54685 No. xxx / October 2009 No. 124 / February 2010 HOW-TO NOTE: A Framework for the Assessment of Political Decentralization Political decentralization is the primary mechanism through which citizen preferences are represented in the decision making, and is therefore essential to an effective system of decentralization. The purpose of this note is to elucidate components of a well-designed political decentralization system and is aimed to assist task teams and stakeholders to evaluate political decentralization effort in any given country. There are two main components of political decentralization system: a) discretion allowed to the local government to perform fundamental functions that allow them to represent the preferences of the citizens in decision making process and b) mechanisms that hold the local government accountable for appropriate use of this discretion. Political decentralization transfers political the local elected officials to perform authority to the local government through the fundamental functions that permits them to establishment of elected local governments. It represent the preferences of the citizens in defines electoral rules and norms of interaction decision making process and b) mechanisms among elected local authorities and local that hold the local government accountable for executives and administrators including the appropriate use of this discretion. Political degree of oversight of the elected officials over discretion is further divided into three elements local executive (Lankina, 2008; Keating, 1995). namely, 1) institutional arrangements for Political decentralization lies at the heart of the separation of powers among the executive, local governance system as it provides the local legislative, and judicial bodies, 2) election laws government the ability to effectively represent and the electoral systems, and 3) the existence the preferences of the local population. Citizens and functioning of party system and political manifest their preferences by selecting party laws. The framework emphasizes that an candidates closest to their preferences and authority can be held accountable for political decentralization allows the elected performing a specific function only if it has the candidates to reflect these preferences in the discretion to perform that function. It also decision making processes. Political argues that accountability is not an automatic decentralization also allows the citizens to outcome of increased discretion and the directly participate in decision-making through governments need to make a conscious effort to various instruments. The objective of this note is create structures that would hold local to present a framework that allows the reader to governments accountable. Moreover, public evaluate a political decentralization system to accountability, where responsible individuals ascertain if the system is designed to be able to are held accountable by other elected or non- fulfil the above mentioned goals. elected officials, as well as social accountability where, public officials are answerable directly to According to this framework, there are two the citizens are essential dimensions of primary components of political accountability. (Figure 1 provides the graphical decentralization system: a) discretion allowed to representation of these relationships). 1 Figure1: Political Decentralization 2 The objective of this note is to explain the 1.1. Institutional separation of powers between importance of each of these components. It also legislature and executive explains how these components should be Separation of powers means that the legislative, implemented. Challenges and good practices in executive and judicial branches of government are implementations are illustrated through examples. independent in exercise of their discretionary A detailed checklist (Table A.1 and A.2 in the powers. A well-designed political decentralization Annex) is prepared that can act as an expedient system requires that the roles and functions of tool in evaluation of the decentralization reforms elected and non-elected branches of government in any country. Uganda, Philippines, Kerala and are clearly identified and local councilors are Rwanda are used as examples to elucidate the use independently able to carry out the oversight of the checklist. We also provide a blank function of the local executive bodies, while local questionnaire which the reader can complete for courts take the role of impartially resolving the country under review (Table A.3 and A.4). conflicts arising between elected and non-elected branches of government and between local 1. Political Discretion governments and citizens. There are four major institutional arrangements that define the division As noted above, political discretion at the of authority and responsibilities between the subnational level is divided into three elements elected council and the executive. These are a) namely, 1) separation of powers among strong executive, b) strong council, c) council subnational executive, legislative, and judicial manager and d) commissioner. Table 1 briefly bodies, 2) election laws and the electoral discusses the benefits, risks and country example systems, and 3) the existence and functioning of of each arrangement of power. party system and political party laws. Table 1. Separation of Powers: Institutional mechanisms Institutional Main characteristics Benefits Risks Country-Examples: Mechanism Strong The mayor dominates Mayor can undertake Local councils are often Cote d'Ivoire, Uganda, Executive the decision making swift public policy marginalized. Pakistan, Philippines, process and has a measures. Ethiopia strong symbolic role in representing the locality. Strong council Mayor is elected by the Local council retains the Decision making Rwanda, Guinea, (parliamentary council. major decision making process may not be very Burkina Faso, Angola, system) authority. efficient. India (Kerala), Tanzania, Indonesia Council- The council appoints Combines the strong Requires high capacity Canada, Australia, Manager and contracts with a political leadership of level among Netherlands, New politically neutral elected officials with the government to institute Zealand administrator to run strong managerial such a mechanism. and manage the city. experience of an appointed administrator. Such an arrangement can preclude politically motivated patronage. Commissioner The commissioners are All have equal powers The system violates the India both legislators and even though one principle of separation department chairs. commissioner may have of powers. the title of mayor. 