Document of The World Bank Report No: ICR00001413 IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION AND RESULTS REPORT (IDA 36940 AND IDA 3694A) ON A CREDIT IN THE AMOUNT OF SDR 45.20 MILLION (US$56.35 MILLION EQUIVALENT) TO THE REPUBLIC OF CAMEROON FOR THE DOUALA INFRASTRUCTURE PROJECT June 28, 2010 Transport Unit Country Department AFCC1 Africa Region CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS (Exchange Rate Effective as of December 31, 2009) Currency Unit = FCFA SDR1.00 = US$1.57 US$1.00 = 456 FCFA FISCAL YEAR January 1 to December 31 ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS AFD Agence Française de Développement (French Development Agency) AIDS Acquired Immune-deficiency Syndrome C2D Contrat de Désendettement et de développement (Framework for use of French debt Relief by Cameroon) CAR Central African Republic CAS Country Assistance Strategy, CFAF Franc CFA (BEAC currency) DCA Development Credit Agreement DIP Douala Infrastructure Project EA Environmental Assessment EIRR Economic Internal Rate of Return EMP Environmental Management Plan EU European Union FY Fiscal Year GOC Government of Cameroon HDM Highway Development Maintenance (Model 4) HIPC Highly Indebted Poor Countries HIV Human Immunodeficiency Virus ICB International Competitive Bidding ICR Implementation Completion Report IDA International Development Agency IMF International Monetary Fund I-PRSP Interim Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper ISDS Integrated Safeguards Data Sheet M&E Monitoring and Evaluation MINDUH Ministère du Développement Urbain et de l'Habitat (Ministry of Housing and Urban Development) MINT Ministry of Transport MINTP Ministère des Travaux Publics (Ministry of Public Works) NCB National Competitive Bidding NPV Net Present Value OP Operational Policy PAD Project Appraisal Document PCC Project Coordination Committee PDO Project Development Objectives PDUE Projet de Développement des secteurs Urbain et de l'Eau (Urban and Water Development Support Project) PIU Project Implementation Unit PPF Project Preparation Facility SAC III Third Structural Adjustment Credit TTL Task Team Leader UCD Urban Community of Douala VOC Vehicle Operating Cost Vice President: Obiageli K. Ezekisili Country Director: Mary A. Barton-Dock Sector Manager: C. Sanjivi Rajasingham Project Team Leader: Jean-Francois Marteau ICR Primary Author: Peter Ngwa Taniform CAMEROON Douala Infrastructure Project CONTENTS 1. Project Context, Development Objectives and Design .............................................................. 1 2. Key Factors Affecting Implementation and Outcomes .............................................................. 4 3. Assessment of Outcomes.......................................................................................................... 14 4. Assessment of risks to development outcomes ........................................................................ 20 5. Assessment of bank and borrower performance ...................................................................... 21 6. Lessons Learned ....................................................................................................................... 24 7. Comments on Issues Raised by Borrower/Implementing Agencies/Partners .......................... 26 Annex 1. Project Costs and Financing .......................................................................................... 27 Annex 2. Outputs by Component.................................................................................................. 29 Annex 3. Economic Analysis........................................................................................................ 31 Annex 4. Bank Lending and Implementation Support/Supervision Processes............................. 36 Annex 5. Beneficiary Survey Results ........................................................................................... 37 Annex 6. Stakeholder Workshop Report and Results................................................................... 38 Annex 7. Summary of Borrower's ICR and/or Comments on Draft ICR ..................................... 39 Annex 8. Comments of Cofinanciers and Other Partners/Stakeholders ....................................... 44 Annex 9. List of Supporting Documents ...................................................................................... 45 MAP A. Basic Information DOUALA Country: Cameroon Project Name: INFRASTRUCTURE PROJECT Project ID: P074490 L/C/TF Number(s): IDA-36940,IDA-3694A ICR Date: 06/30/2010 ICR Type: Core ICR REPUBLIC OF Lending Instrument: SIL Borrower: CAMEROON Original Total XDR 45.2M Disbursed Amount: XDR 43.5M Commitment: Revised Amount: XDR 43.5M Environmental Category: B Implementing Agencies: COMMUNAUTE URBAINE DE DOUALA Cofinanciers and Other External Partners: Government Republic of Cameroon CITIES ALLIANCE C2D B. Key Dates Revised / Actual Process Date Process Original Date Date(s) Concept Review: 09/18/2001 Effectiveness: 03/21/2003 03/21/2003 Appraisal: 02/13/2002 Restructuring(s): 03/22/2006 Approval: 07/18/2002 Mid-term Review: 09/30/2005 01/26/2006 Closing: 12/31/2008 12/31/2009 C. Ratings Summary C.1 Performance Rating by ICR Outcomes: Satisfactory Risk to Development Outcome: Moderate Bank Performance: Moderately Satisfactory Borrower Performance: Moderately Unsatisfactory C.2 Detailed Ratings of Bank and Borrower Performance (by ICR) Bank Ratings Borrower Ratings Moderately Quality at Entry: Moderately Satisfactory Government: Unsatisfactory Implementing Moderately Quality of Supervision: Moderately Satisfactory Agency/Agencies: Unsatisfactory Overall Bank Moderately Satisfactory Overall Borrower Moderately i Performance: Performance: Unsatisfactory C.3 Quality at Entry and Implementation Performance Indicators Implementation QAG Assessments Indicators Rating Performance (if any) Potential Problem Project Quality at Entry No None at any time (Yes/No): (QEA): Problem Project at any Quality of Moderately No time (Yes/No): Supervision (QSA): Unsatisfactory DO rating before Satisfactory Closing/Inactive status: D. Sector and Theme Codes Original Actual Sector Code (as % of total Bank financing) Central government administration 1 6 Roads and highways 83 80 Sub-national government administration 16 14 Theme Code (as % of total Bank financing) Infrastructure services for private sector development 40 40 Other urban development 40 40 Trade facilitation and market access 20 20 E. Bank Staff Positions At ICR At Approval Vice President: Obiageli Katryn Ezekwesili Callisto E. Madavo Country Director: Mary A. Barton-Dock Robert Calderisi Sector Manager: C. Sanjivi Rajasingham Maryvonne Plessis-Fraissard Project Team Leader: Jean-Francois Marteau Abdelghani Inal ICR Team Leader: Peter Ngwa Taniform ICR Primary Author: Peter Ngwa Taniform F. Results Framework Analysis Project Development Objectives (from Project Appraisal Document) The project aims to support the Government of Cameroon and the Urban Community of Douala (UCD) to improve the efficiency of Douala's transport system connecting the sub- regional port of Douala and its hinterlands (local, national, and sub-regional). This objective will be achieved through the implementation of an urgent program of ii rehabilitation of the degraded primary roads connecting the port and the industrial areas; and strengthening the capacity for urban road management and maintenance. Revised Project Development Objectives (as approved by original approving authority) Not applicable (a) PDO Indicator(s) Original Target Formally Actual Value Values (from Revised Achieved at Indicator Baseline Value approval Target Completion or documents) Values Target Years Indicator 1 : 23 km of primary roads rehabilitated Value quantitative or 0 km 23 km 27 km Qualitative) Date achieved 03/21/2003 12/21/2008 12/31/2009 Comments Percentage of achievement: 117% (incl. % A third batch of road works was decided to be funded in 2006, thanks to the achievement) economies made from the two initial batches. Reduction percentage of travel times on main roads affected by the rehabilitation Indicator 2 : works Value 0% 42% 87% quantitative or (30km/h) (40km/h) Qualitative) Date achieved 06/30/2002 12/31/2008 12/01/2009 Comments Percentage of achievement:133% (incl. % The speed did not increase equally on the roads rehabilitated under the project. In achievement) some spots, the speed should be reduced by bumpers to enhance road safety. Reduction percentage of vehicle operating costs on main roads affected by the Indicator 3 : rehabilitation works Value quantitative or 0% 42.3% 59% Qualitative) Date achieved 06/30/2002 12/31/2008 12/01/2009 Percentage of achievement: 139% Comments Decreased fleet age, resulting in lower operating cost partly due to new road (incl. % conditions. Objective would have however been obtained as can be derived from achievement) the sensitivity analysis found in annex 3. Indicator 4 : Road maintenance financing secured (Budget and expenditures) Value quantitative or FCFA 1.105 billion FCFA 6 billion FCFA 4.5 billion Qualitative) Date achieved 07/01/2002 12/31/2008 12/31/2009 Percentage of achievement: 100% Comments Initial allocations were met until end of 2007. In 2006, Team and UCD revisited (incl. % the target and allocations decreased to 4.5 billion in 2009, but were consistent achievement) with credit covenants. iii Indicator 5 : Competent staff recruited in the UCD road management unit Value 3 highway 3 highway quantitative or 0 highway engineer engineers engineers Qualitative) Date achieved 06/30/2002 12/31/2002 12/31/2009 Percentage of achievement: 100% Comments Several other staff was recruited, as the accountant specialist or the (incl. % administrative assistant. The recruitments occurred at the beginning of the achievement) project, but some staff was replaced during the Project. Indicator 6 : Institutional framework enhanced - Creation of sound strategies for urban development, transport and road maintenance Value Institutional - UCD's Actual institutional quantitative or framework infrastructure framework Qualitative) enhanced services are more readily available and greatly improved - 84 staff members trained Date achieved 06/30/2002 12/31/2002 12/31/2009 Comments The trained staff and the various strategies developed have greatly impacted the (incl. % institutional framework of the various implementation agency achievement) (b) Intermediate Outcome Indicator(s) Original Target Actual Value Formally Values (from Achieved at Indicator Baseline Value Revised approval Completion or Target Values documents) Target Years Indicator 1 : Traffic volumes on main roads affected by the rehabilitation works Value 220,000 223,000 (quantitative 155,000 vehicles/day vehicles/day vehicles/day or Qualitative) Date achieved 06/30/2002 06/30/2005 12/01/2009 Comments Percentage of achievement:100% (incl. % The traffic did not increase equally on the roads rehabilitated under the project. achievement) iv G. Ratings of Project Performance in ISRs Actual Date ISR No. DO IP Disbursements Archived (USD millions) 1 12/04/2002 Satisfactory Satisfactory 0.00 2 12/09/2002 Satisfactory Satisfactory 0.00 3 05/06/2003 Satisfactory Satisfactory 0.15 4 11/04/2003 Satisfactory Satisfactory 0.88 5 06/18/2004 Satisfactory Satisfactory 1.06 6 12/16/2004 Satisfactory Satisfactory 3.79 7 12/30/2004 Satisfactory Satisfactory 3.79 8 01/24/2005 Moderately Satisfactory Satisfactory 3.79 9 06/30/2005 Unsatisfactory Unsatisfactory 4.53 Moderately Moderately 10 12/14/2005 9.89 Unsatisfactory Unsatisfactory Moderately 11 05/16/2006 Moderately Satisfactory 16.54 Unsatisfactory 12 10/11/2006 Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 23.04 13 04/11/2007 Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 27.98 14 06/05/2007 Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 30.32 15 11/30/2007 Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 33.15 16 05/29/2008 Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 39.46 17 12/08/2008 Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 50.53 18 06/24/2009 Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 55.23 19 12/22/2009 Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 59.02 H. Restructuring (if any) ISR Ratings at Amount Board Restructuring Disbursed at Restructuring Reason for Restructuring & Approved Restructuring Date(s) Key Changes Made PDO Change DO IP in USD millions - review of the covenant related to funding needs for road maintenance in Douala - reallocation of credit proceeds including: addition of MINT/MINTP 03/22/2006 N MU MU 13.63 components to strengthen the institutional environment regarding both road infrastructure and transport services linking the Port of Douala to its hinterland v ISR Ratings at Amount Board Restructuring Disbursed at Restructuring Reason for Restructuring & Approved Restructuring Date(s) Key Changes Made PDO Change DO IP in USD millions extension of the urban development institutional strengthening component to include pilot slum upgrading projects and preparation of the Urban and Water Development Project I. Disbursement Profile vi 1. Project Context, Development Objectives and Design 1.1 Context at Appraisal 1. Given the key role played by the port and the city of Douala in the economy of Cameroon and the sub-region, the project design was to support the urgently needed improvement of the transport system through: (i) rehabilitation of urban roads, and (ii) institutional strengthening; to enhance the competitiveness of the port and the city of Douala. The appraised project was fully in line with the Bank's Country Assistance Strategy (CAS) of 1996 and the 2000 Interim Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (I-PRSP)1 whose main objectives were to maintain and develop the road network in both urban and rural areas as well as improve the port's efficiency and competitiveness. BACKGROUND 2. The city of Douala is one of the major industrial centers of Central Africa. It is Cameroon's main maritime outlet, handling more than 95 percent of the total imports and prevalent for exports. It plays an integral role in the economic development of Cameroon (95 percent of the country's total maritime traffic, 60 percent of the national industrial potential, and 70 percent of the national formal economic activity)2 and of neighboring landlocked countries. Its port handles an annual average freight turn-over of about six million tons. The bulk of goods shipped to the Central African Republic (CAR), Chad and to a lesser extent the Republic of Congo, passes through the port of Douala. It was therefore a top priority city for development by the Government of Cameroon (GOC) to increase its contribution to the competitiveness of the national economy as a whole and that of the Central African Economic and Monetary Community (CEMAC) sub-region. 3. The economic crisis that affected Cameroon between 1985 and 1995 had a significant impact on the transport sector in Douala. It resulted in a reduction in the volume of public investment and spending on infrastructure maintenance, leading to the serious degradation of the network. To remedy the situation, an ambitious road rehabilitation program was launched in 1991. This however did not materialize due to the fact that, both the resources of the Urban Community of Douala (UCD) and funds transferred from the central government to the UCD had declined sharply. Thus, transport, especially to and from the port and the industrial areas had become difficult, costly, and time consuming for workers, trucks, and goods. This resulted in a reduction in the efficiency and competitiveness of both the port and the city, with several key arteries barely passable, leading to severe continuous traffic jams. The UCD, conscious of this, signed in 1999 a performance contract with the government to improve the city management, and in 2001, the UCD prepared again a comprehensive traffic flows reorganization, and an urgent rehabilitation program for the main roads to address the most critical urban transport issues. It was this initiative that gave birth to the Douala Infrastructure Project (DIP). 