Independent Evaluation Group (IEG) Implementation Completion Report (ICR) Review AFR:Central African Backbone - APL1A (P108368) Report Number : ICRR0020568 1. Project Data Project ID Project Name P108368 AFR:Central African Backbone - APL1A Country Practice Area(Lead) Western Africa Transport & ICT L/C/TF Number(s) Closing Date (Original) Total Project Cost (USD) IDA-46470,IDA-H5150,IDA-H5160 15-Mar-2016 26,730,000.00 Bank Approval Date Closing Date (Actual) 24-Sep-2009 15-Mar-2016 IBRD/IDA (USD) Grants (USD) Original Commitment 26,200,000.00 0.00 Revised Commitment 26,200,000.00 0.00 Actual 24,219,514.96 0.00 Prepared by Reviewed by ICR Review Coordinator Group Ranga Rajan J. W. van Holst Christopher David Nelson IEGSD (Unit 4) Krishnamani Pellekaan 2. Project Objectives and Components a. Objectives The Project Development Objective (PDO) for the Central Africa Backbone (CAB1A) Program as stated in the Financing Agreements for Cameroon (Schedule 1, page 6), Chad (Schedule 1, page 4), Central African Republic (Schedule 1, page 6) and the Project Appraisal Document (PAD, page 14) was: "To contribute to increase the geographical reach and usage of regional broadband network services and reduce their prices". Page 1 of 20 Independent Evaluation Group (IEG) Implementation Completion Report (ICR) Review AFR:Central African Backbone - APL1A (P108368) b. Were the project objectives/key associated outcome targets revised during implementation? Yes Did the Board approve the revised objectives/key associated outcome targets? No PHEVALUNDERTAKENLBL c. Will a split evaluation be undertaken? Yes d. Components This project in Cameroon, Chad and the Central African Republic (CAR) was part of the Central African Backbone (CAB) regional program. The program aimed at providing broadband connectivity to all capital and main secondary cities in Central African countries. Specifically, the program aimed at establishing new regional telecom operators for reselling international, regional and national capacity to national operators and service providers at discounted rates and establishing a regional Public-Private Partnership (PPP) entity to manage the CAB infrastructure. The CAB program was structured as a Vertical Adaptable Program Loan meaning that technical assistance activities to countries were to be phased out as needed prior to mobilizing the required financing for investments in the regional Information and Communication Technology (ICT) sector infrastructure. However, on April 23, 2009 the Africa Regional Operations Committee in the World Bank decided to split the CAB program into two phases. The first phase aimed at creating an enabling environment for developing the ICT sector in the project countries. The second phase, to be triggered once the effectiveness conditions were met, envisaged regional investments in connectivity infrastructure. The effectiveness conditions included: (i) the establishment of a legal structure by countries for managing the regional ICT network PPP arrangements and ensuring an open access regime to regional connectivity infrastructure (meaning that all operators and service providers would have access to regional infrastructure under similar terms and conditions). and, (ii) the CAB legal structure had received the legal rights to operate the CAB network on the recipient's territory. Both Cameroon and Chad took actions that eventually resulted in the cancellation of the second phase. Cameroon withdrew from participation in the second phase in November 2010 and decided to have its national backbone built under a separate contract, as it characterized the regional PPP structure as an imposition on its national sovereignty. Chad created a separate company in early 2012 to manage its fiber optic network, in direct contradiction with the foreseen regional PPP. The envisaged second phase of this project was cancelled on December 15, 2012 due to the failure to meet the effectiveness deadline by the participating countries. As envisioned at appraisal, the project had the following components. Component One. Enabling environment [appraisal cost estimate US$19.98 million (US$6.90 million for Cameroon, US$5.68 million for CAR and US$7.40 million for Chad); actual cost US$18.57 million (US$6.50 million for Cameroon, US$5.19 million for Chad and US$6.88 million for CAR)]. This component financed technical assistance activities associated with providing an enabling environment for developing the ICT sector in the respective countries. Activities included: (i) modernizing and harmonizing the policy, legal, regulatory and institutional framework; (ii) strengthening the capacity of key public stakeholders; (iii) promoting a competitive environment and restructuring of incumbent operators. Another activity in this component (included in Schedule 1 of the Financing Agreement), was the structuring and start-up activities required for establishing regional networks interconnected to the existing fiber-optic cable Page 2 of 20 Independent Evaluation Group (IEG) Implementation Completion Report (ICR) Review AFR:Central African Backbone - APL1A (P108368) laid along the Chad-Cameroon oil pipeline, including environmental and social management assessment and plans. As explained above, this activity associated with regional investments in the ICT sector was cancelled when the conditions of effectiveness for CAB1B were not met by Cameroon and Chad.. Component Two: eGovernment and Flagship ICT Applications (appraisal cost estimate US$1.20 million; actual cost US$1.16 million). This activity was intended for Cameroon as the only country with a core broadband network in its capital city. This component aimed at improving government efficiency through supporting the roll-out of selected egovernment applications. Activities included: (i) selecting major government services for transition to egovernment; (ii) flagship ICT applications; and (iii) establishment of government web portals. Component Three: Project Management Component [appraisal cost estimate US$5.02 million (US$1.80 million for Cameroon, US$1.62 million for CAR and US$1.60 million for Chad); actual cost US$4.49 million (US$1.78 for Cameroon, US$1.58 million for CAR and US$1.13 million for Chad)]. This component financed project management-related activities. Activities included: (i) staffing the Project Coordination Unit (PCU); (ii) financing a financial management system; (iii) technical assistance activities; (iv) small works: (v). Training; and (vi) financing the operating expenses. e. Comments on Project Cost, Financing, Borrower Contribution, and Dates Project Cost. Estimated cost at appraisal was US$26.20 million (US$9.90 million for Cameroon, US$7.30 million for CAR and US$9.00 million for Chad). Actual project cost was 92% of the appraisal estimate at US$24.22 million (US$9.44 million for Cameroon, US$6.77 million for CAR and US$8.01 million for Chad). Project Financing. The project was financed by an IDA loan to Cameroon and IDA grants to CAR and Chad. Appraisal estimate US$26.20 million (US$9.90 