3 However, it should be kept in mind that variations preferences. In this capacity, elections can act as in power sharing mechanisms exist even within an empowerment tool, particularly for the these institutional structures. For example, marginalized groups to express their own Uganda and Philippines have established strong choices, as competition among local politicians executive institutional structure but in Uganda, increases the chances for vulnerable groups to mayor is also the chairman of the council while be included in decision-making (Lankina, 2008). this is not the case in Philippines. (Please see A. 1 The two main electoral arrangements ­ for more examples). proportional and first-past-the post are explained in more detail with their benefits and Separation of powers between executive and risks in Table 2. Three out of four countries legislature can, however, only be fully effective if (Kerala, Philippines and Uganda) in our review there is an independent dispute resolution use first-past-the-post electoral arrangement. mechanism. While formal court system exists in all However, Table 2 suggests that first-past-the- of the four study countries, it is only partially post is not necessarily the most prevalent system accessible to citizens. On the other hand, informal at the local level worldwide. mechanisms of dispute resolution exist in all countries and are operational. 1.3. Nature of party systems and structures A key factor that influences party systems is 1.2. Existence and quality of local electoral partisanship of the local elections. Except systems Rwanda, all other countries in our sample hold Electoral systems shape the incentives of both local elections on party basis. Not enough the elected officials and the citizens and make research is available to be able to make the elected officials more responsive to citizens' conclusive decisions regarding preference over Table 2. Institutional Electoral arrangements in local governments Electoral Main characteristics Benefits Risks Country examples arrangement Proportional Voters generally vote More inclusive of Independent South Africa, Indonesia, representation- for a party rather than minorities and women candidates with no Turkey, Germany, a specific candidate. candidates compared to political affiliation can Sweden, Burkina Faso, Electoral districts first-past-the-post become marginalized. Ethiopia, Guinea have multiple system. Accountability can be representatives. compromised in favour The share of votes of representation. received by a party is translated by a fixed formula into the number of seats to be held by that party. First-past-the- Single candidate is Voters have greater Minority candidates United Kingdom, post elected from each clarity of the individual may not be electorally Canada, United States, constituency based on they are voting for represented. Uganda, Tanzania, plurality. which leads to better Pakistan accountability. Mixed systems Mixture of PR and May guarantee May create confusion in Rwanda, Angola nomination of district territorial representation of local representatives. representation, creates a candidates. transition period between other two established systems (PR and FPP). 4 partisan or non-partisan local elections. Some and willing to hold local governments research, for example, Lankina (2008) and accountable for their discretion. The notion of Packel (2008), suggests that party system at the political accountability can be divided into local level promotes patronage by identifying public accountability and social accountability. the support base of the candidate, while Ahmad et al (2005) suggest that elected officials 2.1. Public Accountability may be more concerned with taking measures Public accountability: An effective, political to ensure their promotion and advancement accountability system includes safeguard in electoral within the internal party structure, rather than systems in the form of recall elections and term in passing policies that benefit the community. limits, and providing mechanism for local council Along the same lines, Mueller (1996) argues oversight of the executive. that political parties can restrict the elected candidates on their policy choices in a way that Safeguard in electoral systems: Elections are the may come into conflict with the preferences of principal method whereby all eligible local its constituents. On the other hand, holding residents can have a voice in the electoral local elections on non-party basis can exclude a outcome. However, the accountability function large cadre of political workers that form the of the elections can be enhanced by introducing base of the political parties, thereby restraining a number of electoral safeguards such as recall the political development in the country. It elections and term limits. Recall provides a should be noted that exogenous factors, for swifter method of holding government officials example political landscape of the country and accountable than the possibility of re-election, national politics, can exacerbate the effect of while term limits can prevent local politicians partisanship (or non-partisanship) in local from becoming entrenched in their positions elections. Pakistan (where local elections are and locked into relationships of patronage. non-party based) and Ethiopia (where local Kerala, Philippines, Rwanda and Uganda have elections are partisan) present a contrasting term limits and the option of recall elections case (See Box 1 for details). where recall can be initiated by the council as well as by the citizens. Other factors that influence the dynamics of electoral competition at the local level are Improving local council oversight: A local competition among political parties, the role of government where legislature has the authority national parties in nominating local