DR C cTRD I C-TED-r. CA4 Vol. 2 This report was prepared for use within the Bank and its affiliated organizations. They do not accept responsibility for its accuracy or completeness. The reporl may not be published nor may it be cluoted as representing their views. INTERNATIONAL BANK FOR RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT ASSOCIATION CURRENT ECONOMIC POSIT1ION AND PROSPECTS OF G UYANA (in two volumes) VOLUME II AGRICULTURE October 1, 1970 Central America. and Caribbean Departrnent CWRRENCY EQUIVALENTS 1 Guyanese Dollar (G$) = US$o050* US$1 = G$2.00 * New rate effective since devaluation of November 1967 (old wraeas M1 = ust$.58; US$1 = G$1.71) GUYANA / KU _ AS he l l J X )) 7 < j; C-' AIr Alkluvial coostat areas j - uOli . IA, st,ips r_ .~~'S~ A5/ ., '- nding ooolS , - ' i asor.oh C "~~~~~~~~~~~........... shipping rote[ -- > ~ ~ ~ : tr X PBi .e Rod kaQer estates ; <~~~~~ < eMotlrwt Rollooys s /nd ne t '~~ ~ i'camrrioa Ri~dge 0 laid workings Reqinqo 0 Ilianond workins *}~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ll"-l *M/ l ' e I jStd d A / rmq Gordeng p lCttl => 9 750,0007 'opu.tohin | 3 z ~O~,o ( _i\o I~~~~~~~' ,- s Moof tE o'-1 - ~~~t5~~"' %I)IY\*If ~ ~ '~Y - - N-A SRK - WE f (i//Y S }~~~~T11K _.-'~~' ) aA A 551< n p fi_+n1 ^ ) + 11 A a i s -s d i and Guyana has a number of important advantages in this industry. There are also goodu prospectLs fLor developing ar- offhor fishing industry for the- Adomestic goou~i± ~±J~J LU. UV ~XUJJJ1~, .LIU±_LO~11 .1 1±U~-, .L11U.U..2L, U -LUI Ullt, -1= _~ market. Consideration should be given to a joint CARIFTA approach to the e:±Ul Uc Uv vU.ll Ut1a nU i'Lo Ut111e I 1. b WLlUel.a J vL U1 dt ±I Ce ldl L,y UVUIIutll U a LUAZLI.L VVd. 11 -J. W o close to Guyana: Guyana could expect to play a leading role in any such venture. 12. Major objectives of government agricultural policy are: i. The creation of employment opportunities for the growing population, many of whom are at present unemployed. ii. Developing agriculture as a primary growth sector, with increased, diversified exports, particularly to Guyana's fellow CARIFTA member countries. iii. The development of the country's interior to provide employment and produce crops of a diversified nature. iv. The use of cooperative societies as a major force in agricultural development. -iii- 13. Several aspct o nf +.the i mTn Iemnt.atio an o-f' +this s require further consideration: i. The simultaneous attainment of production and welfare obje1;ie is peulal difcl in Guya -ne se -agriculIture. The present emphasis on welfare objectives can hinder the achleveLment of0 adequdate production tUargetus andu mly have long-term adverse effects on social and economic devielop- 1i-enU. D .11 1t d k_ CCDiU4L1 J1 dLl an e1 u ile dnt agUricUltue WUoU 01 itself probably result in the expansion and strengthening o1 f±rIil±y ±d.iIl-Lng, tu1iL deveLUopLng a m,Iore LaUcdLy UabaU agricultural structure. ii. Undue reliance is being placed on an undeveloped co- operati-ve movement, there is a danger tLat thils co-uld encourage the setting of unattainable targets and result in disillusion with the cooperative movement. iii. The desirable objective of agricultural diversification should not be sought at the expense of expansion of the staple sugarcane and rice crops. iv. High :protected domestic prices for agricultural com- modities divert resources from more competitive lines, raise living and production costs and reduce the com- petitiveness of exports. Present pricing arrangements for sugar on the domestic market should be reviewed and proposals which would result in higher domestic prices for other commodities should be regarded critically. v. The development of interior regions is being pressed primarily for reasons other than economic, and there is a danger that further development of this kind can become a heavy, continuous drain on the econony. 14. Potential areas for investment include: i. Rehabilitation of Black Bush and Tapakuma land settlement schemes: The successful rehabilitation of these schemes could serve as valuable demonstrations for a general reor- ganization of rice growing in Guyana. ii. Cattle: A recently appraised cattle development project is consistent with the general strategy for agricultural expansion. The public provision of controlled grazing areas for cattle remaining outside the project shou:Ld also be considered. iii. Shrimping: Returns are attractive and there is scope for a considerable expansion of Guyana's present small shrimp- ing fleet. -iv- i-v. Fr £hln5Lig; Development ofI trawling tL o supply ute oUUJIUbUL±U market should be advantageous. There is also the pos- sliblity of f-urther expansion of Guyanese brawling as part of a joint CARIFTA exploitation of Caribbean fisheries. v. Lumbering: Establishment of a viable wood-pulping industry should greatly improve the prospects for economic exploita- tion of Guyana's timber resources and open new opportunities for investment in lumbering and sawmilling. vi. Crop Development: Despite many years of research, little progress has been made in the growing of crops other than sugarcane and rice. Research should be concentrated on a few crops, rather than as at present, diffused over a wide range. vii. The Guyana Marketing Corporation: The Corporation's plans for expanding its cold storage space seem sound. In the light of the suggested investment in fishing (iv. above) a greater expansion than now contemplated may be warranted. I. AGRICULTURE IN THE GUYANESE ECONOMY T 4- - -4UA -* ln u.L odt Vui 1n -I - ,- ....,...~ Q' 1 1. uyana, a co- uitry of somi1e 8u3 u square JileUs, is sltud. U±I Uonth northern coast of South America. Its population of about 730,000 in 1969 is grow.inWg at iJ a"lst U 3) P-- OUt per arULU.11l. U1Gross DoUImesticU ProducLtL L -Ln71 was around US$250 million; income per capita stood at roughly US$275. Agriculture, icl-,uding fUrestrUy aLrI _isLL1Llg (buu exci-utuilg s-ucl major agro-industries as sugar manufacturing and rice milling) accounts for aroulnd one-fifth I 1 GDP aziiu prouvides u ut IiaLiLI sourice of emtployment for about one- third of the work force. Goods of agricultural origin account for half of' thie co-ar {try! Zs t0tail ex--p0rts. 2. GuYana's agriculture uisplays a r-emarkable degree of1 concentration in respect of location, product and management. Virtually all present out- put comes from a narrow coastal strip of less than 2,500 square miles. A little over 160 square miles, or about 0.2 percent of the total land area., is under sugarcane wnich accounts for almost one-half of total agricultural production. Twelve estates owned or controlled by two expatriate companies grow virtualLy all of the sugarcane. Volume and the Structure of Production 3. The structure of agricultural production during the past decade is shown in the following table. Crops account for about 70 percent of totaL sector product. TABLE A VALUEh OF AGRlICULTURAL PRODUCT]-ON 1960-1969, AT CONSTANT 1965 PRICES (GO million) 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 Sugarca-r.e 37.R 3A67 3A6R 35.R g o 29.2 3. a . 38.8A 5.A .-II Rice 12.0 11.8 12.4 9.8 14.9 15.7 15.2 12.1 13.0 10.6 Coconuts 3.0 ° A 3.6 3 A. 1. 3 0 5 3 . 7 I Coffee 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.6 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.1 1.1 1.2 Other Crops I 8.2 9.3 53 53 6.2 6.0 5.4~ 4 .5 1 .) 4-8 Total Crops _/ 61.3 61.8 62.3 54.6 54.9 60.0 57.2 59.0 58.0 61.8 j Ground provisions and plantains. / Excludes cocoa, fruits, green vegetables and corn, which together in 1968 represented abhonu. ) percent of t±he value of total crop nrodtiction. -2- 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968< 19o9 Cattle 3.7 3.8 3.9 4.0 4.4 4.5 4.5 4.2 4.2 4.5 Pigs 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.6 o.6 0.9 1.1 1.3 1.6 Sheep - - - 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 Poultry & Pigs 1.0 1.2 1.1 0.9 1.7 1.8 3.7 4.8 5.2 4 9 Milk 1.0 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.4 1.2 1.4 1.5 1.6 Total Livestock TT T. 6 . 6 8.2 10.14 11. 12.3 12.8 and Livestock Products 1/ Fish 2.5 2.6 2.8 3.8 4.2 4.8 4.7 5.8 7.0 7.6 Forestry 5.5 5.7 5.1 4.4 5.6 5.2 6.3 6.1 6.1 6.1 Total Fish & -70 8.3 7.9 2 9TO 10.0 11.0 11.9 13.1 13.7 Forestry TABLE B INDEX NUMBERS OF AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION, 1960-69 Base 1960 = 100 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 Crops 100.0 100.8 101.6 89.1 89.6 97.9 93.3 96.2 94.6 100.8 Livestock & Products 100.0 106.6 109.8 113.1 134.4 139.3 170.5 190.2 201.6 209.8 Fish & Forestry 100.0 103.8 98.8 102.5 122.5 125.0 137.5 148.8 163.8 171.3 Total Agriculture 100.0 101.6 102.0 92.14 96.7 1014.1 1014.2 109.14 110.6 117.1 Source: Ministry of Agriculture & Ministry of Economic Development. I A __: __ -0 - __ _ _ __ts _1_ __! _ _ r_ _s7 _ __i1__: 14. J8r ;Ull,±Uuiar UUUUI,L U1 WIllUIl c uuu U tIAI'r- I.U llb l-b Ulp pIrUUUulUIi, increased by around 11 percent between the average of the years 1960-62 and 1967-69. Trlis represernts a growth in the volume of production of some 1.5 percent per annum, or about half the rate of growth of population, and less than one-quarter of the growth rate of total GDP. 5. 0O the two major crops, sugarcane production was only some 4 percent greater in the later years of the decade than in the earlier years; reported figures of rice production indicate a slight decline in output. Output of other crops, which include plantains and various roots such as cassava and edoes (generally known as "ground provisionsi), is reported to have declined sharply during the decade. Price 26.98 cents per lb. being average price paid by Guyana Marketing Corporation for fish in 1968 (A-rnua-al RepOr't,Minlis'try of AgrricultUre and Natural Resources 1968, part VI, page 4). -3- 6. The difference in production trends in the 1960's between sugar- cane and rice is noteworthy. Sugarcane production declined by 13 percent to a trough during the mid-years of the decade; but by the end years production was 20 percent higher than in 1964-66. Rice production on the other hand rose by 27 percent to 1964-66, but thereafter fell off sharply by 22 percent in the final years of the decade. Sugarcane production appears to have been seriously affected by the civil strife of the mid-1960's but to be recovering sharply in recent, more settled years. But wzhile iice production appears not to have suffered at all from the conditions of civil strife in the mid-1960's, it has declined seriously during the receent, more settled years. 7. Well over half of the increase in livestock production was accoLmted for by poultry. It is important to bear in mind that the output figures are gross; that the value added component of poultry production, the industry's contributicn to GDP, is much less, probably not more than one-quarter of gross output. Very much the same qualificatiorn applies to pig production - i.e., net output is unlikely to be more than one-quarter of the gross. By contrast, the net output, or value added, of cattle production is likely to approximate gross output. Cattle production increased at about the same rate as total agricultural production. 8. 1ishing (exclusive of shrimping) was by far the most rapidly grrow- ing major component of the agricultural sector. The volume of .ish landiings increased hy ijust 160 nercont between 1960-62 and 1967-69. Annual average shrimp landings increased from 5.2 to over 9 million lbs. between 1960-62 and 1967-69. However. as about nine-tenths of the shrimn are landed by foreign- owned trawlers operating mainly in international waters and are graded, slored and re-ednrcrteri on nommission. the vnalue of these lanrdings clearly cannot. be included in the agricultural product of Guyana. 9. Forestry production increased at approximately the same rate as the sector as E. whole, viz. about 11-12 percent be+ween 1960-62 anrd 1967-69 Resources 'sFnTlored F[l,lma.n Resoiurces 10. Iuyana's commercial agriclture continues to be predo.miantly of a plantation nature. Its main product, sugar, is produced by two large firrms T. 1-.1-. c.-cr n- rv nv.+ ~nAl.v- ,-yrrmcT-y.. nl I -; .c fn +lm-4 r. -n 11 a - v l ,ul- cr~ w>chOe--L -n _rhodox comrillines; --- -_ "hi- -pts, inluin labor, are purchased. Unlike the typical family farm, where the family farm lo is a residu-a after paying relJativelJy few - _ca shj. ou, t g o_ i;.n.g ss and Jp rouc X.- tion is maintained unless better alternative employment is available, estates cease to operate as soon as income falls below outgoings. This state of affairs is often determined by collective action rather than by the availability of alternative employment opportunities. Guyana's many defunct estates, in the midst of widespread unemployment, are evidence of this process. 11. As a corollary of this organizational form, the Guyanese agricul- tural population is predominantly of the wage-earner rather than farm-family type, for the most part the descendants of slaves from Africa and indentured laborers from India. A class of independent farmers is evolving in rice growing, but even here the larger type grower employing some labor is more predominant than the small family farmer typical of most rice-growing countries. Persons of Indian descent tend to predominate in agriculture while those of African descent predominate in the manufacturing and service sectors. 12. A little over 30 percent of the total work force, or 44,000 persons, were reported in 1965 as being engaged in agriculture. It is unlikely that there has been any decrease and there may well have been an increase in the numbers engaged since then. With agriculture accounting for around one-fifth of GDP and providing employment for some one-third of the work force, output per person in the sector is about half of that of persons engaged in the other sectors. 13. Within the agricultural sector, sugarcane production, as noted, accounts for some 47 percent of sectoral product. It employed on average lh,100 field workers or about 32 percent of the total agricultural labor force in 1969. The value of output, or value added, per sugarcane worker is about twice as high as that of output per worker elsewhere in agriculture and is about on a par with the average value of output per occupied person in Guyana. Land l1. Guyana has a large land area relative to population. However, less than 1 .000 of the countryvs 83.000 square miles are m.sed for cron production, and this is located in a narrow strip of alluvial soils on the coast. ndr in rivprinp areas near the const whi ch has a totnl arpe of less than 2,500 square miles. There is 0.7 acres of cropland per head of popuilation compred with 0. 3 acres per head of population in the other principal CARIFTA countries. Additionally, Guyana has large tracts of cornn'7i -n ~!-rlr +.brimicrl- rnf 1 (T, n-rnr1i1r±.irPT ~~-it> 15. The castal belt+ -~ is s-itted+o,- hcv1.,lo- -ne lnrvl. Sea w.all r1efensce are necessary to prevent flooding at high tide and, particularly, at spring tides. The sea defenses are incorporated into a system of polders which permit the outflow of drainage water at low tide while simultaneously prev ent-ing -I. 4 7 - n1v'noc. Ib U nA- 1,4-li 4-4, U 16. The low-lying nature of the coastal belt, diie necessi-tating the erection of sea defences and creating difficult drainage problems, also makes irrigation possible. About one-quarter of the coastal belt has been declared drainage and irrigation areas and is provided with some drainage and irrigation service. Much of the remainder is saline marsh- land used for grazing. 17. The sugar estates in particular have achieved a high level of efficiency in water control and this more than any other factor accounts for their relatively high level of output per acre and per man. This control includes drainage, irrigat;ion and the use of water courses to provide an exceptionally cheap form of intra-estate transport. 18. The quality of the soil on the coastal plain deteriorates as one moves further from the coast, clays and silts giving way first to marsh savannahs and later in the southeast to dry, brown and white sand savannahs and to forest land. The coastal belt in the northwest rapidly gives way to rolling forest on generally poor soils. There is a further large savannah area, the Rupununi distr-ict, in the southwest. The remainder of the country is jungle (see Map). 19. There are about 105,000 acres of land under sugarcane. The acreage of rice varies greatly from season to season; the main autumn crop has been as high as 280,000 acres and as low as 180,000 acres during the 1960's. The smaller spring crop has varied even more widely. The acreage of land under coconut is estimated at 45,000 and under planitains some 17,000. All other crops together account for a further 21,000 acres. 