81210 enGender Impact: The World Bank’s Gender Impact Evaluation Database Cash transfers, conditions, school enrollment, and child work : evidence from a randomized experiment in Ecuador Author(s) Norbert Schady, Caridad Araujo Contact nschady@worldbank.org Country Ecuador Organizing Theme Education and Skills Status The Evaluation is Complete but the project is ongoing Intervention Category Cash Transfer Sector Social Protection The impact of cash transfer programs on the accumulation of human capital is a topic of great policy importance. An attendant question is whether program effects are larger when transfers are “conditioned” on certain behaviors, such as a requirement that households enroll their children in school. This paper uses a randomized study design to analyze the impact of the Bono de Desarrollo Humano (BDH), a cash transfer program, on enrollment Abstract and child work among poor children in Ecuador. The main results in the paper are two. First, the BDH program had a large, positive impact on school enrollment, about 10 percentage points, and a large, negative impact on child work, about 17 percentage points. Second, the fact that some households believed that there was a school enrollment requirement attached to the transfers, even though such a requirement was never enforced or monitored in Ecuador, helps explain the magnitude of program effects. Gender Connection Gender Focused Intervention Gender Outcomes Gender disaggregated school enrollment IE Design Randomized Control Trial Since 2003, the Bono de Desarrollo Humano program (BDH) in Ecuador has taken steps to target cash transfers towards the poor. BDH transfers are made to women, and can be collected at any branch office from the largest network of private banks or from the National Agricultural Bank. The size of the transfer is about $15. Unlike most other cash transfer programs in Latin America, the BDH program did not explicitly make transfers Intervention conditional on changes in household behavior, but program administrators did stress the importance of school enrollment when signing up households for transfers. As a result, some households believed that there was an enrollment requirement associated with the program, even though no requirement was ever monitored or enforced in Ecuador. This paper exploits this quirk in the administration of the BDH program to assess the importance of conditions attached to cash transfers. 1999-Present, in 2003 there was a retargeting of the program towards the poor. Transfers Intervention Period were paid monthly The sample was drawn from four of the 22 provinces in the country. There were 1306 Sample population households with 2875 school aged children in the sample. None of the households received the transfers prior to the evaluation. Last updated: 14 August 2013 1 enGender Impact: The World Bank’s Gender Impact Evaluation Database Since the government could not afford to roll the entire program out at once, the Comparison conditions government randomly selected half of the households to receive the program (treatment) and the other half were told they were put on a waiting list. Unit of analysis Household Level Evaluation Period June 2003-March 2005 The BDH program had a large, positive impact on school enrollment, about 10 percentage points, and a large, negative impact on child work, about 17 percentage points. Significant Results program effects on enrollment were only found among households who believed that there was an enrollment requirement associated with the program; this suggests that this unenforced condition was important. There may be anticipation effects from the control group. Additionally, knowledge about Primary study limitations the program is not randomly allocated so there may be selection issues in the measurement of impact of knowledge on conditionality. Funding Source Schady, N., Araujo, M. C. (2008). Cash Transfers, Conditions, and School Enrollment in Reference(s) Ecuador [with Comments]. Economía, 8(2), 43-77. Link to Studies http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/economia/v008/8.2.schady.pdf Microdata Last updated: 14 August 2013 2