped move transactions and activities along when delays cropped up, and raised the level of respect of the M&E Unit with regard to the other ministries and agencies involved.

Study tours allow policymakers to learn from good practices and avoid reinventing the wheel. The seven-day study tour to Uganda provided Yemen’s government and civil society participants with a hands-on illustration of what good practices produce, which also motivates staff by connecting them to their peers and counterparts in other governments that have created solutions to the challenges they currently face.

Sponsorship from the Prime Minister’s office for the M&E coordination process at the central level provides the necessary leverage and political collateral to activate different commissions and structures across government ministries and institutions. This also contributes to ensuring timely access to data and information for regular reporting by the ministries, as well as coordination of government performance control functions at the central, ministry, sector, and local levels.

Connecting accountability with resource allocation provides incentives to activities across sectors. Yemen’s study tour to Uganda provided lessons learned. In Uganda, the country’s Ministry of Finance, Planning, and Economic Development produces a biannual report on budgeting performance, with a focus on accountability, resource allocation to achieving certain results, establishment of a budget control and accountability unit within the Ministry of Finance, Planning, and Economic Development to supervise activities in the following five sectors: Education, Health, Water, Transport and Public Works, and Agriculture.

A strong and independent (or quasi-independent) statistics office is a key part of a successful M&E program. Yemen’s study tour to Uganda provided lessons learned. The development of a strategic plan to improve statistical activities and that aims to disseminate final results of censuses and surveys in no more than six months has enhanced usage of such data in Uganda’s planning and budgeting. Key products of Uganda’s Statistics Bureau included: Population and social surveys, the private sector and industry, information technology, department surveys and capacity building, and statistical coordination services. Key surveys, censuses, and publications include: the household budget survey, a demographic survey, statistical data for state budgeting, a price index, an industry guide, a construction sector guide, annual summary of statistics, and a facts and figures book.

M&E efforts are greatly supported by establishing a permanent secretariat in each ministry to act as a technical bureau responsible for coordinating special tasks for the ministry. This supported
the preservation of accumulated technical expertise and its concentration and ensured business sustainability in each individual ministry.

Inclusion of civil society organizations in the planning process and in M&E outputs, especially on the central level and policy matters, increases support and is an important part of building M&E capacity.

The Country Context and Political Economy
The Republic of Yemen is the poorest country in the Middle East and North Africa region, and the World Bank has cited the fragility of the political and security environment and the social unrest linked to persisting poverty as one of the key country risks. Most institutions are relatively weak, due to capacity issues, corruption, over- or understaffing in the civil service (a legacy of the 1990 reunification when existing civil services were merged without reform), and the persisting need to clarify institutional mandates and structures. The World Bank has noted that the Republic of Yemen will not meet its Millennium Development Goals for 2015. The country will have to overcome serious challenges to achieve its strategic vision, such as the impending rapid decline in oil revenues, the weak capacity of governance institutions, the pressures of high population growth, the worsening scarcity of fresh water, and the present challenges resulting from protests and regime changes.

Following the World Bank’s re-engagement with the Republic of Yemen in January 2012, an Interim Strategy Note (ISN)\(^1\), covering the period FY2013–14, was presented to the World Bank’s Board of Directors in November 2012. The time frame of the ISN was planned to match that of the current transition government in the Republic of Yemen, expected to continue through 2014.

The ISN framework is oriented around three main principles: (i) intensifying participation and inclusion, especially among women and young people; (ii) strengthening institutional capacity, governance, transparency, and accountability; and (iii) enhancing the operational flexibility of the World Bank-supported program. Strengthening institutional capacity is essential to the development/redevelopment of the Republic of Yemen’s M&E program.

The transitional government prepared a development program for the next two years, called the Transitional Program for Stabilization and Development. The program includes several short-term emergency priorities, such as security stabilization, peaceful power transfer, and humanitarian needs. Medium-term priorities include economic growth sectors, basic infrastructure, social protection, and good governance/state building. A joint donor group is working with the authorities on this program to assist during this fragile transition stage.