20. The value of land in Guyana is a function of its proxidrnity to Georgetown andl of the degree of control of water on it. Tannd in the environs of Georgetown has a high value. Apart from that, land suited for rice rwn wni goh onnd drainage and A i rrigaion services has a markpt. vAl l,ip of about IUS$500 per acre if freehold and about half that if it is held on a 25-Vear lease from the Government. 21. Coastal land without dralinage and irrigation has little value. Land in the intermediate savannahs and in the Rapununi district has li-ttle Af anv v1iie- reflerP-n-c the generar infertillty of +he psol and distance from market. Most of the remainder of Guyana's land, the forest lands which accournt for over 80 percent. of fvhe country' sarear has no market value due to the high cost of clearing the jungle, the generally low fertilit+.yr of- +.the soils andl +.th rdt+.nerp f-romm mankets..cz -6- 22. Statistics are not available to indicate the present number and sizes of separate agricultural holdings. The Rice Producers' Association, however, estimated that there were in 1965 45,000 individual rice-growing lamilies with acreages as follows: PerceP.ntg of Rice Size of Holdings Percerntag of Rice Growers (acres) Land Farmed 81 0 -9 42.7 1 '7 -1 I . C 'r 0 ± 7 - 47 ).u 1 50 -99 6.9 1 100 and over 23.6 These figures suggest that about 8,500 growers account for well over half of the rice acreage. As the total nlmlber engaged m ltre is only about 44,000, of whom 14,000 are sugarcane workers, it is clear that mr mnvVr -r An r,,.TnC hc -m r owr, i, G hA na ,1 4_r ni rxn,,'. 4-1 -n o1A Nn+;A a 23~. Tand Jml.ediate'ly abtigon the coast is usuall1y neld freehold or, in the case of existing sugar estates, by license of occupancy at nominal ren ts drg "ITHer Majestyts P1leasure", in rlots oP rougly,- 1 nnacres,th ± C.'.(20 '.tU.. (3., ( CI ± j COLJ C ... C OCI , I ..V. V I.. '.* ±'2'.. .lJ ..L .2.' O L'.'2 (VI.., original basic estate acreage. These lots,known as "the first depth", are usuall-y about UVo riles deep -with a frontage of abC-Ioukt- 1 ,5U 00 yards on the coast road. The first depth lots are, apart from the sugar estates, in most cases otagr.ented, ouen i dil0ng as MIICtnly as -)U0 or1 £11or1 e UVY11 o ', edach V of w1ho1m will have a narrow frontage and a long thin strip running the length of the 24. Land inward frome the first depth is norally non-vested, State-Uw-ned land. That of the second and occasionally third depths is usually held at low rents on 25-year leases with a right of renewal. Land further inland, used mainly for grazing, is normally held on a one-year "permission of occupancy". The occupier is forbidden to piant permanent crops and is subject to eviction by the State at six months' notice without compensation. 25. Freehold land or land leased from the State may be relet to tenants. This is normally confined to the letting of land to grow rice. Most rice growers hold land rented other than directly from the State. Such land is -7- s-ubJec4 4to the Ric FaD,er Q--rit of Tere Or-- n- ce,-- 1 Qff6. M,4 .ULLUJ u U Uil,I~ LA.L UL Z- d17 CLI II 1 Z) IJt~L 4- IJ L _ U j 4 .1 _ 11 . I UIL J1L UWLllC1L ~,t _L7 ,.) *, . LIJ.J. provides that while nominally land is rented for rice growing on an annual b-asi's, the tenannt 'as -virtual ,ly --I------ __-4 __ abolt seclt of posesio se-t to4--I L) L_ , UJl ueid u IId VL .4i U L dJy dAu UIU L4 -LLSU-U eU-L I U.L U)I' Ob z 0S. I u IiU1 S ~ u JU U_ LA the payment of a low fixed rent. The maximum rent chargeable is US$6 per acre, plusn n additional US$4 pe acre for lanld highly maintaiIn!d in respect of drainage and irrigation services. A market exists for the lransf1er of hile tenant-ri ght o f r i t U grlower btIhUUgIh tlhe 1free oUpedrLaiol o1 this market is hindered by restrictions on the tenant's right of transfer. Capital 26. Nearly 30 percent of public sector investment during the 1960ls, some US$29 million out of US$103 million,was in agriculture. The main items were irrigation, drainage and land development which together absorbed US$19 million. 27. The principal private investment in agriculture during the 1960's has been in sugarcane and in farm machinery. The Persaud Coommission cn the Sugar Industry:/ estimated total capital formation in the industry between 1959 and 1966 as US$12.1 million. The industry indicated that since then gross capital formation has been running at around US$3.5 million per annum, suggesting a total investment for the decade of around US$21 million. About two-thirds of this, or US$14 million (being the proporticn of total sugar production accounted for by cane production), was probably in respect of cane production and the balance in respect of sugar manufacturing. Farm machinery investment during the 1960's is esti- mated conservatively at US$15 million of which around US$2.5 million may have again been for sugarcane production. These two items, investment; in sugarcane and in farm machinery together represent rather more than 10 percent of total private capital formation in the decade. 28. Judging from calculations of the incremental capital-output ratio, the returns in terms of increased output for a given investment appear tc, have been lower in the agricultural sector than in the economy as a whole during the 1960's. However, the returns in sugarcane were probably as good as in other sectors. 29. Credit is available to agricultural producers on an ad hoc basis through a number of sources. The corrnercial banks lent US$2.2 mrillion in 1969, compared with US$1.2 million in 1966 (see Table 29). The Guyana Credit Corporation had outstanding loans of US$1.9 million to agriculture in 1968, a figure which had not changed over a number of years. Hire-purchase credit of US$2.1 million was outstanding in 1969 in respect of industrial and agricultural equipment and vehicles. The Guyana Rice Corporation is owed l/ The ConmTission was occasioned by a labor dispute in the industrv. It examuned the working of the industry in depth and reported in 1967. -8- about US$1 million mainly in respect of cultivations done on contract for rice growers; much of this debt was taken over from the defunct Rice Devel- opment Company. The Guyana Cane Farming Development Corporation commenced lending medium-term credit to farmers in 1969 to enable them to put land under sugarcane. The Corporation has agreed to make loans available to farmers in 1970 to prepare and plant a further 2,300 acres of sugarcane. The Guyana Marketing Corporation provides feeding stuffs on credit to farmers. 30. Thus, agricultural credit does not appear to be a seriously limiting factor on production. Possibly the most crucial area is in medium-term credit for land improvement. The Guyana Cane Farming Develop- ment Corporation has commenced to supply such credit for sugarcane land. There remains a need for similar type credit to improve the internal layout of rice farms in order to obtain better water control. Agricultural Policy 31. The objectives of government policy are stated to be: to increase food production in order to feed better an expanding population; to provide more employment in the sector; to generate exports, particularly in a CARIFTA context; to provide more raw materials for processing industries; and to obtain from an expanding agriculture resources to be used for stimulating growth in other sectors. In addition to these primary objec- tives, the Government hopes to diversify agriculture, so lessening the country's dependence on the sugar industry. It is also hoped that much of the agricultural development will take place in the interior, thus opening up these largely untapped resources and creating what is regarded as a strategically important presence in sparsely populated areas. 32. Building up the cooperative movement is at once regarded as a means and as an objective of policy. Cooperatives are regarded as a means of enabling the small man in farminz to produce. buv and sell more efficientlv. They are also regarded as a desirable political objective in themselves, -inasmchts thev- will innrp_se the onnort,irnitAp. for the mass of th npeonple to save and to acquire ownership and control of economic assets, thus diffusing econom,ic power and lessening the counntryvs dependence on foreign capital. 33. Agriculture is regarded by the Government as a primary growth sector- nThose progress ctrill- - -n- - - - r i n or onnar ors This economic strategy stems from the Government's view that the country has abdn Uland reore and fro It recogn UL11~ 0~I I6ition of the, rel1ative-ly poor manufacturing and tourist potential. 34. A brief description of the principal official and quasi-official oIgardlizatiOns in-Volved in Uimplementing policy is given in an Appendix. -9- II. AN ANALYSIS OF RECENT PERFORMANCE PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS Sugarcane 35. IJnderlying the predominance of sugarcane is the crop's superior economic performance: output value per acre is six times higher -than rice; output per man is twice as high and output value per unit of investment is about 50 percent higher than for other agriculture. Despite this, the sugar industry is vulnerable in two important respects: because of its predorminance and because of its centralized control by two expatriate companies, especiallv now that Guyana has become a Co-operative Republic. For both reasons it is argued bv t,he Guvanese that a lessening of deanendence on sugar is desirabLe. Achieving this is unlikely to be easy. 36. The dominance of the sugarcane crop is due less to the amount of resources involved in its nroduction than to the lower nrodsutivity of these resources when used in other forms of agricultural production. Only about 20 nperent. of t.hse 1 ncd farmped in GTuivyna is ui ndepr siuarcanre.nP T.Pqq t.hnn - third of the sector-s labor is employed and an approximately similar propor- Mion of the seo±orts capital formation has been invested in sugareane production. Had labor, capital and land been used as efficiently in other farm enterprises, al ricltral production wonuld now be 50 percent higher and sugarcane would represent less than one-third instead of as at present one-half of' agri c,ii+rall outputt. It appe+ therefor tha th +b. 1 ! chniiorild be on attempting to increase the productivity of resources used in other agri- cvl- tural activities rather than on decreasing even the relative aon. t of those resources used for cane production. 37. The present dominance of sugarcane needs to be considered in relation 4to 4the depe!ndence of 4h- ro'1-olablt on tbemitnne of specic;a 1, U1±t- ~AcfJziLLUJZiiL OJ. Uit- %-LVY- V1O LL~LLL L Iy 0 U1 ilIciIIU,1d. 1 1' 0± pricing arrangements in the export market. Nearly 90 percent of (Guyanals sugar exports go t--c the Tnlt+eA VnAn nor +the U.S.A. Co A rs, ln chno +ceheyr earn considerably more than the balance realizes on the world market. The pattern of" exorts in- _196 asa olo0 TT.-4 4.&. TT..4 4I--A Kingdom States Canada Total Volume (thousand tons) 195 94 44 333 Value per ton (TuS$) 107.5 142.0 68.0 112.5 Total value (US$ millions) 21.0 13.5 3.0 37.5 Source: Guyana Sugar Producers' Association. -10- 38. The dependence of the sugar industry's well-being on these special pricing arrangements is obvious. Both these arrangements could change in the future: in Britain's case because of its possible entry to the European Economic Cormunity; in the U.S. case because of the possible re-entry of Cuba to the lucrative U.S. market. Cuba's former share of the U.S. market is now apportioned among other producers, including Guyana. Clearly until these two issues are resolved an element of uncertainty must surround the future of world sugar trading and the price receivable by Guyana and similarly situated exporters. 39. However, this element of uncertainty can be exaggerated. Even major changes in the British Commonwealth Sugar Agreement and/or in the re-allocation of U.S. import auotas need not necessarily give rise to serious instability in the world sugar market. Provided no abnormally rapid expansion of sugar supDly followed, the global balance of sugar -production/consumDtion/-prices should be substantially maintained, though with local deviations. It is possible, for example, that countries such as Guyana now benefitting from the CSA and U.S. purchases, would suffer a price decline as a result of the revision of existing arrangements. It would appear, however, that should sugar prices decline, Guyana is at least as well placed to meet this eventual- ity as most other nroducers. I)o. The mnssion estiaTtes that, Givnana can prn(ie sugar at a direct cost!/ of about US$80 per ton, or about 3.7 cents per lb. That is to say, the inclustrv cnml d continue ton nnperat-e t an eyPort. nri ce 2 npercent, helow the average realized in 1966 (and considerably below the average realized in any year of the 196p's) or 20 percent above t.he 1969 f'ree market price= Declines in average export prices of this magnitude seem highly unlikely and wouTld only result from a major irir,in+.in-n nf' +.th present global balance 1of sugar production and consumption. Such low average export prices would be irnli -lyir ±to nperslst+. a mny producr whrori-r -hn llke rlrnn nowf.T sell t.ba h1 ik of their exports at well above the "free market" rate, would be quickly forced to reduce production. Even in the worst eventuality therefore, Guyan.' industry is likely to survive better than others. This factor, together with tVhe Shigh.L4. rat-cs of Li in suarcanc coa Sit o.her agrilt actvi ties, suggest prima facie the desirability of expanding Guyanese sugarcane 1l.~~ A-y- deiso on fuvepouto fsgrae wov-ld Alal ne eAd 4-L I-L.tUIy UtL_;L~DLVII 011 LLUULLL c JIU.LLU VJ.U.LJ ilL 1UwdJ 0d.a1l~W. ) LU.±J UVLZCJ.LJ 1±11 to be taken in the light of developments in the world sugar trade in general andu int Wesl tO InIIUaLni tradeL in paIII c-ula. VVUIr±L tutad in1 suga,ru h.as e^and110 very slowly and this trend is likely to continue. But within this fairly 1] That is exclusive of depreciation, pension payments and income tax. -.1- stagnant global picture, there have been remarkable changes in the role, of different producing; regions and individual countries. The situation in relation to the British West Indies is a case in point. ANNUAL AVERAGE NET IMPORTS AND EXPORTS OF SUGAR (thousand metric tons) 1960-62 i966-68 Change (percent) World Net Sugar Import.s 17,860 18jO92 1 Britsi +3 h We+. Tnd+i nr Net Sugar Exports Barbados 150 177 18.0 Jamaica 375 392 4.r5 Leeward and Inland Islands 64 38 -40.6 Trinidacd and Tobago 193 176 - 8.8 Guyana 316 306 - 3.2 TOTAL 1,098 1,089 - 0.8 Source: Sugar Yearbook 1966 and 1968 42. The British West Indies has failed to maintain its share in the world s slowly growing sugar trade. A variety oi reasons, including lana shortage in Barbados, increasing alternative employment in manufacturing and tourism and. concondtant increases in labor costs in Jamaica and in Trinidad and Tobago, the fairly pronounced recovery of production in Guyana from the setback received in the mid-1960's suggest that even within a very slowly growing world trade and an even slower growing or declining West Indies trade in sugar, there is stil scope for a fairly substantial expansion of Guyana's sugar exports in the 1970's. 143. Repeating a point made earlier, it would be wrong at this stage to lessen the dominance of sugar in Guyanese agriculture by halting or slowring expansion of the industry; rather a more diversified agriculture should be sought to the extent that this is practical, through a more rapid expansion of -12- other lines of production. At the same time, it seems highly desirable to insure that such further growth as occurs should as far as possible have the effect of diluting the present high degree of concentration within the industry. This can be achieved in two principal ways, both recommended by the Persuad Commission: by expanding small cane farming and by a high degree of local participation, both public and private, in future investment by the sugar industry. 4L. The creation of the Guyana Cane Farming Development Corporation is a desirable move in the right direction. It has the active support of the two major sugar companies, which welcome farmers' sugarcane as a means of increasing factory throughput. Its presently available resources, financial and human, may not be adequate, however, for the difficult task of expanding on a sound basis the hitherto small acreage of farmerst sugar- cane so as to achieve a desirable level of overall growth and to widen local participation in the industry. Rice 45. Rice is the next most important product after sugarcane in Guyana's agriclilture Ahnlit nnie-q1arter of' a million acres are used for its cultiva- tion and, with considerable double-cropping, upwards of 300,000 acres of rice are harvested annually. )46. There has been very considerable public and private invest+ment in rice production in the 1960's. The results have been disappointing. The average acreage of rice ,-.a 1 as +ia l durini thTnQod1960-62 was 242,510 with an output of 126,700 tons of rice, giving an average yield of 0-.52T t-ons- pe-r a-cre. the Is - yer 4-1-o AthAe d17=6 , -th equivalent data were 282,000 acres reaped, with an output of 125,000 tons of .L ~ ClLLtL 041 OV Z-~Mr± j _~L U-L- ~J± I 414 LAJISO O.UI J, * iIL UI'-' url s.o.