From Isolation to Integration An Overiew of the Borderlands of the Horn of Africa From Isolation to Integration An Overiew of the Borderlands of the Horn of Africa © 2020 International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/The World Bank 1818 H Street NW, Washington, DC 20433 202-473-1000 | www.worldbank.org Some rights reserved. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this work do not necessarily reflect the views of The World Bank, its Board of Executive Directors, or the governments they represent. The World Bank does not guarantee the accuracy of the data included in this work. The boundaries, colors, denomina- tions, and other information shown on any map in this work do not imply any judgment on the part of The World Bank concerning the legal status of any territory or the endorsement or acceptance of such boundaries. 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Cover photo: Photo: Flore de Preneuf | World Bank ii Contents Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iv Abbreviations and Acronyms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . v Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 Developing a Borderlands Approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 Drivers of Fragility and Sources of Resilience in the Borderlands . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 Some Key Themes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 Operational Implications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 Institutional and Policy Context for Regional Action . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 Recommendations for Action . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 Box O.1 Trade, Pastoralism, and Mobility in the Horn of Africa: The Karamoja Cluster . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 Maps O.1 IGAD Clusters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 0.2 Food Insecurity in the Horn of Africa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 Tables O.1 Challenges and Opportunities in the Horn of Africa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 O.2 Supporting Development and Stability in the Borderlands . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 iii Acknowledgments This work was undertaken by a World Bank team Goodhand, Professor in Conflict and Development led by Varalakshmi Vemuru, and comprising Studies, Department of Development Studies , Matthew Stephens, Aditya Sarkar, Andrew Roberts School of Oriental and African Studies, University and Anton Baaré (formerly with the World Bank). of London. The World Bank editorial team made contributions to these papers with respect to The accompanying papers were written by updating data where relevant. Laura Johnson was Dr. Laura Hammond, School of Oriental and African responsible for copy editing and design. Studies University of London; Dr. Dereje Feyissa Dori, International Law and Policy Institute; The team appreciates comments and suggestions Patta Scott-Villiers, Institute of Development provided by Asbjorn Haland Wee, Helene Carlsson- Studies, University of Sussex; Kristin Bushby, Rex, and Paul Brenton from the World Bank. For Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts overall guidance and support, we are grateful to University, Graduate Student and Elizabeth Deborah L. Wetzel, Robin Mearns, Deo Ndikumana, Stites, Ph.D., Research Director, Feinstein Inter- and Vijay Pillai. national Center, Tufts University; and Jonathan iv Abbreviations and Acronyms COMESA Common Market for East and LAPSSET Lamu Port-Southern Sudan-Ethiopia Southern Africa Transport EU European Union SDG Sustainable Development Goal IGAD Intergovernmental Authority on UNHCR United Nations High Commissioner Development for Refugees v Overview The World Bank Group’s Horn of Africa Regional Initiative promotes resilience and economic opportunity in one of the world’s most challenging regions for security and development. Within the region, extreme poverty, vulnerability, fragility, and food insecurity are disproportionately concentrated in the arid and remote border regions. 1 2 From Isolation to Integration: An Overview of the Borderlands of the Horn of Africa Development policy makers and social scientists political marginalization; entrenched poverty; con- often suffer from “borderland blindness,” treating flict and violence; forced displacement; and envi- the territorially bounded nation-state as both the ronmental degradation, spilling across national central unit of analysis and as the primary site of boundaries. The reach of the state is weak, and development intervention. Underpinning such livelihoods rely on a combination of informal, a state-centric approach to policy making are illicit, and criminal strategies. In Goodhand’s three key assumptions: (1) that the state wields words (2014): “these regions seem immune to the sovereignty over its entire territory; (2) that the development successes celebrated at national and domestic and international spheres can be clearly international levels.” delineated; and (3) that group identity is cotermi- nous with the geographical boundaries of a state But despite its challenges, there are areas in (see Goodhand 2014: 13). In the Horn of Africa,1 the borderlands with real economic potential. with its long history of colonial rule, separatism, For example, the region’s international borders territorial conflicts within and among states, fluid have long allowed communities to benefit from identities, mobility, and multiple overlapping price differentials through licit and illicit trade hybrid governance institutions, each of these (Scott-Villiers 2015). Pastoralism and trade, the assumptions is demonstrably false. dominant livelihoods in the Horn of Africa, require the easy movement of people and goods within A “borderlands” perspective challenges policy and across borders—and continue to heavily rely makers to reconsider the nature of conflict, devel- on cross-country clan and ethnic affiliations. Local opment, and state building. By foregrounding the institutions therefore still play a key role in regulat- particularities of border regions and the commu- ing and facilitating economic activity and managing nities that live in them, this perspective reinforces conflict, especially as the formal institutions are the need to take context and history seriously and often weak or absent. Even in areas at the periphery to understand power as it actually exists on the of state control, the borderlands remain highly con- ground. It does not yield simple policy prescrip- nected to circuits of global capital and exchange. tions, but it does offer an analytical lens that com- plements others, such as the need to explicitly Increasing stability and improving the welfare of consider the gendered nature of—and responses the people in the borderlands requires a fresh to—each of these phenomena, as well as the need approach unconstrained by international borders. to foreground environmental concerns. In sum, Actions by individual countries to support devel- it can help policy makers craft better-targeted opment in their respective borderland regions policies. could help. But given the importance of transna- tional mobility to local livelihood patterns and The borderlands of the Horn of Africa have long the prevalence of external shocks that straddle been synonymous with economic, social, and international boundaries, including conflicts and natural disasters, development cannot take hold 1. The countries in the Horn of Africa are Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethio- in the absence of a spatial approach. Regional pia, Kenya, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, and Uganda. Overview 3 collaboration is essential to the joint management To unpack these observations and examine the of access to grazing lands and water, trade, and analytical and policy implications of a borderlands security. Cooperation is also needed to harmonize perspective for the World Bank and other national policies on mobility and economic integration. and international policy makers, the World Bank Regional institutions and programs are beginning commissioned five background papers, which to show what is possible when countries work are being published along with this overview. The together, but much remains to be done. remainder of this overview introduces each of the background papers; summarizes some of the drivers of fragility and sources of resilience in the Developing a region; discusses key themes that run across the Borderlands Approach papers, namely, livelihoods, mobility, and gender; The World Bank first discussed the idea of the sets out recommendations for action; and con- borderlands serving as potential conflict trig- cludes by touching on some current World Bank gers in a 2014 report entitled Regional Initiative in initiatives that are relevant to issues identified in Support of the Horn of Africa, noting the extent to the background papers. which these areas are contested and fought over. The report cites resource scarcity combined with Jonathan Goodhand’s 2014 paper on the political rapid population growth, poverty, and underde- economy of development in borderlands pro- velopment as exacerbators of communal conflict vides an overarching background to the border- and civil war in border areas. In the prevalent lands approach. His approach is predicated on an discourse, borderlands are not regarded as eco- understanding of three interconnected elements: nomically or politically important; they are usually (1) power, especially material interests and