for Cameroon, US$7.30 million for CAR and US$9.00 million for Chad). According to the information provided to IEG by the project team, the total amount disbursed to date was 96% of the estimate at US$25.00 million (100% of the loan for Cameroon and 100% of the grant for CAR was disbursed and the IDA grant disbursed for Chad was 89% of the appraisal estimate). There was parallel financing for complementary ICT sector-related activities for the CAB1A program from the African Development Bank (AfDB). Borrower Contribution. The appraisal estimate for the contribution from Cameroon was US$0.53 million. Cameroon's contribution at project closure was 4% more than planned at US$0.55 million. No contributions by way of counterpart funding were envisaged from CAR and Chad. Dates. There was one Level 2 restructuring on April 14, 2014 following the cancellation of funds for activities associated with regional ICT investments on December 15, 2012. The project closed as per schedule on March 15, 2016. Restructuring and Split Rating. The following changes were made through the Level 2 restructuring. (a) Funds allocated for the cancelled activities and uncommitted funds were utilized for financing activities in each country that had regional implications. These included (i) financing the establishment of a regional e waste center in Yaoundé in Cameroon; (ii) capacity building in the Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications, the regulatory agencies and relevant stakeholders for addressing interconnection regimes in CAR; and (iii) financing the purchase of quality control equipment to improve service delivery of mobile phone operators and Internet Service Providers (ISPs) in Chad. and, (b) The results framework and outcome indicators were revised as the original framework and indicators Page 3 of 20 Independent Evaluation Group (IEG) Implementation Completion Report (ICR) Review AFR:Central African Backbone - APL1A (P108368) mainly reflected the regional dimension of the project, which was cancelled. Although the PDO was unchanged in the level 2 restructuring, there were material differences in the project scope associated with the cancellation of the regional connectivity activity. Therefore the assessment of the project's outcome in this Review will be based on a split rating of achievements before restructuring when 55% of the loan and grant was disbursed and after restructuring when the balance was disbursed. 3. Relevance of Objectives & Design a. Relevance of Objectives Before appraisal, the economies of Cameroon, CAR and Chad were constrained by the lack of access, limited coverage, and high prices of ICT services. Fixed teledensity (defined as the number of fixed telephone lines per 100 inhabitants) in the countries was on average 1.24 lines as compared to the Sub- Saharan Africa (SSA) average of 1.82. Mobile density (defined as the no of mobile subscriptions per 100 inhabitants) varied widely among the project countries - 24.48 in Cameroon, 2.29 in CAR and 8.53 in Chad - as compared to the SSA average of 22.79 and world average of 49.79. International tariffs for landlocked countries like CAR and Chad which were exclusively using satellites was about 50 times higher than in countries with connections to competitive fiber-optic submarine cables. The low coverage and high prices for ICT services were due to a combination of factors including, isolation of the countries and incomplete market liberalization that allowed the incumbent operators to restrict coverage and keep prices artificially high. The PDO was aligned with the targets of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). While goal one of the MDG, highlighted the need for eradicating poverty and hunger, goal eight of the MDG reaffirmed the need to support the special needs of landlocked countries (MDG target 14) and the need for cooperating with the private sector to make available the benefits of new technologies in the ICT sector to the population (MDG target 18). In the regional context, the PDO was consistent with the declaration adopted by the Central African Economic and Monetary Committee (CEMAC) calling for the establishment of a regional Central African Backbone under open access and PPP principles. The PDO continued to remain relevant for the participating countries until after the project closed as evidenced by the recent adoption of the national ICT strategy in Cameroon and Chad's inclusion of the ICT sector as one of the eight priority objectives in its recent National Development Plan. The PDO was aligned with the World Bank's strategy for the project countries and for the Bank's Regional Integration Assistance Strategy for Africa (RIAS) at appraisal. Theme One of the Country Assistance Strategy (CAS) for the 2010-2013 period highlighted the need for increasing Cameroon's competitiveness through among other things, increased infrastructure investments in the telecommunication sectors. The second axis of the Bank's Country Partnership Strategy (CPS) for the 2009-2012 period for CAR underscored the need for rehabilitating and developing socio-economic infrastructure through, among other things, easing the infrastructure bottlenecks that were hindering the development of key sectors and improving infrastructure for regional economic integration. The Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) for the 2008-2015 period for Chad specifically identified the need for integrating Chad into the integrated fiber- optic communications network. The Bank's Regional Integration Assistance Strategy for Africa (discussed by the Board in April 2004) identified ICT as an emerging positive trend in the 21st century for Africa Page 4 of 20 Independent Evaluation Group (IEG) Implementation Completion Report (ICR) Review AFR:Central African Backbone - APL1A (P108368) and highlighted the Central African Backbone's (CAB's) role for the regional connectivity objective. The PDOs were aligned with the most recent Bank strategy documents for the participating countries: [World Bank: World Development Report 2016 - Digital Dividends; Cameroon Systematic Country Diagnostic, June 20, 2016; Recovery and Peacebuilding Assessment for CAR jointly prepared by the World Bank, United Nations (UN) and the European Union (EU); IDA Turnaround Eligibility Note for the Central African Republic, September 27, 2016; and Chad Country Partnership Framework for the 2016-2020 period]. These documents emphasized the importance of the ICT sector for strengthening competitiveness, creating jobs, improving service delivery and accelerating economic growth in the respective countries. In summary, the relevance of the objective to the national development strategies of the respective countries, the World Bank’s regional strategy and its assistance strategy for Cameroon, CAR and Chad was rated as High before and after restructuring. Rating Revised Rating High High b. Relevance of Design The statement of the PDO was clear and the links between project activities, outputs and their outcomes was