80583 EAP DRM KnowledgeNotes Working Paper Series No. 26 Disaster Risk Management in East Asia and the Pacific LAND VALUE CAPTURE IN URBAN DRM PROGRAMS By Soumya Dharmavaram SUMMARY Risk-sensitive land use planning is vital for sustainable economic development and effective disaster risk man- agement (DRM). Urban development programs should adopt risk-sensitive land use planning to encourage resilient development guiding the growth of people, assets and services within and away from hazardous zones. Many East Asia and the Pacific (EAP) countries have national land use policy and local plans which in- Urban communities in northern Bangkok, Thailand. corporate risk assessments; however, they typically lack the means for their implementation and incorporation into development planning1. Facing these constraints, local governments are attracted to economic instruments, such as land value capture (LVC), to leverage finances. Among a wide array of LVC tools, land readjustment (LR) and transfer of development rights (TDR) are particularly rel- evant as they can spatially direct urban development away from disaster risks. This note introduces the potential of LR and TDR for DRM as seen in their application in Brazil, India, Japan, and the US. The note recommends that if municipalities build capacity for strategic land management, LR and TDR can be used effectively to finance and implement risk-sensitive land use plans. LR offers to accommodate and plan for risks with minimal displacement while TDR promises to equitably relocate development away from hazardous sites through the real estate market. LAND MARKETS, DISASTERS & THE PROMISE OF LVC While the EAP region has made significant progress in managing disaster risks through legislation, institutional strengthening, risk identification, communication and mitigation measures, the region lags behind in addressing the underlying risk factors2, in particular, through land use planning. Some EAP countries have used LVC tools since sev- eral decades; others are seeking them to implement risk-sensitive land use plans. LVC tools are based on the premise that since investments in land development increase its value, the speculated increase in land value can be captured beforehand to leverage private investments and finance urban projects that distribute public benefits equitably. This working paper series is produced by the East Asia and Pacific Disaster Risk Management Team of the World Bank, with support from the Global Facility for Disaster Reduction and Recovery (GFDRR). The series is meant to provide just-in-time good practice examples and lessons learned from projects and programs related to aspects of disaster risk management. 2 Disaster Risk Management in East Asia and the Pacific LVC tools are attractive to municipalities as they creases land value, it is possible to capture the increase promise to address challenges in land market efficien- in land value to implement DRM plans. Well-designed cies, particularly in lieu of risk information and hazard policies after a disaster can result in relatively accessible events (see table 1). Land markets respond to hazard land markets. information. Hazardous sites are often inexpensive and affordable to the urban poor, thus make them dispro- portionately vulnerable. After a disaster, land markets I. LAND READJUSTMENT first drop due to extensive destruction and persistence LR (or land pooling / sharing) works on the principle of blight and then typically boom with risk mitigation that potential increase in land value after development or post-disaster reconstruction investments. Usually, the will provide incentive to landowners to contribute owner-occupied housing market recovers faster than and pool land for public amenities. LR has been ap- the rental market. Developers may struggle to obtain finance in weak property markets post-disaster. Post- plied globally to create serviced plots in the periphery, disaster investments increase property value and poten- optimize land use through densification, acquire land tially gentrify low-income neighborhoods. Demarcating for infrastructure projects, regularize tenure, slum up- no-build zones results in drastic changes in land values grading and inner-city revitalization apart from post- within such zones and outside. Land values drop in the disaster reconstruction5. In an LR project, a portion risky areas and increase in the safer parts. Delays in an- of land is deducted from all land owners to provide: i) nouncing reconstruction policies or no-build zone spurs amenities, and ii) market sale of surplus plots to recover land speculation3. Given that risk information affects part or all of development costs. Neighborhood layout land markets, risk communication spurs land specula- is rationalized to carve space for public amenities such tion, and resilient reconstruction can significantly in- as roads, schools, hospitals and open spaces. Plots are Table 1: The Promise of Land Value Capture Tools Challenges in Implementing Land use plans for DRM4 Potential Benefits of LVC Tools ■■ Political commitments are shorter than typical land use planning ■■ Public opposition is avoided by cycles; compensating land owners appropriately and minimize relocation; ■■ Strong public opposition to land acquisition and relocation since compensations are inadequate and restrictions on housing in buffer ■■ Overall supply of serviced urban land and zones are not supported with timely relocation; housing is increased in the city by reviewing land use regulations; ■■ Safe, serviced and affordable urban land is scarce; land scarcity is exacerbated by out-dated land use regulations; land ■■ Public finance is minimized for public tenure is often ambiguous; land records may be outdated, amenities by leveraging private investment; erroneous or lost, and land management capacity is mostly ■■ Equitable distribution of public amenities; inadequate; benefits of development financed by land value ■■ Finance for land acquisition is limited; funds available during increase are shared by all economic sections; emergency/ relief usually fall short during reconstruction; additionally informal residents, renters and low- income households can be accommodated with ■■ Existing inequities may be reinforced since relocation disrupts provisions for occupancy rather than ownership socio-economic lifelines of the urban poor; if land title is a pre- rights; requisite for housing assistance, relocation/ reconstruction programs exclude renters and informal residents; residents with ■■ Politically acceptable tools to implement land weak tenure may be reluctant to evacuate in fear of losing their use plans for DRR. land; rapid land value appreciation with post-disaster reconstruction tends to gentrify neighborhoods. Land Value Capture in Urban DRM Programs 3 reshaped and resized to accommodate existing land provided. Land use may be optimized for densification owners who receive smaller but regular, serviced plots and mixed use. LR projects rely on voluntary or manda- that are equivalent or greater than the former value. Ad- tory community cooperation6. ditional plots for renters and informal residents may be Figure 1: How Land Readjustment Works Source: Schnidman, Frank. “Land Readjustment.” Urban Land, February 1988: 2-6. LR is a useful tool in post-disaster reconstruction to CASE STUDIES `build back better’ on safe pockets with hazard-resilient building regulations. The Earthquakes and Mega Cities Japan Land Readjustment Initiative (EMI) promotes LR as a tool to incorporate Locally known as Kukaku Seiri, LR has been used ex- DRM in urban development7. tensively in Japan for post-disaster urban infrastructure Key benefits of LR projects: i) continued land owner- (roads, station plazas, parks and sewer system) in major ship, ii) recognition of different land tenure arrange- cities and regional towns10. After the 1995 Hanshin- ments, iii) stronger consensus and cooperation amongst Awaji earthquake, LR projects were implemented in residents, community organizations, private