-L r t, . rice was grown, a smaller amount was produced. 47. The explanation for the reported very poor performance of the rice crop, despite the large ives ents and the deep publc concern for I ldu is patently complex. An exhaustive analysis of the problems involved was out- slUe t,e lmisioilUn' b upe but a numer Of causalLe fUac tors did bUecome eviuent and have central relevance for Guyanese agricultural development generally. 48. A series of unfavorable seasons may have played a part in reducing yields in recent years. But even in favorable years, yieids are low and hiave tended to decline. Only Ecuador and Brazil have lower yields in South America, while average yields in neighboring Surinam are over twice as high.Il 'FAU Product -1- YenarDook 1968, p. 75. 49. A rapid extension of the rice acreage on to land inadequately serviced by water controls is a frequently quoted explanation for Guyana's low rice yields. However, recent experience of simultaneously declining acreage and yields casts doubt on the validity of this explanation. Further, the Government's land settlement schemes accounted for a 'Large share of thE total acreage increase in the 1960's and, although the standard of water control ancd other services on these schemes was above average, yields on them are below average. 50. Twio points need to be borne in mind in considering the very low overall yield of rice farming in Guyana. First, yields even among good farmers rarely exceed one ton per acre and average around 0.8 tons. This, by the standards of good rice farming in other countries, is low. But second, whi-Le many farmers regularly achieve yields of around 0.8 tons, the average yie-Ld in recent years has been 0.)45 tons per acre. Clearly there are in Guyana many farmers whose yields fall far below those achieved by good farmerS. Not only do the very low yields of poor farmers depress the national average, but the circumstances which give rise to the existence of many inefficient rice farmers also depress the performance of good farmers. 51. A number of technological factors cause even good rice farmers in Guyana to adhere to a low-yielding technology. For example, there is wide- spread use of varieties which are Lmresponsive to fertilizers, have maximum yields of aboout one ton per acre under good conditions, but are capable of giving some return umder adverse conditions. The varieties used are late maturing and are not conducive to double-cropping. Their long eroxijng season makes it possible for wild "red rice" to mature with the sown crop, reducing the oualitv and val-ue of the harvested sample through the presence of this undesirable species. 52. Inadequate drainage and irrigation, however, is the most important dPte.Prren-.t to the introductio+inn of a hpt.tPr riceP tePhnolon v_ The most imnortant single factor in explaining the wide gap between the high output per acre on the sugar estates and the low outniut elsewhere, on land of similar aualitv. is that on the former there is effective water control and on the latter control is, ineffective. 53. Effective water control :1s techn-icaly 1 Ir rli ffiM mlt to ac-hreve under Guyanese conditions where most of the farmed land is below sea level. Ihere have as well been technical defect in the design of dralinage and irrigaion schemes, resulting in silting which has impeded drainage, and inadequate T.Te+Yr cs lp-nl JC ;n 1rTn-c' n(n 'k,CnT.LT irc t fr -nell C. UCJw LI ~ w e - JL J -v. E, - - - - - - - -1h- 5h. The Drainage and Irrigation Division of the Ministry of Public Works and Hydraulics provides the main drainage and irrigation canals. Land between the main canals frequently suffers from inadequate access to these. Additionally, individual paddy fields are inadequately graded to achieve uniform coverage with available water supplies. There is some confusion and disagreement among growers themselves and between growers and the Drainage and Irrigation Division as to when water is to be applied and where. The absence of a uniform cropping timetable renders the work of the Drainage and Irrigation Division in managing water resources particularly difficult. 55. Budgeted exDenditure by the Drainage and Irrigation Division during the six years 1964-69 was US$4.7 million. Actual expenditure over that period amounted to US$3.2 million or just two-thirds of the budgeted expenditure. The Drainage and Irrigation Division estimates that the budgeted amount is recuired for the nroner f1nctAioni-nn onr] dq]n1t,e. mnnintern-nnc. of itts various schemes. Over a long period, only two-thirds of the amount budgeted has been snent,- win suggests that the schpTmps have not. bhen adequately mnintained and thus not able to function properly. 56. The Guyanese Rice Marketing Board, the sole buyer of rice in the corntrv_ rpd1cirpi the price it paid for rice in the 1966 and subsequent market- i-c seasons following losses incurred in previous years' operations. The price was redudpri from an averageP of TjqtR._Q to UTS7qn p per 180 lb Tbag of rice, weighted according to the intake of rice of various qualities in the 1965/66 season. It was argued at thatntme that the effect would be to compel farmers to improve their husbandry and thereby increase yields and output of better qualitry rice Events have not borne this out so far; both acreage and yields per acre declined sharply. (Prices had previously been changed in the 10( 1(9 season, r-eult+-ing in an average rise nof iu-; 1r -cen-+; acreage and, - - -6 - -- C - - ---~ -- J - 24 El ..U0 to a less pronounced extent, yields increased subsequently.) It seems plausible in view of the predominance of relatv+-ely large-scale grow-rs ThT +1igh variabl costs in the form of hired labor and machinery that rice production in Guyana s-ox± d respond positiVely to Tprlce change. It is probablea thereforx, that the reduction in the rice price has been an adverse effect on production. 57. Coupled with the reduction in price there has been a reorganization _, r :_m s 1 _ : AJ_ 1-} _ - _ -5 _ 1 4_ 1, - _) 4 __ - A 01U lie vilt lU-U- PITUarjl t: E-11p, 'DOUa:rd-W-U - W -LIW r-teb -Ul ted 11 W1 i-:in:lv USvC tvn 01 Ullt: 1x | C Producers' Association being removed from it. Many growers complained that the present position where a monopoly p-uciiasiig board without producer representation had cut the price of rice and was generating substantial surpluses above costs was not such as to instill confidence in growers or to induce them seriously to attempt to increase production. 58. Although some effort has been made in the introduction of higher- yielding, quicker maturing varieties from the United States - notably the variety Bluebelle - resistance to the introduction of these varieties is widespread, on the grounds that although when fertilized and grown under favorable conditions they yield better, the increased yield is frequently -15- inadequate to offset the increased cost of production. Experiments with International Rice Research Institute varieties are also in process, with some strains being used for crossing to develop new varieties suitable for local growing and marketing conditions. 59. Inadequate water control and the high incidence of "blast" militate against the introduction of higher yielding, quick maturing varieties. Slow growing varieties make the control of "red rice" difficu-Lt, which in turn reduces the value of the produce. These factors, together with the reduction in price and the removal of producerst representatives from the RN3- partly account for the continuing low average rice yield in Guyana and for the decline in that *iedl. in recent vears. Attention is now Hirectedi to faetors which appear to cause many growers to fail to exploit the potentials everL of' the prevailing poor tercinology 60. T'he tenure syvtem is conducive to many continuing to farn a larger acreage of rice than they might otherwise. The Rice Farmers (Security of Tznirmy) Orrdi nance fixes low madm1.m- rents for rice land and assures posses- sion subject to the payment of these low rents. Two important consequences are to be e1 - ,ected. First, nT.frners or +Cnant-fvi lef' T.rho through -or ineptitude or because they have other interests, are unable to grow good rice c'TCrops w.ill i inA it - c + c im-Tr more potl to g-rowr-r p -o,or -rice c ;han to rent out some or all of their land at low rents on irrecoverable leases to personS more comPetent or.r better posi oned to do so. Indeed, in +h virtual absence of land taxes, the prospect of capital appreciation can make i4 m or aI tu 1;o 4 leave good Jand. id-Le mothaanac4 . to ren itO n a vu11al irrecoverable lease at a low rent. 61. Tenants who have rice larnd rented are encouraged to retain it provided- A 4hev- in. twUL n c an obta.in - ULa sUI 4.. fo it L ±cLenJ Lt 4Uo cover t]e low fixed rents. That the surplus required to pay the legally fixed rents is easilay U a-LIIeU _Ls _L1iULUUaLAU by ithe efXiALbe1UU Uof a cladestUfi L I ne mar'k'1..et in. such tenancies. It is reported that although illegal and difficult to cDnceal, utenantd±us dU trLan1sfe1 irJf.liIldlly ,d.L±U b,y de-ViLULL I10 U11ous1 mntILr tn Lnt lgt, frequently for subs-tantial considerations. 62. The high degree of mechanization in a situation of large-scale rural unemnploymient, -which is characteristic of Guyanese rice-growin1g, ls one obvious aspect of the rigidities introduced by rent and tenancy controls. Wages in rice-growing tend to be detenfLned by the level obalnilng in the more productive sugarcane growing, prec:Luding intensive use of hired labor. At the same time, controls discoulrage occupiers from rentbing land s-urplus to whjat they can handle with their own or family labor. These circumstances are conducive to holding land, using relatively iittie iabor on it and niring or owning -16- relatively large amounts of machinery. Even small growers, who have no desire to work in the paddy-fields themselves, prefer to hire machinery to do the work than to rent their land to others who would be prepared to do this work. Tne common resort to machinery in a situation of high unemploy- ment is an apparent misuse of resources. 63. The non-collection of drainage and irrigation charges has much the same effects as the fixing of low rents. The exaction, in the form of drainage and irrigation charges, of the full cost of water control would require those to whom the services are made available either to use them efficiently or to make way for those who can. 64. A number of Land Settlement Schemes, of which the most important are Anna Regina/Tapakuma and Black Bush, have come into production in recent years. In addition to water control, further investment in housing, roads, etc., took place on these schemes. Settlers were generally selected because of their economic needs and not because of their likely competence as rice growers. Their performance as rice growers has been poor, and because they account for a substantial proportion of the total rice acreage, they are a factor in depressing the national average yield. They have fallen heavily into arrears on current costs of the Land Settlement Schemes and have paid nothing towards their capital cost. 65. It is clear from the above that the problems of Guyanese rice grow- ing are complex and deep rooted. In addition to the technological and price factors such institutional factors as rent controls, the mode of selection of settlers cn land schemes and the failure to exact the cost of water control are conducive to the widespread failure to exploit even the prevail- ing limited technological and price possibilities. Placing the industry, which is the way of life of a large segment of the Guyanese population and which is the best immediate prospect of diversifying the agricultural sector from its hitherto extreme dependence on sugar, on a sound efficient basis calls for a thoroughgoing reorientation. 66. Such a reorientation should halt the decline in production of recent years and make possible at relatively little cost an expansion of output to meet a fairly buoyant domestic and export demand. Domestic rice consumption is expected to increase from 40,000 tons in 1968 to 55,000 in 1975. Exports to CARIFTA countries, at relatively high negotiated prices, are likely to increase from 56,OOO tons to 96,000 tons over the same period, and it should be possible to maintain exnorts to other markets. in the Caribbean and West Africa, at the 1968 level of 40,000 tons. This would give _l_ n 1- n tntal outlet fnr ahout 190,000 tons of rise in 1975. comnared with an actual average annual output of 125,000 tons in the period 1967-69. This -17- increased output should be attainable with modest additional capital inFuts, providing present resources are utilized more effectively. 67. The key elements to improved performance in the rice industry, in the light of the above analysis, would appear to be: a. the development through research of a better rice-growing technology applicable to Guyanese conditions; b. eff'ective water control; and c. policies to encourage the shift of productive resources into the hands of those best able t1o use them. Action may also be Dossible to improve the quality and marketing of rice s,o as to incre!ase its ex-farm value. 68. Present developments at the Mahaicony-Abary Rice Development; Station (MARDS) promise results upon which an improved, more Droductive rice technologv will be macde available. It is planned to spend US$1.5 million between 1970 and 1972 on facilities for breeding, testing and propagating new varieties. It is also intendecd to carry out large-scale trials on water control, fertili- zing and other husbandrv asnects. Achieving the other essential elements of reorganization will be much more complex and difficult. 69. A more effective pricing system for the provision of drainage and irrigntAnn fqc-iii tis -is requiLred. This hinges unon nnmrpl1irng those WilOn occupy land benefitting from these services to pay for their cost, provLded t.hisz ls le~z s than t;he benefits w-l acu rom ther fflcient. utl.i1iro7n+.)n Such a policy would have the dual merits of compelling a better utilization of existi f i and provide source a the inctiv to impove thesQa facilities. Additional water control services should only be provided if the beneflts tlhe-Yyiiel(ld exceed their econom-ic cos-t. t70r A--- A-lch efficientrU4r ala4-n__ a__t uti of-4 4 and irgt- 4-, Litl... JLiLi UtJ t J.L...A S _. L Lt4LL _LiuEt. L± t, CL U.LI i l'. . UL LiLIi*U ~ _LLLL6 U ~ i LC ~ ~ e within the main system provided by the Drainage and Irrigation Division could be tackled by one or m-ore of the- -Pol-loe.r0 cn meanvs: a. g iivi n ginternal land occupie-r the -t-rti ri- nght to onstrt wa-ter channels through intervening land; b. reorganizing holdings so that all individual lots have access c. requ±a-iri n JJ±h-UDainage and Irrigation i-vision to asswlu responsibility for internal drainage and irrigation channels. -18- 71 The direction of available resources into the most competent hands can be achieved by a greater reliance on the pricing system. The extraction of the full cost of water control, at least to the point where this is less than the benefits to efficient users, will compel those who cannot pay to m7ke aJOIT forM more efficien+t -r-Tr ers. 72. Existing rent cntrol legiislation needs to be changed so as to make it more attractive to those who hold land and are unable or unwilling to make effective use of it to rent Tt to those who can. It is also necessary to increase the economic pressure on those who already rent land Liu t are no longer ablue orL__ LIlngt use it effLectiveliy, 4to s edr5 or a portion of it to those who can. 73. Change in rent control legislation might be complemented by incr-easing lanu Uaxes. Along -with the suggested improved colec t-in of drainage and irrigation charges, these would put added pressure on ineffi- cient land o-w-ners to pass on portions of their lan-Sd to more efficient tenants. The combination of higher land taxes, water control charges and hiLgher ren1ts wouldU a't) once creatue greater press- e and iore atUUracti--e inducements for the more efficient allocation of land among rice growers. Such an allocation would result for the most part irn co-mpete-nt growers increasing their present acreage and less competent ones decreasing theirs. It is unlikely that more than a small number oI very inefficient growers would be forced, or find it more profitable, to abandon rice growing. 74. It should be recalled here that one objective of the Government's agricultural policy is 'to provide from agriculturai production such economic surpluses as can be invested in other sectors of the economy". The practice of supplying water control facilities below cost runs counter to this objec- tive. Recovery of the full cost of this service coupled with a land-tax (to accompany a rational land tenure system) provides the most effective means of mobilizing the economic surplus of agriculture for use in other sections. 