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Addressing the Enforcement Gap to Counter Crime:

Investing in Public Safety, the Rule of Law
and Local Development in Poor Neighborhoods

PART

1

CRIME, POVERTY AND THE POLICE

Heike P. Gramckow, Jack Greene, Ineke Marshall & Lisa Barão

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Foreword and Acknowledgements

Justice is central to the World Bank's core agenda of reducing poverty and boosting shared prosperity. It is an intrinsic goal of development overall and influences the achievement of many specific development outcomes. Well-functioning and inclusive justice institutions prevent and mitigate conflict, crime, and violence; ensure executive accountability and people's meaningful access to services; give people legal identity and voice to protect their rights; enable investment and private sector growth; and promote equitable and inclusive development outcomes.

The Bank's 2011 *World Development Report* demonstrated that conflict, crime, and violence are major barriers to development, with direct economic costs that can add up to substantial proportions of GDP.¹ Of the various dimensions of the rule of law, the basic control of violence has the strongest correlation to economic growth in developing countries. Moreover, crime and violence especially affect the poor. High levels of criminality and widespread violence create fear that constrains mobility, erodes trust between people and communities and their trust in institutions, and reinforces stigmas toward and the exclusion of certain groups perceived to be dangerous, all of which impede long-term development. Effective and well-functioning justice systems can provide the critical legitimate processes that are needed for the resolution of grievances that might otherwise lead to conflict, crime, and violence.

Implementing holistic approaches to violence, crime, and insecurity has become a part of the Bank's work. These engagements have thus far been limited and led chiefly by two Global Practices (GPs), primarily in Latin America and the Caribbean. The Urban and Social Development GP focuses on urban design and social approaches to violence prevention,² and the Governance GP's justice team is collaborating with them on analytical work, operational design, and initial implementation and on initial engagements with ministries of justice to support police and other criminal justice sector agencies, especially in Latin America. Citizen security and violence prevention are currently a small area of the Bank's work, but they have significant growth potential, primarily in Latin America and the Caribbean, though demand also exists in the Middle East and North Africa, Europe and Central Asia, and various fragile and conflict-affected states.

1 In El Salvador, for example, the value of lives lost due to death and disability reached approximately US\$271 million, nearly 2 percent of GDP, in 2010. See World Bank, "Crime and Violence in Central America: A Development Challenge (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2011a). In Guatemala, violence cost the country roughly US\$2.4 billion, or 7.3 percent of GDP in 2005. See UNDP, "El Costo Economico de la Violencia en Guatemala" (New York: UNDP: 2006).

2 In the area of violence prevention and citizen security, there are six Development Policy Loans (DPLs) worth US\$2.7 billion in Brazil, Colombia, and Honduras. In addition, the Bank's portfolio includes 53 projects aimed at violence prevention (20 investments, two Institutional Development Funds (IDFs), 16 analyses, and nine technical assistance operations). Roughly 60 percent of violence-related investments are located in Latin America and the Caribbean, with the remaining 40 percent divided between East Asia and Africa.

This document was developed as a result of a request from World Bank President Jim Yong Kim to the Governance GP for more information on the link between crime and poverty and the Bank's current and potential engagement to support client countries in their efforts to counter crime in their communities. The resulting review of the evidence base and the Bank's response to date pointed to the need to highlight the importance of law enforcement to counter crime as part of a holistic approach, especially in poor communities, which not only suffer from economic and social ills but also rarely have access to the government services needed to address these problems. Effective policing services are also lacking, leading to a serious enforcement gap in many poor communities that requires attention and investment to allow these neighborhoods to recover and eventually prosper.

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1. Introduction

Crime and violence across the world impede development and disproportionately impact poor people. The World Bank, the World Health Organization (WHO), the United Nations Office for Drugs and Crime (UNODC), and the Geneva Declaration Secretariat collectively point out that though crime and violence represent serious problems in many countries, they are particularly concentrated in less-developed countries, often those that are characterized by fragile or less-trusted government institutions and pervasive insecurity. Under such circumstances, human, social, political, and economic development suffers. The corollary is demonstrated by the Geneva Declaration Secretariat (2011, 9) which found that “Countries with higher respect for the rule of law – including effective criminal justice systems – ... show lower levels of intentional homicide.” An effective and accepted justice system, especially one that includes the efficient and consistent enforcement of the law and social order, has been shown to be a prerequisite to reducing violence and crime in many parts of the world. Moreover, economic and other development efforts can be more effectively implemented when safer and less violence-prone communities can shift attention and resources away from efforts to maintain personal safety, secure property, and avoid victimhood toward measures to promote economic and social growth.


Violence and crime have broad implications for public safety, local justice, and economic and community development. Worldwide, the costs of violence, crime, and social disorder are staggering. These costs involve the breadth and depth of harm and human suffering that crime, violence, and disorder cause to individuals, families and communities; the “containment costs” of such negative and destructive behaviors (World Bank 2011c), and the subsequent lost opportunities for social, economic, and government development and stability. Estimates of the annual public expenditures for the containment of crime alone reached US\$1.989 trillion globally in 2014 (IEP 2015), a figure that does not include the costs of conflict-related violence and internal security. If those are added, the global estimate of annual losses reaches US\$14.3 trillion. At the same time, when weak domestic institutions (e.g., education, health care, government) are confronted with sustained crime and violence, their capacities and resources are further drained, the cycle of decline continues, and the states’ capacity for social and economic development continues to weaken.

In most countries, the police or similar law enforcement agency are supposed to be a main line of defense in addressing violence and crime in neighborhoods, across the country, and even across borders. Constitutionally, the power to enforce the law is generally given to the state, which has the responsibility to protect vulnerable people and communities, and the local police in particular, who are imbedded in these communities and tasked with the preservation of law and order. At the same time, police agencies often struggle with many problems, including uneven service quality, inefficient organizational models, and longstanding connections between corruption, organized crime, and law enforcement. All of this in turn often leads to an ingrained civic mistrust of the police and other criminal justice actors in many places, especially those that need just and effective police services the most.

INTERNATIONAL EFFORTS TO ADDRESS THE PROBLEM

Considering the negative impact on development, and especially the negative results for poor people, the World Bank, Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), United Nations, and numerous bilateral donors provide funding and assistance to address crime in their client countries, and many lessons can be drawn from these efforts. Research across the globe has shown that holistic approaches that focus on the entire spectrum of a government's crime response chain, ranging from crime prevention to enforcement, tend to have better outcomes than isolated interventions involving only the police or other individual government agency. Not surprisingly, the UN Summit for the adoption of the post-2015 development agenda explicitly recognized the role of safety and justice in achieving development objectives, highlighting the need for "strengthening institutions at all levels; promoting peaceful and inclusive societies; securing access to justice for all; and respecting human rights, including the right to development" (UN 2015). Nevertheless, the percentage of international investment in programs that support the criminal justice portion of the response chain remains small. A 2015 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) report indicated that even in the 50 most fragile states, funding for legitimate politics (4 percent), security (2 percent), and justice (3 percent) is low (see figure 1). In other developing countries, investment patterns look very similar.

FIGURE 1. Overseas Development Assistance Allocations to the Peacebuilding and Statebuilding Goals (PSG) in 50 Fragile States, 2012



Source: OECD 2015.


As the UN's Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) are being finalized, the need for effective programming and financing to achieve Goal 16, which aims at promoting just, peaceful, and inclusive societies, will become more prominent. Considering the World Bank's twin goals of ending poverty and boosting shared prosperity and the negative implications crime and violence have on reaching these objectives, the Bank can play an important role in incentivizing, monitoring, and chronicling the "good practices" that seek to improve the administration of justice in poor and marginalized communities and in financing their adaptation in client countries.

To date, most of the Bank's investment in efforts to reduce crime has focused on crime prevention in the form of urban and social development programs. Investment and policy lending that support the improvement of police operations to reduce crime and develop stronger neighborhoods are more limited. Currently, even in Central American countries with staggering crime rates that impede development and effective investments in other sectors, large lending programs that focus on crime prevention do not include a component to strengthen police capacities. In part this gap is due to prior interpretations of the Bank's articles of engagement, especially International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) Article III, Section 5(b),³ which had been interpreted as precluding the Bank from engaging with criminal justice institutions, especially police. Although some activities involving the criminal justice sector, including even police agencies, had been financed (for a list of projects prior to 2010, see Leroy 2012), it was only in 2011 that a new Legal Note was issued by the Bank's General Counsel that clarified the framework for the Bank's engagement with law enforcement agencies (Leroy 2012). In some countries, the significant enforcement gaps in poor neighborhoods might be getting some needed attention from other donors, such as the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), the United Kingdom's Department for International Development (DFID), or Australia's Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT). In other instances, the enforcement gaps remain, reducing the effectiveness of other investments in poor communities.

A 2014 review of the Bank's lending portfolio to understand if and how the issuance of the Legal Note on Criminal Justice influenced Bank programming indicated an uptake in projects that included some criminal justice component (see figure 2). Still, no lending project could be identified that included assistance to build the capacities of local police to address crime in poor neighborhoods beyond a few activities to develop data collection capacities or provide limited support for police to deliver better services to victims (World Bank 2014b). Interestingly, for years, almost every road project the Bank supported included a component to bolster the traffic police to increase road safety. Taking a cue from road projects, the idea to include problem- and community-oriented police services in urban development programs, for example, to improve neighborhood safety, does not appear farfetched.

3 This article provides that "[t]he Bank and its officers shall not interfere in the political affairs of any member; nor shall they be influenced in their decisions by the political character of the member or members concerned. Only economic considerations shall be relevant to their decisions, and these considerations shall be weighed impartially in order to achieve the purposes stated in Article I." Substantively identical provisions are contained in the International Development Association (IDA) Articles Article V, Sections 1 (g) and 6, and Article VI, Section 5 (c).

FIGURE 2. World Bank Lending Projects with Criminal Justice Components, 2010–2014



Source: World Bank 2014b.

LAW ENFORCEMENT CAN BE IMPROVED

The main aim of this paper is to provide World Bank Country Management Units, teams, and client counterparts interested in exploring ways to address the enforcement gap in poor neighborhoods with a general understanding of the important role police play in helping to alleviate problems related to poverty, crime, and social disorder. The paper also identifies the kinds of approaches to policing that tend to be most effective in reducing crime in a sustainable manner. Building on the already significant body of World Bank and other literature outlining the impact of crime on development in general and poor people in particular and the role of holistic crime prevention in addressing crimes and violence (see, for example, World Bank 2003, 2011a, 2011b; World Bank and UNODC 2007), the discussion presented here relies particularly on criminological research to outline what is known about crime, as well as the role and importance of effective and inclusive police services, in socially disorganized, marginalized, and impoverished communities. As local police are regularly deployed in these areas, they have both an opportunity *and* a responsibility to work with community members, their leaders, other government and private service providers, and local businesses to improve the conditions for reducing harm from crime, violence, and disorder and improve community and economic development. In this regard, local policing either *helps* to create a climate for community social and economic development or *detracts* from it.

Research has shown that a combination of community and problem-oriented policing, as well as restorative justice practices involving the police, is particularly effective in buttressing community development and harm reduction and addressing governance shortcomings in the police structure. The focus of part 1 of this paper is on understanding the breadth, scope, and anticipated changes brought about by implementing combined community and problem-oriented policing and restorative justice approaches, and the related important role of police in sustaining community development efforts.

BOX 1 – Experiences from Brazil

In 2008, to curb the violence in the city and in preparation for its bid to host the World Cup and the Olympic Games, Rio de Janeiro implemented the “Unidades de Policia Pacificadora” (UPP) program. The aim was to increase security by restoring state control in the *favelas* and by integrating the *favelas* and their residents into the formal city. Five years later, fewer incidents of lethal violence are being registered, residents feel safer, and pacified *favelas* have been integrated to some extent into the rest of the city. These achievements have also led to increased costs for public services and housing, however, compelling some residents to move to other marginalized parts of the city.

Source: Oosterbaan and van Wijk 2015.

