Document of The World Bank Report No: ICR00001015 IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION AND RESULTS REPORT (IDA-34870 IDA-3487A TF051374) ON A CREDIT IN THE AMOUNT OF SDR 10.5 MILLIONS (US$ 16.05 MILLION EQUIVALENT) TO THE REPUBLIC OF NICARAGUA FOR A NATURAL DISASTER VULNERABILITY REDUCTION PROJECT August 27, 2009 Sustainable Development Department Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua and Panamá Country Management Unit Latin America and the Caribbean Region CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS (Exchange Rate Effective 06/04/2009) Currency Unit = Córdobas Córdobas 1.00 = US$ 0.05 US$ 1.00 = [19.79 NIO ] FISCAL YEAR ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS APL Adaptable Program Loan BRIMUR Municipal Response Brigades CAPRA Central American Probabilistic Risk Assessment CAS Country Assistance Strategy CEPREDENAC Central American Center for the Coordination of Disaster Prevention CIGEO Center for Geophysical Research CPPR Country Portfolio Performance Review CODE/EOC Emergency Operations Center DRM Disaster Risk Management EDAN Needs Assessment Information Subsystem FISE Fund for Social Investments ICR Implementation Completion Report IDA International Development Association INETER National Institute for Territorial Studies ISR Implementation Status Report JSDF Japanese Social Development Fund MAGFOR Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry MARENA Ministry of Environment and Renewable Resources M&E Monitoring and Evaluation MTI Ministry of Transportation and Infrastructure PAD Project Appraisal Document PCU Project Coordination Unit PDO Project Development Objective QAG Quality Assessment Group RAAN North Atlantic Autonomous Region RAAS South Atlantic Autonomous Region SE-SINAPRED Executive Secretariat, National Disaster Prevention System SIGER Information System on Risk Management SINAPRED National Disaster Prevention System UCRESEP Coordination Unit for the Public Sector Reform and Modernization Program UNISDR United Nations International Strategy for Disaster Reduction Vice President: Pamela Cox Country Director: Laura Frigenti Sector Manager: Guang Zhe Chen Project Team Leader: Joaquin Toro ICR Team Leader: Nara C. Meli NICARAGUA NATURAL DISASTER VULNERABILITY REDUCTION PROJECT CONTENTS Data Sheet A. Basic Information B. Key Dates C. Ratings Summary D. Sector and Theme Codes E. Bank Staff F. Results Framework Analysis G. Ratings of Project Performance in ISRs H. Restructuring I. Disbursement Graph 1. Project Context, Development Objectives and Design .............................................................................1 2. Key Factors Affecting Implementation and Outcomes.............................................................................4 3. Assessment of Outcomes ........................................................................................................................14 4. Assessment of Risk to Development Outcomes .....................................................................................18 5. Assessment of Bank and Borrower Performance....................................................................................18 6. Lessons Learned......................................................................................................................................20 7. Comments on Issues Raised by Borrower/Implementing Institutions/Partners......................................21 Annex 1. Project Costs and Financing ........................................................................................................23 Annex 3. Lessons Learned from Ex-Post Evaluation (Borrower) ..............................................................32 Annex 4. Bank Lending and Implementation Support/Supervision Processes ...........................................35 Annex 5. Summary of Borrower's ICR and/or Comments on Draft ICR ...................................................37 Annex 6. List of Supporting Documents....................................................................................................39 A. Basic Information Natural Disaster Country: Nicaragua Project Name: Vulnerability Reduction IDA-34870,IDA- Project ID: P064916 L/C/TF Number(s): 3487A,TF-51374 ICR Date: 08/28/2009 ICR Type: Core ICR REPUBLIC OF Lending Instrument: SIL Borrower: NICARAGUA Original Total XDR 10.5M Disbursed Amount: XDR 10.5M Commitment: Revised Amount: XDR 10.5M Environmental Category: B Implementing Agencies: Secretaria Ejecutiva del SINAPRED Cofinanciers and Other External Partners: B. Key Dates Revised / Actual Process Date Process Original Date Date(s) Concept Review: 06/29/1999 Effectiveness: 10/16/2001 Appraisal: 01/08/2001 Restructuring(s): Approval: 04/03/2001 Mid-term Review: 01/26/2004 Closing: 03/31/2005 02/28/2009 C. Ratings Summary C.1 Performance Rating by ICR Outcomes: Satisfactory Risk to Development Outcome: Moderate Bank Performance: Moderately Satisfactory Borrower Performance: Moderately Satisfactory C.2 Detailed Ratings of Bank and Borrower Performance (by ICR) Bank Ratings Borrower Ratings Quality at Entry: Moderately Satisfactory Government: Moderately Satisfactory Implementing Quality of Supervision: Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory Agency/Agencies: Overall Bank Overall Borrower Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory Performance: Performance: i C.3 Quality at Entry and Implementation Performance Indicators Implementation QAG Assessments Indicators Rating Performance (if any) Potential Problem Project Quality at Entry No None at any time (Yes/No): (QEA): Problem Project at any Quality of Yes Moderately Satisfactory time (Yes/No): Supervision (QSA): DO rating before Satisfactory Closing/Inactive status: D. Sector and Theme Codes Original Actual Sector Code (as % of total Bank financing) Central government administration 67 67 Other social services 7 7 Sub-national government administration 26 26 Theme Code (as % of total Bank financing) Municipal governance and institution building 33 33 Natural disaster management 67 67 E. Bank Staff Positions At ICR At Approval Vice President: Pamela Cox David de Ferranti Country Director: Laura Frigenti D-M Dowsett-Coirolo Sector Manager: Guang Zhe Chen Danny M. Leipziger Project Team Leader: Jose C. Joaquin Toro Landivar Tova M. Solo ICR Team Leader: Jose C. Joaquin Toro Landivar ICR Primary Author: Nara C. Meli F. Results Framework Analysis Project Development Objectives (from Project Appraisal Document) The development objective is to improve Nicaragua's disaster management capacity by: (a) strengthening institutional capability in disaster management at the national level; (b) building institutional capacity for disaster mitigation at the national level; (c) promoting disaster awareness and "preventive thinking" through public sector education and awareness programs; (d) building local capacity to manage disaster emergencies, to assess risk and to identify mitigation measures; and ii (e) implementing vulnerability reduction and mitigation measures at the local level. Revised Project Development Objectives (as approved by original approving authority) - (a) PDO Indicator(s) Original Target Formally Actual Value Values (from Revised Achieved at Indicator Baseline Value approval Target Completion or documents) Values Target Years Number of international projects in disaster management, for which the SE- Indicator 1 : SINAPRED is the executing agency Value quantitative or 0 2 Qualitative) Date achieved 10/31/2001 02/28/2009 Comments (incl. % achievement) Square meters of SINAPRED (HQ), EOC, and Civil Defense buildings designed Indicator 2 : and constructed Value 1565 m2 designed quantitative or 0 design, 0 construction and constructed Qualitative) Date achieved 10/31/2001 02/28/2009 Comments (incl. % achievement) Indicator 3 : Number of studies completed, disseminated and in use Value quantitative or 0 4 Qualitative) Date achieved 10/31/2001 02/28/2009 Comments (incl. % achievement) Changes to the curriculum - formal education (pre-school, primary, secondary) Indicator 4 : and in communications programs (university level) Changes to the curriculum in Value formal education quantitative or none and in Qualitative) communications studies Date achieved 10/31/2001 02/28/2009 Comments (incl. % iii achievement) (b) Intermediate Outcome Indicator(s) Original Target Actual Value Formally Values (from Achieved at Indicator Baseline Value Revised approval Completion or Target Values documents) Target Years Indicator 1 : Fulfillment of SE's coordinating role vis-a-vis SINAPRED Value (quantitative 0 All roles fulfilled or Qualitative) Date achieved 10/31/2001 02/28/2009 Comments (incl. % achievement) G. Ratings of Project Performance in ISRs Actual Date ISR No. DO IP Disbursements Archived (USD millions) 1 06/26/2001 Satisfactory Satisfactory 0.00 2 12/21/2001 Satisfactory Satisfactory 1.00 3 05/16/2002 Satisfactory Unsatisfactory 1.00 4 12/16/2002 Satisfactory Satisfactory 1.50 5 01/17/2003 Satisfactory Satisfactory 1.71 6 06/16/2003 Satisfactory Satisfactory 2.53 7 12/17/2003 Satisfactory Satisfactory 3.21 8 06/10/2004 Satisfactory Unsatisfactory 4.07 9 12/14/2004 Satisfactory Unsatisfactory 4.99 10 03/19/2005 Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 5.66 11 11/04/2005 Moderately Satisfactory Satisfactory 9.06 12 04/29/2006 Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 10.98 13 10/19/2006 Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 11.89 14 02/27/2007 Satisfactory Satisfactory 12.36 15 10/01/2007 Satisfactory Satisfactory 12.99 16 04/17/2008 Satisfactory Satisfactory 14.12 17 11/11/2008 Satisfactory Satisfactory 15.10 H. Restructuring (if any) Not Applicable iv I. Disbursement Profile v 1. Project Context, Development Objectives and Design 1.1 Context at Appraisal 1. Nicaragua's economic development is often negatively affected by devastating natural disasters which set back the country's social and economic progress. Its geographic location makes it vulnerable to hurricanes, droughts and fires, volcanic eruptions, tsunamis, and particularly severe earthquakes. Among Central American countries, Nicaragua stands out in both the frequency and severity of natural catastrophes. On average, between 1970 and 2000 annual deaths due to disasters in Nicaragua amounted to approximately three thousand, with the number of persons injured or left homeless running up to some six thousand per year, according to the International Red Cross figures. Each disaster has left the country more vulnerable to the next round of natural catastrophes. Based on data from the second half of the 20th century, the International Institute for Advanced Systems Analysis estimated that Nicaragua "should expect to lose approximately 0.4% of capital stock, that is US$20 million annually from natural catastrophes, with possible extreme events reaching US$800 million in direct losses," assuming that no mitigation measures are undertaken. Following Hurricane Mitch in 1998, national vulnerability to natural disasters was seen as fundamental to all sector development issues. 2. Hurricane Mitch led the Bank, other international organizations, donors, and Central American governments, to look at disasters differently. It became clear that many of the victims suffered because of poor land-use planning, construction standards and institutional response by all levels of government. As a result of the damage Mitch caused all actors were pushed to search for ways to mitigate the impact of future disasters by building institutional mitigation and response capacity. 3. Prior to 2000, Nicaragua had some juridical and operational instruments, mainly for disasters response, such as the Civil Defense Law, the National Commission of Central American Center for the Coordination of Disaster Prevention (CEPREDENAC), the National Urban System, and building codes, etc. However, the country had no national system for disaster risk management or a coordinating agency to promote long term plans for disaster prevention and emergency response. As illustrated by the ravaging effects of Hurricane Mitch, Nicaragua had no disaster mitigation programs or long term plans, only limited public awareness of disasters and how to prevent them, no local emergency preparedness, no hazard analyses or vulnerability assessments, and no system for financing local disaster mitigation measures. 