75. The development of an improved rice technology and the suggested changes in the tenure and water control systems should make it easier for the small, efficient rice grower to progress. But much more can be done to assist and encourage him. The suggested increase in land taxes provides a source of funds some of which can be effectively re-directed back to the sector in the form of credit and extension services to small efficient farmers capable of making good use of them. 76. The Rice Marketing Board sells portions of its supplies on the domestic market above the world price. It also sells on Caribbean markets at high negotiated prices for limited quantities (see Table 11). The balance is disposed of in other markets at current world prices. 77. It is economically sound for the RMEB to generate surpluses equivalent to the excess it earns by selling rice on the domestic .nd Caribbean markets al higher than world prices, so that the price to growers is appro amately equivalent to the Board' s marginal reven.ue from sales at world prices.V The surpluses which are at present used partly 4to sub1s4iu4z(a inefficl--;ent prokducers 4th,rou-gh the, rachiner cotrc -services4 -- u U L L U -JLL* LI- 4 ±J LLLL c)iLLLU u I I0 L~1j. I L.lL U 11iC %,1_LLIiU±J U.O 0±V4~ of the Guyana Rice Corporation could be used more effectively, again by prov ei . VVce o eiL _: UJ.ViUc IIIdLL uue * £11 D U.!. ULL required for the pwuchase of better seeds, fertilizers, the hire of machinery anu, especial'ly, thUe gradWL1 of pady filds. he retorati of growers! representation on the Board should contribute to the acceptance of such a prlclng and resoUi-(-c allocatlion polcy o-nI the part of the nice I iarketlng Board. 78. The sudden increase in free market sales, from 3,000 tons in -intl m I~~~~n n 2.. , n r', --- - In nn~n t.. -.. nintl 1 … U.. - O.. . 2 19O64 GO L4UJOOU in 1965 andiLU Uo uuu 6U20) t Los InUu Iflay hiave UeLI a faUUUr in1 depressing returns from this marke1. A more orderly flow of supplies to the free market should enable Cuyana to get higher prices there. Such a more orderly flow would result from an improved technology, characterized by less year-to-year fluctuations in yields and acreage. Additionally, the ERB might marginally influence free market sales by accepting the need for compensating stock changes. 79. Rice quality should also improve as a result of better growing technology, which would reduce the incidence of "red rice" and pest damage. There may be a case for reviewing existing quality differentials with a view to widening these and so increasing incentives to growers and millers to supply better rice to the RMB. Additionally, it may be desirable to provide credit to growers and millers to enable them to improve disease and pest control, drying and milling facilities. 80. Payment by the RMEB of a seasonally uniform price for milled rice is an incentive to mill paddy immediately after harvest. This involves loss in a number of ways. First, there is probably a tendency to over-use milling capacity immediately after harvest to mill and sell to the RMEB as soon a.s possible, so as to cash the crop and to sell to the Board before it beccmes overstocked with milled rice. This is likely to lead to poorer quality milling and to some loss of product. Second, more rice is held in milled form - its only marketable form - 'by the RMB, the millers and the growers than is required to meet market requirements. As milled rice is niore perishable than paddy, avoidable losses occur in storage. Third, there is also likely to be deterioration of the rice bran, a highly perishable commodity. Finally, this system undermines the Government's aim of provid- ing a guaranteed price to growers. As the guaranteed price applies only to milled rice and the RM3B is unable to take up all the I/ The RMTO3 1968R snrpls of US$'13 million appron±mqtely equalled the difference between the value of govermment-to-government contract sals r.Tnt. +.ad a th same woni1 h1 beni real -i z.edr i f l at r I +r non-c'n-ra)+. lr,,i prices. (See Tables 10 and 11) -20- milled rice offered to it at harvest time, growers, who are normally short of cash and probably also storage space, are forced to sell paddy at a discount to millers who can afford to hold it pending sale to the RMB. 81. Government, with financial assistance from USAID, hopes to improve rice quality through a rice development program, the main feature of which is the erection of six storage facilities with a capacity of 60,000 tons of paddy. This will enable the Guyana Rice Corporation, which will control the facilities, to nurchase and store in npddv form all of the rice likely to be offered for sale at harvest. The cost of the new storage facilities is esti-mated at nearly TS$10 million. Particijiarlr in view nf Gul-q-yana's declining rice output - production in 1969 was 111,000 tons compared with i6t()on( ton-, in 19tc - it. ^rTniuld nnnpar dreirbhle to. rcnsider nihln alternative methods of avoiding the losses occasioned by carrying excess st.oPks of' rilledi rice and bran 82. A possible alternative means of reducing present. losses is by the introduction by the RMB of seasonally variable prices for rice. The seaoiranl nri rP ITA-ri pt.i on cn1il r' lhp ni ±.r t.o pr.cl,lrp t.nt. t.Thp TRnrr i.Tnn rdI never be required to take up more milled rice than was needed for normal trading pnp-oses. In addition to possible gains from improved quality, the RMB would be saved the cost of financing unnecessarily large rice stocks and rmuch of its present storag-+e cnapaci n A be e-aed nit to millers (including the Guyana Rice Corporation) for paddy storage. These gin- -A savngr- o n-rl enable t B-o -A +n -, pay -a higr -eiht+eA otroragn price than its present uniform one. 83. Sufficiently wide seasonal price variations would of themselves ensure a desired flow o,f sales to th,-e DUl-. However itu- is- -POSible that due to acute shortage of funds on the part of millers and growers, unaccep- tabOly Tv-vride seaosoncall pric e var-iain ri-- Jght be reured. Thi prblm r_ W.W LWA.j/ V EWS OaOW-'.WaA. H LWIC V c). LaUA.JI,o .WIUJ..a - U L' A. C-4WA.. I C/A. IlU . A - o/C I 33 -..-A be overcome by the provision of credit to millers, rice-growing cooperatives andU lar.g e,/Z- I gL ower1 /JL'JI ZtLagainst paduuy s UU Consid euLLLratU-Lioll mLight U s beo given to the provision of credit to these to improve the quality of existing stuorage capacit-y. 8X. The variu-us meas-ures o-utllned in the paragraphus above may be a more effective and less costly way of achieving improvement in the quality and free market price of Guyanese rice than the present rice development program. They, or some variation of them, appear worthy of consideration. Coconuts 85. Coconut plantations are located on a number of narrow sand reefs running parallel to the coast. hnere has been no increase in production over a number of years. Dbmestic production of coconut oil is inadequate for the countryis requirements. Imports in 1967 were US$148,000. There were additionally US$208,000 imports of other vegetable oils and oilseeds. -21-- 86.= It is government policy to holdn the ons.mer nrice of edibFle nils, particular:Ly coconut oil, as low as possible. Following this policy, `-he Guyana Mrk]eting Corporation has a monopoly of oil imports and incurs losses on its edible oil trading, equival]ent to about I percent of its turnover. The price of omil is fulrthe.r h.eld Adow,n byr the gene-ral p-rohibition of -opra and coconut oil exports. All locally-produced copra is sold to two local processling pat t1 5Gyns et e od rc hc a obtained fDr the past six years. Producers believe that if exports were 4CreelJy per-4tLted tLh1ey could realiz.e igher prices, 4ugh- the a4ve f . o -. . price of copra at present is only about 16.5 Guyanese cents per pound. 87. Growers complain that apart from the low price of copra, the 4n duS 4-y-y 4s adverse-ly aPffectedb the laren of- nuts, 4inadequate dalnage .LIUL U .L,y ~ .1. dL Ul OC) .J d.L.I.-L C U IiCLL U Uiy tlC -LCt LUCLi,y I± LILt UD, LLIIOLUC'4LLc IUC U. l~ , and by tariffs on insecticides. The latter are necessary for the control of pestLs -W 'L i/ich cause ser-ious d'o u0LUge tLUo tIrees andU are -a major fa Iin hoUlding down production. Other Crops 88. A wide range of other crops is grown. These are mainly vegetables and fr uit S for direct h-umIan consuw--ptIlon; togetiher, they- acc:ount for abcut 10 percent. of agricultural sector output. The small local market and t-ide- spread larceeny mrdilita-te against expansion. Climatic conditions make it difficult if not impossible for local producers to compete with imports of a number of temperate zone vegetables and fruits whicn are importecd in fairly substantial quantities, such as potatoes, onions and cabbage. A small amount of maize is grown, mainly for human consumption, but most of the maize used for livestock feeding is imported. 89. There are few longer term possibilities of expanding crops ot;her than sugarcane ancd rice. With respect to maize, sorghum and soybeans, t,here should be continuing and more intensive research on the development of high yeilding varieties adapted to Guyanese conditions, and the development of appropriate husbandry techniques. But results available to date clearly indicate 1;hat unless and until much higher yields are obtained, little expansion of outputt of these crops can be expected. 90. Despite the negative indications from past research, a recently for-med govermrnent enterprise, Global Agri-Inclustries Limited, plans to grow, maize on the intermediate savannah, commencing in 1970. The company intends to use 'modern large-scal.e agricultural techniques" to harvest four crops every 13 months. It expects to get 191,600 tons of grain from the four crops on 22,500 acres. This represents an output of 8.5 tons per acre over a 13-month period, or approximately 7.8 tons of grains per acre per annum. This is an extremely ambitious venture in the face of uncertain prospects for growing maize economically in Guyana. A pilot project on a much reduced scale, and viewed as part of a continuing program of crop research, would appear to be a more appropriate line of approach. -22- 91. Priority in the allocation of public funds should at the present stage also go to research on feedstuffs production rather than to the stimulation of pig production, as in the case of the GMC's provision of credit to pig producers (see b1elow paragraph 113). Only if Guyana solves the problems of providing low-cost feed can it hope to create an efficient, Cattle 92 L. G ~ uYanaLICL, deLspi Ui t UlaJ rge ~ I UaL V to U L popu.La LUL Jti, adiI d. Ja lo per capita consumption, is a net importer of beef. Production has been LL e1±1t:d:11 D UJL|y, UULlIUI1F PULUHI 1D iL8J11.Ij' D1d.L CU1 dIIU J-lllPUl UL' II1UIu LU l d0 [ b | | (see Table 5). Recent production levels appear to have been achieved at the cost of a run dow-n of the national herd, -which is about one-q-uarter million cattle, and average slaughter weights have declined. 93. There are three main forms of cattle production in Guyana. First thlere is extensilve ranching in the savannah area of the -Rupunuril in soutnwe3t Guyana, where about one-fifth of the total cattle population is located. Ranches are few and larger in area; one organization, the Rupununi Development Company, owns some 60 percent of the cattle in the area. The land is poor, with a present stockirng of about teLn to t-welve head per square mile. This fact, coupled with the high cost of air transport into and out of the Rupununi - US4.5) per pound - limits investment. A further factor hampering the develop- ment of cattle production in this region is the incidence of foot-and mouth disease, infection being likely to occur from neighboring Brazil. Additionally, the flight from the area and abandonment of properties by a number of the ranchers, following a recent abortive rebellion, has caused a setback. 94. Land in the ltupununi is held at low rents on one-year license of occupancy from the Government. In practice this land has been ranched on similar terms since the beginning of this century and no case is known of renewal of a license of occupancy being refused to an occupier or his heirs. However, some uncertainty on this account appears to have arisen among ranchers since Guyana became independent and this may also be a factor in slowing development. Production in the Rupununi is characterized by a low production rate, very slow maturation - the normal finishing age being five-six years - and by an extraction rate of about 10 percent. Cattle are slaughtered adjacent to the Lethem Airfield and the meat is flown to the Georgetown market- Producers get USU21 per pound carcass weight, which price is partly made possible by a subsidy of US/2 per pound on the UsiI.5 air freight cost. 95. A second form of cattle production is by a small number of com- mercial ranches in the coastal area. These are located, for the most part, in the land behind the rice and sugar-growing areas in the Abary river basin. The pastures are normally flooded during rainy seasons, with some drier areas at higher elevations. Of the approximately 100,000 acres of land in the Abary area capable of being ranched, about 20,000 acres an at present being used. Although productivity from these ranches is at present low, some improvement is taking place and the area has pot;ential for higher output. 96. The third form of cattle production is that practised by a number of small cattle-owners resident on t;he coast. These account for the bulk of the country's cattle-and-beef-production. This form of cattle production is characteristically non-commerical. There is little relationship between the number of cattle a person owns and the land he has available for grazing. Herds, of an average size of 11-12 head, are grazed in common, on roadways and on unoccupied land, particularly saline marshlands, and on rice-land after harvesting. When grazing is scarce, especially during the rice-growing season, cattle are moved further inland to graze the State-owned marsh savannahs. This form of cattle production has mnajor defects. There is no form of pasture management, or attempt at relating stocking to available pasturage; as the grazing is for the most part common, the individual cattle-owner gains nothing from limiting his stock as this simnly leaves more grazing for his neighbors' cattle, with no significant benefit to his own. Disease and parasite control is difficult if not impossible, as is likewise the pursuit of a systematic breeding policy. The fact that the cattle are, for the most part, grazing inundated pastures results in heavv calf losses due to drowning as well as other causes. The larceny of cattle, to which the communal grazing system readily lends itself, has always been a serious problem and annears to be becoming more acute. 97. There are a number of possible approaches to improving cattle pro- duction in Guvyana, epreciallv in the coastal areas. The extensivP area avail- able and the small number of production units involved suggest the Rupununi as a prommsing cattle area as w.Tell, although the problems alreayr mentioned - poor land, distance from supplies and market, and the incidence of foot-and-mouth disease - have to be surmounted for its development. Thlis situation could change if the proposed road to Lethem is constructed, although neither the cattle producing nor+ the agricUl'tural potent al of the Rupununl would , of temselves, +Uu+i fJ +he building of this road. Moreover, any movement of live cattle would incur seri- ous di sease control costs a-nd risk-s. OR then. coasta:l cattle lndustr-y suggets the need tc treat with extreme caution plans to expedite the moving of live cattle from the! --4''1 4to 4the coast. Tndeed it appar 4ihl deiabetoraciat -h boning plant at Lethem so as to fly out only boned beef. This would have! the dual IaIavantae 4 of- gretl lessnln -4 rls of speain foo-andl-m,ou4th in- fection to the coast and of reducing transport costs. The bones, if processed, woULLLd adLso suppAlJ.Yr locally needed fetllizes. LI Th L prsntIIu 0LUb ULI Uonb:ee air-freight from Rupununi to Georgetown reduces the incentive to ship boneless beef. 99. Elsewhere in Guyana the most promising line of cattle development appears to be a cabz±e project at present' uanuer cons'uera'blon. Injs en-visages the supply of credit to the small number of existing commercial cattle ranchers to enable them to expand operations. Its more important element, however, is -2L- the creation of a number of group ranches embracing a large proportion of the non-commercial cattle-owners on the coast, placing their cattle under centralized control on ranches further back from the coast, fencing the grazing area and clearing patches of higher land and sowing these to pasture to provide grazing and safe calving grounds during the flooded rainy seasons. The success of the project will depend to a very large extent on the willing- ness of herd owners to surrender their cattle to group ownership and control, and, thereafter, on the competence and firmness of the project management. 