

# HIGHER EDUCATION GOVERNANCE IN GUINEA

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# Abbreviations and Acronyms

|        |  |
|--------|--|
| AAU    | Addis Ababa University   |
| ANESRS | National Evaluation Agency   |
| CAMES  | African and Malagasy Council for Higher Education                        |
| CNRP   | National Commission for Recruitment and Promotion                        |
| CPS    | Country Partnership Strategy   |
| GER    | Gross Enrollment Ratio   |
| ICT    | Information and Communication Technology                                 |
| LMD    | Licence-Master-Doctorate   |
| MENA   | Middle East and North Africa   |
| MOE    | Ministry of Education  |
| M&E    | Monitoring and Evaluation  |
| PBC    | Performance Based Contract   |
| PC     | Performance Contract   |
| PPP    | Public-Private Partnership   |
| PREMA  | Program for Reformation of the State and Modernization of Administration |
| PRSP3  | Third National Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper                          |
| RBM    | Results Based Management   |
| SSA    | Sub-Saharan Africa   |
| TVET   | Technical and Vocational Education and Training                          |



# Executive Summary

The World Bank's Country Partnership Strategy (CPS) for Guinea in FY 2014–17<sup>1</sup> confirmed the Government's priority to build 21<sup>st</sup> century skills for improved employability and to implement systemic reforms. Guinea is emerging from years of political and economic isolation and instability. The democratic election of President Alpha Condé has opened the door for the international donor community, including the World Bank, to come forward and support the new government. Its important reform agenda, PREMA,<sup>2</sup> has helped restore the confidence of the international community. The World Bank will partner with the Government of Guinea to develop systems that will “*improve lagging human development indicators for absolute poverty reduction, through more efficient and transparent allocation of resources, and to build shared prosperity by aligning the business environment and education system with Guinea's economy*” (World Bank, 2013, pp. 1). This is in line with the government's priorities, as per the Third National Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP3) approved in 2013. The PRSP3 aims to reduce poverty and to create and sustain a vibrant private economy by maximizing rents from Guinea's substantial mining sector. The Bank supports the Government's agenda on improving human capital by: (a) promoting both the quantity and quality of education and (b) upgrading skills for the needs of emerging and export-oriented sectors such as agriculture, tourism, mining, and telecommunications and Information and Communications Technology (ICT).

The education system has made significant progress, with the primary gross enrollment rate reaching 83 percent as of 2013. However, challenges remain in the areas of coverage, quality, and relevance. Approximately 60 percent of the student population between the ages of 8 and 14 are out of school, and learning assessments conclude that the government must step up its efforts to improve completion rates, gender parity, and learning outcomes. University enrollments have increased tenfold over 10 years, reaching more than 95,000 students in 2012. However, Guinea's higher education coverage rate remains relatively low compared to its neighbors, at 916 students at 100,000 inhabitants. In addition, the traditional opportunities for Guinean graduates on the labor market through the civil service are no longer sufficient. Graduates between the ages of 25 and 35 are facing unemployment rates close to 30 percent, increasing the likelihood of social instability.

All of these goals must be achieved while ensuring that the needs of the labor market are met by the education system.

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1 The other two areas are: improving governance and service delivery and stimulating growth and economic diversification (World Bank. 2013. Country Partnership Strategy for Guinea).

2 PREMA stands for Program of Reform of the State and Modernization of the Administration and it has the following items on agenda: organization of the country, management of the human resources available in the public sector, improvement of fiscal and economic governance, and overhaul of the judiciary.

The education system must equip graduates with the skills needed by the emerging export-oriented economy. Developing relevant skills programs that provide students with the competencies in demand and will subsequently enable them to be employed in an economy that values a technological and scientific skill set. Government needs to lay the groundwork to offer training in the relevant fields at the secondary, vocational, and higher education levels.

Despite its abundant natural resources, Guinea has struggled to become attractive to investors and entrepreneurs. In the Ease of doing Business report, Guinea ranks 175<sup>th</sup> out of 189 countries.<sup>3</sup> Firms operate in a heavily constrained environment and face frequent power shortages and a slow bureaucracy. All of these factors contribute to poor business policies. This unfavorable business environment is also partly the result of poor governance and petty corruption. The International Finance Corporation is providing substantial support to strengthen Guinea's business environment. Lack of local skills is an important constraint, and in order for jobs in the emerging sectors (mining, construction, hotel industry, banking and finance) to be filled by Guineans rather than foreigners, the Government must equip its youth with the skills required.


In 2012, the Government requested special support from the Bank in the form of technical assistance to conduct an analysis of the higher education system. This analysis would be used to prepare a comprehensive higher education strategy to meet the needs of both the economy and the labor market. Since the early 2000s, the Bank had limited involvement in this critical sub-sector. Per the Government's request, the Bank mobilized resources to engage in policy and analytical work in the areas of governance, financing, and diagnostic of skills demand and supply from a new employer survey prepared specifically under this technical assistance project.

1. Supply and Demand: Higher Education and Skills. This note reviews the current state of education and workforce skills from an employer perspective. It identifies the key bottlenecks faced by firms in hiring qualified workers and provides concrete recommendations to improve workforce quality.
2. Current Outcomes and Challenges: Diagnostic of the Higher Education System. In this note, we trace the evolution of the higher education system. The note shows trends over time, highlights tracer characteristics, and draws comparisons between the public and private provision of education.
3. Governance of Higher Education. The key governance issues faced by the Guinean higher education system are presented. The note delves into the reforms undertaken by the government after 2011 with a focus on the two presidential decrees.

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3 World Bank (2014). Doing Business Report.

## Conceptual Framework



4. Financing of Higher Education. The note provides a brief overview of education funding and structure; the main focus is on the sources and uses of public and private funds for higher education.

These four distinct policy notes are intended for policy makers and technical staff. They may be read individually or as a series. The results from this work will also form the cornerstone for a new higher education operation in Guinea.

### Note 1: Higher Education and Skills: Supply and Demand

Economic development and civic participation in Guinea are hampered by an extremely low literacy rate and a poorly educated working population, especially in rural areas. Nearly 22 percent of youth were either economically inactive or unemployed in 2012, with the highest unemployment rates found among the educated population, pointing to a marked mismatch between the supply and demand of skills.

In general, the education system is neither responsive to nor currently producing graduates equipped to adequately meet the needs of the labor market. Universities offer a predominantly theoretical education, despite the fact that firms value experience and practical skills. The school to work transition offers further insight into the extent of the training-labor market absorption mismatch. Graduates of longer-term programs enter the job market earlier than those completing short programs, but there is no distinction between the different levels of programs. Employers report difficulty finding employees with the skills they require, and the informality of the labor market, aggravated by the preference for hiring through personal networks, has important consequences for equity and efficiency.