This paper also examines the requirements for implementing community-grounded programs by the police and the obstacles within and outside of police organizations that impede increased and sustained collaboration for community safety. Implementing planned changes in police organizations has proven to be complicated, as they usually involve the reorientation and reengineering of many parts of the police system and its work cultures, as well as extensive outreach to the communities the police serve. The police’s ability and willingness to respond to community needs especially affects how communities perceive police interactions, and these perceptions ultimately can be tied to the institutional legitimacy of the law and its agents. Such changes have been realized in some parts of the world, leading to improved police and community interactions and ultimately to more secure and less crime-ridden communities. Lessons from these reform efforts have also shown that if such change is to take place, the administrative, professional, and political will of the police and superordinate government leadership is mandatory. Such commitment is the cornerstone of moving forward with meaningful change processes.

Developing a meaningful and feasible pathway for the local police to embrace the goal of community growth, civic cohesion, and social integration is not an easy task. Yet armed with what is known about crime and its manifestations in impoverished and often marginalized communities, coupled with an understanding of the underlying supporting role played by local justice system actors (police and other decision makers), it is possible to outline the building blocks needed to create a supportive environment for greater community cohesion and collective efficacy in order to improve community safety, promote justice, and enhance development.

Building on these concepts, part 2 of this paper outlines what is needed to design and implement effective change in police agencies in more detail. This is done with the view of broadening World Bank programs especially in the areas of rule of law, anti-corruption, and governance, but also other sectors that are needed to address crime effectively, such as social and urban development, education, and health. Part 3 provides an annotated bibliography of relevant sources for those interested in learning more.

BOX 2 – The Impact of Crime on the Poor

“When we think of global poverty we really think of hunger, disease, homelessness illiteracy, dirty water and a lack of education, but very few of us immediately think of the global poor’s chronic vulnerability to violence—the massive epidemic of sexual violence, forced labor, illegal detention, land theft, assault, police abuse, and oppression that lies hidden underneath the more visible deprivations of the poor.”

Source: Haugen and Boutros 2014, xiv.


2. The High Cost and Impact of Crime and Insecurity on Poverty

Across the world, crime and violence have a disproportionate presence in and impact on poor and marginalized communities that in turn are often home to a disproportionate number of offenders as well as victims. Poverty is made manifest and reinforced through social and economic exclusion, and the resultant negative behaviors often concentrated in poorer communities include considerable interpersonal violence and property crime, as well as a wide array of disorderly behaviors (ranging from the trivial to the serious) that continue to destabilize community life.

Poverty and insecurity are intimately connected. Insecurity with regard to food, water, and the necessities of sustaining life, coupled with poor health care, education, and other social services, contributes to social and economic decline. The direct effects of economic crises, unemployment, family health crises, unexpected changes in household composition, or natural disasters all contribute to vulnerability and poverty (for a review, see Barrientos 2007). Insecurity further contributes to a weakening of the capacity of socially disorganized communities to develop collective efficacy, and within these communities, of the individual to take charge of his or her life. At the same time, vulnerability to crime and violent victimization in itself is a source of insecurity. Fear of crime negatively affects community social cohesion, as people withdraw from the public square. Fear of crime has also been shown to contribute to the cycle of decay in urban neighborhoods (Skogan 1990). At the same time, public fear of crime has often led to “get tough on crime policies.” Although such approaches aim at taking criminal elements out of the communities they threaten, they tend to be ineffective, do not address most of the underlying causes of crime, are very costly, and are most often applied to marginalized communities (Garland 2001; Simon 2007; Selke 2014). This has been the case not just in Western countries but throughout many Latin American nations and other regions of the world.

Instead, the World Health Organization (Krug et al. 2002, 12) and others, using an ecological model and public health approach for understanding violence across a number of social contexts, suggest that “Violence is the result of the complex interplay of individual, relationship, social, cultural and environmental factors. Understanding how these factors are related to violence is an important step in the public health approach to preventing violence” (see figure 3 below).

FIGURE 3. Socio-Ecological Model for Understanding Crime and Violence



Source: Krug et al. 2002, 12.

As shown in figure 3, the nature and complexity of violence, crime, and disorder result from complicated interactions between and among individuals, their immediate social groups, the communities in which they live, work, and recreate, and the larger society in which they live. All crime is local in its impact if not its genesis. As the costs of violence, crime, and disorder are primarily realized at the local community level, local police and justice officials are the most essential players in community crime prevention.

The costs of crime and violence are many:⁴

Governments face substantial direct costs. These include the health and medical care costs associated with helping victims of violent crime; lost productivity and earnings; the costs of containing violence, such as law enforcement, the prosecution and adjudication of offenders, and correctional procedures, as well as the restorative processes associated with individual and communal rehabilitation; and the costs involved in repairing damage to property (Hoffman et al. 2005; Krug et al. 2002). In some parts of the world, such costs also include the loss of development investment and tourism. In addition to the direct loss of resources, countries or communities that face these negative economic impacts can be breeding grounds for terrorism and other forms of radicalized behavior (Akyuz and Armstrong 2011; LaFree and Ackerman 2009).


The costs of crime at the macro-level are substantial though difficult to estimate. As noted above, the “containment costs” alone, that is, the annual costs of the government apparatus required to deal with crime and violent victimization, were estimated by the Institute for Economics and Peace to be close to US\$2 trillion in 2014 (IEP 2015), a figure that reaches US\$14.3 trillion, or 13.4 percent of the global GDP, if the costs related to violence from conflict are added. This is an astounding figure, indicating that more than 1 in 10 U.S. dollars in gross world product expenditures are dedicated to the containment of crime and violence, adding substantially to world economic deficits and detracting from countries’ ability to invest in other common social goods, such as health care, housing, education, and so forth.

Victims suffer a wide array of injuries from crime. If they are assaulted or injured, they suffer the immediate physical effects and/or financial losses associated with a criminal act. Financial costs also stem from the loss of wages due to lost work and the immediate and longer-term medical costs of recovery and rehabilitation. Long-term disability results in further physical and financial costs to victims. All of these financial, physical, and even psychological costs can be greatly debilitating (Krug et al. 2002). Moreover, for people who already live in impoverished conditions, becoming victims of crime has a disproportionate impact because of their lack of the resources and access to government services needed to recover.

Businesses can be significantly impacted by crime, increasing the cost of doing business, reducing potential profits, and often leading firms to relocate and not invest in certain neighborhoods, cities, or regions. When businesses withdraw from communities, tax revenues and other investments vanish along with job opportunities and other development options that are so vitally needed in poor communities. Enterprise surveys conducted by the World Bank indicate the high cost businesses incur as a result of crime (see figure 4).

4 For a good overview of assessing the cost of crime, see, for example, World Bank and UNODC (2007).

FIGURE 4. Crime-Related Losses and Security Costs are High for Firms in Developing Regions
(Percentage of Annual Sales)



Source: World Bank 2014a.

Communities, beyond the immediate victim or business, must deal with costs, as the vicarious victimization and resulting increase in fear have broader psychological impacts and associated costs for communities that experience crime and disorder, especially repeatedly and over time (Cornaglia, Feldman, and Leigh 2014). Such broader community trauma has important implications for building confidence in the police and the administration of justice. Those who believe that the police are not present or cannot protect or help them are likely to withdraw further from the civic space and/or rely on local groups, even criminals, for such protection, or at least become cynical about the legitimate role and function of the law and the police (Kirk and Papachristos 2011). Youth especially often join gangs for protection and a sense of identity and as a vehicle for social and economic mobility, pathways often lacking in socially disorganized communities (Gibbs 2000). Sustained community trauma resulting from repeat victimization, often accompanied by a persistent climate of violence, has many implications for community development that are similar to the traumatic impacts experienced by individuals and communities embedded in war zones. As reported by Tuller:

Violence causes disruption to social roles when different groups vie for dominance ... It endangers children's emotional development as parents and authority figures, themselves traumatized, struggle to create psychologically protective environments that will mediate children's experiences of violence... It causes ruptured social networks when people fear to participate in normal activities, when people must move to avoid the threat of violence, and when loved ones are imprisoned, injured, or killed ... It reduces social and political trust... By destroying the norms and values that underlie collective action for the common good, violence compromises people's ability to prevent further violence or to advocate for improvements to their communities (2015, 1–2).

3. Creating and Sustaining Healthy Communities: A Stratagem for Crime Prevention and Enforcement in Poor Neighborhoods

One of the fundamental values outlined in the UN Millennium Development Declaration (2000) states that “Men and women have the right to live their lives and raise their children in dignity, free from hunger and from the fear of violence, oppression or injustice. Democratic and participatory governance based on the will of the people best assures these rights.” The SDGs take this forward in Goal 16, which aims at promoting just, peaceful, and inclusive societies, recognizing that peace, stability, human rights, and effective governance based on the rule of law are important conduits for sustainable development (UNDP 2015).

Living in safe and secure communities that are relatively free of crime, violence, and disorder are also expressed values in the UN Declaration of Human Rights (UN 1948). Safe and stable community conditions support pro-social behavior and community engagement; unsafe and insecure communities do not attract or support residents or businesses. The incidence and fear of crime in these communities degrades the quality of life, erodes community capacity to participate in the larger society, discourages community investment, and consigns the community to a dependent and subservient status. According to the International Crime Victimization Survey (ICVS), a unique standardized general population survey of the experience of being victimized, considerable proportions of the respondents in Latin America and Southern Africa report feeling “very unsafe” walking alone in the dark. Reported feelings of fear are considerably lower in the developed world. Still, feelings of insecurity do not have a straightforward relationship with levels of likelihood of victimization; indeed, the ICVS has found that feelings of insecurity are relatively high in several countries with low levels of common criminality, suggesting that feelings of insecurity may reflect a lack of neighborhood social cohesion (van Kesteren, van Dijk, and Mayhew 2014, 62).

Building safe and secure communities is a prerequisite to much of social and economic life. Any development efforts should therefore recognize the critical role of personal and community safety, particularly in the developing world (Haugen and Boutros 2014), and preventing crime, ensuring community safety, and building greater community trust in the law and those who enforce the law should be taken as important benchmarks for community development efforts. Moreover, how the police address communities that suffer from poverty and a host of other social and economic problems, including crime, violence, and disorder, must be a central focus of attention. Police engagement with communities to increase public safety can improve community social cohesion and collective efficacy, central elements in informal social control. Where communities are less plagued by crime and other violence because of police action, violent subcultures will erode, thus potentially halting or reversing community residents’ life trajectories of crime and violence (Bernburg 2014; Cohen 1980).

The ICVS also measures perceptions of general police performance on the part of the public at large. Its surveys demonstrate considerable variation in reported levels of satisfaction with the police, with Western Europe and other developed countries, including the United States, Canada, New Zealand, and Australia, reporting higher levels of satisfaction than other areas. Residents of Latin America, Eastern Europe, and Africa are most skeptical about the capacity of the police to prevent and control crime (van Dijk 2008, 23), though within each region, there is similar variation in the levels of satisfaction with law enforcement. Feelings of safety also vary considerably across countries (Zvekic and Alvazzi del Frate 1995).

Recognizing the importance of crime prevention for safe and healthy communities and for successful economic development, the UN issued Guidelines for the Prevention of Crime in 2002 (see box 3). Building on decades of research in many countries, these guidelines outline the need to develop a holistic approach to crime that includes the entire response chain that the government, in collaboration with communities and other players, should develop and strengthen. To be effective, police services have to be implemented across the dimensions outlined in the box below, understanding that other government institutions have equally important roles to play and should be part of a combined, collaborative response.

BOX 3 – From Crime Prevention to Enforcement: the Response Chain

1. Promoting the well-being of people and encouraging pro-social behavior through social, economic, health and educational measures, with a particular emphasis on children and youth, and focusing on the risk and protective factors associated with crime and victimization (prevention through social development or social crime prevention)
2. Changing the conditions in neighborhoods that influence offending, victimization and the insecurity that results from crime by building on the initiatives, expertise and commitment of community members (locally based crime prevention)
3. Reducing opportunities, increasing risks of being apprehended and minimizing benefits of crime, including through environmental design, and by providing assistance and information to potential and actual victims (situational crime prevention)
4. Preventing recidivism by assisting in the social reintegration of offenders and other preventive mechanisms (reintegration programs).

Source: UN 2002.

As will be outlined and explored in more detail in part 2, the need to develop the entire response chain within different community contexts effectively places the World Bank at a distinct competitive advantage. A successful response to crime requires a programmatic approach across sectors that the Bank may already invest in (i.e., governance, social and urban development, education, health, etc.), activities upon which a problem-focused crime response program can be developed. Moreover, the Bank's convening powers provide many options not only for bringing various stakeholders together, but also for coordinating the efforts of different donors with the aim of developing and financing an effective program against crime in a client country.