logical. The intended outcomes were in principle, measurable. Component One activities aimed at providing technical assistance for the development of the ICT sector in conjunction with a regional network were expected to contribute to improving ICT services. Component two activities aimed at selecting major government services for transition to egovernment were expected to improve government efficiency. The combination of these activities was expected to respond to the PDO of contributing to increasing the geographical reach and usage of regional broadband network services and reduce their prices to users. The original design was ambitious - covering three countries each with its ICT sector issues and capacities, implementing agencies and creation of a regional PPP. The ICR does not clarify whether the decision by the Africa Regional Operations Committee to split the project into two phases was taken in consultation with the respective participating countries, given that the second phase of the project had to be cancelled on account of the refusal of Cameroon and Chad to accede to the project effectiveness conditions. It is also not clear if there was a thorough assessment of the results framework at design, given that the original outcome indicators were focused on activities associated with investments in the regional ICT infrastructure and hence inappropriate for monitoring the technical assistance activities eventually financed by the project. The revised design had a narrower scope and was confined to technical assistance activities aimed at creating an environment conducive for the development of the ICT sector in the project countries. The revised design also utilized the funds resulting from the cancellation of the regional PPP activities for activities with regional implications in conjunction with the original activities, could be expected to contribute to the PDO and to the higher level objective of aiding regional economic integration. In summary, the relevance of the original design before restructuring was rated as Modest and the relevance of design after restructuring was rated as Substantial. Page 5 of 20 Independent Evaluation Group (IEG) Implementation Completion Report (ICR) Review AFR:Central African Backbone - APL1A (P108368) Rating Revised Rating Modest Substantial 4. Achievement of Objectives (Efficacy) PHEFFICACYTBL Objective 1 Objective To contribute to increase the geographical reach and usage of regional broadband network services. Rationale Although the PDO remained unchanged, given the change in project scope and changes in outcome targets, a split rating is conducted in this Review through assessing the efficacy of outcomes before restructuring when 55% of the loan and grant was disbursed and after restructuring when the balance 45% was disbursed. Before Restructuring. (a) Outputs. The technical assistance activities for the three countries were completed as targeted. For Cameroon the outputs included : • Various studies, reports and documents on telecommunications and internet issues: (i) a policy note on the regulatory bottlenecks impeding the development of the broadband market; (ii) a policy note on the general and specific obligations for the set-up and operation of transport infrastructure for electronic communications; (iii) the publication of the new legal and regulatory framework and secondary legislation for the ICT sector; (iv) completion of a report on the strategic repositioning of the incumbent operator; (v) the telecommunication sector tax and tariff study was completed; (ii) completion of feasibility studies for the use of solar energy for network transmission and for establishing a technology innovation center in Cameroon: (iii) the white paper on operational procedures for submarine cables was completed; (vi) the study for defining procedures for digitization of documents and content was completed; (v) Completion of a study summarizing all public services available on the government website. (vi) The government website was completed: (vii) the studies on electronic filing system, establishing a hybrid mailing service and reviewing the spectrum management framework were completed (ICR, paragraph 75, Annex 2 page 44- 46). • Technical assistance provided for improving the regulatory framework. Cameroon awarded the third license to Vietnam's Viettel in December 2012 and Viettel started operations in September 2014. In September 2014, the Government awarded a fourth license to Cameroon Telecommunications (CAMTEL) and at project closure, all four mobile operators offered 3G services in major cities and towns and 4G services were launched in December 2015 (ICR, page 24). Page 6 of 20 Independent Evaluation Group (IEG) Implementation Completion Report (ICR) Review AFR:Central African Backbone - APL1A (P108368) • Equipment and Systems: The project provided equipment for spectrum management and monitoring, and information systems. • Workshops and training: Capacity building for stakeholders in the telecommunications sector on the implementation of the new laws on electronic communications, cybersecurity and cybercrime, electronic transactions, and consumer protection as well as communication strategy for the project and training for designing and setting up the regulatory tools for spectrum management (ICR, paragraph 56, Annex 2). ). For CAR activities included: • Various studies, reports and documents on telecommunications and internet issues: (i) adoption of the draft law on electronic communications by the government; (ii) the fiscal study on open access was completed and the recommendations of the study was adopted by the government; (iii) the study on management and financing mechanisms for setting up the universal service fund was completed; (iv) the report with recommendations was completed; (v) the technical study for implementing digital community centers was completed; (vi) CAB related environmental and resettlement plans were completed; (vi) technical assistance was provided to promote PPP to the CAB program; (vii) the studies associated with the auditing of the Central African Telecommunication Company (SOCATEL) and the incumbent operator and a strategy for the structuring of SOCATEL were completed; and (viii) the study on the design of frequency spectrum management regulatory tools was completed (ICR pages 47-48). • Information technology and internet connections: These were established for the Ministry of Telecommunications and Information Technology and radio equipment was procured for the High Council of Communications. • Equipment and systems: Spectrum management and monitoring systems were installed. • Workshops and training sessions: The staff of ART were trained on spectrum management and monitoring. For Chad activities included: • Legal and regulatory framework and studies: (I) the new legal and regulatory framework and secondary legislation for the ICT sector was completed and nine new laws were adopted by the government; (ii) the studies on regulatory tools, regional interconnection and design