developers the most severely affected urban centers in the Kobe re- and the government, iv) bargaining power offered to gion, particularly for redevelopment of aging neighbor- low-income residents through community consensus hoods from the 1940-50s11. By adopting risk-resilient prior to project approval, and v) increased municipal construction practices for rebuilding, LR projects have revenues through property taxes from serviced land8. reduced damage from future disasters. The damages in districts improved by LR after WWII in Kobe were less Key challenges of LR projects: A number of pre- severe following the 1995 Hanshin-Awaji earthquake12. conditions have to be met: i) land owners must believe After the 2011 earthquake, the Sendai City Earthquake that final profits will justify project and value improve- Disaster Reconstruction Plan recommends LR to ac- ments in neighborhood amenities and public infra- commodate relocation from inundated areas13. structure, ii) land ownership is not scattered, and af- fected landowners want to stay in the neighborhood, iii) Project Design & Implementation: LR projects in Ja- destruction allows for readjusted plot boundaries and pan are voluntary, with legislation dating back to 191914. residents are equally impacted and willing to cooper- Almost half have been implemented by private associa- ate; where some houses are not damaged, individuals are tions for suburban residential development or center- likely to not want to lose some of their land for readjust- city redevelopment. Projects must conform to city’s ment project, iv) technical skill is available for designing zoning and infrastructure requirements15. The 1992-93 project incentives, v) ownership records (cadasters) are master plan allows for densification in such projects16. updated and reliable, and vi) potential disputes can be Community consent is important, as readjusted plans, resolved through agreement or legislation9. cost and revenue estimates as well as land contribu- 4 Disaster Risk Management in East Asia and the Pacific tion requirements from residents are subject to public Hanshin-Awaji earthquake22. In Misuga Nishi, a resi- comment and final plans are approved by landowners. dential neighborhood of wooden row houses and nar- Private associations must obtain agreement of the ma- row alleys, 70% of the wooden buildings in two blocks, jority of landowners and lease holders. If there are a few Mikura 5 and 6, were burnt. The area was occupied by hold-outs, legal procedures exist to buy-out landowners low-income families and elderly had a high proportion and ensure project implementation. Land contribution of tenants and multiple ownership of property. Landlords is typically 20% of land for public facilities and 10% for were reluctant to rebuild due to economic recession. The sale (called cost-equivalent land). Redistributed parcels area was designated as part of the Disaster Restoration must conform closely in terms of location, environmen- Land Readjustment Project to widen streets from 4-6 m, tal condition, land use and size. Any equity loss must be allocate space for parks and public open spaces, regulate compensated for, or else settled through financial ad- and update building codes and zoning23. justment17. In public projects, subsidies or low-interest loans from national, prefectural and local governments Actions: Two blocks were re-organized to include 2 may supplement revenues from cost-equivalent land high-rise apartment buildings (90 units) and 1 collec- sold. After the 1995 Hanshin-Awaji earthquake, na- tive housing. A local volunteer group provided informa- tional finds paid for land and public facilities; the city tion and technical data on LR in appropriate language also purchased land from willing sellers that helped for the residents. They persuaded owners to rebuild new minimize parcel reductions for those who remained18. apartments and share the value of their lands with their Private projects are self-financed19. 70-80% of cost- tenants24. Volunteers also sent fliers to former residents equivalent land is sold at market rates to public agencies of the Mikura community residing in distant emergency for Because schools/ public two thirds housing (490 persons) formerthe of the and remainder residents is to could not return sold their shelters25. The co-housing project accommodated ten- to owners/ lessees within the project area 20 . LR projects ants and small landowners with insufficient land for con- previous home location and many factories and stores left the community after the disaster, have 5-10 years timeline21. tribution. Additionally 10 off-site owners donated their there were many empty spaces in Mikura 5 and 6 Blocks. Even eight years after the event, land in the city in exchange for participation right26. there were about 6,500 m² (25% of the area) which remained unused (as of 07/2004) (ibid) Misuga Nishi (Kobe) LR Project Results: The project provided much needed open space (Figure 7.6). Figure 7.6 (Left) shows the high building density and land-use conditions in Objective: Kobe city used LR simply as a means under in a declining inner-city neighborhood. Replacing small Mikura in the pre-disaster period. Figure 7.6 (Right) shows Mikura in 2001, five years after the national law (Land Readjustment Law of 1954) to single family homes, the new multi-store building was the quake, with receive its widened funds national and newly created for streets and two open reconstruction spaces the after allocated 1995for the resistant to earthquake and fire27. The project accom- construction of public parks. Figure 7.6: Maps of Mikura 5 and 6 Blocks Comparison Between Pre-Disaster Figure 2: Misuga Nishi (01/1995) (Left) Land Readjustment and Post-Disaster (06/2001) (Right) Project Park Land Park Land (Source: Miyasada Akira) Mikura 5 and 6 Blocks before disaster & after LR project Some of the empty spaces were filled with litter and some were fenced, which created Source: Yasui, Etsuko. Community Vulnerability and Capacity anin Post-disater unhealthy Recovery: and unattractive The cases environment ofneighbours for the Mano and Mikura (Machi-Communication 2003). neighbourhoods in the wake of the 1995 Kobe earthquake. The empty spaces also created dark spots at night which made the neighbours feel unsafe and Unpublished Thesis Report, University of British Columbia, 2007. Mikura 5 and 6 Block insecure about walking after dark (see Figures 7.7 and 7.8). The residents and visitors also Source: Google Earth Satellite Imagery: 4/26/2012. 242 Land Value Capture in Urban DRM Programs 5 modated tenants; although many of the original owners tion of land for sale by auction to recover infrastructure did not move back into the community after LR as they costs. The process is slow as local governments have no had already settled in the relocation area. Only 1/3 of authority to sanction plans, manage land auctions or re- the original residents moved back and the overall popu- vise land use rules and regulations and state government lation was less than before the earthquake even after approvals are required34. 