4. The passage of Mitch prompted the Government to take decisive measures to reduce Nicaragua's vulnerability to adverse natural events. To deal with the short term impact, the Government, with help from the International Development Association (IDA), identified specific critical areas of focus, and carried out priority mitigation measures through two on-going projects implemented by FISE (Social Investment Fund project) and INIFOM (Instituto Nicaraguense de Fomento Municipal). For the long term, the Nicaraguan Government decided to develop a comprehensive national disaster risk management system, thereby introducing a preventive approach to disasters. With help from the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) and the Governments of Spain and Colombia, a task force headed by the Vice President 1 designed a plan for a National System for Disaster Prevention, Mitigation and Response. The plan led to the passage of Law 337 of 2000, published in the National Gazette April 4, 2000 which created the Sistema Nacional para la Prevención, Mitigación y Atención a los Desastres (hereafter "SINAPRED" or the System). The System links various ministries (such as Education, Agriculture and Forestry, Environment, Transportation and Infrastructure, etc) in the coordination of disaster risk management in the country. Heading this coordination effort is the Executive Secretariat for Disaster Prevention, Mitigation and Response (hereafter "SE- SINAPRED" or the Secretariat), lodged within the Office of the President. The regulatory framework required to apply and execute Law 337 was established through Decree 53/2000, which became effective on June 28, 2000. At the same time, the detailed responsibilities of all entities comprising the National System were assigned officially through Decree 98/2000 (effective October 5, 2000). 5. Among the priority actions identified under the Law 337, the SE-SINAPRED is charged with: a) making the System operational and ensuring appropriate staffing of the Secretariat and of member institutions, which must in each case name a representative to liaise with SE- SINAPRED; b) preparing and activating a National Emergency Plan; clarifying policies, procedures and standards to be applied; and training System members in the Plan and, specifically, in their respective roles in disaster response, prevention and mitigation; c) establishing and maintaining a data base, supported by Geographical Information Systems (GIS), relevant to disaster management, including information on hazard and vulnerability assessments, as well as on programs, projects and actions relevant to disaster prevention, mitigation and response and; d) establishing and coordinating working committees on sector and territorial issues to support disaster prevention and mitigation through national institutions and local governments respectively. Rationale for Bank Engagement 6. The Hurricane Emergency Project (P064084), which assisted Nicaragua post-Mitch, paved the way for a radical paradigm shift in the Bank's approach to disaster risk management, which went from a reactive perspective to an ex-ante one, focusing on vulnerability reduction. Along with Honduras, this was the Bank's first Natural Disaster and Vulnerability Reduction (NDVR) project. 7. The Bank brought technical expertise from other countries and experiences from involvement with other disaster management projects to help the Nicaraguan government orient its policies and investments. In addition, IDA support fomented overlap and transference of disaster concerns into other IDA supported projects related to themes of local development and environmental protection. 8. At the time of Hurricane Mitch, the Bank was financing three on-going projects in the environmental and urban sectors and had two more in preparation. In response to Mitch, the Bank reallocated investment funds from two existing operations (PROTIERRA, and an Financial Sector Adjustment Credit) to finance the fast-disbursing Hurricane Emergency Project (P064084). A team of disaster experts also visited the country and identified a series of small- scale emergency investments designed to contain the damage of Mitch and prevent greater 2 flooding and landslide damage at local levels. The FISE (Social Investment Fund project) credit was restructured to carry out US$4 million in small-scale mitigation works. Country Assistance Strategy (CAS) 9. The 1998-2002 CAS for Nicaragua focused on three core themes: (i) private sector development; (ii) rural sector development and environmental protection; and (iii) development of human capital and poverty alleviation. 10. The NDVRP responded to each of these as follows: (i) Insofar as the frequency of catastrophic natural events in Nicaragua discourages private sector investment and hampers its growth, measures taken to reduce the adverse impact of catastrophic events contribute to a more conducive environment for private sector development. (ii) Rural development is also set back whenever disasters occur. Hurricane Mitch, for example, dealt a major blow to agricultural lands, damaging export crops, such as bananas, sugar and the production of basic grains. Besides providing planning tools and financing mitigation measures to protect lives and property in vulnerable communities of rural municipalities, the NDVRP also financed an initiative specifically focused on rural sector development and on environmental protection. (iii) Poor communities are most vulnerable to disasters. The disaster mitigation measures supported by NDVRP helped to alleviate the risk of accelerated poverty in communities by reducing their vulnerability. 1.2 Original Project Development Objectives (PDO) and Key Indicators (as approved) 11. The original PDO was to improve Nicaragua's disaster management capacity by: (a) strengthening institutional capacities in disaster management at the national level; (b) building institutional capacity for disaster mitigation at the national level; (c) promoting disaster awareness and "preventive thinking" through public sector education and awareness programs; (d) building local capacity to manage disaster emergencies, to assess risk and identify mitigation measures; and (e) implementing vulnerability reduction and mitigation measures at the local level. 12. Key indicators (listed in Annex 2) were established in order to monitor: (a) increased capacity of SINAPRED in performing its assigned functions and responsibilities (with all costs covered by the National Government); (b) improved technical knowledge and increased local government capability for disaster management; and (c) reduced vulnerability of the population in highly vulnerable municipalities. 1.3 Revised PDO (as approved by original approving authority) and Key Indicators, and reasons/justification The Project Development Objective and Key Indicators were not revised. 3 1.4 Main Beneficiaries 13. Given the pattern of disasters triggered by natural events in Nicaragua, groups at risk occupy marginal urban settlements and rural communities, and are poor. According to the PAD, the target population constituted "Populations at risk from natural disasters". The selection process used to identify highly vulnerable municipalities included a poverty analysis as well as hazard risk mapping (see Annex 13/ PAD, p. 12.). The project directly benefitted the SE- SINAPRED, the Nicaraguan Institute for Territorial Studies (INETER), the Army's Civil Defense (from here Civil Defense), the Ministry of Education and teachers trained, and the selected municipalities. Indirectly, the targeted beneficiaries were the populations exposed to natural hazards. 1.5 Original Components (Table taken from PAD p.10) Components Indicative % of Bank % of Bank Cost Total Financing Financing A. Strengthening of National System Capacity for 4.82 30 3.59 26.2 Institutional Disaster Management B. Development of National Mitigation Program and 1.65 10.3 1.5 11.1 Management C. Building Public Awareness of Disaster Prevention 0.97 6 0.88 6.5 D. Strengthening Local Capacity for Disaster Risk 3.69 23 3.34 24.7 Management E. Implementation of Local Vulnerability Reduction 4.16 25.9 3.56 26.4 F. Project Financial Management 0.76 4.7 0.63 4.7 Total Project Costs 16.05 100 13.5 100 1.6 Revised Components. No components were revised. 1.7 Other significant changes The closing date of the project was extended 5 times, for the cumulative amount of 4 years as described in Section 2.2. 2. Key Factors Affecting Implementation and Outcomes 2.1 Project Preparation, Design and Quality at Entry Quality at Entry: Moderately satisfactory 4 Background Analysis 14. The project was designed to support the National Plan for Risk Reduction, part of the Government's long term strategy to prioritize risk management. The National Plan itself identified five sector needs. · Need for institutional coordination for disaster prevention, preparedness, and response. The recent establishment of SE-SINAPRED meant that it needed strong capacity building to enable it to fulfill its mandate. · Need for a national disaster mitigation program and strategy. Nicaragua had no disaster mitigation (i.e. risk identification, management, reduction, transfer) programs, and sector institutions such as INETER (Institute for Research on Earth Sciences), MAGFOR (Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry), MTI (Ministry of Transportation and Infrastructure) and MARENA (Ministry of Environment and Renewable Resources) had limited technical capacity to forecast, gather, analyze and share information on natural hazards and vulnerability. · Need to increase public awareness of disaster prevention. A "culture of prevention" was largely absent from the formal education system and from the communication media. · Need to carry out emergency preparedness, hazard analysis, and vulnerability assessments at local levels. Due to the lack of continuing growth of technical capacity to evaluate risks and to specify appropriate disaster countermeasures, local Governments have not yet been able to take the required steps to identify areas at risk, prevent the growth of settlements, or encourage adequate land-use and building standards. · Need for disaster mitigation measures at the local level. Nicaragua's municipalities depend on national budget transfers and on national financial programs to finance investments. Investment financing generally conforms to sector programs set by line Ministries, and at the time of appraisal, did not include disaster mitigation. Assessment of Project Design 15. The Bank team designed a comprehensive and well-targeted project that introduced a `Culture of Prevention' in Nicaragua, while reducing vulnerability and building institutional capacity at the municipal and national levels and through an educational initiative. The project was also holistic in its approach at the governance level: the desire to work beyond national institutions was strong, as approximately half of the project's funds were directed to strengthening capacity and reducing vulnerability at the local level. Furthermore, the project showed its willingness to support an existing (although very young) institution in the country, providing SE-SINAPRED a chance to strengthen itself. However, in the end it proved too much for the institution to execute the project without more capacity- building support. 5 16. In addition, three strategic choices were made (see PAD Section B.3): (i) The decision to support a relatively short (three year) project left open the possibility of a follow-on operation. In line with this, the NVRDP called for development of plans and studies which could lead to future activities, or projects, and for an evaluation of the Secretariat's performance at the beginning of the final year of the project. In hindsight, the project's comprehensive approach (including the large number of components, subcomponents, and working at different levels in the country) would have benefited from a longer timeframe. (ii) The project was designed to complement the work of other donors1, and was based on a careful review of DRM technical assistance planned for or provided to the country. The operation was well-coordinated with other donors, and an agreement including the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), US Agency for International Development (USAID), and Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) determined the municipality of Managua (one of Nicaragua's most vulnerable municipalities) would be served better under a separate project, focusing on community-managed vulnerability reduction. This project gained the support of the Japanese government, which designed a grant, modeled on the NVDRP, for the municipality of Managua. The grant was attached to the project, and yielded very good results. (See Section 2.2) (iii) In order to assess the most vulnerable communities in the country, the NDVRP followed a careful study of comparative vulnerability among Nicaragua's 152 municipalities, which was carried out by the Bank in association with Nicaraguan institutions, including the Instituto Nicaraguense de Estudios Territorales (INETER) and the Instituto Nicaraguense de Fomento Municipal (INIFOM). It also carried out an assessment of the institutional capacity of the institutional members of SINAPRED. While a key objective is to cover all the municipalities in the country in terms of emergency preparedness and response, the more costly prevention and mitigation activities initially focused on the country's twenty five most vulnerable municipalities. This pilot approach is a good way to test the receptiveness of the municipalities and the development of the works. 