Universities offer predominantly theoretical education, when firms value experience and practical skills. For example, in the construction, industry and service sectors, one in five firms state that they cannot find the type of qualifications they need, leading to a substantial proportion of vacancies. To increase the relevance of the education system to the labor

market, the agriculture, construction and mining industries recommend a focus on the entire system.

As Guinea strives to embark on an accelerated development path, its ability to meet the demands of a diversified economy will be partly determined by the quantity and quality of its trained workforce. An emphasis on growing Guinea's Technical and Vocational Education and Training (TVET) sector, adjusting university programs for greater relevance, and developing strategic partnerships with the private sector will gradually close the gap between skills supply and demand.

### Note 2: Current Outcomes and Challenges: Diagnostic of the Higher Education System

Human capital is increasingly a key ingredient for economic success: in Guinea, vast mineral reserves paired with a lack of appropriate skills to exploit their potential keeps the country trapped in poverty. Though enrollment rates have significantly improved over the past decade, Guinea has yet to ensure that its education system produces a labor force composed of workers with the low, middle, and high level skills required by high-growth-potential sectors.

Access to higher education remains a more significant barrier for girls. In 2011–12, only one fourth of higher education students were girls, in contrast to high schools where about 40 percent of students were girls.<sup>4</sup> However, the share of girls by level remains rather stable over time. This implies: girls have as good, if not superior, academic performance as boys, and once they enter higher education, they do not face many constraints in continuing to pursue their education.

Between 1989 and 2010, three major reforms—the transformation of Higher Education Institutions into public administrative institutions, extension and diversification of universities, and transition to the Licence-Master-Doctor-at system—have set the higher education system on a more promising path, though progress remains to be made in the areas of institutional autonomy, access in equity, institutional capacity, and teaching quality.

Higher education receives a disproportionate share of all public education spending, relative to enrollment levels. More troubling is the allocation: nearly half of the budget goes to scholarships, and of that, the majority supports predominantly wealthier students enrolled in private institutions.

With the simultaneous removal of entry requirements and substantial increase in high school graduates, higher education enrollment has soared. Though private institutions are multiplying and thus helping to absorb the surge, Guinea remains below the Sub-Saharan average for private higher education enrollment. It should be noted that while access has expanded, secondary education access, completion, and course selection largely determine the distribution of tertiary education students across program areas, with obvious consequences for subsequent employment opportunities. Furthermore, the current system offers little flexibility and few opportunities for adjustments to labor market needs. High repetition rates

<sup>4</sup> ELEP (2012).

throughout primary and secondary education creates delays in university enrollment and thus the entry of the most skilled labor onto the labor market.

Guinea's higher education landscape offers ample public-private partnership possibilities, from forecasting to curriculum development, training, job placement, and equipment provision. Public-private partnerships (PPPs) are the key to developing the healthy, equitable, and high-quality education system that will enable Guinea to develop and sustain a skilled and versatile workforce that will enable Guinea to take advantage of its immense natural resources and achieve economic stability.

### Note 3: Governance of Higher Education

Over the past decade, governance reforms, which include increased institutional autonomy, diversification of programs, and additional resources for institutions, have contributed to the reawakening of the higher education sector in Africa's developing countries. In Guinea, the central government has pursued three decentralization strategies: delegation to (a) a lower level of government, (b) a buffer body, or (c) institutions themselves.

Moving towards a fully autonomous system should be an incremental process. Given the differences in economic conditions and development of the higher education system, this note examines countries on a similar scale, particularly in the Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) region, namely: Ethiopia, Nigeria, Ghana, and Kenya.

The successful reforms among the ones adopted are highlighted to provide examples of best practices.

Guinean institutions do not have the institutional autonomy to hire and fire permanent teaching staff, and the growth of teaching staff has not kept pace with enrollments. Private institutions "poach" teachers from public institutions, aggravating the shortage, and the low level of international faculty indicates that opportunities for research collaboration and innovation are insufficient. More than one third of qualified teachers will retire within the next two years. Guinea recently adopted and is in the process of adopting Decrees that will change the higher education landscape. This roadmap for a successful transition towards a more decentralized system of higher education should be combined with initiatives to relax the stringent conditions attached to the budget and allow more flexibility in its use; give control to institutions over the recruitment, promotion, and management of their teaching and research staff; and implement adequate accountability and quality assurance mechanisms.

### Note 4: Financing of Higher Education

The education sector is supported by three sources of financing: government, household, and donor financing, respectively. Major challenges include highly centralized funding, disconnect between the budget and sectoral goals, fluctuation in expenditures and consequent lack of predictability.

Guinea's suboptimal allocation of resources is among the most important challenges facing the education sector. One-third of total public education funding goes to higher education, even though enrollment accounts for only eight percent of the entire student body, and the subsidies eating up most of

the budget not only prevent better leveraging of public funds; they also remove incentives to develop relevant and innovative higher education programs. Indeed, funding for higher education is neither allocated nor used efficiently: almost half of the higher education funding for operating expenditures is used to support students in public and private universities through stipends and scholarships, regardless of the academic merits of the student and the value of the program in the labor market. Furthermore, evidence shows that this support is both insufficient to cover students' needs, and not allocated to the students most in need.

Improving the effectiveness and efficiency of the sector will require revamping of the scholarship and subsidy payments to higher education students and institutions, greater involvement of the private sector as partners, and the introduction of performance-based contracts for increased accountability of both public and private institutions.

### Policy Recommendations

| Policy challenge   | Recommendations   |
|--|---|
| <b>Skills supply and demand mismatch</b>                                 | <p>Develop and improve skills relevant programs aligned with employer demand</p> <p>Involve the private sector as partners in curriculum development, practical training, and financing.</p>  |
| <b>Disconnect between schools/ graduates and potential employers</b>     | <p>Facilitate intermediaries to link skills profiles with jobs</p> <p>Reform labor market access</p>  |
| <b>Uneven access to relevant training programs</b>                       | <p>Reduce geographical inequities and ensure school and labor market reform and adequate distribution of training programs throughout the country</p> <p>Expand education opportunities for the poor and girls</p>  |
| <b>Lack of autonomy of institutions</b>                                  | <p>The government and the higher education institutions need support to facilitate their transition towards a decentralized and more autonomous higher education system</p> <p>Higher education institutions should be given control over the recruitment, promotion, and management of their teaching and research staff.</p> <p>Autonomy with adequate accountability and quality assurance mechanisms.</p> |
| <b>Inflexible budget</b>   | <p>Relax the stringent conditions attached to the budget and allow more flexibility in its use</p>  |
| <b>Inefficient and disproportionate spending on student scholarships</b> | <p>Revamp the scholarship and subsidy payments to higher education students and institutions</p>  |
| <b>Lack of accountability</b>  | <p>Introduce performance-based contracts for increased accountability of both public and private institutions.</p>  |


# 1. Introduction: Why Are Governance Reforms Needed?

The importance of higher education for economic growth and prosperity is well documented; as is the increasing social and private benefits attributed to higher education. While substantial efforts have been made over the past few decades to increase access to higher education, progress in access has not always been commensurate with equivalent improvements in equity, efficiency, and quality. The most advanced systems have shifted from a state-governed and controlled education system towards one shifting greater responsibility to the institutions themselves to blossom and innovate. Governance reforms are needed to tackle the growing demand for higher education across the continent (Figure 1), while ensuring equity in access and achievement.