10 years28. Lessons from Japan Land Readjustment Projects: LR Bhuj Land Readjustment Project projects have been successful for several reasons: i) inte- Objectives: Bhuj town endured severe damages during gration with the city master plan, ii) private associations the 2001 earthquake35. In the densely populated inner- are active in residential projects while the city comple- city, buildings collapsed on narrow streets/ cul-de-sacs ments with infrastructure projects, iii) tradition of com- and hindered rescue efforts36. TPS was undertaken in munity based planning in Japan is generally strong, iv) the inner-city as part of comprehensive city-wide plan- legislation supports selective use of eminent domain to ning initiatives that included significant investments in ensure project implementation, v) successful cost recov- social amenities at the periphery and trunk infrastruc- ery in private projects, and vi) risk-resilient building ture to 3 relocation sites37. methods incorporated in reconstruction. Challenges Actions: TPS was used in 8 inner-city sites to opti- include: i) finance for public projects, ii) community op- mize density, control non-conforming land uses, ensure position especially from residents who do not appreciate minimum lot size and plot access to roads and basic the project benefits29, iii) insufficient occupation despite infrastructure in the inner-city. Residents had the op- densification, iv) retaining original owners if process is tion to relocate voluntarily or participate in the TPS. slow and emergency shelters are distant, and iv) dura- Many households preferred to move out of the congest- tion of LR projects is long in the tight time frames of ed walled city to the well-serviced and well-connected post-disaster reconstruction30. relocation sites in the periphery and the overall number of plots in the TP schemes reduced by 20%. Voluntary Gujarat (India) relocation reduced resistance to TPS in the inner city. Neighborhood committees were formed for micro- Locally called Town Planning Schemes (TPS), LR is planning tasks. Eminent domain was used for com- used as a mechanism for land assembly and plot ad- pulsory surrender of plots and houses that were either justments in about 1/3rd of urban projects (Ahmedabad severely damaged or obstructed the TPS layout. Plot ring road, public spaces in unauthorized and peri-urban access was ensured by widening streets where build- developments) in Gujarat state31. LR has been used for ings had collapsed while maintaining the original street rebuilding 4 severely affected urban centers after the pattern and avoid disturbing built properties. Wide 2001 earthquake32. loop roads connected the walled city to the rest of the Project Design and Implementation: TPS projects are urban area and amenities38. Preparing the new layout voluntary and must conform to the master plan. Legisla- was challenging since base maps were lacking, no ac- tion was established in Maharashtra and Gujarat states curate data was available for underground utilities and in 1915. Community engagement is not effective33. TPS it was difficult to work around standing structures. Ab- is an elaborate multi-stakeholder exercise with legisla- sence of updated property records caused delays in plot tive to technical departments involving more than 30 transfers39. TPS was sensitive to very small plot own- steps. Landowners transfer up to 40% of their land to ers. There were no deductions for plots < 30sq.m. while the government in return for serviced plots. Only regis- plots > 300 sq.m. had to contribute 35%40. Further, to tered land owners are allowed to participate; renters and ease the burden on low-income residents, a 5 year mor- informal residents are excluded. Land owners can ei- atorium on property tax was declared41. Land use regu- ther build new homes or sell the sites. The government lations and development controls were revised to allow builds roads and public facilities and reserves a por- uniform height across all wards for seismic resilience42. 6 Disaster Risk Management in East Asia and the Pacific Fig 3: Bhuj Inner-city Land Readjustment Project Narrow streets and cul-de-sacs before disaster Wider and continous streets after LR Source: Jha et al. Safer Homes, Stronger Communities: Resources for Reconstructing Housing and Communities after Natural Disasters. Washington DC: The World Bank, 2010. Results: The Bhuj TPS project decongested parts of the to build, to mine, to farm, among others and that these walled city by ensuing minimum lot sizes and plot access; `partial’ rights are available for market transactions. but it did not minimize relocation. Although the process The concept of severance of rights is used in several was expedited to be completed in half the time during countries for programs: farmland and environmental post-disaster reconstruction, compared to a convention conservation, urban growth management/ TOD, heri- TPS in Gujarat, it cost the government almost a third tage preservation and social housing45. The owner of a more43. The significant expansion of serviced land in the property with considerable public amenity (infrastruc- periphery along with LR in the walled city appears to ture, low-income housing etc.) value can trade `devel- have moderated real estate price increase in the periph- opment rights’ from a designated `sending zone’ to a ery; and the overall supply of safe, serviced and affordable buyer for use in a designated `receiving zone’ resulting land sites for the urban poor increased in Bhuj44. in a `transfer of development rights’. The land owner in the sending zone loses his right to develop but is com- Lessons from Gujarat Land Readjustment Projects: pensated for the development potential of his land at The projects have been successful given their: i) integra- tion with the master plan, ii) selective use of eminent do- market value. The buyer, usually a private developer, is main ensures project implementation, and iii) combina- given density bonuses to provide public amenities. De- tion with other LVC tools, such as tax holiday in Bhuj. velopers may also trade development rights in the open Drawbacks include: i) focus on land owners only - rent- market. TDR balances `wipeouts’ for property owners ers and informal residents are excluded, ii) weak commu- in preservation areas where land values drop and `wind- nity engagement, and iii) delays caused by bureaucratic falls’ for property owners in growth areas where land state government procedures for local development. values increase46. The design of a TDR program can be complex and is based on a city’s comprehensive plan and real estate market. TDR programs can be mandated II. TRANSFER OF DEVELOPMENT or voluntary. Although municipal TDR programs are RIGHTS common, TDR programs are also planned to guide re- gional development47. TDR (or density transfers / air rights) works on the principle that absolute property rights can be consid- TDR is a promising tool to guide development away ered as a `bundle’ of different rights, such as the right from hazard buffer zones to high-density compact de- Density With TDR Land Value Capture in Urban DRM Programs 7 Figure 4: How does Transfer of Development Rights Work Transferred unused development rights Unused development 2.5 Units/Acre Density Without TDR 8 Units/Acre rights on zoning lot with landmarked building 0.1 Units/Acre Density With TDR 10 Units/Acre Source: Huron River Watershed Council: Source: New York City Department of City http://www.hrwc.org/publications/smart-growth-publications/transfer-of-development- Planning rights/. http://www.nyc.gov/html/dcp/html/zone/ glossary.shtml. velopment in safe zones. The EMI endorses the use of CASE STUDIES TDR to reduce/ mitigate risk by reducing densities in most sensitive areas and conserving habitat48. In Phil- USA ippines, TDR programs have been recommended for Several US counties use TDR to direct development mainstreaming DRR through land use planning49. In away from hazard buffer (landslide, coastal and seismic) Marikina, it is recommended for earthquake mitigation zones. The New Jersey State TDR Bank recommends that is challenged by relocation of informal settlers from TDR to coastal communities for protection of habitat, risk areas, scarcity of developable land and high popula- riparian buffers, watershed, steep slopes and wellheads tion density50. and transfer development to areas with access to pub- Key benefits of TDR projects: i) economic equity for lic infrastructure and amenities53. Florida State identi- the land owners; ii) preserved amenity (environmental/ fies TDR as one of the tools to implement beach-front cultural) value of land, iii) new development guided into post-disaster redevelopment planning and reduce de- designated zones, and iv) government can plan for pub- mand for evacuations and shelter by guiding develop- lic amenities at minimal cost without land acquisition51. ment in hazardous areas54. The US EPA recommends Key challenges for TDR