17. Despite these strategic choices and in-depth background analysis, it must be noted that disaster risk management encompassing prevention measures was a new approach both for the Nicaraguan government and the World Bank2. There were no examples of best practices from other vulnerability reduction projects to draw from within the Bank, which could explain the maladapted scope of the project to the planned timeframe. Implementing Agency Capacity 1 ASDI, GTZ provided assistance on early warning systems; NOAA, NWS, OFDA and USGS assisted on hazard mapping; COSUDE, the Government of Norway, the Red Cross and PAHO assisted on disaster reconstruction; UNDP assisted on legal frameworks. 2 This project was begun in 2001, well before the 2006 IEG Evaluation of World Bank Assistance for Natural Disasters which did not include any recommendations for mitigation. 6 In hindsight, project design underestimated the initial challenges of dealing with a new agency, and therefore had an ambitious timeframe and scope. The Bank recognized SE-SINAPRED's weak capacity on financial management and procurement matters, and as such they were assigned to UCRESEP, the Coordination Unit for the Public Sector Reform and Modernization Program3. Implementation under SE-SINAPRED also suffered from low disbursement rates, caused by high rotation of staff (at administrative and managerial levels), poor knowledge transfer to incoming staff, and weak leadership. This led to the creation of a Project Coordination Unit (PCU) to aid the implementation progress (See Section 2.2). The PAD mentions the desire to strengthen SE-SINAPRED while it is still a new institution, while leaving open the possibility of a follow-on operation. But the scope of the project was not designed as such. Instead, SE- SINAPRED was put in charge of implementation at the same time as it was being strengthened, which slowed implementation and created significant delays. Assessment of Sustainability and Risks 18. Sustainability was to be determined according to two factors: i. The successful mainstreaming of disaster (i.e. risk management) awareness concerns into the operations of Ministries and other public and private institutions. ii. The ability of the System to operate during and beyond the next two presidential administrations. ICR Assessment: 19. The project successfully contributed to the mainstreaming of DRM in key ministries such as the Ministry of Education, Ministry of Health, Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry, INETER, and Ministry of Transportation and Infrastructure. DRM was absent from public policy before the project. 20. The National System was developed in 1999, under Arnoldo Alemán's administration and SE-SINAPRED survived the changes of administration from Alemán, to Enrique Bolaños, and to Daniel Ortega. While it is difficult to predict what the next presidential administration will bring, the inclusion of a line for SINAPRED and SE-SINAPRED in the national budget shows that the system has gained considerable political weight, and that SE-SINAPRED is seen as a regular ministry. Another positive manifestation of sustainability is the evidence that coordination between institutions has improved substantially, with new initiatives in DRM stemming from the pilot (see Annex 6). 21. It is also important to note that the System itself has been consolidated through the project. The ministers and institutions within the System now have clearer roles and responsibilities with regards to disaster risk reduction. For example, in the Ministry of Education, DRM was integrated in public schools' curricula; in the Ministry of Environment, watershed 3 UCRESEP was an agency with Bank procurement and financial certification located in the Vice Presidency (as was SE- SINAPRED. 7 management is being examined from the DRM perspective; and INETER has better tools for hazard mapping. 22. Furthermore, SINAPRED and SE-SINAPRED have shown that coordination during large, medium and small disasters has improved. Hurricane Felix demonstrated this improved coordination between institutions, regional governments, international organizations and civil society. Another example is how SE-SINAPRED led the coordination during the Managua floods and floods resulting from Tropical Storm Alma, in May 2008. Risks 23. The overall risk for the project was rated as Substantial by the task team, in recognition of the possible lack of ownership and commitment to implement the Disaster Risk Management agenda. ICR Assessment: 24. The risky nature of the project was well-identified, which was evident when some of the risks materialized: (i) nearly all the trained staff left the Secretariat, during the life of the project, and re-training was not consistently organized; and (ii) there was limited capacity in the SE- SINAPRED to fulfill its mandate within the project's original timeframe. 25. The political context in Nicaragua is a major factor influencing the effectiveness of most Bank operations in the country. In this project it was manifest in two aspects. First is substantial staff turnover: From one administration to another (such as from Bolaños to Ortega), entire institutions are drained of their staff, new casts are put in place, and training is not always systematic upon assuming job functions. Second is discontinuity in policy priorities; that is, financing of certain activities may get abruptly interrupted or redirected, depending on the new administration's preference. This was the case for the national disaster awareness campaign prepared under the project, which was ended following the Bolaños administration. 2.2 Implementation 26. As mentioned above, the NDVR project was designed at a time where there was no basis for best practice for disaster risk management, as it was the first (along with Honduras NDVRP) of its kind in the Bank. This made implementation challenging because the design was ambitious and didn't take into account the challenges in the country, including working with a new institution (SE-SINAPRED), as well as taking disaster management in a different direction. 27. The NDVRP was appraised in March 2001, and approved by the Board in April 2001 and declared effective in October of the same year. After meeting disbursement goals the first year, the project slipped behind showing serious lags such that by 2004 the Country Portfolio Performance Review (CPPR) reported that after 30 months of implementation, only 27% of funds had been disbursed (at the time, the closing date was still the original March 31, 2005). 8 28. Slow disbursement began to threaten the continuity of the project, and faced with the risk of closing the project and cancelling 70% of the funding, the Bank assisted with the creation of an external Project Coordination Unit (PCU) in August of 2004. This decision was also based on the fact that SE-SINAPRED had a high staff turnover at managerial levels, which was hampering implementation progress. 29. Additionally, in March 2005, the Bank team chose to grant (when requested by the Borrower) project extensions limited to six months at a time, and increased its supervision within the country, to maintain pressure on the Borrower. These actions drastically improved disbursements between 2005 and February 2007, where the project disbursed close to 50% of the total credit amount. A final two year extension until February 2009 saw the disbursement of the remaining 20% in 24 months. 30. SE-SINAPRED fully assumed all executing responsibilities from the PCU in 20074, and ran into difficulties in hiring qualified staff, due to the limits imposed on civil servants' salaries5. This temporarily translated into longer processing times for procurement activities and financial management reports, as SE-SINAPRED worked to recruit the needed staff. 31. Implementation was also affected by Hurricane Felix. Felix severely hit the north coast of Nicaragua in August of 2007, stopping progress during the rest of the year, while SE- SINAPRED turned its attention to responding to the disaster. 32. UCRESEP, which had experience in financial management and implementation of IDA projects, successfully managed procurement and financial reporting: it sent Integrated Project Management Reports (PMRs) to SE-SINAPRED and semi-annual progress reports to the Bank. The project covered the costs of: (a) consultancies for UCRESEP's additional procurement and accounting needs; (b) software, computers and office furnishings acquisitions; and (c) consultancies for the Executive Secretariat additional procurement and accounting needs. When 4 UCRESEP, which had been involved from the beginning, continued its assistance with the fiduciary aspects of the project 5 Among other changes, the new government used its executive and constitutional powers to impose salary ceilings for technical staff. The consequences, however, played out on the project as positions took time to fill, and new staff took time to become acquainted with procedures and project objectives. 9 UCRESEP's functions were transferred to SE-SINAPRED, more formal capacity building for the institution, especially for the fiduciary branch, should have been provided. 33. Other specific delays that arose during implementation centered around: · The building of the headquarters of SE-SINAPRED, CODE (Emergency Operations Center) and Civil Defense 34. As part of component A1, the project aimed at "refurbishing an existing building donated to the National System"6 (including furniture and equipment). This was an important component, as the building would be the official headquarters of the two main institutions promoting disaster risk management in the country: SE-SINAPRED and Civil Defense (which focused on emergency response). Though the building had been initially evaluated for its viability by USAID's Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA), a Bank mission determined later on that only 20% of the building was viable, and that its location was unsatisfactory (i.e. exposed to flooding hazards, high traffic congestion, and lack of access to a heliport). It was therefore recommended not to use it. The choice of a new site, legalization of land, design and bidding for works took 16 months. At the time of this ICR, the new building was already occupied by the SE-SINAPRED and is to be officially inaugurated soon. Civil Defense has not moved yet because of the lack of furniture and a communications antenna (according to SE-SINAPRED, the antenna was built and installed in May 2009). · The procurement issues with the risk maps 35. FISE, the agency responsible for the pilot mitigation works requested an exception to the Bank procurement guideline on the qualification of the technical and financial proposals for consultancies for the risk maps of the municipalities (a change in the quality/cost ratio from 80/20% to 70/30%), to encourage local offers. Disagreements between FISE and UCRESEP caused a delay of 9 months and led to the pilot mitigation works being executed without a priori vulnerability assessment (i.e. the risk maps). It should be noted however that this did not affect the relevance of the pilot mitigation works, as they were based on observation of recurring events. · The additional JSDF Grant Activities 36. In August 2002, the Government of Japan provided a Japanese Social Development Fund (JSDF) grant to support a Community-Level Vulnerability Reduction Program in Managua, in the amount of US$1,489,300. This grant was tied to the NDVR project, and its objective was to complement the activities under the NDVRP, decreasing vulnerability to disasters in Managua's poorest and most risk-prone neighborhoods by providing training, equipment, and civil (mitigation) works. The grant was successfully implemented under the responsibility of Civil Defense, as the agency in charge of coordinating disaster response, with support from the Municipality of Managua (which provided in-kind contribution for two of the small mitigation 6 From PAD, pg. 7 10 works and environmental studies) and SE-SINAPRED (through the PCU). UCRESEP also provided assistance with financial management and procurement matters. The JSDF Grant Reporting and Monitoring (GRM, 2006) stated smooth implementation by the PCU and good coordination between UCRESEP, Civil Defense, and the Municipality of Managua7. While no official follow-up operation was planned after grant closure, the Municipality of Managua expressed satisfaction with the grant, and strong interest in obtaining more Bank funds for urban sanitation issues. A relevant point of the GRM for the grant is that `Overall Outcome' and `Sustainability' are rated `uncertain', mostly due to lack of or limited resources, a similar issue in the NDVR project. 