Over the past decade, governance reforms, which include increased institutional autonomy, diversification of programs, and additional resources for institutions, have contributed to the reawakening of the higher education sector in Africa's developing countries. Since 2000, aside from an expansion in student enrollment, allocations to higher education budgets have increased, and both staff salaries and teaching conditions have improved. In fact, the expansion of higher education has required reforms to enable Africa to keep pace with the demand for higher education. The initial stages to higher education system reforms stem from the pro market reforms of the 1990s, which led many countries to move from state-run to market economies. Fiscal constraints towed the initial reforms: the promotion of private institutions, and in some cases the privatization of public institutions (Varghese, 2006, 2013). Another reform, proposed by the African Union Convention, attempted to standardize the higher education system across Africa in terms of degree structure, student assessment, and external quality assurance (Varghese, 2013). This reform has yet to be ratified by every country in the region.

As frequently observed in other countries, especially in SSA, governance is also the weakest link in the Guinean higher education system, both at the central and institutional levels. As part of its technical assistance, the World Bank reviewed the existing legal texts governing higher education and held discussions with the Ministry of Higher Education and

**Figure 1: Higher Education Gross Enrollment Ratios (GER), SSA and World, 1970–2010**



Source: Modified table 1 from Varghese (2013).

**Table 1: Models of Governance**

| Institutional Governance Model | Status of Public Universities  | Examples                    |
|--------------------------------|--|-----------------------------|
| A. State Control               | Can be an agency of the MOE or a state-owned corporation   | Malaysia<br>Guinea          |
| B. Semi-Autonomous             | Can be an agency of the MOE, a state-owned corporation, or a statutory body  | New Zealand<br>France       |
| C. Semi-Independent            | A statutory body, charity, or non-profit corporation subject to MOE control  | Singapore                   |
| D. Independent                 | A statutory body, charity, or non-profit corporation with no government participation and control linked to national strategies and related only to public funding | Australia<br>United Kingdom |

Source: Fielden (2008).

representatives from individual institutions. This note presents the key governance issues facing the higher education system since 2011 and the reforms initiated since, including the two presidential decrees: Decree 62 refers to the governance of public higher education institutions, and Decree 63 addresses the governance of private of higher education institutions.

## 2. Higher Education Governance

Governance in higher education is presented in the context of Fielden's framework of "basic elements of higher education" (Fielden, 2008).<sup>5</sup>

### 1. Who Manages the System?

In recent years, reforms in higher education have contributed to more decentralized systems. The central government has pursued three decentralization strategies: delegation to (a) a lower level of government, (b) a buffer body, or (c) institutions themselves (Table 1). To further illustrate these strategies: (a) In some countries, control has been transferred to provincial governments, with the central government maintaining responsibility for the general state policy. This is the case in Australia, the United States, and to a certain extent, China. Upon gaining independence in 1958, Guinea, similar to other Francophone West African countries, inherited a highly centralized higher education system. Until 2012, Guinea's higher education system shared many characteristics with state-controlled systems of governance, with just a few small steps taken towards autonomy, which will be described in the next section. (b) In countries like the UK, India, and Pakistan, powers ranging from strategic planning to academic program review and funding advice or allocation have been granted to buffer bodies. However, the central government always retains the policy power, i.e. the power to set national strategies related to education. Buffer bodies offer the key advantages of removing detailed

<sup>5</sup> Fielden is one of the world renowned experts in governance of higher education.

operational issues from the Ministry of Education (MOE), encouraging institutional autonomy, and to a certain extent, relieving the MOE from lobbying. It may be difficult to maintain a good relationship with MOE while retaining independence. (c) Finally, the central government can delegate considerable powers to the institutions themselves and keep only the power to establish strategies for the higher education system.

## **2. What Powers Are Retained at the Center, If Some Are Devolved to Buffers or Institutions?**

Even in decentralized systems, certain powers are retained at the central level. Predominant among them are the right to set overall policy for the higher education system (including its size and shape), develop strategic planning for the system, negotiate funding with the government, and coordinate with other governmental ministries or agencies. In the 1980s all higher education institutions in Guinea were under the purview of the Central Government. From the 1990s onwards, the government initiated reforms that conferred a limited degree of autonomy to the public institutions. These reforms included the creation of an administrative council, which, along with the authority of the institution, had administrative, financial, and teaching management responsibilities. The World Bank was at the origin of some of these reforms through its higher education project that ended in 2001. The Bank project spurred improvements in the management capacity of staff at both the central and institutional levels, development of strategic plans in all higher education institutions, discontinuation of irrelevant programs, increase in the number of teaching hours, and a reduction in the overall higher education share of the education budget. Other improvements included new equipment, staff training, and installation of telephones, computers, and software to improve communication between the Ministry and the institutions. Administrative councils gained authority in the fields of finance, teaching, and administration.

## **3. What Types of Central Agencies Are Needed?**

*Role of the Ministry of Higher Education:* Until 2013, Guinea was lacking important bodies. For example, a clear higher education policy, with explicit and comprehensive objectives and strategies had yet to be developed. In cases where institutional strategic plans were developed, the quality assurance and evaluation of the institutions was insufficient. The financial needs analysis of the system was incomplete, and because the institutions had not developed a formula or mechanism to distribute financial resources, the Ministry of Finance was fully responsible for resource allocation and lacking a key tool to guide and coordinate the development of the system. Various units within the Ministry of Higher Education were involved in the governance of the higher education system, but their goals or responsibilities were not properly defined, leading to inefficiencies.