4. Learning from Past Experiences: Focus Must be Local

Although this paper aims to provide information to effectively address crime enforcement gaps in World Bank client countries, most of the fundamental knowledge about how crime evolves, how communities are impacted by it, and how police can more effectively respond has been developed in the West. The Bank's many client countries vary significantly in terms of economic development, population, ethnic diversity, and political, religious, social, and cultural characteristics. These countries also differ substantially with regard to the capacity of government structures, past and more recent history and other events that influence crime, the scope and presence of crime and violence in communities, and the government—and especially the police—response to that crime. Globalization and internationalization are believed to have a homogenizing effect on these issues, but there is no question that important differences continue to exist between regions and nations (Braudel 1993; Gannon and Pillai 2013), and programming should reflect these differences.

LESSONS ARE TRANSFERABLE

At the same time, experience from client countries, especially in Latin America, South Africa, and Eastern Europe, has shown that lessons learned in the West can be applicable to other contexts, provided that the local context is well understood and programs and models are appropriately adjusted, tested, and implemented (Newburn and Sparks 2004). Furthermore, experience and research from the Bank's client countries, whenever available or accessible, are adding to a growing body of evidence that is being used to develop more holistic approaches involving the entire crime response chain, from prevention through enforcement. Problems related to exclusion, victimization, crime, and disorder are common experiences in many poor communities across the globe, and data show that poor *urban* communities share basic commonalities in the role of policing and its potential as an agent of change. Still, it is important not to overgeneralize when drawing from lessons learned in other client countries. Regional and local levels and types of crime and violence in developing countries differ, as do the drivers of that crime and violence and the capacity of the state and community to respond, all of which has to be reflected in adequately adjusted programming. Particularly when countries are experiencing or coming out of conflict, violence may still result from and be intermingled with criminal behavior, requiring modified approaches.

EFFECTS OF URBANIZATION WORLDWIDE

In order to address crime effectively, it has to be recognized that crime is first and foremost occurring and experienced at the local level, and that is where interventions need to focus. Accordingly, this paper emphasizes local crime and response mechanisms, which requires an understanding of the subnational variations in crime and response options and programming. To this end, one needs to be cognizant of the huge differences in the local or immediate social context in which people—and the police—find themselves, even within a country

or city. Poverty and crime exist everywhere, and different localities tend to require somewhat different responses; at the same time, crime, disorder, and violence manifest themselves most commonly and in more extreme forms in rapidly growing but impoverished urban communities, where crime is often the most critical issue, hence this paper's focus on crime response mechanisms in cities. This does not mean that crime in marginalized rural communities is neglected, because in many of the Bank's client countries, the police are a national institution with local area command structures, and even where this is not the case, interventions in the main urban centers tend to have cascading effects. Reform of the larger national system therefore tends to eventually affect policing in urban and rural communities alike, and some programming approaches for urban centers may also apply to rural areas, with the needed adjustments.

As the 2014 UN World Urbanization Prospects report concludes, the world is becoming more urbanized at a rapid pace. Globally, more people now live in urban than rural areas and the rate is increasing. Africa and Asia are urbanizing faster than other regions. Still, in 2014, close to half of the world's urban dwellers resided in cities and towns of fewer than 500,000 inhabitants, and only one in eight lived in the 28 mega-cities, with more than 10 million inhabitants. By 2050, however, the UN predicts that an additional 2.5 billion people will be living in cities, with 90 percent of the increase occurring in Africa and Asia (DESA 2014). By that time, the world is projected to have 41 mega-cities with more than 10 million inhabitants, mostly concentrated in the global south. Many of the worst problems related to (violent) street crime are concentrated in the larger slum areas in the developing world, in the mega-cities in the Philippines, India, South Africa, Mexico, and Brazil. These cities also tend to suffer from serious gaps in all public service delivery, including in preventive and enforcement services, especially in poor neighborhoods. These gaps exist due to high needs combined with a lack of resources, compromised service delivery systems, and often weak governance structures.

Comparable problems related to disorder, crime, and a lack of public safety have been well documented in western urban agglomerations around London, Paris, New York, and Chicago (Body-Gendrot 2012). Scholarly writing on "urban security" (where the role of policing, private and public, is central) has focused on the ghetto, the slum, the *banlieue*, and the *favela* as spaces of "urban marginality" (Aas 2013, 68), of social and economic exclusion, where residents often share similar experiences, regardless of whether they live in Rio de Janeiro, Detroit, Manila, or Mexico City. Even in Norway, one of the wealthiest welfare states in the world, there is documentation of the "existence of spaces governed by the drug economy, violence, deep urban marginality and ethnic and racial exclusion" (Aas 2013, 69). A number of scholars have written about the impact of globalization on local urban environments, highlighting the social and economic exclusion of those living in slums on the outskirts of many world cities (Aas 2013; Davis 2006; Sassen 2001; Wacquant 2008). In the view of many, there now exist numerous "dual cities" across the globe, reflecting the social polarization of the privileged elite and the marginalized city residents.

International data show a concentration of homicides and other violent and non-violent crimes in urban centers. At the same time, recent studies to better understand the relationship between urbanization and crime and violence seem to indicate that urbanization in itself may have a positive effect on the peacefulness of

a country due to a range of potentially positive factors, such as greater economic opportunities and access to services in urban centers (IEP 2015). The data, however, also indicate that high levels of urbanization are associated with poor scores for societal *safety and security* when rule of law is weak and intergroup grievances and income inequality are high. These studies point to the need to address these issues to counter crime in a holistic manner.

5. Understanding the Scope of Crime in Context

As noted above, crime and violence vary across regions and countries, within a country and locality, and across time. Understanding where a specific type of crime occurs, as well as its perpetrators and victims, is essential for developing effective response systems. One of the issues many of the Bank's client countries face is that reliable crime data to inform programming choices are difficult to obtain, so programming to support the development of such data can be a helpful entry point (see box 4).

When local data are scarce or of variable reliability, international data sets can be a good place to start in understanding the crime and violence issues that need to be addressed. Among the most widely used international crime data are homicide data published by WHO and UNODC. UNODC's 2013 Global Study on Homicides provides a good overview of homicides across the globe and a valuable account of the usefulness and limitations of these data for the development of interventions.

BOX 4 – Jamaica: Inner City Basic Services for the Poor

This World Bank project supported the Ministry of National Security (MNS) in building a crime observatory to monitor crime levels throughout Kingston. At the time of project completion, the observatory was tracking crime and violence data for four key incidence types in five parishes and was beginning to cross validate the data. This information has since been used to inform prevention and enforcement activities and to engage communities in prevention processes.

Source: World Bank 2014d.

LIMITS OF NATIONAL DATA

It is important to recognize that national-level data are rarely helpful in designing local-level interventions. The type and scope of crimes, offenders, and victims vary across neighborhoods and require targeted approaches. Even the seemingly straightforward "homicide" category requires further analysis to inform response options. For example, in their recent study of homicide trends, Alvazzi del Frate and Mugellini (2012, 148) report that in countries with relatively low homicide rates (for example, in various European and Asian countries), homicides related to intimate partners or within relatively small groups or communities, such as families, workplaces, or apartment block buildings, tend to dominate. Homicides related to property crime (robbery, burglary, theft) are often opportunistic and tend to appear more frequently in countries with greater income inequality. Finally, homicides connected to gangs and organized crime are increasing the fastest and are significantly higher in countries in Central and South America than those in Asia or Europe, for example (Geneva Declaration Secretariat of 2011 as cited in Alvazzi del Frate and Mugellini 2012, 148).

All of these international data sets and studies rely on officially reported crimes, that is, crimes that were reported to or detected by the police. In most countries, however, including in the developed world, only a fraction of crimes actually committed are reported to the police. In an attempt to shed more light on crime and victimization in different countries, the ICVS has been conducted six times over the period 1989–2010 in more than 80 countries in different regions of the world, including many Bank client countries (van Kesteren, van Dijk, and Mayhew 2014). Most of the samples in the developing world are city-based⁵ and the method is not without its critics (i.e., the scope of crimes included is limited, respondents may not recap the crime events properly, etc.). As a result, the ICVS results cannot be used as reliable estimates of the true extent of property and violent victimization across the world but are nevertheless useful as an indicator of respondents' perceptions of the seriousness of crime and neighborhood safety, reporting behavior, and satisfaction with the police. Moreover, the ICVS is probably also the most useful source available on the rates at which crimes are reported to the police. The survey results indicate that globally, fewer than half of conventional crimes (excluding homicide) are reported to the police by victims (40 percent). The rates also show considerable variation across world regions; the rate is roughly twice as high in Western developed countries than in developing or transition countries (van Dijk 2008, 20).

IMPORTANT ISSUE: VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN

There is less confidence especially in the accuracy of what is known about the extent and nature of violence against women. At the same time, even the limited data available indicate that this is one of the most pressing problems facing many parts of the world, independent of the country income level, with many implications for development overall. Since the UN Resolution on Abuses against Women and Children was adopted in 1982, global efforts have been made to collect more information on violence against women. A 2013 WHO report with global data on the prevalence of violence against women indicated that overall, 35 percent of women worldwide experienced either physical and/or sexual violence by a partner or non-partner, and there are many other forms of violence to which women may be exposed. The hidden nature of gender-based violence makes it difficult to measure its prevalence, and this is even more the case in a comparative context (Kangaspunta and Marshall 2012). The International Violence against Women Survey (IVAWS), which was designed to assess this specific issue, used standardized surveys in Australia, Costa Rica, Czech Republic, Denmark, Greece, Hong Kong, Italy, Mozambique, the Philippines, Poland, and Switzerland. It found that in 2003 and 2005 (the last time these data were collected), between 35 and 60 percent of women in surveyed countries experienced violence by a man during their lifetime (and between 22 and 40 percent experienced intimate partner violence), with the highest levels reported in Australia, Costa Rica, Czech Republic, and Mozambique, countries with very different income levels. It is noteworthy that less than one-third of the women reported their victimization to the police (Kangaspunta and Marshall 2014, 5,104–17).

5 For example, Buenos Aires, La Paz, Beijing, Bogata, Cairo, Mumbai (Bombay), Lagos, Panama, Seoul, Kampala, and Dar es Salaam.

BOX 5 – The Cost of Violence Against Women in the European Union (EU)

The hidden nature of gender based violence, especially domestic violence, makes the development of meaningful cost estimates difficult. Using a quite comprehensive estimation methodology, a 2014 study estimated that the cost of gender-based violence against women to the EU was €225,837,418,768—a staggering amount for any economy and especially devastating for the less-affluent countries and population groups.

Source: EIGE 2014.

To understand the full impact of gender-based violence on development, it is important to recognize that although women face dangers at home, they also face harassment, abuse, and violence in many public and community settings, such as school or the workplace, or simply while shopping for food or carrying out other everyday activities. Local police services need to reflect the extent to which women are especially vulnerable to violent victimization, as does donor support and Bank programming.

6. Systems of Social Control and the Importance of Law Enforcement

In order for any group to live together in a more or less orderly fashion, there is a need for conformity to social norms (including legal norms). Every society, small or large, has a way to make sure that most people follow most of the rules most of the time, particularly those that are essential to life and property. Here, the generic term “social control” is used to refer to the capacity of a group to regulate itself (through rules and sanctions). Internalized (i.e., conscience) and informal social control is the glue that holds all societies together. Informal social control exists when the sanctions for norm-violating behavior are given by other members of the social group: friends, parents, neighbors, or bystanders (through expressions of approval, shaming, punishment, and exclusion). A society cannot survive without informal social control. The predominance of informal social control is more typical of traditional and less-developed communities, but this type of control remains crucial in all societies, including the most advanced nations of the world. In many impoverished communities, delinquency, disorder, and crime often flourish because individuals, families, and communities lack the capacity to sustain informal social control.

When this informal control fails to restrain people from getting involved in undesirable behavior, there is a need to rely on the more formal variant. Formal social control implies that formalized rules are set, and sanctions (punishments and rewards) are imposed by a specifically designated authority, primarily the government. Formal social control, in the form of state law (with the police as primary enforcer) is becoming more important in many countries today as the informal social control mechanisms deteriorate, in part due to increased migration to urban centers and the breakdown of larger family units and community networks in a fast-changing, globalizing world.