projects: i) information on TDR as a tool for designating coastal retreat zones as TDR sellers, buyers and prices is not available and sending areas in order to decrease risks from sea level landowners find it difficult to find buyers (if the prices rise55. In the US, about 140 TDR programs have effec- fluctuate a lot, landowners may speculate and not sell tively preserved about 49,000 acres of land56. TDRs), ii) land market values are high enough for de- velopers to make enough profit from the additional de- Program Design and Implementation: There are many velopment they can sell, even after paying for the ser- models for TDR programs with different designating vices the city wants them to provide, iii) large public sending and receiving areas and incentive ratios. Most subsidies reduce land market price differentials essen- programs are municipal but there have been also suc- tial to make TDR viable, iv) restricted technical skills cessful regional programs. The New Jersey Pinelands is available to design the program incentives; v) limited one of US’s most successful regional programs across 13 demand for additional density in receiving areas, and municipalities to protect sensitive aquifers. Most TDR vi) complex program design and approval procedures52. programs are voluntary57. 8 Disaster Risk Management in East Asia and the Pacific Collier County TDR Program processes for new developments and public disapproval to density bonuses in receiving areas subverted TDR Objective: 3 TDR programs address rapid urban transactions59. Later, a low floor price for TDRs was set growth that is threatening unique wildlife habitat and that was not attractive to landowners. Landowners in water resources near Naples city, a wealthy community the sending area preferred to sell land outright for better located along the Collier County (Florida) coast ad- market price. In both later programs bonus TDR were joining the Everglades National Park, Big Cypress Na- offered to boost the programs60 and TDR sales picked tional Reserve and the Florida Panther National Wild- up. Connections to public sewer and water service are life Refuge58. prohibited in the TDR sending areas. In the rural area, Actions: TDR programs were adopted in 1974 to: i) TDR program sending and receiving areas are based preserve coastal islands and marshes, and later in 2002- on land characteristics (soils, land use and land cover). 3 to ii) preserve agricultural land in the urban-rural Land use benefits are differentiated in 8 layers to com- fringe, and to iii) control development in rural areas. pensate landowners for land potential other than devel- Over time, the County adjusted the program incentives opment and TDRs are generated by removing a layer to address real-estate market fluctuations and public of land use. All receiving developments are clustered opinion. Initially, stringent restrictions and approval to maximize habitation, preserve native vegetation and Figure 5: Collier County TDR Program TDR PROGRAM ACTIVITY JUNE 2013 ROBERTS AVE W MAIN ST E MAIN ST 13TH ST SE S 9TH ST S 1ST ST S 5TH ST OTT ER TR L STOCKADE RD CR 846 CORKSCREW SWAMP IMMOKALEE RD SANCTUARY 70TH AVE NE OIL 40TH ST NE 68TH AVE NE W EL 66TH AVE NE 66TH AVE NE LG LEE 64TH AVE NE LEGEND RAD 64TH AVE NE ER 62ND AVE NE DESOTO BLVD N COUNTY D 60TH AVE NE TDR SEVERED 58TH AVE NE 56TH AVE NE NATURAL RESOURCE PROTECTION AREA 54TH AVE NE RURAL LANDS STEWARDSHIP AREA 42ND ST NE 46TH ST NE 44TH ST NE 52ND AVE NE 40TH ST NE 50TH AVE NE PUBLIC LANDS (NOT ELIGIBLE FOR TDR) 22ND ST NE 10TH ST NE 20TH ST NE 16TH ST NE 18TH ST NE 12TH ST NE 14TH ST NE 47TH AVE NE RURAL FRINGE MIXED USE DISTRICTS: 8TH ST NE 45TH AVE NE 45TH AVE NE 45TH AVE NE EVERGLADES BLVD 43RD AVE NE RF-Neutral 41ST AVE NW 41ST AVE NE 41ST AVE NE 39TH AVE NW 39TH AVE NE RF-Receiving 39TH AVE NE 37TH AVE NE 37TH AVE NW 37TH AVE NE RF-Sending 35TH AVE NW 35TH AVE NE 35TH AVE NE 33RD AVE NW 33RD AVE NE OIL WELL RD CR 858 2ND ST NE 31ST AVE NE 4TH ST NE 31ST AVE NE 8TH ST NW 2ND ST NW 4TH ST NW 6TH ST NW 29TH AVE NE 29TH AVE NE 27TH AVE NE 27TH AVE NE 25TH AVE NE RANDALL BLVD IMMOKALEE RD 24TH AVE NE 24TH AVE NE 24TH AVE NE 24TH AVE NW 24TH AVE NE AUTUMN OAKS LN 22ND AVE NW 22ND AVE NE 22ND AVE NE 22ND AVE NE 22ND AVE NE DESOTO BLVD N 20TH AVE NW 20TH AVE NE 20TH AVE NE 20TH AVE NE ! ( 951 18TH AVE NW 18TH AVE NE JUNG BLVD E 18TH AVE NE NAVASS A LN 16TH AVE NW 16TH AVE NE 16TH AVE NE 14TH AVE NW 14TH AVE NE 14TH AVE NE 14TH AVE NE WILSON BLVD N UPOLO LN WOLFE RD 12TH AVE NW 12TH AVE NE 12TH AVE NE 12TH AVE NE 10TH AVE NW 10TH AVE NE 10TH AVE NE 10TH AVE NE 10TH AVE NE ENGLISH OAKS LN VANDERBILT BEACH RD 8TH AVE NE 8TH AVE NE 22ND ST NE 20TH ST NE 6TH AVE NE 15TH ST NW 6TH AVE NE 17TH ST NW 19TH ST NW 18TH ST NE 23RD ST NW 21ST ST NW 13TH ST NW 14TH ST NE 16TH ST NE 10TH ST NE 12TH ST NE 25TH ST NW 3RD ST NW 11TH ST NW 7TH ST NW 5TH ST NW 4TH ST NE 6TH ST NE 8TH ST NE 2ND ST NE LOGAN BLVD N 9TH ST NW 29TH ST NW 31ST ST NW 27TH ST NW 1ST ST NW 5TH AVE NW 5TH AVE NW 4TH AVE NE 4TH AVE NE 3RD AVE NW 3RD AVE NW 2ND AVE NE 2ND AVE NE 1ST AVE NW 1ST AVE NW GOLDEN GATE BLVD W GOLDEN GATE BLVD E 1ST AVE SW 2ND AVE SE 2ND AVE SE 23RD ST SW 29TH ST SW 19TH ST SW 31ST ST SW 21ST ST SW 17TH ST SW 15TH ST SW 11TH ST SW 9TH ST SW 7TH ST SW 3RD ST SW 1ST ST SW 2ND ST SE 14TH ST SE 3RD AVE SW 10TH ST SE 12TH ST SE 16TH ST SE 4TH ST SE 22ND ST SE 3RD AVE SW 6TH ST SE 8TH ST SE 5TH ST SW 18TH ST SE 20TH ST SE 4TH AVE SE 4TH AVE SE 5TH AVE SW 5TH AVE SW 6TH AVE SE 6TH AVE SE 27TH ST SW 25TH ST SW 13TH ST SW 7TH AVE SW 7TH AVE SW 8TH AVE SE 8TH AVE SE PINE RIDGE RD WHITE BLVD 10TH AVE SE 10TH AVE SE 15TH ST SW 11TH ST SW 9TH ST SW 11TH AVE SW 11TH AVE SW 12TH AVE SE 12TH AVE SE DOGWOOD WAY 13TH AVE SW 13TH AVE SW 14TH AVE SE 14TH AVE SE LANCEWOOD WAY 23RD ST SW 19TH ST SW 21ST ST SW 17TH ST SW 15TH AVE SW 15TH AVE SW 16TH AVE SE 16TH AVE SE 16TH AVE SW GREEN BLVD 17TH AVE SW 18TH AVE SE 18TH AVE SE SUNSHINE BLVD CEDAR TREE LN SU 19TH AVE SW 20TH AVE SE WESTPORT LN N 20TH AVE SE SE T 21ST AVE SW HUNTER BLVD 54TH TER SW 22ND AVE SE 50TH TER SW SEA GRASS LN RD 22ND AVE SE 23RD AVE SW 24TH AVE SE 24TH AVE SE STAR GRASS LN 25TH AVE SW 26TH AVE SE 26TH AVE SE 44TH ST SANTA BARBARA BLVD 27TH AVE SW 28TH AVE SE 46TH ST 28TH AVE SE 29TH AVE SW 30TH AVE SE 30TH AVE SE SW 31ST AVE SW 32ND AVE SE 32ND AVE SE SW 32ND AVE SW 34TH AVE SE 34TH AVE SE § ¨ ¦ 36TH AVE SE 36TH AVE SE 75 38TH AVE SE 38TH AVE SE RADIO RD 40TH AVE SE 40TH AVE SE § ¨ ¦ 75 § ¨ ¦ 75 DESOTO BLVD S NAPLE S HERITA COPE LN CREWS RD ! ( 951 GE DR RATTLESNAKE HAMMOCK RD SORRENTO LN R GD GLE VD EVERGLADES BLVD S RT BL DO RE SO LE LY £ ¤ Í PALM DR TOWER RD 41 MANATEE RD CAMPANILE CIR SILV ER LAK ES BLV D AVIAM AR CIR 0 0.5 1 2 3 4 MULBE RRY Miles GIS MAPPING: BETH YANG. AICP DESOTO BLVD S TECHNOLOGY & GIS SUPPORT /GROWTH MANAGEMENT DIVISION £ ¤ 41 FILE: F:/GIS/DATAREQUEST/TDR/TDRACTIVITYMAP.MXD LN ! (951 134TH AVE SE Source: Google Earth Satellite Imagery 2012. Source: Collier County Florida: http://www.colliergov.net/Index.aspx?page=270. Land Value Capture in Urban DRM Programs 9 connections to preserved lands and wildlife corridors. Program Design and Implementation: The program, in Receiving areas must be used for compact mixed-use particular for slum redevelopment, serves as a model in developments and no increase in density is permitted India. It has one coordinating planning agency and mul- except through purchase of development rights. Since tiple executing agencies that include private developers, developers can get additional density though `Planned public bodies, NGOs and cooperative housing societies Unit Development’ projects and cluster developments, of slum dwellers. The program designates the relatively there is less incentive to purchase TDR61. dense Mumbai CBD (island city) as a sending area. All TDR generated from plots within the island city are to Results: Colliers County depends on its TDR program be used in the suburbs. Suburbs can serve as sending and to manage growth and has designated 41,500 acres in receiving