of frequency spectrum management regulatory tools were completed (ICR page 49). • Equipment for Information Technology: Spectrum management and monitoring systems were purchased. • Workshops and training sessions: Workshops were held for mobile quality of service and training was provided for procurement. • Technical assistance: This assistance was provided for the building two fiber optic links infrastructure and extending the national backbone for interconnection with Cameroon and Sudan. Activities included training for the staff of the ministry and The Telecommunication Company for Chad (the French acronym - Page 7 of 20 Independent Evaluation Group (IEG) Implementation Completion Report (ICR) Review AFR:Central African Backbone - APL1A (P108368) SOTEL) on fiber optic backbone and interconnection and a survey study on technical specifications used for the Chad-Sudan fiber link. The two links broke Chad's landlocked status and constituted the first cross-Africa fiber link (ICR, page 26). Technical assistance was also provided for a new legal framework and this contributed to setting of two new modernized regulatory agencies - The Regulatory Authority for Electronic Communications and Posts (the French acronym - ARCEP) and the Agency for Development of ICT (the French acronym - ADETIC). ARCP started licenses for Third and Fourth Generation wireless mobile communications technology (3G and 4G) and this contributed to increasing competition (ICR, page 27). (b) Outcomes. • Activities before restructuring in the three countries were all output-oriented. • Activities pertaining to regional ICT investments for improving connectivity were cancelled. Rating Modest PHREVDELTBL PHINNERREVISEDTBL Objective 1 Revision 1 Revised Objective The objective remains unchanged: To contribute to increase the geographical reach and usage of regional broadband network services. Revised Rationale After Restructuring. (a) Outputs. In addition to the outputs discussed above which were all relevant after restructuring, the following outputs were produced. Cameroon; Feasibility study was prepared and Terms of Reference drafted for operationalizing the regional e-Waste center and practical guide was prepared for the Digital Switchover (DSO) process. CAR: The study for establishing a national and regional Internet Exchange Point (IXP) was completed. Chad: (I) The feasibility study on establishing a national IXP was completed: (ii) The study on regional interconnection was completed: (iii). Three Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) were signed by Chad - with Cameroon, CAR and Sudan: and, (iii) Survey studies were completed and social and environmental impact assessment of the fiber optic network from N'Djamena to Sudan border was completed. (b) Outcomes. Cameroon. • 92.5% of the population had mobile coverage compared to 35% at the baseline. This exceeded the original target of 70% (ICR, Data Sheet, PDO Indicator 24). • The number of beneficiaries (defined as any individual covered by the wireless network of a mobile Page 8 of 20 Independent Evaluation Group (IEG) Implementation Completion Report (ICR) Review AFR:Central African Backbone - APL1A (P108368) operator or Internet Service Provider) increased from 6,849,646 at the baseline to 21,593,366 at project closure. This represented a 315% increase. No targets were set for this indicator (ICR, Data Sheet, PDO Indicator 16). • 68 private and public stakeholders benefitted from the project and more than 4,166,000 new people used Internet at project closure. No target values were set for this indicator (ICR, Data Sheet, PDO Indicator 19). CAR. • 59% of the population had mobile coverage compared to 19.3% at the baseline. This exceeded the original target of 47.5% (ICR, Data Sheet, PDO Indicator 25). • The number of beneficiaries (defined as above) increased from 826,118 at the baseline to 2,891,162. This represented a 350% increase. No targets were set for this indicator (ICR, Data Sheet, PDO Indicator 17). • 10 direct project beneficiaries were identified at closure. This included: The Ministry of Post and Telecommunications in charge of New Technologies, CAR (MPTNT), The High Council of Communications (HCC), The Telecommunications Regulatory Agency (ART), and three Internet Service Providers. 182,000 new people used Internet at project closure (ICR, Data Sheet, PDO Indicator 20). Chad. • 83% of the population had mobile coverage compared to 24% at the baseline. This exceeded the original target of 50% (ICR, Data Sheet, PDO Indicator 26). • The number of beneficiaries (defined as any individual covered by the wireless network of a mobile operator or Internet Service Provider) increased from 2,673,538 at the baseline to 11,651,102. This represented a 436% increase. No targets were set for this indicator. (ICR, Data Sheet, PDO Indicator 18). • 11 direct project beneficiaries were identified at closure. This included: The Ministry of Posts and New Information and Communication Technologies, The Regulatory Authority for Electronic Communications and Posts, The Central African Telecommunications Company, three mobile private operators and five internet service providers. 863,000 new people used Internet at project closure. No targets were set for this indicator (ICR, Data Sheet, PDO Indicator 21). Summary. Not all of the outcomes could be attributed to the project activities given that outcomes could also have been influenced by exogenous factors such as the rapid growth of ICT globally, whose adoption tends to be faster especially in the urban context and the rapid evolution of the sector in general, including the introduction of third and fourth generation (3G and 4G) mobile broadband technologies, which help to make more broadband accessible. While it is difficult to assess the extent to which the project contributed to this objective, there is considerable evidence to indicate that the project made a substantial contribution after restructuring to increasing the geographical reach and usage of regional broadband network services. Revised Rating Substantial Page 9 of 20 Independent Evaluation Group (IEG) Implementation Completion Report (ICR) Review AFR:Central African Backbone - APL1A (P108368) PHEFFICACYTBL Objective 2 Objective To reduce the prices of regional broadband network services. Rationale Before Restructuring. (a) Outputs The outputs listed above for Objective 1 were also relevant for this objective. Many of them contributed to reduced prices for regional broadband network services and for individual consumers. (b) Outcomes. Activities before restructuring in the three countries were all output-oriented. Rating Modest PHREVDELTBL PHINNERREVISEDTBL Objective 2 Revision 1 Revised Objective The objective remains unchanged. To reduce the prices of regional broadband network services. Revised Rationale After Restructuring. (a) Outputs. The outputs listed above were also relevant after restructuring. (b) Outcomes. Cameroon. • Average monthly price of wholesale international capacity link from Yaoundé (Cameroon) to European Hub (E1) dropped from US$6,000 at the baseline to US$920 at project closure. This exceeded the original target of US$1,200. (ICR, Data Sheet, PDO Indicator 10). • Retail prices of Internet Services (Mbit/s per month) dropped to US$200 as per the original target and as compared to US$660 at the baseline (ICR, Data Sheet, PDO Indicator 27). • According to the Global System for Mobile Communication Association (GSMA), the Herfindahl- Hirschman (HH) Index - a commonly accepted measure of market concentration - dropped from 5,309 in December 2008 to 3,784 for Cameroon. This is indicative of increasing competition in the ICT sector (ICR, page 27). Page 10 of 20 Independent Evaluation Group (IEG) Implementation Completion Report (ICR) Review AFR:Central African Backbone - APL1A (P108368) CAR. • Average monthly price of wholesale international capacity link from Bangui (CAR) to European Hub (E1) dropped from US$7,000 at the baseline to US$3,200 at project closure. This was short of the target of US$2,500. (ICR, Data Sheet, PDO Indicator 11). • Retail prices of Internet Services (Mbit/s per month) dropped from US$1,700 at the baseline to US$1,000 at project closure. However, this was well short of the target of US$400.(ICR, Data Sheet, Indicator 28). • According to GSMA, the HH Index dropped from 3,996 in December 2008 to 3,130 in March 2016 for CAR (ICR, page 27). Chad. • Average monthly price of wholesale international capacity link from N'Djamena (Chad) to European Hub (E1) dropped from US$7000 at the baseline to US$108.76 at project closure and as compared to the target of US2000 (ICR, Data Sheet, PDO Indicator 12). • Retail prices of Internet Services (Mbit/s per month) dropped from US$2,120 at the baseline to US$1080 at project closure. This was short of the target of US$320 (ICR, Data Sheet, Indicator 29). • According to GSMA, the HH Index dropped from 5,389 in December 2008 to 4,704 in March 2016 for Chad (ICR, page 28). Not all of the outcomes could be attributed to the project activities given that outcomes could also have been influenced by exogenous factors such as the rapid growth of ICTs globally, whose adoption tends to be faster especially in the urban context and the rapid evolution of the sector in general, including the introduction of third and fourth generation (3G and 4G) mobile broadband technologies. While it is difficult to assess the extent to which the project contributed to this objective, there is considerable evidence that the project made a substantial contribution after restructuring to increasing competition in the ICT sector in the respective countries and thereby to reduced wholesale and retail prices in the three countries. Revised Rating Substantial PHREVISEDTBL 5. Efficiency At appraisal, an economic and financial analysis for each country was carried out based on the assumption that investment in fiber-optic infrastructure would be supported through a PPP in the second phase. As explained above, CAB1B (activities proposed for the second phase of CAB1) was cancelled. The project eventually financed mainly technical assistance activities which are not amenable to a formal cost- benefit analysis because of the difficulties of measuring benefits. Administrative and Operational Costs. There were no cost overruns. The funds resulting from cancelled activities were used to finance activities with regional implications as requested by the governments. The Page 11 of 20 Independent Evaluation Group (IEG) Implementation Completion Report (ICR) Review AFR:Central African Backbone - APL1A (P108368) costs of technical assistance activities associated with regulatory framework and draft legal frameworks were comparable to technical assistance costs of Bank projects in its West Africa Regional Communication Network Program (WARCIP) that financed similar activities. Although it took ten months between approval and effectiveness due to capacity constraints in Chad and the disbursement rate was 31% for Cameroon and 26% for Chad (55% for Cameroon) prior to the Mid Term Review in May 2013, these were rectified and all planned activities were completed at project closure with a disbursement of 96% as of March 14, 2016. There were no time overruns. Despite the outbreak of conflict in CAR in 2012-2014, which resulted in suspension of project disbursements from March 2013 to April 2014, all planned activities were completed by the scheduled project closing date. Efficiency Rating Substantial a. If available, enter the Economic Rate of Return (ERR) and/or Financial Rate of Return (FRR) at appraisal and the re-estimated value at evaluation: Rate Available? Point value (%) *Coverage/Scope (%) 0 Appraisal 0 Not Applicable 0 ICR Estimate 0 Not Applicable * Refers to percent of total project cost for which ERR/FRR was calculated. 6. Outcome The project development objectives were highly relevant to the priorities of the participating countries in the Central Africa region and to the Bank’s strategy for the participating countries and in the regional context before and after the project’s restructuring. Relevance of design before structuring was rated as Modest and relevance of design after restructuring was rated as Substantial. Efficacy of the two objectives - to contribute to increasing the geographical reach and usage of regional broadband network services and to reduce the prices of regional broadband services - was rated as Modest before restructuring when 55% was disbursed and Substantial after restructuring when the balance 45% was disbursed. Efficiency was rated as Substantial before and after restructuring. Hence outcomes before and after restructuring were, respectively, Moderately Satisfactory and Satisfactory. Assigning numbers to these outcome ratings based on a six point scale (i.e. 4 and 5) with the shares of total disbursements before and after restructuring (i.e. 55% and 45%), the overall rating is based on the following formula (O.55*4+0.45*5)= 4.45 which indicates that the overall outcome rating was Moderately Satisfactory. a. Outcome Rating Page 12 of 20 Independent Evaluation Group (IEG) Implementation Completion Report (ICR) Review AFR:Central African Backbone - APL1A (P108368) Moderately Satisfactory 7. Rationale for Risk to Development Outcome Rating Government Ownership/ Commitment. In the three participating countries, the governments’ ownership of the project remained strong as outcome was the result of the enactment of a telecommunications law and secondary legislation (discussed in Section 9a). Also the three countries had also launched additional service providers to enhance competition in the ICT sector and this could be expected to increase usage and lower prices for ICT services. However, this Review concluded that there is a moderate risk to development outcome from this process could be delayed or even halted due to the delays associated with restructuring of the incumbent operators in each country. a. Risk to Development Outcome Rating Modest 8. Assessment of Bank Performance a. Quality-at-Entry