4. The government's funding at the time was very limited and the situation at the UCD was no better. This resulted in both these entities having to rely principally on donor funded programs. The only prospects available then were the World Bank and France, which was 1IDA/SecM2002-2007 2 Project Appraisal Document-June 2002 1 preparing a substantial debt relief initiative (the Contrat de Désendettement et de Développpement, C2D) and chose to allocate part of the funds to this program. The result was a comprehensive program of over 40 km of key roads to be rehabilitated and/or expanded with support from these two donors. However, the support of the C2D was contingent on Cameroon reaching the Highly Indebted Poor Countries Initiative (HIPC) completion point. 5. The rehabilitation of the main roads in Douala was considered crucial to the overall success of the newly reformed maritime transport and port operations. These had been subject to constant monitoring at the time both from the government and from the donor community under the HIPC completion point criteria. It also aimed to allow competitive private urban transport operators to develop activities. The other key preoccupation of the government and the donor community was to secure appropriate maintenance of the network (and particularly once the roads were rehabilitated). Substantial effort had been made by the European Commission and the Bank in creating a Road Fund to secure the necessary financing for the main intercity network and to build capacity of Small and Medium Enterprises and the government central administration, but urban roads were hardly considered in these efforts. 1.2 Original Project Development Objectives (PDO) and Key Indicators 6. The PDO was to support the GOC and the UCD in improving the efficiency of the Douala's transport system connecting the sub-regional port of Douala and its hinterlands. This objective was to be achieved through the implementation of an urgent program of rehabilitation of the degraded primary roads connecting the port and the industrial areas; and strengthening the capacity for urban road management and maintenance. The key performance and output indicators for the project were as follows: Table 1: Key Performance and Output Indicators at Appraisal PDO Main Project Output Indicators 1- Improve the efficiency of Douala's · Rehabilitate 23 km of primary roads; transport system connecting the port and the · Reduce travel time on main roads by 42% industrial areas and their hinterlands. after rehabilitation; · Reduce vehicle operation cost by 42.3% after roads rehabilitation. 2- Strengthen urban road management and · Institutional framework enhanced; maintenance. · Ensure appropriate road maintenance budget and expenditures · Recruit competent staff: Finance, procurement and technical specialists. 1.3 Revised PDO and Key Indicators, and reasons/justification 7. The PDO was not revised. Key Performance Indicators were similarly left unchanged. The main Project Output Indicators however changed due to the additional activities which were incorporated after the midterm review and included increased traffic volumes on main roads affected by the rehabilitation works. 1.4 Main Beneficiaries 2 8. The primary target groups identified in the Project Appraisal Document (PAD) were the inhabitants of the city of Douala, especially the users of the transport system, the port and industrial areas. Other beneficiaries included the construction industry through the creation of jobs of medium and low skills suited especially to the poor and neighboring countries such as Chad, Central African Republic and Congo through simplified foreign trade. 1. 5 Original Components (as approved) 9. The project originally consisted of three main components at the appraisal stage. They were: (i) the urban road rehabilitation program in Douala, (ii) institutional development, and (iii) support to the project implementation units. Component 1 ­ Urban Road Rehabilitation ­ (US$58.13 million, Bank financing: US$46.50 million) 10. Component 1 which accounted for more than 80 percent of the project resources aimed to rehabilitate 23 kilometers of existing primary roads connecting the port and the industrial areas to other districts of the city of Douala as well as the intercity road network. It was divided in two Lots, at an estimated cost of US$58.13 million. This component was managed by the UCD. Component 2 ­ Institutional Development ­ (US$12.86 million, Bank financing: US$9.00 million) 11. This component was designed to provide technical assistance for program implementation, audits and monitoring, project management, capacity building for urban road management and maintenance, and preparation of an urban development strategy and program for Douala and other cities, including city development strategies, as well as financial and organizational audits of UCD. This component had therefore an overall goal of supporting road and urban strategies beyond Douala, and was technically managed partly by the UCD and partly by the Ministry of Housing and Urban Development (MINDUH). Component 3 ­ Support to units of project implementation ­ (US$0.35 million, Bank financing: US$0.25 million) 12. This component would support the project implementation entities, namely the project management unit, the Project Coordination Committee and the Environmental Unit of the Ministry of Public Works (MINTP). 1.6 Revised Components 13. The main project components were not revised during implementation. However, a reallocation of credit proceeds occurred as needed and as agreed with the GOC. In essence, the award of the two major civil works (Lots 1 and 2) contracts during a period of strong competition in the road construction industry in Cameroon (due inter alia to the arrival of Chinese Companies), resulted in a significant drop in the projected costs. In this context, the UCD in consultation with the other line ministries involved, proposed a reallocation of the credit proceeds and allowed to increase the outputs of each component. 14. For Component 1, an additional 4.1 km section of road was incorporated which constituted the third Lot of rehabilitation, to partly cover insufficient funding on the C2D funded roads, and provided an alternative route to the city center from Yaoundé and additional relief of the industrial area. 3 15. Component 2 saw an expansion in scope in two ways. With regards to the urban development institutional strengthening, the component was complemented by: (i) several studies related to Habitat and city management, (ii) a preparation budget for an Urban and Water Development Project (PDUE), and (iii) pilot testing of slum upgrading and drainage projects in the City of Douala for further replication in the PDUE. The latter elements were to be managed from a technical standpoint by the UCD. 16. The scope of the institutional strengthening activities was also expanded to capture the whole Douala port hinterland and not only the city of Douala. This led to the introduction of new sub-components to support the national transport strategy to be managed by the Ministry of Transport, and the national road sector to be piloted by MINTP comprising of: (i) strengthening of the road maintenance planning capacity of MINTP; (ii) a study on the creation of a road agency; and (iii) a study on performance based contracts. 17. For Component 3, the operational and training budgets of the Project Implementation Unit (PIU) which were under estimated during project preparation were increased. 1.7 Other significant changes 18. Extension of Closing Date. The closing date of the project was extended once by 12 months from December 31, 2008 to December 31, 2009. The extension was mainly due to: (i) the slow start of the project (not until December 2004) and delays in implementation, (ii) time required by the UCD to adapt to Bank procedures and adjust to changes in the senior management team of the UCD, and (iii) time needed to put in place the necessary mechanism integrating the various line ministries and to fine-tune final expenditure estimates for the remaining activities in the new project set up. It was therefore mainly aimed at finishing the institutional activities and low income settlement pilots. 19. Amendment of Development Credit Agreement (DCA). There were two reallocations of credit proceeds approved at the Country Director level to reflect these changes, the first in March 22, 2006 to reflect the change in scope of components, and the second in July 31 2008 to reflect updated costs after finalization of most procurement activities. 2. Key Factors Affecting Implementation and Outcomes 2.1 Project Preparation, Design and Quality at Entry PROJECT PREPARATION 4 20. Project preparation was driven by the urgent need to improve the transport system which had suffered significant deterioration due to lack of maintenance. In order to further avoid damage to the existing road network which would have paralyzed the road traffic and the Port of Douala, the government requested various donors to fund the rehabilitation of primary roads in Douala. 21. A Performance contract, prepared with assistance from the Agence Française de Développement (AFD, French Development Agency), was signed in December 1999 by the UCD and the government. Inter alia, this set up a road maintenance account for the city of Douala and established the modalities of participation of local communities in infrastructure maintenance. In addition, the GOC committed four billion CFAF to rehabilitate a severely deteriorated road section and, jointly with the UCD, prepared an emergency rehabilitation program for the most strategic roads to unlock the Port and industrial areas of Douala and to improve road traffic, environment and safety. As part of this program, the government and the UCD committed themselves to allocating regular amounts for road maintenance established in the Government Policy Letter dated February 1, 2002. 22. Project preparation benefited from these different actions and a Project Preparation Facility (PPF) in the amount of US$600,000 helped the UCD fund some of the preparation activities in addition to the AFD financed feasibility, economic and environmental studies. Design, studies and cost estimates were completed prior to project appraisal, and their conclusions and recommendations were reflected in the appraisal decisions. The project made use of rich analyses of previous investment operations and lessons learned in the road maintenance sector in Cameroon, especially from the implementation completion report of the Transport Sector Technical Assistance Project.3 It also benefited from active stakeholder participation. PROJECT DESIGN 23. The project design was simple and in line with the government's orientation at the time. The main lesson applied to this project was that, infrastructure investment alone would not bring efficiency to the transport and port systems. Only when the institutional development and support to the various units involved in the management and operation of these systems are guaranteed, will it be possible to ensure appropriate project performance. The design of the project was focused on this concept. 24. The design included a core element of civil works and an institutional component, which was in line with similar projects at the time. The fiduciary responsibility for the project was given to the UCD after assessment of both the central government ministry (MINDUH) and the UCD. From a technical standpoint, oversight of the activities was split between the UCD, the MINDUH for part of the technical activities linked to institutional development and the Environmental Unit of the Ministry of Public Works (which had recently been trained) for environmental oversight. A steering committee for the project was chaired by the MINDUH. In the context at the time, this aimed at using each resource as efficiently as possible. In retrospect however, it included a fundamental bias as the fiduciary responsibility is fully with UCD. As a 3 ICR N0. 20044, February 14, 2000 5 result, the MINDUH (and later other ministries) had to oversee contracts signed by the UCD and somehow depended on the UCD for access to resources under the project, even if from an administration standpoint the MINDUH was the controlling ministry of the UCD. 25. The design of the investment component initially comprised roads to be funded by the C2D and roads to be funded by the International Development Association (IDA), but their management was completely separate with no cross conditionality. 26. Another feature of the project design typical of the context between Cameroon and the Bank at the time was the set up of constraining conditions with financial implications in terms of road maintenance funding. These were stated in an additional letter summing up the requirements for maintenance of the roads to be rehabilitated with IDA and C2D funding over the next five years. However, these set conditions did not take into account: (i) that delays were likely to occur both for IDA and for C2D funded roads, as the rehabilitation schedule was assessed very optimistically, (ii) the nominal budget proposed was far too high compared to the actual needs of these roads in the period following rehabilitation, and (iii) no consideration was given to the rest of the road network. 27. The initial key performance indicators equally, could not fully reflect the various project outcomes - inclusion of a few key efficiency indicators during the revision of the various components would have been appropriate. A system to carry out monitoring and evaluation for the environmental aspects was not put in place within the PIU but rather within one of the line ministries, which later on proved to be ineffective. However, this was not unusual for projects prepared at the time. 28. The road sections chosen appeared to be essential for urban mobility in Douala and as such the objectives and design remain highly relevant today. The prompt reaction of the Bank team on the critical transport sector issues faced by the city of Douala at appraisal led to the mobilization of other donor funding for the Douala Infrastructure Rehabilitation Program. 29. The project was consistent with the Bank's 1996 CAS and 2000 I-PRSP which emphasized the maintenance and the development of road network in both urban and rural areas, and the improvement of the Port efficiency and competitiveness. The project was first conceived as an urban project, but given that, preparing an urban project would have taken a much longer time and that the current road network in Douala needed to be urgently upgraded, it was agreed to focus principally on the road network rehabilitation.4 However, during this project's implementation, a future urban development project, the Urban and Water Development Support Project, was approved by the Bank's Board on May, 29 2007, and it benefited from the activities carried out under the DIP. 30. Project design is rated Moderately Satisfactory. QUALITY AT ENTRY 4 Project Apraisal Document, page 9, June 2002. 6 31. The design of the project was appropriate for the management of the Civil Works in Douala and for activities directly implemented by the UCD, probably more so than the initial set up that had contemplated that all project components would be managed the MINDUH. 