68728 Building Post-Crisis Capacity: Cases from the Solomon Islands Solomon Islands Government Housing Management Project, Phase 2 Government Housing Management & Policy Background SIGHMPP2 is a $5million, three-year strengthening project funded under the RAMSI Machinery-of- Government program 1 . The project commenced in July 2006 and all project staff are co-located with the Government Housing Division (GHD) within the Ministry of Lands, Housing & Surveys (MoLHS). There are four long term advisers, two Solomon Islands nationals and two expatriates, who cover overall policy development, property management, tenancy management, and maintenance planning, along with a number of short term adviser inputs in key areas including property and records management. The project follows on a modest Phase 1 effort, which consisted of one resident expatriate advisor who was fielded in response to a request from a former Prime Minister concerned about the impact of scarce and poor quality government housing on service delivery in the provinces. Government housing is an issue not only of considerable personal interest to public servants, since housing is a core public service entitlement (with officials entitled to either a housing allowance, a government-owned house, or a rental paid for by the government) but also an issue of fiscal and fiduciary management and of line ministries’ service delivery in provinces. − Detailed analyses completed by the Office of the Auditor-General (OAG) provide clear diagnostics 2 on the level of waste and fraud within the full range of Government Housing programs: illegal sale of Government houses, uncontrolled and fraudulent expenditures under the Public Service Rental Scheme (PSRS), inconsistent and ineffective management of tenancy programs, poor maintenance of Government houses. An estimated 7% of the 2006 budget was assessed as being wasted – more than the entire budget for the Ministry of Agriculture. − As a result of poor management and maintenance of government-owned property in the provinces, distribution of housing in provincial areas distorts the delivery of social services: services are delivered where housing is available rather than necessarily where they are most required. IN addition, poor maintenance endangers health; SI police estimated that a significant proportion of their 35% absenteeism was due to illness mostly malaria infections resulting from poorly screened residences. The project goal is to improve the capacity to deliver government services across Solomon Islands, and the project purpose is to assist the MoLHS, the Ministry of Public Service (MPS) and other key agencies to manage government housing through the implementation of accountable and transparent polices and management practices. The project seeks to: strengthen capacity of the MoLHS in property management; strengthen government regulatory and housing policy frameworks; and improve management of government tenancies. To attack the policy issues being raised, the project worked through a Cabinet-approved Government Housing Taskforce and associated working groups. In order to deliver, the Ministry of Lands had to establish a completely new unit (with a transfer of some functions from the Public Service Ministry). 1 For details on the history of government housing in the Solomon Islands, policy and fiduciary issues, past donor interventions, and project design, see the January 2006 “Project Design Document: Solomon Islands Government Hpousing Management Project Phase 2�; for progress to date, see the May 2008 “SIGHMPP2 Independent Mid- Term Review� by Michael Blarney and Eric Goropava, as well as hour-monthly Performance Reports delivered to SIG and RAMSI (latest available to team was 1 January – 30 April 2008). 2 Not only have OAG reports helped provide necessary objective data to define the extent of ‘the housing problem’, but their iterative audits over several years help support the MoLHS and project staff who are keen to leverage change by keeping attention focused on the scale of the problem. The project’s support to the Ministry has also helped the PS and US in preparing Action Plans that address the issues raised by the OAG, perhaps possible only because of the dual efforts to build capacity on both sides. 1 Building Post-Crisis Capacity: Cases from the Solomon Islands Solomon Islands Government Housing Management Project, Phase 2 This was done at no additional cost to either the ministry or the donors by reviewing existing functions and individual skills and capacities so that a new unit with real potential to implement policy could be established with no net increase in staffing numbers – instead, staff capacity that was unrecognized or misdirected was “catalyzed� into effectiveness, highlighting how existing resources can be focused on new tasks without eroding the capacity to perform other core functions. Using this as a base, SIGHMPP2 has used its financial and human resources to build the Government Housing Division (formerly Unit) “from inside�, with project staff entirely co-located and integrated with the GHD staff. What makes this a Capacity Building ‘Success’? The structure of the project’s goals, objectives, and inputs highlights the importance of clarity on the question of what capacity is being built; here it is useful to distinguish between 1) the project’s explicit work to “strengthen capacity in property management�, which explicitly requires both skills and knowledge at the individual level as well as systems and processes, and equipment, at the unit level, and 2) the project’s work to “strengthen government regulatory and housing policy frameworks� and “improve management of government tenancies� which are policy and implementation results that have as implied pre-requisites a strengthened capacity in administrative and management systems, and in policy development