*New functions:* Drawing inspiration from the Senegal system, Guinea proposed a financially independent National Directorate of Higher Education. The Directorate would be under the purview of the Ministry and undertake the following tasks: policy development, planning, resource allocation, data collection, system evaluation, accreditation of private institutions, and monitoring of institutions. The new responsibilities

assigned to the Ministry of Higher Education are outlined in the 2013 Decrees regarding public and private institutions. These responsibilities include:

1. Define the vision, policies, and goals of the higher education and research system; submit the strategic development plan to the government;
2. Determine the structure—in terms of shape and size—of the higher education and research system;
3. Ensure that the institutional strategic plans are aligned with the national strategy;
4. Submit proposals for the creation of new public institutions;
5. Authorize the creation of private institutions;
6. Allocate public resources to institutions;
7. Assess the performance of institutions;
8. Compile higher education statistics in a database and provide indicators to monitor higher education and scientific research performance.

In line with international trends, Guinea is gradually transitioning towards a decentralized system by clearly limiting the responsibilities and duties of the Ministry of Higher Education.

## **4. How Much Autonomy Should Institutions Have?**

The basic principle behind institutional autonomy is that institutions operate best when they are in control of their own destiny. Institutional autonomy is not static; that is, institutional autonomy has evolved over time and its evolution is dictated by the inherent traits of the country. This means that the degree of autonomy institutions have in one country may not be applicable in another. Institutions may also react differently to autonomy from the central government, even within the same country. According to Fielden, governments may be reluctant to devolve powers to institutions because they do not believe the institutions are fully ready to assume that power. In some countries, Indonesia for instance, a capacity improvement program had to be established as a prerequisite for autonomy.

Further reforms were introduced by the Government of Guinea with the aim of decentralizing decision-making to the institutional level and better aligning academic programs with the needs of the Guinean people and economy. The establishment of a governing board for each institution and the adoption of the Licence-Master-Doctorate (LMD) system were to be the pillars of these new reforms. However, due to increased demand for higher education, lack of resources, and poor management of the higher education system, some of the progress achieved prior to 2001 was lost, and later reforms were disappointing.

*Public Institutions:* Since 2001, the Ministry has taken measures to devolve power to institutions. These include the creation of governing boards; however, the boards had limited power as their members were representatives of Ministers and all decisions had to be approved by the Ministry of Higher Education. In most cases, these boards did not exist nor did they play an active role in the governance of institutions, which

remained under the influence of the Ministries of Higher Education, Finance, and Civil Service. Professors continued to be hired centrally and there were stringent requirements on allocated financial resources.

**Addressing the shortcoming in the decentralization of governance required bolstering the power of the governance boards in public institutions.** More clarity in the determination of the board responsibilities was critical, particularly those related to planning, budget approval and follow-up, nomination and evaluation of the president, and hiring of personnel. The size and composition of the board were also examined. The new Boards would have nine to 11 members, the majority coming from the economic and professional world. In addition to the governing board, an institutional council was proposed, to be chaired by the president of the institution to deal with academic affairs. The council would be composed of 15 to 30 members selected among faculty, staff, and students of the institution. The council would work under the governing board. These proposals were accepted and confirmed in decree 62.

**The most significant change detailed in Decree 62 is that institutions will now take the lead on the development of their strategic plans.** Institutions will be able to change their organizational structure, adopt regulations, and hire personnel, all without Ministry intervention. For these changes to be successful, the relevant ministries will need to cooperate closely: the Ministry of Higher Education, the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of Civil Service, and the National Directorate of Higher Education, now responsible for steering the entire higher education system.

**Private institutions:** In general, private universities, while operating within the framework of the laws and policies of the government, have a larger degree of freedom in governance and management compared to their public counterparts. This is only partly true, as observed in Decree 63 concerning private institutions, this decree resembles the Decree concerning public institutions in a number of ways. According to this decree, private institutions in Guinea will be managed by four entities: the Founder, Governing Board, Institution Council, and Director General. The governing boards of private and public institutions have the same responsibilities, except that private governing boards leave the financial and resource management aspects to the Founder. The Founder chairs the Governing Board, serves as the chief authorizing officer, and has authority over both the administrative and technical staff. The composition and responsibilities of the Institution Council for private institutions are identical to those of public institutions. Finally, the responsibilities of the Director General of private institutions are similar to those of the Rector of public institutions, barring the duties assumed by the Founder.

## 5. How Are Institutions Held Accountable?

As greater autonomy is granted to institutions, governments must determine how to balance this autonomy with the responsibility of the State to offer quality education and ensure efficient use of public resources. In other words, how will they balance autonomy with the need to keep institutions accountable? As direct control was abandoned, governments developed complex accountability mechanisms to supervise

institutions. The central government directly or indirectly (through buffer bodies) retains control of the following areas:


- Review and approval of draft statutes/articles before granting autonomous status to universities;
- Grant degree-awarding power to new public or private institutions;
- Set a cap on the total number of students funded by the state, and sometimes the total in selected high cost areas (e.g. medical and veterinary students). If the state is funding the bulk of the cost of higher education, it is reasonable that it control this cost by limiting the students it subsidizes. The distribution of students within this cap is decided by the buffer body through a bidding or allocation process. None of this would affect the right of institutions to enroll full fee-paying private students, if the state agrees to this principle.

Further restrictions are based on national policy. For example, institutions within the US, Australia, and South Africa may set academic salaries, a power not given to Guinean institutions (see Table 2 for different models of financial control). In most countries, institutions have the right to establish new academic programs; but in a few others, this power is exercised through buffer bodies.

Figure 2 below illustrates accountability relationships in an institutional autonomy setting.

**Management of financial resources.** Usually, an institution's recurrent budget is approved by the Board, and the Rector or Director General is the authorizing officer. The Board and the Rector/Director General have flexibility in using their financial resources. This is not the case in Guinean public institutions, where financial affairs are subject to control by the Ministry of Finance. The Ministry of Finance oversees finances through the Division of Financial Affairs along the assistance of a controller and an accountant. The institution's budget has restrictions regarding the use of funds and movement between different budget items. If institutions are to become

Figure 2: Accountability Relationships



Source: Putting Higher Education to Work, authors' elaboration based on World Bank 2013.

**Table 2: Models of Financial Control**

| Topic  | Centralized Control  | Full Control   |
|--|--|--|
| Annual Budgets   | Agreed in detail by MOE or the funding body  | Agreed by the Board (but possibly reported to MOE or the buffer body)  |
| Expenditure  | “Line item control” so that institutions cannot switch expenditures between the agreed budget headings                 | Total freedom to allocate and spend as required within the overall total grant or budget awarded by the MOE      |
| Under-spending at the end of an accounting period                                      | Surrender of all under-spent sums to MOE/ Ministry of Finance  | Freedom to carry forward under-spending (and to absorb any over-spending from future funds within limits)        |
| External earnings from non-governmental sources  | Surrender to the Ministry of Finance or MOE all external earnings  | Freedom to retain and spend freely all sums earned from non-government sources                                   |
| Tuition fees for domestic “local,” domestic “out of state,” and international students | Fees cannot be charged or, if they are, have to be set at a fixed rate and then surrendered to the Ministry of Finance | Fee levels can be set freely and the money retained without affecting the budget allocation from the government. |

Source: Taken from Fielden (2008).

truly autonomous and accountable, and the prescriptions of decree 62 rigorously applied, grants must be provided with as few restrictions as possible. The Division of Financial Affairs should be under the sole authority of the Rector or Director General without being accountable to the Ministry of Finance. The role of the accountant should be limited to ensuring proper execution of financial decisions.