areas. TDR generated in the suburbs can be sending areas, almost half in private ownership62. The used in the same ward or in another ward north of the first TDR program designated a ‘special treatment plot. Incentive Floor Space Index (FSI) 69 is offered to overlay zone’ over 80% of the county and preserved 325 cover costs of construction costs and private land, transit acres63. The two later programs (rural-urban fringe and camps, offsite infrastructure, maintenance corpus fund, rural land stewardship program) covered 73,222 acres servicing of loans, and for adequate developer profits. In- overall in the urban-rural mixed-use fringe and the ru- centive FSI varies with land value (lower in high-value ral areas. A new town and university rely on TDR from island city and higher in the suburbs) and can be used preserved land. The Colliers Rural Lands Stewardship in the same plot or as TDR in receiving sites, or mort- Area program is promoted as a model by the Florida gaged70. However, uncontrolled generation of TDR from State. Counties in Florida must adopt TDR program for preserving agricultural land in rural areas64. the three programs has created a glut in the TDR market several times thereby reducing TDR market price and Lessons from US TDR Programs: TDR programs making TDR projects financially not viable71. have significantly reduced public expenditure for pub- lic amenities as compared to land acquisition. But they Community organizations play a crucial role in explain- have been challenging to implement since they depend ing the benefits of the TDR program. Consent of 70% on: i) development pressure and the fluctuating market of slum residents is mandatory. The program is sensi- for TDRs, ii) complex program design for designating tive to the needs of informal residents, renters and par- sending and receiving areas, allocation rates and ap- ticularly vulnerable sections within the urban poor. All proval procedures, iii) ensuring adequate services for the pavement and slum dwellers who establish that their receiving areas, and iv) other municipal programs with names were on the electoral roll before a cut-off date the same objectives that land owners may find it easier are eligible. Women are organized into cooperative self- or more profitable to use instead of TDR65. help groups to access funds from credit institutions72. Older and special needs residents are allotted ground floor units73. Cooperatives of slum dwellers receive India (Mumbai) leasehold title to the land. Municipal taxes are pegged at TDR has been used in Mumbai since 1991 to supple- 20% to reduce burden on slum families with a provision ment finance for infrastructure, slum redevelopment to increase them gradually over time. Apart from slum and heritage preservation66. Following the Mumbai redevelopment, the TDR program was used to mini- program, several Indian cities are adopting TDR, espe- mize displacement while clearing land of slums for the cially for transportation and slum redevelopment67, and Mumbai Urban Transportation Project74. to manage disaster risks. Zoning regulations in Manga- lore incorporate TDR to appropriately compensate for private property acquired as part of the GOI-UNDP Mumbai TDR in the Coastal Regulation Urban Earthquake Vulnerability Reduction Project, a Zone sub-component of the DRM program in 38 cities lo- Objective: The rapidly urbanizing coast line of Mumbai cated in Seismic Zones III, IV and V with a population has high-value real estate and large number of slums lo- of half million and above68. cated in flood-prone stretches. The 1991 Coastal Regu- 10 Disaster Risk Management in East Asia and the Pacific lation Zone (CRZ) under notification by the Ministry Results: The state government lacks the funding to of Environment and Forests controls development along enforce the federal government CRZ notification. Vio- the coast. The CRZ restricts all developments within 500 lations are rampant: Navi Mumbai satellite town that meters of the high tide line. Being flood-prone, the CRZ, was planned to decongest the city was constructed by especially CRZ II is home to many slum dwellers who destroying mangroves directly in violation of the CRZ. cannot afford safer housing. The Slum TDR was modi- TDR is a tool that has been successful in preserving fied to prevent additional development in the CRZ75. environmentally sensitive areas in many countries. In Mumbai, even though it has been used to clear large Actions: Although the government offers incentive FSI parcels of land required for expansion of road and sub- to promote slum redevelopment in less expensive areas, urban railway network, and metro, monorail and river program imposes restrictions on incentive FSI in the development projects, its potential to enforce the CRZ CRZ. TDR is not allowed within and from this zone, regulations and provide financial incentives to direct making slum redevelopment with TDR financially not development away and relocate slums from the CRZ viable76. Public share of 51% has been permitted to has not been explored. Unfortunately, environmental- make it attractive for private developers, but incentive ists consider Slum TDR in the CRZ as environmentally details are unclear. Government committees have ar- irresponsible while proponents of slum redevelopment gued for permitting increase in FSI for slum redevel- consider it socially irresponsible78. opment within the CRZ, and to reduce the CRZ in zones with high population density and built up areas. Lessons from Mumbai (India) TDR Program: The Revisions to the CRZ have reduced the no-build zone Mumbai TDR has been successful as it: i) increased the and freed up several slum clusters for redevelopment77. overall housing stock through incentive FSI in high- Figure 6: Mumbai Coastal Regulation Zone CRZ designation Slums in CRZ II Source: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/ Source: Google Earth Satellite Image 1/9/2013. article/pii/S0964569112001019. Land Value Capture in Urban DRM Programs 11 value lands, even slums79, ii) legitimized the residency used directly for payment of works. The CEPACs can rights of large numbers of pavement and slum dwell- be traded as bonds on the Stock Exchange. The selling ers, iii) combines tax rebates and deferment along with price of bonds is set by the respective Urban Operation TDR to make the program more accessible to the urban Law. The bonds are guaranteed by financial institutions poor, and iv) allows TDR certificates to be mortgaged and auctioned to the real estate market to expedite the by developers, it provides much needed development projects under Urban Operations. Revenues are col- finance for private developers who are known to other- lected in a state owned bank for specific funds such as wise depend on the underworld to raise capital. Limita- social housing82. tions relate to lacking: i) designated sending and receiv- ing areas with reference to the CRZ and master plan, so Curitiba Flood Protection TDR Program83 TDR is not used to implement the CRZ, ii) receiving areas developed without adequate infrastructure, and Objective: Curitiba is surrounded by rivers and flood- iii) incentive FSI in CRZ such that Slum TDR is fi- ing is a serious problem. Flood prone areas are occupied nancially unviable in the low-value hazard zone. by slum dwellers. TDR is used to preserve the green recreational areas for flood protection and relocate slum Brazil dwellers. Locally known as Solo Criado, TDR is widely used in Actions: Curitiba has a TDR program for environmen- Brazil for heritage preservation, environmental pro- tal protection apart from heritage preservation and so- tection, social housing, inner city redevelopment and cial housing. In order to protect the city from recurrent urban infrastructure projects such as road access to floods, Curitiba created a natural drainage system using buildings, drainage works, and relocation of rail road TDR for environmental protection instead of install- tracks. Sao Paulo used TDR in 1969 to restructure an ing concrete flood protection