100. Many small coastal owners may remain outside this project, in which case there would continue to be two highly dissimilar forms of cattle produc- tion on the coastal belt. One, a relatively small number of commercial ranches, including the existing ones and the group ranches which are envisaged under the project; the other would be the large number of small herds operating outside the proposed group ranches. 101. Even if many small producers consign their cattle to the proposed group ranches a large number will continue to operate as at present. It is therefore worthwhile considering means by which this more traditional system of cattle production could be improved. Two approaches are suggested. Cattle are at present moved from the coast to inland areas during periods of pasture shortage. But, in the Reneral absence of controlL, cattle-owners complain of high losses, due to mortality and larceny among their cattle when they are located in these more distant areas, away from their homes. It would appear worth investigating the possibility of providing better, more closely controlled seasonal grazing facilities in these inland areas. What is envisaged here is a modification and improvement of the existing system. 102. A possible approach might be for government or local authorities to fence in and subdivhide grazing land inland from the coast and capahle of providing grazing at periods when this is scarce in the more popular grazing areas close to the omn.ers' homes. Cattle would be accepted into these pub- licly controlled grazing areas subject to a fee and other appropriate conditions. The fee collected should substantially, at least, cover the costs involved; the likelihood of their doing so should be a key condition in deciding upon the provision of these servric_es. 103. It 1-s st-ressed th-1at1 cons-ide--a-"on of the cretio of agistment areas should not be allowed to jeopardize the success of the proposed cattle project by presenting it to Guyanese cattle-owners as a comlpeting altenLative . The development of grazing areas should only take place after the lapse of s-affIlcient time to ensure that all those likely to participate in the proposed project will have done so. loL. A second approach to improving the existing small scale cattle pro- duction on the coast is through a more determined effort to reduce, if not eradicate, larceny. Widespread larceny of coconuts, vegetables, fruits and live- stock is a much cited impediment to the more rapid development of agriculture in Guyana. 105. The prevalence of predial larceny reflects no doubt deep--seated nc.i,l attit,mdes to nronprty; and the rate of econonic progress in general will to a large extent be determined by the pace and extent to which the se attitudes change- e- howevr it. mqv bh possibhI to t+ke some concrete action to curb the larceny of cattle and other livestock. Proper corntrol of `the gJraz.ng arena shoul-d1 rrlueduce or elimina+nn t.hp larcenyv ,'f r__t._ __ when in these areas. More vigorous police action, closer scrutiny of viLlage slaughteirhouse +and a m st niYrArin . ,dilicil atti+ud r e caz lled fnr- -if not to redress the wrong of the indiviclual owner whose livestock is stolen, then to create con tio. S r^.0ore fa fo-or-abl I r invstr om-mn+ in andr raio,nal ne I rln77ca I,nmnn+. of the Guyanese livestock industry. 106. It is stressed that the possible provision of communal grazing areas anCd .bet tUer controlU ofL larceny are almed at 4L L4 tradltional pattern of small-scale cattle production on the coastal belt, which in one form or another ----- bund to pe:rsist. They are apprache -ich are unlikely to bring immediate or spectacular results, but if properly executed tihey shOUL U. iLVe re s0LUl0 Uo a p-L I:LI=LI U n1d1 I a 0.11U CtU Vel y LitLeUUL c,osU. Dair-yinf, 107 ( . Ihis1Lb, a, LLn mlUbo UfcU-u tjrle, ls a. bIIU.LL-L ilcll LLndubsU p.duclnLIg at a high cost for a narrow market. The GMC, which has a legal monopoly of rm.ilk-pasturization and sale in Guyanai hanles less than one million gallons yearly. It incurs losses equivalent to about 11 percent of its sales. Production costs are high because of tjhe low milk output of lhe indigenous cow stock, or, where improved stock are introduced, the cost of these, t,heir relatively poor performance and short life under tzropical conditions, anda the need to feed them liberally with expensive food to obtain moderate yields. AdditionalLy, there are difficult problems in maintaining milk at an accept- ably high quality for any prolonged period in Guyana's climate. The purchasing power of the local market is such that it can only absorb a small quantity of liquid milk at local high costs of production. 108. Improvements can, no doubt, be made in production methods which would reduce costs, and, as income increases, demand for liquid milk will also increase. But both of these forces are unlikely, in the foreseeable future, to result in a major expansion of the liquid milk industry. 109. The replacement of dairy produce imports by local production may offer a possible means of development. But the production of these frcm local milk would greatly increase their cost. The present plans of the GMC seem sounder: these are to produce evaporated milk locally, using imported milk fat and skim-milk powder. Pigs and Ploultry 110. The numiber of pigs in Guyana is reported as having increased from 50,000 in 1963 to around 80,000 in 1968. The country is virtually self-sufficient in pigmeat, hams being the only remaining import of significance. The GMIC is -26- the principal outlet for pigs and is the sole producer of bacon, hams and nickldri nork. Tt. nprcnh2sed over 5;00o pigs in 1908 fnr a tont.a1 cnost of US$172,000. It incurred operating losses amounting to about 5 percent of -it+s tu,rnoverdrc on pimet 111. The GMC has recently begun actively to encourage pig-production by the supply of foodstuffs on credit to groups of pig-producers loosely organ- members appears to be low and the extension of credit is likely to result in l-osses. 112.C * ElUUU UctULI UofI ,UL Ul anIUt 0 tjJ)tcII d egg appeaLr tV hav epndeLIdL mor e rapiLLy and more soundly than pigs. Poultry numbers have increased from 2.5 million to over 0 IILL±ion andL the valueL o otu TTCfom r) toU.--iion between 196L and 1969. The better performance of poultry is attributed to a better technology practised by a smaaller n-umber of larger units and to the better feed conversion rates achieved by poultry. The latter point is import- ant in Guyana where feed is expenslive and riiduch of it is imS-,-ported. 113. The point seems worth making that pig or poultry production based on imported feedstuffs, at best adds relatively little to GNP. Under good manageriientL anduL hLusbaUndry UUIditlons, LIIU Va d oIU f UtIh prdIULt Pis {± -L ly moiUirl than 25 percent in excess of the cost of the purchased foodstuffs. When good management and husbandry conditions do not obtairn, as is frequently the case in Guyana, the value of the product can very easily drop below the cost of purchased inputs, resulting in a decrease in GNP. Pig and poultry production can very readily be stimulated by official action, such as the easy provision of feedstuffs on credit by the GIVIC; it is an altogether more difficult task to bring about an economically worthwhile expansion of those enterprises. buch expansion has been taking place with poultry, though with a minimum otf official intervention or encouragement. Forestry 114. Although 70,000 out of Guyana's total area of 83,000 square miles are under forests, timber's contribution to the economy is extremely small. Forestry production accounts for about 7 percent of total agricultural sector output, or 1.6 percent of GDP; it accounts for 2.6 percent of agricultural sector exports and for about 1.5 percent of total exports. Timber output has remained virtually static over a number of years. The main explanation for forestry's small contribution is the generally poor commercial quality of the forests. 115. Guyana's forests are characterized by extreme heterogeneity and by the small size of most trees. As many as 15 and commonly L0 - 50 different species are found in an acre of forestland. Only a small number of these species can, under present conditions, normally be exploited commercially; these are purple- heart, greenheart and, to a lesser extent, wallaba. A forest survey, which has already covered most of the countrv's forest reserve has, so far as it has progressed, confirmed the heterogeneous nature of these resources. The first -27- phase of the survey, which is being executed with assistance from the United Nations, ends in 1970. It is intended to continue the survey to cover all the country's forest land. 116. The heterogeneity of the forests implies that the commercially valuable species are sparsely interspersed with other commercially unattractive trees so that the yield from any acreage of forest worked is small. The Guyana Timber Company, a subsidiary of the Commonwealth Development Corporation, is at present harvesting about 125 cubic feet, or 2.5 tons, of commercial timber per acre of forest worked. This low yield of commercial timber increases the unit cost of recovery, particularly in relation to road and track building. The Company, which is the largest timber company now operating in Guyana, is at present incurring heavy losses in its logging and sawmilling operations which are cnly offset by the profits from its timber fabrication operations. 117. T'he situation tends to worsen with time. This is because the most accessible stands of the commercially valuable species are worked out arid it has become necessary to press further into the forests to obtain fresh stands. The increasing distance that has to be covered and the additional road-miaking costs make extraction increasingly less attractive. 118. Their generally small size is the main obstacle to exploiting species nt,her thnn arpmnhPirt.. nirnleRheart and w nllnhn. The nntulrp of' cf snopn.i . precludes the use of the outer sapwood, which is subject to rapid decay once the trees are cut. The result is that t,h.lereas in the case of greenheart, whose sapwood can be used, there is a 55 percent recovery of lumber from the log, in thei ot.her snpcleis thp normnl recovrv il 35 npercent. 119. There are a number of possible approaches to the problem of the heterogeneity and -the small tree size of Guyana's forests. One, which the F'orestry- niil,-. -' ~W ~ IfesX :d xrlson of the ME nilstr~y of Agri culIture and NTatura-l Resources, hopes to try on a pilot scale, is the u,e of small, portable sawmills used at or near th'xe Ife,llilng s:it,e, 4- rim- -an sqar logs so 4that only -eoeal 4--r,- LL~d.. ~ .J. _ ) U~J ±.Llll L O.L' U0jL.JU . ~ -6Q 3QJ U- U V'LI4J .1. -VU~±C.L'4. U m4- would be hauled out, thereby greatly reducing present impossibly high transport cost. Persons ln the tilmber trade. do not appear to consider thls a feasible solution. 120. A second, and more hopeful solution, is the development of a pulping -indA1u1str,-y which wouMlld perm-it the use ofP a, -;Ae rang of--- hadoo pc Po .JAL .J UJFJ±Ld JJ..L j~ II"L U ilV " L' d .1 d 1~ J I±d.J. AWL" A U -JL varying, mainly short, fibre lengths. The Litton Industrial Development Cor- poration, W-hiLch ihdas been give n aL concessio UJ. of oVe one millioL n aLc -res ol forest on either side of the Demerara River, is investigating the technical feasibility of this operation and is negotiating terms -wlth the Guyarnese Governmi,ent. 1 dA ni L : __ L I- -1 _ -1 -:~H __ -X - - - L1 - _' 4.1 41 - _ ¢' I I . iL tLi I r'U approUac, atd presenL1 D L)nLtg UtVC|L UItU W-LLAI L.It LICp X1u UN technical assistance, is the impregnation of logs to prevent clecay. Success- ful impregnation would mak-e possible the retention-L of the outer sapwood, tlereby raising the milling recovery rate to 45 percent or more. 122. The trade has suggested, however, that even this recovery rate would be uneconomic; that less than a 50 percent recovery wouid be non-viable, under present circumstances. On the other hand, the establishment of a pulping industry would also provide an outlet for the large volume of chips wh-ch other- wise would be wasted and which would result from an expanded sawmilling industry. - 28- 123. The successful use of impregnation and the sale of chips to a pulp- mill could alter the economics of forest exploitation in Guyana. These two developments would raise substantially the rate of recovery of lumber from logs and simultaneously lower the break-even rate of recovery. This would make possible the use of a wider number of species and smaller trees and, in turn, would greatly increase the yield of timber per acre, which would reduce the overhead costs of road building. In this way the successful development of impregnation and the establishment of a nulning industry are means of placing the lumber industry on a much sounder basis, which would offer pros- pects of ranid growth. Fhi 5ir P' 1 2) There are two distinct, very dissimilar, sections of the Guyanese fishing industry, fishing and shrimping. The former is almost exclusively an lnsh-o1rertI _T ncnducted by numbers of indl --- el---the- h w-i th nets cast off from the shore or from small fishing boats. A few larger trawlers also operate into Georgetown and NewA Amsterdam.. 12 o5 Guyaa- i-orts over ne a of Jts iPsh r-e-irement, rn'-4, in- the form of dried, salted fish. Expansion of the industry, which would require the procurement of additional - t r Pihing o hr, is discouraged by the better returns available to shrimping. Almost all of the small increase i-n (Gu=yana's tr1kw-i-Ing f-leet Jn recentl years has b-een used f~or srmig ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~14 SI-)r 1-- _ |.nn[_ _5 _ =_ Au_ 4_ _P _ -J 1A I LU * Illele da reUIIC LIJJU1'd.LtI- ± i111 I UI D111 11pb Uso m e1 C lUl W1 UUdO D of South America. This number is expected to grow and the fished area to be extended . The shir-irlaping trawlers are o-w-Led rinlaL-y by Ull I tedu Qta tes' andu Japanese interests (about 15 are Guyanese-owned) but most are locally based in JU)/ll M4J_.LIdIi -.LL4 A -i-I 4.12 D_ .IU4-.UUO - C'.4U1 -I )U -- -_ LU1 41 I- Ud-_ U C-_ Guayana, S -rin-Arli, TrlnidadLCt andl BarbaULJdo. Sorle I- 150 tr-a-w_lers aret: basedu on Georgetown and are serviced by Georgetown Seafood Limited and Guyana Industrial H/oldings 1,(Bookter) T44Lill W: Ser-vicig ll-udes uloadlg the catch, washing, grading, boxing it in five-pound packs, freezing, storing and shipping. A TTO I-, - -_ _- 1 2... ~- -... __ t11 - I- - - C.-- TTC'ifl chiarge of ¼utyx2 peur poundu li ruade for thtese services. i-An export tax oui UIJg0.) per pound is levied. Exports, mainly to the U.S., Japan and Britain, are - -- r L...t ~~~~TTC'C4t', - --_ - val-ue at an average of abuutu UoUI .30 per' poundi. 127. Shrimping in the area is recognized to be highiy profitabie. A well operated vessel can land some 80,000 pounds of shrimp per annum. Allowing for the cost of servicing the catch and for the export tax, the average value to the shrimper is about US$1.16 per pound, or US$92,800 per boat per annum. Deducting operating costs of about US$42,000 plus amortization on the average cost of a boat (US$100,000 over a seven-year period), yields an annual profit of nearly US$40,000. 128. The most serious immediate factor limiting expansion of shrimping is the availability of adequate, suitably situated shore facilities for handling the catch. Guyana Industrial Holdings, with some Japanese participation, plan to erect a new handling plant up-river from Georgetown at a cost of US$3 million. -29- This plant, which is expected to begin operations in mid-1971, will be capable of handling another 150 shrimping vessels. No difficulty is foreseen in achieving full utilization of the additional capacity. 129. Apart from a likely small expansion of the private locally-owned shrimping f'leet - of which Bookers have the largest number - the Guyana Development Corporation is considering in conjunction with the Commonwealth Dev- elopment Corporation and, possibly, Japanese interests, the acquisition of' a shrimping f'leet. Guyana is well situated to develop such a fleet. 130. Georgetown, a major port, is well situated in relation to the shrimp- ing grounds. The time taken in getting to and from the grounds is less than in the case of Trinidad or Barbados. The catch-handling facilities are well established and expanding rapidly. Shore labor is abundant, cheap and of good quality. The handling of the catch is not subject to many of the usual port restrictive practices and, it is exDected, will be even less so at the planned new handling plant up-river from the main port of Georgetown. 