power inhabited by groups that lack representation in relations as mediated by formal and informal insti- central power structures and are viewed by others tutions; (2) space, particularly the ways in which as offering limited economic potential. Border- the flows of people and commodities across space land communities frequently rely on traditional unsettles the orderliness of states; and (3) time conflict management mechanisms and tools and history, or the ways in which neither border- to resolve competition over resources, such as lands nor states develop in a smooth or linear rangeland or water, as well as to manage violence. way. When considered in this light, borders are In many cases, these communities have been not merely lines demarcating territorial boundar- overwhelmed by well-financed criminal networks ies—they are institutions underpinned by specific and by armed groups that appeal to the histor- interests and power relations and they represent ical grievances of marginalized groups in their mentalities or ways of thinking about the world recruitment strategies. Border areas are becoming bolstered by particular worldviews and ideologies. increasingly militarized, with an increase in the For instance, labor markets and systems of pro- circulation of weapons as well as in the number of duction may be oriented around borders, and the people who use violence in pursuit of their goals protection of borders may be the basis on which (World Bank 2014a). violence is mobilized. 4 From Isolation to Integration: An Overview of the Borderlands of the Horn of Africa Goodhand warns against considering the bor- tackled by national action alone. All of the clus- derlands merely as “lagging regions” that their ters are identified based on physical and social respective states and development processes will factors as well as with their demonstrated impor- inevitably absorb through improved infrastructure, tance in terms of human and animal cross-border better connectivity, and investments in people. movement. The four delineated IGAD clusters are Instead, borderlands must be understood as polit- Karamoja, Borana, Somali/Mandera, and Dikhil; an ical and social spaces, created by the interplay of additional four clusters are being considered. The power, geography, and specific historical context. papers do not seek to endorse a specific institu- A borderlands approach does not yield simple tional mechanism for dealing with cross-border policy prescriptions. Take the example of infra- challenges but instead to analyze the challenges structure development. From a national develop- in and identify lessons from areas that have ment angle, roads, railways, communications, and been identified by an existing intergovernmental irrigation projects are often rightly seen as nec- initiative. essary public goods that allow “lagging areas” to catch up with the rest of their respective country. The background papers build off one another. However, a borderlands approach demands policy Laura Hammond’s 2017 paper on livelihoods and makers consider concerns such as the extent to mobility in the border regions of the Horn of Africa which political and security objectives of national provides a conceptual framework for the study of capitals drive the specific configuration of these borderlands. Dereje Feyissa Dori’s paper takes up infrastructure projects and the manner in which the discussion of resilience and development assis- they affect communities residing in borderlands tance in the Horn of Africa. By doing so, they each whose livelihoods and trading relationships may draw heavily on two rich empirical case studies be more closely connected to communities across of IGAD clusters: Patta Scott-Villiers’ paper, which national borders (Goodhand 2014). covers the borderland regions from Lake Turkana in the west to the Mandera triangle of Kenya in the The other papers commissioned by this project east, and Kristen Bushby and Elizabeth Stites’ 2015 cover thematic areas and geographically specific study, which encompasses the Karamoja cluster, borderland regions.2 As their point of departure, including the borderlands of northeastern and these papers build on the notion of cross-border northwestern Uganda, northwestern Kenya, south- “clusters” identified by the Intergovernmental eastern South Sudan, and southwestern Ethiopia. Authority on Development (IGAD). These clusters All of the papers assess the interactions between represent regions of the Horn of Africa that have livelihood, mobility, and resilience in the border historically suffered from underinvestment and regions of the Horn of Africa with a view toward whose challenges and vulnerabilities cannot be informing the design of development interventions that address the drivers of fragility while building 2. Because the papers were commissioned over an extended period of time, they have been lightly updated to account for on the region’s sources of resilience. specific empirical changes that have occurred in the interim, such as the addition of detailed information regarding recent South Sudanese displacement, which has had significant impacts on the region. Overview 5 Map O.1. IGAD Clusters SAUDI ARABIA OMAN SUDAN KHARTOUM ERITREA Re CHAD REP. OF YEMEN d Kassala Se ASMARA SANA'A a Wad Madani Mekele Rabak Gonder Gulf of Aden DJIBOUTI Bahr Dar DJIBOUTI Ali Sabieh ADDIS Dire Dawa Berbera Abyei Malakal ABABA Jijiga INDIAN Wau ETHIOPIA Adama Jimma OCEAN CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC SOUTH Hawassa SUDAN JUBA BANGUI Lake Arua Turkana Gulu SOMALIA Lira 0 250 500 Kilometers UGANDA Kitale Wajir MOGADISHU DEM. REP. KENYA KAMPALA Jinja Busia Eldoret OF CONGO Nakuru Garisa Lake NAIROBI Kitui Victoria Source: IGAD Spatial Web Portal RWANDA KIGALI IBRD 44378 | APRIL 2019 IGAD CROSS BORDER CLUSTERS This map was produced by the BUJUMBURA Cartography Unit of the World CLUSTER 1 Bank Group. The boundaries, colors, denominations and any BURUNDI TANZANIA Mombasa CLUSTER 2 other information shown on this VICTORIA map do not imply, on the part of the World Bank Group, any CLUSTER 3 judgment on the legal status of any territory, or any endorsement or CLUSTER 4 acceptance of such boundaries. DODOMA Note: The four IGAD clusters are Karamoja, Borana, Somali/Mandera and Dikhil while a further four clusters are under consideration. All clusters are mainly based on physical and social factors, but also with demonstrated importance for human-animal cross-border movement. Hammond (2017) also introduces the three ana- to external shocks and in relation to livelihoods. lytical frameworks used across the subsequent Such approaches can inform decisions on how to papers: the Sustainable Livelihood Framework, the minimize forced displacement and distress migra- Drivers of Migration Framework, and the House- tion and how to facilitate the kind of mobility that hold Economy Approach. The analysis generated generates income. through the application of these frameworks provides decision makers with actionable data on The Sustainable Livelihood Framework assesses livelihood patterns, information on the economic people’s command over a range of assets: physical, welfare of households within the livelihood zones, financial, natural, human, and social. The degree and an understanding of mobility as a response to which an individual, household, or community 6 From Isolation to Integration: An Overview of the Borderlands of the Horn of Africa has access to these assets determines the quality Drivers of Fragility and of their livelihood and, in turn, their resilience to Sources of Resilience in the shocks and crises, such as conflict and drought. The Borderlands Household Economy Approach analyzes livelihood zones and provides a detailed rundown of the Challenges and Drivers of Fragility income, expenditure, and consumption patterns High levels of poverty are entrenched in the Horn of the people living there. Livelihood zones can of Africa despite the existence of natural resource then be disaggregated based on wealth group to wealth and some of the world’s rapidly growing examine the varying levels of control that peo- economies. Existing on the periphery of state ple have over assets and the various ways they control, the borderlands face major development respond to shocks. Finally, the Drivers of Migration challenges including violent conflict, forced Framework complements the other frameworks by displacement, low agricultural productivity, food shedding light on how people in different livelihood insecurity, environmental degradation, climate and wealth groups respond to shocks and how change vulnerability, natural hazard risks, poor they make decisions about mobility. Understanding public health, and high levels of illicit money flows these dynamics is crucial in a region where mobility as well as human and small-arms trafficking. Vio- is central to livelihood and crisis response. A bor- lent extremism is an increasing threat. Combined derlands approach combines the three frameworks with the other challenges, high rates of popu- to provide a detailed understanding of livelihood, lation growth have led to stresses on finite land welfare, and mobility. Examples abound in the and natural resources. In particular, a large youth papers by Dereje Feyissa Dori, Patta Scott-Villiers, cohort is demanding improved social services and and Kristen Bushby and Elizabeth Stites. increased livelihood opportunities, and most insti- tutions in the region lack the capacity to deal with This approach can serve as a powerful tool for such stresses. It is important to note, however, preparedness and adaptation. If