The Republic of Yemen’s fragile socioeconomic and political situation and current civil strife and its suspension of activities with the World Bank have further stalled implementation of the M&E strategy as well as the most recent Economic Development Program (the Fourth Development Program for Poverty Reduction, DPPR).
The Three Phases of Building M&E Capacity in the Republic of Yemen

For the purposes of this chapter, three phases of M&E development have been identified. Following reunification, efforts toward promoting good governance and pursuing comprehensive reforms began in 1995 with the implementation of the Economic, Financial, and Administrative Reform Program. Efforts continued with the development of the Second Five Year Economic Plan and Poverty Reduction Strategy (PRS). The government completed the Interim Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper in 2000, which was followed by the Republic of Yemen’s first Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (2003–5). However, the PRS-related planning was not reflected in budget lines because the country did not have the required capacity given the weakness of its financial systems.

In 2003, the Republic of Yemen benefited from a PRSP trust fund grant; the purpose of the grant was to support the government of Yemen’s implementation of its first PRSP, as well as to strengthen partnership, outreach, and dissemination activities with parliamentarians and civil society, all of which were identified in the Joint International Monetary Fund (IMF)–World Bank Staff Assessment of 2002. One of the four components housed in the grant included the institutional setup of a PRSP Monitoring Unit in the Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation (MOPIC). Implementation of the program was delayed, however, because the training and awareness campaigns on the PRSP and PRSP monitoring were not initiated during the first two years of the program. Although 12 workshops were held between 2003 and 2005 to improve awareness of the PRSP and help in identifying and gathering information to construct the monitoring indicators, the M&E unit itself was not established. As a result, there was no centralized unit within the government to establish a statistical baseline, and no agreement on indicators or on which agency would lead the data collection, resulting in tensions between MOPIC and the National Statistics Office (NSO). At the time, the priority was not focused on data gathering. Rather, the focus was on establishing the poverty reduction program as outlined in the interim World Bank–IMF PRSP monitoring review.

Phase II: Developing M&E Capacity with the German Agency for International Cooperation (2006–07)
The Republic of Yemen’s “Strategic Vision 2025” is the country’s long-term development plan, first outlined in 2006, and oriented toward lifting its international ranking from a least-developed country to one of “medium human development” by 2025. The plan was translated into a series of successive national plans, including the Third Socio-Economic Development Plan for Poverty Reduction, which is packaged together with the second PRS as a single program under the DPPR. The government developed an M&E strategy for the DPPR that included specific measures to elaborate a poverty monitoring system covering data generation, analysis, storage and dissemination of information required to track trends in poverty and to help assess progress toward achieving PRSP goals.

The German Agency for International Cooperation made significant contributions to building capacity within MOPIC by placing an employee in-house for two years to assist with the development of the M&E master plan, as well as the M&E strategy for the Third Socio-Economic Development Plan for Poverty Reduction. The government of Yemen developed the
National Monitoring and Evaluation Strategy as an M&E system for the DPPR. MOPIC led the creation of this system, which involved a participatory process with line ministries and other key stakeholders to draft the goals and activities all the way through to the completed M&E framework. MOPIC’s M&E unit carried out multiple rounds of workshops with line ministries and other stakeholders to whittle down the number of monitoring indicators. The DPPR stressed the need to reduce the budget deficit, strengthen national accounts, and improve the country’s statistical capacity. Also highlighted in the DPPR was the need for sectoral reforms to increase efficiency and better manage scarce resources as well as expand the still insufficient budgeting systems.

Training workshops covered a variety of M&E functions, including alignment of outcomes with related indicators and preparation and implementation of the M&E work programs consistent with the overall M&E strategy.

Phase III: Operationalizing a M&E Unit with the World Bank (2007–10)

As mentioned earlier under phase I, a PRSP monitoring unit did not yet exist in MOPIC, though some degree of progress had been made with the training and workshops that took place during phase II. The World Bank project that began in October 2007 was created in response to the recommendation to establish and operationalize the PRSP monitoring unit as stipulated in the M&E strategy. The project supported capacity building for operationalizing an M&E system in MOPIC to enhance the institutional and individual M&E competencies of staff in MOPIC and across the line ministries to help operationalize and maintain an M&E system focused on poverty reduction.