The regional program was based on lessons from regional operations in Africa such as the Regional Communications Infrastructure Program (RCIP) operations in Kenya, Burundi and Madagascar and the Southern Africa Power Market Program. Lessons from these projects that were incorporated included, emphasizing the need for a proper enabling environment for development of the ICT sector in each country and mobilizing resources to strengthen the implementation capacity prior to approval, given that weak implementation capacity across participating countries had been identified in the RCIP project as a key constraint for accelerating the implementation of the project. Given the differences among regional countries in terms of the sector structure, the level of development and access, the operational and financial situation of the respective State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs) in the respective countries, the design arrangements in terms of ownership and management were appropriately defined at the country-level. The preparation team played an important convening role by bringing together different partners [the African Development Bank (AfDB), the Central African Economic and the Central African Economic and Monetary Community (CEMAC) and the African Union (AU)] who made financial resources available through the Project Preparation Facility (PPF) for helping the countries to be ready to move quickly on implementation after project effectiveness. During preparation, the project team mobilized a grant from the Institutional Development Fund (IDF) for strengthening the CEMAC's capacity to monitor performance at the regional level through establishing a regional telecom and IT monitoring system and installing new datasets and M&E systems at the member-state levels (ICR, page 12). Despite these positive aspects to project preparation there were significant shortcomings in the project’s Quality-at-Entry. As discussed in Section 3b of this Review, the original design was ambitious - covering three countries each with their own sector issues and capacities, implementing agencies and with different views on Page 13 of 20 Independent Evaluation Group (IEG) Implementation Completion Report (ICR) Review AFR:Central African Backbone - APL1A (P108368) the creation of a regional PPP. The original proposed Central African Backbone (CAB1) project was split into two phases, with the first phase (CAB1A) focusing on the technical assistance activities for the respective countries and the second phase (CAB1B) on the investments in regional ICT connectivity infrastructure through PPP arrangements. This was motivated partly so that the first phase could be included in the FY2009 allocation of IDA-15 commitments (ICR, page 37). Further, it is not clear if the decision to split the project into two phases was taken in consultation with the stakeholders namely the respective governments. This lack of consultation appears to have been conformed by the rejection by Cameroon and Chad of the regional PPP option - as discussed in Section 2b of this Review. The rejection resulted in a failure to meet the effectiveness conditions for CAB1B and the eventual cancellation of the project and activities associated with the regional PPP. There were shortcomings in M&E design. It is not clear if there was a thorough assessment of the results framework at design, given that the original outcome indicators were focused on activities associated with investments in the regional ICT infrastructure and hence less appropriate for monitoring the technical assistance activities eventually financed by the project. Appropriate arrangements were, however, made for compliance with safeguards. Quality-at-Entry Rating Moderately Unsatisfactory b. Quality of supervision Eight Implementation Supervision Reports (ISRs) were filed over a six-year period. The Task Team Leader (TTL) was based in Yaonde (Cameroon) and the proximity to Chad and CAR aided in communication with the counterpart agencies in the project countries, and also contributed to resolving issues and providing support for procurement throughout the life of the project (Borrower's ICR, page 62,63 and 66). The supervision team appropriately revised project activities during restructuring to better respond to the needs and objectives of the countries. The supervision team in undertaking a restructuring that included dropping activities that were no longer feasible and utilizing the funds saved to set up activities that were identified as priorities by the Governments and that would also have a regional focus. Bank Supervision missions conducted in the field on a regular basis helped in constant monitoring of activities during project implementation (Borrower's ICR, page 66). The supervision team also addressed issues faced by the project, such as governance issues in Chad and security threats in CAR and this in conjunction with working extensively with the national project teams contributed to ensuring that activities were completed in a timely fashion. Quality of Supervision Rating Satisfactory Overall Bank Performance Rating Moderately Satisfactory 9. Assessment of Borrower Performance Page 14 of 20 Independent Evaluation Group (IEG) Implementation Completion Report (ICR) Review AFR:Central African Backbone - APL1A (P108368) a. Government Performance The commitment by the three governments to the PDO was high as evidenced by the enactment of legislation associated with telecommunication sector reforms in the years before appraisal. This included, enactment of a telecommunications law in 1998 followed by secondary legislation and launch of two operators in both the fixed and mobile telephone segments in Cameroon, enactment of a new telecommunications law in 2007 followed by secondary legislation and launch of four mobile operators in CAR, and legislation establishing a sector regulatory agency in Chad in 2008 and launch of three mobile operators in 2009 in Chad. The PDOs had the endorsement of the Central African Economic and Monetary Community (CEMAC) heads of state. Specific challenges and support from each government could be summarized as follows. Cameroon. The Government was slow in remedying the lack of ownership of the various government agencies involved in implementing the project and the creation of the Ministry of Public Procurement in 2012 contributed to delays. These issues were eventually resolved. CAR. The Government provided strong support throughout the project. Chad. The Government commitment remained strong following the enactment of nine laws related to electronic communications. Government Performance Rating Moderately Satisfactory b. Implementing Agency Performance The relevant Ministry of Telecommunications was in overall charge of implementing the project in each country (the Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications (MINPOSTEL) in Cameroon, the Ministry of Posts, Telecommunications and New Technologies (MPTNT) in CAR and the Ministry of Post Telecom and ICT (MPTIC) in Chad. The