drought hits, how that some drivers of fragility can also be sources will agropastoralists respond? Will they move of resilience; these are discussed in greater detail within or across borders to access water? If violent below. conflict breaks out, will people flee en masse, or will only the wealthy be able to move to a city? If The geopolitical context in the Horn of Africa has climatic conditions are favorable to agriculture, changed markedly since the background papers can an influx of migrants be expected? Will tight- were commissioned. A tentative peace deal has ening borders improve security or increase crime been agreed between the rival political groups and violence by forcing people into “maladaptive” led by President Salva Kiir and Riek Machar in livelihood choices? The answers to such questions South Sudan, while in Sudan a transitional civil- can help governments and development agen- ian-led government has replaced the regime led cies identify interventions to protect and promote by former President Omar al-Bashir (after nearly essential forms of mobility and provide meaning- 30 years in power). Ethiopia remains in transition, ful alternatives to forced migration. but Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed Ali has made Overview 7 wide-ranging changes after being elected as triangle, appear to have resulted in knock-on prime minister by the ruling Ethiopian People’s improvements in women’s safety, and on existing Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) in April livestock-based livelihoods—which have been 2018. He began a rapprochement with Eritrea after quite dangerous due to cattle-raiding practices, as nearly two decades of stalemate and regional an example. The impacts of insecurity are heavily proxy warfare, released political prisoners, par- gendered across the region. In Karamoja triangle, doned and welcomed back armed groups and young men are the most affected by traditional opposition members, apologized for human rights practices around cattle raiding as those who take violations, and announced his intention to open part in raids and protect the cattle. Women and up the Ethiopian economy. Finally, in Somalia, the children have primarily been affected by spill- federal government has taken notable steps to over effects on their security, such as when they consolidate its control over regional governments, travel outside their villages to collect firewood, has undertaken economic reforms, and has also water, and food. Women, of course, are dispro- taken concrete steps toward debt relief. The portionately affected by gender-based violence in longer-term impact of these geopolitical changes general, as well as by forms of structural patriar- remains to be seen, but the broader structural chy, such as male control over productive assets challenges identified by the background papers (Bushby and Stites 2015). continue to remain relevant to the region. Demography Insecurity and conflict The population of the Horn of Africa is young and Insecurity, conflict, displacement, poverty, and rapidly growing. The “youth bulge” is a significant underdevelopment are closely related, although demographic trend offering opportunities and the precise relationship depends on context. The posing challenges. In Kenya, over 60 percent of the Horn of Africa is affected by a number of major population is under the age of 25; in South Sudan conflicts. Bandits and armed groups, including the and Somalia, an estimated 70 percent is under the Al-Qaeda-affiliated Al-Shabaab, are active in some age of 30. Most youth in the region are either unem- areas. The state’s absence is an oft-cited cause of ployed or—more worryingly—underemployed or in violence, but a heavy-handed state presence that highly vulnerable employment. Given that the pop- views the borderlands through the prism of secu- ulation is expected to double over the next 23 years, rity or terrorism can also exacerbate instability and none of the countries across the region is creating a sense of marginalization. The proliferation of jobs quickly enough for the expanding workforce, small arms and light weapons has made conflict and young women tend to be particularly disadvan- deadly, regularly triggering the mass displace- taged in the region’s labor markets. High rates of ment of thousands of people fleeing violence. youth unemployment may increase young peo- Communal conflict is present in some areas, as are ple’s susceptibility to illicit activities and high-risk high levels of gender-based violence. Government behavior, especially in political contexts marked by efforts to control the proliferation of small and political grievances and perceptions of exclusion light weapons in some areas, such as the Karamoja from political and economic development. 8 From Isolation to Integration: An Overview of the Borderlands of the Horn of Africa Map 0.2. Food Insecurity in the Horn of Africa SAUDI ARABIA OMAN SUDAN KHARTOUM ERITREA Re CHAD REP. OF YEMEN dS ASMARA SANA'A ea Gulf of Aden DJIBOUTI DJIBOUTI ADDIS ABABA INDIAN ETHIOPIA OCEAN CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC SOUTH SUDAN JUBA BANGUI 0 250 500 Kilometers SOMALIA UGANDA MOGADISHU DEM. REP. KENYA KAMPALA Source: Famine Ealy Warning Systems Network (FEWS NET) OF CONGO Lake IPC V3.0 ACUTE FOOD INSECURITY PHASE Victoria RWANDA KIGALI NAIROBI 1. MINIMAL IBRD 44369 | APRIL 2019 2. STRESSED This map was produced by the BUJUMBURA Cartography Unit of the World 3. CRISIS Bank Group. The boundaries, colors, denominations and any BURUNDI TANZANIA 4. EMERGENCY other information shown on this VICTORIA map do not imply, on the part of the World Bank Group, any Would likely be at least one phase worse judgment on the legal status of any without current or programmed humanitarian territory, or any endorsement or assistance acceptance of such boundaries. DODOMA Environmental factors of displacement in the Horn of Africa. They are Risks related to natural hazards, such as floods, also interrelated. In South Sudan, for instance, the drought, and climate change effects, are increas- declaration of famine in 2017 was closely related ing across the broader Horn of Africa. In the bor- to conflict in the country. Further, climate change derlands, environmental hazards typically include vulnerability not only affects those pursuing erratic and decreasing rainfall, land degradation, rural livelihoods, but in a region undergoing rapid and changes to the flood seasons (Hammond urbanization, it can also lead to a reduction in 2017). Such events affect soil quality and drive available drinking water, affect urban agriculture, down agricultural productivity, which contributes and increase the likelihood of floods and other to widespread food insecurity (see map O.2). In weather-related events. turn, food insecurity and conflict are major drivers Overview 9 Socioeconomic factors which statistics are available from United Nations Most countries in the Horn of Arica are poor, but High Commissioner for Refugees), the countries extreme poverty is more common in the border in the region were hosting 3.9 million refugees regions. Furthermore, while poverty has declined or people living in refugee-like situations; and in Africa over the last 20 years, the same is not another 120,000 people were seeking asylum.4 true for the borderlands. Food insecurity is a sig- And given the difficulty of counting displaced nificant proxy for a wider range of vulnerabilities, persons, these probably underestimate actual and as map O.2 illustrates, millions of people in numbers. Further, the region continues to receive the Horn of Africa remain undernourished and at refugees and asylum seekers from countries in the risk of famine. Chronic food crises, a rising number region as well as from neighboring countries such of people living with HIV/AIDS,3 and an increasing as the Democratic Republic of Congo, Burundi, incidence of other infectious diseases contribute and Yemen. Internal displacement is also a major to high levels of morbidity and mortality. Poverty issue: at the end 2018, the Internal Displacement in the borderlands is deeply gendered, especially Monitoring Centre estimated that there were where women do not have full control of or access 8.95 million internally displaced persons living in to property or incomes. the region.5 Refugee camps and informal settle- ments located in the region’s borderlands shape Livelihood options are limited; and both public the economy in significant ways by creating mar- and private investments are minimal. Most people ket opportunities and attracting development and earn a living through pastoralism and/or agropas- humanitarian resources into the region, but can toralism. Trade across borders, mostly in livestock also trigger competition between the displaced and consumer goods, also represents a vital and other residents, lead to environmental degra- source of income. Much trade activity is informal, dation, and produce changes in livelihood patterns operating outside of governmental regulation. (Hammond 2017; Waters 1999; Whitaker 2002). There has been scant public or private investment to support trade or pastoralism. In fact, public Political and governance factors policy has at times been inimical to the interest of The capacity of borderlands to cope with vulner- pastoralists by supporting commercial agriculture ability and fragility risks is becoming increasingly and by tightening borders in response to interna- limited for two reasons: (1) the region’s formal tional security threats. institutions—including social service delivery, economic and financial systems, law and order, Displacement Both mobility and displacement can be drivers of 4. Data are available at http://popstats.unhcr.org/en/persons_ of_concern. and reactions to development challenges, con- 5. Data are from https://www.internal-displacement.org/data- flicts, violence, and political persecution. The Horn base/displacement-data. These numbers may have changed because, as an example, many of the internally displaced in of Africa is one of the world’s main sites of dis- Ethiopia (a significant contributor to the overall number for the placement: at the close of 2018 (the latest year for region) have since been resettled or have returned to where they had been displaced from. In addition, the total number does not include internally displaced persons in Eritrea (for 3. HIV/AIDS = =Human immunodeficiency virus/acquired immu- which no data were available) but does include 31,000 from the nodeficiency syndrome. disputed region of Abiyei between Sudan and South Sudan. 