Autonomy has the potential to improve higher education and skills development, but exploiting this potential depends

on the state of the relationships between the relevant actors, and the involvement of students and communities. Box 1 discusses how to reap the full benefits of autonomy.

## 6. How Is Quality Assured?

Quality is controlled through several stages. They are: (i) authorization—first, approval allowing an institution to operate; (ii) accreditation—approval granted once the institution has established its system, that is, its programs, staff, and facilities; (iii) continuous quality assurance system requiring institutions to be accredited at regular intervals; (iv) re-authorization—if/when new programs are offered; and (v) periodic review—to ensure that existing institutions are up to standard.

The Ministry recognized quality assurance and evaluation as a major impediment to strengthen institutional quality for both public and private institutions. To counter the weakness in accountability, the Government sought advice on setting up a quality assurance agency, the *Agence Nationale d’Evaluation de l’Enseignement Supérieur et de la Recherche Scientifique* (ANEESRS). A Decree has been prepared and submitted to the Government for adoption. The Decree states that the mandate of the ANEESRS is to evaluate teaching and research in both public and private institutions and examine how they stack up against pre-determined standards. The Decree also specifies the powers, duties, membership, and organization of the ANEESRS. Although the agency would be under the supervision of the Ministry of Higher Education, but independent and autonomous.

**The Decree also specifies the quality assurance process to follow before a private institution can operate.** To establish a private institution, the founders must obtain authorization from the minister. The institution’s board must present a file containing the institutional plan, adequate financial resources, information on senior members, and pedagogic records. The ANEESRS evaluates the file, then issues its recommendation regarding operational status. This is then forwarded to the Minister, who will authorize or deny the formal opening of the institution.

### Box 1: Translating Autonomy into more Socially Efficient Outcomes

#### Translating autonomy into more socially efficient outcomes

The main argument for higher institutions’ autonomy lies in the potential gains that flexibility in substantive and procedural issues provides in responding to changes in the labor market, in addressing differentiated local needs and in allowing quality-enhancing choices. None of these benefits will really materialize, however, if the client power and internal management relationships do not work. While a university may know the needs of its local community better than the central government, those needs are most likely better addressed if the community can directly express its preferences by, for example, participating in the university board. More importantly, involving members of the local community may be necessary to ensure that the university uses its knowledge to satisfy local needs.

Similar reasoning holds for student involvement; and equally important are the possibilities for students to express preferences by voting with their feet (the “exit” option).

Beyond client power, internal control and quality measures (illustrating the internal management relationship) are also essential to support quality enhancing choices in higher education institutions. Such measures typically include self-administered quality assurance (including self-evaluations), tenure systems, and other performance incentives for faculty, as well as university boards that can hold the university management accountable for its decisions. Institutional autonomy without a culture of internal quality—including holding staff and management accountable for performance—runs the risk of simply not producing the desired outcomes.

Source: Putting Higher Education to Work. World Bank (2013).

## Box 2: African and Malagasy Council for Higher Education (CAMES)

### African and Malagasy Council for Higher Education (CAMES)

The African and Malagasy Council for Higher Education, also known as the *Conseil Africain et Malgache pour l'Enseignement Supérieur* (CAMES) came into being in 1968 in Niger. The organization was established by the Heads of States of the Organization Commune Africaine et Malgache to co-ordinate, harmonize and foster co-operation in African countries in higher education and research. The organization which has 19 member states: Benin, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Congo, Cote d'Ivoire, Gabon, Guinea-Conakry, Guinea-Bissau, Equatorial Guinea, Madagascar, Mali, Niger, Democratic Republic of Congo, Rwanda, Senegal, Chad and Togo, manages accreditation, quality assurance, recognition of diplomas and management of teaching and research for its member states. In 2006, CAMES, through a resolution elected to reorganize the university structure and syllabi so as to implement the LMD. It is believed to provide a path towards aligning higher education systems in Anglophone and Francophone Africa.

CAMES has created a database or register of qualified personnel in higher education and research. This register is a step onto ensuring that qualifications of personnel and standard are recognized across the different nations and that there can be an open space for mobility of both professionals and students. For a personnel to enter into the register, committees of specialists will examine applicants in all fields of study and across grades (lecturer, professor etc.). The criteria include the method of recruitment, the professional qualifications of the personnel as well as quality of teaching measures.

Source: African Union (2007).

ANEESRS will continue to evaluate the institution in the first few years of operation; positive evaluations will determine the conclusive status of the institution. ANEESRS ensures that public and private universities are held to the same standard.

**The low quality of higher education in Guinea is compounded by the severe lack of qualified teachers.** Many positions are occupied by 'homologues' who are young graduates whose only qualification is a license or a master's degree. The lack of qualified teachers has led Guinea to adopt promotion standards that are not equivalent to those used by the *Conseil africain et malgache pour l'enseignement supérieur* (CAMES) in the other Francophone countries of Sub Saharan Africa, therefore limiting mobility of teachers and students and recognition of its diplomas. Recently Guinea has indicated its intention to adopt the CAMES standards within two years (Box 2).

### 7. How Is Research in the Higher Education Sector Managed?

The management and distribution of funds for research depends on the national funding priorities and systems in place. Some countries prefer to allocate funds through the ministry or buffer bodies; other countries allow universities to receive multiple research fund sources, each with its own set of rules, criteria, and expectations.

In Guinea, there is currently no financing available for research, and the first reform to be initiated in the coming years will be the reform establishing a competitive fund. The fund aims to encourage innovation and greater relevance in academic programs by awarding grants on a competitive basis to programs developed through academic institution-private sector partnerships. From equipment and materials to curriculum development, the fund will finance any program jointly developed by educators and employers that demonstrates potential to narrow the education-employment skills mismatch.