2.3 Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) Design, Implementation and Utilization 37. The M&E framework in the PAD (Annex 1)8 presented the results9 indicators. At the time of project design, Bank policy on indicator monitoring and definition was less strict than nowadays, and there was more flexibility around the subject. Against today's criteria, the design of indicators is too focused on outputs, and not enough on outcomes. Furthermore, the original indicators were not monitored closely (there was not monitoring arrangements table in the PAD yet), as would be expected today. As such, the Quality of Supervision Assessment (QSA7) carried out in 2006 rated the results framework (including intermediate performance indicators) and readiness for implementation arrangements for M&E as Unsatisfactory. A change in the internal reporting system of the Bank, which reflected a decision to increase supervision and reporting in projects, led to the introduction of a set of indicators in the Implementation Status Reports (ISRs) from March 2005. While the 6 ISR indicators are not measuring outcomes, (as they focus on outputs ­ Sq. meters of HQ and CODE, number of Government staff trained, number of municipalities with risk maps and response plans), they give an idea on the quantitative progress on the project development objective. These indicators were agreed upon with the PCU staff, who kept track of the data in the country. 38. Outputs. Original output indicators are numerous in the project. They were complemented by additional indicators that were introduced in the ISRs during the project. With the ISRs and through interviews with PCU and SE-SINAPRED staff the Bank was able to report on all of the outputs. Furthermore, the ex-post evaluation revealed more information on the works executed, providing a rich and comprehensive view of what was achieved in the project (see Annex 2 for a list of outputs and their achievements). 39. Outcomes. The project lacked intermediate outcome indicators, or an outcome-by- component breakdown. Furthermore, of the four outcome indicators in the table (PAD Annex 1), only one measures an outcome, the others focus on outputs. ("Long Term Disaster Mitigation 7 The grant was completely disbursed within the original timeframe (it closed on December 31, 2005), and reaped the following results: (a) 6 small mitigation works finished, (b) 5 community vulnerability assessments at district level and 42 at neighborhood level, (c) 5 community vulnerability action plans at district level, and 42 at neighborhood level, (d) 5 organized local prevention committees at district level, (e) 42 organized response brigades at neighborhood level, (f) Delivery of $113,300 worth of rescue and communications equipment. 8 Attached in Annex 2. 9 Also known as output or product indicators 11 Plan prepared, and financing identified, by end of project", "National Disaster Emergency Response plan developed by end of second year of project", and "Disaster Management Committees organized and equipped in all municipalities by end of project"). The project team missed an opportunity at the Mid-Term Review in January 2004 to introduce outcome indicators, and also a year later, in 2005, following the implementation evaluation report. 40. Impact. The project also included impact indicators. These indicators depended on the results of studies to be carried out as part of project implementation, which were to evaluate popular awareness of disasters and to quantify the number of persons and households (among other variables) considered vulnerable to disasters. As specified in the Operations Manual, a comparison of results of these studies and of the two disaster simulations programmed for the first three years, would provide indicators of improvement or lapses in disaster awareness, in vulnerability and in emergency response capability. Although the two simulations took place as planned, neither the disaster awareness component nor the vulnerability assessments had been initiated by the Project's Mid-Term Review. In the end, impact was measured in the ex-post evaluation commissioned by SE-SINAPRED, in June 2009 (a summary of lessons learned is included in Annex 3). 2.4 Safeguard and Fiduciary Compliance Safeguards 41. The project was classified as Environmental Category B (ratings are A to C), implying that potential adverse environmental impacts on human populations or environmentally important areas (including wetlands, forests, grasslands, and other natural habitats) were not likely to be significant. The Project relied on FISE's standard procedures for technical and environmental reviews and screening procedures. No safeguard issues came up during Project implementation Financial Management and Procurement 42. Financial and Procurement Management was irregular as it passed from UCRESEP to the SE-SINAPRED. Each change translated into longer processing times for procurement activities and financial management reports. Procurement lags during the first phase of project implementation (under UCRESEP and SE-SINAPRED) are attributable to delays in SE- SINAPRED's completion of technical terms of reference and evaluations, but also to a prolonged dialogue ending with the Bank approving an exception to its guidelines on the standard 70/30% quality/cost ratio to encourage local offers. Difficulties re-emerged when SE-SINAPRED assumed all executing responsibilities and staffing became an issue, as the Ortega Government set a limit on civil servants' salaries. The introduction of the National Project Financial Management System - SIGFAPRO ­ resulted in additional delays as the SE-SINAPRED learned to operate in the new system. 43. Financial management and procurement suffered in particular toward the end of project implementation. Under the administration of SE-SINAPRED, quarterly deadlines for the submission of the Financial Management Reports to the Bank were not respected; Project Audit Reports conclude that internal control issues had not been well addressed in the execution period 12 of the project. As a result, FM ratings dropped to Moderately Satisfactory from April to October 2006, while procurement ratings fell to Unsatisfactory in January 2009. 44. An Ex-Post Review of procurement was conducted at the end of the project and revealed the weak capacity of SE-SINAPRED on Bank procurement processes: standard procurement times took longer than average because procurement processes were not done properly, and files were poorly organized. 2.5 Post-completion Operation/Next Phase SE-SINAPRED has expressed interest in continuing investing in disaster risk management. This is an encouraging step. Two main factors must be considered when designing follow-on operations, one external and the other within SE-SINAPRED. 45. The external role of SE-SINAPRED is to actively maintain DRM priorities on the Government's agenda Disaster risk management, particularly prevention, is a necessary investment for a country with high multi-hazard risk, and can yield tangible results, such as reduced mortality and infrastructure damages caused by natural hazards. It is a never-ending task, requiring steadfast commitment and resources. Unfortunately, in many municipalities it is secondary to needs for food aid, education, or health care. The collective awareness of the consequences of unplanned land used, or an unprepared population is rising, and peaks in the wake of a hurricane or other recent disaster, but can be pushed aside when faced with other development issues that may carry heavier political capital on a day-to-day basis. Thus, the external role includes: a) The continued implementation and strengthening of early warning systems (i.e. beyond mere communications and natural hazards surveillance systems: e.g. protocols for authority and responsibilities distribution, cultural-ethnic adjustments, social communication procedures, quality control devices, linkage to full risk management systems, orderly evacuation and shelter management, long term territorial and development planning, etc.) b) The expansion of the risk assessments and mapping to more municipalities, with accompanying training and awareness building to the rest of the country's municipal authorities, particularly in the RAAN and RAAS (the two autonomous regions of the Atlantic watershed). c) The definition and elaboration, along with other institutions part of SINAPRED, of risk financing and financial risk transfer strategies, mechanisms and tools. d) The request for explicit political, technical and material support from the Government for the implementation of the Central American Probabilistic Risk Assessment project (CAPRA). Nicaragua, along with Costa Rica are the pilot countries CAPRA, a regional initiative led by the Central American Center for the Coordination of Disaster Prevention (CEPREDENAC) in collaboration with the United Nations International Strategy for Disaster Reduction (UN/ISDR) and the World Bank, with the participation of government entities and institutions of Central America. CAPRA will 13 enable Governments and scientific communities to identify and evaluate the sources of potential losses (both geographically and by sector) from adverse natural events, risk reduction investment opportunities, as well as government capacity to finance and manage recovery operations. This knowledge will nourish the formulation of strategies and policies to strengthen the national risk prevention and emergency management system, and to develop a risk financing strategy. 46. Internally, to mitigate the effect of high staff turnover rates, SE-SINAPRED should ensure new staff is trained on a continuous basis, to maintain the knowledge base. Reinforcing a refresher course (at advanced second stage-level) for continuing staff would also be important. To this effect, SE-SINAPRED has already begun a `mayors training' program, where the 69 new mayors that were elected this year (in January 2009) and 152 municipalities received training in DRM, thus building on the existing knowledge base created trough the project. At the technical level, emergency equipment should also be kept up to date, and cared for (this includes regular technical checkups, testing of existing equipment, provision of batteries). 3. Assessment of Outcomes 3.1 Relevance of Objectives, Design and Implementation 47. The NDVRP's objectives are highly relevant to the needs of the country. It supports the national initiative to mainstream disaster risk management at the central and local levels in Nicaragua, in order to reduce the country's vulnerability to recurrent hazards. They are reflected in the design and implementation of the project, conducted at the national and municipal levels, the execution of mitigation works, and the increased public awareness and creation of a "Culture of Prevention". The overall goal of the project is particularly pertinent to Nicaragua, due to its high exposure to multi-hazard risks, and to the escalating impacts of climate change on the region. 