structures. TDR sending important road, metro and for development of activity areas include riverbanks that were converted into parks poles80. The Joint Urban Operations (Operações Urbanas to absorb overflow and lakes constructed to contain Consorciadas) program for projects implemented by the flood waters to prevent flooding downstream. Barigui Park (140 Ha. park with 40 Ha. of lake) created using municipal governments (Sao Paulo, Rio de Janeiro and TDR was once occupied by slum dwellers (Fig 7). The Curitiba) with land owners, residents and private inves- right to develop protected and forested areas could be tors uses TDR Certificates of Additional Construction exchanged for the right to develop in other city receiv- Potential (CEPAC)81. ing areas. Other municipal policies support the TDR Program Design and Implementation: Brazil has so- program. To encourage urban trees, city regulations re- phisticated TDR programs. In Sao Paulo, allocation of strict the area of developable land in proportion to for- CEPACs is complex and varies according to the Stra- est area. Tax rebates are given for having trees on private tegic Regional Plans and local master plan. Planners in land. A cycling network was created along the streets Sao Paulo evaluate several indicators to assess the carry- and inside parks. ing capacity of receiving sites that are monitored closely Results: The Curitiba park system is estimated to be 5 for adverse effects of using additional floor space. In Cu- times less expensive than building flood protection ca- ritiba, an automated cadaster and land information sys- nals. Maintenance costs were reduced by 80% by keep- tem was established in the 80s to give the municipality ing sheep in the parks to eat grass and provide natural precise information on building coefficients, densities fertilizer. The reserved forests that have increased 50 and development potential of every plot in the city. An times since 1970 capture an estimated 140 tons of CO2 independent public authority, the Institute for Research per Ha. Land values adjoining the parks have increased and Urban Planning of Curitiba, is responsible for re- together with property tax revenues. search, planning and implementation of urban plans that assures continuity across different political regimes. Lessons from Brazil TDR Programs: i) comply with CEPACs issued by a municipality can be auctioned or the master plan and carefully designate receiving zones 12 Disaster Risk Management in East Asia and the Pacific Figure 7: Curitiba Environmental TDR program TDR for Environmental Preservation Barigui Park Source: Suzuki, Hiroaki, Arish Dastur, Sebastian Moffatt, Nanae Source: Google Earth Satellite Image - 5/21/2009. Yabuki, and Hinako Maruyama. Eco2 Cities: Ecological Cities as Economic Cities. Washington DC: World Bank, 2010. according to infrastructure capacity, ii) use TDRs as Basket of Tools publicly tradeable bonds which convert floor space into LR and TDR are not `silver bullets’ for the challenges in currency that gives flexibility in using the revenues for public finance and land protection in DRM programs. public amenities, and iii) combine other municipal poli- Municipal tools can sometimes work at cross-purposes cies such as development restrictions, tax rebates and to LR and TDR mechanisms. Local governments must incentives to use flood storage recreational areas to en- identify tools that will complement LR and TDR such sure success of the TDR program. as, integrating with the master plan and supporting land management tools, enabling legislation and institution- RECOMMENDATIONS FOR al coordination, and adopt risk resilient land use and IMPLEMENTING LR & TDR building regulations. Land value capture mechanisms, such as LR and TDR, are used to manage urban growth in several countries 1. Integrating with the Master Plan with different resources, technical capacities and gov- LR and TDR are not stand-alone tools but comple- ernance systems. Often, they can be complex to design ment other land management tools, such as, land regis- and implement especially where land management ca- ter/ cadaster, land use planning, land and property valu- pacity is poor. To effectively use LR and TDR in imple- ation and taxation. They must be incorporated with city menting land use plans for DRM, local governments master plan (as in Brazil, Japan, and the US) for hazard must improve existing land management capacity by: zoning, density management and housing supply (in- i) combining LR and TDR with supporting municipal cluding rental) and environmental protection plans. tools in a `basket of tools’, ii) strengthening municipal TDR programs must designate clear sending areas and capacity in land administration and work with real es- receiving areas that have adequate infrastructure. LR tate markets, and iii) supporting community-based or- and TDR are opportunities to create compact, dense, ganizations. well-serviced neighborhoods and increase overall sup- Land Value Capture in Urban DRM Programs 13 ply of affordable housing in the city while avoiding de- other amenities. Where TDR is used to implement haz- velopment in hazardous sites. Wipeouts due to hazard ard buffer zones extending over several municipalities, buffer zones can be managed by designating no-build inter-jurisdictional cooperation must be strengthened. zones for eco-system services for hazard mitigation and amenity values as in Curitiba. In the US, local govern- 3. Risk resilient land use and building ments facilitate TDR to develop greenways84. Resto- regulations ration, rehabilitation and management of mangroves along Vietnam’s coast reduced substantial disaster risks Disaster reconstruction projects often overlook exist- and provided additional income to coastal communities ing risks. LVC projects are opportunities to review land through aquaculture products etc.85. Where local gov- use and building regulations and demarcate hazardous ernments lack the capacity to execute large scale mas- pockets, reserve land for emergency shelters and opera- ter/ disaster resilience plans, LR projects can be imple- tions or open spaces for DRR related ecosystem servic- mented in an integrated orderly sequence according to es. In Istanbul, Turkey, LR has been used to provide for the master plan and at a manageable scale. A TDR pro- public squares, parks, playground, green areas, police/ gram is most effective when used in conjunction with gendarme stations and hospitals86. LR projects must other land management tools such as zoning, purchase incorporate rebuilding using hazard resistant building of development rights, land acquisition and develop- codes and materials. ment impact fees, land register/ cadaster, property valu- ation and taxation. Since gentrification due to increased property taxes after redevelopment is possible, property LAND ADMINISTRATION CAPACITY tax holiday as in Bhuj and Mumbai (India) can ease the impact of higher fees. In many developing countries land markets are robust enough to make LVC tools attractive, but land admin- istration is poor. LR and TDR depend on extensive use 2. Enabling Legislation & Institutional of land records, establishing and re-establishing rights Coordination over conflicting claims. However, incomplete and out- LVC mechanisms depend on land markets and land dated land records as well as pluracy of land tenure ar- markets are not regulated in many countries by appro- rangements as in Kobe ( Japan) are common. Land ad- priate legislation. LVC works best when there is a strong ministration capacity should be strengthened for LVC legal framework. Fragmented, inadequate and complex mechanisms. The automated system in Curitiba offers laws increase project costs. Instituting legislation that a sophisticated model. However, where land adminis- can enable local governments to use LVC mechanisms tration capacity is very poor, especially after a natural for quick recovery after a disaster is paramount. Sup- disaster, LVC projects can be an opportunity to improve porting legislation must enable