32. However, it also included a fair amount of technical assistance outside the UCD. It may have been useful to propose the progressive set up of a unit with fiduciary responsibilities in the MINDUH after building its capacity. This was in fact done several years later when the preparation of the PDUE started. Instead, a complete management of the project by the UCD was bound to raise difficulties as it implied that the UCD had to manage funding for others. 33. The use of credit covenants and conditionality was normal at a time where the country dialogue was shaped by structural adjustment credits and the goal to reach the HIPC completion point. However, the projects did not have strong leverage to change the revenue structure of the UCD and of local financing in general, therefore the request to allocate substantial amounts of money to the road sector fell mostly on the central government. 34. The PAD assessed key potential risks that could jeopardize implementation. The mitigating measures to prevent these risks were not efficient enough, as two main risks identified and rated as substantial later materialized. The GOC had great difficulties mobilizing counterpart funds as defined in the Credit Agreement throughout the project. Counterpart funds were disbursed with delays and in insufficient amounts during the life of the project. Since this was one of the effectiveness conditions which was not met by the required effectiveness date, this date was hence pushed back twice. In the same manner, the road maintenance funds planned by the Government Policy Letter dated February 1, 2002 were never allocated to the Road Maintenance Account in a timely manner. 35. Quality at entry is rated Moderately Satisfactory. 2.2 Implementation 36. The initial project design was simple but with the revision of the various components during implementation, the operation became complex. Its development objective was broad, and as such gave it flexibility to address issues as they arose, but this made implementation monitoring difficult. The breadth of the project and its flexibility would have required the appraisal team to put in place well structured systems to manage uncertainty including planning, budgeting, synergy among various line ministries involved and monitoring systems which were inadequate in this project. 37. Looking back, the project implementation seemed to consistently face challenges, be it on the civil works component, on the institutional development side, counterpart funding, etc.... This resulted in an overall impression that many elements could have been better implemented or handled, and implementation was almost never rated as fully satisfactory after early 2005 (moderately satisfactory or moderately unsatisfactory depending on the issues). However, the project in the end accomplished more than what was initially projected. It more than succeeded in the implementation of its main component; urban road rehabilitation, which accounted for over 80 percent of the project resources. It equally completely changed traffic conditions in Douala for the better; no cost slippage was observed in a sector which had a reputation for bad 7 governance. The project helped prepare several operations that are now implemented in other major cities. Implementation analysis is therefore difficult, as output goals were achieved, but often against greater challenges than envisaged and with significant efforts from the project management and the Bank teams. 38. As a result of the high competition experienced during the award of the two major civil contracts (Lots 1 and 2), a cost savings of about 8.1 billion CFAF was made. In effect, Lots 1 and 2 were contracted at 11.3 billion CFAF and 8.8 billion CFAF respectively against the initial estimates of 14.8 and 13.4 billion CFAF. This cost savings, including the unallocated funds from the credit proceeds, helped launch in the second half of 2007 a tender for further additional works for the rehabilitation of 4.1 km of primary road and subsequently other new sub- components which included: (i) a study on the creation of a road agency for the management of road maintenance contracts; (ii) a study on performance based contracts, (iii) investment in some basic infrastructure requirements in two low income settlements, (iv) the construction of a major sewage canal, and (v) increase of the operational and training budgets for the PIU. These sub- components however, encountered some major implementation difficulties, as communication and coordination synergies between line ministries and the UCD were almost nonexistent. CREDIT COVENANTS 39. The government experienced great difficulty in meeting its commitment concerning the replenishment of the Road Maintenance Account, and the same was true for counterpart funds. These difficulties led to significant delays in project implementation (delayed effectiveness). To overcome the lack of counterpart resources, the UCD managed to secure funding from the government during the period prior to reaching the HIPC Completion point (as all projects needed to be considered satisfactory at the time). The UCD also launched a 7 billion CFAF pre- financing fund in 2005, to carry out road maintenance pending government's repayment, and later used a bond issued on the market to pay part of it. However, it is only in 2006 that the Bank team and the UCD re-evaluated the covenant, and it appeared that: (i) due to the delays in implementation the figures indicated in the supplemental letter to the DCA did not correspond to the actual number of kilometers of roads rehabilitated and (ii) that the amount calculated was far too high for the network considered. 40. The requirements of the DCA with regard to the maintenance account had therefore generated a substantial increase in road maintenance funding in Douala, which was partly used for the secondary network and not for the primary rehabilitated network as initially envisaged. The Bank team and the UCD therefore decided in 2006 that this credit condition was no longer relevant, yet requested that the government keep substantial funding to the road maintenance account in Douala to allow a satisfactory funding of the network. This condition was met, albeit with slight delays, in 2007, 2008 and 2009. INSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT 41. With reference to the institutional development component, some activities did have a great impact, such as the city development strategy and the basic studies related to Douala in general, even if the actual implementation of action plans was not necessarily forthcoming afterwards. This component did manage to provide a basis for the PDUE preparation studies and the use of some districts of Douala as pilot and did lay the ground for its smooth implementation. However management by MINDUH of several studies was deficient, and the addition of 8 components managed by MINTP and MINT from a technical standpoint led to lower than expected results (several studies cancelled) as the relationship between the UCD and other agencies was difficult (reluctance of staff from line ministries to report to UCD for fiduciary matter, and lack of incentives for these staff). ROAD REHABILITATION 42. The road rehabilitation component which was the main component of the project monopolized the operational time of the implementing agency team and hence impeded the smooth progress of the other components. This component encountered significant difficulties during project implementation. However, thanks to close supervision from the Bank team and the UCD, the component's objectives were fully achieved and even exceeded. 43. The recruitment of the firms in charge of the two initial civil works lots took longer than planned. The works then started with poor quality outputs, which led to an action plan drawn up by the Bank team and the UCD with several remedial measures for a closer supervision and better enforcement of contract provisions. The staff of the consulting firm in charge of supervision was equally reinforced to this effect. These measures led to significant progress in terms of quality and quantity of the civil works. One of the two main civil works Lot even finished ahead of schedule with high quality outputs. For both works contracts, final quantities and costs remained closely checked and no cost overrun was tolerated by the Client. 44. However, the management of one of the lots (Lot 1) remained difficult all along the project and highlighted the weaknesses of contract management by the UCD. The main foreign contracting firm of Lot 1 sub-contracted a major part of its activities to a local firm, which had previously been disqualified in the biding process to undertake the work as a main contractor. This sub-contractor was not only inefficient but also had a strong political influence. It gradually imposed itself as the lead firm despite not having the required technical or financial capacity to lead such a project. This resulted in significant delays in implementation, conflict in contract management, unfinished tasks and poor quality of some works. 45. Unfortunately, the UCD was not able to correctly enforce contract provisions and the supervising engineer was also subjected to constant pressure (there were three changes of the engineer in charge of the lot, out of which probably two were linked to excessive pressure exercised by the contractor). Being preoccupied by the daily pressures to assert its leadership role and by the intervention of the subcontractor's leadership at the highest level of the government, the UCD failed to anticipate the necessary procedures to be implemented during and at the end of such a conflict ridden contract. 46. The contracting firm ignored several notifications to close Lot 1 and insisted on being paid for tasks which both the UCD and the supervising consulting firm considered unjustifiable. In the end, after all contracting mediation options were exhausted with no agreement reached between the contracting firm and the UCD; the UCD proceeded with payment of tasks which were considered acceptable and eventually requested a bailiff to take stock of the uncompleted tasks. These uncompleted tasks which constituted about two percent of the entire works for the Lot were later contracted to and completed by a local firm, recruited through a competitive bidding process. 9 47. This situation had no negative financial implication on the overall cost, as quantities were consistently reviewed and managed by the engineer and the UCD, and the unjustifiable claims from the contractor were not accepted. A stricter contract management of time and possibly an early termination of the contract may have led to a faster use of the credit. It is also probably one of the reasons why the Credit had a US$2 million undisbursed balance. 48. The other consequence of this difficult contract was that it mobilized most of the UCD and the Bank team's energy at the expense of other components. During the most critical parts of the contract the Bank Task Team Leader (TTL) or the Bank co-TTL would be on site every month to help the UCD deal with project issues. 49. Another key feature for this component is that the other roads that were to be funded by the C2D encountered major delays and had to be reduced in scope. Delays were due to the fact that the HIPC completion was reached only in early 2006 (instead of 2004) and that all procurement related to the C2D were therefore delayed by more than two years. 2.3 Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) Design, Implementation and Utilization M&E DESIGN 50. Key performance indicators were agreed upon as part of project design summary to monitor project performance at several levels during implementation. These indicators were for the most part measurable and meaningful but referred directly to the road rehabilitation component, and barely to the institutional support component. The UCD was to monitor and evaluate these indicators on an ongoing basis. 51. The consultant firm in charge of the initial economic analysis defined the baseline of some of these indicators, and the same consultant was later recruited to follow up their progress at mid-term and at the end of the project. In addition, project technical annual audits were included in the design in order to identify shortcomings in all technical aspects of the project and to provide neutral technical advice to the UCD. A matrix providing comparison of performance indicators agreed at the project appraisal and achieved at project completion is presented in Annex 2. MONITORING AND EVALUATION (M&E) IMPLEMENTATION 52. The M&E system implementation started slowly, but gradually achieved very good performance when a consultant was recruited to follow up the progress of key indicators after the midterm review. The PIU did not always provide in a timely manner the values of these indicators. There was equally neither proper definition of responsibilities nor a manual within the UCD's internal administration for the follow up of these indicators. 53. As a result, the indicators were not monitored for a long time during the course of implementation as noted by the Bank team during several supervision missions. However, it became imperative to revise the outcome indicators to fully reflect project achievement, after the revision of the various components as described in section 1.6. An updated economic analysis 10 was carried out at the end of the project by a government recruited consultant, which helped the UCD determine the last values of the project's key indicators as outlined in annex 2. M&E UTILIZATION 54. The monitoring and evaluation system was used as a basis for assessing the achievement of the project's targets values and planning the way forward. In the context of data scarcity, as is the case for most urban cities in Cameroon, the M&E performance is considered adequate as most of the data collected helped in the review of the city of Douala's transport system. These values were appropriately collected before, during and at the end of the project and did allow for a reliable measurement of their impact to the project. The rest of the M&E framework however was more vague and difficult to follow. One weak area was the monitoring of the social impacts of the project. The information collected was not fully utilized, and the techniques used to assess poverty, gender and social impacts proved rudimentary as shown by the content of the government's final completion report. However, a population of 10,000 inhabitants in the slums areas benefited from; 500 meters of paved roads, 1,080 meters of walkways; Construction of more than 800m length of sewage drain; 1,350 meters of pipe borne water network supplying 4 public taps; 3,800 meters of electricity cabling supplying 16 street lights. 55. Monitoring and Evaluation is rated Moderately Satisfactory. 2.4 Safeguards and Fiduciary Compliance ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT 56. Bank Operational Policy OP4.01 on Environmental Assessment was the only safeguards policy triggered at appraisal for this Category B project. An Environmental Assessment was carried out and included a simple and straightforward Environmental Management Plan (EMP) which was adopted during project preparation. Environmental aspects of the project were therefore addressed in compliance with this EMP. A budget for its implementation was drawn, and the environmental and social monitoring arrangements and reporting mechanisms equally defined. 