The process of building M&E capacity in the Republic of Yemen entailed a large number of (often overlapping) activities, which made progress challenging to follow at times. The MOPIC project coordinator mitigated this challenge with regular communication and document sharing with the World Bank for terms of references and overall project management, as well as regular coordination with the World Bank Yemen Country Office on issues related to procurement and financial management. The project accomplished many of the original goals and made a significant amount of progress in building M&E capacity.

This initiative consisted of five main activities (see Figure 4.1).
Activity 1: Refinement of outcomes and indicators. First, the relevant outcomes and development goals were extracted from the DPPR, including sector strategies. Next, a list of implementation measures and/or programs was constructed and plotted against goals in a matrix format. Strong and robust indicators—consistent among agencies—were established, and a simple analysis of monitoring indicators conducted. The project reduced the number of existing DPPR indicators from 450 to below 200. MOPIC held a significant number of workshops with individual sector representatives to drill down on what information was collected, requiring many negotiations to reach agreement on which ministry/agency would provide data for specific indicators. Each line ministry or relevant agency now has a person(s) devoted to M&E, as do the offices in the governorates. Not every goal was met by the end of the project, as an indicator database developed in DevInfo was not complete at that time. There were also issues with data collection, as the same data was sometimes reported from multiple agencies.

Activity 2: Stakeholder consultation on the program interventions. With the assistance of international and national experts, the M&E team from MOPIC finalized the outputs from Activity 1 for stakeholder consultations. The consultations were open to the government, the donor community, and civil society.

Activity 3: Study tour to Uganda and training activities in the United States and Jordan (MOPIC 2009). As part of the project, a delegation from the Republic of Yemen conducted a study tour to Uganda in November 2009 to learn from the country’s M&E practices and experiences. Seven staff members from the M&E Unit at MOPIC and from the line ministries participated, along with three representatives from civil society organizations. The group discussed many useful topics with their Ugandan counterparts, including the inclusion of civil society organizations in the planning process and in M&E outputs; the strong sponsorship from the prime minister’s office of the M&E coordination process to provide the leverage and power needed to push through the necessary changes; and the importance of establishing a permanent
secretariat in each ministry. The main lessons from the Uganda study tour are outlined in box 4.1. To learn from other experiences, Yemeni government members also participated in training activities at the World Bank in Washington, DC, and in Amman, Jordan.

**Activity 4: Planning and strengthening the M&E implementation process.** Technical assistance was provided to distill the M&E strategy document into working plans within the overall framework of agreed outcomes, indicators, and proposed program interventions. The training and workshops provided the relevant teams with the skills required to eventually implement the M&E master plan.

**Activity 5: Enhancing capacity for planning M&E implementation mechanisms.** This activity developed a draft plan, defining and establishing the monitoring structures, and advancing the work into actual implementation. Developing the master plan formed the basis for implementing a coherent M&E system for DPPR-PRSP programs linked to sector M&E systems. MOPIC has developed an M&E master plan and put in place an integrated M&E system to implement the plan, linking it to sector M&E systems and aligning it to agreed outcomes, as well as adhering to institutional, structural, and technical proposals built into the master plan. MOPIC is responsible for coordinating the DPPR-PRSP monitoring process and therefore reporting structures to and from other sectors have been aligned accordingly.

While the World Bank supported the project - it met most of the objectives and made a significant amount of progress - the M&E Unit was established in MOPIC, however most of the staff was actually pulled from other departments within the ministry (such that new hires were not made). The database in DevInfo is not complete, and sometimes receives the same data from different sources, for example the NSO and the Ministry of Health. Data are often delayed and have to be requested numerous times.