131. Guyanese are good fishermen and their wages are relatively low. Most U.S. and a-ll local shrimning vessels are also manned by Guvanese. and their performances compares well with that of foreign crews. 132. 'The prospects for regular trawl fishing are good, if not quites so good as shrimpinng. As already mentioned, .- tr n th thp high re+urns ava ilbhle in shrimp- ing, it is difficult to justify the direction of similar equipment and personnel to the less lucrative trawl fishing. 133- Again, marke- prospects for fish are not as good as in the case of shrimps, which find a ready exporlt market. Additional fish landings would have to be sole s - d i; n t h. oe dome_Stc w e or, at beSt, i -n her local me"e t s Asc already seen, Guyana imports over one-quarter of her fish requirements. These ir,1po. LI , Uo CLIJLL LaLamouti5L Uto Ia-u - abou TT$ (l. --1 £Wl..lion a1 ly are 1Pnai.-I .1-UI in the fo r- dried or salted fish, for which there is a strong demand in Guyana as in other Clarlbbean countLri4es. ILocally- landled, fresh flsh of goo' quallt and - attractlvely4- Ud.L L.) cLiI UU L I-I± -U L d.LL) .Ld Aiu -L 1 ~1 L -L O~il ±J. ~U A. ±Ld11J UY d.L1-L Et L, U- cv-. U1 V q=_L.y priced could probably in time rep-Lace imported dried or salted fish. 134. A recent FAO report on trawl fishing off the Guyana coast.!! suggests 41W.C U _LLI V 0a U1ILU LL U _LU i CX UJ CiWL V~ LLr, 1. ~UUUVY U LLL4. L . J ~ A C.t I V U %Al LI Vii I Vi . 2' JV I i.VL I U capital. These returns were based on a 17-day schedule which allowed five days fLor travelling tuo anid Lrom. .UIhe fLsLIing grow.dis andU 6 days flslng Th rvl ling time was the estimated average for a number of Caribbean countries, all buut one of -w`hlch was cosdrbymre dsatfomtefs ggonsta Guyana. It should be possible for Guyana substantially to reduce the scheduled uravelling, lre -wth a corresponing Wlnircrase .LLI UrcUUUU U fiV s iLng.Li Uutl,ie. *1ii.L would greatly increase the return on capital invested in a Guyana-based trawling Ilee U, . 1 / 'uN anci FA0, 1969, Rtep or t SF /CAii/'REG/1 6I . L -30- 135= G ('Tiven it.s locational advnta.ge Gliivyn might hope tno deve1on an export trade in fish. However, the ongoing UNDP/PFAO study of fishing in the Caribbean has awakened general interest in the countries nf the reainn in the possibilities of developing off-shore fishing. It appears likely, in the light of this interest, that the other member countries of CAPIFA will wish to develop their individual off-shore fishing industries. Because o t--is it appears ad,Vs-i tlhat befor Gu-n emIbark on a- ecaaslon of its trawling fleet, other than to supply its domestic market, consideration s1h ou ldL Ue V given lo Ite j04oin development ol a "''AmF f-leet 4 . In any sucLih development, Guyana, with its locational advantage and seagoing population, could' exD-ectu to play a mio rle III. AGRICULTURAL POLICY 136. Many aspects of agricultural policy have already been discussed, as these apply to particular commodities, in the preceding chapte!r. Thte present chapter is devoted to an examination of certain broad aspects of policy, which in many cases cut across individual commodities ancd which therefore could not be adequately dealt with by a commodity apprc!ch. Welfare Aspects of Agricultural,Policy 137. Understandably, the Guyanese Government is deeply concerned to improve the economic conditions of the mass of the people and particularly of those whose incomes are especially low. In common with many other governments, the Guyanese Government sees in agriculture not merely a means of adding to GNP but also a sector in which a wide section of the populat;ion, and particularly the poorest class, can participate. In this way, GNP is increased in a manner likely to be directly beneficial to many people, espec- ially the poorest. Not surprisingly, therefore, government action in relation to agriculture is frequently dictated as much by a desire to improve the incomes of a deserving class as to increase output. 138. Aspects of this simultaneous striving for the dual objectives of welfare and production in relation to the rice crop are the failure to exact anything like the full cost of water control; rent controls; the choice of settlers for Land Settlement Schemes on the basis of need rather than compet- ence; the losses incurred by the Guyana Rice Corporation in providing culti- vation and harvesting services for less competent rice growers whom commercial contractors are reluctant to service. The regulation of copra exports, if this results in lower prices, would represent a case of welfare being pursued directly at the cost of production. A further example was seen in the GMC granting of easy credit to pig producers, an action dictated in part by a desire to increase pig production and in part by a desire to improve the income of those getting the credit. (Other, patently more efficient,piLg producers did not have to buy on credit from the GMC.) Again, the deficits run by the GMC are incurred partly in an attempt to stimulate diversif:ied agricultural produlction and partly to raise the very low incomes of those from whom it purchases. 139. To keep the matter in perspective, however, it should be emphasized that even by Guvanese standards the losses already or likely to be incurred by the GMC are very modest; they represent less than one-quarter of one percent of (IN-P - n fq-r 1owPr pronortion thnn most eonntrips nav directlv for welfare objectives in agriculture. Much the more serious situation is that in respect to rice, where he-aiv direct. eostsz in tlhe forTrm nf' unreqnited eienr1i t,rsn on water con-trol are incurred by the exchequer. 140. The pursuit of welfare objectives in agriculture is likely to be bringing cew ly in produ_ case. whethronthe co- as nand,n icoty bringing naew land into productiorn, whether on the coast or inland, is costly. -32- That coastal agricultural land, with good water control, is worth US$500 per - - 1…11 1… _- - acre, is a measure of hiie scarcilty of -well located, reasonably fertlle developed land and of the cost of bringing new land into production. Guyanese agriculture has potential, but exploibing this potential will not be easy. T11. The achievement of rapid agricultural growth depends above all on getting resources into the hands of those who can make the most effective use of them. It by no means follows that such a direction of resources must inevitably result in the continued concentration of those resources as in the past in Guyana. Special factors have accounted for the remarkable degree of concentration in Guyanese agriculture, in sugarcane especially, but also in rice. It is entirely compatible with the pursuit of agricultural expansion that the debilities which have in the past hampered the development of efficient small-scale farming in Guyana should be removed. Much can be done along this line in sugarcane by strengthening and encouraging the Guyanese Cane Farming Development Corporation; in rice by liberalizing and rationalizing the land market; and generally by the provisions of credit to creditworthy farmers and by facilitating the development of efficient marketing services. 12. An agriculture which is economically efficient in a Guyanese context is unlikely, with existing developed land resources, to employ fewer people or to have fewer production units than at present. Progress toward economic efficiency could be characterized for the most part by a redistribution of existing land resources among the farming community, with the less efficient passing some land to the more efficient. A small minority, comprising the least eflicient producers - probably mainly the part-time rice-growers - may leave agriculture altogether. It is clearly of equal importance that additional land resources, whether drained and irrigated coastal land or land cleared from jungle, should also be directed to economically efficient farmers. 113. A possible alternative to the present approach of giving scarce and costly newly created agricultural resources to people without knowledge, experi- ence or interest would be the provision of public work. Some, or all, of the wages paid might then be regarded as the price which circumstances required that the recipients should get to forego their "claims" on a share of the country's productive agricultural resources. Looked at in this way, labor would be available to the Government at little economic cost for public works. The exercise would be justified if the value of the increased production from the agricultural resources set free, plus the value of the public works, exceeded the wages paid. The Role of Cooperatives 184- The declaration of a Cooperative Republic underlines the great reliance which the Government places on this form of economic organization. Guvqanese cooperatives have a long history, of which the first major landmark was the cooperative pn1rehase of a vllqvp by a grnun of liberated slaves The record of cooperatives in Guyana has not, however, been very successful, one frequently quote rea.on heing the indifference of pre-independence governments to the cooperatives. It is argued that with the present, much more benevolent Government attitude, -33- - .LL~~~--- - _ _~ ! - - -- I - . .O Z_ - __ - 1 cooperatives can p'lay a ifiucn imure cuOristuctive ruie in une I uLurc. r U.r bILer, Government emphasizes its readiness to experiment with different forms of cooperative organization with a view to evolving forms more suited to local conditionS than the classical form. 145. It would be unrealistic, however, to expect that the achievemients of agricultural cooperatives in the near future will be significantly better than in the past. An uncritical faith in the capacity of the cooperative form of organization, especially given its present level of developmeni in Guyana, may be hindering Government from taking a more pragmatic approach to many existilng problems in agriculture. At the same time it may encourage the formulation of plans and the setting of targets which are unrealistic. 1L6. It would be a service to agriculture if more rigorous thought were given to the possible contribution of cooperatives in their present stage of development in Guyana. It is particularly necessary in the longer term to attempt to evolve in Guyana a form of cooperative organization more appropriate than the classical form. One such alternative might be a corporation-like organization conducive to firm, skilled management, which in turn could be accountable to central direction. This could still enable the participation of "the small man" as a shareholcder and/or laborer, and might well be better suited to Guyana's situation at this juncture. Diversification 1L7. Guyana has some opportunities for expanding its agriculture along diversified lines. The most immediately hopeful of these are cattle, shrimping, fishing and forestry. But the largest and quickest returns are to be gained from an expansion of the two staples, sugar and rice. It would be tragic if the challenges affecting increased production of these two crops were faced less determinedly because of a diversion of attention and resources to the development of other commodities whose prospects, generally speaking, are more speculative and distant. Marketing and Pricing Policies 148. Charging higher prices on the domestic market than the producer realizes abroad could, especially in the context of a policy of agricultural diversification, quickly lead to serious economic distortions. By granting a sufficiently high level of pro-tection on the domestic market, as for example in the case of manufactured dairy products, resources could be attracted from more competitive enterprises, such as sugar, rice and cattle. At the same time, living and, therefore, production costs would be raised generally, reducing the competitiveness and further hindering the growth of efficient industries. Rather than contemplate a higher price for sugar on the domestic market, as has been suggested by the Sugar Producers Association, the Government should consider reducing it to the level of the least valuable exports - i.e. those tc Canada. 149. The GMC reported the following losses in its operations in recent Vear5: 196) US$301,000 1965 478,000 1966 221,000 1967 207,000 1968 287,000 150. These losses would, probably, have been greater but for the fact that the Corporation is the monopoly importer or exporter of a number of staple commodities, viz. edible oils, cabbage, carrots, wheat middlings, pickled pork and beef, processed hams and bacon, pasteurized milk. Profits from these activities partly offsets losses on its domestic purchases. 151. The Corporation acts as buyer-of-last-resort for a number of commodities. In this way it also performs, at some cost, the welfare func- tion of helping to maintain the income of inefficient producers whose commodities are generally inferior, at glut periods. Whether the GMC should perform such a function is questionable on grounds that higher productivity could come from these resources if diverted to other purposes, and the same welfare ends might be achieved more effectively and cheaper by other means. However, as already noted, the amounts involved, even by Guyanese standards, are modest. 152. The management of GMC appears to be reasonably efficient: it performs its statutorily required task at low cost. However, the recently introduced provision of feedstuffs nn reaqdily]- a l redit terms. may prove an excep- tionally costly operation. GiMC believes it could help reduce its losses by f'i 'll+.dr i n-rvn1T.mPn±. mM M1ni lX iTn ronlri Tnr-nnrp +.r- irmn rvn+. nhry.-tdi-'n supply/demand discrepancies and for the construction of a milk-reconstitution plnt. Interior Development 153. P-AA-atn Considrations othernr than ecfirfm n ----- to mni +vate Guynm's drl,,ivr to the interior. Foremost of these is what is conceived to be a strategic need to mintain or establi)sh a strong presence in bordei r areas, subject to encroac1h=- ment from neighboring countries. The road to Lethem, together with the agricultural development olf bnMI A n-,,ews Ridge, r-eprese,n4s th t s h drive to the interior. The Government expects this will open new lands en route. It ma also facilit LatLe thie deve1opment ofL Ulthe graLz-ing potentiaUlCJ andl of ocet .L Li .. ay a ' Ci.1 - ; ct.LL Lid UC Li/I 4 CCVC±I., AI L Li/ U4 1 , - ----4 4 -L/L/4jJ 4// -iLd.).. -0A1-Cd 1 - - 4.X i of rice soil in the lee of mountains in the Rupununi. Finally, it is hoped that a road to eLetem on the Brazilian uorAer, -wl±l eventually le tou aU major development of trade between this north-eastern region of Brazil and Georgetown, w-hich is the nearest major p-,ort. 1554. Settlement of the interior is costly. A very approximate mission estimate, based on the available data, suggests that clearing and bringing an acre of land into cultivation in Mathews Ridge costs from US$300 to US$)400. It costs a considerably smaller amount to place an additional acre of otherwise waste land on the coast under sugarcane or rice. In addition to land clearance, the building of houses, schools and shops, and the provision of other public ser'vices are~ neessa y. It is tTe that these facllties are adequate for the present population of some 700 families in Mathews Ridge but, if this nLULmber is added t.oY , adl.4.a.. itional. faclllties wihllJ1 at once bDe neCeSSarJ. TheJ need for such social infrastructure is less on the coast, where existing r .aC4 1 4 4- A - A 4- 4 T1 A " -X 4 -4 -- - -A A -; 4 _ A ---AE 1-A. ± J.-L.LUiLe a nD L, ue ImorJe Ll ue1in V D v < ; J U CL J Li d F1 IULU DULUI UdAI L'V -ilI tU1Oi UZU- by the more intensive use of land already under cultivation or at the margin. 155. Transport is likely to prove a crippling cost in the development of the interioL for agricultural purp-oses at the present stage. Even lf the road to Lethem is built, overland freight costs into and out of the Rupununi - II ~ ' 1-- - z _ ~ ~ -__ 'l__ 1 - 1 - - TTOJ 1- In,- - -- wl±l sill oe high, hardlay less thani USF1± per puullu. hi reuctUionU i-n inpult costs is unLikely, griven the quality of the land, to stimulate production great- ly. AIr freight is the chief form of tranrsport from Mrathews Ridge; the cost OI this is US4.5 per pound. How significant this is may be grasped from Table 18 showing prices paid by GPiC for agricultural produce in 1968. Of 20 crop products bought, the average price paid exceeded the freight cost from Mathews Ridge only in the case of seven. Of these seven, except for coffee, the freight cost was more than one-third the value of the commodity. Consumption and production goods being brought into the area involve a similar high cost. 156. The high capital cost and the continuing high transport cost would only be jus-tified, on economic grounds, if the land were extremely productive of high value commo(dities relative to weight, or if settlers in the interior were prepared to accept extremely low returns. As neither of these conditions obtain, it is clear that the creation and maintenance of interior agricultural settlements must involve a very large subsidy element. 