10 From Isolation to Integration: An Overview of the Borderlands of the Horn of Africa and justice and safety—remain weak and incon- Robust trade, especially in livestock sistent. (2) At the same time, informal institutions The livestock trade is robust, even in times of have been eroded over time, greatly undermining conflict. Livestock exports from the Horn of Africa social, economic, and climate resilience among exceed US$1 billion per year, tapping markets in local populations. It is not always clear who Egypt and the Middle East even as they remain enjoys legitimacy and exercises authority over the vulnerable to climate crises and external market borderlands, making a nuanced understanding shocks (FAO 2018). There is potential for expansion of governance crucial. As Conciliation Resources as “the largest part of the borderland economy— (2017) observes, “navigating diverse governance the livestock economy—has received hardly any structures and sources of authority in borderlands useful investment inside the borderlands them- is vital to more effective peace and development selves” (Scott-Villiers 2015). In particular, the prev- interventions.” alence of pastoralism (or agropastoralism) as the primary livelihood across the borderland region helps sustain this trade, as described in greater A Zone of Potential: Opportunities detail below. and Sources of Resilience Despite the challenges, opportunities exist for Mobility for livelihoods and survival building resilience to cycles of conflict, insecu- Mobility is a major source of resilience. While rity, and poverty. For example, border areas offer recent global attention is focused on forced dis- a “spatial discount,” where buyers, sellers, and placement and mixed migration as a response to employers can take advantage of different prices, external shocks, mobility is and has long been an wage rates, levels of security, degree of regulation effective strategy for maintaining livelihoods as and enforcement, availability of natural resources, people travel in search of employment or better quality of health or education systems, and access conditions for farming and pastoralism. to markets—across national borders. As Goodhand (2014: 19) has argued, Traditional institutions In an area where state institutions are weak and “These dynamics take place not just in the border inefficient, traditional, and informal institutions but because of the border. The intensity of eco- retain legitimacy. However, the authority of tradi- nomic flows and relations may be greater across tional leaders has been diminished by urbaniza- the border than with the metropolitan center tion and by the proliferation of young men with within the state” (emphasis added). guns making their own rules. Community-based institutions do continue to regulate the livestock A good example of this comes from the border trade, manage trade relations, solve problems, regions between Somaliland and the Somali and resolve disputes. Many of these institutions Regional State (Abdi and Hagmann 2020). Border- are clan-based and cut across artificially imposed lands can provide trade corridors for landlocked international borders. countries, labor for seasonal agriculture, and increased animal production for export. Overview 11 Urbanization managed, oil revenues could spur employment The rapid urbanization that has taken place across and development. the region has brought development challenges and opportunities. Urbanization affects major The entrance of extractive industries can attract as well as secondary cities, although it is the government attention as well as public and private latter that has witnessed the most rapid growth. investment. For example, there are plans for a Some countries have responded to such changes road network and oil pipeline known as the by investing in infrastructure and employment LAPSSET6 (Lamu Port-Southern Sudan-Ethiopia opportunities. Ethiopia, for example, has an ambi- Transport) corridor to connect Kenya’s coast with tious plan to develop industrial parks—which will South Sudan, Uganda, and Ethiopia. This corridor also employ refugee labor. This has made it nec- would link South Sudan’s oil to Kenya and open essary for Ethiopia to engage with much broader up the potential for additional foreign invest- questions of decentralized service delivery and ment. However, like many such large projects, it macroeconomic policy and to balance the needs is unclear if and how quickly this one will proceed of the vast majority of its citizens who earn their due to security concerns and other geopolitical livelihoods from agriculture or pastoralism with tensions among the countries of the region. If the much smaller group whose livelihood comes completed, the LAPSSET corridor could potentially from manufacturing (Ronnas and Sarkar 2019). demonstrate how investment in neglected bor- Urbanization has had a major impact on liveli- derland areas can spark local development and hoods: many of the jobs in the newly urbanized reduce vulnerability. and peri-urban areas are informal and precarious, including quarrying, construction, domestic work, Any potential benefits achieved through the and selling mobile phone credits. However, urban extractive industries can be undone by the populations tend to have better access to services, “resource curse.” Tensions arose in Turkana as notably education and health. soon as exploration began. Oil operations blocked off land, denying pastoralists the ability to access The emergence of extractives to grazing land and local residents to access water. The recent expansion of the extractive indus- Armed groups launched multiple attacks, seeking tries, primarily oil, gas, and mining, represent an extortion payments for personnel and property opportunity for local economic development. The from the Tullow Oil Corporation to the extent 2012 discovery of as much as 1 billion barrels of that the company has threatened to withdraw its oil in Turkana County in the northwest of Kenya, investment (Achuka 2017). Many of the jobs cre- which shares borders with Ethiopia, South Sudan, ated have reportedly been allocated to outsiders, and Uganda, has increased the potential for eco- with only menial work available to locals. There nomic development in one of the country’s most are fears of rising inequality. Ensuring that locals impoverished areas. Exploration was announced benefit from oil industry activities requires careful in 2015, and export was scheduled to commence planning, local consultations, and the mitigation in 2017 but was since delayed to 2021. If well 6. For more on LAPSSET, see www.lapsset.go.ke/. 12 From Isolation to Integration: An Overview of the Borderlands of the Horn of Africa Table O.1. Challenges and Opportunities in the Horn of Africa Challenges and Drivers of Fragility Opportunities and Sources of Resilience Isolation. The borderlands are at the margins of the state Spatial discounts. Differences across borders can create and are largely neglected. opportunities for people to profit from transnational pricing, knowledge and service differentials, and labor opportunities. Conflict and governance. In addition to the region’s major Traditional institutions. Despite challenges, traditional interstate conflicts, there are communal conflicts—often over institutions retain legitimacy and influence. Often based on land or natural resources. These regions are also marked by a clan or ethnic affiliations, they can cut across borders and higher incidence of gender-based violence and rising violent play significant roles in providing social stability, regulating extremism. Formal institutions generally lack the capacity to trade, and managing conflict. manage these stresses; informal institutions can do so but have been eroded over time and are under pressure. Displacement. Conflict and climate-induced disasters, Trade and mobility. Trade is robust and resilient, mostly in including droughts and floods, are causing mass forced livestock and consumer goods, continuing even in times of displacement. There are around 3.9 million refugees and high conflict and in the absence of supporting investment. almost 9 million internally displaced persons living in the Trade is facilitated by mobility—the primary resilience strat- region. egy as people move in search of better livelihood opportu- nities or better conditions for farming and livestock. Poverty. The proportion of people living in poverty has de- Extractive industries. Emerging industries, including oil clined slightly, but the absolute number of poor is increas- and small-scale mining, carry social risks but also offer