The project had a slow start—it was approved in March 2007 but did not become effective until October—however, eventually a fully staffed M&E unit was up and running, supported strongly by the minister, raising its status and strengthening its mandate. Nonetheless, there were some challenges regarding low project implementation capacity and political delays because key reports had to be approved by the Yemeni Cabinet before the project could move on to subsequent new activities.
Box 4.1. Uganda Study Tour

Participants from the Government of Yemen and Civil Society:
Ministry of Planning and International Coordination
Head, Monitoring and Evaluation Unit
General Manager for Studies
General Manager, Sectoral Policy
Head, Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)-funded projects monitoring unit
National Statistics Office
Three coordinators
Yemen Civil Society
Three representatives

Presentations by and field visits to Ugandan Government, including:
Office of the Prime Minister
Ministry of Public Service
Office of Budgeting at the Ministry of Finance, Planning, and Economic Development
Ministry of Education
Ministry of Water, Lands, and Environment
Ministry of Local Government
Planning Unit of the General Authority for Development of North Western Areas
National Planning Authority (NPA)

Main lessons learned from the study tour:

- Sponsorship from the Ugandan Prime Minister’s Office for the M&E coordination process at the central level provides the necessary leverage and political collateral to activate different commissions and structures across government ministries and institutions. This sponsorship also contributes to ensuring timely access to data and information for regular reporting by the ministries, as well as coordination of government performance control functions at the central, ministry, sector, and local levels.

- Connecting accountability with resource allocation provides incentives to activities across sectors. In Uganda, the country’s Ministry of Finance, Planning, and Economic Development produces a biannual report on budgeting performance, with a focus on accountability, resource allocation to achieving certain results, and establishment of a budget control and accountability unit within the Ministry of Finance, Planning, and Economic Development to supervise activities in the following five sectors: education, health, water, transport and public works, and agriculture.

- A strong and independent (or quasi-independent) statistics office is the key to a successful M&E program. The development of a strategic plan to improve statistical activities with the aim of disseminating final results of censuses and surveys in no more than six months enhanced usage of such data in Uganda’s planning and budgeting. Key products of Uganda’s Statistics Bureau included: population and social surveys, data on the private sector and industry, information technology assessments, department surveys and capacity building, and statistical coordination services.

- M&E efforts are greatly supported by establishing a permanent secretariat in each ministry to act as a technical bureau responsible for coordinating special tasks for the ministry. This supported the preservation of accumulated technical expertise and its concentration and ensured business sustainability in each individual ministry.

- Inclusion of CSOs in the planning process and in M&E outputs, especially on the central level and policy matters, increases support and is an important part of building M&E capacity.

Source: Author’s compilation.
M&E Champions

The champions that were instrumental in moving forward the process of building M&E capacity included the former Deputy Prime Minister and former Minister of MOPIC (and current Managing Director of Social Fund for Development) and the Vice-Minister of the DPPR.

The minister of MOPIC fully and openly supported the project. This moved transactions and activities along when delays cropped up and raised the level of respect of the M&E Unit among the other ministries and agencies involved. MOPIC led the process of adopting a more systematic approach to M&E and enhancing the capacity to assess the impact of the Republic of Yemen’s poverty reduction efforts and progress in achieving its strategic vision. The Social Fund for Development (SFD) is a local Yemeni agency that is known and respected for its own M&E processes and was involved in several of the activities. At the end of the project, a large degree of progress was made, and the objectives remain important for the country, as highlighted in the Fourth DPPR, published in 2011. Drawing on lessons from the third DPPR and previous PRSPs, this fourth DPPR is the first plan to have its own M&E framework and mechanism, with a separate annex solely devoted to M&E.

Conclusions and Next Steps for Strengthening Results-Based M&E in the Republic of Yemen

The objectives of the World Bank project were, and still are, very relevant to the issues facing the Republic of Yemen. Although the topic of M&E had been raised for several years before grant approval, implementation of M&E-related policies and activities had not yet taken place. Figures 4.2 and 4.3 illustrate the main M&E activities, as well as some of the roles and responsibilities for M&E activities that are laid out in this chapter.
Figure 4.3: Fourth DPPR M&E Activities

M&E Tasks

- Raise Awareness
- Revise laws and regulations
- Analyze policy and data
- Assess Effects
- Include Citizen Voices
- Ensure Implementation
- Produce Data and Information
- Build Capacity

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During the process of building M&E capacity, it became clear that more cooperation with the NSO was needed. Line ministries occasionally complained of data issues between themselves and the NSO, including a lack of access to NSO data, or, duplicative and inconsistent results. This led to some delays in data gathering and reporting. To address this issue, a Cabinet resolution was passed in 2010 (Cabinet Resolution No. 314) to reinforce and frame the involvement of the NSO in the development of the M&E process between MOPIC, the line ministries, and other agencies. Implementation of this resolution is in progress, though arguably at a slow pace. The government does not yet have a centralized online system that links the statistics office and line ministries to the M&E unit to allow for regular updating of all indicators. The Republic of Yemen also has a statistical master plan to be implemented by the NSO, which brings some coordination challenges. As the official state statistical agency, the NSO is key to many, if not most, of the monitoring indicators.