157. Expenditure on Mathews Ridge to date has mainly been for land clear- ance. Little farming has taken place there as yet. Most of the former mine- workers have been employed on this work, and it is intended to continue em- ploying these on clearing further land to accommodate settlers who are expected to arrive in early 1970. If plans for clearing and settling the area fructify, Guyana could shortly be faced with the situation of having a fairly large popula- tion located at Mathews Ridge, dependent upon an agriculture which can only pro- vide a subsistence at the cost of extremely heavy subsidization. Mathews Ridge, on present plans, could quickly be built up into a sizeable public liability. 158. A policy of consolidation, rather than expansion, seems urgently necessary at Mathew;s Ridge. This would involve concentrating on settling the land alread;y cleared rather than clearing additional land. Newcomers should not be encouraged for the time being. Farming the cleared land will inevitably involve heavy subsidlies, which may be regarded as the cost of maintaining a presence in the area. The object, however, should be to contain and minimize this subsidy. This will involve the development of the most appropriate crop- ping patterns with emphasis on crops of high value relative to weight in view of the heavy transport cost. Cattle production might also be encouraged, not because production at Mathews Ridge could ever hope to be as economical as on the coast, 'but as a form of land use likely to involve smaller losses than others. -36- 159. The history of land settlement schemes in Guyana, present develop- ments and the circumstances of the Mathews Ridge scheme indicate the need for caution. Mathews Ridge is clearly an exceptional case which, as well as serving important strategic objectives, could provide useful experience for further settlements and, if app;. 6 44.0 36.3 55'.2 n,,a. Ground provisions and plantains (million lbs.) 34.4 172.2 193.7 196.7 110.3 128.8 125.4 112e3 93.4 91. 1 n.a. Cof'fee (million lbs.) 1 3 0 8 1.0 1.0 1. 2.' 2e'5 2.5 2e.8 2.9 n4,a. Beef (million lbs,.) 6.6- 8:4 8.5; 8.8 9.0 9.9 10.2 9O/4 td.6 8.8 n,,a. Fis,h (million lbs.,) n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 14. 0 15.7 17.8 17'.3 21.6 21:.1 n4,a. Shrimp (milliorn lbs.) n. . 2.6 3.9 5 1 6.5 7.0 E8.0 59.5 9.0 9.2 n.a. T4,mber (million cu. ft,,) . 5. c- AN c' r1 6' o n,a. Area (000 ac res) ) b/ Sugar (rea)ed) 77. 5 98.1 107.8 100.3 97.0 9c5.2 107'.1 103 .8 11 --3 10701 12l4.9- Rice (reaped) 171.9 220.2 261.4 246.0 201.1 311.4 337'.2 308.4 253¢ 313.1 2793 3 Coconuts (11000, inc:Ludes bearing and non-bearing trees) 32.0 3 3 35.3 38.0 38.9 39.9 40.2 440.7 44. 2 ). .4 n,,a. Grourd provirsions ard plantains (o000) 22.4 24.5 27.6 32.0 26.8 31.9 32.0 214.7 24. 3 2:L.5 n,,a. Cof'fee 4.8 2.8 2.9 3.0 3.4 3.1 3.4 3.5 3.1 3.1 n,a. Yielc /acre sugar (tons) 3.23 3.41 3.01 3.25 3.27 2.71 2.89 2.78 2).98 2.95 :2.8- Rice (bags of padi) 13.8 15.3 12.7 14.1 13.6 13.4 13.0 12.7 12.3 10.4 9.8 Coconuts ("1000 nuts per planted acre) 1.8 1.2 1. 1.3 1.2 1.3 °9 1.1 0. 8 1.2 n.a. Ground provisions and plantains ('000 lbs.) 1.5' 7.0 7.0 6.1 4. 1 4.0 3.9 4. 6 38 4.2 n,,a, Cof'fee (lbs.) 271.0 286,0 345.0 336.0 430.0 812.0 743.0 716.0 9114.0 920.0 n.a. a/ 1956 figure b/ Provisiona:L n.a. = Not Available Sourc! FconoTninC T)i-trH a,cm œ MThi it,f,r-il Table 2: GUYANA - SIWiAR: PRODUCTION, ACREAGE AND YIELDS, Product~~~~~ion Acreage elds ± 7 I-L ~J,7 A -1T ,,-3 rrouucuA uji 0l1-k - -= -L e±Lus Total Cane Farmers Total Cane Farmers Estates Cane Farmers (Ejstates & (Shiare ofL P (s t atu-e sa & (are of' Farmers) Total) Farmers) Total) (k'tons") (acres) (tons per acre) 19<6 263,333 7'¢,837 3.67 2.10 19<7 284,973 83,432 3.62 2.09 19X8 306,361 86,988 3.73 2.33 1959 289,42c 89,134 3.37 1.74 1960 334,441 9,%08 93,094 3,012 3-.9 3.16 1961 324,745 8,164 107,840 3,219 3.18 2.54 1962 326,023 9,490 100,334 3,021 3.41 3.14 1963 317,137 9,600 97,014 3,204 3.49 3.00 1964 2r8,378 8,606 9rc,183 4,199* 2.82 2.47 1965 309,44: 14,032 107,104 6,300* 2.89 2.57 1966 288,869 15,038 103,772 6,166* 2.81 2.44 1967 3h3,922 21,716 115,298 7,838* 3.00 2.77 1968 316,848 21,<13 107,450 7,534* 2.96 2.86 1969 364,465 22,261 124,9319/ 8,85O*/ 2.92 2.859/ * Includes Lochaber and Belle Vue a/ Provisional Source: Economics Division, Ministry of Agriculture 01) _ P.. ,O 1 'U' r-IObD O J D CM r'\ C- rH \0 -_ 0D Ct- ( IN CO tD_ rll c\ *> 0 -4 -4 tf CJA-4 _; ( \ CM CM C3 O\ fr4 '-' rQ Hr rH r-l rH rH H H H H rH rH U) ~~~~~~~*r- 0 Cl ;0 C) 0) ON CN 'IC. rC- ("\ * 4 -_T I0 O', 0D 1\ (Z) V- tri tJ) - (C) - :4 rH r- 'If, C\ co (j ON (D rH ON 1-\ O ~~~~~~~~~~ ~~~4-'VC') H 1-V -,: 'If. r-H 0D C)' co C)N co -7 ON '.0 co C4z o ON a:) rl- _zt -:(N- ("i< \41 \0 C2D ^ t w ct)~~~~~~~~~~~~- r- Vr 5 CD c\j V '\0 C- a) ON CD rH CMj (n --7 'I. ND r- co OYN co 1-r 1r If, 'Ic, "D \JD \"0 ") N.O NO \D \JD NO NO 0) ON O ON, ON ON' ON\ ON ON OIN OIN ON, ON ON ON" OIN H HI -- H- H- H- H- H- H- H- H- H- H- H- H H- Th7l:)?L: GUYANA - BASIC DATA ON LIVESTOCK, 19155 AND 1960, 1965-1969 1955' 1960 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 -…- -S- - Cubject to Cattle revision), Prov. Estimate Population '000 n.a. 160 350 315 305 250 250 Slaughtering '000 18.6 21.6 27.3 18.7 27.8 29.0 32.6 Meat Production 'COO :Lbs. D,556 8,b34 10,234 10,155 9,413 9,,54i7 10,069 (1956) Official Slaughtering '000 lbs.(Meat F'roduction) (n.a.) (6,187) (8,591) (9,423) (8,648) (8,783) (9,362) Average Slaughter Weights n.a. 325 315 328 311 302 288 Populaticon '000 36.9 20 65 68 83 79 n.a. Slaughtering '000(rounded to nearest thousand) 1- 9 lL4 15 18 2:3 28 Meat ProdLuction '000 lbs. 769 631 1,018 1,402 1,701 2,149 2,610 Average Slaughter Weights n.a. 76 70 913 93 91 95 Sheep Populaticn '000 36.5 n.a. 87 82.6 100 97.7 n.a. Slaughtering '000 809 621 3,254 3,988 4,836 5,060 5,686 Meat Production '000 'lbs. 19' 14 78 99 108 106 137 Averaige Slaughter Weights n.a. 33 2L1 25 22 2L 21 Goa-ts P'opulation 'COO 12.:L n.a. 33 31 2 38 n.a. ISlaughtering '0000 510' 4L3 266 307 413 356 h74 lMeat Procluction '000 lbs. 12 11 6 7 9 7 12 Average S'laughter Wleights n.a. 35 25 25 23 2-L 24 Po u'Ltry Population 'C 00 611.14t 398 3,000 3, 537 4,562 5,92:3 n.a. Slaughtering '000 n.a. 438 701 1,672 1,871 2,009 2,023 Meat Production '000 lbs. n.a. 1,096 2,103 L4,179 5,473 5,92:3 5,'564 Average Slaughter Weights n.a. 2,'.5 3 3 3 3 3 1TCat1ttle IPopulation: Popu'lation figures are very crude estimate!s. A survey in 19 9 gives an estimate of 250,000 head. 2/ Meat Production: The figures presented in table above on beef prcduction were adjustecI and. includes an allowance for private slaughtering and meat equivalent of live animals exported. I'he f'igures in brackets are the estimated meat production from official slaughtering. 3,' AveraEe Slaughter Weights: The average slaughter weights were arrived at by taking the total estim,ated production of beef from off'icial slaughterings and dcividing 'by the number of head of cattle reported slaughtered. $ource: Ecconomics Division, Ministry of Agriculture Tabl-e j U-'I.iTi - 'PR0 I ', - AND CONSTUN' I01 OF BEEF, - _ - 195 -,Df 1 965s Year Prociuc tion* Increase from 3ncrease frovi EKpolrs l4ot avail- Imports Consunptior Previous Year Base Year able from produe tion ('co 000bs)' ('G0O ibs) % (00 lbs) % ('001 1bs) ('0Cs) ('(300 Ibs) (0000 lbs) ($'000s) ('0G0 ids) _ - - , 5 - 1 1 ( ,55, , 94 837 8,;IIL99 ' 937 7,'110 53 8.0 552 8.L 29 13 7,080 1,651 789 8,732 9 ~ ~01 ~~.2 85L 13.08 20h 123 ,6 ' 5(3 7 ,l0 3 01 .2 85lO 13.0 244 12-3 '7,166 1,81L1 919 8,977 7 9'7,990 580 7.8 1,h32 21.9 132 54 7,857 1,511 833 9,368 1960-i 83,4±35 LL5 5.6 1,879 28.7 189 71 83,2L6 l,7L1L 1,003 9,990 ''61 8 ,)90 55 C.7 1,939" 29.5 188 112 8,302 1,988 1,173 10,290 8,184 351 .1 2,285 3h.9 -231 113 ,61iL 2,020 1,138 10,631 1 ;C3 9,>5000 15, 1.8 2,bL14 37.3 2Gb 87 8,796 2,101 1,141 10,897 1962 9,919 919 1.0 3,36 51-.3 5,47 220 9,372 2,003 1,153 11,375 1969 10,23h 315 3.2 3,67e 56.] 'i79 720 ,256 2,630 1,556 11,885 19 66 1G,155 - 79 - 0.8 3,595' 54.9 565 289 9,590 2,278 1,611 11,867 1967 9,-J3 - 7T2 - 7.3 2,857 3 6 333 103 9,080 2,362 1,555 11,442 1965 9,547 134 1.4 2,991 L5 .6 383 142 9,16Lt 2,70h 1,789 11,868 ' Includes mleat equivalent of live animals exported and allowance made for unofficial slaughterirgs. Source: iconor.ics Division, Ministry of Agriculture Table 6: GLTYAA - ESTIMATED IIILK PRODUCTIOGN 1955 - 1968 Year Gal]ons (000) 1955 2, 8L8 1956 n.a. 1957 n.a. 1958 n.a. I959D9 2,689 1960 2,808 1961 3,170 1962 3,5L2 1963 3,8350 1964 1,042 1P5 lt,250O 1966 3,443 1967 14,268 1968 L,560 Source: Economics Division, Ministry of Agriculture Table 7: ESTIMATED PRO)DUCT ION, LOCAL CON SiUMPTION OF FISrH AIND 'SHRIMP ANID EXPOR'S OF SH-RIMP, 1960 - 1968 YEAR PRODUTCTION CONS UMPlTION EXPORTS OF ShRThMF Fish Shrimp]/ FishlV Shrimpl/ Quantity Value ('C000 lbs) (' 000 lbs) (o000 lbs,) ()o00 Lbs) (Co00 ibs ) ($' ccc) 1960 9,3 48* 2, 613 15, l791 L46. 3 ,523 1,651.6 19,61 9,678* 3,951 15,9c 53 L47.)6 4,17Q 2,741.0 1962 10,209* 5,(071 16,180 4S.' 5,1;3 3,3c5.1 1963 14,018 6,5o8 19,321 5Q.3 5,875 3,868.6 1964 15,713 6,c981h 22, 931 51.'7 5,577 4,2L48.2 1565l 1-7,7'98 8,C!4.8 23,856 737(4 7,7C, 4 al !LC 1966 17,322 9, 545 2L,(49 n.a. 9,731 6, LE1. i 1967 21,600 9,036 27,888 n.a. 8,810 5,984.0 1968 26,000 9,161 31,L 90 n.a. 9,153 7,310.1 * These figures have beren revised. 1/ Production not available! - the amount represents; shrimps handle(d by comnercial oroducers. 2/ Consumption = Production + Imports and these include (1) fis,h, fresh, chilled or frozen and (2) all fish, salted, smoked, in tins or otherwise preparedd. 3,'/ Te fiurs aup lie b-; the Libsl-atva a;-e UliJy sii,LKij)s LViiJUL1 di are avdi±ciJe for o)idLuipt U2U11 cuiii,eral producers, and do not include quantities produced by smalL fishermen. Source: Fisheries Division, Ministry of AgricultureX Table 8: GUYANA - TIMBER PRODUCTION BY PRINCIPAL SPECIE.S, V(56 j- 1968 ('OOO cubic feet) TYPES 1956 1 957 1958 1L959 :1960 :l961 1962 1963 196 1965) 1966, 1967 1968 Green:nart 3,30 3 3,372 ' 3,37:L :3,783 3,359 3,606 3,165 2,559 3,279 3,609 3,i897 3,61.7 Crabwsocd 767 1,- 322 387 L2P L20 882 31X9 315 361 280 3599 Jiallaba 130 31 6 793 254 273 320 366 251 288 283 202 276 M. rc 655 517 525 373 338 307 208 302 846 281 3C3 307 OtF.er 1,133 1,030 -L,00 787 963 962 830 751 1,121 569' 1,503 1,37'5 - TOTALJ 5,,79'9 5J,777 r O, 5,2 V7 5,362 5, 25 ,,01 8,252 5,879 5,1C'3 6,185 5,97 5, 999 , r1 total aw,lable t;o -tc.e Source: Forest TDivisijon., Ministry,- o:f lands., Forest and Mines Table 9: GUYANA - EXPCRTS OF SUGAR, 1964o - 1969 (Volume in thousand long tons; value in million Guyana dollars; unit value in dollars per long ton) 196Lh 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 Tt.otal Exports Vol_Inre 23L1 286 266 312 29, 333 Value 4c 53 52 5 1 62 75 TTJiit. irqlue 21'0 ]8q 895 l81 2'11 225 Ulnit+ed-( KingrdIm 1 m 1 .~ IR . . _ _. _ , v_ Vo'l,-,.e 1 7' 9185 1809 lQ.' I8 15 I35 Value 37 39 4l1 38 41i L2 UTnit value 20' 213 29 212 217 21 5 Vo ' . .-. Lrl 26 Ci''- V lue 13 17 27 iT-n 4 va31ue 1714 201i 21) I-I 07R 2a,7 C4 -qi -,.-aa 7T ILu, e 32 '70 1 77 14 Ii. Value 8 8 4 6 4 Uni t- vauW5 C38 7 Q ~ n3 S o,-,- 3 c e u....... g a r 'I_;-Wd rl +; A 4 Table 10: GUYANIA: EXPORTS OF MIL-,ED RICE, TOTAT AD11 BY PRINCIPAL DESTIDATICONS -.AN.D TYrPE O:F SAL-, ANNU,AL, 19t'61 - 1968 (thousand mnetric tons) -L961. 1962 1963 196L 1i95 1966 16067 1968 Total Exports: by calendar year 91.7 80.7 - 78.P 95.1 107.9 1ul.6 95.7 by crop year ending 30th September 74.2 8'9.9 79.3 - By Governlmfient-to-CGovernmernt .----(by crop year) -----------(by calendar ye.r)- Contracts 63.2 77.6 7h.6 75.5 5LL.7 4S7.7 55.5, 55.9 Regional. Rice Agreements Jamaica (8.9) (12.9) (11.2) (14-3) (11-7) (10.8) (15.3) (17.3) Trinidad and Tobago (26.1) (23-0) (25-7) (28.2) (29.8) (28-5) (3l-.L (30.7) Others 1/ (1L.C) (13.2) (1h-5) (a.L'I) (s/5) (8.h) (9.2) (9) Cuba (IL.2) (28-5) (23.2) (18.9) (3-7) _ _ By Non-Contractual Sales Ll.l 12.3 L.7 3.3 4c0.4 62.2 )L5.7 39.8 Frernch Caribbean Islands (0.6) (0.2) (0-3) (0.3) (L.O) (5.8) (8.8) (8.1) Other West Indies and Caribbean Countries (6-7) (5.1) (3.9) (a) (a) (E) (a) (a) British African Countries - - (b) (16.8) (21.0) (b) (b) French African Countries - _ (b) (b) (8.8) (16.3) (b) Far East, - (b) (b) ( .0) (12.7) (b) Western Europe (2.8) (2-7) (0-5) (O.L) (7.8) (b) (b) (1.6) Others (residual-) (1.0) (C) 4) 2. (iL.8) _ (21.6)(c) (7.9) (3().1)d 1/ Mainly Barbados and Antigua Te) Included in Etegional Rice Agreements (b) I-ncluded in others (c) Of which Liberia, 11.4 (cl) ilt least haljF of which was to Far East Sources: Reports of the Brit:ish Guiana Rice Marketing Board and Monthly Accounts Re] ating tc ExternaL Trade, The Statistical Bureau, Georgetoiwm, various issues. na+~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ )T- 1, 1]:o!`lTj.:- I37)Ca' O7 T._. _-, 8, i .- -; O:F Li . R T -C' l.r .Y -D, I-, .................................... (Y, Table 11: GUTrA -,INtIp3.i, T5rnXZEa 0? , ., ( , '.^I TL OF C_ NILC-E T^ L Y PRINCIPAL,TY E fl (l"F : l .l'lT fff. ' ,'TORLB -- T L F. [ .;, FnO. .i[I , I ;.Ti. Wu, 1 -L1j9iU (Ns. ';er retric ton) 1964 L$ 95 ,715 V v rs o - I I I-) i t. V lu 7IrroT ; 2Hu2na, by type of Sale or destination: Goverinment-to-zgov-ernm!ent conatracts Regional 3.ice A,gree`ments Trinidad - Tcihagnci Jamaica (aver;We) 15 H) 17 7 1P, i5 Others 1 75 -- 15i 1j2 Cuba 17L 172 !ion-con:tractual sales Range 1/ 2 All Exportls, A.verage 162 1!1l 3- 176 Thailand: A.7vg. un-t value 2/ 1(7 108 120 160 157 3urMLr: nAvg. unit value, Parboiled rice ?13 .'D3 Average_Export Prices, by origi-n and quali-ty Government- to -govTernment co)ntrac ts Guy,ana, fi rst qualitY 3/ 1', 150 150 15C 6/ Thailand, white rice, 355% brokens 102 102 6n 128 176 Thailand, Taihite rice, 5 '7 brokens, sold 1:37 137 166 228 2`3 by private trade FAC Rice Daport Price Index Bilaterial contracts sub-index (1957-59=-GGQ' 709 112 118 131 1 / Average for 2.0 thousand tIons out of .3 thousand tons excorted4 W/ :ieighted average value for all mi.lled rice except these grades: 1G,- ;Thol, F:i brokens, 15-% broken-!s. 3' FcOr comparative purposes, contract pr-ices for Guyanian milled rice, first quality-, sold under recional rice agreements during 1957/58 wa-,as USSi37- 7/mre i tri ton. This p;:ice 1,as lncreased duringi I-l'v6 to 615.. 1/ ICt quoted. Sources: Unit values.. Gu rana.. lonthlya AcM(-tr c,nountsR to Extern,al Trade, var. i.ssues, -wilth valu..tions chargme.1 to US$ at these exchaine rates: =SO 1.71 3; 1968 1 USO = 2.00G8. Cther unit va.lues are cal- ul-tc by Econo.mi^cs DeP-t. T:?RI!j frorn offi-cial e:xternal trnde .statis. cs in a similar aamer. Ave.'aae Dxpcirt Prices anld Fl'mO .'.-ice 2T o:rt Pri-e InTex fro" _iep s of Study Grouu on Rice to the Cn R_ P vaorti.rous IIJ' L L -s,.LI and ye t. Table 12: GUYANNA - T IMPEl IMORTS AND EXPCRT'S, - 56 - 1968 (Thousands of G$) 1956 1957 1958 U9559 1960 l961 1562 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 IDPORTS 300.9 6 2.8 91 .8 319.3 369.7 298.6 252.5 150.4 253.6 313.2 51 386.7 56h.s 1C/PORE 3,23I.5 3,595.6 3,623.9 3,317.3 5,637.0 2,997.3 3,010.2 2,552.5 2,591 2,665.9 2,7i67.7 Rxtlar atorvUw l.ote: Th(e above figures hiave been revised and represent Impcrts andK IE rLs of all categories of timber Source: Economics Divisiocn, linistry of Agr culture Table 13: IMPORTS: TOTAL VALUlES OF NET I]MPORTRS OF AGRICULTURAL MERCHANDISE ALND TIHETT PERCEN1AGE OF THE TOTAL VALUE OF NqET IMPORTS (in thousannds of G$) 1960 1961 :1962 1963!/ 1964 1965-/ 19660' 1.967-'/ 19680/ Live animals chief'ly f'or f'ood iL41 61 59 112 207 278 259 1.66 177 Meat and mLeat preparations 2,(54 2,,234 2,004 2,000 2,203 2,652 2,989 2,632 2,672 Dairy products, eggs atnd honey 5, 686 5.667 5j512 5,275 6,491 7,359 8,A480 8,'36 8,528 Fish and ftish preparatoions; 2,:371 2.,213 :2,32 2,210 2,572 2,690 2,644 2,9'90 2,533 Cereal and cereal preparations 5,:329 5,96'; 8,42)4 6,610 7,953 6,937 8,137 8,8;38 9,,782 Fruits and. vegetables 4,189 4,194 14,318 4,472 4,985 5,'640 5,974 5,5991 5,,939 Sugar and sugaLr preparations :337 389 297 291 227 423 423 405 658 Coffee, tea, cocoa, spices and maniuf actures thereof 1,717 1,864 '1,415 1,471 1,570 1,669 1,735 1,638 1,,756 Feeding stuff for animals (not including unmilled cereals) 1,436 1,482 980 522 499 632 637 311 260 Miscellaneous foocl preparations 1,433 10,384 '1,52)4 1,599 1,612 2,036 2,078 1,5910 2,,497 Beverages 1,287 1;,428 867 858 863 1,037 1,168 1,119 951 Tobacco and tobacco manufactures 828 94!3 800 92 866 857 953 906 1,,082 Hide skins aLnd f'ur skins undcressed. -. Oil seeds, oil nuts and oil kernels 4 101 2 4 2 159 88 1,392 160 Animal and' vegetable oils (not essent:Lal oils), f'ats, greases and derivatives 1,799 1,369 569 1,302 1,172 2,607 1, 743 1,7'60 2,,086 Essential oil and peri'ume materia:Ls, toilet, polishing and cleansing preparations 1,883 2,136 2,012 2,1433 2,639 3,381. 