57. Each of the contractors recruited were required to include in their execution plan an EMP, which was approved by the UCD. An environmental specialist was thereafter recruited to follow-up this, as part of the consulting firm in charge civil works supervision. At appraisal, it was assumed that the Environment Unit of the MINTP would be fully involved in monitoring the environmental and social aspects of the rehabilitation works. This was based on the fact that this unit had received substantial training under a previous IDA funded project and had been evaluated to have this capacity. This unit was not involved at the end of the project as previously explained. Instead the UCD took over this responsibility with the support of the consulting firm in charge of civil works supervision. To adjust to this reality, the environmental management team of the UCD was given specific training to reinforce its capacity to implement the project EMP. 58. One of this project's strengths was the access it granted the poor or vulnerable groups (including women and young adults) to project activities, especially in the investments carried out in the two low income settlements. During supervision missions, the social concerns of the 11 project were specifically addressed to facilitate the participation of the poorest groups, women and young adults inclusive. It is worth mentioning that this was one of the first projects in Cameroon with a very successful social compensation scheme for people affected by the project and which was equally considered a best practice on social issues. This resulted in improved standards of living in the project areas. 59. Unfortunately, very little emphasis was put on Human Immunodeficiency Virus/Acquired Immune-deficiency Syndrome (HIV/AIDS) awareness campaigns as outlined in the EMP. This social risk which is critical in all construction projects was not well mitigated despite the fact that it was identified in the EMP. Likewise, its impact could not be measured as there were no indicators developed for HIV/AIDS at appraisal of the project. INVOLUNTARY RESETTLEMENT 60. At the time of appraisal, in 2001, it was determined that there would be no need for resettlement or compensation to affected people as the road rehabilitation activities were on existing roads. As the urban environment is very dynamic, the city increased dramatically in population in the following years, with a much larger number of street vendors, small shops and, in general, a much larger informal sector. Furthermore, the project activities changed to include different road segments, to make use of the cost savings from the major civil works as explained previously. 61. Based on this new circumstance, the UCD decided to prepare resettlement action plans following the Bank's recommendation in order to compensate people affected by the project. The resettlement plan was developed for all sections rehabilitated under the Project. A sociologist was recruited by the UCD for this, assisted by the consulting firm in charge of civil works supervision. The Safeguard team of the Bank which carried out a mission in April 2005 to this effect, equally made a significant contribution to its success. These resettlement plans were well implemented, despite delays in their approval by the UCD. Six hundred and forty two persons and one industry were compensated an approximate sum of US$1.5 million. The Integrated Safeguards Data Sheet of the project was never revised to reflect this newly triggered operational policy (OP 4.12) and the resettlement action plan was never published in the InfoShop, even though the project was supervised in accordance to it and de facto implemented in compliance with the terms of OP 4.12. 62. Safeguards compliance is rated Moderately Satisfactory. FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT 63. Project accounting and financial management reporting systems, including arrangements for audits have been moderately satisfactory. There was a financial accounting issue related to outstanding bills which had to be settled before the end of the grace period which was due to the fact that the UCD had no prior experience in closing Bank financed projects. This problem was eventually resolved with the support of the Bank's Financial Management team. 64. The difficulties encountered by the government in meeting its commitment to the counterpart funds mirrors the difficulties mentioned above for the allocation of funds to the road maintenance account. This led to serious drawbacks within the financial management of the 12 project with recurring payment problems for contractors and consultants, until the very end of the project. Payment delays were also often long even on the components funded by the Bank, which created cash flow tensions on the main civil works contracts at their beginning. 65. Project financial statements were submitted to the Bank with significant delays during the whole project duration and the quality of these reports was often not satisfactory. Some improvements however, occurred during the second half of the project following extensive input from the Bank's supervision teams. Nevertheless, these difficulties did not impede in general the timely and reliable provision of necessary information that was required to manage and monitor the implementation of the project. Audit reports were all submitted on time. 66. Financial management is however rated Moderately Unsatisfactory. PROCUREMENT 67. There were no major procurement issues recorded except that relating to Lot 1 of civil works as described above which led to significant delays. All contracts were awarded according to procedures despite slight deficiencies recorded during post review. The prequalification and post qualification processes of the two main civil works contract, which was almost the first activity of the project, was carried out very slowly and probably with not enough care in the verification of qualification. The UCD procurement team was subsequently dynamic and implemented the World Bank's procedures appropriately. Some delays with bid evaluations in activities carried out by the line ministries were noted, and they hindered the good progress of the institutional component. Responsibility for these delays was shared between these line ministries and the UCD, which did not pay the same level of attention to activities benefiting other structures. 68. While this is not procurement per se, contract management was sometimes less satisfactory than the procurement process itself. An example is the authorization given to subcontract a large share of Lot 1, which was not defined well enough to provide appropriate safeguards to the UCD in case of failures. 69. Procurement performance is rated Moderately Satisfactory. 2.5 Post-completion Operation/Next Phase 70. The PDUE was designed to pursue and consolidate the objectives of the closed project in terms of institutional development, city strategy and slum upgrading. During the Implementation Completion Report (ICR) mission it was agreed that data collection for measuring post- completion performance would be borne by this project, which would also be required to monitor and report their implementation on an ongoing basis as part of supervision missions. 71. Urban road conditions in Douala still require significant funding for rehabilitation and development, which are beyond the financial capacity of the city of Douala and compete with all other cities for government funding. Unfortunately, there were not enough resources to prepare another meaningful operation with IDA funding. The UCD and the government are currently 13 negotiating with France and other donors to secure additional funding to rehabilitate the East and West entries to the city. 72. During the ICR mission, the Bank team also agreed with the government that the following indicators would be used to monitor post completion operation of the project; · For road rehabilitation: (i) amount of road maintenance account resources allocated annually to the UCD for the maintenance of its primary road network, and (ii) Status of road networks expenditures on road maintenance. These indicators will be monitored by analyzing annual budgetary allocations and road maintenance contracts executed. · For institutional support and capacity development: (i) Recruit more staff to enforce the technical departments of the UCD, (ii) make the existing data-base on road maintenance management operational, and (iii) complete transfer of already constructed basic infrastructure to the development associations of the low income settlements for full ownership, continuous maintenance and sustainability. 73. These indicators are intended to verify that the institutional efficiency promoted under this project will be sustained by the UCD. 3. Assessment of Outcomes 3. 1 Relevance of Objectives, Design and Implementation 74. These were assessed in terms of responsiveness of the project to current circumstances as discussed above. This project was essentially designed to contribute to rehabilitate the core road network of Douala. Its implementation arrangement with the UCD as implementing agency was probably the only affordable option at the time given the low capacity of MINDUH. There was a good match between the initial objective of the project and the UCD's economic and transport context at inception. The overall project design, complied fully with the project objectives. 75. The project was equally consistent with the UCD's priorities at appraisal, the objective of the 1996 CAS and the 2000 I-PRSP which was to maintain and develop road network in both urban and rural areas and improve the Port of Douala's efficiency and competitiveness. It remains fully relevant today, as stated in the GOC's revised Growth and Employment Strategy and in line with the Bank's most recent CAS of February 23, 2010, whose objective emphasizes the reduction of infrastructure and transport constraints. 76. The relevance of the project's objective, its design and implementation is rated Satisfactory. 3.2 Achievement of Project Development Objectives 77. The project's key development objective, which was to improve the efficiency of Douala transport system connecting the sub-regional port of Douala and its hinterland through the rehabilitation of degraded primary roads connecting the port and the industrial areas, is rated satisfactory. The Urban Road Rehabilitation component which constituted more than 80 percent of the project resources, planned to rehabilitate 23 km of roads but at the end achieved the 14 rehabilitation of 27 kilometers of such roads. This de facto improved traffic conditions in terms of access to and from the city. 78. One of the project's outcomes was the gains in travel time and vehicle operating costs (VOC) as shown in Table 2 below and Annex 3. The three road sections which were rehabilitated, now have mean reference speed of 40 km/hour (higher than the 21 km/hr estimate in the PAD), which exemplified the improvements in road conditions achieved under the project. Table 2: VOC and mean speed (See Annex 3 for more details) Mean speeds (km/hr) Reduction in Real growth of VOC Before project After Mean speeds (%) (2002) project (2009) (million CFAF) MEAN VALUE 21 40 90% 155 826 79. Sustainability of road management by the UCD has improved significantly, through increased maintenance funding even if there is no formalized mechanism securing consistent road maintenance funds, and with the creation of a specific directorate in charge of maintenance and investment. The limited results obtained by the Institutional Development and Support to other ministries, as discussed below in Section 3.3, do not have a major influence on the rating of the PDO given their very small size and possible contribution. 80. The project has transformed living conditions in two low income settlements in Douala and laid the ground for larger scale investments in five major Cameroonian cities under the current Bank financed, Water and Urban Development Project. Besides providing access to potable water and basic transport facilities, the investment in the low settlements helped improved safety and security conditions of the inhabitants by the provision of street lights. 81. The achievement of PDO is rated Satisfactory. 3.3 Outputs by Components 82. A comparative presentation of pre- and post-project output indicators is shown in Annex 2. It must be mentioned that meeting project outputs was further enhanced by the decision to finance additional activities in the rehabilitation and institutional development components from the cost savings as discussed previously. This initiative helped uphold the relevance of this component to the attainment of the PDO. 83. The key output indicators of the project were: (i) kilometers rehabilitated in Douala, (ii) the travel time on the main roads, (iii) vehicle operating costs, (iv) daily traffic on main roads and (v) the setting up of a financing mechanism for the replenishment of the Road Maintenance Account. 15 84. Overall, the project outputs are rated Satisfactory. Component 1 ­ Urban Road Rehabilitation 85. Urban road rehabilitation constituted more than 80 per cent of the project resources. The planned target was 23 kilometers of roads rehabilitated, at an estimated cost of US$58.13 million. This component was achieved at a higher level than initially planned, as a third lot for a 4.1 km road section was added later on in 2006, thanks to the cost savings made from the two initial lots. Hence, approximately 27 kilometers of primary roads were rehabilitated. The road works were completed in 2008 at a final cost of US$67.88 million with the Bank contributing 78 percent of that total (US$53.02 million). Nevertheless, the completion of this component faced several challenges as explained previously. Lot 1 was completed with delays due to a difficult contractor, but Lots 2 and 3 were fully completed without difficulties and a good quality of construction. Additional consolidation works due to small landslides were added to Lot 3 to ensure safe conditions for neighboring settlements. 86. The civil works have improved the traffic circulation conditions in the city of Douala as travel time on the main roads was reduced by almost 65 percent of the targeted value. The traffic volume on the same roads also increased by about 43.8 percent. This was mainly attributed to reduced vehicle operating costs, increased traffic volumes and reduced travel time. This component proved to be economically justifiable, as its net present value (NPV) of 141billion CFAF far exceeded the estimated NPV at appraisal of 45.9 billion CFAF. 87. Component 1 is rated Satisfactory. Component 2 ­ Institutional Development 88. Component 2 included: provision of technical assistance for program implementation, audits and monitoring, project management, capacity building for urban road management and maintenance, and preparation of an urban development strategy and program for Douala and other cities, including city development strategies, and financial and organizational audits of the UCD. It was originally designed for the UCD and MINDUH, but was later extended to MINT and MINTP after its revision to include new activities financed from the cost savings explained above. It equally contributed significantly to the satisfactory implementation of the preparation of the PDUE. 89. The pilot urban investment identified to upgrade slums in Bessengué and Cité de la Paix was substantially completed. Despite the weakness of the supervision engineer and the slow execution by the small and medium size enterprises recruited under the project, works were completed without any major deficiency and within the project extended duration. The everyday life conditions in these areas have been enhanced through the improvement of their roads network, provision of potable water, street lights and the construction of a sewage disposal canal. Activities carried out include; 500 meters of paved roads; 1,080 meters of walkways; Construction of more than 800m length of sewage drain; 1,350 meters of pipe borne water network supplying 4 public taps; 3,800 meters of electricity cabling supplying 16 street lights over a 44 hectare of residential area with population of 10,000 inhabitants. The participation of the population in the design and execution of these investments, through their local development 16 association, was quite significant and integral to its success while ensuring ownership and sustainability. 