SOCIAL CONTROL AND SOCIAL DISORGANIZATION

There are a number of social and criminological theories, particularly the control and the social disorganization theories that are connecting poverty and crime to community social disorganization and a lack of effective community-initiated change. Individual social capital is often depleted, while there is an ever-present need for increased community social cohesion and a lack of access to even basic government services, including police services. Social cohesion refers to community bonds that at once give neighbors a “community” identity and condition their interactions, which serve as informal social controls inhibiting deviance, crime, and violence, especially among local youth. Individuals’ sense that they have the ability to influence their own lives often comes from community bonds, which link them to pro-social normative behavior. Persistent and structural poverty decreases the level of pro-social social cohesion, which in turn lessens collective efficacy (i.e., the capacity of the community to exercise informal social control).

As a result, these communities must rely on secondary agents of social control, like the police, to help establish orderly community processes. If the police are absent, compromised, and/or not trusted, an enforcement gap exists that poor

communities can often address only by turning to local vigilante groups, frequently criminal gangs. Isolated and marginalized communities thus often must confront what might be called “underground” social control processes, imposed by gangs and other criminal enterprises to serve as the arbiters of social order, even when those groups are violent and inconsistent in their application of “street order” (Manwaring 2007). In what has become a landmark study in social disorganization, Kornhauser (1978, 66) found that in socially disorganized communities, “a delinquent-criminal organization arises and persists as a semi-autonomous system, with its own culture and a well-knit social structure.” Such findings are supported in the research of Anderson (1999) and Kirk and Papachristos (2011) in the United States, where neighborhood cultures born in social disadvantage and disorganization give rise to persistent violence.

At an individual level, social control theory states that individuals abstain from crime and conform to social norms because of bonds formed through attachment to peers and family, commitment to school and work, involvement in conventional activities, and belief in societal rules and morals (Hirschi 1969). Those with strong bonds are more likely to care about and adhere to normative expectations of behavior. When bonds are weak or nonexistent, individuals are free to violate the rules of society. Control theories have been widely tested within the United States and elsewhere, and results tend to confirm that stronger social bonds reduce the frequency and severity of delinquency (Hoeve et al. 2012; Chui and Chan 2012; Junger-Tas et al. 2012; Shechory and Laufer 2008; Ozbay and Ozcan 2008; Chamratrithong et al. 2013; Hartjen and Kethineni 1999).

At the neighborhood level, social disorganization theory (Shaw and McKay 1942) suggests that structural characteristics affect a community’s ability to exercise informal social control. Community-level problem solving is impeded by factors such as concentrated disadvantage, residential mobility, and ethnic heterogeneity (Bruinsma et al. 2013; Messner et al. 2013; Steenbeck and Hipp 2011). Socially disorganized neighborhoods experience higher rates of crime, which makes citizens feel threatened and fearful, leading them to withdraw and further hindering the ability of communities to exercise social control. Social disorganization theory too has been supported by numerous studies conducted across the globe and has demonstrated that the effects of structural characteristics operate in similar ways within very different cultures. In Guangzhou, China, for example, citizens living in neighborhoods with higher levels of residential instability and poverty perceived higher levels of neighborhood property crime (Jiang, Land, and Wang 2013). Studies in Latin America demonstrate the especially powerful effects of social disorganization in producing crime. Although neighborhoods in Latin American countries tend to have particularly high levels of social cohesion and would thus be expected to be able to maintain social control, disorganized neighborhoods still experience higher rates of violent crime despite their very dense social networks (Villarreal and Silva 2006).

COLLECTIVE EFFICACY

Importantly, social disorganization theory has been expanded to include the concept of collective efficacy as the mediating process between structural social disorganization in neighborhoods and increased levels of crime and disorder (Sampson, et al. 1997). Collective efficacy is defined as the shared power of a group of connected and engaged individuals to influence the maintenance of public order. When the police work to form community and social partnerships to

address the effects of social disorganization, they can help foster the development of collective efficacy and social capital, resulting in far-reaching effects. Even within poorer developing countries like Trinidad and Tobago, higher levels of collective efficacy are associated with more positive views toward police services and greater perceived institutional legitimacy (Kochel 2012).

Lederman, Loayza, and Menendez (2002) examined measures of social capital and the incidence of homicide in 39 different developed and developing countries. Their results indicated that a sense of trust among community members was most strongly associated with lower rates of homicide, even while controlling for such factors as income inequality and economic growth. Although various dynamics, such as concentrated disadvantage, residential mobility, and ethnic heterogeneity, tend to impede the ability and desire of citizens to develop close relationships with one another and with local institutions, police departments that form collaborative partnerships with neighborhoods are able to help foster relationships, cooperation, and investment in communities (Choi and Choi 2012; Pino 2001) and can therefore help reduce the negative effects of social disorganization.

7. Reformulating the Role of the Police – Potential for Investment

First and foremost, the police must protect communities from violence, crime, and disorder, but do so in a way that respects the rule of law. In addition to protecting, the local police can and sometimes do play an important role in assisting socially disorganized communities to build social capital and collective efficacy, though this often requires a reformulation of police functioning in these communities from almost exclusively managing risk and exercising control to emphasizing community development values. Although police are well positioned within communities to take on these tasks, it is often a substantial role change for the police and is not easily achieved.

It is important to note that the lack of police services in poor and marginalized communities is not always due to the absence of funding but rather to the dearth of appropriate policing approaches. In many places, a shift in policies and resources from a police force that only engages with communities if called to a crime scene—if they come at all—to one that is embedded in the communities it serves and connected to other service providers could make a substantial difference without significantly increasing resource needs.

FIGURE 5. Police Services
(Community Oriented Policing, Problem Oriented Policing, Restorative Justice)



Figure 5 diagrams the relationships between crime, poverty, social disorder, and police interventions. Marginalized urban communities suffer from many social and economic ailments, have weak local social institutions, and are underserved by the state in many aspects. Such conditions are characteristic of social disorganization, leaving these communities with weak social controls, minimal social cohesion and social integration, and low collective efficacy, and leaving them also ripe for increased crime and disorder, a heightened fear of crime, and a weaker ability to implement community development efforts. Improved police services aimed at strengthening local community leadership, social institutions, and community involvement in social control can help overcome community social cohesion and collective efficacy problems. What is more, as shown in figure 5, these efforts can strengthen the interactions between communities and their police, increase the fair and impartial administration of the law, and improve community assessments of the legitimacy of the law and the police, which in turn helps to increase conformity to the law within the community.

NEW MODELS OF POLICING, FROM TRADITIONAL TO COMMUNITY ORIENTED

Over the past 20 years, alternative models to traditional policing have emerged and set the stage for improving police and community interactions as well as solving persistent community crime and disorder problems. These models, known as community and problem-solving policing, have been advanced to overcome three important problems of traditional policing: 1) police disengagement from the communities they protect, 2) police inefficiency in dealing with persistent crime and disorder problems, and 3) the challenge of creating an organizational and service delivery model that is transparent and accountable. At the same time, models of restorative justice have also emerged that provide additional support for helping individuals and communities to increase social cohesion and heal community and individual injury. Importantly, these approaches seek to improve community resistance to criminality and resilience against criminal victimization.

Assuming that police are even serving poor communities, which is not always the case even in parts of U.S. cities, the policing practices applied frequently do not address the particular needs of poor neighborhoods. Table 1 compares and contrasts traditional policing with that of community-oriented, problem-solving, and restorative justice approaches, outlining the major differences across these models and how each model contributes (or not) to improved community engagement, increased problem-solving efficiency, and police transparency and accountability.

TRADITIONAL NOTIONS OF POLICING

On the matter of civic engagement and inclusion, the police have often embraced a military or professional ideology about their work that has tended to exclude their clientele from ongoing discussions about crime, justice, and police responses. Such social distancing of the police effectively cuts them off from those whom they are expected to protect and serve. There are many reasons why and how the police have distanced themselves from their publics, which has the collective effect of fostering and sustaining distrust of the police by the public and the public by the police. One important reason is associated with their institutional sensitivity about their acceptance within the community, and especially with regard to any real or perceived challenges to their authority. This view often leads the police

to avoid meaningful interactions with their communities as much as possible, and where they must act, they do so authoritatively. This wariness of community criticism and distrust of community attitudes toward law enforcement frequently leads the police to withdraw into an internal police culture that is suspicious of outsiders and committed to supporting fellow officers, almost to a fault. It is also a culture that will use force, even violent force, to maintain respect for the law and especially the police (Chevigny 1995).

A second factor is associated with police deployment practices. When police become more distant from the public as a result of patrolling in cars and not on foot, for example, and responding to disturbances by simply taking a crime reports instead of engaging with community members, they will not gain an understanding of community problems and be in a position to propose response options that aim at prevention. This is further exacerbated by patrol deployment procedures that frequently rotate police through different community settings, resulting in little understanding or ownership of the communities they police. This state of affairs greatly resembles the role of an occupying army, emphasizing control and oversight rather than support and problem solving. Ineffective police deployment practices can be made worse by a nation's inability or failure to pay salaries high enough to attract and retain qualified officers. In countries such as Afghanistan, Ghana, and Belize, low salaries generally lead to very high rates of attrition and turnover, thus obstructing the ability of officers to forge close relationships with members of the communities (Aning 2006; From et al. 2010; Hanson, Warchol, and Zupan 2004) while also inviting corruption. Police who do not trust or have little knowledge of the communities they serve are likely to be ineffective in addressing crime or other problems in any meaningful way. Absent solid community connections, it is not surprising that the police often fail to meet the needs and expectations of local communities, particularly the more severe needs of disenfranchised and marginalized communities.

BOX 6 – A Different Use of Data – Results-Based Financing of Police

In a remote village in South Kivu in the Democratic Republic of Congo, using a notebook, a local policeman keeps track of his patrols, the people he has assisted and the arrests he has made. Once a month this notebook is sent to the provincial capital, where a local nongovernmental organization (NGO) compiles the notes into a database. Local communities then check the data, verifying whether the policeman really did patrol the mentioned areas and whether he behaved correctly and lawfully toward the citizens. Based on the verified data, a donor agency then pays his police station according to agreed-upon indicators.

Source: Cordaid 2015.

A third area that generally requires improvement is the ability of police to provide crime, disorder, and other social support services that actually address community problems. All too often, the organizational delivery system impedes effective police services in places where the outcomes of police interventions are most valued. This mismatch between police delivery systems and the results achieved occurs on several levels. If not focused on community inclusion, technology-driven reforms can further undermine the provision of effective police services.

Police systems in many parts of the world still emulate military organizational and command and controls structures (see table 1). Such police interventions have largely been reactive to social and criminal problems, responding to problems once alerted either by the community or by police officers on the street and then withdrawing and awaiting other calls for assistance to emerge. Under such circumstances, the police have resembled a revolving door response to many urban crime and disorder problems; they arrive, quell the problem for the moment, and leave, only to return as the problem resurfaces and then repeat the cycle (Goldstein 1990). Rarely do the police actually address the underlying conditions, giving rise to repeat calls for police services. Especially in countries emerging from conflict, where the primary source of recruits for police service is ex-soldiers or where the military still has a key role in keeping the peace, creating a different, more effective approach is not easy but is often sorely needed.

ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES

Taken together, these dynamics—the inability of local police to engage with their communities for the common purpose of community safety and civic protection, as well as their inadequate service delivery system, which is effort rather than results oriented—have led to the development of two alternative police models to address the shortcomings of traditional policing systems. The first is community policing, which is centered on civic engagement, and the second is problem-solving policing, which is focused on thinking more deeply and analytically about community problems with a view to addressing persistent calls for service by finding and ameliorating their underlying common cause. Both methods are currently being implemented. For example, Singapore has shifted its police services to a Neighborhood Policing Center model, emphasizing the integration of community and problem-oriented policing. As Brogden and Nijhar (2005, 93–96) report, such shifts were meant to 1) increase police proactive problem solving in neighborhood settings, 2) increase police sensitivity to local social contexts, 3) increase police ownership for local crime and disorder problems, and 4) provide more direct service to victims of crime.