ing. Poverty remains highly gendered. the potential for local economic development, including connective infrastructure. Demography. The population is very young and is expected Regional institutions. Approaches are being piloted to to double in 23 years. This can be seen as both a challenge promote greater cross-border collaboration and policy har- and an opportunity. monization on trade and freedom of movement. However, some regional institutions have been more successful at resolving conflicts than with developmental matters. of environmental and social impacts, such as land reduced the amount of land available for agropas- acquisition and involuntary resettlement. toralism. Improving occupational health and safety and more inclusively managing land issues could Artisanal and small-scale mining support responsible small-scale mining. The artisanal and small-scale mining sector has long been influential in the Karamoja cluster as Summary of Challenges and a source of livelihood and cross-border trade. Opportunity Although it has generated economic benefits, the Table O.1 provides a summary overview of the work is hazardous and can damage the environ- key challenges and drivers of fragility as well as ment. Furthermore, 62 percent of the 27,000 square opportunities and sources of resilience in the Horn kilometers of land in the cluster is now subject to of Africa. mining licenses, displacing indigenous populations who often lack registered titles. The sector has also Overview 13 Some Key Themes agropastoralism as a dual subsistence strategy to balance the risk of pursuing either livestock or Livelihoods farming alone. Livelihood systems in the borderlands cross, defy, and exploit international borders. Drawing on the Pastoral communities rely on shared livestock Sustainable Livelihood Framework, Hammond management practices, use of grassland and (2017) maps out livelihood zones for the entirety water resources, trade links, and access to infor- of the Horn of Africa, demonstrating that while mation about weather, prices, and the availability pastoralism and trade stand out as the main of water. Many agricultural communities take livelihoods, some inhabitants engage in agrarian advantage of borders by marketing produce in activities, labor, and self-employment. The com- towns and cities across their border. Others attract mon thread across the region is that livelihoods seasonal labor from bordering countries. are intrinsically transnational. The example of the Hawd grazing area is illustrative: Somalis graze Decisions regarding livestock mobility—where to their camels in Ethiopia during the dry season, go and when—are based on local knowledge and and Ethiopians of the Somali Regional State take traditional systems of governance. However, pas- advantage of common kinship and language ties toralists are increasingly using technology, such to sell their herds in markets across the border as mobile phones, to access information about in Somalia. Many people and households hold a market prices and trade opportunities. Satellite portfolio of jobs, requiring seasonal movement imagery can provide information on vegetation, from rural to urban areas. Gender remains a informing better migration decisions and thereby crucial determinant of livelihood. Women are reducing livestock mortality rates. often responsible for herding smaller animals, maintaining homestead gardens, and marketing Trade agricultural products; men usually do the plowing, Trade in livestock and consumer goods is vibrant sowing, and harvesting. in the borderland region. While systematic and up-to-date data are extremely difficult to obtain, Pastoralism the extent of the livestock trade can be estimated In 2015, UNECA (2017: 6) estimated that over using multiple sources. For example, one author- 38 million people in the Horn of Africa were pasto- itative study estimates that the total value of ralists.7 As Feyissa (2016) explains, “Other liveli- Ethiopian cattle, goats, sheep, and camels sold hoods are barely viable.” In areas where land is across the border in Somalia, Kenya, and Djibouti more fertile and rainfall more abundant, such as in in 2009 was US$250–300 million (Aklilu and Catley the southern tip of the Horn, many people pursue 2009; Hammond 2017). In 2005, turnover at a single market on the Ethiopia–Somalia border 7. www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2014/03/18/ was US$50 million; more recently, the value of the world-bank-pastoralists-horn-africa. This should be consid- livestock trade on the Somaliland border was an ered a very broad estimate. It is difficult to accurately count pastoralists in the Horn of Africa because of (1) major data estimated US$ 200–300 million—about four or five constraints in the region and (2) difficulties of classification. 14 From Isolation to Integration: An Overview of the Borderlands of the Horn of Africa times the officially recorded level (World Bank moved farther inland.8 Over half of the informal and DFID 2019). Livestock exports—particularly cross-border traders in the region are women. those to Gulf countries—play an outsized role in some countries’ economies. In 2015, the World Clan and kinship ties are crucial to cross-border Bank and the Food and Agriculture Organization trade. Most transactions cover relatively short estimated that Somalia had exported 5.3 million spans. Traded goods are handed over to other animals (World Bank and FAO 2018). However, the actors in the value chain, who in turn pass them outsized importance of the livestock trade also to others higher up the chain. Clan affiliations are means that countries remain extremely vulnerable central to trust and connections across borders, to the effects of climate change and the outbreaks and they provide a form of protection against of disease, as illustrated by the livestock exports rent-seeking officials, warlords, and armed groups from Somalia in 2016 and 2017. A combination of a seeking to disrupt trade. Traditional customary Saudi ban on Somali livestock imposed at the end institutions therefore play a crucial role in manag- of 2016 due to an outbreak of disease (temporarily ing trade activities and resolving disputes. These lifted for the haj season of July–September 2017) institutions are often clan-based, so they can cut and the impact of the drought on the health of across international boundaries and at times clash animals and on herd losses led to a sharp fall in with state authorities. exports from 5.3 million animals in 2015 to 1.3 mil- lion in 2017 (Sarkar and Serriere 2019). A range of factors hampers intraregional trade. Intraregional exports among the IGAD countries Small traders, including many women, transport was estimated at US$1.9 billion in 2011 (more kerosene, cooking oil, grain, pasta, cloth, and even recent figures are difficult to find). While this is an luxury items—such as electronics from ports on increase in real terms, it is a four percent decline the Indian Ocean—to and through the borderlands. in the share of overall intraregional export since Illicit trade in weapons is also a lucrative industry, 2000 due to: (1) a lack of infrastructure connect- albeit a major challenge to security. In commu- ing the countries of the subregion; (2) the fact nities living in border areas, most opportunities that countries in the region tend to produce come from the informal sector, particularly for similar commodities, which limits trade comple- women. Informal trade outweighs formal trade by mentarities; (3) the economic imbalance among a factor of 30 in some areas. Important sources of members; (4) ineffective taxation systems and income for people living in border communities tariff barriers; and (5) overlapping memberships include trade in livestock, khat (a local stimulant), in regional groupings that duplicates efforts and cereals, second-hand clothing, and consumer makes institutions compete with one another. goods that are either produced in the region or imported (usually from Gulf states) and then 8. Not all border regions are on land—the Red Sea is a crit- ical “borderland” to communities living in the region, with livelihoods, trade, mobility, and conflict playing out across the sea-border in many of the same ways that they do on land. Overview 15 Box O.1. Trade, Pastoralism, and Mobility in the Horn of Africa: The Karamoja Cluster The Karamoja cluster includes northeastern Uganda, ing in activities like informal trading or manual labor. The northwestern Uganda, northwestern Kenya, southeastern extractive industries are emerging as a potential source of South Sudan, and southwestern Ethiopia. While diverse, employment in various parts of the cluster, but not with- many of the groups in the area share a similar language, out social risk. livelihood patterns, and cultural practices. Social and family networks are essential to livelihoods in Most people in the cluster are agropastoralists, combin- the cluster; and community-based institutions and tradi- ing a nomadic livestock-based livelihood with sedentary tional alliances are crucial to accessing grazing land and agriculture. Mobility, including the crossing of internation- to the sophisticated networks that underpin the exchange al boundaries, is central to agropastoralism in terms of of goods and services, such as livestock; consumer goods; accessing grazing land, water, and markets. and illicit trade; including small arms and light weapons. Security in the cluster has improved, but challenges per- As government policies favoring sedentary agriculture sist. South Sudan remains unstable. Bandits operate in the makes pastoralism