candidates, to oversee the executive has a greater ability to rules governing the financing of parties and be more responsive to the demands of the candidates, the participation of disadvantaged citizen. Indicators of authority of local council groups such as women or certain minorities, and to oversee the legislature include the option of the availability of platforms based on ethnicity veto power available to the council, the degree or religion. Local laws in Kerala, Philippines, of independence from the executive with which Rwanda and Uganda provide for free electoral the council can make decisions, and the ability competition. Multiple parties, as well as of the local council to establish committees to independent candidates, are allowed to contest oversee the function of the executive. elections. However, national parties, as well as Generally, there is a lot of variation in the traditional leaders, can affect the outcome of the division of power among executive and the competition in Philippines and Uganda. council. Philippines is the only country among our study countries where executive has 2. Political Accountability complete veto authority over the decisions of the council. Local council in Philippines also do Accountability is not an automatic outcome of not have the authority to establish ad hoc increased discretion of the local governments. committees to oversee the functioning of the Specific mechanisms should be designed to executive, nor can the councillors remove ensure that citizens and higher officials are able 5 executives by no-confidence vote. On the other Creating a political culture for citizen oversight through hand, local governments in Rwanda and Kerala community-driven development operation: By have discretion in all of the above mentioned introducing mechanisms for marginalized groups areas. of citizens to participate in decision-making and accountability processes, community-driven 2.2. Social Accountability development (CDD) programs can enable all A crucial requirement for any political social citizens to participate in the decision making accountability mechanism is to enable the citizens to process. (See Box 3 for some instances of CDD demand information from the government. This can implementation for enhancing political social be done through legislation, by creating specific accountability). bodies and processes for citizen oversight and by strengthening the community through various 3. Conclusion community driven development (CDD) initiatives. A well-designed political decentralized system should provide adequate separation of power Generic legislation empowering citizens to demand between the executive and the legislature so that accountability: Legislation should give citizens local council can effectively monitor the function access to mechanisms to redress grievances, of the executive. Minority and marginalized request explanation of municipal legislation, groups in society should be given special demand public hearings and consultation on a representation to ensure that elections are not specific issue, and to submit public petitions. dominated by the majority and the powerful sections of the society. However, the discretion Specific bodies and processes for citizen oversight: of the local government should be matched with Citizen-based committees that oversee the adequate accountability. There should be function of local council are one of the most provision of recall elections and term limits. common forms of social accountability. These Similarly, social accountability mechanism committees can take the form of citizen juries, should be strengthened through legislation to forums for various social groups, such as the enable citizens to demand accountability from young or the elderly, and neighbourhood the local council. Citizens based monitoring assemblies, among others. committees and CDD approaches should be established to enhance the capacity of the citizens that will strengthen social accountability 6 Appendix: Checklist to Evaluate Political Decentralization System - Country examples and questionnaire A.1. Political discretion-Country examples Kerala Philippines Rwanda Uganda Separation of Powers Overall institutional Strong Council Strong Executive Strong Council Strong Executive arrangement Is mayor elected by the Yes No Partially Yes council? Do councilors select the chairperson among council Yes No Yes No members? Is the mayor also the Partially No Yes Yes chairman of the council? Can the councilors hold No Partially Partially No other positions? Is there an effective formal Yes Yes Yes Yes court system? Are local courts easily accessible to average Partially Partially No Partially citizens? Is there an informal court system/alternative dispute Yes Yes Yes Yes resolution mechanism? Electoral systems Executive Legislature Executive Legislature Executive Legislature Executive Legislature First First past First First Mixed Mixed First First past Type of electoral system past the the post past the past the System System past the the post post post post post Are local officials elected Yes Yes Yes Yes No No Yes Yes through direct elections? Are there any election No No No No No No Yes Yes thresholds? Nature of party Systems Can multiple parties run in Yes Yes No No Yes Yes elections? Are any parties outlawed Yes Yes No No Yes Yes Yes Yes in local elections? Are local elections Yes Yes Yes Yes No No Yes Yes partisan? Can independent candidates contest local Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes elections? Is there an organization Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes committee for elections? Can national parties affect the outcomes of local Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes elections? Can traditional leaders affect outcome of the Partially Partially Yes Yes No No Yes Yes elections? Are there established rules Yes Yes No Partially for party financing? Are there quotas for Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes women? Are there quotas for other Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes minorities? 7 A.2. Political public accountability- Country examples Kerala Philippines Rwanda Uganda Electoral safeguards Can citizens remove councilors from office?