90. Implementation of the institutional support component outside the UCD was slow, resulting in unfinished activities at project closing. Studies carried out under this component were hardly translated into action plans as explained earlier. However, the bases for sound strategies for urban development, transport and road maintenance now exist thanks to this component. The organization of the UCD's infrastructure oversight function, the reinforcement of its capacity in road maintenance as well as the training of its key staff have equally improved as a result of its achievement. Notwithstanding, the component failed to secure a financially sustainable road maintenance funding for the UCD as prescribed at appraisal and which was one of its major expected outputs and key indicator. This is probably due to the fact that it is closely related to decentralization and to local fiscal issues, and that overcoming the challenges faced by sub national entities in raising funds is probably an issue that needs to be tackled in the overall country dialogue with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the donor community as a whole rather than within the scope of an investment project. Secondly, the initial amount which was later reviewed was over estimated from the onset, making it unrealistic to achieve. 91. This component is rated Moderately Satisfactory. Component 3 ­ Support to the Project Implementation Units 92. It included support to the project implementation units, namely; the PIU, and the Environmental Unit of MINTP. From the onset of the Project, there were recruitments of staff from both the public and private sectors for the PIU, including the recruitment of a civil engineer for project management, a procurement specialist, a municipal engineer for the relocation of utility networks and coordination with utility companies, two municipal engineers to oversee the civil works, an accountant and an administrative and Finance officer (RAF). A budget increase became inevitable, due mainly to increased number in staff recruitment and training, and the introduction of new activities. This budget which was initially underestimated was thus increased to address these needs through the DCA amendments of March 2006 and July 2008, respectively. 93. This component is rated Moderately Satisfactory. 3.4 Efficiency 94. At appraisal a full economic evaluation was carried out on the road rehabilitation component only. The NPV and Economic Internal Rate of Return (EIRR) were computed for an assumed project life cycle of 25 years. The analysis used the World Bank Highway Design and Maintenance Standards Model (HDM-IV), with input and output data from pre and post project traffic surveys. The resulting overall NPV and EIRR for the rehabilitated road sections are presented in Table 3 below and additional details can be found in Annex 3. Table 3: Summary of Economic Analysis Baseline Value (PAD) ICR Value (2009) 17 Cost 80.4 billion CFAF NPV 45.9 billion CFAF 141 billion CFAF EIRR 32% 54% 95. Even under conservative assumptions ignoring the indirect, non-measurable benefits of the project such as reduction in accident and air pollution, the project will remain economically viable even after its completion. Its calculated EIRR and NPV are significantly higher than at appraisal. 96. The project shows an excellent overall economic rate of return of 54 percent, which is more than 1.5 times the estimated appraisal value of 32 percent. The NPV effectively tripled from 45.9 to 141 billion CFAF. An analysis on travel time and vehicle operating costs (VOC) shows a gain of 87 and 59 percent respectively compared to baseline values (see Annex 3). Savings from the first two works contracts of about 15 percent led to the incorporation of new activities including an alternative access to the city center of Douala and its industrial zone from Yaoundé. Nevertheless, the rating of the efficiency of this project is affected mainly by its management pitfalls as explained previously. These led to unaccomplished activities in the institutional development component, protracted contract management, and a longer implementation period. 97. A sensitivity analysis suggests that the NPV and EIRR are more sensitive to gain in time savings and VOC than to increase in traffic. A 30 percent traffic increase will result only in an increase of four to seven percent of the NPV and EIRR respectively. Meanwhile, a reduction by only two percent of the initial discounted rate of 12 percent will result into a 28 percent increase in NPV (39 billion CFAF). 98. Project efficiency is rated Moderately Satisfactory. 3.5 Justification of Overall Outcome Rating 99. The road rehabilitation component that accounted for over 80 percent of project resources shows positive results. Most of the main outcome indicators were substantially met, although over a longer timeframe than expected. Of the planned target of 23 kilometers, approximately 27 kilometers of primary roads were rehabilitated. The extra 4.1 km which constituted the third Lot of rehabilitation, equally provided an alternative route to the city center from Yaoundé with additional relief of traffic circulation to the industrial area. 100. Traffic circulation conditions in the city of Douala have significantly improved as travel time on its main roads has reduced by almost 65 percent of the targeted value. Similarly, the traffic volume on the same roads has increased by about 43.8 percent. 101. The project facilitated the transition to the new Bank-financed PDUE Project, which will now serve as a platform to monitor the project indicators after completion. However, some studies were not achieved in the project institutional component, and the recommendations of others out were also not fully implemented. 18 102. The extension of the project's closing date by one year helped overcome some policy and managerial challenges as well as enabled the effective completion of works in the low income urban settlements which significantly improved livelihood. However, results obtained were impeded by the fact that the PIU and the UCD top management still needed to focus on the protracted conflict resolution of Lot 1 civil works, even if most of the works themselves had been completed for more than two years. This means that especially the staff of the infrastructure directorate of UCD could not allocate enough time for capacity building, as had initially been planned. 103. Project outcomes remained significant and the economic viability of the project is highly justified as previously described. Nonetheless, delays in securing the agreed upon funds for road maintenance and in allocating these funds prevented the planned road maintenance program from being implemented effectively at the start of the project. 104. The overall achievement of the project is therefore rated Satisfactory. 3.6 Overarching Themes, other Outcomes and Impacts (a) Poverty Impacts, Gender Aspects and social development 105. The impact on poverty, gender and social development by the project is quite significant as it generated employment opportunities, many of them requiring medium and low skills. Substantial efforts were provided by the project team to improve social conditions of the urban population at large through the design of contextual project activities. The gain in travel time and reduced VOC resulted in lower transport cost which was particularly advantageous to low income urban commuters (see Figure 3.1 of Annex 3). 106. Good access to the port and industrial areas are strategic for economic growth, employment and poverty alleviation. It is noteworthy that the upgrading of the low income settlements, helped improve the living condition of the inhabitants who for many years were subjected to deplorable social and health conditions. The installation of footbridges and streetlights enhanced safety and security in these areas and the provision of access to potable water, construction of a sewage disposal canal and the upgrading of their road network significantly improved their mobility and health conditions. No negative impact has been reported on human lives as a result of the project. (b) Institutional Change/Strengthening 107. The following activities were undertaken to develop the institutional capacity of the UCD and the various line ministries involved in the project implementation: (i) leveraging financing from the GOC and other donors for the rehabilitation of primary road network in Douala which has helped created a consistent maintenance funds for the UCD; (ii) development of a Priority City Development Plan for the city of Douala which would help the UCD to prioritize its investments and define concrete development actions; (iii) institution of an accounting and financial management system and provision of practical technical support and advice for its operation, as currently utilized by the ongoing Bank financed PDUE project and which has also helped improve significantly the management efficiency of the UCD; (iv) assist MINDUH develop the vision of implementing and expanding the new concept of upgrading low income 19 urban settlements through the PDUE project, which is now being expanded to five major cities of Cameroon; (v) implementation of studies that helped in the development of the institutional capacity of the various line ministries on roads and transport strategy, urban development program and strategy, and road maintenance strategy; (vi) development of a road management data base for the UCD which has helped it better plan its road investments and (vii) personnel training in relevant subjects as spelled out in the training plan ( a total of 84 staff were trained) which has helped improved skills and staff output. (c) Other Unintended Outcomes and Impacts (positive or negative) 108. The cost savings derived from contracting the two main lots of the road rehabilitation component had positive unintended benefits. It partially relieved the shortage of funds from the C2D, and helped fund the third lot of this component which provided an alternative access to the city center of Douala and its industrial zone from Yaoundé. This alternative access greatly improved traffic circulation conditions and improved the outputs of the project. Other significant unintended outcomes resulting from these cost savings were the low income settlement pilot program, including the paving of 500 meters of road in the low income settlement areas and the construction of a major primary sewage canal which will considerably ease the activities of the ongoing Bank financed PDUE project in these areas, as well as improve the living conditions of the inhabitants. These outcomes also laid the foundation for future investment in similar areas around the country. 3.7 Summary of Findings of Beneficiary Survey and/or Stakeholder Workshops 109. This is a core ICR which does not require a beneficiary survey/stakeholder workshop. 4. Assessment of risks to development outcomes 110. Overall project risk was rated moderate at appraisal and analyzed in terms of failure to achieve critical assumptions to project indicators. This analysis appears appropriate for most of the assumptions made. However, some key risks identified at appraisal became effective and still remain potential even after project completion. These included: counterpart funding shortfalls and lack of appropriate capacity by the project management units. Although the project risk identification was suitable, the mitigating measures did not succeed in fully addressing these potential risks. The lack of synergy among line ministries and inability of the UCD to find timely solutions to resolve the persistent contractual conflict relating to Lot 1 of the civil works, which emerged later on during implementation, became a major risk to the overall project outcomes as well. 111. A combination of some new measures taken to mitigate potential risks and the fact that funding for road maintenance by the UCD while insufficient has been consistent over the years serve as positive signs to mitigating risks to development outcomes. The two major risks to the project's development outcomes are: (i) the consistent contribution by the GOC or the UCD to the Road Maintenance Account, and (ii) the translation of key studies on institutional strengthening and development into concrete actions. Given that in Cameroon like elsewhere in sub-Saharan Africa, road maintenance policy reversals are quite possible considering limited resources available, the UCD needs to remain vigilant and keep building capacity and adopt new 20 ways of managing its road networks, and to start implementing some of the funding proposals for road maintenance, even if the path to sustainable financing may be slow. 112. Risk to development outcomes is rated as Moderate. 5. Assessment of bank and borrower performance 5.1 Bank Performance (a) Bank Performance in Ensuring Quality at Entry 113. The project design was relevant and responsive to the client's needs. However, limitations in risk analysis discussed in Section 4 above and the fact that not all project components had clear performance indicators and baseline data from the onset are factors affecting quality at entry. For example, the institutional component included only one key output indicator, even after its revision which increased its scope. Besides, the arrangements involving the UCD as fiduciary agent for line ministries were conducive to conflicts. There are however indications that the project preparation team was pushed into this by the prevailing weak capacity of the MINDUH and the lack of other tools to follow up on sector policy, which was a strong demand of the government at the prime minister and minister of planning level. On the other hand, the flexibility of the project enabled the Bank to finance additional activities which helped enhance the attainment of the PDO and help develop other sector projects downstream. 114. The project was well designed, with substantial consultations held and with clearly stated objectives. The PPF was adequately funded and experienced Bank staff members were assigned to the operation. The skill mix for project preparation and in-depth analysis of lessons learned from previous operations was equally good. Safeguards preparation was probably not as thorough as OP 4.12 was not triggered. The analysis of the road maintenance issue probably did not foresee enough the risks linked to the potential failure or delay of the C2D and the set up of the legal covenant related to funding was probably not realistic. 