more difficult, a variety of “maladap- Turkana region of Kenya, extorting money from local peo- tive” livelihood practices have emerged, including cattle ple. Cattle raiding, which has become violent, is frequently raiding, trading in firewood and charcoal, engaging in used as a means of redistributing wealth. Communal con- banditry, and joining armed groups. Limitations on mobili- flicts have been trigged by the presence of the extractive ty also hinder pastoralism in the cluster. Restrictions have industry and have arisen between pastoralists and farmers been imposed for reasons of security, the gazetting of over communal land. Fluid migratory patterns support land as national parks, the growth of private investment, pastoralism but also contribute to cross-border conflicts. and private land titling. Poor infrastructure also negatively impacts mobility. Livestock-based livelihoods are the predominant source of income because they are well adapted to minimal and The Karamoja cluster functions through hybrid systems of variable rainfall. Livestock also provides social and cultur- governance that rely on formal and informal institutions. al capital as they are an indicator of wealth. Government Formal institutions of the state are generally weak and policies, poverty, and conflict are pushing people out of inefficient. And while violence has undermined their au- pastoralism and into agrarian or urban livelihoods, espe- thority, traditional institutions continue to have legitimacy cially in Uganda. Some households make this shift per- and power within societies, including customary justice manently; others move seasonally or split households. In institutions, which play a crucial role in settling disputes. urban areas, many people have a portfolio of jobs, engag- 16 From Isolation to Integration: An Overview of the Borderlands of the Horn of Africa States have been taking measures to formal- trade in the pursuit of greater cooperation and ize informal trade. Ethiopia and Sudan have integration. For instance, small-scale cross-border agreed that small traders are allowed to make trade (dominated by women) is an important issue 48 cross-border trips per year with goods valued driving a greater dialogue on trade between the at a maximum of US$117 per trip. Ethiopia has also Democratic Republic of the Congo and Uganda. placed value and movement limits on trade with Some monitoring systems have been developed Djibouti, Kenya, and Somalia. to capture data on the extent and the nature of small-scale trade to further remove barriers The formalization of trade protects licensed and facilitate such commerce. Facilitation of traders and generates revenue for the govern- cross-border trade has been mainstreamed into ment, but it hinders traders who cannot secure the national trade policies of some countries; and licenses. Unlicensed traders tend to come from with World Bank assistance, the Common Mar- marginalized groups, such as women and the very ket for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), a poor; and licensing regimes create rent-seeking regional economic community, has developed and opportunities. Movement restrictions impact pas- adopted a charter to help normalize the process- toralists dramatically, sometimes forcing them to ing of small-scale trade at the border. This, in turn, overgraze, which degrades the land and depletes has reduced harassment and bribe-seeking, and the water table. Pastoralists then can feel forced has facilitated border crossings. COMESA and the to engage in maladaptive livelihoods. The example East African Community, another regional eco- of the Karamoja cluster vividly illustrates the inter- nomic community, have also developed simplified section of spatial aspects, livelihoods, and mobility trading regimes to facilitate the formalization of in the Horn of Africa (see box O.1). trading businesses without imposing insurmount- able regulatory and tax burdens. Despite these challenges, the prospects for greater regional economic integration through Diversification and maladaptive livelihoods trade and mobility are considerable. Improving While pastoralism and trade remain dominant, transport links, including corridors to the major livelihood patterns continue to evolve. Many peo- seaports; developing secondary seaports and the ple in the Horn of Africa have had to diversify their Ethiopian power sector; and proceeding with the livelihoods in the face of increasing populations LAPSSET project could accelerate regional eco- and a depletion of the natural resource base due to nomic linkages and trade. Efforts in the border environmental changes, large-scale infrastructure regions to improve the management of shared projects, and restrictions on cross-border mobility. water resources, enhance the common manage- Some have moved into urban areas or are engaged ment of pastoral rangelands, and promote the in agrarian activities, either permanently or sea- free movement of people could also increase sonally. The extractive industries are creating some cross-border trade. job opportunities as well. Finally, it is worth noting that policy makers can Where diversification is not possible, people can draw on the experiences of other regions as they fall out of pastoralism and take up high-risk liveli- try to leverage the importance of cross-border hoods such as: Overview 17 “various and potentially damaging livelihood Mobility strategies, including unsustainable use of natural Given the importance of trade and pastoralism resources, such as cutting trees for charcoal pro- to the livelihoods and resilience of the people of duction and sale, sending daughters to work as the borderlands, freedom of movement is cru- house servants in towns, thereby exposing them cial. Such freedom allows a trader from Somalia to risk of abuse; engaging in illegal contraband to buy cheap livestock in Ethiopia and then sell trade; and criminal activity such as ‘organized it in Kenya, where the prices are higher. Even livestock raiding’ or banditry.” (Feyissa 2016) small price differentials can mean the difference between survival and extreme poverty. Further- Across the region, technical initiatives to increase more, where movement is restricted, the effect food production or reduce pressure on natural on trade disadvantages both the people living resources have been elusive, largely because of in the border zones as well as people relying on environmental and social constraints. Alternate goods further along the value chain. For exam- nontechnical operations focused on human capac- ple, vegetables grown in the agropastoral zones ity building may hold the key to future efforts of Ethiopia are traded in border-area markets for toward livelihood diversification and improving ultimate distribution in southern Somalia. Block- risk management (Coppock et al. 2011). One such ing borders can impact markets as far away as initiative targeted the Borana, who were once con- Mogadishu. In the western borderlands, along the sidered a model of sustainable pastoralism in East Ethiopia–Sudan border, agricultural production Africa but who had grown progressively poorer also depends on the mobility of agricultural labor, and more vulnerable due to a combination of pop- domestically and across borders. ulation growth and development investment, a trend exacerbated by repeated droughts. A partici- Mobility is particularly essential for pastoralism patory process was implemented that involved the because in areas where it is the dominant liveli- pastoral community in problem diagnosis, chart- hood, people must be able to move around a wide ing pathways for change and ultimately the imple- area to access essential resources for themselves mentation of interventions. The process, which and for their herds. Constraining pastoralist involved collective action, microfinancing, and movement leads to overgrazing, depletion of the participatory education, resulted in women taking surface water table, and long-term degradation on leadership roles, major improvements in the of rangeland resources (Hammond 2017). While quality of life, accumulation of wealth, reduction agropastoralism and irrigated agriculture is pos- of hunger, and management of risk (Coppock et al. sible in some border areas, this is not the case for 2011: 395). Interventions like this can be models for most of the border regions in the eastern part of borderlands programming. In other words, devel- the Horn of Africa, where the land is not suitable opment policy makers need to build elements of for sedentary agriculture, making the transhu- human capacity building into their programmatic mant livelihood practice necessary. interventions in addition to the spatial element of borderlands programming. The key to understanding the role of mobility in resilience and vulnerability is an analysis of how 18 From Isolation to Integration: An Overview of the Borderlands of the Horn of Africa mobility influences daily livelihood practices and overall food security of households as husbands adaptation to shocks. Most forms of mobility in the and wives can be separated for several months Horn of Africa are driven by multiple overlapping per year, and women and children providing for drivers, including migration to sustain specific types themselves while the men are away. In agricul- of livelihoods; longer-term movement for economic tural areas, women are normally responsible for gain or to find employment; involuntary movement homestead gardens and for weeding larger plots; due to violence, conflict, or persecution; or dis- men plow, sow, and harvest. Women are often also