and implementation. Achievements thus far are a mixture of elements required for improved government housing management and better service delivery in provinces – where “capacity� is seen as systems and processes and the individual skills and knowledge needed to make them work: − improved reimbursement of rental deductions to provincial governments for Central Government employees living in provincial government-owned houses; directly contributed to the increase in provincial government revenue and increased funding for maintenance − suite of asset registers provides large volume of information concerning all government owned housing (detailed property and tenancy information, together with condition assessments, and an Illegal Occupants register); all registers are updated following ongoing inspection programs − new database of all current PSRS leases, and improved management processes relating to the PSRS, resulted in the identification of landlord overpayments in excess of SBD$4M per annum. − system for title restrictions over government houses to prevent their uncoordinated sale (will complement the proposed new Sale of Government Houses policy and guidelines) − maintenance model framework has introduced improved practices and controls which will lift asset sustainability and achieve long term savings − implementation of tenancy management guidelines and procedures, including financial reconciliations to satisfy audit requirements and achieve recurrent budget savings SIG and project team members attest to the importance of these systems and processes, and the value of the Solomon Islanders who operate and manage them. It is instructive to note that interlocutors raise two kinds of questions about the sustainability of the capacity built thus far in the areas above: the resilience of the built capacity to sustain high levels of compliance in the face of “shocks� such as intense pressure during the annual lease renewal period to by-pass or short-cut the new systems; and the vulnerability of a small but enthusiastic group that does not yet have critical mass (both in numbers and skills levels) nor a long enough track record of working as a team. Significant importance was attached by stakeholders to the cross-government task force approach as a platform for effective capacity; the key elements here appear to be consistency of advice across levels and areas supported by Advisors, adding value in navigating complex and politically sensitive issues through the system, and providing a useful method of ‘buffering’ by building coalition across the system. If Public Service numbers are reduced (as predicted as logging revenues dry up) then this could represent an innovative way to harness additional capacity outside the Agency driving the issue. 2 Building Post-Crisis Capacity: Cases from the Solomon Islands Solomon Islands Government Housing Management Project, Phase 2 While the project has also delivered important intermediate results in the area of policy analysis and formulation, aside from the inter-ministerial taskforce (discussed in more detail below) these results are not emblematic of specific capacities, and indeed their adoption and implementation is still an open issue. Senior project and Ministry staff are mindful of the need to move the policy debate past the threshold where interference or “roll-back� becomes hard or impossible, and there is some evidence of explicit thinking about whether there are things that the project can do to help generate that protection. This vulnerability is not trivial; it seems clear from the range of stakeholders interviewed that this activity will not be viewed as a success if it becomes clear that the policies developed will not be implemented, and that shift in perception will have undeniable, albeit unpredictable, effects on the effectiveness of the GHD and the confidence of individual SIG staff. This signals caution on the balance between process and results, where process relies on the capacity for long term engagement and leveraging key entry points in the operating environment and results are the actual policy development and implementation. What makes ‘Success’ possible? Some elements of the project design and early implementation signal a nuanced approach to a complex capacity and policy challenge; RAMSI responded to the PM’s request by putting in a single adviser directed by a simple TOR, on the basis of a brief round of SIG consultations; instead of the large externally-driven assessment usually associated with new projects, the approach was to provide urgent support and in doing that generate the detailed assessment of the operational environment while building critical relationships with key SIG counterparts. The detailed project design work was undertaken after about 6 months after the adviser commenced and leveraged off this preparatory phase. The advisor support then morphed into a full project in with no break in continuity of support, a critical juncture given that the broader Australia-funded lands and property project (SISLAP-1) was closing at that same time, having failed in addressing politically sensitive policy battles partly because of extremely problematic advisor relations with SIG. The new housing project proved robust in an environment previously compromised by the SISLAP conflict because it was designed around an intimate knowledge of SIG needs and the operational/political environment; the question of “capacity for what� was answered inside SIG rather than by an outside ‘design team’, and the level of trust that had been built by the advisor was leveraged in a way possibly not achievable through a more traditional linear approach to activity design. This sensitivity to “approach� aligns with stakeholders’ reports of two elements that support effective capacity being built: an inclusive egalitarian style of advisors (open, approachable, invest in communication, create opportunities for social interaction) and physical integration of project team in government unit, and open-plan workspace to reduce barriers. Also emphasized was the purposive joint diagnosis of skills gaps which is being addressed through a ‘layering’ of: task-specific classroom skills training (computers, driving), on-the-job coaching and mentoring, confidence-building tasks like presentations to Ministers, and short-courses designed to meet specific needs and customized for cultural dimensions of SIG participants. On a very practical note, strong mention was made of how important it had been to have a pool of funds to use flexibly for critical capacity building inputs. Stakeholders report that the housing taskforce, comprising senior representative of most of the key service delivery ministries, has been the most active, effective and sustained inter-ministerial grouping in the SIG, laying a foundation for an integrated and whole of government approach to a complex nest of financial, human and physical resource issues. This may provide an example of how to strengthen the effectiveness of public service operations in environments that are resource constrained and have weak (or misallocated) capacity, but at this stage this “built capacity� is not yet seen as having “delivered the results� (with the possible exception of the Working Committee approach used at the provincial level to bring together stakeholders at that level, where improved property management processes are already delivering benefits seen by all). While intermediate results in policy analysis, policy formulation, and inter-ministerial policy debate have also been achieved, there have been no ‘policy breakthroughs’, and a 3 Building Post-Crisis Capacity: Cases from the Solomon Islands Solomon Islands Government Housing Management Project, Phase 2 wide range of stakeholders acknowledge that the political economy of housing policy reform – both on the PSRS and on Illegal Occupancy – could quite likely result in either policy stalemate or new policies adopted but not implemented. Furthermore, the systems and processes that are cited when documenting the policy process thus far appear linked with task-specific initiatives; they may ‘model’ good practice for addressing complex policy issues, and they may have built some new behaviors and processes for inter- ministerial work, but they do not yet represent self-sustaining capacity for policy development and implementation, And should the political will develop to advance and implement the policy changes being proposed, there will be a cascade of implementation actions needed which will require administrative and management capacity improvements on at least as large a scale as has been built thus far in the less contested property management functions where the project assists. Observations for wider consideration: □ The scope of the project spans outcomes that require an extremely wide range of capacity, highlighting the importance of clarity on “building capacity for what� and what will foster sustainability in administrative and managerial areas vs. in policy areas. □ As with all other projects reviewed, multiple stakeholders emphasized the critical ‘coaching and partnering’ style of the skilled advisors/trainers. And as with the OAG project, SIGHMPP2 grounds quasi-formal training and computer skills sessions in actual tasks needed for the unit’s work program at that time. □ The project showcases the accountability linkages across different SIG entities, with the audit process reinforced through a strong interaction between the project team, the GHD and the Auditor General’s Office following an extensive audit of housing entitlements and their management - the Acting Auditor General regards the follow-up by GHD as the best they have experienced, whereas the MoLHS and the project team both regard the OAG inputs as essential in their efforts to base the policy debate on analytics. □ Project staff are entirely co-located and integrated with the GHD staff, similar to PSD staff with National Parliament Office team (although the expat advisors in GHD appear to be a bit more forward-leaning than the project team in Parliament in terms of handling complex tasks themselves, while still focused on coaching, congenial support, inclusive approach). □ The project’s history – beginning with a modest and focused intervention generating specific value, leading to a second phase with a more ambitious but still focused project scope – echoes those of the OAG and Parliament projects, where those early focused interventions produced impact with potential spillover, leading to broader ‘systems’ impact. This stair-step project evolution seems to help build true ownership on the part of key SIG counterparts, who see their own role in defining the iterative work approach as evidence of their investment in the project. □ Much emphasis is placed on the project having fostered collegial high-level policy development: leadership of good policy development practice with relevant Permanent Secretaries of Departments meeting as the Government Housing Taskforce that tackled interrelated issues affecting public service management and service provision without regard to ministerial ‘turf’. However, given the political complexities that confront the proposed policy changes in areas such as PSRS and illegal occupancies, the question must arise: does the new capacity in policy development have sustaining value if the underlying policy does not advance? Is there then a “backlash� against investing in policy debate? While capacity to formulate policies can be separated from capacity to implement them, the OAG and Parliament projects showcase the importance of the team experiencing a sense of respect and pride from seeing the results of their “built capacity�. 4