115. The Bank's performance on Quality at Entry is rated Moderately Satisfactory. (b) Quality of Supervision 116. The Task Team Leadership changed four times during project implementation, which no doubt affected the smooth progress of the project. It may have equally contributed to delays at the beginning, as the TTL was changed three times during the first three years of implementation. The Quality Assurance Group carried out a Quality at Supervision review in 2004 and rated the quality of supervision as moderately unsatisfactory. Issues raised were articulated around; (i) inordinate delay in the procurement of Civil Works caused by a faulty packaging at entry and time-consuming background checks of bidders' qualification, (ii) lack of compliance with the payment schedule of yearly contribution to the Urban Roads Maintenance Fund and (iii) compliance with the Bank's Safeguard Policies. The report criticized the way supervision was conducted and recommendations were made to improve it. Later on, these 21 recommendations were applied by the Bank team from early 2005. For example the same TTL was kept from mid-2005 to the closing date and the Bank reinforced its support to the project in procurement and civil works oversight. Good cooperation between the Bank team and the UCD, improved results monitoring, re-orientation of actions and improved impact through constant innovation were other positive contributions from the Bank team. 117. After 2005, the team established during the whole critical period of roads contract implementation a very close supervision, with either the TTL or the Co-TTL coming on site every month, complemented by two missions involving senior management, and missions every six months from an experienced civil engineer. The team also maximized the synergies between Country Office and Washington based staff, inter alia to alleviate the pressure related to the conflict between the contractor of Lot 1 and the UCD. There was significant involvement by the Bank's team in the resolution of day to day crises. The actions taken by the Bank to resolve implementation bottlenecks were therefore adequate. Its efforts at strengthening Monitoring and Evaluation were probably not sufficient. Supervision aide-memoires for the implementation phase were extensive and provided highlights on key issues and prompt information to the client and Bank management. 118. The Quality of Bank Supervision is rated as Moderately Satisfactory. (c) Justification of Rating for Overall Bank Performance 119. In determining the rating for the overall bank performance, various aspects were taken into account. These included: (i) moderate quality at entry, (ii) the strong cooperation between the Project team and the government, (iii) the timeliness of the Bank's intervention to help the government resolve various crises, such as the replenishment of the Road Maintenance Account or the counterpart funding shortfalls and the termination of the Lot 1 civil works contract, and (iv) the achievement of the project development objectives. 120. Overall Bank performance is rated Moderately Satisfactory. 5.2 Borrower performance (a) Government performance 121. The UCD's signing of a performance contract with the government in December 1999 to set up a road maintenance account and to establish the modalities of participation of the local communities in infrastructure maintenance was key to shaping the project objectives. In addition, its commitment of 4 billion CFAF to rehabilitate a severely deteriorated road section and its support to the UCD to prepare an emergency rehabilitation program for the most strategic roads to unlock the Port and the industrial areas of Douala, were strong signals of full commitment and ownership at project inception. 22 122. There was however a perceived risk at project inception that the GOC would not respect its commitment concerning the replenishment of Road Maintenance Account and project counterpart funds, a risk that was actually validated. Counterpart funds were disbursed with delays and in insufficient amounts. This resulted in the postponement of the effectiveness date on two occasions as counterpart funds were part of the effectiveness conditions. Similar shortages appeared in 2004, 2005 and in 2008-2009, which prevented the project from having a final fully satisfactory implementation rating. Similarly, the funds planned by the Government Policy Letter dated February 1, 2002 were usually not allocated to the Road Maintenance Account in a timely manner and resulted in significant delays in project implementation. These funds even though initially overestimated as explained above, subsequently contributed to the downgrading of the project's implementation performance ratings to unsatisfactory. 123. The GOC was slow in forging consensus to enhance synergy among line ministries, which was critical in attaining the desired outcomes. They are epitomized by the lack of leadership by the MINDUH during most of the project implementation. Despite several measures taken during the course of the project to facilitate the remittance of the various amounts owed by the government, the results obtained were never sustained. 124. The GOC's performance is rated Moderately Unsatisfactory. (b) Implementing Agencies Performance 125. At appraisal, the project was designed to be implemented by the MINDUH. However, after the review of the various components, the fiduciary responsibility for the new activities (procurement and financial management) remained fully with the UCD, while the line ministries set up technical teams to prepare procurement documents and oversee activities in their domains of competence. 126. The UCD was the main implementing agency with the PIU being responsible for general project coordination. This unit was set up at project inception and had very little experience on bank-financed projects. It demonstrated a weakness from the onset in the effective monitoring of project activities. The implementation of contract terms with the various contracting firms suffered from high level political interference and relatively weak supervision consultants. The PIU and the UCD had difficulties to manage the beginning of the two main road contracts (Lots 1&2) as explained in section 2.2 above and were consistently challenged on Lot 1 supervision. This resulted in a negative impact on the overall PDO rating during part of the implementation. Likewise, the UCD failed to anticipate the necessary procedures needed to terminate the Lot 1 contract. Several attempts to resolve pending managerial issues yielded very little fruit. Another setback was the lack of proper assignment of responsibilities within the UCD's internal administration for the follow up of outcome indicators. Hence, these indicators were not monitored for a long time over the course of project implementation. 127. Project financial statements were submitted to the Bank with significant delays and often with unsatisfactory quality. The PIU also experienced a financial accounting challenge related to payment of outstanding bills which had to be settled before the end of the grace period. However, some improvements occurred toward the end of the project following input from the Bank's supervision team which helped improve project performance. 23 128. The poor dialogue and lack of synergy between the line ministries and the UCD impeded the smooth progress of the project. Communication between them was almost nonexistent. The implementation arrangement at appraisal or during the revision of the components did not take into account these factors. Consequently, the UCD as the main implementing agency had no authority to ensure appropriate coordination of the various activities carried out by these ministries whose commitment to project implementation was not very active. As a result, some of the studies earmarked were cancelled, unfinished or not translated into action plans. 129. The performance of the implementation agencies is rated Moderately Unsatisfactory. (c) Justification of Rating for Overall Borrower Performance 130. Based on the combination of the two ratings above, overall Borrower performance is rated as Moderately Unsatisfactory. 6. Lessons Learned 6.1 Project Preparation and Design 131. The project was simple at the beginning with its three components clearly linked to the PDO, thus favoring a clear assessment of its outcomes with respect to set targets. However, with institutional responsibilities being shared among several line ministries later on, things became much more complex. The components that had the least success were those requiring inter- agency coordination. Nevertheless project design could have recognized the weak institutional environment within the implementing agencies by limiting the spread of the project. A key lesson in this regard would be to design simpler project institutional set up and avoid their spread across ministries. Project design should also include an agreed exit strategy with an action plan which defines clear responsibilities during all stages of implementation to ensure that each agency concerned has a good grasp of its role and is committed to its implementation. 132. A fortunate but unforeseen situation was the financing of the third lot of civil works from cost savings which provided an alternative access to the city center of Douala and its industrial zone from Yaoundé. It will be good to anticipate such opportunities in future similar projects in order to use a flexible project design to accommodate cost savings in a more creative manner to enhance achievement of the PDO. This is partly taken into account in the recently approved improved processes for project restructuring. 133. At the time of the project implementation, current measures to use savings and keep them within a given IDA country envelope had also not been put in place. In a case such as this one, it would probably have been preferable to use part of the proceeds to create a separate small technical assistance project for institutional strengthening in the urban and transport sectors using part of the savings. It would have improved accountability of beneficiaries. 134. This project should be commended for its innovative application of investment in low income settlements within the urban set up of Douala. This was the first of its kind in Cameroon and is now being expanded to other major cities of the country through the Bank financed PDUE. Given that it was a pilot investment, more emphasis should have been placed on 24 documenting lessons learned and on developing the capacities of local small and medium enterprises which would have been very useful for similar future investments. 135. Institutional development and capacity building are critical factors to ensure sustainability during and after project. Experience suggests that best results are achieved through long-term relationships where new ideas can be introduced indirectly and gradually, in pursuit of a shared vision and with a clear road map. It is also critical to support institutional building by encouraging synergy among implementing agencies while making sure that all initiatives are demand-driven and developed in a participatory manner. Following this approach could have helped to limit the shortfalls observed on components that involved line ministries. 6.2 Project Implementation 136. Non-payment of counterpart funding has dire consequences on project performance. Not only does it reduce the output of contractors, resulting in poor performance with associated costs, but counterpart funds payment delays can also result in nonpayment of outstanding bills leading to a reputational risk for both the government and the Bank. It is therefore recommended that all Bank credits for similar projects finance 100 percent of the cost to avoid such risks. 137. In addition, supervision missions need to put more emphasis on procurement and contract management using all required skills. The use of external technical support was done for this project with an international road expert whose participation in most supervision missions proved to be of great value to orient contract management and improve risk assessment during implementation. 138. Strengthening institutional setup and capacity building usually takes a long time. In order to successfully carry out institutional reforms, it is critical that: (i) studies have strong ownership, commitment and sufficient resources for implementation of the accepted recommendations; and (ii) the concerned institution should interact with others involved in project implementation in order to ensure the right synergy is in place. This project would have accomplished more if this was the case. Future projects should seek to design framework that integrates this. 139. The need for a clear articulation of outcome indicators is true for all projects, but is particularly important for broadly defined projects which cover more than one component with diverse activities of institutional/capacity building nature. This will facilitate improved monitoring by the implementing agencies, unambiguous evaluation of performance at every stage, and identification of timely corrective actions. A formal review and revision of indicators should equally be built into the legal documentation of the project. With increased focus on outcomes, appraisal documents now have more appropriate indicators at the outset, but the problem persists during implementation as was the case of this project whose outcomes mainly focused on the road rehabilitation component. 6.3 Project Supervision 140. Continuous and quality supervision missions by the Bank team, using resources both from Country Offices and Washington DC, was very typical of this project in its latter phase of implementation and are important and critical. This is essential to ensure that steady progress and effective supervision are maintained to readily address specific needs during implementation. 25 141. The necessary adjustments made during implementation to ensure project objectives were fully met, as a result of: (i) good cooperation between the Bank team and the UCD, (ii) the sharing of monitoring results, (iii) the re-orientation of actions and, (iv) the search for improved impact through, knowledge sharing and guidance in decision making. However, the Bank's incentive structure is not conducive to several staff being responsible of supervision and therefore this mostly relies on the goodwill of team members. Especially when conflicts with contractors can easily degenerate into governance related issues, it is also probably critical that not all staff involved in supervision be based in the field. 142. Many changes in project leadership from the Bank's side, as was the case in this Project, had a negative effect on the overall progress and performance of the project. Extreme care should therefore be taken in the assignment of projects staff, taking into consideration the various factors that impact staff members such as retirement, transfers and change of role or sector. In the case of inter-regional transfers, consideration should be made to maintain the same TTL to preserve institutional knowledge and prevent some of the backlash that was experienced in the course of the several TTL changes that occurred in this project. 143. Key lessons learned related to environmental issues include the need to prepare an implementation safeguards instrument with clear measureable indicators in order to ensure close supervision with consistent support from the government and the Bank team. With growing concerns about global warming and climate change, and an added emphasis on scaling up related mitigation measures, future operations could support these aspects in project design and monitor some key indicators even if the project cannot be held accountable for them. For example, no data was collected for air pollution, which was identified from the onset as one of the main impacts resulting from poor road conditions. 7. Comments on Issues Raised by Borrower/Implementing Agencies/Partners Not applicable 26 Annex 1. Project Costs and Financing (a) Project Cost by Component (in USD Million equivalent)5 Actual/Latest Appraisal Estimate Percentage of Components Estimate (USD (USD millions) Appraisal millions) 1. REHABILITATION PROGRAM 58.13 67.88 117% 2. TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE, 12.86 13.28 103% AUDITS AND TRAINING 3. SUPPORT TO PMU, PCC AND EU FOR PROJECT 0.35 2.70 771% IMPLEMENTATION AND MONITORING6 4. PPF REFINANCING 0.60 0.10 17% Total Baseline Cost 71.94 83.96 117% Physical Contingencies 0.00 0.00 0.00 Price Contingencies 0.00 0.00 0.00 Total Project Costs 71.94 83.96 Front-end fee PPF 0.00 0.00 .00 Front-end fee IBRD 0.00 0.00 .00 Total Financing Required 71.94 83.96 (b) Financing Appraisal Actual/Latest Type of Estimate Estimate Percentage of Source of Funds Cofinancing (USD (USD Appraisal millions) millions) Borrower 15.60 20.47 131% International Development Association 65.57 63. 