Project Coordination Unit (PCU) was adequately staffed and this aided project implementation (ICR, page 64). Cameroon. As indicated above, there was lack of ownership on the part of various government agencies implementing this project in the initial years of the project. Nevertheless, the PCU was proactive and held meetings every two months with the main government stakeholders and this helped alleviate procurement delays. The PCU also helped in facilitating agreement between the Government and the Bank on procedures to be followed with the Ministry of Public Procurement and its management of financial aspects of the project was deemed to be satisfactory (ICR, page 39). CAR. The large turnover of ministers at the Ministry of Posts, Telecom and ICT and delays by other implementing agencies contributed to delays during implementation. The PCU was able to carry out its functions despite the political conflict in the country in 2012-2014. Chad. The PCU in Chad had frequent staff turnover and this in conjunction with the Government's cumbersome national and administrative procedures (for instance, national procurement practices such as all contracts above US100,000 needed to be cleared by the President) contributed to procurement delays. There were ineligible expenses; seven Project Coordination Units were found to have been engaged in fraud and misuse of project funds and the staff were dismissed. According to the information provided to IEG by the project team, the Government has cleared all ineligible expenses that were identified in the Bank portfolio. Page 15 of 20 Independent Evaluation Group (IEG) Implementation Completion Report (ICR) Review AFR:Central African Backbone - APL1A (P108368) Implementing Agency Performance Rating Moderately Satisfactory Overall Borrower Performance Rating Moderately Satisfactory 10. M&E Design, Implementation, & Utilization a. M&E Design The key outcome indicators for this project were the same as the outcome indicators for the regional program and were standard quantitative ones that covered geographic reach, usage and price of ICT services. The three key outcome indicators at the country level (volume of international communication traffic, volume of national communication traffic and the average price of international communications) were in principle, measurable. The indicators were originally designed to reflect improvements in telecommunications at the regional level when the project was designed. However, once the project was split into two projects by the Bank’s Regional Operations Committee, the indicators were not revised or updated to reflect the change in the scope of project activities. The data for monitoring were to be collected by the sector ministry and the telecom regulatory authority. The Central African Economic and Monetary Community (CEMAC’s) ICT unit was responsible for data analysis for M&E activities across the three countries, although the respective countries were responsible for collecting data (ICR, para 42). CEMAC was also to develop a common M&E system to be shared by all CEMAC members for monitoring regional technology and Information Technology (IT) activities at the regional level. b. M&E Implementation After the Mid-Term Review and project restructuring, key indicators were changed to ensure alignment with the nature of the project activities (both new and old) to better capture the expected outcomes. However, given that revised indicators were designed to keep track of the outcome of technical assistance activities, there were fewer standard quantitative indicators for monitoring progress. Although the new M&E systems were installed and operational in the member states and CEMAC Commission as envisaged, ongoing capacity constraints - with no dedicated M&E specialists appointed in either the ministries or regulatory agencies - and a lack of follow up training, complicated the task of implementing the M&E systems in the individual countries. Ultimately the Information and Communication Technology (ICT) unit of the Central African Economic and Monetary Community (CEMAC) collected the data and performed the M&E around once per year from project approval until late 2012. Following this, the conflict in Chad during 2013 and 2014 resulted in the destruction of computers at the CEMAC ICT Unit and this seriously undermined the performance of M&E related activities. Page 16 of 20 Independent Evaluation Group (IEG) Implementation Completion Report (ICR) Review AFR:Central African Backbone - APL1A (P108368) c. M&E Utilization The indicators were used for monitoring project progress. However, it is not clear whether the data collected were used to inform decision-making and resource allocation (ICR, page 13). M&E Quality Rating Modest 11. Other Issues a. Safeguards The project was classified as a category A project for environmental purposes. Other than environmental assessment (OP/BP 4.01), the social safeguard for Involuntary Resettlement (OP/BP 4.12) was triggered. Environmental Assessment. At appraisal the negative environmental effects were expected to come from the infrastructure/backbone and rural Information Communication Technology (ICT) components of the project under the second phase of the project. The impacts included temporary local disruptions due to the construction of ducts for laying the fiber optic networks or from the construction of ancillary infrastructure (notably access roads associated with towers for microwave links and rural wireless systems) and the deployment of regional and national backbone infrastructure to link all capital and central cities in Central Africa (PAD, page 39). The PAD (page 39) notes that an Environmental and Social Management Framework (ESMF) was prepared that was in compliance with both the respective countries' environmental policies and the World Bank's safeguard policies and it was publicly disclosed as required. The ESMF outlined in detail the environmental and screening process for sub-projects. Since Cameroon, Chad and CAR's environmental procedures did not include a screening process for sub-projects, the ESMF was prepared in screening form in compliance with OP 4.01 Environmental Assessment (PAD, page 40). As noted already in this Review the second phase of the project was cancelled and the project eventually financed only technical assistance activities. The Bank Task Team Leader clarified that there were no environmental issues and the compliance with safeguards was deemed to be satisfactory because no construction works were undertaken. Involuntary Resettlement. At appraisal, it was anticipated that the project activity associated with the construction of telecommunication and ancillary infrastructure could entail land acquisition and thereby necessitate involuntary resettlement of the affected population (PAD, page 40). A Resettlement Policy Framework (RPF) was prepared at appraisal for the overall program taking into consideration the specificity of each country in the program, including in Cameroon, Chad and CAR). The RPF was publicly