COMMUNITY POLICING: CENTRAL TENETS

Community policing is centrally focused on improving civic engagement as well as the transparency of the police in community settings. The central tenets of community policing include establishing beat integrity (maintaining the same officers in patrol areas over time), increasing police-public interaction and exchange, and building and combining resources and information to address community problems more systematically with the police in partnership with other civic, government, and private agencies. Here, policing is seen as a broadly cast enterprise, where civic leaders, other government service providers, the police, and interested private agencies come together to increase public safety, reduce fear of crime, and improve police-community relationships. Community policing is also about moving the police toward better use of discretion as shaped by the rule of law. At its core, community policing is about improving police legitimacy in communities where it may be in question, a theme that is directly connected to respecting community needs and problems and working collaboratively to solve them. The key elements of community policing include community crime prevention; patrol deployment for nonemergency interaction with the community; active solicitation by police of requests for public service; and the provision of opportunities for feedback from the communities about police operations (Bayley 1984).

TABLE 1. From Traditional to Inclusive, Problem-Oriented Policing (Adapted from Greene 2000)

SOCIAL/INTERACTION OR STRUCTURAL DIMENSION	TRADITIONAL POLICING	COMMUNITY POLICING	PROBLEM-ORIENTED POLICING	RESTORATIVE JUSTICE
Focus of policing	Law enforcement and aggressive order maintenance	Community building through crime prevention, harm and fear reduction	Law, order, harm, and fear problems eliminated or reduced	Restoring community sense of order and safety
Forms of intervention and deployment	Reactive, based on criminal law; proactive in aggressive police practice, crime attack focus, rotated deployment	Proactive, using criminal and administrative law, engaging partners to address local community needs, local deployment	Mixed on criminal, civil, and administrative law, trying to solve or mediate persistent problems, local deployment	Proactive, seeking the reconciliation between victim, offender, and community to increase social cohesion
Range of police activities	Narrow crime focus	Broad crime, order fear, and quality-of-life focus	Narrow to broad problem focus, depending on problem	Broad, seeking to address harm and accountability in a less threatening way
Level of discretion and accountability at the line-officer level	High and often unaccountable	High and accountable to community	High and primarily accountable to the stakeholders.	Intermediate but accountable to victims, offenders, and communities
Focus of police culture	Inward, distancing the community and external others	Outward, building partnerships	Mixed, depending on problem, but analysis focused	Externally focused on other groups in the healing process
Locus of decision making	Police directed, minimizing the involvement of others	Community-police co-production, joint responsibility and assessment	Varied, police- and community-identified problems	Community directed, with other agencies leading, police following
Communication flow	Downward from police to community (asymmetric)	Horizontal between police and community (balanced)	Horizontal between police and community partners (balanced)	Upward from the community to the police (asymmetric)
Range of community involvement	Low and passive	Intermediate and active	Mixed, depending on problem set	High and active
Linkage with other agencies	Poor and intermittent	High participation and integration with other agencies	High participation and integrative, depending on the problem set	Highly integrative across agencies serving the same community
Type of organizational accountability and legitimacy	Centralized command and control, low accountability and legitimacy	Decentralized with community linkage, accountability, and legitimacy	Decentralized, with local accountability and higher legitimacy	Highly decentralized, high accountability and legitimacy
Measurement of success	Arrest and crime rates, particularly serious crime	Varied: crime, calls for service, fear reduction, community social cohesion	Varied, problems solved, minimized, displaced, or improved, and community quality of life enhanced	Community reparation, community social cohesion, fear reduction

As shown in table 1, from an organizational perspective, community policing involves opening police organizations and their policy apparatus to external comment and review. It engages the “customer” of police services in a public safety dialogue, while at the same time mandates that the police engage the community rather than stand at a distance. For many, it is an overarching organizational philosophy or strategy that identifies the police as part of and not apart from the broader civic body. It also defines policing as a public service and collective good, requiring police lawfulness and inclusiveness. For the most part, community and problem-oriented policing have been widely adopted in the West, but aspects of these police models have also migrated to many other parts of the world.

BOX 7— Four Building Blocks for Community-Oriented Policing:

1. Neighborhoods or small communities should serve as locations of police organization and operation.
2. Urban policing should be organized and conducted at the community or neighborhood level.
3. Police should work with communities to identify and respond to the unique and distinctive neighborhood problems that conventional police organizations and responses do not address.
4. Community consensus should guide police response to the community’s law and order problems.

Source: Neild 2000.

PROBLEM-SOLVING POLICING IN URBAN NEIGHBORHOODS


Problems of crime, violence, and disorder have numerous roots, and certainly the police are not responsible for most of them. Nonetheless, the police can be seen as a key frontline government agency that has ongoing contact with local communities, thereby creating government awareness of the needs and problems at the community level. From this perspective, the police can play an important advocacy and coordination role to assist others who bring non-police expertise to bear on community problems. An important aspect of community and problem-solving policing is building networks of partnerships for coordinated and more substantive community intervention (see figure 6).

As early as 1979, Herman Goldstein called attention to the police failure to understand the consequences (ends) of policing because of the usual concentration on the efforts of the police (means). This means-ends inversion leaves the police in a position of focusing on what they do rather than on what their efforts achieve, such as solving or mediating community violence, crime, and disorder problems or conversely producing community distrust of the police.

As an alternative to this means-ends inversion, the problem-solving model was developed in the United States by the Police Foundation in collaboration with police departments (Eck and Spellman 1987). This model provides police officers with a series of questions and protocols that require more than a superficial assessment of community problems and their genesis. The problem-solving model emphasizes Scanning–Analysis–Response–Assessment (SARA) as the most

appropriate way to address persistent community safety problems. Although the SARA model has been modified and improved over the years, its central features have remained constant and are presented in figure 6 below.

FIGURE 6. *The Police Problem-Solving Model*



Source: Office of Community Oriented Policing Services, U.S Department of Justice

The problem-solving model of policing has been widely applied across most of North America and Europe, as well as in several Asian countries and Australia and New Zealand. The generalizability of this model across police and legal systems is stressed to the extent that the model accommodates a wide array of institutional and legal differences. In essence, the SARA problem-solving model is the application of the scientific method to social problems and as such, it adapts to differing social and legal systems. It is not a “one-size fits all” approach, however; rather, it encourages the tailoring of solutions and interventions to the problems encountered. The SARA model is not without its problems, especially those associated with implementation in police agencies. All too often, the police, seeking to address immediate problems, skip steps in the process or accomplish them in less than a rigorous manner. This has led to concerns about “shallow problem solving” (Braga and Bond 2008), that is, employing the “spirit” of the process without its depth and structure. Nonetheless, by adopting a problem-solving posture in law enforcement agencies, the police begin to actually focus on addressing persistent community problems. Police responses to crime and other safety problems are slowly transformed from reactionary or reflexive to more analytic, thoughtful, and problem specific.

8. The Value Added of the New Approaches to Policing

Although research on community policing shows some mixed results, improvements in police-community interactions and community satisfaction with the police are consistently found, as are reductions in fear of crime and disorderly behavior and in some cases, increased officer job satisfaction (Bayley 1989, 1994; Brogden and Nijhar 2005; Chan 1997; Deosaran 2002; Feltes 2002; Manning 1998; Mackenzie and Henry 2009; Shearing 1998; Moore 1992; Punch, van der Vijver, and Zoomer 2002; Neild 2000; Skogan and Hartnett 1999; Skolnick and Bayley 1988a, 1988b). The general aspects of community policing appear to have an ameliorative influence on police and public relations, perhaps setting the stage for improved problem solving. Community policing has not been associated with significant declines in crime necessarily but has succeeded in creating a police-public environment that will allow for this issue to be more successfully tackled in the long run.

In contrast to community policing, problem-solving policing has been associated with 1) reducing specific crime types in specific places, 2) lessening the impact of crimes when they do occur, and 3) increasing the time between crime occurrences (Bullock and Tilley 2003; Skogan and Frydl 2004; Eck 2006; Braga 2014). Problem solving achieves these results due to its focus on discrete crimes in discrete places and to the way it focuses on the police role. Problem solving is also evidence based, in that it first measures the underlying dynamics of problems in community settings and then the results of police interventions to address these problems. Coupled with community policing, problem solving forms the basis of a coordinated police intervention system that 1) engages those affected by crime and disorder with the police to 2) focus on particularly persistent or troublesome crimes in clearly defined community settings. Community policing often sets the stage for problem solving in that both require the active engagement and trust of the community.

Ideas imbedded in community policing suggest that people residing in close proximity to local institutions (schools, churches, and so forth) become the structures upon which social control is actually built. In this regard, communities have imbedded within them social mores and norms of behavior that guide and shape resident behaviors. In matters of social control, communities are the first line of defense against social disorder and crime. The power of community-based, informal social control is often latent, hidden from immediate public view but important in shaping and controlling community social life (Black 2014).

POLICE AS FORMAL SOCIAL CONTROL ON THE COMMUNITY LEVEL

The police should be taken as the second line of social control in communities, that is, the formal aspect of social control. Rarely are the police as intimately engaged in communities as are members of that community, yet they do have important observations and information about community life. When the police remain in communities over time, their understanding of community dynamics deepens and becomes more actionable. This can be seen as part of an acculturation experience for the police, who are learning the norms and mores of the community so that

they can engage with it on its own terms. This is in recognition of the fact that the police must understand the nature, structure, and dynamics of that community if they are to be effective and accepted. In this case, understanding the social context is of prime importance for the police.

In part, police legitimacy comes from understanding the internal dynamics of communities. The police must at once enforce the law and support the local community ethos, most often strengthening and supporting those norms and values that stress pro-social behavior as well as acceptance and adherence to the law. Discussions of police legitimacy focus on how the community and its residents perceive the police and their interventions. Where the police are viewed as even handed and “fair” in the application of the law, communities can support and affirm their interventions. Where such actions are perceived to be arbitrary and unevenly applied, community support for the police recedes (Tyler 2006). As previously suggested, absent such community acceptance, the police become more like a standing army or external oversight process for the community, often producing alienation from law enforcement and the law. This is a delicate balance that cannot be over-emphasized. For the police to support community development and informal social control, they must be seen as a legitimate source of authority and service in that community. Although in some places the police do manage communities through “fear,” they frequently lose community support, leading these communities to revert to being dominated by crime and disorder absent clear normative connections between the police and the public.

All communities are not the same, however. Crime-ridden districts require police to reassert control before community building can occur. In Brazil’s community pacification program, for example, police often engaged in pitched battles with gangs for control of *favelas* that had been crime ridden for generations (Riccio et al. 2013). Community pacification was a necessary component to enable a community support and development environment to emerge. The *Grupamento Policial em Areas Especiais (Special Areas Police Group, GPAAE)* was created to address the situation and remove the perception that the government was turning a blind eye to the problem and therefore contributing to it. This mechanism of crisis control was intended to reduce levels of crime and gang violence, and the police originally sought to form positive relationships with citizens, reduce instances of police abuse, and form social partnerships to address community problems (Da Silva and Cano 2007). Residents in these *favelas* also recognized the changed safety climate and responded accordingly. The police, however, withdrew too early which impacted community trust negatively since it was felt the police were withdrawing their commitment to safety in these communities (Riccio et al. 2013).

Typically, communication between the police and the public is asymmetric, with the police generally talking more at than with the public. Redressing this imbalance can improve the nature of the communication, as well as how the police and the public view one another. Over time, if the police make efforts to talk to people they know, respect, and trust, some of the barriers they face in conflicted and marginalized communities can dissipate. This is a long and complicated process, however, especially in urban communities that are experiencing rapid migration. Nonetheless, a police service that regularly interacts with community residents is less likely to violate the rights of individuals in that community; in these cases, familiarity breeds a degree of civility, demonstrating the affinity between community policing and the deepening of the rule of law (Mastrofski and Greene 1993).

Police engagement with civic leaders and their respective organizations also magnifies the relationships between informal and formal social control. In most communities, even those with complex problems, social institutions such as the local church or other civic organizations become anchors for re-establishing community viability and longer-term trust in the law and the police. As part of such engagement, police often work with trusted community leaders to conduct community meetings to discuss local problems, in order to, consistent with the goal of problem solving, strategize the sources of these problems and how they might be addressed. Here, the focus is on further building community trust in the police by engaging the community and its informal leadership. These kinds of activities are often not routine for the police, however, who have frequently been independent authorities in matters of local crime and justice. By engaging the community in such a discourse, the police must ultimately share authority over community problems and what should be done to address them. For such engagement to work, police will need training and support in building community coalitions and in sharing power with the community over local definitions of crime and disorder and the sources of community problems.