12 96.26% (IDA)7 5 Increased figure was due to weakened dollar /SDR exchange rate. There was no cost overrun and no additional funds from the Bank 6 Increased in actual estimate is due to the contribution of both Alliance and C2D to this component 7 The Appraisal estimate include unallocated funds to the PAD 56.35 USD millions estimate 27 Other External 0.5 0.22 44% Partner Other External 0.2 0.15 75% Partner 8 The contributions of Cities Alliance and C2D was mainly for the financing of the City Development Strategy for the city of Douala 28 Annex 2. Outputs by Component Objectives Key Performance Indicators Status as of June 2009 Sector-Related CAS Goal: Sector Indicators: Enhanced traffic circulation conditions resulting Maintain and develop the Status of the networks from an improved status of road networks. road network in both urban Reduction percentage of travel times on main roads and rural areas affected by the rehabilitation works by 47.5%. Expenditures on road maintenance Maintenance expenditures partially stabilized In 2006, the team and the UCD revisited the target values for this indicator and the amounts allocated decreased to 4.5 Billion in 2009, but were Transport costs and transit time reduced (indicators consistent with the agreed targets (see section 2.2, Improve port efficiency and monitored through the SAC III Project) credit covenants and 3.2). economic competitiveness Significant reduction in transport cost and transit time. Reduction percentage of vehicle operating costs on main roads affected by the rehabilitation works by 59%. Project Development : 1. Improve the efficiency of Douala's transport · 23 km of primary roads rehabilitated · Total of 27.65km of road completed by system connecting the end 2008 (Achieved and exceeded with an addition port and the industrial 4km being added as a result of cost savings) areas and their hinterlands · Travel time on the main roads reduced by 42% · Decreased travel time by 87% (up to 65% after rehabilitation; less than targeted); · Lower vehicle operating costs and · Vehicle operating costs reduced by 42.3% after renewal of vehicle fleet due to the improved road 2. Strengthen urban road road rehabilitation; conditions were seen as a direct result of this management and rehabilitation by 59% (Total reduction in VOC of maintenance 155 826 million CFAF). · Institutional framework enhanced; · Institutional framework enhanced; Strengthened personnel capacity - 84 staff members; UCD's infrastructure services are more readily available and greatly improved; Creation of sound strategies for urban development, transport and road maintenance. · Maintenance financing secured (budgets and · Initial allocations were met until end of expenditures) ; 2007. In 2006, team and UCD revisited the target and allocations decreased to 4.5 Billion in 2009, but were consistent with credit covenants (see section 2.2, credit covenants and 3.2). The new targets are still covering all the maintenance needs identified, which was the reason to measure this indicator. This covers maintenance needs identified. (Total cumulative amount of 28,065 million CFAF as against 36.620 million CFAF ­ 76.64%­ was achieved). 29 · Competent staff recruited in the road management · Recruitment was completed of key personnel unit (at least 3 highways engineers) (with at least 3 highways engineers) early in the project e.g. civil engineer, procurement specialist, accountants, and municipal engineers. · Make the UCD existing data-base on road maintenance management operational. Output from each Output indicators: component: · Urban Road · 23 km of main roads · 27.65km of main roads rehabilitated rehabilitation · Staffing: Finance, procurement and technical · Recruitment was completed of key personnel · Technical Assistance specialists early in the project (civil engineer, procurement specialist, Finance, and municipal engineers. · Capacity building · Ongoing training continued to strengthen the · Urban Strategy capacity of the Implementation Units 84 staff and investment program members received training out of which 63 were staff of the UCD; · Studies carried out on institutional aspects, · Twenty studies carried out on institutional city development strategies, slum upgrading, provision aspects including city development strategies of basic services to the poor for Douala; · UCD's infrastructure services are more readily available and greatly improved (operational road maintenance database and M&E unit put in place and improved coordination between UCD, the various municipalities and the population in terms infrastructure management); · Creation of sound strategies for urban development , transport and road maintenance; · Slum upgrading provision of basic services to the poor (A population of 10,000 inhabitants in the slums areas benefited from: 500 meters of paved roads, 1,080 meters of walkways, 1,350 meters of pipe borne water network supplying 4 public taps, and 3,800 meters of electricity cabling supplying 16 street lights). · Construction of more than 800 m length of sewage drain. 30 Annex 3. Economic Analysis 1. At appraisal a full economic evaluation was carried out on the road rehabilitation component. An economic evaluation was not carried out for the other components, which are Institutional Development and Support to Project Implementation Units (PIUs). At completion, the government hired the same international consultant firm as at appraisal to reassess the economic viability of the project. The methodology and the assumptions were thus the same before and after the project, which allowed a strict comparison of the two economic analyses. Methodology and Assumptions 2. The economic analysis of the rehabilitation works was done using the World Bank Highway Design and Maintenance Standards Model (HDM-IV). It was performed by assessing the economic benefits generated by savings in time and vehicle operating costs in comparison with the investment and maintenance costs. Benefits resulted from the reduction of accidents and of air pollution are not taken into account. The economic analysis compares the without-project alternative with the project alternative. The without project alternative is the reference situation, in which the rehabilitation works were not carried out and the main roads were only supposed to be maintained slightly. The project alternative corresponds to the achievement of the rehabilitation works and to the execution of the future maintenance works. The simulation was done over a 25-year period, starting in 2003, and with a discount rate of 12 percent. 3. Traffic counts at completion were made in the same spots as at appraisal, during the dry season for different vehicle classes. The traffic count campaigns were carried out from November 25, 2009 to December 5, 2009. The traffic estimates for the future were issued from the results of the PDU model. Table 3.1 shows the results of the traffic counts and of the estimates. 4. The vehicle operating costs include fuel and lubricant consumption, maintenance and repairing costs, tires costs. These costs depend considerably on the road quality and shape. To compute the vehicle operating costs, the International Roughness Index was determined. Vehicle operating costs dropped on all roads after project as shown in Table 3.2 below. 5. To determine the time benefits, mean speeds and travel times were measured on each section. They depend on the road quality, the traffic volume and the circulation conditions. The more degraded a road was, then the higher the traffic volume resulting in significantly lower the mean speed. Besides, the value of time for people commuting for work was assumed to be equal to their wages, contrary to people commuting for other reasons, for which the value time is equal to 25 per cent of their wages. The mean speeds are shown in Table 3.3. 31 Table 3.1: Traffic Before and After the Project, and Future Estimates Bef 2015 2025 Afte Re ore Section r project Esti Esti al project (2009) mates mates growth (2002) Carrefour Ndokoti - Avenue Japoma - 248 260 3440 5205 1 1% Boulevard de l'Unité - Place Leclerc 15 26 6 9 Carrefour Ndokoti - Douala/Yaoundé 670 123 3631 4970 2 9% Road 6 48 1 6 Boulevard Portuaire - Entrée sur le Wouri 129 218 4662 6664 3 8% 82 88 9 4 Boulevard Bésséké - Pont Joss 146 282 1537 2130 10 4 43 18 3 3 % Pont Joss - Place Leclerc 221 300 1537 2130 5 5% 03 98 3 3 Rue de Japoma - Ndokoti - Logbaba - 836 135 3234 4336 6 7% Japoma 4 76 4 1 Rue de Japoma between Yabassi camp 761 934 3719 4924 7 3% and Ndokoti 4 6 3 4 East freeway PK10-PK14 559 112 1140 2223 10 8 2 10 3 0 % Nyala - Carrefour Yassa 120 407 50 9 5434 7299 2 1 % 1 Carrefour Ndokoti - Carrefour CCC 173 176 3003 4229 0.2 0 08 02 1 3 % TOTAL 121 174 2644 3754 6% 329 383 97 42 Table 3.2: Vehicle Operating Costs Reduction After the Project 32 Reduction of VOC Section (CFAF million) Carrefour Ndokoti - Avenue Japoma - Boulevard de l'Unité - Place 25528 Leclerc Carrefour Ndokoti - Douala/Yaoundé Road 18151 Boulevard Portuaire - Entrée sur le Wouri 3869 Boulevard Bésséké - Pont Joss 12175 Pont Joss - Place Leclerc 5169 Rue de Japoma - Ndokoti - Logbaba - Japoma 39211 Rue de Japoma between Yabassi camp and Ndokoti 19757 East freeway PK10-PK14 13141 Nyala - Carrefour Yassa 10375 Carrefour Ndokoti - Carrefour CCC 8451 0 TOTAL 155826 Table 3.3: Mean Speeds Before and After Project (km per hour) Before After Section project project Real growth (2002) (2009) Carrefour Ndokoti - Avenue Japoma - 16 30 86% Boulevard de l'Unité - Place Leclerc Carrefour Ndokoti - Douala/Yaoundé Road 16 45 180% Boulevard Portuaire - Entrée sur le Wouri 26 39 51% Boulevard Bésséké - Pont Joss 37 51 37% Pont Joss - Place Leclerc 36 32 -10% Rue de Japoma - Ndokoti - Logbaba - Japoma 11 35 224% Rue de Japoma between Yabassi camp and 16 36 127% Ndokoti East freeway PK10-PK14 13 39 197% Nyala - Carrefour Yassa 15 64 329% Carrefour Ndokoti - Carrefour CCC 16 35 117% 0 MEAN VALUE 21 40 90% 33 Results 6. Regarding the 23 km initially planned to be rehabilitated under the project, the cost decreased by 15 percent from the baseline figure at appraisal. Furthermore, the travel time decreased by 90 percent between 2002 and 2009, while the vehicle operating costs dropped by 59 percent, which corresponds to a travel time reduction of 33 percent and a vehicle operating cost reduction of 29 percent more significant than expected. Overall, these effects amount to a CFAF 141 billion net present value (NPV) and a 54 percent economic internal rate of return (EIRR), in contrast with the CFAF 45.9 billion appraised NPV and the 32 percent appraised EIRR. These unforeseen benefits can be explained by car renewals. The road upgrades encourage the road users to buy new cars, as the vehicle operating costs decreased, resulting in a stronger effect on the vehicle operating costs and on the travel time. Table 3.4 gives Net Present Values and Internal Rates of Return at appraisal and at completion. 7. It is worth noting that the NPV and the EIRR depend slightly on the traffic previsions. Indeed, a 30 percent traffic decrease would modify the NPV by only 4 percent and the EIRR by 7 percent. This result means that vehicle operating cost decrease resulting from a more significant traffic is compensated by the mean speed drop off and thus by the reduction of time benefits. The road capacity is therefore reached over the 25 year period considered within the economic analysis. On the contrary, the EIRR and the NPV depend on the discount rate, as a 20 percent discount rate would alter the NPV by 58 percent. Most of the benefits will thus be reaped in the future, as Figure 3.6 illustrates. The results of the sensitivity analysis are shown in Table 3.5. Table 3.4: Results of the Updated Economic Analysis Updated NPV- Appraised NPV- Updated IRR Appraised IRR 12% 12% 54% 32% CFAF 141 billion CFAF 45.9 billion Table 3.5: Sensibility Analysis Traffic -30% -20% -10% 0% +10% evolution NPV (CFAF 135 137 139 141 143 billion) IRR 50.24% 51.53% 52.86% 54.22% 55.62% Discount 8% 10% 12% 15% 20% rate NPV 233 180 141 99 58 (CFAF 34 billion) Figure 3.1: Costs and Benefits over the 25-year Period between the Project Alternative and the Without Project Alternative 35 Annex 4. Bank Lending and Implementation Support/Supervision Processes (a) Task Team members Responsibility/ Names Title Unit Specialty Lending Supervision/ICR C. Sanjivi Rajasingham Sector Manager AFTTR Pierre A. Pozzo di Borgo Program Coordinator AFTTR Abdelgani Inal Sr Transport. Spec. AFTTR Mohammed Feghoul Sr Transport. Spec. AFTTR Kingson Khan Apara Sr Transport. Spec. AFTTR Hubert Nove-Josserand Sr Transport. Spec. AFTTR Jean-Francois Marteau Sr Transport. Spec. AFTTR Peter Ngwa Taniform Transport Specialist AFTTR Amine Bennis Intern AFTTR Jacques Espalieu Consultant AFTTR Sekou Keita E T Consultant AFTFM Faustin-Ange Koyasse Sr Program Officer AFTP3 Antoine V. Lema Senior Social Development Spec AFTCS Emeran Serge M. Menang Forestry Specialist AFTEN Evouna Kouami Hounsinou Messan Procurement Specialist AFTPC Helene Simonne Ndjebet Operations Analyst AFCC1 Yaka Daniel J. Murphy Senior Country Officer AFCC1 Irene Marguerite Nnomo Team Assistant AFCC1 Ayinda-Mah Fridolin Ondobo Financial Management Specialist AFTFM Sekou Keita Financial Management Specialist AFTFM Salim Refas Intern AFTTR Chantal Reliquet Sr Urban Spec. AFTUW Wycliffe Okoth Program Assistant AFTTR Cedric Loic Allio Intern AFTTR Pierrette Manfoumbe Program Assistant AFTTR 36 Moussodou Nadège L. Thadey Office Manager AFTTR (b) Staff Time and Cost Staff Time and Cost (Bank Budget Only) Stage of Project Cycle USD Thousands (including No. of staff weeks travel and consultant costs) Lending FY02 14 80.33 FY03 1 17.18 Total: 15 97.51 Supervision/ICR FY02 0.00 FY03 11 63.49 FY04 18 88.58 FY05 35 137.59 FY06 35 123.61 FY07 28 106.74 FY08 23 131.76 FY09 35 170.23 FY10 22 64.35 Total: 207 886.35 Annex 5. Beneficiary Survey Results (NA) 37 Annex 6. Stakeholder Workshop Report and Results (NA) 38 Annex 7. Summary of Borrower's ICR and/or Comments on Draft ICR 1. Le Projet d'Infrastructure de Douala (PID) avait pour objectif principal l'amélioration de l'efficacité du système de transport de la ville de Douala, par la mise en oeuvre d'un programme de réhabilitation d'urgence de réhabilitation des voiries principales dégradées. Par ailleurs au plan institutionnel, le projet visait également le renforcement des capacités de la Communauté Urbaine de Douala, en matière de gestion de l'entretien routier, de même que la préparation d'une stratégie urbaine à l'échelle nationale. Le projet a été mis en vigueur le 21 mars 2003, sur la base d'un cofinancement de l'IDA pour 45.200.000 DTS et le gouvernement camerounais pour 15,60 millions US$. 2. Le projet a connu une période d'instruction très courte (à peine six mois entre l'identification et la signature), pour une structure comme la Communauté Urbaine de Douala, dont c'était le premier projet avec la Banque Mondiale. Il a également été très contraignant au démarrage, en ce sens qu'il avait onze conditions pour les négociations et onze conditions de mise en vigueur. Tout ceci n'a pas favorisé une bonne préparation du projet par l'équipe, occupée à remplir les conditions de mise en vigueur du crédit, d'où la faible consommation du PPF 80.000 US$ sur 600.000 US$ alloués. 