3.2 Achievement of Project Development Objectives 48. Based on the evidence collected through interviews (particularly with ex-PCU staff and SE-SINAPRED staff), progress against the ISR indicators, and field visits, the Project Development Objectives were mostly achieved, despite their delay. A. Strengthening Institutional Capacity in Disaster Management At the National Level 49. The inclusion of a budget line for SINAPRED and SE-SINAPRED in the national budget since 2008 indicates that the system has gained considerable political weight and that SE- SINAPRED is seen as a an integral part of the country's development strategy. Coordination between institutions was improved substantially, with new initiatives in DRM stemming from the project (see Annex 6). 50. The international community recognized that SE-SINAPRED successfully led the response to the Hurricane Felix emergency. This hurricane cannot be compared with Mitch, but 14 the coordination between institutions and the general response of the government improved substantially compared with previous emergencies10. Fully Achieved. B. Building Institutional Capacity for Disaster Mitigation at the National Level 51. The project conducted vulnerability studies (2 out of planned 3), which allowed for the drafting of a disaster risk management plan. This plan is now in place, and was used during Hurricane Felix with success (quick response time and good coordination between institutions). While progress was made on its elaboration, a resettlement policy for populations living in high- risk areas is still awaiting approval by the National Assembly. Partially achieved. C. Promoting Disaster Awareness and "Preventive Thinking" through Public Sector Education and Awareness Programs 52. DRM was introduced in educational curriculums as of 2008 through the training of teachers, and educational material produced for schools. However, ex-post evaluation shows that there has been no follow-up to this. While no media awareness campaign was officially launched (it is awaiting approval from the new administration), SE-SINAPRED is currently elaborating a communication strategy to promote a culture of prevention. This component was only partially achieved. D. Building Local Capacity to Manage Emergencies, to Assess Risk and to identify Mitigation Measures 53. This objective was surpassed in one aspect, with 30 municipalities producing preventive land use plans instead of the original 25. While low resources (financial and staff) threaten the sustainability of this achievement, an evaluation of project activities realized in 2007 reported that the use of planning tools has gone up from 43% to 87% among municipalities. This component was fully achieved. E. Implementing Vulnerability Reduction and Mitigation Measures at the Local Level 54. This objective was fully achieved. The eligible 15 municipalities have all implemented mitigation measures. However, these were not based on risk assessments: pilot mitigation works were chosen, designed and built before the vulnerability assessments and recommended land use plans had been completed, but were based on local observation of recurrent events. 55. In some of the municipalities, the project had an important multiplier effect. An example is the case of San Juan del Sur, south of Managua. San Juan del Sur was part of the 30 selected municipalities that received risk maps. It also was part of the 15 municipalities that were provided with final designs for pilot mitigation works (though no financing to accomplish them). The city used the designs and the risk maps to do their own mitigation works, and to do territorial planning. These works were financed through tax collection and the issuance of permits to regulate construction, in accordance with national law. Improved tax revenues led to 10 Based on interviews with SE-SINAPRED staff, Civil Defense, and ex-PCU staff. 15 the municipality's budget rising from $4 million Córdobas (approx. US$210,000) to $50 million Córdobas (US$2,600,000) in four years. 56. The ex-post evaluation of the project reports the drafting of a new law on urban and territorial planning, led by SE-SINAPRED, which would establish specific norms on the use and occupation of the national territory. 57. The involvement of the local community is an important factor in promoting sustainability of the mitigation works. The ex-post evaluation reports however, that in most cases there was no process of public consultation, and no active involvement of the community, which explains the presence of waste deposits or other evidence of poor maintenance on the works sites. 3.3 Efficiency 58. At project close, at the end of February 2009, all activities had been completed, and over its lifetime, the project disbursed 100%. However, the numerous delays in implementation (see Section 2.2) led to the project lasting four years longer than originally planned (5 extensions). While the objectives were mostly accomplished, and the positive results yielded are not discounted by the project's extended life, inefficiency did increase the amount of time vulnerable populations were exposed to risk in the country. 59. Net Present Value was not estimated at the beginning of the project, nor at the end. However, FISE conducted cost benefit analyses for sub-components it was responsible for, ensuring that the most efficient option would be selected in the implementation of mitigation works. 3.4 Justification of Overall Outcome 60. The baseline for the outcomes of the project can be assumed to be very low because of the lack of previous experience in DRM in the country. One unexpected and significant way the capacity of the System was tested was through Hurricane Felix: the improved coordination between the System's agencies during the emergency, and show of leadership from SE- SINAPRED, revealed the increased strength of SINAPRED and its Secretariat. However, the lack of outcome indicators does impede a full and clear assessment of the reach of the project. To compensate for this weakness, some of the major outputs were viewed as proxies for project achievements, such as: the building of the SE-SINAPRED, CODE and Civil Defense headquarters, which lends credibility and legitimacy to the institution; and the educational material in the schools, which contributes to the mainstreaming of DRM in regular activities. Another output used as a proxy was the extent of the training and equipping of the local emergency committees, which proved to work in the past two hurricane seasons, with reported faster response times and better equipment to deal with emergencies. Rating: Satisfactory. 16 61. The following chart shows rating by components and adjusted for importance of each component. Component % of the project cost ICR Rating Component A: Strengthening National Capacity 30% Satisfactory for Disaster Management Component B. Enhancing Institutional Capacity 10.3% Satisfactory for Disaster Mitigation at National Level Component C. Heightening Public Awareness of 6% Moderately Satisfactory Disasters and Prevention Heightened Component D. Local capacity to assess risks 23% Satisfactory identify mitigation measures and respond to natural disaster strengthened Component E. Local vulnerability reduction 26% Satisfactory measures implemented Component F. Project Management 4.7% Overall Rating 100% Satisfactory 3.5 Overarching Themes, Other Outcomes and Impacts (a) Poverty Impacts, Gender Aspects, and Social Development 62. The project did not directly focus on aspects related to poverty, gender, ethnic and social development issues, even if many of these issues are linked with disaster risk management. Nevertheless, according to interviews, the project had direct and indirect influence on poverty reduction, through improvements in safety, vulnerability reduction and better knowledge about risk in communities (through risk mapping), employment during the construction of mitigation works, and the introduction of the topic in the educational curriculum, etc. (b) Institutional Change-Strengthening 63. SE- SINAPRED has now been established and recognized as the authority responsible for the coordination of risk management, and is moving to support mainstreaming of risk management at the local level. The agency certainly needs further strengthening. These end results are long-term and key for the development of disaster risk management in the country. (c) Other Unintended Outcomes and Impacts (positive or negative) 64. This project allowed the municipalities to improve participation, integration, and organization around the topic of disaster risk management. 3.6 Summary of Findings of Beneficiary Survey and/or Stakeholder Workshops Not Applicable. 17 4. Assessment of Risk to Development Outcomes Rating: Moderate 65. There is moderate risk to the overall outcome of the operation. Specifically: 9 Staff turnover: Large numbers of technical staff rotate during each change of administration. This jeopardizes the continuity of on-going and new initiatives at SE- SINAPRED and at the Municipal level. Whilst the Project outcomes are still in the process of consolidation, periodic knowledge and skills training are required at SE- SINAPRED staff levels (managerial, technical and scientific) to avoid the loss of the momentum already gathered. 9 Government commitment to DRM: While disaster risk management has clear benefits and should be a continuous effort, sustainability depends on the commitment in the country to continue DRM mainstreaming and promotion of prevention activities. SE- SINAPRED has remained active through the last three administrations. The agency has coordinated and executed projects and activities with other sources of financing that consolidate the results yielded by this project (see Annex 6). These on-going activities show the agency's and the government's commitment to maintain DRM efforts in the country. 5. Assessment of Bank and Borrower Performance 5.1 Bank Performance (a) Bank Performance in Ensuring Quality at Entry Rating: Moderately Satisfactory 66. The Bank correctly identified the country's needs and the operation is highly relevant to Nicaragua. However, the overestimation of the capacity and leadership of SE-SINAPRED was at the root of several implementation problems. Also, the creation of a national system for disaster emergency response and prevention was a difficult task to achieve in the original timeframe (3 years). This is consistent with the issues that arose during implementation. (b) Quality of Supervision Rating: Moderately Satisfactory 67. During supervision, five relatively limited project extensions were authorized by the Bank, to maintain pressure on the country to perform. Missions were also timely and solution- oriented, as the Bank team supported the borrower in reducing several operational set-backs and helped ensure implementation arrangements with the Executive Secretariat; for example, to aid implementation, the Bank assisted in the creation of a PCU. It also provided procurement 18 assistance through the Country Office in Nicaragua. However the Bank missed an opportunity to improve the outcome indicators during the Mid-Term Review. (c) Justification of Rating for Overall Bank Performance Rating: Moderately Satisfactory 68. The Bank designed a project that was well-adapted to the needs of the country, and provided adequate support during implementation to help resolve arising issues. From the beginning, UCRESEP was designated as the financial management and fiduciary provider, to help fill the capacity gap in SE-SINAPRED. When disbursement slowed, the Bank chose to grant shorter extensions to maintain the pressure on the Borrower to perform. 69. However, the Bank underestimated the challenges of supporting a nascent institution, and tasking it with the implementation of a new type of project. It proved to be overly ambitious for the timeframe of the project. 5.2 Borrower Performance (a) Government/Implementing Agency Rating: Moderately Satisfactory 70. Throughout the project, SE-SINAPRED's capacity has been strengthened, and its focus is now to maintain a strong presence institutionally. SE-SINAPRED received assistance from UCRESEP on fiduciary matters, as well as from a PCU during implementation in 2004. Despite the assistance provided by these two institutions, SE-SINAPRED suffered from inherent institutional weaknesses, such as vertical decision-making and a slowing of the flow of information, actions, and resolution of issues. An additional complication was the significant staff turnover in essential positions such as the Executive Secretary of SE-SINAPRED (3 changes), due to the changing political context. (b) Justification of Rating for Overall Borrower Performance Rating: Moderately Satisfactory 71. While the assessment of the implementing agency is rather negative, the overall outcome of the project is a deciding factor in the rating: the project managed to accomplish positive results, albeit within an extended timeframe. The outcome is that disaster risk management, which was largely absent from public policy before the project, has now been introduced, and the system has demonstrably worked. 