*Status of teachers and researchers:* One of the biggest barriers to improvements in the Guinean higher education system is the inability of institutions to select their own teachers and researchers. Currently, the National Commission of Recruitment

and Promotion (*Commission Nationale de Recrutement et de Promotion (CNRP)*) is responsible for the recruitment of teachers and researchers, both of whom are considered civil servants. The CNRP's short list of successful candidates is forwarded to the Ministry of Civil Service, which then hires these persons and assigns them to institutions. In this system, the hiring of teachers does not directly take into account the needs of the institutions. As civil servants, permanent teachers and researchers receive attractive pensions but low salaries. The civil service makes it easier for them to change positions, which hampers institutional stability. Furthermore, since the institution is not the paymaster, the Rectors and the Directors General encounter difficulties in managing their teaching and research staff. For instance, faculty members are not required to report and explain leaves of absence.

These challenges cast doubt on the motivation and commitment of faculty members. The main stakeholders (Ministry of Higher Education, Ministry of Civil Service and universities) should conduct an in-depth review of the status of teachers and researchers against the backdrop of the new autonomous powers granted to institutions by the Decrees discussed above.

**The recruitment issue is compounded by a severe lack of qualified teachers in Guinea.** Many positions are occupied by 'homologues', young graduates whose only qualification is a license or a master's degree. The lack of qualified teachers has led Guinea to adopt promotion standards that do not match those of the *Conseil africain et malgache pour l'enseignement supérieur* (CAMES) in the other Francophone countries of Sub Saharan Africa, therefore limiting faculty and student mobility and recognition of Guinean diplomas. Guinea recently indicated its intention to adopt the CAMES standards within two years.

In the future, high priority should be placed on the development of competencies and motivation of teachers and researchers. Recruitment of qualified teachers, adoption of a professional development plan for existing faculty, and improved living and working conditions are among the actions necessary to raise competency and motivation levels of faculty to the level of that of other CAMES members.

### 3. Best Practices: International Examples (What Can We Learn?)

Governance in higher education has long been trending from a state-controlled system towards greater autonomy. African education systems are far from the forefront, given this international trend in governance reforms (Saint, Lao and Materu, 2009), but there have been interesting developments in Africa and elsewhere from which lessons can be learned. On the path towards a system under institutional control, buffer bodies have emerged to manage finances and perform other sector tasks. New funding models are emerging that provide incentives for institutions to raise income from non-governmental models while easing the restrictions on state money. Institutions have been encouraged to collaborate with organizations to kick start creativity, provide research benefits, and generate other sources of income. Since the concept of institutional autonomy is closely tied to accountability, while governments have promoted greater institutional autonomy, they have demanded better accountability and quality assurance mechanisms. External agencies have been created to evaluate institutions, and there has been a focus on establishing reporting and monitoring systems. Indicators on performance and operational data are collected and evaluation results are presented. An important trait is the treatment of human capital. Since autonomous institutions have the power to hire, promote, and fire their teaching and research staff, qualification requirements and evaluations are necessary to ensure the high quality of research and teaching. Finally, reforms have led to the creation of governing bodies, such as university boards, which have taken over the decision-making power from governments. Some examples of the abovementioned trends are outlined in Box 3.

**Moving towards a fully autonomous system should be an incremental process.** Given the differences in economic conditions and development of the higher education system, it is most beneficial to examine countries on a similar scale (see Box 4 for a description of the Vietnam reform process), particularly in the Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) region. The evolution of governance (or specific reforms) in higher education systems in the following countries: Ethiopia, Nigeria, Ghana, and Kenya will be examined.<sup>6</sup> The successful reforms among the ones adopted are highlighted at the end of this section to provide examples of best practices from SSA countries.

**Ethiopia** – The Higher Education Proclamation of 2003 (No. 351/2003) grants every higher education institution autonomy and accountability. Autonomy is defined in terms of personnel, finances, internal organization, and links with national and international organizations; cost sharing, enrollment budgeting and block grant were introduced. The governance structure includes an independent board of governors, a senate comprising academic deans and directors along with a few elected academics, an academic commission and department assemblies. There was also a shift from a collegial to a managerial model, the creation of buffer organizations and an outcome-based strategic plan. Finally, the reform ushered in the era of private institutions of higher learning in Ethiopia.

#### Box 3: Governance Reform Successes in Selected Countries

##### Governance Reform successes in selected countries

1. POSTECH in the Republic of Korea, a private university, enjoys high levels of managerial autonomy. One of its successes has been the collaboration with the electronics and mechanics sector to ensure that the university is meeting the needs of the industry (Rhee, 2011).
2. The National University of Singapore has improved its performance on university rankings after switching to the model of higher institutional autonomy.
3. The Hong Kong University of Technology reached the top echelons of university ranking within a decade of its founding. Its success is attributed to the freedom the university is allowed in recruitment and private sector partnerships (Postiglione, 2011).
4. Curriculum reform in the Prince of Songkla University in Thailand has been encouraged by the institutional reforms in this country. As a result, the university which is located in a region where the labor market needs are related to the rubber industry, has created new programs in chemical engineering that will ensure there is no mismatch between graduates and the labor market needs (Doner et al, 2013).

**Ghana** – The governance reforms in Ghana resulted from the reforms initiated internally in the University of Ghana in 2007; these reforms replaced the previously existing Act of Parliament and statutes governing public universities. New institutional evaluation procedures, curricula redesign, a new credit system, cost-recovery measures, a new funding formula, the creation of new governing bodies and buffer institutions, the transition of the staff from civil service to university employees were some of the reforms undertaken.

**Kenya** – The initial public sector reforms of the 1990s were improved upon by the results-based management (RBM) approach to governance adopted by the government. The keystone of RBM was the performance contract (PC) between the government and public institutions. The contract focused on institution performance and outcomes. In return, the institutions retained managerial and operational autonomy.

**Nigeria** – Since the 1998 Magna Charta Universitatum, public universities must meet accountability standards; however, they are autonomous and free from governmental overregulation. With autonomy, universities are able to appoint officers, have some say in staff employment conditions (including introducing evaluations by the institution), and have control over student admissions, academic curricula, and finances. In 2003, the law was further amended to improve autonomy for the university system by allowing them the freedom to govern and regulate themselves without any government interference; in essence, the amendment took away the government's ability to appoint and remove the Vice Chancellor.