planning at local level, capacity. For example, in post-conflict Angola, LR has unlike in India in the past, where state mandates sup- been effectively implemented without a legal frame- pressed local planning possibilities for revising develop- work and formal governance due to extensive commu- ment regulations. Selective use of eminent domain has nity mobilization by an NGO87. It is therefore necessary worked well to avoid hold outs, as in Kobe and Bhuj. to identify key land administration strengths required Implementing LR and TDR can be time consuming immediately in the aftermath of a disaster and long- term capacities that are required for continued func- and complicated and poor institutional coordination tioning of LVC tools. at different levels can delay or stall LVC projects for DRR. Approval procedures for LR and TDR project To design LR and TDR programs, technical capacity is approvals must be streamlined. In locations where LR required to understand the functioning of real estate mar- and TDR are planned for increased density, coordina- kets in order to set incentives for private developers such tion with sector agencies is required to provide adequate that they are profitable while protecting the interests of transportation networks, water supply and sewage and the landowners and residents, including the most vulner- 14 Disaster Risk Management in East Asia and the Pacific able. Local governments can manage land markets with costs. Community organizations can better ensure that price information and oversight88. Renters are often not the needs of the most vulnerable residents are heard. considered, as in Bhuj (India). LVC projects must rec- Local governments must develop capacity to support ognize different forms of land tenure arrangements and and leverage the skills of CBOs. After the Kobe earth- the legitimacy of renters, as in Misuga ( Japan). Since LR quake, the role of community-based organizations in reduces plot size, it may be unsuitable for low-income DRM has been recognized and local governments in households that rely on extra space for rental income or Japan are expected to support them89. UN-HABITAT home-based industries. In such cases, variable deductions has launched the Participatory and Inclusive Land Re- of land for infrastructure, as in Bhuj (India) and the op- adjustment (PILaR program that focuses particularly tion to purchase additional space, as in Misuga (Kobe) on community development in addition to institutional can preserve the interests of low-income residents. and governance reform90. COMMUNITY-BASED ORGANIZATIONS KEY RESOURCES LVC mechanisms depend on successful community en- ■■ World Bank. 2013. Building Urban Resilience: gagement such as in Japan and India (Gujarat) where Principles, Tools and Practice. community cooperation is traditionally strong. Com- ■■ UN-HABITAT. 2010. Land and Natural Disasters munity organizations play an important role to commu- – Guidance for Practitioners. nicate project decisions and implementation process, as ■■ World Bank. 2011. Memo to the Mayor: Improv- in Misuga (Kobe) especially where property owners do ing Access to Urban Land for All residents: Fulfill- not recognize their obligation to pay for services and are ing the Promise. World Bank Urban Development reluctant to give up part of their land to cover project Series Knowledge Paper. Land Value Capture in Urban DRM Programs 15 ENDNOTES Yasui, Etsuko. Community Vulnerability and Capac- 11 ity in Post-disaster Recovery: The cases of Mano and 1 ESCAP-UNISDR. Reducing Vulnerability and Ex- Mikura neighbourhoods in the wake of the 1995 Kobe posure to Disasters: The Asia-Pacific Disaster Report earthquake. Unpublished Thesis Report, University 2012. ESCAP-UNISDR, 2012. of British Columbia, 2007 2 Hyogo Framework of Action Priority Area 4, see Oosawa, Kishii. n.d. 12 ESCAP-UNISDR.2012. Office of Disaster Reconstruction, Disaster Recon- 13 3 For a discussion on land markets and natural hazards, struction Headquarters. “Sendai City Earthquake see UN-HABITAT. Land and Natural Disasters – Disaster Reconstruction Plan (Interim Draft), Di- Guidance for Practitioners. 2010. gest Version.” Sendai City, September 2011 4 Jha, Abhas K, Jennifer Duyne Brenstein, Priscilla Oosawa, Kishii. n.d. 14 M Phelps, Daniel Pittet, and Stephen Sena. Safer Homes, Stronger Communities: Resources for Re- Schnidman, 1988. 15 constructing Housing and Communities after Nat- Olshansky, Robert B, A Laurie Johnson, and C Ken- 16 ural Disasters. Washington DC: The World Bank, neth Topping. “Rebuilding Communities Following 2010. Disasters: Lessons from Kobe and Los Angeles.” 5 LR originated in Germany for farmland consolida- Built Environment, 2006: Vol. 32 No. 4 pp 354-374. tion and has since become an important urban de- Schnidman. 1988. 17 velopment tool in several countries in Europe, USA, Olshansky, et al. 2006. 18 Asia, Middle East, Africa, Latin America and East Larsson, G. “Land Readjustment: A tool for urban 19 Asia. See (Haile, Solomon Abebe. “An Overview development.” Habitat International, 1997: 21(2), of Land Readjustment Case Studies UN Habitat 141-152. Documented and some Lessons Learned.” 8th FIG Regional Conference. Montevideo, Uruguay: UN- Schnidman, 1988. 20 Habitat, Global Land tool Network, 2012; Hong, Yasui, 2007. 21 Yu-Hung, and Barrie Needham. Analyzing Land Olshansky, et al, 2006. 22 Readjustment: Economics, Law and Collective Action. Yasui, 2007. 23 Cambridge, MA: Lincoln Institute of Land Policy, Ibid 24 2007). LR is one of the UN HABITAT’s Global Land Tool Network’s 18 recommended pro-poor Tanaka, Yasuzou, and Akiko Kimura. “Housing 25 land tools UN-Habitat (Handling Land: Innovative Problems after the Great Hanshin-Awaji Earth- tools for land governance and secure tenure. Nairobi: quake: Co-Housing and Rebuilding the communi- UN-Habitat, International Institute of Rural Recon- ty.” n.d. struction, 2012). Olshansky, et al. 2006. 26 6 Schnidman, Frank. “Land Readjustment.” Urban Ibid 27 Land, February 1988: 2-6. Yasui, 2007 28 7 EMI. Kathmandu Risk Sensitive Land Use Planning. In all 178 post-disaster LR projects from 1919- 29 Mainstreaming Disaster Risk Reduction in Mega 2000, LR was not implemented where the number Cities: A Pilot application in Metro Manila and of houses collapsed was 100 or less since residents Kathmandu - Topical Report No. 1, Quezon City, were not uniformly affected and would not appreci- Philippines: Earthquake and Megacities Initiative, ate benefits of LR (Oosawa, Kishii. n.d.). 2008. In Mano, Kobe, the community preferred not use 30 8 Yu-Hung, Needham. 2007. LR since it suffered relatively less damage and feared 9 Ibid. that LR could delay the reconstruction process (Ya- 10 Oosawa, Kishii. n.d. sui, 2007). In Misuga, Kobe, 2 LR projects perma- 16 Disaster Risk Management in East Asia and the Pacific nently displaced some residents and businesses by ment), being considered in Germany, Bangladesh slow progress (Olshansky, et al.2006). and Hong Kong (Dharmavaram, Soumya. Taking 31 Haile, 2012. Transferable Development Rights To Mumbai Slums: Implications for Policy Transfer, Working Paper 32 Rajack, et al. 2012. (Draft) 2009). 33 Haile, 2012. The UN Millennium Project endorses TDR as a tool 46 34 Sanyal, Bishwapriya, and Chandan Deuskar. “A Bet- that generates resources for socially responsible use ter Way to Grow? Town Planning Schemes as Hy- of land (UN Millenium Project Task Force on Im- brid Land Readjustment Process in Ahmedabad, In- proving the Lives of Slum Dwellers. A home in the dia.” In Value Capture and Land Policies, by Gregory city. London, Sterling Va.: Earthscan, 2005). K Ingram and Yu-Hung (eds.) Hong. Cambridge, Pruetz, Rick. Beyond Takings and Givings. California: 47 Massachusetts: Lincoln Institute of Land Policy, Arje Press, 2003; Rose, J G. “The Transfer of Devel- 2012. opment Rights: An Interim Review of an Evolving 35 GSDMA. The Implementation Completion Report. Concept.” In Transfer of Development Rights, by J G Gujarat State Disaster Management Authority, Rose. New Jersey: Center for Urban Policy Research, 2008. Rutgers - The State University, 1975. 