3. A l'origine, le projet comportait une composante dédiée aux travaux de réhabilitation des voiries principales constituée de deux Lots pour environ 23 km, une composante institutionnelle bâtie autour l'assistance technique à la Communauté Urbaine de Douala dans les domaines de la conception et la supervision des travaux de réhabilitation des voiries, le renforcement de ses capacités managériales d'entretien de la voirie, les audits et la préparation d'une stratégie urbaine nationale. Enfin une dernière composante relative à la facilitation des unités de projet. 4. Le projet a été mis en oeuvre par quatre agences d'exécution, dont trois ministérielles. Au départ, participaient à la mise en oeuvre du projet, outre la Communauté Urbaine de Douala, le MINDUH responsable de la sous composante urbaine, la Caisse autonome d'Amortissement au titre des décaissements, le MINPAT et le MINFI. La responsabilité fiduciaire a été cependant gardée par la Cellule d'Exécution du projet, agence d'exécution pour la Communauté Urbaine de Douala. Au-delà des objectifs initiaux, il a été rajouté après la revue à mi parcours du projet, une sous composante relative à la préparation d'une stratégie routière nationale, dont le MINTP et le MINT assuraient la responsabilité technique. 5. L'organisation retenue pour le projet et notamment la responsabilité fiduciaire laissée à la Cellule d'Exécution du projet a été mal acceptée par les unités des ministères, qui ne comprenaient pas qu'elles puissent dépendre pour ces aspects d'une structure décentralisée. Cela s'est traduit par de nombreux retards aussi bien dans la préparation des TDR pour les différentes études, que lors des évaluations des propositions des consultants. Ceci justifie en partie les résultats modérément satisfaisants d'une partie de la composante institutionnelle. Par ailleurs les rotations fréquentes intervenues au niveau des points focaux des ministères sont venues aggraver cet état. 6. Au niveau de l'IDA, on peut relever également un important turnover des chargés de projets (cinq en tout pendant la durée du projet). Fort heureusement, la stabilité du reste du staff de l'IDA a permis d'atténuer l'impact qu'aurait pu avoir cette situation sur le projet. Les missions de supervision de l'IDA ont été fréquentes, probablement en raison des difficultés liées à l'exécution des travaux du Lot 1 de réhabilitation des voiries. Les échanges entre la Cellule 39 d'Exécution et le staff de l'IDA ont été empreints de cordialité, ce qui a naturellement favorisé des prises de position consensuelles sur les problèmes posés au projet. 7. Le Comité de Pilotage s'est régulièrement réuni, pour constater l'état d'avancement des activités du projet. Malheureusement, celui-ci n'est jamais intervenu pour faciliter les relations du projet avec le gouvernement, comme on peut le constater dans les difficultés connues par le projet pour la mobilisation des fonds de contrepartie. Il en est également de même du volet approvisionnement du compte d'entretien de la voirie, qui n'a pas semblé être sa préoccupation, alors que celui-ci figurait bien dans ses missions. A titre d'exemple, alors que les ressources du fonds routier étaient identifiées comme source de financement de l'entretien de la voirie de Douala, celles-ci n'y ont pas contribué pendant toute la durée du projet. 8. Les activités de passation des marchés ont été conduites de manière satisfaisante, malgré les pesanteurs nées de la frustration des entités ministérielles. Elles ont porté sur un ensemble de 186 marchés tous types confondus représentant 42.195 millions de francs CFA, et répartis ainsi qu'il suit : Pourcentage Montant en Pourcentage Type/catégorie de Nombre par rapport au millions de par rapport au marché/contrat total CFAF montant total Firmes de consultants 27 14,6% 5.056 12,0% Consultants Individuels 81 43,8% 1.166 2,7% Travaux 25 13,5% 35.515 84,3% Equipements 21 11,3% 233 0,6% Fournitures 31 16,8% 164 0,4% Total 185 100,00% 42.134 100,00% 9. Les décaissements ont connu un rythme acceptable au début du projet, mais les délais sont devenus longs après la revue à mi parcours en raison du volume des transactions et surtout des retards dans l'approvisionnement des fonds de contrepartie qui ont perturbé le processus. Les demandes de paiements directs du fait de leur transit par la Mission Résidente de la Banque Mondiale, sont restées tributaires des départs de la valise diplomatique, entrainant aussi quelques retards. Cela devrait cependant être amélioré avec l'introduction de la signature électronique en cours d'introduction dans le système de paiement. Le projet a du payer des intérêts moratoires de plus de 25 millions CFAF. 10. Les résultats obtenus en matière de réhabilitation des voiries principales sont plus que satisfaisants, puisque c'est près de 27,65 km contre 23 km de voiries prévus qui sont concernés. Cette composante a été financée à hauteur de 78,11% par les fonds de l'IDA, soit un montant de 53,02 millions US$ pour un total de 67,88 millions US$. Dans le cadre de travaux liés à la préparation de la stratégie urbaine, des opérations pilote d'aménagement ont été financées à hauteur de 4,38 millions US$, dont 3.50 millions US$ de l'IDA soit 79,91%. La composante institutionnelle a été mise en oeuvre à hauteur de 13,28 millions US$, dont 9,21 millions US$ par l'IDA, d'où une contribution de 69,35%. Enfin la composante facilitation des unités de projet a coûté 2,70 millions US$, dont 0,99 millions US$ pour l'IDA, soit 36,67% 11. Les résultats sur le plan institutionnel, peuvent être jugés satisfaisants au regard des objectifs initiaux du projet et notamment le renforcement des capacités de la Communauté Urbaine de Douala en matière d'entretien de son réseau routier d'une part et la préparation d'une stratégie de développement urbain, qui quoique non adoptée de manière formelle, a connu ses premières opérations pilote, puis la négociation et la mise en vigueur d'un nouveau projet avec 40 l'IDA dans le secteur. La sous composante dédiée au réseau routier national a été l'objet d'activités significatives, dans la préparation des réformes institutionnelles dans le secteur des transports. Ces dernières serviront d'inputs dans le projet de facilitation du transport et du transit en zone CEMAC. Cette composante aurait être bien menée si elle avait été cernée suffisamment tôt, car elle n'a été clairement définie que quelques temps avant la revue à mi parcours. 12. Des études stratégiques ont été conduites dans le cadre du projet et celles-ci dont les résultats peuvent orienter durablement les interventions dans certains secteurs sont essentiellement pour la ville de Douala le plan de transport et de déplacements urbains, la stratégie de développement de la ville de Douala et son aire métropolitaine (cofinancé par Cities Alliance et le C2D), au plan national la stratégie sectorielle des transports et la politique nationale de l'habitat et au plan régional le régime de transit des marchandises en zone CEMAC. 13. Au plan du renforcement des capacités, un accent particulier a été mis sur la formation, et qui s'est traduit par l'inscription de cette activité dans l'amendement de l'Accord de crédit, intervenu après la revue à mi parcours. A travers les différents plans de formation établis par les agences d'exécution, des opportunités ont été offertes aux personnels de se former localement et à l'étranger sur l'entretien de la voirie, la passation des marchés, l'aménagement urbain, la planification et la programmation et enfin la gestion financière et comptable. C'est au total 84 cadres qui ont ainsi été formées dont 63 pour la seule Communauté Urbaine de Douala qui opté pour des modules de formations locales de masse. Le coût total des différentes formations est de 0,58 millions US$. 14. Par ailleurs la bonne exécution du projet a permis de confirmer la capacité de la municipalité de Douala, à conduire un projet de développement. Cela peut servir d'expérience pilote dans le contexte de décentralisation actuel et a valeur de test pour les collectivités territoriales décentralisées dans le domaine de l'exercice de la maîtrise d'ouvrage publique. Ce constat doit être certainement relativisé pour les autres collectivités territoriales décentralisées, à l'exception de la Communauté urbaine de Yaoundé 15. Le projet a enfin amené la Communauté Urbaine de Douala, à prendre conscience des enjeux liés à l'impact environnemental et social des grands projets d'infrastructure, puisque ces deux volets ont fait l'objet d'un traitement et d'un suivi particuliers. L'organigramme de la Communauté Urbaine de Douala a été enrichi par la nomination désormais, d'un cadre spécialement chargé de l'ingénierie sociale des projets. Les différentes indemnisations et autres compensations au titre du projet s'élèvent à 7.678 millions XAF soit 1,55 millions US$ et ont été intégralement versées. Elles ont affecté 108 ménages (642 personnes) et un industriel. 16. Sur l'ensemble du réseau routier réhabilité, les résultats sont très satisfaisants au regard des taux de réalisation respectifs par rapport aux valeurs cible de 120,21% de longueur de voirie réhabilitée, 207,14% de réduction du temps de parcours, 139,48% de réduction du coût d'exploitation des véhicules. En outre le trafic sur ces axes a augmenté de 43,80%. Ces gains ont été répercutés sur les coûts du transport des personnes qui ont diminué de 30% à 50% sur les axes du Lot 2 situés en partie Est de la ville de Douala. 17. Par contre l'entretien de la voirie a connu des résultats modérément satisfaisants, compte tenu d'une mobilisation des ressources de l'ordre de 76,64% (28.605 millions XAF entre 2002 et 2009) par rapport aux prévisions (36.620 millions XAF). Ces résultats restent cependant acceptables en raison des faibles besoins en la matière en ce moment, les charges d'entretien sur le réseau réhabilité étant ramenées à celles dites de routine, pour les premières années d'exploitation après réhabilitation. 41 18. Toutefois, il faut dès à présent finaliser la stratégie d'entretien de la voirie de Douala et surtout réunir toutes les conditions de pérennité de son financement, les premières dépenses significatives étant attendues à partir de 2012. Dans cette perspective, les conclusions et recommandations de l'audit technique financier et comptable des prestations financées par le compte d'entretien de la voirie de Douala seront très utiles. 19. L'analyse économique des investissements routiers réalisés conduite à la fin du projet confirme la viabilité du projet. A ce titre la VAN est estimée à 140,8 milliards XAF, contre 45,9 milliards XAF à l'évaluation du projet soit 306,75%, tandis que le TRI atteint 54,22% pour 32% soit 169,44%. 20. L'analyse de sensibilité par rapport à une variation du trafic entre -30% et +10% d'une part, combinée à une variation du taux d'actualisation entre +8% et +20% d'autre part, permet d'estimer une VAN comprise entre 54,2 milliards XAF et 235,8 milliards XAF et un TRI variant entre 50,24% et 55,62%, valeurs qui restent supérieures à celles de l'évaluation du projet. 21. La mise en oeuvre du Projet d'Infrastructure de Douala, a permis de mettre en évidence des enseignements dont il faudra probablement tenir compte à l'avenir pour des projets similaires. Les leçons à tirer de la mise en oeuvre du projet peuvent se résumer ainsi qu'il suit : · Période d'instruction du projet réduite et qui peut justifier une imprécision d'une partie de la composante institutionnelle ; · Rotation excessive du personnel de supervision de la Banque Mondiale qui peut affecter les résultats du projet ; · Organisation de la gestion du projet autour de la Communauté Urbaine de Douala qui a été mal perçue au niveau des ministères, l'administration centrale trouvant qu'elle se retrouve sous un démembrement de l'Etat ; · Vérification systématique des informations fournies par les PME dans leurs offres, dont l'absence a amené à attribuer des marchés à des entreprises qui avaient présenté de fausses références pour la phase 1 des travaux d'amélioration de l'accès aux services de base dans les quartiers ; · Engagement des associations de quartiers non documentés, d'où évidence pour les bénéficiaires à n'avoir aucun devoir, comme on peut le vérifier dans l'attitude des comités de développement des quartiers, qui ne veulent pas prendre en charge l'exploitation des ouvrages réalisés ; · Absence de contrôle interne formalisé, qui n'a pas permis d'optimiser l'utilisation des différents manuels de procédures, ce qui s'est traduit par des lacunes en matière de gestion des risques et nombreux retards dans la production de l'information financière ; · Absence de vulgarisation de la technique comptable à l'ensemble des principaux responsables au début du projet, comme cela a été le cas pour la passation des marchés, d'où une méconnaissance totale des exigences comptables par le coordonnateur, pourtant désigné comme premier comptable du projet ; · Absence d'une information structurée sur le projet, qui devrait permettre une meilleure acceptation par les bénéficiaires des réalisations de celui-ci, en améliorant la perception de la gouvernance ; · Meilleure circulation des informations entre les bailleurs de fonds du secteur, qui aurait permis d'avoir des informations fiables sur le chantier de l'entreprise ETEP au Mali, où elle éprouvait déjà à l'époque des difficultés similaires, dans le 42 même schéma que celui adopté pour le projet (sous traitance locale à 100% de son marché). 43 Annex 8. Comments of Cofinanciers and Other Partners/Stakeholders (NA) 44 Annex 9. List of Supporting Documents List of Supporting Document are: 1. Project Appraisal Document 2. Pre and Post project Economic Analysis 3. Environmental and Social Management Plan (ESMP) 4. Aide memoires and Implementation Status Reports 5. Country Assistance Strategy (CAS) of 1996 6. 2000 - Interim Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper 7. Government Policy Paper of February, 2002. 8. Country Assistance Strategy (CAS) of 2010 9. Urban Community of Douala Road Maintenance audit report by 2AC, November 2009 10. Final Draft of Borrower's Completion Report, by the Project Implementation Unit, May 2010 45 MALI 10° 20° 12° 14° 16° NIGER This map was produced by the Map Design Unit of The Lake Chad World Bank. The boundaries, colors, denominations and CHAD any other information shown SUDAN on this map do not imply, on the part of The World Bank Group, any judgment on the legal status of any territory, or any endorsement or BENIN acceptance of such 10° 10° boundaries. Nig NIGERIA Kousséri er e 12° 0 40 80 120 160 Kilometers 12° nu Be CENTRAL AFRICAN REP. 0 20 40 60 80 100 Miles C H A D Cha CAMEROON ri Gulf of Guinea Yaounde U e le EQUATORIAL C on go EXTREME GUINEA Mora NORD SÃO TOMÉ AND PRÍNCIPE DEM. REP. 0° CONGO OF 0° Mokolo GABON CONGO Bogo Maroua 10° 20° Yagoua Kaélé 10° 10° Guider 10° CAMEROON DOUALA INFRASTRUCTURE M ay o Ke bi La go ne PROJECT oué Ben Garoua URBAN COMMUNITY OF DOUALA SELECTED TOWNS NORD DEPARTMENT CAPITALS Guibjiba PROVINCE CAPITALS Poli Tcholliré NATIONAL CAPITAL UNPAVED ROADS Fa ro 8° PAVED ROADS 8° RAILROADS a RIVERS Mounguel Vi n re PROVINCE BOUNDARIES be M Tignére Ngaoundere INTERNATIONAL BOUNDARIES ADAMAOUA NIGERIA Banyo Nkambe Meiganga Malarba NORD - Tibati Wumo Lake OUEST M bam Assom Kumbo 6° Nbengwi 6° Bamenda Lake Mamfe Bambili Garoua Boulai Foumban Dje rem Dschang Ndokayo Mu Bafoussam Lom Nguti OUEST CENTRAL ngo Bafang Bangangté SUD - Supé AFRICAN Mundemba Nkongsamba CENTRE OUEST Bélabo REPUBLIC Kadei Bafia Kumba Nanga Bertoua Yabassi Ntuj Eboko Batouri LITTORAL Monatélé Doume Buea Idenao Douala Abong Mbang Ndelélé 4° 4° Limbe Yaounde EST Edéa Akonolinga Nyo Mbalmayo Yokadouma ng Lomié Bo um Gulf of Guinea Sangmélima Dja Kribi ba Ebolowa Sangha SUD EQUATORIAL Nt em GUINEA Muloundou IBRD 32043 2° 2° Ng GABON JUNE 2002 ok o 10° 12° 14° C O N G O