19 6. Lessons Learned 72. A monitoring and evaluation framework that includes outcome indicators is necessary to measure results, as is an effective supervision team. Ideas for possible outcome indicators could include improvements in quality standards (for works), skills tests (for training), drills and practical tests (for new equipment and procedures). 73. Evidence from the interviews and the ex-post evaluation illustrate that low ownership and awareness in the community leads to lower than ideal maintenance, and the presence of trash and debris on the works sites. In most cases, the community was not introduced to the works, nor invited to any process of public consultation. The involvement of the local community (through town halls, consultations, informational events) is fundamental to ensure the sustainability of mitigation works and outreach efforts made under the project. Stronger communities will lead to improved coordination and leadership in times of crisis. 74. Disaster risk management is an excellent basis for a national/municipal/territorial development strategy. Including risk as a factor of consideration in development encourages preventive and mitigating action across sectors, allowing for more sustainable achievements on the path to development. It also allows for participatory processes developing consensus toward a common future. 75. Unlike emergency response, prevention entails a change in behavior. Establishing a culture of prevention therefore takes time, and requires dedication and resources over multiple years and activities. The project shows that a combination of analytical work (risk mapping) followed by a concrete action (mitigation works) is a good way to keep actors involved through a full project cycle leading to tangible change in perception, behavior and capacity to manage risks. 76. Clear roles and responsibilities should be assigned to the coordinating agency staff (in this case SE-SINAPRED) in regular times and in times of crisis, to ensure there is enough capacity at headquarters at all times for prevention and mitigation purposes. This is especially important in countries with highly recurrent events. 77. Disaster risk management institutions are frequently over stretched between regular operations and emergencies. This means a project implementation unit should have clear roles, so that staff can continue to work on on-going projects independent of staff tending to the emergency. This would ensure continuity, and is especially important in countries with highly recurrent events. 78. Tensions often emerge from internal and external equity problems among institutions funded by the Bank. The Country Management Unit (CMU) at the Bank should monitor standards for PCU salaries according to the national levels and based on other institutions across Bank projects. This will diminish the chance of a disconnect between PCU salaries with local government pay. 20 7. Comments on Issues Raised by Borrower/Implementing Institutions/Partners (a) Borrower/implementing institutions Design, planning, execution and evaluation of the project 79. The final design should have taken into consideration the timeframe required for the proposed objectives, including clear and measurable results indicators, and the cost and quality of expected products. This has caused contradictions in the report, such as "the positive manifestations of sustainability is the evidence that the coordination between the institutions has much improved, with new initiatives in DRM that arose from the project."[W1] 80. The overall risk for the project was qualified by the Bank team as "substantial", based on the possible lack of ownership and commitment to apply the DRM program, but this is contradicted in another part of the report, where it is mentioned that the "inclusion of a budget line for SE-SINAPRED and SINAPRED in the national budget shows that the system has gained much political weight, and that SE-SINAPRED is considered a ministry." 81. The ICR rates the executing agency's capacity negatively, but the project did manage positive results and the System has shown to function. Context of the Project 82. Before the year 2000, the SINAPRED system did not exist officially, and there was no executing agency to coordinate DRM. However, there were juridical and operational instruments for prevention and response. For example, the Civil Defense Law, the National Commission of CEPREDENAC, the Chancery manual, Construction regulations, Land use plans, and the National urban system. Staff rotation and salaries 83. Staff contracted in the beginning of the project was hired as consultants, not as public servants (functionaries). In 2006, some consultants who had won contracts were integrated as part of the personnel (functionaries) of SE-SINAPRED, and were as such paid conforming to Government functionaries' salaries. This led to salary disparities between consultants and functionaries in SE-SINAPRED. This is why in 2007 the Executive powers established the ceiling for salaries. Operational priorities following project closing 84. It must be emphasized that there were actions and programs coordinated and executed by SE-SINAPRED with other sources of funds, to maintain the results yielded by the project. Some 21 of those initiatives are described in Annex 7. Recommendations should reflect that these are not pending activities, but ongoing ones. 85. INETER, which carried out vulnerability and risk mapping activities, insisted on the importance of providing all municipalities with risk maps. The country does not have the resources to currently extend this to the rest of the municipalities, and it should be prioritized in future projects. 86. Civil Defense used its experience to provide two kinds of training: (a) organization of the committees, including distribution of equipment for emergency response; and (b) training in the use of equipment and in emergency response. Civil Defense recognizes that although its targeting for equipment distribution was good, its monitoring was poor, as much of it disappeared or failed to be used effectively. This emphasizes the need for improved tracking and delivery procedures. (b) Cofinanciers N/A. (c) Other partners and stakeholders N/A. 22 Annex 1. Project Costs and Financing (a) Project Cost by Component (in USD Million equivalent) Appraisal Estimate Actual Estimate (USD Percentage of Components (USD millions) millions) IDA only Appraisal Borrower and IDA STRENGTHENING OF NATIONAL 4.82 3.59 30 SYSTEM CAPACITY DEVELOPMENT OF NATIONAL MITIGATION PROGRAM AND 1.65 1.50 10.3 STRATEGY BUILDING PUBLIC AWARENESS 0.97 0.88 6 OF DISASTER PREVENT STRENGTHENING LOCAL CAPACITY FOR DISASTER 3.69 3.34 23 MANAGEMENT IMPLEMENTATION OF LOCAL 4.16 3.56 25.9 VULNERABILITY REDUCTION PROJECT FINANCIAL 0.76 0.63 4.7 MANAGEMENT Total Baseline Cost 16.05 13.50 100 Physical Contingencies 0.00 0.00 0.00 Price Contingencies 0.00 0.00 0.00 Total Project Costs 0.00 13.50 Front-end fee PPF 0.00 0.00 .00 Front-end fee IBRD 0.00 0.00 .00 Total Financing Required 0.00 13.50 (b) Financing Appraisal Actual/Latest Type of Percentage of Source of Funds Estimate Estimate Cofinancing Appraisal (USD millions) (USD millions) Borrower 2.55 2.55 15.8 International Development Association 13.50 13.50 84.1 (IDA) Total 16.05 16.05 100 23 Annex 2. Outputs by Component 1. The attached Annex 1 from the Project PAD shows proposed project outputs and impacts by components at Appraisal. Nicaragua: Disaster Vulnerability Reduction Hierarchy of Key Performance Monitoring and Critical Objectives Indicators Evaluation Assumptions Sector-related CAS Goal: Sector Indicators: Sector / Country Reports: (from Goal to Bank Mission) Economic Growth and Poverty Reduction Project Development Outcome / Impact Indicators: Project Reports: (From Objective to Goal) Objective: To improve Nicaragua's disaster Executive Secretariat fully Semi-annual Project Progress Functioning of the National management capacity by: operational by end of project Reports; System unhindered by electoral cycles (a) strengthening institutional Core institutions of the capability in disaster NationalSystem fully on board Copies of plans, and evaluation Funding continues to be prevention preparedness by end of project (Performance of consultations and adequate. and response at the national levels of the Secretariat and the dissemination workshops; level; System in general, will be (b) building institutional measured during the life of the capacity to gram disaster project through the evaluation of mitigation at the national selected disaster management level; activities). (c) promoting disaster awareness and Long Term Disaster Mitigation Semi-annual Project Progress "preventative thinking" Plan prepared and financing Reports; through public sector identified by end of project. education and awareness programs; Disaster management (d) building local capacity to committees organized and Impact Evaluations of Disaster manage disaster equipped in all municipalities by Awareness Program of Disaster emergencies, to assess risk end of project. Theme in School Curricula, and and to identify mitigation of Mitigation Measures, measures; and Project impact will be assessed including surveys of (e) implementing mitigation through: beneficiaries. measures at the local level. (a) evaluation of success of the To improve Nicaragua's national disaster awareness disaster management campaign and the capacity. mainstreaming of disaster themes in formal education curricula: (b) evaluations of preventative planning exercises and mitigation measures carried out in the eligible municipalities (This evaluation will look at indicators such as total number of schools retrofitted, total cost of investment per capita, etc.) 24 Output from each component: Output Indicators: Project Reports: (From Outputs to Objectives) A. Institutional capability of National System for Key staff of the Secretariat Semi-annual Project Progress Trained staff remains in the disaster management at identified, hired and trained by Reports; Secretariat first year of project; Secretariat national level has relocated to reconditioned Copy of National Emergency strengthened. offices with Emergency Plan Operations Center and supplies B. Institutional capacity for emergency needs over five Copy of national Disaster Fund for disaster mitigation years, by end of second year; Procedures; and national level Legal procedures defined and enhanced. adopted for National Disaster Copies of Operational Manuals Fund by second year of project; for Executive Secretariat and National System; Operations manuals prepared and published by second year of Evaluations of simulation project; exercises. 