Although the infrastructure for a monitoring system has been established within MOPIC, the practical measures of identifying indicators and implementing a system for systematic M&E has not advanced further. After the grant closed, the next step was to be implementation of the M&E master plan. However, shortly after grant closing, social unrest began, stalling further progress, which serves to illustrate the additional challenges faced in fragile and conflict-affected country settings.

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Chapter 5: Conclusions

The experiences of Mexico, Rwanda, Vietnam, and Yemen serve as useful examples of how M&E capacity building advancements can take different paths, according to the country context. This meta analysis aimed to illustrate that the process is flexible and works in different contexts, although it will be different in each country. The comparisons across these four countries are summarized into two useful frameworks to help policymakers and other colleagues that work on the daunting and important task of building M&E capacity in young systems: mechanics and process of building M&E capacity.

The first framework revolved around the mechanics of building M&E capacity: documenting and comparing main activities, M&E champions, accountability relationships, and what information was produced. Country examples highlighted in this paper stressed the importance of utilizing whatever capacity already exists, and building upon it. Comparing the main activities across the country examples illustrated how different key areas of progress can be, but all are advancing.

The second framework is a comparison across the process of such an initiative, from the incentives and political economy issues through to challenges faced and assessment of sustainability. As shown in this report, while much of the M&E capacity-building process is donor-driven in the beginning, without country governmental support, the process will not really become entrenched, no matter how many resources donors pour into the effort. In addition, political and technical advancements should be made simultaneously, or else M&E capacity building will only serve donor reporting requirements, and once projects end, the advancements will not be retained. Also, advancements that have the consensus of line ministries and those that capture and report information are critical, to ensure that the M&E system develops in a useful way and also is sustainable beyond the tenure of specific M&E champions, donors, projects, and programs.

In particular, the issue of how to sustain M&E advancements—especially progress that has been interrupted, such as the case of Yemen—will be particularly important. Documenting achievements from this and other conflict-affected countries will be useful. Additional areas for future work in this area could include further analysis of the continued progress of the profiled countries, or comparisons between the profiled countries and countries that have similar contexts.
References