ROOTS OF CRIME REFLECT OTHER SOCIAL ILLS

Communities that struggle with disorder and crime invariably struggle with other economic, employment, social, educational, health, and mental health issues as well. Studies of poverty, inequality, and marginalization (Bhalla and Lapeyre 2004) have repeatedly concluded that such communities suffer from numerous social, economic, and political engagement issues. Although it is clear that the police do not have a legal mandate or the resources to address all community problems, they are often the first government actors in communities who can direct or refer residents to other government services for assistance, and they ultimately coordinate with such agencies to improve individual, family, and community agency and social cohesion. Moreover, understanding an issue like violent crime from a medical, social welfare, social interventionist, public health, and legal perspective sheds light on possible government interventions to address the problem. It might be said that though the manifestations of violence and crime have serious legal implications, the roots of these problems typically lie elsewhere.

Marshalling the support of other government and private sector agencies, which, more often than not, are also focused on improving marginalized and isolated communities, can greatly assist the police and the community in improving social cohesion and community order. Today, policing is often carried out by law enforcement agencies in partnership with numerous civic, governmental, and private organizations. Especially when access to other government services, such as health, social services, and so on, are scarce, this civic-police partnership provides for more effective service delivery overall. The police can accelerate the connections they have with external agencies and organizations by building a community matrix of service providers and having regular meetings to understand the dynamics behind troubled individuals, families, and locations.

Such arrangements require some reorganization and reinvention of government services from being independent of one another to being problem focused, with individuals, families, and communities as potential targets for intervention. Community and problem-oriented policing strategies can be seen as a subset of a larger problem-solving government movement (Emerson, Nabatch, and Balough

2012), where the value of interagency coordination is recognized as a means to get at the underlying dynamics of persistent community problems, whether crime related or otherwise.

Coordinating committees composed of local government service providers, together with community leaders, broaden the scope of community and government interaction and have the potential of increasing public acceptance of government and police services within these local groups. Like police interactions with residents and local civic leaders, however, this involves some degree of “power sharing” wherein at times, the police lead problem-solving efforts and at other times, other agencies or individuals take the lead. However, programming to build these kinds of networks and socialize service providers to develop coordinated and complementary strategies and tactics to address what are often deep-seated community problems requires considerable effort. All too often, the governance of cities (and communities and neighborhoods) through power sharing is a complex and difficult business (Bollens 2013).

BOX 8 – Police-Community Collaboration in Sierra Leone

Police reform efforts in Sierra Leone have focused on building Local Policing Partnership Boards (LPPBs), consisting of local leaders, businesspeople, farmers, and service workers. The role of the police in LPPBs involves participating in the security and justice decision-making process as well as serving as police proxies within their communities. This relationship between informal and formal methods of justice not only serves as a check on official police authority but also prevents the abuse of authority by local leaders.

Source: Albrecht et al. 2014.

PRIVATE SECTOR HAS A ROLE

Lastly, although government has the potential to make a considerable impact in troubled communities, so too does the private sector. Private sector actors, such as shop owners, landlords, local businesses, and so forth, are rooted in these communities. They often service, in full or in part, many of the community’s needs, such as for housing or access to food or other services. Local businesses are both social and economic anchors within communities and can play a role in helping these areas become more socially cohesive. Creating a police liaison with local businesses and landlords, for example, opens a dialogue about the quality of life and community services. At the same time, police-business interaction can provide an assurance that the police will help protect and preserve these businesses so that they can continue to serve the public. In many places, police-private partnerships are a way to serve the interests of the local community by bolstering elements of its economic base while at the same time acting as a stimulus for police reform (Bhanu and Stone 2004).

9. An Important Piece of the Puzzle: The Commitment to Restorative Justice

In many parts of the world, justice system decisions and outcomes often exacerbate the injuries and losses already experienced. Justice system actors and rulings can sometimes lack grounding in ways to repair the damage that exists between those injured through some form of delinquent or criminal behavior and those who committed these offenses. Police, prosecutors, judges, and prisons can increase social disorganization in local communities when they focus primarily on control and punishment. This can happen on several levels. For example, area youth are often the target for police and justice system interventions in marginalized communities; they can be labeled as deviant, delinquent, or criminal, even when their offenses are minor. Such labeling can lead youth to accept this negative status, limiting their opportunities and inclination to participate in legitimate activities (such as education and work), thereby further distancing them from pro-social influences.

Communities can be further destabilized through mass arrest and incarceration practices, and weakened yet again when offenders are returned to these communities without appropriate support services (Clear, Rose, and Ryder 2001). Those returning after incarceration often weaken normative bonds within the community by negatively influencing others, thereby further reducing community cohesion. Control and punishment are then seen as the only role and function of the law and its enforcers, and once formal justice systems move toward simply adjudicating guilt and meting out punishment, the interactions between victims and offenders are often distant and conflictual. Under such circumstances, the adversarial, risk-based justice models become ascendant, and community harm reduction and restoration are made more complicated.

In contrast, the restorative justice movement recognizes the importance of repairing the harm done to victims by offenders, maintaining the dignity of both parties in the process, and improving community social cohesion through processes that reintegrate the offender back into the community. Restorative justice philosophies and practices seek to give voice and participation to victims in addressing the harm they encountered and to have offenders accept responsibility for the harm they caused (Braithwaite 2002). Rather than the state simply advocating for the victim and punishing the offender, restorative justice processes seek to engage the victim and the offender in a process of healing.

According to the UNODC, restorative justice is "... any process in which the victim and the offender and, where appropriate, other individuals or community members affected by a crime participate together actively in the resolution of matters arising from the crime ..." (2006, 7). Restorative justice processes are varied and include victim-offender mediation, family group conferencing, restorative conferencing, community restorative boards, restorative circles and systems, circles of support and accountability, and sentencing circles. Each of these methods seeks to engage victim and offender in a dialogue about harm experienced and responsibility accepted.

BOX 9 – Restoring Community Peace after Conflict

In some contexts, restorative justice practices may be crucial to repairing damage caused by extreme violence and societal conflicts. Community-level *gacaca* courts were historically predominant in Rwanda, but Western models of justice were imposed under Belgian rule. After 1994, the formal court system was flooded with attempts to adjudicate the hundreds of thousands of criminals imprisoned for their involvement in the genocide. Local *gacaca* courts quickly regained importance and were not only vital for the efficient processing of offenders but were also extremely important for the healing of a torn, conflicted society. The *gacaca* courts implemented community customs of citizen participation in the dispute-resolution and restitution process. These courts not only adjudicated offenders more quickly but also promoted solutions and reconciliation within the communities directly affected by their violent acts.

Source: Westberg 2010.

These approaches emphasize social as opposed to legal intervention as the first line of defense in securing community safety and order. At the same time, restorative processes are meant to 1) be flexible responses to the circumstances of the crime, 2) maintain the dignity of offenders, victims, and communities, 3) be alternatives to traditional criminal justice interventions, such as arrest and prosecution, 4) incorporate problem solving, 5) repair harm and ensure accepted accountability for harm, and 5) occur within community settings so as to affirm the prevention role communities play in addressing crime, violence, and disorder.

Such approaches have been successfully used not just after conflict but as an alternative and sometimes more successful response to community-level crimes. As shown in figure 7, restorative justice practices seek to balance the interests of the victim and the offender, as well as the community in which the harm is suffered. The overarching objectives are to improve community safety in which offender, victim, and community all participate, improve the competency of the offender for prosocial behavior, and create an accountability link between the victim, the offender, and the community. All sides of this triangle intersect in restorative justice practice.

These approaches were originally found in traditional, informal justice systems in Africa, Australia, and the tribal nations in North America, among others, but they have since been adjusted, systemized, and integrated into modern justice system responses in many countries around the globe. For example, in 2013, Jamaica, as a key component of implementing its National Restorative Justice Policy, opened seven Community Restorative Justice Centers working officially in 11 communities. In their first phase of implementation, these centers have begun to address community conflicts and complaints outside the formal justice system (Wachtel 2014).

FIGURE 7. Restorative Justice Model



Source: Wordpress.com.

Restorative justice processes align well with community and problem-oriented policing in that each seeks to improve local social control, reduce harm, and improve acceptance of the law and its enforcers, through transparent and accountable government and criminal justice procedures. Restorative justice not only benefits the victim and offender, it can also help increase the legitimacy of the justice sector in developing nations by integrating community members into discussions about justice reform and other government or political processes. When citizens have been wronged or where especially powerful distrust exists, restorative practices can foster discussions and develop solutions. These methods help to enhance the quality of the justice system and the services it provides and to improve perceptions of legitimacy (Braithwaite 2007). The police can play an important role in restorative justice practices as a referral source for community disputes and conflicts and as a means of improving community social cohesion.

10. Investing in Police and Community Engagement

Attached to a broader community crime prevention movement that began in the 1960s, current efforts involving police and citizen interaction attempted to make communities crime resistant first by mobilizing the community in its own defense (Hope 1995, 21–89) and second by organizing the community for greater surveillance of public places. This gives the community a “co-production” (Skolnick and Bayley 1986) role in crime prevention, while at the same time increasing community “guardianship” and management of public places, a cornerstone of the situational crime prevention movement (see Clarke 1995, 91–150).

Strategies that attempt to engage the community in a dialogue about safety and security have now become imbedded in larger systems of more open forms of governance. The World Bank has been actively engaged in promoting open governance in numerous ways,⁶ and engaging the police in such governance reform is essential to dealing with violence and crime, particularly in impoverished areas. As crime and disorder are often correlated with community social and economic problems, the police are at the social coalface, in direct contact with struggling communities, over and above other government services or interventions.

Organizationally, the police tend to be geographically rooted in districts, patrol areas, and beats, while at the same time differentiated by functions such as general patrol, youth work, and criminal investigation. Ideally, they regularly survey communities by virtue of their local presence, and they have the potential to be very knowledgeable about community dynamics. In much of what is known about the police worldwide, having “beat knowledge” (knowledge of the patrol beat to which the police officer is assigned) is an essential ingredient for good policing. Collecting and synthesizing this local knowledge is an important opportunity for the police to tailor their interventions to dynamic and changing local conditions, a critical element of community and problem-oriented policing, as well as restorative justice practice.

BOX 10 – The World Bank’s Focus on Open and Participatory Government

Open government—increased transparency, citizen participation, and collaboration between government and citizens—is a key driver of development in the 21st century. Citizen-centric governance, with openness as a central pillar, improves the use of public resources, facilitates inclusive decision-making processes, and increases trust between governments and citizens. Governments that are more open are better positioned to act effectively and efficiently, foster private sector growth, and respond to the true needs of all citizens.

Source: World Bank 2015.

⁶ See World Bank Global Solutions Groups – Open Government at <http://globalpractices.worldbank.org/governance/Knowledge%20Base/Global%20Solutions%20Group%20-%20Open%20Government%20Brief%20-%20FINAL.pdf>.

In many places, however, police have not taken full advantage of their local position and knowledge of community affairs, nor have they used what should be in-depth information about local conditions to calibrate their local interventions and support for the community. Instead, the police have often relied on a “uniform” approach to community engagement, one that is often asymmetrical with regard to information and power sharing and focused primarily on the interests of the police and not the community.

THE IMPORTANCE OF HORIZONTAL AND VERTICAL INTEGRATION

At the same time, effective engagement structures within disadvantaged communities are not easy to create, not just because of people’s often great distrust of police and other government actors, but because these communities are frequently neither horizontally nor vertically well integrated. They lose their horizontal connections between neighbors as they are often highly transient places with considerable population heterogeneity, and they are frequently unable to informally supervise social relations, including those that lead to crime and disorder. Vertical integration is often equally lacking, meaning that the connections between the local community and superordinate districts and institutions are insufficient to gain the needed support (social, political, economic) for local community life. These connections are often political in nature, meaning that when communities are successfully vertically integrated, they can and do lobby and leverage government resources for community development and support.⁷

Furthermore, the poorest and most marginalized people in most societies feel the brunt of negative police attention. In many parts of the world, the history of policing in marginalized communities has resulted in great mistrust of government and the police. In Latin and South America, Africa, the Middle East, and many other parts of the world, the police are seen as part of an oppressive government system, and they are often corrupt and/or criminal in nature. Police services in many regions have direct links to the military and internal intelligence communities, and the idea of community-police engagement will likely take considerable time and institutional adjustment to develop. Under these circumstances, the actual security and safety needs of these communities have largely been ignored or only partially satisfied. Here, incorporating community or problem-oriented policing and/or restorative justice practices requires rebuilding the basic relationships between the justice system and the public, especially in terms of police-community communications and interactions.