**Senegal** – In 2010, Senegal started a major reorganization of its higher education system. The National Directorate of Higher Education (*Direction Générale de l'Enseignement Supérieur*) was restructured and reinforced. Its planning capacity has improved, with the Directorate now able to manage

<sup>6</sup> Adapted from Varghese (2013)

#### Box 4: Higher Education and Governance Reform: The Case of Vietnam

##### Higher Education and Governance Reform: The Case of Vietnam

The higher education system in Vietnam is highly centralized with a history of decision making at the central level. The Ministry of Education and Training is the dominant force, but there are a few other ministries involved. There is a struggle to balance the desire of the central government to provide institutions with more powers while at the same time retain the socialistic trait of higher education. Higher education, always a significant part of Vietnam, has in recent years contributed to the growth in economic development. Reforms were introduced to bridge the gap between Vietnam and further advanced Western nations; the reforms were also necessary to keep pace with the burgeoning demand. In 2004, the department of testing and educational quality evaluation was established within the MoET. Reforms were made in every aspect of higher education such as training structure, staff recruitment, financial management, research and management. The government issued 'curriculum frames' that are in effect guidelines giving institutions power to create their own curricula. Reforms in quality assurance have involved setting up centers for quality assurance, accreditation and testing. Teaching and training materials have been standardized across institutions in the country. These reforms have resulted in a system that removes bureaucratic red tape and allows for more equity, financial sustainability, a focus on research etc. The law also eliminates 'line-ministry control', which supports the devolution of control from the state to the higher education institutions (Dao and Hayden, 2010, p.133). Additional reforms allowed for collaboration with international organizations and individuals to further improve the research and teaching standards. Staff recruitment received a significant boost from the reform process.

The following results were noted from a survey of 10 decision makers at the MoET:<sup>a</sup>

- Organizational structures were simplified at the national level after governance reforms and their efficiency improved. The focus of the ministry is now directed towards strategic planning, educational law and policy setting and management of quality.
- Governance reforms also had a positive impact on the decision making process at the national level. Due to the simplification of the structure as well as clarification of roles, it is now faster to make decisions at the national level. Given the devolution of powers, efficiency was noticed in the decision making process as the government's role was narrowed down.
- For financial planning and control to succeed at the institutional level, the capacity of the institutions in these fields must be increased.
- Increased autonomy for higher education institutions had a positive impact on monitoring and evaluation. Institutions were found to be more responsive to the assessment process.
- In terms of academic management at the institutional level, more than half of the respondents agreed that the institutions took a more active role in management. However, this additional responsibility called for qualified decision makers and professionals at the institutional level.
- The financial management was altered by the reforms. It was noted that decision makers tend to be more creative and flexible with financial management. However, the reforms benefited more the established institutions as newer institutions had less capacity to manage the financial affairs and need more guidelines.
- Human resources was positively impacted by the reforms. This is because institutions were now free to use their own judgment on how best to use their human capital. In particular, the decision of employee appointment in addition to the quality of recruitment is now in the hands of the institution. The central government monitors the institutions when it comes to human resources, but the decision is at the institution level.

Source: Think.

<sup>a</sup> The response rate for the survey is 70 percent.

performance-based contracts (PBC). A quality assurance agency was created and is now operational. It has developed procedures and standards on par with international practices. Public universities will soon have a Board, with half of its members coming from civil society; its main responsibilities will be to approve the strategic plan of the institution, make sure it is followed, approve its budget and assure follow-up. Since universities have more autonomy in Senegal, a PBC can be prepared and signed with each of the five existing universities. The Ministry has indicated five priorities for improvement for the PBC: internal efficiency, new technologies, education

quality, linkage with the labor market, and university governance. The universities have set targets for improvement and are free to use the methods they believe to be most effective in reaching these goals. New means of communication have been developed to share information with the community on progress made in the implementation of the PBC.

Those reforms were developed with the active participation of rectors, professors, and representatives of the Ministry. Teacher's Union and student representatives were also regularly consulted. One of the most interesting features of the reform was the establishment of the program SAMA PC, which aims to provide

each student with a computer. After one year of operation, more than half of undergraduate students have their own computer, and the majority of teachers use ICT in their courses. Similar progress has been made in other aspects of the PBC.

### ***Good Practices in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) Region***

The World Bank/Center for Mediterranean Integration MENA Regional Program on Higher Education aims at addressing key challenges faced by higher education systems and at enhancing governance and accountability of universities through capacity-building measures grounded in an evidence-based and inclusive approach (<http://cmimarseille.org/highereducation/>).

Through the program, a University Governance Screening Card has been developed that assesses the extent to which universities in the MENA region are following governance practices aligned with their institutional goals and international trends, whilst monitoring their progress over time in terms of mission, managerial orientation, autonomy, responsibility and accountability towards the society (corollary of autonomy) and participation to all system stakeholders, namely students, administrative staff and the private sector. This benchmarking tool has proven useful not only for MENA institutions, but is also in demand by other regions, therein offering the potential to be up-scaled and replicated trans-regionally. At present, 100 universities from across seven countries (Algeria, Egypt, Iraq, Lebanon, Morocco, Tunisia and the West Bank and Gaza) have participated in the benchmarking exercise.

**Innovative funds to support Academic Quality and Institutional Performance: the Tunisian experience.** A competitive fund was set up in 2006 with the support of the Bank to improve the academic quality and institutional performance of higher education institutions. The competitive fund is a mechanism to transfer funds in the form of block grants to institutions to supplement their recurrent budget. These funds are meant to encourage innovative experiences to improve the quality of teaching and learning while strengthening management capacity of beneficiary institutions. It also supports programs with high employability potential.

An internal evaluation of the fund shows faster acquisition of student learning and increased availability of access learning materials; an increased sensitization of teachers to student needs and the labor market while making the curriculum more relevant; improved sensitization of institutions to government priorities amongst others in terms of employability of young graduates and equity; improved accountability in public resource utilization through contractual arrangements; emergence of lessons learnt to pilot results based budget allocation which could be disseminated to other sectors. An external evaluation will provide further in-depth analysis related to relevance of programs, efficiency, and its impact and sustainability of interventions.

### ***Which Reforms Worked?***

In all of the cases outlined above, new governance structures were created as a result of the reform process. In most cases, reforms helped governance and operational efficiency. There was less reliance on state funds. However, there is less agreement on the quality of services provided, and on equity in access

and success. Similar conclusions can be drawn from studies in Asia (Varghese and Martin, 2013) and Francophone countries (Martin, 2013). See Box 4 for a case study of Vietnam.