UN. 2010. United Nations site for the MDG Indicators  


Annex A: List of People Interviewed (Rwanda)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Institution</th>
<th>Position</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Emmanuel Ndahimana</td>
<td>Private consultant</td>
<td>Former Minister of State (MINECOFIN)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jean Paul Rwabiyonza</td>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>Country Economist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John Kayemba</td>
<td>IMF</td>
<td>Country Economist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ingrid Mutima</td>
<td>MINECOFIN/EFU</td>
<td>Aid Policy Coordinator</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Godfrey Kabera</td>
<td>MINECOFIN /Planning</td>
<td>Research expert and planner</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Andre Habimana</td>
<td>MINECOFIN</td>
<td>Head of Development Planning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ronald Nkusi</td>
<td>MINECOFIN</td>
<td>Financial Resource Mobilisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jean Paul Rwaboyanza</td>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>Economist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dr. Emilen Nkusi</td>
<td>MINISANTE</td>
<td>Head of M&amp;E System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Murangwa Mago Yusuf</td>
<td>Ag DG</td>
<td>NISR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egide Rugamba</td>
<td>MINALOC</td>
<td>Director General</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eric</td>
<td>MINISANTE</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Masterjurb</td>
<td>MINEDUC</td>
<td>Consultant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rogers Mugisha</td>
<td>NISR</td>
<td>MDGs and EDPRS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alex Ndagijimana</td>
<td>MINAGRI</td>
<td>M&amp;E Specialist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ernest Ruzindaza</td>
<td>MINAGRI</td>
<td>PS</td>
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<tr>
<td>Marie-Clare Mukasine</td>
<td>MININFRA</td>
<td>PS</td>
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<tr>
<td>Theodore Hakizimana</td>
<td>NISR/UNDP</td>
<td>National Coordinator</td>
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<tr>
<td>Clement Mugabo</td>
<td>MINEDUC</td>
<td>Planning and Budget / M&amp;E</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vincent de Boer</td>
<td>EC</td>
<td>Economist</td>
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<tr>
<td>Egide Rugamba</td>
<td>MINALOC/Planning, M&amp;E</td>
<td>DG</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kalisa Mbanda</td>
<td>SNV</td>
<td>Capacity building consultant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alex Kamurase</td>
<td>World Bank</td>
<td>Social Protection (VUP, Governance &amp; Decentralisation)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Organization</td>
<td>Role</td>
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<tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Obald Hakizimana</td>
<td>MINECOFIN/Macro Unit</td>
<td>Sector economist (previously statistics department)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stephan Klingbeil and Timo Mahn</td>
<td>KFW</td>
<td>Director (Economist) – PFM, budget support, decentralisation, governance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elias Baingana</td>
<td>Budget</td>
<td>Head</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mimi Omowunni Ladipo</td>
<td>World Bank</td>
<td>Country manager</td>
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<tr>
<td>Gemma Williams</td>
<td>MINESANTE</td>
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<tr>
<td>Richard Arden / Catherine Howgego</td>
<td>DFID</td>
<td>Resp. Human development and health</td>
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<tr>
<td>Dr. Okwach Abagi</td>
<td>President’s Office</td>
<td>Senior Policy Advisor – Social Cluster / M&amp;E Specialist of PSTA</td>
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<tr>
<td>Phillipe Karenzi</td>
<td>President’s Office</td>
<td>Governance Cluster</td>
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<tr>
<td>Josianne Barebereho</td>
<td>President’s Office</td>
<td>Economic Cluster</td>
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<tr>
<td>Alexis Ndagijimana</td>
<td>MINAGRI</td>
<td>M&amp;E Specialist of PSTA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anton Delie</td>
<td>Belgium Embassy</td>
<td>Head of office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yusuf Mago</td>
<td>NISR</td>
<td>Director general</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stella Mugabo</td>
<td>Public Sector Capacity Building Secretariat (PSCBS)</td>
<td>Executive secretary</td>
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<tr>
<td>Fabien Majoro</td>
<td>Office of the Prime Minister</td>
<td>Director General of the Coordination Unit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vivian Gakire</td>
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<tr>
<td>Benoit Mpambara</td>
<td>Bugasera District Office</td>
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<td>[Name]</td>
<td>District – Nyamasheke</td>
<td>Data Manager HMIS</td>
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<td>Leonard Rugwabiza</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ernest Ruzindaza &amp; Alexandra Lowe</td>
<td>MINAGRI</td>
<td>PS &amp; ODI</td>
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<tr>
<td>Prosper Musafiri</td>
<td>MINECOFIN</td>
<td>Former DG MINECOFIN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Isabelle Cardinal</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Institution</td>
<td>Position</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dr Dinh Van Nha</td>
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<tr>
<td>Dr Tran Van</td>
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<tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ms Pham Thuy Anh</td>
<td>Center for Cooperation Human Resources Development</td>
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<td>Steve Price-Thomas</td>
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<td>Jim Anderson</td>
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<td>Daniel Mont</td>
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<tr>
<td>Nga Nguyet Nguyen</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
### List of People Interviewed (Yemen)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Institution</th>
<th>Position</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ali Dahhaq</td>
<td>MOPIC</td>
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<tr>
<td>Wilfried Engelke</td>
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<td>Wael Zakout</td>
<td>The World Bank</td>
<td>Yemen Country Manager</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abdulkarim Al Arhabi</td>
<td>Social Fund for Development</td>
<td>Deputy Prime Minister and former Minister of MOPIC/Managing Director</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mutahar Alabassi</td>
<td>DPPR</td>
<td>Vice Minister</td>
</tr>
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