EXAMPLES OF SUCCESSFUL IMPLEMENTATION

There are illustrations that such approaches can indeed be implemented in historically conflicted places. Evaluations of justice system reform in post-conflict Cambodia, for example, have been predominantly positive. Researchers found that both violent crime and crimes involving property theft have declined sharply since the implementation of policing reforms, and public fear of crime has declined as well. These indicators suggest that organizational and policy changes have generally been successful. The studies also point to the importance of

⁷ Vertically integrated communities have the political efficacy to demand and receive government resources and support; they are also able to make the government aware of their problems and have the political strength to ensure that government acts on their behalf for community benefit. Simply put, they have the political and social leverage to get government responses when needed.

sufficient financial resources and organizational commitment to improving citizens' confidence in the police. Although citizens were less fearful of crime, they did report being disappointed in the persistent lack of equipment and police personnel within law enforcement agencies. (Broadhurst and Bouhours 2009).

Continued reform efforts have also been undertaken in Bougainville, a now autonomous region of Papua New Guinea, which was previously policed by the Royal Papua New Guinea Constabulary (RPNGC). Following the establishment of its autonomy, a hybrid approach to police reform was implemented. To alleviate distrust in law enforcement created by the domineering approaches of the RPNGC, police worked together with community leaders who had traditionally been responsible for solving disputes and reducing tensions in times of state-level conflict. With the assistance of the New Zealand government, Bougainville created the Community Auxiliary Police (CAP), whose goal was to respect rather than undermine traditional peacekeeping efforts of the villages. In this model, police officers are elected by tribal elders and remain accountable to community leaders. Citizens place a great deal of trust in those chosen by their leaders and have confidence in their administration of justice. Working together, most disputes are resolved at the community level and village courts are provided with resources for their operation. Observational and interview data indicate that despite previously high levels of distrust in the police, the CAP model is significantly increasing the positive perceptions of law enforcement officers (Dinnen and Peake 2013).

For the police to reclaim marginalized communities, a long-term strategy is needed. Many of these communities have witnessed severe isolation and deprivation, sometimes spanning generations. Recasting a relationship between the police and the public in these places will require that these historic experiences be overcome. Trust and civic acceptance of the police are especially fragile, and police attention to community needs requires a persistent and visible positive police presence and outreach to disaffected individuals and families. Once such efforts have been sustained over time, the legitimacy of the police and legal system can be reframed.

COMMUNITY MOBILIZATION ON ALL FRONTS

Community mobilization in the crime prevention arena can be seen as allied with other community mobilization strategies in health care and education. For example, research on alcohol and drug prevention programs shows “that in programs that involve high levels of community participation and control, there is greater participation in health improvement activities. Community engagement builds social capital—social ties, networks, and support—which is associated with better community health and well-being. [And], participatory decision-making can uncover and mobilize community assets, strengths, and resources that would have been otherwise overlooked” (Prevention by Design 2006).

The maintenance of order in communities with an existing consensus on the subject creates many positive opportunities for the police and the community to interact. Indeed, in communities with some level of social organization, there is often the capacity and motivation for the community to work with the police. “The more organized the neighborhood’s means of giving voice to its preferences, the easier it is for the police to obtain input, deal with diversity of viewpoints within the neighborhood, and mobilize the community to support and assist police officers” (Mastrofski and Greene 1993, 89). Of course, the opposite is equally true; communities without consensus make the policing of order more

difficult. Communities with little or no social organization are often “occupied by the police” as a means of preserving order, which is even seen as a central feature of many community and problem-oriented policing initiatives (see Moore 1992), yet once a modicum of order is achieved, the police must shift their focus toward stabilizing the community, building social cohesion, and in doing so, having a more organized community with which to form crime prevention partnerships.

Much thinking about community, problem-oriented, and restorative justice practices contains imbedded assumptions about the nature of what constitutes a community, how communities can be engaged, the linkages between informal and formal social control, and the capacity of the police to effectively change their organizational and service delivery models to accommodate these new approaches (see Brogden and Nijhar 2005, ch. 3). Most of the criticism of community policing has been aimed at its Anglo-American models (Brogden 1999), which have been exported across the world (Pino and Wiatrowski 2006). The critique centers on whether such exportation is useful in helping transitional countries in pursuit of democratic governance and more effective policing. To expect that police can take on social, economic, and political inequality as their central role would be unrealistic, as the roots of these issues lie in other sectors of governance. In such environments, the police must be careful not to raise public expectations that they can indeed take on such fundamental governance and public service delivery issues if the other parts of the government are not equally engaged. Police can support facilitate these matters, but not be the sole solution to all government ills.

Taken together, experiences from the exportation of Anglo-American models of community policing and its derivatives suggest that local legal traditions and cultures, as well as the nature and structures of communities within these systems, must guide any change process. Nonetheless, case studies in Northern Ireland (Engel 2008), Iraq (Mullick and Nusrat 2008), South Africa (Shanafelt 2008), and Kazakhstan (Snajdr 2008) all reveal that community engagement, as difficult as it may be, is an important aspect of the movement toward a democratic police service.

11. Challenging Barriers to Implementing Effective Policing Methods

When police are indifferent to communities and their problems or benefit from corrupt or brutal practices, broader social disruptions are often accelerated, sometimes resulting in riots and other violent government confrontations. A police service invested in community problems, on the other hand, has the potential to strengthen local community leadership and the social norms emphasizing law-abiding behavior. The police, when they are doing their job, are all too aware of local community problems, especially in impoverished and marginalized places. They patrol the streets and byways of these places, interact with people on the streets or local shop owners, and come to understand the rhythms and contradictions of community life.

At the same time, the public is intimately aware of the police as either a source of support or comfort or as a yet another travail of community life, worsening social relations and either indifferent to or corrupt in the provision of public safety services. Although there is certainly an asymmetry between the police and the public, in struggling communities, both face the consequences of negative and often violent social behavior. Clearly the community feels the brunt of violence and other criminal acts more starkly, but the police also experience negative community behaviors. Whether they are arresting offenders or attending to victims, the police see the first-hand impacts of crime and violence in community settings. In this regard, the police and the community should be naturally allied, but unfortunately this is not always the case in many parts of the world.

Crime-ridden and unstable communities with a weak police presence are problematic for law enforcement agencies worldwide. Often these locations are hotbeds of criminal activity, lack internal social cohesion and control, and are ripe for infiltration by criminal gangs. Social order, such as it is, is often enforced by criminal groups or gangs, where the threat and reality of violence is imminent. Residents in these communities are often faced with a choice: conform to social norms that emphasize fear, retribution, and loss of community voice and agency or be subject to aggression from the criminal underworld (Arias and Rodrigues 2006). While many in these communities would most likely opt for police-enforced law and order, their experience is that the police have typically either turned a blind eye to the situation, are part of problem due to corruption, or are in other ways insufficient in creating and maintaining the long-term stability necessary for community cohesion and agency to flourish (Rodgers 2006). Absent a protectorate in the form of the local police, most residents are left to fend for themselves and are forced to capitulate to the demands of those threatening to commit violence (Jones and Rodgers 2015), effects are felt particularly among immigrant communities and minority ethnic and religious groups.

TREATING ENTIRE COMMUNITIES AS CRIMINAL

At times, the police often conflate dangerous areas with dangerous residents, to the extent that when a community is labeled crime-ridden, its residents, good and bad, often feel the brunt of aggressive police action. As described above, the

police in many parts of the world have embraced a model of policing that emphasizes “crime attack” and “crime suppression,” that is, aggressive police actions in public places, presumably to serve as a deterrent to potential criminals. Unfortunately, the police in these countries often cannot easily or clearly distinguish between those who need police intervention and those who do not; in a crime-ridden area, the entire community is often blamed. Aggressive police tactics, then, often contradict people’s expectations about being treated fairly before the law, further distancing them from the police and increasing insecurity about crime. This crime-attack model of policing has maintained popularity as the police have continued to narrow their professional role to dealing almost exclusively with criminal behavior. This stands in stark contrast to a broader set of roles and functions the police have historically fulfilled, when they were traditionally part of the fabric of local civic support or were at least a distant and perhaps more benign social force in community life.⁸

From the perspective of the rule of law, these conditions immediately taint social expectations about government and judicial legitimacy. Where individual rights are suspended and/or where flagrant corruption is the expected social exchange medium, police-civic relations are damaged and usually very fragile. Moreover, if these circumstances have been in place for an extended period of time, the expectation that the police are present to protect and serve the community is often met with outright disdain. In either case, improving the police-community interface clearly requires an in-depth evaluation of the roots of social control in a given community and its decline.

Chile offers a useful example. In contrast to many Latin American countries, citizens in Chile hold rather positive views of the police. Whereas most other countries in Latin America are struggling to implement extensive plans to increase the legitimacy of law enforcement agencies following decades of instability, corruption, militaristic policing, and high rates of crime, Chile has had no need to take special action. Instead, the people continue to maintain high levels of trust in the police, even in the face of rising crime rates. It has been argued that Chile’s divergent experience can be explained by the existence of a relatively stable government and a slow and gradual incorporation of community participation following the transition to democratic power since the late 1990s. The Chilean Carabineros, i.e. the police force responsible for patrolling the streets and maintaining public order, managed to rehabilitate its image and reestablished positive relationships with the Chilean society. Chilean policing also emphasizes community participation in formulation crime policy and a series of initiatives incorporated the community into policing (Malone 2013). Chilean citizens have held consistently favorable attitudes toward the police and trust that the police will do their best to protect their communities (Fruhling 2007). Conversely, surrounding countries have continued to experience instability and have focused on community policing efforts only during troubled periods when public scandals or conflicts with the police arise.

8 Dammert and Malone (2006) examined how crime, victimization, and other insecurities contribute to fear of crime in Latin America. In Brazil and Argentina, which both emphasize zero-tolerance approaches to crime, citizens were significantly more fearful of crime than citizens in Chile, whose police focus on community-oriented approaches toward crime and justice. The strategies of Brazilian and Argentinian police often involve heavy-handed, militarized tactics that intimidate community members and undermine trust in the police (Dammert and Malone 2006). At the same time, such practices are thought to also make these communities more criminogenic (Howell 2009), while incurring considerable financial and normative costs for the police.

THE SPECIAL PROBLEM OF CORRUPTION AND OTHER POLICE CRIMES

Particularly powerful barriers to reforming police services and improving police-community interactions are criminal behavior and corruption on the part of the police themselves. Concern about how the police use their authority is ever present in many countries. Police misconduct and malfeasance can include many actions, including, on the lower end of the corruption scale, misusing their authority to secure material gain, such as free meals or free services, often from shopkeepers happy to have the police remain in their area. This exploitation can be passive or more aggressive, depending on whether the police officer takes what might be seen as “gifts” or whether he demands and receives free or discounted services. Kickbacks and shakedowns clearly involve the misuse of police authority; in these “transactions,” the police are the equivalent of white collar criminals who misuse their occupational positions for self-benefit.

BOX 11 – Bribery in Law Enforcement

Around the world, 31 percent of people who have come into contact with the police report having paid a bribe. Bribery rates of the police were highest (at 75 percent or more) in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ghana, Indonesia, Kenya, Liberia, Nigeria, and Sierra Leone.

Source: Transparency International 2013.

Stepping up the corruption scale, when police officers fail to carry out their duties, either by taking actions that violate their professional ethics or by failing to act when clear law enforcement action is warranted, they are corrupt. Police corruption can also be internal to the police process, such as when officers tamper with evidence, make false arrests, plant false evidence, or lie in court proceedings, or it can take the form of police protection for illegal or criminal enterprises, such as the protection of forced slavery, drug dealers, prostitution rings, illegal gambling enterprises, and so forth. It is also seen in police theft of property from victims of crime, such as additional thefts by the investigating police from store- or homeowners who experience a burglary. Moreover, officers are sometimes directly involved in criminal enterprises, including the seizing and selling of drugs, weapons, and other restricted or prohibited goods.