1. *Management processes:* Addis Ababa University (AAU) introduced a Business Process Reengineering for university affairs and aimed to optimize service delivery and core processes. In Nigeria, democratic processes were established to select heads of departments and deans. A committee system that would introduce due process and procedures was set up, and most importantly, selection procedures for staff hiring were codified, along with rules for promotion. Kenya saw more transparent, accountable, participative, and inclusive management processes.
2. *Academic programs:* AAU established multidisciplinary centers, diversified programs of study, and improvements in science, technology, engineering and mathematic subjects, and introduced curriculum redesign. In Nairobi University, performance contracts led to more academic programs with increased student enrollment, and increase in research outputs. Innovative curricula with courses created in response to needs were the result in Nigeria. Ghana redesigned its system, introduced a four-year structure, new grading system, review committees for curriculums and redid requirements (PhD) for staff selection.
3. *Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E):* A quarterly monitoring system was established in Kenya along with the publications of results. Critics pointed out that funds were not always available, and while the University of Nairobi was always diligent with M&E, the same could not be said for the entire system. In Nigeria, staff accountability/evaluation procedures were changed, and a carrot and stick system for teaching was created.
4. *Financial Management:* In Nigeria, diversified income sources came into being—competitive research funding, special project fund, tuition fees, income generating ventures, etc. Universities directly contracted with international organizations. In Ghana, public universities were required to raise 30 percent of their budgets.
5. *Overall improvement in the Higher Education System:* In Kenya, research productivity, autonomy, and efficiency increased. In Ghana, staff gained responsibility, decision making improved at the faculty level, and there was more clarity in terms of institutional direction.

## **4. Policy Recommendations**

This note summarized the current state of higher education governance in Guinea, and examined undergoing reforms in Guinea and recently adopted reforms in other countries.

*A new policy for higher education:* The recently adopted and pending Decrees will change the higher education landscape in Guinea. In order to ensure a successful transition towards a more decentralized system of higher education, it is essential to carefully plan for the changes. The draft national policy for higher education (2013–2020) acknowledges this need. The nine areas marked as priorities are:

1. Improvement of higher education and research governance;
2. Development of teacher, researcher, and technical staff competencies and motivation;
3. Improvement of access to higher education, as well as infrastructure and working environment;
4. Promotion of short programs with an emphasis on relevance;
5. Improvement of teaching and learning quality;
6. Promotion of private higher education, public/private partnerships, inter-university co-operation and co-operation with the Guinean diaspora;
7. Development of scientific research and innovation;
8. Promotion of ICT;
9. Efficient management of financial resources.

The specific strategies and actions suggested for each axis may be found in Annex 1.

The following additional policy recommendations to ensure the success of reforms in Guinea are listed below, and described in more detail in Annex 2.

1. **The government and the higher education institutions need support to facilitate their transition towards a decentralized and more autonomous higher education system.**
2. **Relax the stringent conditions attached to the budget and allow more flexibility in its use.**
3. **Higher education institutions should be given control over the recruitment, promotion, and management of their teaching and research staff.**
4. **Autonomy with adequate accountability and quality assurance mechanisms.**

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# Annex I

For each axis, a series of specific strategies and actions have been suggested. The following aim to improve the system and institutional governance more directly:

- Reinforcement of institutional autonomy by the establishment of governing boards and training of its members, in conjunction with the creation of the National Evaluation Agency (ANEESRS);
- Improvement of coordination of the different levels of education by the creation of a consulting body and by the adoption of a Higher Education Act;
- Creation of centers of excellence and thematic networks to promote sharing of good practices and the development of research;
- Adoption of adequate norms to ensure an adequate workspace and capacity to accommodate students, teachers, researchers, and support staff;
- Reinforcement of the management and financial capacity of the Ministry of Higher Education and the institutions by introducing training programs for authorities and staff. These programs would train participants in the areas of leadership, communication, planning, management of human and financial resources, and the implementation of a higher education system;
- Reinforcement of the information system of the Ministry and the institutions by the adoption and extension of an integrated, modern, efficient, and secure system;
- Promotion of excellence and equity by ensuring that scholarships are allocated based on academic excellence while also taking into account inequities related to gender, disability, and income. Promote more women into decision making positions.

- Stimulation of public/private partnerships by restructuring and redefining the relationships between institutions, enterprises, and local government. This is to be done by developing projects to improve infrastructure, promoting gifts of equipment to promote pedagogy, and promoting studies, training, and research for local communities.

Specific strategies with regards to private education are:

- Foster the expansion of a quality private education sector by improving the National Directorate of Higher Education capacity, making private institutions eligible for competitive Ministry funds, and connecting to the optical fiber.

To reinforce funding capacity, the following strategies are envisaged:

- Develop criteria and procedures for sustainably allocating student scholarships. This is to be done by adopting appropriate criteria and procedures and creating a national scholarship agency;
- Ensure that a portion of the state grant to institutions is based on the results of their development, validation and adoption of the institutional development plan, adoption of legislative texts allowing contracts between the institutions and the government, and by the negotiation of performance based contracts.
- Reinforce and diversify institutions' revenue sources by identifying new sources and by adopting a rules and operational manual for the management of said resources; promote the development of competitive funding for Higher Education and Research; and develop science and technology and academic innovation.

# Annex II

Additional policy recommendations:

- **The government and the higher education institutions need support to facilitate their transition towards a decentralized and more autonomous higher education system.** Without adequate support mechanisms, the proposed reforms are likely to exist only on paper. The government needs support in relinquishing control while ensuring that standards are met. The higher education institutions need an efficient Board, a relevant institution council and effective committees in order to carry out the changes. These should go hand in hand with providing training and capacity-building to institutions in the areas of management, including fiduciary management.
- **Relax the stringent conditions attached to the budget and allow more flexibility in its use.** In financial matters, autonomy means that universities have a say in the allocation of their budgets (Estermann and Nokkala, 2009). If they do not, one cannot really speak of autonomy. While allowing for greater flexibility in the use of budgets, the Government should encourage institutions to be proactive in increasing their share of own-source funds. They should also be encouraged to form partnerships with international organizations and industry, in order to foster research and to serve as a potential source of income.
- **Higher education institutions should be given control over the recruitment, promotion, and management of their teaching and research staff.** This note documented the consequences of centrally managing civil servants.

Giving institutions the right to choose their own staff will ensure that they hire the staff best suited to their mission. This will also help to maintain stability. To make sure that this new responsibility is performed with transparency and effectiveness, guidelines and requirements should be provided, and controls could be put in place during the transition period to avoid conflicts of interest in the recruitment of new teachers. A corollary to this recommendation is that institutions improve the working conditions of staff. Increasing salaries will attract higher quality staff, as will opportunities for growth in research and teaching. CAMES standards should be used to ensure that newly recruited or newly trained teachers meet its minimum standards and are in line with the rest of the region.

- **Autonomy with adequate accountability and quality assurance mechanisms.** While the Guinean government is releasing direct control over the institutions, accountability mechanisms must be put in place with follow-up procedures. An annual report must be presented by the Board to the Ministry. Accreditation at various phases of the life of an institution, public and private, will ensure compliance with reform procedures and quality standards. Performance-based contracts—contracts between the state and higher education institutions—can also keep institutions accountable. The contract is between the state and a higher education institution. To reward performance or the realization of a development plan, a certain amount of funding is added to the regular grant the institution receives from the Government.



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