disclosed in all the countries participating in the program and in the Bank's Info shop as required (PAD, page 40). Specific costed Environmental Management Plans (EMPs) and RAPs were to be prepared as necessary for the terrestrial facilities during project implementation, in line with the ESMF and RPF, once the exact locations of those facilities were identified (PAD, page 40). The Task Team Leader clarified that there was no involuntary resettlement as no construction activities were undertaken during implementation. Hence compliance was not an issue. Page 17 of 20 Independent Evaluation Group (IEG) Implementation Completion Report (ICR) Review AFR:Central African Backbone - APL1A (P108368) b. Fiduciary Compliance Financial Management. Financial assessments were carried out for the project countries at appraisal (PAD page 25). The ICR (page 14) notes that financial management was deemed to be satisfactory during implementation. Interim Financial Reports and internal and external audit reports were submitted in a timely fashion in CAR and Cameroon (ICR page 14). Regarding Chad, there were some problems with the budgeting systems and audits were often submitted late and “on August 22, 2013 the team came across ineligible expenses arising from perceived fraudulent activities carried out by the Project accountant. Seven Project Coordination staff were found to have engaged in fraud and misuse of project funds and were dismissed (ICR, page 15). The Task Team Leader clarified that this issue has now been resolved and on January 10, 2017, the Government cleared all ineligible expenses and lapsed loans identified by the team on the World Bank Portfolio. Procurement. Procurement assessment was carried out for the project countries at appraisal (PAD, page 25). The ICR (page 14) notes that there were procurement delays in the initial years of the project due to lack of coordination between the implementing agencies in Cameroon. Also, there were procurement issues and delays in 2012 due to a major institutional change associated with the creation in Cameroon of the Ministry of Public Procurement. These were eventually rectified and the procurement management was deemed to be satisfactory at the project's close (ICR, page 14). In CAR, despite some initial delays in signing contracts because of political issues, procurement was deemed to be satisfactory despite the conflict in CAR which resulted in destruction of equipment at the Project Coordination Unit and temporary suspension of disbursements (ICR, page 14). There were procurement delays in Chad and national procurement procedures (all contracts above US$100,000 needed to be approved by the President) and although procurement management improved, the filing and archiving system still remained inadequate at project closure (ICR, page 15). c. Unintended impacts (Positive or Negative) --- d. Other --- 12. Ratings Reason for Ratings ICR IEG Disagreements/Comment Moderately Moderately Outcome --- Satisfactory Satisfactory Risk to Development Modest Modest --- Outcome Bank Performance Moderately Moderately --- Page 18 of 20 Independent Evaluation Group (IEG) Implementation Completion Report (ICR) Review AFR:Central African Backbone - APL1A (P108368) Satisfactory Satisfactory Moderately Moderately Borrower Performance --- Satisfactory Satisfactory Quality of ICR Substantial --- Note When insufficient information is provided by the Bank for IEG to arrive at a clear rating, IEG will downgrade the relevant ratings as warranted beginning July 1, 2006. The "Reason for Disagreement/Comments" column could cross-reference other sections of the ICR Review, as appropriate. 13. Lessons Of the seven lessons provided in the ICR (page 40-42), the following four lessons are deemed to be the most important from the experience of implementing this project and have broader application beyond this project .. (1) Projects should not move forward to Board approval if the project team and client countries are not truly committed and ready to implement the project. In the case of this project, a deadline for IDA commitments was used as the justification for moving to project approval. This led to the splitting the project activities in two phases - with the second phase focusing on the regional PPP dimension. The project countries perceived the regional PPP option as a top down option imposed by the Bank and considered this as an infringement on their sovereignty. Consequently they took actions in direct contradiction with the regional PPP proposed for the second phase. This eventually resulted in cancellation of activities associated with this component. (2). A thorough political assessment of high-level national commitment to regional commitment coupled with communication campaign is required for regional projects. While support from the heads of state of a regional body such as CEMAC can provide important political backing for a regional project, general political economy challenges at the national level such as the interest of incumbent operators need to be addressed before designing a regional project. For regional projects such as this, a communications strategy and implementing agencies is necessary to ensure that all stakeholders understand the objectives and desired results of the project. (3) For some difficult reforms in the ICT sector such as awarding a new license, privatization of an incumbent operator, passing a PPP law, a Development Policy Operations (DPO) may be a viable option. A DPO or series of DPOs at the national or regional level undertaken in partnership and agreement with the country or countries that include these reforms as conditions or triggered may be a more appropriate instrument to use, in combination with Adaptable Program Loans (APLs). (4) This project demonstrated how a regional project's performance can be monitored at the country level since all results indicators were country-focused. Incorporation of country-based M&E in regional projects can be helpful in identifying the best performing and less performing countries within a regional project in order to better target project issues. This can also help in streamlining regional projects into country programs. 14. Assessment Recommended? Page 19 of 20 Independent Evaluation Group (IEG) Implementation Completion Report (ICR) Review AFR:Central African Backbone - APL1A (P108368) No 15. Comments on Quality of ICR The ICR is reasonably well-written. It reports both outputs and outcomes of the project and its assessment of the project is evidence-based. It is candid in providing reasons for splitting the project in two phases and also candidly discusses the attribution issues associated with ICT projects. Given the number of ICT terms, it would have helped if the ICR had listed a glossary of ICT terms in an Annex. There is a discrepancy in the ICR. While the body of text rates the risk to development outcome as Low (ICR, page 36), the risk to development outcome is rated as Moderate in the Datasheet. a. Quality of ICR Rating Substantial Page 20 of 20