placement caused by environmental changes such responsible for marketing the agricultural prod- as drought, flood, deforestation, or other extreme ucts, which makes them effective managers of the weather events—which are increasingly common in household economy (Hammond 2017). Climate the Horn of Africa. Mobility is, of course, regulated change, economic crises, conflict, and insecurity by multiple legal regimes, but decisions about who therefore have very different impacts on men and migrates, where to, and when, are both gendered women across the region—leading to a re-shap- and generational. For instance, in erstwhile north- ing of these culturally defined gender roles and, ern Bahr el-Ghazal state (on the border regions in many cases, driving the decisions of young between South Sudan and Sudan)—civil war has led men and women to migrate (Feyissa 2016). Many to profound changes in livelihood patterns and an traders engaged in small-scale, cross-border, and increasing reliance on market economies in soci- informal trade are women. Compared with men, eties previously dependent on cattle ownership. they have lower profit margins, face greater secu- Young men have begun to migrate, either to join rity risks, and are less able to protect themselves armed groups or in search of paid wage labor in against exploitation. Sudan; young women have taken jobs marketing produce and, if able to, have migrated to Sudan in As previously noted, gender influences people’s search of paid work, profoundly restructuring fam- decisions about movement. During times of food ily and intergenerational relationships (Majok 2019). insecurity and economic hardship, women may move into cities or stay with relatives, while men move farther afield for labor migration, to graze Gender camels or other large animals, or to find work in As previously mentioned, like the other phe- other countries. There is a higher proportion of nomena discussed in the background papers, women to men in refugee camps than in society livelihood strategies, migration, and mobility are more generally because women are more likely to deeply gendered. In pastoral communities, cultur- seek assistance for their children while men are ally defined divisions of labor mean that women more likely to be engaged in employment, busi- are usually responsible for herding smaller ness, military activity, or maintaining the family’s animals, such as sheep, goats, and sometimes property in the area of origin. Another major form cattle, remaining close to their homes, while men of gendered migration is the movement of young take their camels farther in search of grazing areas women from the Horn of Africa to Gulf countries during the dry season.9 This pattern weakens the and marketing of livestock products, while men are more en- 9. In other words, women frequently engage in the production gaged in the production and marketing of larger livestock, such and marketing of small livestock, as well as in the processing as camels, cattle, and donkeys (World Bank and DFID 2019). Overview 19 to find employment as domestic workers. In 2013, Enhancing livelihoods in the borderlands goes the Ethiopian Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ Consular hand-in-hand with building resilience. Localized Monitoring and Support Directorate estimated cross-border collaboration and the integration of that 1,500 Ethiopian women were leaving the formal and informal institutions and civil society country every day, and unlike men who leave the could help capitalize on thriving informal trade country for the Gulf or another destination, the routes and the versatility and interconnectedness women usually travels with the assistance of a of its business communities. As such, opportuni- private employment agency, which secures them ties and entry points exist to soften borders, pro- an offer of employment—or at least claims to— mote public safety, build capacity for cross-border prior to departure (Hammond 2017). Once at their government collaboration, deregulate trade, and destination, many women work under precarious develop cross-border livelihoods. Further, policy conditions; and reports of physical, sexual, and makers should draw on existing success stories, emotional abuse by employers are common. The such as interventions aimed at building human borderlands play a critical role in many of these capacity in pastoralist communities, which may journeys: while some women travel to Gulf coun- hold the key to future livelihood diversification and tries by plane, many others travel over land to one improving risk management (Coppock et al. 2011). of the numerous ports that dot the Horn of Africa’s coast. Border crossings are risky. If a woman At the policy level, decisions that limit trade lacks the necessary documentation and permis- and access to pastoral lands should be carefully sion to cross the border, or if they are traveling reviewed. Issues of concern include the expansion using smuggling networks, she is at risk of being of commercial agriculture, extractive industries, extorted and sexually assaulted (RMMS 2014). and even national parks. In addition, an assess- ment is needed regarding the implications of tightening borders and converting trade from Operational Implications informal to formal. Livelihood and mobility patterns in the border- lands highlight the need to support pastoralists Informal clan- and ethnic-based institutions can and small-scale traders. In practical terms, this act as a bulwark against cross-border mobil- would entail infrastructure investments, including ity risks. Given their prevailing legitimacy and roads and electricity, as well as mobile phone and authority, support should be extended to such Internet coverage to enhance communications institutions to strengthen their capacity to govern and access to market and climate information. economic activity and resolve disputes. Extension services could expand to serve pastoral- ists, including mobile phones. Policy makers in the Finally, the absence of robust and reliable data region could draw on lessons from other regions compounds borderland blindness. Datasets and and countries (specifically COMESA) that have strategies of social inquiry are bound to the nation been helpful in facilitating cross-border small- state. Statistics are largely based on national, scale traders. In turn, cross-border trade can act as aggregated datasets. There is an urgent need to a “hook” for closer cross-border cooperation and collect better and more borderlands-focused data. integration. 20 From Isolation to Integration: An Overview of the Borderlands of the Horn of Africa Institutional and Policy aims to promote “peaceful, open and prosperous Context for Regional Action borders” (AU Peace and Security 2018). The African Union is committed to instituting a system of elec- Regional Initiatives tronic passports to facilitate visa-free movement There is an increasing recognition among coun- in the continent by 2020, although it is unclear tries and regional organizations in the Horn of whether this will be achievable. The EU Emergency Africa that the borderlands require regional action. Trust Fund for Africa has provided €63 million Despite the challenges of its weak economies, for cross-border activities, focusing on stability political instability, violent conflict, and economic in the four IGAD clusters. The European Union is imbalances between countries, analysts still con- also supporting research to better understand the clude that “the prospects for regional integration dynamics of cross-border economies as zones of [in the Horn of Africa] … look good” (Feyissa 2016: common livelihood practice. And finally, the Horn 13). Important building blocks underpin deeper of Africa Regional Resilience Network of the United regional collaboration. In 2015, under the aus- States Agency for International Development seeks pices of IGAD, the countries of the Horn of Africa, to strengthen regional and cross-border collabora- international development partners, and financial tion to expand livelihood opportunities, strengthen institutions instituted a “borderlands partnership.” governance, and improve human capital. The IGAD’s cross-border cluster approach, referred to earlier, provides an entry point for concrete At the bilateral level, trade, mobility, and coopera- action (see map O.1). The clusters represent zones tion agreements impact cross-border dynamics. In that share resources, services, and cultural values, 2013, Kenya and Uganda signed a memorandum of often bound by clan and/or ethnic networks. The understanding that harmonized the assessment clusters also tend to be pastoral or agropastoral in and control of transboundary animal diseases. nature. Some basic analysis has been completed: They have also established a harmonized regula- most of the Horn of Africa has been assessed tory and customs system for trade. using the Household Economy Approach, and livelihood zone maps have been prepared for each Despite the number of regional and donor-sup- of the member countries (see Hammond 2017). ported initiatives, tensions between regional and national action persist. National agricultural policies Bilateral, multilateral, and regional institutions tend to favor sedentary agriculture and commer- support cross-border initiatives. Kenya and Ethiopia cialization, often at the expense of pastoralism. are piloting an integrated cross-border develop- The expansion of extractive industries—and even ment program to tackle deficits in development national parks for conservation purposes—reduces and security. The IGAD Drought