36 Jha, et al. 2010. Reyes, Marqueza (ed.) L. Mainstreaming Disaster Risk 48 37 Rajack, et al 2012. Reduction Through Land Use Planning and Enhancing 38 Ibid Risk Management Practices. Cross-Cutting Capacity Development (3cd) Series, Philippines: Earthquakes 39 Edadan, Narayanan. Understanding Land Market ef- and Megacities Initiative, Inc., 2006. fects of Town Planning interventions in Post Disaster Management: Case of Gujarat Earthquake Reconstruc- NEDA, UNDP, ECHA. Mainstreaming Disaster 49 tion Project. Presentation, International Conference Risk Reduction in Sub-national Development: Land on Land Access in Disaster Management Program, use/ Physical planning in the Philippines - Guidelines. The World Bank, 2010. National Economic and Development Authority, United Nations Development Programme, Euro- 40 Rajack, et al.2012. pean Commission Humanitarian Aid, 2008. 41 Edadan, Narayanan. “Post Disaster Land Manage- Banba, Michiko, et al. “Analysis of Land use Man- 50 ment Persepectives: Case of Sri Lanka and Gujarat.” agement for Earthquake.” 13th World Conference on World Reconstruction Conference. Geneva, Switzer- Earthquake Engineering. Vancouver, Canada, 2004. land: World Bank, GFDRR, UNISDR, Global Plat- form for Disaster Risk Reduction, 2011. Pruetz, 2003; Rose, 1975. 51 42 Rajack, et al. 2012. Walls, Margaret, and Virginia McConnell. Transfer 52 of Development Rights in US Communities: Evaluat- 43 Edadan, 2010. ing Program Design, Implementation, and Outcomes. 44 World Bank. After the Aftermath: Post-Disaster Land Washington DC: Resources for the Future, 2007. Management Policies and their Medium Term Impacts Bruder, Steven. “Transfer of Development Rights & 53 on Land Markets in Gujarat and New Orleans. Syn- Possibilities for Coastal Communities.” Monmouth thesis Report, Washington DC: The World Bank, University: Urban Coast Institute. 2007. 2012. State of Florida. “Review of the Literature on Post- 54 45 US (heritage/ farmland preservation/ environmental Disaster Recovery and Redevelopment.” 2010. conservation, control urban sprawl), Canada (heri- Titus, James G. Rolling Easements. Washington DC: 55 tage, open space, housing and mixed use develop- US Environmental Protection Agency, 2011, 176. ment), Brazil (roads, social housing, densification, TOD, heritage and forests), Netherlands (farmland), Walls, McConnell. 2007. 56 India (heritage, infrastructure and slum redevelop- Ibid 57 Land Value Capture in Urban DRM Programs 17 58 Ibid Dharmavaram, 2009. 71 59 Pruetz, 2003. Burra, 2005. 72 60 Density bonuses are offered for early entry, environ- Gill, Maninder, and Ashwini Bhide. “Densification 73 mental restoration and maintenance of sending areas, through Vertical Resettlement as a tool for Sustain- conveyance of property to government or non-profit able Urban Development.” Sixth Urban Research organization, preserving native vegetation, receiving Symposium. World Bank, 2012. areas with public water and sewer access, lands des- Burra, 2005. 74 ignated as flow-away stewardship area, habitat stew- Burra, Sundar. “Changing the Rules: Guidelines 75 ardship area or water retention area (Walls, McCon- for the revision of regulations for urban upgrading.” nell. 2007). 2003. 61 Walls, McConnell. 2007. Ibid 76 62 Ibid Ministry of Environment and Forests. “Report of the 77 63 Pruetz, 2003. Committee - Chaired by Prof. MS Swaminathan - 64 Walls, McConnell. 2007. To Review the Coastal Regulation Zone Notifica- 65 In Queen Anne’s County, the TDR program became tion 1991.” New Delhi, 2005. inactive when density transfers were allowed through Burra, 2003. 78 a non-contiguous development program; in Sarasota Gill, 2012. 79 County, a PDR program undermines TDR sales. For Acioly Jr., Claudio C. “Can Urban Management De- 80 a discussion of US TDR programs, see Walls, Mc- liver the Sustainable City? Guided Densification in Connell. 2007. Brazil versus Informal Compactness in Egypt.” In 66 Municipal Corporation of Greater Mumbai: http:// Compact Cities: Sustainable Urban Forms for Devel- www.mcgm.gov.in/ accessed 4.11.2012. oping Countries, by Michael Jenks and Rod Burgess. 67 The Ministry of Housing and Poverty Alleviation London: Spon Press, 2000. recommends TDR to state governments to create Froes, Marilda, and Jorge M Rebelo. “Urban Opera- 81 a slum-free India through the Rajiv Awas Yojana tions And The São Paulo Metro Line 4.” 2006. program (Mission Directorate. Rajiv Awas Yojana: Acioly. 2000; Froes, Rebelo. 2006. 82 Slum-free India Mission. Ministry of Housing & Ur- Suzuki, Hiroaki, Arish Dastur, Sebastian Moffatt, 83 ban Poverty Alleviation. Government of India, Pre- Nanae Yabuki, and Hinako Maruyama. Eco2 Cities: sentation n.d.). The UN HABITAT identifies it as a Ecological Cities as Economic Cities. Washington DC: best practice for facilitating security of tenure and ac- World Bank, 2010. cess to land for the urban poor (UN-Habitat. 2012). Association of State Floodplain Managers. “No Ad- 84 68 Venkataramana , Katta, and Sanjeev Peethala. “Com- verse Impact in the Coastal Zone.” 2007. prehensive revision of building byelaws - A case of Mangalore city.” 2nd Asian Ministerial Conference on ESCAP-UNISDR. 2012. 85 Disaster Risk Reduction. New Delhi, India, 2007. Haile, 2012. 86 69 Floor Space Index refers to ratio of permissible floor Ibid 87 space allowed in a plot of land to the area of the plot Germany practices freeze on development and sales 88 itself (World Bank. Memo to the Mayor: Improving during an LR project unless formally permitted by Access to Urban Land for All residents: Fulfilling the the LR committee (Schnidman, 1988). In Brazil, Promise. World Bank Urban Development Series land prices are frozen once the government announc- Knowledge Paper. 2011). es its program (Acioly, Claudio. 2000). In Chile, the 70 Burra, Sundar. “Towards a pro-poor framework for Real Estate Co-ownership Law requires all partici- slum upgrading in Mumbai, India.” Environment & pating land owners of the LR project to sign a legal Urbanization, 2005: 67-88. document; any sale of land held by the designated 18 Disaster Risk Management in East Asia and the Pacific organizing agency would require the consensus of all Wakayama, T. “Community-based Disatser Preven- 89 participating owners (Hong, Yu-Hung, and Isabel tion Planning (R. Watanabe, Trans.).” In Lessons Brain. “Land Readjustment for Urban Development from the Great Hanshin Earthquake, by Y Shiozaki, and Post-Disaster Reconstruction.” Land Lines: Lin- E Nishikawa and T (Eds.) Deguchi. Kobe, Japan: coln Institute of Land Policy, January 2012: 2-9). In Creates-Kamogawa Publishers, 2005. Pinelands, New Jersey, the state government operates UN-HABITAT, Urban Legal Network and GLTN. 90 a TDR bank authorized to purchase and sell devel- Participatory and Inclusive Land Readjustment. n.d. opment rights as well as provide matching funds for purchase by a municipality. In the Calvert County farmland preservation TDR program, the govern- ment buys some rights each year and retires them; the prices have been very stable since the early 1990s (Walls, McConnell. 2007). East Asia and the Pacific Region The World Bank 1818 H St. NW, Washington, D.C., 20433 http://www.worldbank.org/eap Special thanks and appreciation are extended to the partners who support GFDRR’s work to protect livelihood and improve lives: ACP Secretariat, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Denmark, Egypt, European Commission, Finland, France, Germany, Haiti, India, Indonesia, International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, Ireland, Islamic Development Bank, Italy, Japan, Korea, Republic of, Luxembourg, Malaysia, Mexico, Morocco, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Portugal, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Solomon Islands, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Togo, United Kingdom, United Nations Development Programme, United States, UN International Strategy for Disaster Reduction, and the World Bank.