4 national simulation exercises carried out by end of project; C. Public awareness of disasters and of Studies to analyze vulnerability Information sharing policy prevention heightened. and identify mitigation programs Semi-annual Project Progress agreed and maintained. for the city of Managua, for key Reports watersheds and for building Local officials and functionaries codes carried out by end of Copies of final study reports; of technical institutions project and found satisfactory by involved in and interested in the Bank; Copy of official resettlement applying vulnerability analysis Policy for resettlement of policy for persons at risk of in policy and programs persons at risk of natural disaster natural disaster adopted by second year of Executive Secretariat remains project. involved in and interested in D. Local capacity to assess applying resettlement policy risks, identify Teaching and Communication mitigation measures 2000 formal school teachers Semi-annual Project Progress professions remain interested in and respond to natural training in disaster prevention Reports; and concerned for disaster disasters strengthened. and given instructive materials Copies of teaching guides and prevention. for use by 10,000 students by materials on disaster awareness end of project; for use in public schools; National Disaster Awareness Public Awareness Campaign on evaluations of training modules Raising Campaign reaches out Disasters carried out by third for teachers; to most vulnerable population year of project; Copy of the Design and Plan for Municipalities are interested in 150 communication media Disaster Awareness Campaign; participating in disaster employees trained in disaster evaluations of the campaign; vulnerability reduction activities reporting by end of project; Evaluations of training results; At least 124 municipalities have Semi-annual Project Progress prepared local emergency plans Reports; by end of project; Copies of local emergency At least 20 eligible plans; municipalities have carried out Digital files of hazard and vulnerability assessments and vulnerability maps, copies of E. Local vulnerability prepared "preventive" land use vulnerability assessment plans by end year of project; reports; evaluations of reduction measures participatory exercises; implemented. At least 15 eligible municipalities have Semi-annual Project Progress Municipalities are interested in implemented mitigation Reports; participating in disaster measures identified under Copies of M'pal Investment vulnerability reduction activities component D by end of project Plans; impact evaluations of mitigation measures. Municipalities are interested in Quarterly Project Progress participating in disaster Reports; Copy of the Design vulnerability reduction activities and Plan for National Awareness Raising Campaign 25 Project Components/Sub- Inputs: (budget for each Project Reports: (From Components to components: component) Outputs) A. Strengthening the US$4.82 Semi-Annual Project Government contributes National System Capacity for Progress Reports operating costs of the Disaster Management Executive Secretariat A.1 Institutional Strengthening Independent Audit Reports; and National System; of the Executive Secretariat A.2 Strengthening of the Supervision Mission There is adequate National System Reports; capacity in the Secretariat to coordinate B. Development of the US$1.65 National Emergency Plan tasks across various National Mitigation Program institutions and to and Strategy supervise consultants B.1 Mitigation Information Semi-Annual Project System Progress Reports; Independent Audit Reports; Hiring of consultants and B.2 Strategic Mitigation Supervision Mission procurement of Studies Reports equipment is carried out Study of Watershed on a timely fashion C. Building Public US$0.97 Vulnerability Study of Awareness of Disaster Building Codes; Prevention Study of Managua Vulnerability to C.1 Mainstreaming of disaster Earthquakes; awareness into formal Resettlement Policy; education National Mitigation C.2 Public Awareness Program Program Semi-Annual Project C.3 Disaster Awareness in Progress Reports; Communications Media Independent Audit Reports; Supervision Mission D. Strengthening of Local US$3.69 Reports; Capacity for Disaster Risk Copies of Teaching Management Materials developed for D.1 Consolidation of local elementary school, for disaster response committee. general public and for D.2 Promotion of preventive communications training planning E. Implementation of US$4.16 Local Vulnerability Reduction Semi-Annual Project Measures Progress Reports; E.1 Identification of sub- Independent Audit Reports; projects Supervision Mission Reports; E.2 Design and Implementation of sub- projects US$0.76 F. Project Financial PMRs delivered quarterly; management Semi-Annual Project Progress Reports; Independent Audit Reports; Supervision Mission Reports 26 Project Components/Sub- Inputs: (budget for each Project Reports: (From Components to components: component) Outputs) (b) Technical knowledge and Quarterly Project Progress skills Reports; Independent Audit Reports; Supervision Mission Reports 2.1(b) Training and technical assistance to improve natural hazard and disaster information gathering, analysis and sharing 2.2(b) Establishment of technical advisory group to assist in risk analysis and sub-project identification at the local level 2.3(b) Inventory and partnering of private sector institutions/ firms working in scientific and technical areas 2.4(b) Promotion of disaster management information and experience exchange at the local and regional level 3. Strengthening of Local Capacity to Mitigate and US$2.5 Respond to Natural Disasters 3.1 Establishment of local emergency committees, including provision of training, equipment and specialized support and monitoring 3.2 Preparation of local disaster emergency plans 3.3 Local vulnerability analysis and identification of mitigation measures, including land use planning 3.4 Design and implementation of structural mitigation measures 3.5 Design and implementation of non-structural mitigation measures 4. Project Management US$2.0 27 2. Achievement of Outputs As Indicated in the Project Appraisal Document. This information was collected from interviews with SE-SINAPRED and the PCU at project closing. Component A: Strengthening of National System Capacity for Disaster Management PAD Output Indicator Achievement at Project Close ICR rating Key staff of the Secretariat Accomplished but not in specified Satisfactory identified, hired and trained timeframe. This was done 7 years by first year of project later. Secretariat has relocated to Accomplished but not in specified Satisfactory reconditioned offices with timeframe. This was done 7 years Emergency Operations later. Center and supplies for emergency needs over 5 years by end of second year Legal procedures defined Accomplished but not in specified Satisfactory and adopted for National timeframe. This was done 6 years Disaster Fund by second later. year of project Operations manuals Achieved within timeframe. Satisfactory prepared and published by second year of project 4 national simulation 2 simulation exercises Satisfactory exercises carried out by end accomplished, 4 theoretical of project simulation exercises accomplished. Component B. Institutional Capacity for Disaster Mitigation at national level enhanced Studies to analyze Accomplished. Satisfactory vulnerability and identify mitigation programs for the city of Managua carried out by end of project and found satisfactory by the Bank Studies to analyze Not accomplished. A Regional N/A vulnerability and identify project funded by European mitigation programs for key Commission (PREVDA) was doing watersheds carried out by the same for the region. Therefore it end of project and found was decided that this activity was satisfactory by the Bank better addressed within the regional project given the scale and geographic scope, and was canceled in this project. Studies to analyze Accomplished. Satisfactory vulnerability and identify mitigation programs for building codes carried out by end of project and found satisfactory by the Bank Policy for resettlement of Partially Accomplished. Policy Moderately Satisfactory persons at risk of natural elaborated but not approved by disaster adopted by second National Assembly. 28 year of project Component C. Public Awareness of Disasters and Prevention Heightened 2000 formal school teachers Training was accomplished. Exact Satisfactory trained in disaster number of trainees pending prevention and given counterpart evaluation. instructive materials for use by 10,000 students by end of project Public Awareness Partially accomplished: the Moderately Satisfactory Campaign on Disasters Campaign was designed but not carried out by third year of executed. project 150 communication media Workshops were held, but exact Moderately Satisfactory employees trained in number of participants pending disaster reporting by end of counterpart evaluation. project Component D. Local capacity to assess risks, identify mitigation measures and respond to natural disaster strengthened At least 124 municipalities Accomplished. 140 municipalities Satisfactory have prepared local with plans. emergency plans by end of project At least 20 eligible Accomplished. 30 municipalities Satisfactory municipalities have carried have prepared land use plans. out vulnerability assessments and prepared `preventive' land use plans by end year of project Component E. Local vulnerability reduction measures implemented At least 15 eligible Accomplished. Satisfactory municipalities have implemented mitigation measures identified under component D by end of project It is worth noting that the Implementation Status Report (ISR) lists a different set of indicators. These are listed below. These indicators were introduced during the implementation of the project, in 2005. ISR Indicators PDO Indicators Baseline value Last ISR ISR rating ICR assessment Number of 0 4: a. Managua Satisfactory Satisfactory international JSDF (closed projects in disaster with management, for satisfactory which the SE- results), b. SINAPRED is the Component 1 implementing of Hurricane agency Felix ERL, c. 29 PREVDA-EU; c. JICA- Community Disaster Management Square meters of 0 1,871 m2 Satisfactory Achieved. Satisfactory. SINAPRED, EOC designed and and Civil Defense constructed buildings designed and constructed Number of studies 0 3 studies Satisfactory Achieved. Satisfactory. completed, completed, disseminated and in disseminated use and in use, 1 study pending Changes to the 0 Changes in Satisfactory Achieved. Satisfactory. curriculum- formal formal education (pre- education school, primary, under way, 9 secondary) and in student books communications and 9 teacher programs guides (university level) incorporated in curriculum. Curriculum design changes to communication s programs done but not yet implemented. Intermediate Outcome Indicator Fulfillment of SE's 0 SE- Satisfactory Achieved. Satisfactory. coordinating role SINAPRED's vis-à-vis budget has SINAPRED been approved and includes payment for staff previously paid by the project (this was assumed by the SE in 2007). This shows Government commitment 30 31 Annex 3. Lessons Learned from Ex-Post Evaluation (Borrower) Following NDVR project completion, SE-SINAPRED commissioned an ex-post evaluation to the Center for Geophysical Research (CIGEO), in May 2009. CIGEO conducted the evaluation through semi-structured interviews, surveys, workshops and checklists. It selected 37 municipalities, the 30 that were part of the project, and 7 as a control group. The following lessons learned are those drawn from the evaluation of the project. On the Promotion of a Culture of Prevention. · Field visits revealed that various Prevention Committees were trained to strengthen the technical, operational, institutional and organizing capacities for the prevention and reduction of existing risk in the municipality. · In some of the territories, members of BRIMUR (Municipal Response Brigades) were preparing training with SE-SINAPRED and Civil Defense to improve their capacities. Brigades are composed mostly of professionals using their experience and knowledge to serve and protect the population. · Teachers and students were trained, though not 100%. Only those attending centers that operate as temporary shelters during emergencies in the municipality. The trainings focused on methodological guides that include themes and activities for risk management education. These teachers also participated in trainings given by Civil Defense on what to do in the occurrence of an adverse natural event. · Interviews with trained teachers reveal they still need more education on prevention and mitigation of disasters. There is also a lack of follow-up, once the training is over. · Teachers feel that trainings and guide books are insufficient, and ask for more presence from SINAPRED, not only in the case of emergencies, but also that the system bring more tools. · Teachers were very emphatic when speaking about the workshops that they were extremely important, as well as the inclusion of risk management in the education curriculum, which allows them to adapt the component to various areas and disciplines. · The activity notebooks were all used, improving the student's capacities, and enabling him to apply his knowledge in his own community. · A Culture of Prevention was developed among the population, training people from various civil organizations, community leaders that are responsible for transmitting the knowledge to others, and the extinct municipal development committees (CDM). · SE-SINAPRED has conducted campaigns of prevention to inform the population at the municipal level, and was generally well received in the communities. One request however, 32 was that those campaigns be more frequent instead of periodic: that