Disaster Resilience the land available to pastoralists, forcing many into and Sustainability Initiative fosters regional collab- less sustainable livelihood choices, including partic- oration on natural resource management, market ipation in armed groups. Further, national security access and trade, livelihood support, and conflict policies often result in the tightening of borders, prevention. The African Union’s Border Program which restricts trade and pastoralist activities. Overview 21 In the absence of a focused approach to the bor- economic corridors, energy transmission, and derlands, national and regional initiatives remain steps toward the formation of a single digital mar- mostly uncoordinated. A clear opening therefore ket. The second focuses on trade and economic exists to strengthen regional cooperation through integration and aims to facilitate trade in priority a dedicated borderlands approach. The precise corridors, develop regional value chains, and institutional configuration for engaging in the bor- improve the investment climate. The third pillar, derlands also remains open for discussion. which focuses on resilience and climate change, is aimed at building resilience to climatic shocks. And the focus of the fourth pillar is the develop- Relevant Initiatives ment of human capital. The borderlands papers within the World Bank can provide useful programmatic insights for each Some recent World Bank initiatives have taken of the four pillars as the initiative progresses. up the issues identified in the background papers presented here, including an updated regional integration strategy for Africa; a World Bank Recommendations for Action strategy on fragility, conflict, and violence that is Addressing the security and development deficits the process of being finalized; and a new Horn of in the borderlands will require integrated action on Africa initiative. The findings of these papers are three fronts (summarized table O.2). First, regional relevant to all of these initiatives. For example, the collaboration at the policy and institutional levels draft fragility, conflict, and violence strategy builds is needed to ease the flow of capital, labor, goods, on the joint United Nations/World Bank report, and services. Second, to mitigate the impact of Pathways for Peace (2018), which emphasizes geographic isolation and neglect, investments are inclusion as a key value to mitigate the drivers of needed in basic infrastructure and social services, conflict (UN and World Bank 2018). The findings such as roads, energy, education, health, water, of the papers presented here can help influence information and communications technology, how the strategy is operationalized on the ground, and access to finance. Finally, given the quality of especially in terms of preventing violent conflict governance and presence of conflict, there is a risk and/or interpersonal violence, helping countries that investments will not be sustained. Hence, for- transition out of fragility, and mitigating spillover mal and informal institutions should be supported effects. In particular, both the draft World Bank to strengthen collaborative border management strategy and the background papers recognize the and their capacity for conflict management and need to take a spatial approach in addressing fra- violence prevention. Needless to say, all interven- gility at the community, subnational, and regional tions need to be extremely sensitive to the gen- levels and in tackling cross-border challenges. dered nature of livelihood and resilience strategies across the Horn of Africa, as well as the gendered The World Bank’s new Horn of Africa Initiative impact of conflict, insecurity, and violence. has four pillars of engagement. The first focuses on regional infrastructure networks covering 22 From Isolation to Integration: An Overview of the Borderlands of the Horn of Africa Table O.2. Supporting Development and Stability in the Borderlands Strategic development • Borderlands are isolated, poor, and insecure. challenges • Access is limited to infrastructure, social services, and livelihoods. • Freedom of movement for people and goods is essential to livelihoods and survival but is restricted by some states for security reasons, creating the need for regional collaboration to deal with cross-border issues. • Governance systems are hybrid and often weak. Programmatic response Short-Term Medium to Long-Term Regional integration and col- • Support regional dialogue through IGAD • Expand regional dialogue to laboration and the African Union for cross-border harmonize policies on trade and management of natural resources, including freedom of movement. water and grazing land. • Build capacity for collaborative • Provide technical support to IGAD to man- border management of the age the regional dialogue. movement of people and livestock and of security threats. Strengthening social contracts • Invest in basic services—health, education, • Expand Internet connectivity. through infrastructure and and water—including through cross-border • Expand skills-based livelihood social and economic services planning and sharing of resources in programs for youth. identified livelihood zones. • Support access to finance, including • Support community-based projects for through e-banking. climate change adaptation. • Expand investment in transport, energy, and mobile phone coverage for market linkages and to promote private sector development. • Provide livelihood assistance, particularly focused on agropastoralism and informal cross-border trade. Strengthening local institu- • Build the capacity of formal and informal • Support cross-border collaboration tions institutions to manage economic activity for development planning and and conflict. shared investments in infrastructure and basic services. Coordination and partnerships • Partner with IGAD Secretariat and African Union for regional dialogue and collaboration. • Conduct joint analytical and operational work with Horn of Africa Initiative development partners. • Establish private sector reference group to advise on investments and job creation. IGAD = Intergovernmental Authority on Development. Overview 23 The borderlands approach seeks to address the Regional Cooperation and Integration drivers of fragility in the Horn of Africa based on Additional support to existing development the following principles: initiatives is needed, including those formulated by IGAD and the African Union on borderlands, to Facilitate mobility and trade as central to liveli- strengthen platforms for dialogue as well as tech- hoods in the region; nical capacities aimed at: (1) harmonizing policies on trade and freedom of movement, including Prioritize the poor and vulnerable, particularly youths and women; by building on lessons from other countries and regional economic communities; (2) promot- Support preparedness to minimize mixed ing the shared management of water and land migration; and resources; and (3) facilitating cross-border devel- opment planning for shared investments in infra- Follow a community-driven approach to pro- structure and social and economic services. mote participation and transparency. Cross-border initiatives need to be multisectoral Infrastructure and Social and and must address livelihoods, institutions, and sta- Economic Services bility/security in the following areas: Regional transport and energy infrastructure are poor in the Horn of Africa, which exacerbates the Regional cooperation to strengthen and har- impact of isolation and hinders trade and invest- monize policies for the movement of people ment. Transportation links could facilitate private and goods that builds on the draft Protocol on investment, connect smaller markets, and support the Free Movement of People and to promote livestock routes. Access to power is limited and the joint management of resources and devel- needs to be expanded in rural areas and second- opment planning; ary cities. Expanding information and communica- tions technology services, such as mobile phone Establishment and strengthening of social coverage and Internet connectivity, would reduce contracts between states and borderland communities by investing in infrastructure isolation and improve access to information on and social and economic services; markets and climate. Local and community-based climate change Shared investments in health and education adaptation; require cross-border planning and resource shar- ing among local governments. Many children from Local livelihood opportunities, focused on Somalia and Ethiopia, for example, attend school at-risk youths and women; and in Kenya, where the quality of education is thought to be higher. Greater use of shared services could Support to formal and informal institutions for maximize limited resources. social cohesion and conflict prevention. 24 From Isolation to Integration: An Overview of the Borderlands of the Horn of Africa Adaptation to Climate Change Strengthening Institutions Because of the region’s vulnerability, all activities Community-based institutions continue to play an under a borderlands approach must be climate-in- important role in managing economic activity and formed. Community-based projects are a viable dispute resolution. While the traditional leaders’ means of supporting climate change adaptation, authority is being eroded by youths in armed and and many local civil society organizations have the criminal groups, they still retain considerable capacity to support communities. Local govern- sociocultural capital. 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