/trigger a Yes Yes Yes Yes recall Are there recall elections? Yes Yes Yes Yes Are there Term Limits? Yes Yes Yes Yes Council Oversight Does the executive have veto power over council No Yes No Partially decisions? Can the executive occupy dual role/employment? No Partially No Can councils take decisions independently of the Yes Yes Yes Yes executive? Does the council have veto power of executive Yes Partially Yes Yes decisions? Can council call executive for hearings/ask for Yes Yes Yes testimony? Does the council receive periodic reports from the Yes Yes Yes Yes executive? Do local councils have the authority establish standing Yes Yes Yes Yes committees? Do local councils have the authority establish ad-hoc Yes No Yes Yes committees? Can council members to remove executive officials by Yes No Yes Yes no-confidence vote? 8 A.3. Political discretion- Questionnaire Country Separation of Powers Overall institutional arrangement Options: Strong council, Strong executive, Council manager, Commissioner Is mayor elected by the council? Options: Yes, No, Partially Do councilors select the chairperson among council members? Options: Yes, No Is the mayor also the chairman of the council? Options: Yes, No, Partially Can the councilors hold other positions? Options: Yes, No, Partially Is there an effective formal court system? Options: Yes, No Are local courts easily accessible to average citizens? Options: Yes, No, Partially Is there an informal court system/alternative dispute resolution mechanism? Options: Yes, No Electoral Systems Executive Legislature Type of electoral system Options: First past the post, proportional representation, mixed system Are local officials elected through direct elections? Options: Yes, No Are there any election thresholds? Options: Yes, No Can multiple parties run in elections? Options: Yes, No Are any parties outlawed in local elections? Options: Yes, No Are local elections partisan? Options: Yes, No Can independent candidates contest local elections? Options: Yes, No Is there an organization committee for elections? Options: Yes, No Can national parties affect the outcomes of local elections? Options: Yes, No, Partially Can traditional leaders affect outcome of the elections? Options: Yes, No, Partially Are there established rules for party financing? Options: Yes, No Are there quotas for women? Options: Yes, No Are there quotas for other minorities? Options: Yes, No 9 A.4. Political public accountability- Questionnaire Country Electoral safeguards Can citizens remove councilors from office or trigger a recall? Options: Yes, No Are there recall elections? Options: Yes, No Are there Term Limits? Options: Yes, No Council Oversight Does the executive have veto power over council decisions? Options: Yes, No, Partially Can the executive occupy dual role/employment? Options: Yes, No, Partially Can councils take decisions independently of the executive? Options: Yes, No, Partially Does the council have veto power of executive decisions? Options: Yes, No, Partially Can council call executive for hearings/ask for testimony? Options: Yes, No Does the council receive periodic reports from the executive? Options: Yes, No Do local councils have the authority to establish standing committees? Options: Yes, No Do local councils have the authority to establish ad-hoc committees? Options: Yes, No Can council members remove executive officials by no-confidence vote? Options: Yes, No 10 References: Ahmad, J., Devarajan, S., Khemani, S. and Shah, S. (2005) "Decentralization and Service Delivery." World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 3603. World Bank, Washington, DC. Aslam, G. (2009) "Collaborative Politicians- the intended consequences of decentralization reforms: Evidence from Pakistan using social network analysis" Harvard Political Networks Conference, Jun 11-13, 2009, Cambridge, MA Cheema, A., Khwaja, A. and Qadir, A. (2005) "Decentralization in Pakistan: Context, Content and Causes" Kennedy School Working Paper Number RWP05-034 Helling, L., Serrano, R. and Warren, D. (2005) "Linking Community Empowerment, Decentralized Governance, and Public Service Provision through a Local Development Framework." Social Protection Discussion Paper 535. World Bank, Washington, DC. Keating, M. (1995) "Size, Efficiency and Democracy: Consolidation, Fragmentation and Public Choice." In Judge, D., Stoker, G. And Wolman, H (ed.) "Theories of Urban Politics," Sage Publications, London Lankina, T., Hudalla, A. and Wollmann, H. (2007), "Local Governance in Central and Eastern Europe: Comparing Performance in the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Russia" Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke McLean, K., Helling, L., Orac, J. and Serrano, R. (2006) "Exploring Partnerships between Communities and Local Governments in Community Driven Development: A Framework." Social Development Paper 96. World Bank, Washington, DC. Mueller, D. (1996) "Constitutional Democracy" Oxford University Press Packel, D. (2008) "Electoral Institutions and Local Government Accountability: A Literature Review." Social Development Working Paper No. 111. World Bank, Washington, DC. World Bank (2008) "Local Government Discretion and Accountability: A Local Governance Framework". Economic and Sector Work Report No. 40153. Washington, D.C. World Bank (2009) "Local Government Discretion and Accountability: Application of a Local Governance Framework" Economic and Sector Work Report no. 49059-GLB, Social Development Department, World Bank, Washington, DC 11 This note is prepared by Asli Gurkan, Serdar Yilmaz and Ghazia Aslam, as part of How-to Notes and Case-study learning series and is derived from SDV's Economic and Sector Work Report (2010) on local governance and accountability. The series is an attempt by the Governance and Accountability Team of the Social Development Department (SDV) to provide guidance on select approaches to improve governance and accountability in World Bank operations. The authors would like to thank Jamie Boex and Sanjay Agarwal for their valuable comments. For questions and comments please contact ESW team members: Ghazia Aslam at gaslam@worldbank.org, Serdar Yilmaz at syilmaz@worldbank.org, Asli Gurkan at agurkan@worldbank.org.