they be conducted throughout the year, and not only during the dry and wet seasons. On Strengthening Municipal Capacity in Risk Management · Staff remaining in the municipalities was able to maintain coordination with the various institutions, but institutional memory was lost in most of them, due to a high rotation of staff. Municipalities recognize this problem, as each new administration changes technical staff working in areas of prevention or planning, which can seriously delay implementation. · The majority of municipalities report not having the sufficient material resources to promote prevention and mitigation of adverse natural events. Some brigades use their own emergency equipment. Those that have received funds from SINAPRED have out of date or missing equipment and parts. · Of the municipalities visited, the departmental capitals have a larger presence of SINAPRED authorities, as opposed to the smaller towns, independent of the level of risk (which may be higher in those smaller towns). Since 2008 however, SE-SINAPRED has at least one delegate in each of the 153 municipalities. · Most municipalities have trained response brigades with technical staff and first response equipment. · In the municipalities that have received some communication materials from SINAPRED, some are in poor state, due to lack of maintenance and reparation. It is important to underline that the equipment was insufficient to safeguard all mitigation activities. · In almost all mayor offices there is at least one risk map. Some mayor offices have all the risk analysis maps, and it is considered that each institution knows its role in the occurrence of a disaster. Final Recommendations on the Project · Interviews with the municipalities reveal that training and spreading of knowledge should be continued, online, where the Information System on Risk Management (SIGER) can be found, and a municipal training can be begun for the incoming officials on the instruments that were designed under the project. · It is necessary to complete the IT equipment, with at least a software developer, in Visual Studio 2005 and SQL 2005, to remain up to date, and for the unfinished designs. · It is important to re-engineer the Damage Evaluation and Needs Assessment Information Subsystem (EDAN), and move it to a more robust platform such as VS 2005, SQL 2005, and the programming language asp.net. · It is necessary to implement the Manual on Norms and Procedures. 33 · It is necessary to implement the contingency plans. · It is necessary to automatically implement the password change for the users at least every 3 months. · Document each information subsystem, beginning from the analysis and design, using case studies and UML, with technical and user manuals. · Establish a good backup system, for the storing of programs and archives. · Incorporate the Notice Board of Instruments, as a forecasting instrument, without overwhelm the database. · Incorporate early warning indicators. · Homogenize IT applications in a single development tool and data and information base. 34 Annex 4. Bank Lending and Implementation Support/Supervision Processes (a) Task Team members Responsibility/ Names Title Unit Specialty Lending/Supervision/ICR Ana Campos Garcia Consultant LCSUW Omar D. Cardona Consultant LCSUW Irani G. Escolano Consultant LCSPT Augusto Garcia E T Consultant LCSSD Ross Alexander Gartley Operations Officer LCSUW Maryse D. Gautier Manager, Portfolio and Operations EACPF John V. Kellenberg Sector Manager, Environment ECSSD Alvaro Larrea Procurement Specialist LCSPT Nelson Antonio Medina Rocha Consultant ETWAN Rudy Morales Consultant LCSUW Alexandra Ortiz Senior Urban Economist MNSSD Enrique Pantoja Senior Land Administration Specialist LCSAR Enrique Antonio Roman Financial Management Specialist LCSFM Fernanda Ruiz Nunez Young Professional YPP Jose C. Joaquin Toro Landivar Hazard Risk Management Specialist LCSUW Rafael Vera Senior Water & Sanitation Specialist ETWAN Nara Meli E T Consultant LCSUW Sergio Mora Senior Disaster Risk Management Specialist LCSUW Osmar Velasco Senior Disaster Risk Management Specialist LCSUW (b) Staff Time and Cost Staff Time and Cost (Bank Budget Only) Stage of Project Cycle USD Thousands (including travel No. of staff weeks and consultant costs) Lending FY99 31.75 FY00 16 48.93 FY01 27 87.24 FY02 6 17.65 FY03 0.00 FY04 0.00 FY05 0.00 FY06 0.00 FY07 0.00 FY08 0.00 Total: 49 185.57 Supervision/ICR FY99 0.00 FY00 0.00 35 FY01 0.00 FY02 10 52.06 FY03 18 102.60 FY04 12 82.14 FY05 16 91.25 FY06 9 60.63 FY07 26 101.80 FY08 20 72.61 FY09 5 0.00 Total: 116 563.09 36 Annex 5. Summary of Borrower's ICR and/or Comments on Draft ICR Summary table of comments received from Borrower: Project theme as treated in the Comments or Observations ICR response ICR 1. Design, planning, execution and The final design should have Differences arise due to evaluation of the project considered the time required for the timing. SE-SINAPRED proposed objectives, such as clear leadership has improved and measurable results indicators, since early project timeframe, cost and quality of implementation, and the expected products. This has caused team recognizes it has grown contradictions in the report, such as to an established ministry by with the "weak leadership of SE- the end of the project. SINAPRED" and "the positive manifestations of sustainability is the evidence that the coordination between the institutions has much improved, with new initiatives in DRM that arose from the project." The overall risk for the project was The difference comes from qualified by the Bank team as the risk rating at appraisal, "substantial", based on the possible versus after the project. The lack of ownership and commitment risk to development to apply the DRM program, but this outcomes has been is contradicted in another part of the downgraded to moderate. report, where it is mentioned that the "inclusion of a budget line for SE-SINAPRED and SINAPRED in the national budget shows that the system has gained much political weight, and that SE-SINAPRED is considered a ministry." The ICR rates the executing SE-SINAPRED's capacity agency's capacity negatively, but was weak at the beginning of the project did manage positive the project and has since results and the System has shown to shown signs of function. strengthening, though continuous capacity building is needed. The Borrower noted that the Noted, we have added this project's execution was under the information to the report. responsibility of the SE- SINAPRED, and was completed successfully. The SINAPRED system functions well, as demonstrated in the last significant emergency, Hurricane Felix. The territorial policy was elaborated and sent to the National Assembly. 2. Context of the Project Before the year 2000, the Noted, we have added this SINAPRED system did not exist information in the report. 37 Project theme as treated in the Comments or Observations ICR response ICR officially, and there was executing agency to coordinate DRM. However, there were juridical and operational instruments for prevention and response. For example, the Civil Defense Law, the National Commission of CEPREDENAC, the Chancery manual, Construction regulations, Land use plans, and National urban system. 3. Staff rotation and salaries The staff contracted in the beginning of the project was based on consultant modalities, not as public servants (functionaries). In 2006, some consultants who had won contracts were integrated as part of the personnel (functionaries) of SE-SINAPRED, and were as such paid conforming Government functionaries' salaries. This led to salary disparities between consultants and functionaries in SE- SINAPRED. This is why in 2007, the Executive powers established the ceiling for salaries 4. Operational priorities following It must be emphasized that there Noted, we have added this project closing were actions and programs information in the report. coordinated and executed by SE- SINAPRED with other sources of funds, to maintain the results yielded by the project. Some of those initiatives are described in annex 7. Recommendations should reflect that these are not pending activities, but ongoing ones. 38 Annex 6. List of Supporting Documents Project Appraisal Document, Credit agreement, Project Operational Manuel, Implementation Status Reports, Aide-Mémoires. Country Assistance Strategy (1998-2002), Country Portfolio Performance Review 2004, 2005, Ex-post evaluation of the project submitted by the country. Table A. List of Interviewees: Implementation Completion Report Mission, Nicaragua March 30 ­ April 4, 2009 No. Name Title and Institution 1 Jorge Ramón Arnesto Sosa Executive Secretary, SINAPRED, from January 2007 to date. 2 Cristóbal Sequeira Executive Secretary, SINAPRED, from March 2005 to October 2006. 3 Félix Hernández Assessor of Executive Secretary, SINAPRED, from May 2008 to date. 4 Laura Gutiérrez Ex-Director of Planning, SE-SINAPRED 5 Julio Icaza Ex PCU Coordinator 2005-2007 6 Silvio Cerda Ex Chief of Mitigation and Infrastructure Technical Unit, SE-SINAPRED. 7 Wilfred Strauss Director Geophysics, INETER 8 Coronel Mario Perezcassar Director, Civil Defense 9 Dionisio Rodríguez Coordinator of ex-post evaluation, CIGEO 10 Ligia Calderón Director of Territorial Planning, SE- SINAPRED. 11 Field visit to Leon Municipality's Disaster Risk Municipal Technical staff Management Unit 12 Brenda Mendieta Project Planning support 2003-2007 Ex PCU Coordinator 2007-2008 HQ Interviewees 15 Tova Solo TTL of project from 2001 to 2004 16 Alexandra Ortiz TTL of Project from 2004 to 2007 17 Joaquin Toro TTL of Project from 2007to 2009 18 Enrique Pantoja Sr. Land Administration Specialist 39 Table B. Ongoing operations in DRM in Nicaragua Existing Projects with Donors and Funding Agency / Allocated HFA International Financial Institutions International Partners Budget and Activity Period Area(s) (US$) Nicaragua Disaster Vulnerability Reduction World Bank 10 million 1, 2, 3, 4, Project 2001-2009 5 Hurricane Felix Emergency Recovery World Bank 17 million 4 2008 -2011 Support for DesInventar online disaster PREDECAN Not available 2 database creation of the National Disaster 2008-2009 Prevention and Management Information System (SIAPAD) Seminars and guidance for municipalities on PREDECAN Not available 2 risk reduction 2008-2009 A study to update Disaster Risk Management IADB Not available 2 Indicators 2009 Development of a Risk Assessment Platform World Bank (GFDRR) 350,000 2,3 for Nicaragua 2009-2010 Development of disaster risk management Japan International 300,000 2,4 capacity at the local level in Bonsai Cooperation Agency 2008-2011 Program for the Reduction of Vulnerability European Commission 3.33 million 1,2,4 and Environmental Degradation in Nicaragua 2007-2011 (PREVDA) Regional Plan for Disaster Reduction (PRRD) Norway, 400,000 1 Spanish International Cooperation 2006-2011 Agency Disaster Risk Management for volcanic and Disaster Preparedness Programme 520,000 2,4 landslide hazards in Ometepe island of the European Commission's 2008-2011 Humanitarian Aid Department (DIPECHO) Training on disaster risk management to local UNDP 400,000 1 authorities Disaster risk reduction program for Nicaragua Swiss Cooperation COSUDE 2.2 million 1, 2, 3, 5 2008-2012 Earthquake Risk Reduction in Guatemala, El Norway 2.4 million 2 Salvador and Nicaragua with regional 2007-2010 cooperation support to Honduras, Costa Rica and Panama (RESIS II) Regional Program of Environment in Central Danish Cooperation (DANIDA) Not available 2,4 America (PREMACA) Mesoamerican coordination system for IADB 800,000 2 territorial information 2009-2011 Technical assistance to strengthen World Bank 446,000 1,2 Information and Communication Tools for 2007-2009 CEPREDENAC and National Commissions 40 C. Chronology of Project NICARAGUA NATURAL DISASTER VULNERABILITY REDUCTION PROJECT CHRONOLOGY Description 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 Efect Oct Sept Responsible Unit Tech. Unit Executive Secretariat SINAPRED Project Coordinating Unit Executive Secretariat SINAPRED June Coordinator Tech. Unit José Santos Mendoza Julio Icaza Brenda Mendieta Executive Secretary SINAPRED April Nov January Executive Secretary N/A Cristóbal Sequeira Jerónimo Giusto J. Ramón Arnesto Sosa April April Sept April Sept Feb Implementation periods Original timeline of project Ext. 1 Ext 2 Ext. 3 Ext. 4 Final extention (5) 40 WB339312 C:\Users\WB339312\Documents\Nica-ICR\ICR_Nicaragua_Aug 27.docx 8/28/2009 12:03:00 PM 40