Police corruption can be found in the actions of individuals or entire units or divisions, or may be systemic. The old adage of the “rotten apple” is generally replaced with the idea of the “rotten barrel,” indicating that individual police officer corruption often needs a supporting or at least an indifferent environment in which to occur. Other police officers, police supervisors, and so on must either turn a blind eye to police malfeasance or participate in it directly. In either case, much of what is known about police corruption is that it is often on a larger scale than that of an individual police officer (Agbiboa 2015). The worst case scenario is when police are undermined by or taken over entirely by actual criminal elements. Police forces in some countries in Latin and Central America, for example, have long histories of themselves being part of organized crime networks, and such connections have also been found in U.S. police agencies, most recently in Puerto

Rico (Pestano 2015). If these ties are broad and strong, reforming the agency can be very difficult and requires the highest-level commitment and community support.

Corruption among the police also depends to a significant degree on social tolerance, not just within but outside the law enforcement agency. In other words, police corruption is at once contextual and cultural. At the point of the corrupt action or decision there is of course a context, that is, a scenario in which the police officer is presented with an opportunity or is subject to influences and chooses to use his authority inappropriately or illegally. Situational circumstances matter, and how the police become engaged or react in those circumstances is critical to understanding police corruption and the police's role in crime prevention in developing countries (Grant 2014). Widespread police corruption and criminality are therefore often rooted in broader cultural ideas about social exchange. In simple terms, corrupt police officers need the compliance of the community (either the local or broader community) and the police system to sustain the corruption. When paying for police protection becomes a norm in a community and when the police expect such payments, the cultural ground has shifted and the exchange has replaced the broader expectation that the police will provide services because the government uses its resources to carry out this duty (Jones and Newburn 1998).

CONSEQUENCES OF POLICE CORRUPTION AND CRIME

So what are the implications of these varying types of corruption and crime in a police agency? First, the presence of corruption challenges the idea that police services are expected to be a collective public good meant to benefit all citizens equally, regardless of wealth or status (Jones and Newburn 1998). Instead, those services go only to those who can pay for or otherwise influence police discretion and decision making. In a related way, when corruption becomes the norm in the provision of police services, it undermines the rule of law, in that influences other than the law affect law enforcement activities. Simply put, the law is supplanted by other influences on the police, and those without that influence become outsiders to the entire process or exchange, leaving the law itself undermined and the citizen's connection to the law violated. Lastly, when corruption takes precedence over law in police decision making, individuals become legally disenfranchised, in that they can no longer expect to be protected by the law and its enforcers. In such circumstances, individuals and communities may feel obligated to create other social control mechanisms, such as vigilante groups, or they may simply withdraw from the law altogether, experiencing no personal attachment to or protection from the police and the legal system. Many people in poor communities across the world experience this, actually living "outside the law" because they do not enjoy the protections of the law or its enforcement agencies.⁹ Corruption saps the capacity of the state and the police to effectively bring law and order to these poor and marginalized communities, for whom the police are part of their larger crime and violence problem.

⁹ Nigerian police had historically been instituted as a political and paramilitary tool to protect the state rather than the interests of the citizenry. Consequently, Nigerian citizens developed great distrust and could not rely upon the formal police force to protect them from crime. Community members established informal policing structures within their villages to preserve and protect traditional norms and bring those who violated them to justice (Onwudiwe 2009). Similarly, nations like Afghanistan were traditionally policed by community networks and tribal elders along with other governmental hierarchies. Paramilitary approaches to policing have been met with great resistance because they undermine the traditional community-level approach toward justice (see From et al. 2010).

Addressing corruption requires strong government agency and overall commitment to change. It also often requires external pressure and international support to develop and maintain comprehensive investments in reform. That change is possible has been demonstrated, for example, in Liberia, where ongoing work to reduce police corruption has resulted in better internal accountability practices and professional standards, and evaluators have seen some improvements in police officers' willingness to report corruption and abuse of power to the designated authorities.¹⁰ However, most corrupt practices in developing countries remain unaddressed and widespread, and additional support is needed to improve training and education, raise police salaries, conduct independent investigations, and develop stronger anti-corruption legislation (Human Rights Watch 2013).

Corrupt police systems clearly undermine the values and practices that are imbedded in community and problem-oriented policing and restorative justice. These approaches seek to form alliances between the police and communities they serve, which requires shared expectations about the rule of law and the protection of the vulnerable and also demands transparency and accountability in police policy and decision making. Still, targeted interventions in select communities where police leaders and communities are committed to change can be a start if supported by a commitment to reform at the upper levels of government.

¹⁰ Similar results have been found in Kenya, a country in which corruption has been rampant since colonial rule. Significant steps have been taken toward fighting corruption, including measures to improve government accounting, developing and enforcing stronger anti-corruption laws, and encouraging public participation to demand accountability. Evaluations demonstrate that such measures have strongly reduced opportunities for corruption, but persistence and continued improvements are needed to continue to work toward success (Mutonyi 2002).

12. Community and Problem-Oriented Policing and Restorative Justice: Making a Human Rights Approach Central

It is useful to think about the differences and similarities between community and problem-oriented policing and restorative justice practices as broad philosophical and ethical statements about human rights and the role of the police within the rule of law. Problem-oriented policing and restorative justice speak to how police strategies and tactics are made operational, transparent, and accountable to the public. Such changes often challenge the prevalent notion of the police as a semi-military organization that is almost exclusively focused on crime and highly aggressive in the design of strategies and tactics. Historically, the philosophy of policing has been intimately tied to ideas about community safety and lawfulness. Although the police do indeed address disorder and crime issues in community settings, they also, at least in theory, respond to calls for assistance for a wide array of community needs, including protecting children or other vulnerable people; caring for the indigent, dispossessed, or mentally incapacitated; protecting property; assuring for the safe movement of vehicular and pedestrian traffic; responding to medical emergencies and natural catastrophes; caring for victims of violent crime; diverting youth from gang or other street-level negative activity; and today, dealing with concerns with security.


In a broader sense, police interventions often follow paths similar to medicine. First, the police are expected to **prevent** community harm, including violence and crime. Absent such prevention, the police must then **respond** to crime incidents and at once protect the victims and hold the offenders to account, a central requirement of the rule of law. Third, the police must also **restore** communities once they have become victimized or harmed. Figure 8 presents a schema for understanding policing from a human rights perspective, wherein the police protect the vulnerable and others from harm, respond to harm when it occurs, remove the offenders, and restore community cohesion. These models of policing, which emphasize public safety first and foremost, require adherence to the rule of law. Simply put, this means that the police must enforce the law equitably, focused on ensuring procedural justice, that is, the evenhanded application of criminal sanctions.

Community and problem-oriented policing as well as restorative justice are philosophies, strategies, and tactics that focus on all three intervention points depicted in Figure 8. These approaches seek to prevent and respond to crime by engaging and partnering with a wide array of individuals and organizations to make communities secure and to address persistent problems. At the same time, community and problem-oriented policing and restorative justice seek first to restore communities in the aftermath of trauma and/or victimization and then help communities and the police prevent and respond to future problems. All operate within the rule of law, and all seek to provide a broader sense of community safety, social cohesion, and agency. Moreover, all are rooted in the idea of partnership and engagement.

It would be naive to minimize and understate the range of criminal problems that often beset troubled communities. At times and in many places around the world, these communities resemble war zones, replete with high levels of violence and retaliation for those who cooperate with the police, reinforced by an underground ethic and economy that is often rooted in drugs, weapons, and human trafficking. In these areas, resistance from gangs, organized crime or militant groups to any law enforcement effort is often violent and substantial. As a result, police tactics resembling those of a military force are often a necessary first step to deal with the concentrated violence. But like in war zone locations, successes achieved through military ends often require some form of community building to sustain them, and in the same vein, winning the “hearts and minds” of the local community is an underlying strategy in effective policing. For all practical purposes, the police cannot maintain a long-standing, army-like presence in domestic communities, since to do so requires overwhelming economic, social, and political resources.

An illustration of how the combined community forces can magnify the impact of the police in securing public safety and promoting human rights is found in the efforts of the International Justice Mission (IJM) in the Philippines (Haugen and Boutros 2014, 242–57). There, the combined efforts of IJM lawyers, investigators, social workers, and the Philippines Department of Justice and police, with assistance from the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, took on what was a rampant child commercial sex trade. The program was focused on preventing sexual victimization from occurring, but also on bringing the traffickers to account, while restoring both individuals and communities that had been traumatized from this crime. The Cebu City Justice System Transformation Project enlisted a wide array of government, political, socio-cultural, and international and justice system participants all focused on reducing the commercial child sex trade. All of these combined efforts produced improved case management, law enforcement training, prosecutorial understanding of the law, and care for the victims, creating dramatic results. The project reported a substantial increase in the rescue of sex trafficking victims and the successful prosecution of sex traffickers, and also a 79 percent reduction in the overall vulnerability of children to the commercial sex trade (Haugen and Boutros 2014, 244). Collective purpose produced collective results.

FIGURE 8. Policing for Human Rights through the Intervention Continuum



Source: Adjusted from Greene 2010.

13. Conclusion

Strengthening lawful police interaction with marginalized and violence-prone communities can become a means for stabilizing these communities, thus making them more able to successfully respond to development efforts. Evidence from around the globe has long shown that without a safe and stable environment, development interventions are likely to suffer. Effective, inclusive, and community-focused law enforcement is an essential element in creating or maintaining that safe environment, including by building citizen trust in government and developing sustainable mechanisms for successful government service delivery.

The *community policing* approach seeks to 1) open police organizations and their internal cultures to external input and review, 2) increase the capacity of the police to address persistent and often debilitating community problems, either by acting alone or by working in partnership with others, and 3) reform police agencies such that they are more problem and community sensitive, accountable, less corrupt, and less willing to misuse police authority. Allied with problem-solving and restorative justice practices, this new model of policing helps to anchor the police in rule of law, open governance, and inclusiveness, while encouraging them to be more sensitive to community contexts and nuances.

Focused on such ideas as consensus, community empowerment, public safety, and police reform, various forms of community policing programs have sprung up in many regions of the world (Brogden and Nijhar 2005). Some apply older police techniques such as foot patrols to the newer problems of urban decay. Others stress effective communication between the police and the people in setting the agenda for police activity locally. Still others are focused first and foremost on reforming the police, reducing corruption, and moderating police misuse of force as preludes to community engagement. Community policing, then, means a variety of measures depending on how it is designed and implemented. It is at once an ideology, an organizing framework for various police activities, and a set of individual programs. For some, the “flexibility” in meanings associated with community policing is seen as problematic, but as Moore (1994, 290) suggests, “... it is partly the ambiguity of the concept [community policing] that is stimulating the wide pattern of experimentation we are observing.”

Allied with community policing, *problem-oriented policing* is more tactical, focused on persistent problems that continue to degrade communities. Problem-oriented policing is seen as 1) a way of broadening police thinking about problems and their roots and branches, 2) a way of moving the police from employing reactive social and legal interventions to applying proactive ones, 3) a vehicle for increasing other civic, government, and private agency engagement with social problems, including those of crime and disorder, and 4) a way for the police to better assess their effectiveness and accountability. Community and problem-oriented policing, taken together, are the philosophy and practice of open and inclusive government and police engagement with communities and other constituents and of problem resolution, reduction, or mitigation; they are also the means for assessing the effectiveness and lawfulness of police and other government interventions in an effort to stabilize communities.

Restorative justice practices also help confirm community identity and reduce the tensions that arise between victimized communities and the offenders, particularly with regard to youth crime. Restorative practices help communities mediate harm and risk and provide a vehicle for community input into justice decision making. As such, restorative justice practice is perhaps a normative way of bringing communities closer together, thereby improving social cohesion as well as the agency of individuals.

Community and problem-oriented policing as well as restorative justice practices can be used to assist police in their efforts to provide safety and security to marginalized and violence-ridden communities. They are also helpful in creating a better environment for more effective service delivery. Collectively, these practices show promise as strategies that can support World Bank investments focused on professionalizing police services, grounding police philosophy and practice in the rule of law, reducing corruption, and improving police-civic engagement.

Part 2 of this report provides more detailed information on building effective police services that address the needs of poor communities as part of a stronger service delivery and government accountability system. It also offers helpful ideas for effective programming and entry points for improving police services in order to enhance community quality of life and the prospects for community development in struggling parts of the world.

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