3,173 3,C)9o4 3,049 Live animals other than for food 1 72 37 10 -2 11. -1.1 --23 -21 TOTAL 30,497 31, 505 31,17 4 29,265 33,859 38,367 40, 472 41,664 42,,114 Total net imports -L45,)420 144.,807 123,478 116,610 147,294 176,749 198,169 219,732 211,235 Percentage 20.97 21. 76 25.25 25.10 22.99 21.71. 20.42 18.96 19.94 aL/ Provisional Source: Ministry of Agriculture iaid Nilatural Resources. Table 14 8: EXPORTS: TOTAL VALUES OF EXPORTS OF DOIMESTIC PRODUCE RELATED TO AGRI:CULTURE AND TH]EIR PERCENTAGE OF THE TOTAL VALJUE OF EXPORTS OF DOMESTIC PRODUCE (in thousands of G $) 1960 1961 1962 1963.! 196L, 1965a/ 19662// 1]967l/ 1968A/ Live animals chief:Ly for food 54 120 121 88 83 73 9i7 118 :L12 Meat & meat preparations 49 22 16 5 1.59 358 200 1 33 Dairy products eggs & honey 3 4 2 2 3 2 2 2 Fish & fish preparationsb/ 1,653 2,741 3,366 3,869 4,797 5,895 7',022 638514 8,:L31 Fruits & vegetables 222 235 306 99 186 106 121 128 201 Sugar &: sugar preparat:ions 60,246 59,545 62,289 79,2b9 57,5947 46,o60 51,311 5)9,261 63,5994 Coffee, tea, cocoa, spices & manLfactures thereof 271 1146 123 126 1.62 126 120) 98 80 Feeding stuiff for animals (not including unmi1Led cereals) 320 4120 556 328 2,85 384 562 383 .333 Miscell.aneous food preparations 25 31 26 33 142 52 42 514 80 Beveragres 3,132 3,182 3,312 3,185 3, 369 14,339 3,512 5,789 14,335 Tobacco & tobacco manufactures 1 1 .7 7 1 1 2 2 Hide skins & fur skins undressed 143 34 31 26 21 26 37 34 26 Oil. seeds, oil nuts & oil kernels Animal & vegetable oils (not essential Oils), fats, greases & derivatives 1 1 Cereal & cereal preparations 15,422 23,034 151,859, 23,002 22,232 29,984 23,14146 24,o043 27,667 Essential oils & perfume naterials,toilet, poliLshing & cleansinig preparations 584 541 5914 562 737 593 66i7 627 576 Live anlima:Ls other than for food 242 242 223 277 LL29 12 13 16 16 TOTA1L 82,268 90,300 90,827' 110,859 90,1452 88,,012 8i7,156 97,4412 L05,L90 Total Domestic Exports 125,031 146,907 160,L18 175,805 160,681 166,213 18IL,1149 190,7145 208,2144 Percentage 65.80 61.417 56,62 63.05 56.29 52.95 148.11 51.007 50.51 a/ Estimated. b/ Inc]Ludes shrimps Source: Ministry of Agriculture and Natural Resources. Ta ]5:- I GTJITTYAN - ITSTqTPTOTjrPTnM rOF PTRICE APPF.Ar.R Ac,- res Fa-rm,ers Percent of R_;Ce_'lancls ,-. ,. 0 I~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~.r '7 J Ul7 L4CL. 1- .)- 17 2 r. Q JAJ147 t C2. L r5r)-99- -I 6. '- 100 aino 1OVE.6 Source: Rice Producers Association, 1968 Table 16: GUrYANA - RICH GROWITNG FL TLITS AND 71 F *SuR .i-;;-- 1955-ly68 (Thlousands) l1ce Growing Sugar W'oorers Fam1ilies_ _____ __ ___ F _ield Factory Total 1955 32.1 22.9 5.5 28.5 1956 33.8 22.2 5.0 27.2 1957 34 .Lh 21.0 5.2 26.2 1958 36.0 19.) 5.2 24.7 1959 37.7 18.0 4.9 22.9 1960 39.4 17.8 b.6 22.4 1961 h1.8 17.1 4.2 21.3 1962 42.5 14.9 3.9 18.8 1963 Lk3.3 15.2 3.6 18.8 1964 L.9 13.2 3.5 16.7 1965 45.0 (approx.) 15.0 3.8 18.8 1966 n. a. 14-5 3.4 17.9 1967 n.a. 14.8 3.6 18.4 1968 n.a. 15.2 3.7 18.9 Source: Sugar Producers Association and Rice Producers Association Table 17: GUYANA - MINIMUM PADDY PURCHASE PRI(E, SINCE 1950 (G$) Effective from jan. 1, 1950 $3.15 per bag of lhO lbs. net delivered at a rice factory " if Oct. 1, 1950 $3.25 If " " t i it it if " if Sept. 1, 1951 $4.50 " ft "t it if "t it If it " Oct. 1, 1951 $4.95 ft i it It " tft t It " Oct. 1, 1953 $6.30 " i" if it " If " ft i t Oct. 1, 1955 $6.00 it "f H ft ft i f Sept.11, 1957 $6.80 " it " It ft f" "I Oct. 1, 1962 $7.30 t H f f t it 'H " ft Oct. 1, 1966 $6.30 "t ft I ft It If " ft "f It Sept. 1, 1968 $2.90- if it if " " 7.80 1/ Elxplanatory Niote: ' Tne Guyana Rice MIarketing Board has continued to advocate a mini-nrum paddy price of G$6.30 per bag of 140 lbs. net for d-ry, clean, winnowed paddy delivered at mills. Owing to the flexibility Of tnis order, the Guyana Rice Development Compary established the following purchase prices for paddy as from 1st September 1968: Grade Extra "All - $7.80 per sack of 140 lbs. net Grade A - $7.30 f" ft I It I" " t Grade B - $6.8o f f f " t " Grade C - $6.30 t ;; ; Grade D - $4.70 t i f f f f Grade E - $2.90 ;t ; t ; f; An incentive of 509 extra is offered for each bag of Blue Be.ilie pactcy (9u percent purity) purchased. Source: Economics Division, Ministry of Agriculture Table 18: (a) GUYAMA - FLOOR AND AVF-L..PG L PRICES PATD BY CEI1URIKA PRODUCEIJ L-r .r- 1968 (Guy-nese currency) Cornrodity Minimum Price- Commodity MinimUn Price- Cents per lb. Cents per lb. Plantains, Grade A 4 Dhal 14 Plantains, Grade B 3 Castor Beans 9 Sbweet Cassava 1.5 Peanuts 24 Eddoes 2.5 Corn 6 Tannias 4 Yams Cents each SwJeet Potatoes 4 Oranges, Grade A 2 Cabbage 17 Oranges, Grade B 1.25 Onions 8 Oranges, Grade C *75 Blackeye peas 16 Grapefruit, Grade A 2 Grapefruit, Grade B 1 Prices uncha.nged since 1965 (b) ATT-ERAGE PRICES PAID TO FAR'IERS BY GUYANA MARKETING CORPORATION, 1968 CoTmmodity Average Price Comnodity Average Price Cents per lb. Cents per lb. Plantains 6.0 Coffee Beans 43.5 Yddoes 6.0 Pumnkins 3.7 Sweet Potatoes 8.0 Cucumber 9.0 Yams 1n.), Tomatoes 26P..2 Tannias 9.6 Cabbage 21.8 Gassava 2.3 Peppers~ 16.- Bananas 3.9 Corn 7.1 Limmes 80 Golden Apples L.o Cents each Blac'-eye Peas 19.8 Orans2.7 Grapefruits 2.8 Temons 1. 5 Source: Guy-ana Marketing Co-rpuoration. Table 19: GUYANA - SELECTED AVERAGE ANNUAL REI'AIL PRICES 1 961 - 1969 …~~~~~ (Guyana cents per pound) COM4ODNrIES IJNIT 1961 1 92 1963 1964 1 565 1 966 1967 1 968 1969 Beef lbs. 55.1 57-5 57.8 56.6 55 .0 62.8 62.'7 66.1 67.4 Pork fI 80.7 74.5 75.0 74.3 74-.9 75.0 75.2d 75.0 75.9 Muttton 1.0 10h.4 109.8 110.0 107.0 110.7 1110.0 109.3 11 6.3 Chicken " 95.0 98.1 97-7 100.2 98-0 86.4 91.2 96.9 100.3 Red Snapper It 71 .1 65.2 74.0 79.4 80.3 85.3 89.8 81.0 83.5 Cabbage (Local) " 30.0 30-4 39.1 35.0 38 .2 39.3 65.3 35-9 37.1 Ora;nges 12.7 10.5 13-5 15.5 17.7 15.3 1l4.7 14.5 1 6-4 Source: Economics Division, Ministry of Agriculture. Table 20: GUYANA - LANDED COST AND FARM COST OF THE P'AIN TYPES OF FERTILIZERS, 1965 AND 1968 1965 1968 1965 1968 Kinds of F'ertilizcrs Larnded Cost Cost to Farmers per ton at Retail ettores c.i.f. G$ per ton G$ =ulphate of Aimmonia 92.14 81.26 124-30 135-00 Urea 194.80 1 77.33 215.00 210.00 Triple Superphosphate 164.72 196.58 197.00 245.00 Hyperphosphate 74.29 81 .10 79.60 -- WMriate of Potash 99.59 108.03 136.98 178.00 Nitrophoska 167.31 170.28 181 .84 -- 10 - 20 - 0 154.20 173.10 170.00 194.50 15 - 15 - 15 175.79 171.06 195-00 235.00 13 - 13 - 20 175-99 -- 211. 0 215.00 Limestone 19.14 32.32 26.00 49.16 Source: Econo.m,Lics rvso, Mlnlstry of Agriculture Table 21 : GUYANA WAGE RATES FOR UNSKILLED WORJKERS 1955-11969 (In Guuyanese DolLars) 1955 1956 1957 195,8 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 19,64 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 Sugar fields 0.88 0.'92 o).96 0.96 11.04 2.1X9 3.00 3.00 3.45 3.45 3.45 3.60 3.60 3.90 3.90 3Sugar milling2/ 0.19 0.19 0).24 0.28 0.29 0.31 -- 0.38 0.43 0.43 0.43 0.45 4.50 0.49 0.48 Rice Development corporationi! 0.31 0.34 t).32 0.36 ().38 0.35 0.36i 0.38 0.38 0.40 0o46 0.48 0.5c0 0.53 ? Bauxite 2lining!/ C).49 0149 (.58 o.68 ().80 0.90 0.90 1 .00 1..00 100 1.15 1.15 1 .25 1 .25 1 .30 Metal works manufacturingl/ 0).33 0.33 3 ).36 0. 38 0.40 0o40 0.47 0.47 0.47 0.56 o.56 o.60 o.63 0.67 0.69 Public Works 2.52 2.5'2 2.52 2.352 2.75 3.04 3.04 3.04 3.04 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.0C) Commercial Under- takings O. 51 w: 0. 51 5 0.51 1' 0.51 1/ Per day 2/ Per hour Source: Ministry of Labor arLd SociaL Security Table 22: GUYANA - RICE iMARKETING BOARD FINANCTAL OPRATITONS. 196g-7GQi/ (G$ Million5 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 (Forecast) P.cenptc 26.8 26.0 260. 3 0-3 21.5 23.8 T.cal~ sales 2.7 3-1 2.7 2.5 2.7 2.8 Export sales 24.1 22.9 23.8 27.8 18.8 21.0 Expenditure -31 .1 -28.9 -26.0 -26.7 -19.5 -21 .0 Rice purchases 26.8 25.1 21.7 22.6 16.o 17.8 3 3.5 3.9 3.4' 3_1 Interest 0.3 0.5 0.8 0.2 0.1 0.1 Operating Surplus (gross) -4.3 -2.9 0.5 3.6 2.0 2.8 Depreciation - - - - -0.2 -0.4 Debt Exrittent on O - 2 -0.1 -0.1 - Operating Surplus- -4 r. -. A 1. 3 1 r 1. UO...- .UA4 iUj. U 1 -*-.L- J L Financing Governi-nent credit (net) 1.7 1.1 -0.3 1.7 2/ -0-5 Bank borrowing (net) 2.5 0.2 -1 .3 -3.6 Others, inclu,ding cnange in assets3/ 0.4 1.6 1.3 -1.6 0.2 -0.9 (of which change in rice stocks) (2.9) (-1.2) (-1.4) (-1.4) (0.9) - 1/ F'inancial years ending September 20th. 2/ G$2.5 million debt written off by Government; G$4 million repaid. 3/ - = Increase Source: Rice Marketing Board Table <2: GUYANA - LOSSES OF GUYANA MARKETIN3 CORPORATION A -NTn rl nTT 7~ 1~ C'TT-D0C'T7Y1 I nzL1 I n ±ilVJ UV-=.i.~ _ SUB,IDY , 19 614-19U6 (in G$) 1964 {965 1967 1968 Milk Plant 089, 89>.73( 410,419~.61 253,842.23 ZI- ( 257,495 4 21L[J,O1I1.,Y Produce Depot 70,806.51 248,285.60 90,872.88 130,820.82 3.15,3Ju.0U Ham and Bacon Factory 34,152.82 17,7i3-98 32j839.65 _3,335.72 Processing Factory 26,055.29 32,107.33 27,441.22 14,808.c0 3,368.0h New Amsterdam 12,B28.34 31,023.24 22,298.06 23,320.'3 18,499.46 Fish Mlarket 13,952.4o 3,727.80 17,217.70* 19,6h1.61* 270.81- Edible Oil Trading 94,o64.76 197,163.63 h7,936-73 _ 4C,783.16 _§821.28-' TOTAL 6o1,586.87 956,880.11 442,887.40 414,502.13 574,650.20 Government Subsidy 6.31,610.00 1,255,000.00 600,000.00 600,000.00 600,000.00 * Trading Surplus Source: Guyana M-iarketing Corporation Table 24: GUYANA - GOVERARNiZ,TT INTVESTNENT IN AGRICULTURE, 19954-11968 LeveL of Agricultural Investment C jG mMillions) (G$ thousancs) Total Irrigation Public Agriculture & Drainage S'ector Agricultural as a percent General 1/ Irrigation Land Devel- Total Agri- as a % of Investment Sector Total of Total Agriculture S: Drainage opment ForeSts cu:Lture Total Agri- cul ture 19'54-1959 103.8 33.0 31 4,5e 9 26,606 2,774 n.a. 32,968 76 19cO6-1'964 82.3 29.5 36 3,230 23,5;27 24(09 n.a. 29,168 81, 1965 16.l 3.5 15 1 ,0).8 1 ,981 4'55 35 3,519 56 1966 * 26.3 6.5 2L 3,716 1,076 1,66o 91 6,543 1 7 1967- 27.2 6.LL 24 3,062 1,233 1 ,265 88 6,433 1.9 1968* 32.10 5.5 17 2,230 1,150 1,211 89 5,LL78 22 1 / Spending b:y I4inistry of Agriculture mainly- on research, educat;ion, soi-l surveys and acreage subsidies. * Estimates; subject to revision. Source: `Mlinistry of Finance Table 25: GU'YANA - PUBLIC IN'ESTMENT IN AGRICULTURE IT THE DEVELOPXfIf-,NT P19GR-4A, 1966-1972 (in G$ thousands) Revised Revi-sed 1966-72 1 970-72 1966-*72 1970-72 Drnai-.e and I,rrglto`Il =Lcu' tureul_ 1. Boerasirie Internal 1 Rice Development 1P3 192 (Jacob's Lust/Georgia) 1400 - 2. Soil Surveys - - 2. )pa.>vLa 51 o - 3. J±.L- IE, esearch Stalion Crops 90 -- 3. Atkinson/M1Lckenzie l 00 - 4i. Meteorological Stations 13 -- 4. Mahaicony-Abary 10,500 - 5. Crop Investigations - - 5. Mara/Torani .500 - 6. Technology Division 15 -. 6. BlaLck EBush Front lands '750 - 7. Eradication of Accoushi Ants 10 90 7. Crabwood Creek Southwards 800 - 8. Information and Communication 28 28 8. Minor Works 1,1300 - 9. Rural Youth 9. surveyEs '750 - 10. Farmer Training and Refresher Courses - -- 10. Canje Biasin Dam, Pump, Roads, etc. 214,000 - 11. New Animal Laboratory and 'uarantine 11. Staff - Station 100 1 00 12. Expansion of Livestock Farm. 700 -- Sub-Total 40,l10 13. Sheep and Goats -- 14. Beef Cattle Development, Ebini, etc. 700 -- LarLd Development 15. Progressive Farmers' Scheme -- 16. Beef, Dairy, Banana, etc. 8,000 -- 1. Anna Regina '150 - 17. Staff 2. Charity 1 00 - 18. Agricultural Credit, 3,OC)O -- 3. Tapakuma 50 - 19. By-products Plant Lethem 36 '36 14. MaLra '150 - 20. Guyana S7chool of Agriculture 200 700 5. Onverwagt 600 - 21. Bonus to Producers 50 ,_ 6. Black Efush 150 - 22. Payments for Rice Combines 5C)0 - 7. Brandwagt-Sari 25C - 23. World Food Program 1400O 8. Wauna/Yarakita/Kailtuma/Aralaka 725 1400 214. Technical Assistance 1,200 -- 9. Mac hinerv 500 - 1 0. Crabwood Creek *outhwards 200 - Sub-total 15,21 5 11. Torani 150 - 12. Contingjencies 200 - 2 5. Guyana Marketing Ccrporation 5'15 Sub-Total 3j175 Total E>9 jQ1/5` 1/ This sum is approximateLy G$5 million less than the sums of agricultural investments listedl in Appendix A of the Development Program (1966-1972) Sour cet Development Progran (1Q66-197?) Table 26: GUYANA - STOCK OF JA92! i CHIIi,RY IN 1 965 AND ADDITTOMS FRO- 1966-1 968 Stock of Farm AUDDT TT ONS KINDS Machinery 1 6< 16(f 1 Q7 1Q8R No= No. Nro. N,o. Tractors 3,635 269 229 3hg1 Ploughs 3,268 67 106 122 Go.m.bins 393 O27 27 == Roenaers nrA RB rin-rle 0 =- =- Th.eshing 63.- Sorting Li IlCa,c h i ne s (Shellers and Hullers) 98 -- -- -- Other Harvesting f4achines 5-- -- -- 3mall mills for crashing seeds andl cak ) es 7 35 Fertilizers, distributors and seed drills 7 6 7 Lawn Mowers 873 -- 117 103 Source: Economics Division, Hinistry of Agriculture aUbIe 27 NAI - IINV ZADIVINZIU IIN RLICEn JAACIJ.1TNh 1957 - 1965 and 1966 - 1968 1 Rice Mills and Machinery Approximate Value of Equipment & Year No. of Building Improvements _ _1ills (excluding land) G$ 1957 200 private single-stage 3,000,000 1960 2 Govt. Mills 5,000,000 Improvements to private mills 250,000 Two single-stage mills were replaced by two multi-stage mills; 40 other mills install d additional hullers, expanded storage sheds, etc. 1961- 204 private 1965 mills 3,600,000 64 multi-stage mills were erected and five h Govt. run mechanical driers Cooperative installed. The other Mills 3,000,000 millers expanded their drying floors, storage sheds and milling capacity. A number of shallow wells were also bored. Total Rice Mi3ling Assets - Private 6,850,000 Government 8,000,000 14,850,000 Source: Rice Producers Association Continued/ 1av-Li 4 UUUII -lutu/ 2. Tractors & CoJJ1iJfes Unit Unit Year Tractors Price Combines Price (G$)- (G$)* 1957 800 3,325 25 1958 1,042 41 1959 1,360 63 1960 2,104 3,700 137 25,000 1961 2,611 183 1962 3,176 222 27,000 1963 3,687 263 1964 4,103 4,200 334 30,000 1965 4,503 4,700 349 29,000 1966 3,450 341 1967 3,611 371 1968 3,625 380 - Different sizes and makes of tractors and combines are used. Listed below are the sizes of the most popular types: Tractors Combines Make Size Prices Make Size Prices Massey Ferguson 45 H.P. $5,950 Massey Ferguson 14 ft. cutter $34,900 nf 'f 60 H.P. 7.800 Case " 42,000 67 H.P. 8,500 International Tnternational )12 H.p. 6,350 Harvester 13¾ 42,500 Harvester Source: 19Q7 t-o 1?Q65 estimate by the Rice Proceurprq Assnoiationn 1966 to 1968 estimate by the Economnics Division, Ministry of Anv ,-1 +nr. - Table Ž8.: CUYANA - Data on EcLsting and Proposed Land Development Schemes Financial Support from Governm -t Total Invest;- Alloca- Average Number of Families Invest- ment per tion for RevLsed Land Development Projects Year Gross Number size of eeaaa; To De DI-zV - made in ment to Acre 1966 1972/72 Started Acreage of Farms Fams Eiettledl settled 1.965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1969 1969 - 1972 Existing Schemes (actes) $ G$ G$ 0$ G$ G$ G$ G$ Go 1. Asna Reg' a 15514 7,'9 800 lt>2S, 800 Nil 599Q27)1 50jQ0 37,0008 11,400 30,51l8 728,192 - 7100.000 150,000 2. Charity/Amazon 15'54 170 268 -3/4 150 118 45,560 _ 85,30t) 7,600 9,956 98,416 578 100,000 10,000 3. On,verwagt 1555 6,ooo 441 10-20 422 19 - - - - - 495 600,000 600,000 1. *Fbra 15656 3,800 220 15-:L7½ 32 - 2,501,273 - - - - 2,501,273 658 50,000 50,000 '. Black Bush Polder 1960 31,000 1,500 17½>-10 1,500 - :l6,896,521 50,000 20,500 11,400 Nil 16,978,421 547 150,000 150,000 6. Wauna Pilot Project 1961 3,000 50 15-50 4o 10 326,459 100,000 o10,5oo 33,000 12,280 582,239 194 225,000 - 7. *I'apakurua 15,63 35,000 - 5-10_ - - 13,133,139 - - - 13,133,139 375 50),000 - 8. Bzrandwagt/Sari Pilot Project 1564 1,000 100 10 4 96 181,936 60,000 27,000) 52,000 65,000 385,936 386 250,000 250,000 P'roposeid Schermes Wauna.arakit/Kaituna 1566 200,000 - - - 6,000 - - - - - - 500,000 500,000 Crabwood Creek Southwards - 8,000 - - - 600 - - - - - - 200,000 200,000 Torani - 4,000 - - - 300 - - - - - 150,000 150,000 Other 1rojects Preliminary Investigations 1560 300,000 - - - - 8,ooo 5,000 3,00) - 15,750 31,750 - 200,000 - World Food Program Project 1564 - - - - - - - - - - - - 300,000 IPurchase of Combines 15'64 - - - - - 492,000 - - - - 492,000 - 500,000 500,000 4. * This Scheme has been abandoned. r. * Includes 31,000 acres aLuLeaiued Crv.iL Ids i--l;,e AC nat corrolladb Lan Dc,clpc..t. S)urce: Ecoromics Division, Miniitry of AgricalEure Table 29: GIJYANA - CCI 'fliERCITAL BANKS' CREDIT TO A(7RTC1FLT1PE 1J1TSTA'DlTDNV [AT xrmn n THIRD QUARTFhE 1966 & 1969 ( in G$it.hous and) ___ ___ ___ __1966 1969 Indiv duals QE3ugarcneA 1:\ anr+;ng o1 77 L)tA6a Uas I,X JaI ' ..L±U 6 C. ' I I , ~~~~~~~~ cA, j T ivstc 22 3 nn 41_A . _1 n'^ uu i,er - rLgr i vculturel l>; Forestry 328 156 Sub-total 2,434 4,469 Agro Ino.ustries Sugar and iMIolasses 3,837 13,645 Rice Milling 3,698 1,039 Timiber 721 7 Sub-total 8,256 16,427 Tot-aL 10,690 20,896 Source: Bank of Guyana