

## Urban Politics in Kenya and Tanzania

### Cities and Political Change

by Richard Stren, Mohamed Halfani, and Joyce Malombe

NAIROBI and DAR ES SALAAM. Urban areas in Africa are often arenas for major political change. As centers of national power and authority, urban areas have been focal points for political agitation and transformation. At the same time, concentration of the most strategic sectors of the national economy in cities endows urban areas with a political vitality much greater than their physical boundaries. Thus in the 1990s, as Africa enters a new era of political pluralism, and with the resurgence of civil associations, urban areas have become centers for the reform process. This has happened in countries that have pursued completely opposite development strategies, such as Kenya and Tanzania.

Both Kenya and Tanzania pursued high-profile, contrasting urban policies in the 1960s and 1970s. Local government, as the focus of political activity, declined sharply during the same period in both countries. Since the 1980s stagnant, and even faltering economies have severely

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## Hawker Politics in Nairobi

by Otula Owuor

NAIROBI. Residents of Nairobi are still recovering from the shock of the January 1994 beating death of 37-year-old street hawker, James

stations for booking, the officers declined to charge him on the grounds that he was already "a dying man."

Given this chain of events, many



Destruction of hawkers' stalls in Nairobi/February 1994.

Irungu, allegedly at the hands of city askaris (security police). In the wake of this incident, the city askaris destroyed a used clothing market containing hundreds of kiosks and other structures, which they claimed were built by the hawkers without proper authority. These actions were followed by the beating of the chairman of the Hawkers' Joint Commission, Wilson Muchiri, causing him serious injuries. Although Muchiri was taken to one of the city police

were surprised when the popular Nairobi mayor, Steve Mwangi, said he had no prior knowledge of any of these actions. He made the point that the senior officers of the city council are seconded to the city by the Ministry of Local Government, and as such are not directly under his control. But in response to criticism from newspaper editorials, Mwangi told his senior officers, "I swear to God that you have declared war on me and the city council but I also swear to God that you will not make it."

This ongoing controversy underscores the fact that Nairobi is currently being run—for the first time in its history—by an elected council comprised mainly of councillors from opposition parties. When Mayor Mwangi of Ford Asili (an opposition party) took office in early 1993, he quickly learned that he had to collaborate with the ruling party, KANU, and its Ministry for Local Government, if he wanted to accomplish anything during his term. While this conciliatory approach has cost him the support of some of his own party councillors, the head of the city askaris has now been transferred and the mayor has regained much needed credibility.

These tragic events in Nairobi are a strong reminder of the importance of achieving a working compromise between local and central governments over city council policies which affect the survival of the urban poor.

Otula Owuor is a Kenyan journalist who writes regularly for the Nation newspaper in Nairobi, and who has contributed to past issues of The Urban Age.



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**LETTERS TO THE EDITOR**

We welcome your comments, thoughts, and suggestions on *The Urban Age*.

The following letter was among those received in response to the Summer 1993 issue on "Urban Violence":

Editor:  
I was impressed by Usha Rai's article, "Escalating Violence Against Adolescent Girls in India," and hope it reaches policy makers in my country.

Rape, which was hitherto virtually unknown in the Ghanaian media, is hitting the headlines. Of late, calls have been made for measures to help curb the incidence of rape. These have, however, not gone far enough.

The threat of violence against adolescent girls is indeed a very real one, and should be of major concern to anyone who has the welfare of society at heart. Your topic for the Summer 1993 issue was very appropriate and Usha Rai's article was very down to earth and thought provoking.

*Eric Tudzi  
Department of Land Economy and  
Estate Management  
University of Science and Technology  
Kumasi, Ghana*

The following letters were among those received in response to the Fall 1993 issue on "Urban Transportation":

Editor:  
We read your Fall 1993 issue with interest. Most articles advocate policy changes or recommend reforms, but the actual development appears to be the same in most places: faster urban sprawl and fragmentation, more traffic chaos and less safety, more environmental devastation, higher direct cost and longer travel times. And a growing imbalance between those who can afford to pay the cost of good transport and attractive locations to live in and work and those who cannot.

We presently work in Tanzania and Kenya on a study of non-motorized urban transport (the majority of all trips) and mobility, as part of the UNECA/World Bank Sub-Saharan Africa Transport Programme. The first target is to formulate non-motorized transport action plans for Dar es Salaam and Nairobi. The next step will be pilot projects to test the efficiency and effectiveness of different plan elements.

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**Editor's Note**

This issue of *The Urban Age* charts new territory by attempting to explore city politics. As the world becomes more urban, discussions of city politics will become increasingly important. Clearly, there is a strong political dimension to what happens in cities worldwide.

The broad range of topics and insights found in these articles represent pieces of a much larger puzzle. This issue is best viewed as a collection of ideas, stories, and viewpoints, and a contribution to the further exploration of urban politics.

Many common threads weave this issue together, even though articles were written by a diverse group including practitioners, academics, journalists, observers, social and political scientists. One common theme is that cities and municipalities are the power closest to the people, and therefore the place where human problems often have the potential to be resolved.

Articles from Kenya, Tanzania, Ecuador, Uganda, and Honduras describe growing tensions between local governments and the urban poor. As urban poverty increases and more people rely on the informal sector for basic survival, local politics and attempts by local or national authorities to regulate or influence the informal sector become highly charged.

The faces of the urban poor include men, women (often single-heads of household), and children. As a basic survival strategy, more

women are becoming activists, as discussed in the article from Nigeria. However, elected politicians and high-level political and economic decision-makers are predominantly men. Articles from Nigeria and the United Kingdom offer interesting insights into gender and urban politics.

The Honduran authors ask why disorderly urban growth, land tenure, and provision of basic urban services should be so difficult to resolve. They conclude the problems are not technical, but essentially political. Along with other contributors, they advocate greater participation. Articles from the United Kingdom and Peru show how participatory approaches can enable communities to empower themselves.

A final word of thanks to the authors of articles included in this issue. A number of them took on the difficult task of writing about politically sensitive topics in countries where freedom of speech and political expression are still tenuous. We thank each contributor for their own personal efforts in putting this issue together.

With this issue we hope to start a dialogue on the topic of urban politics, and we encourage you to participate in this interchange and debate. We also hope to hear from you with your comments, suggestions, and feedback on *The Urban Age*.

*—Bonnie Bradford*

# Politics and the City

by Paul Singer

Paul Singer, a Brazilian economist, is a professor at the University of Sao Paulo, and a researcher at CEBRAP (Brazilian Center for Analysis and Planning). He writes on urban issues in developing economies and served as Planning Secretary of the city government of Sao Paulo from 1989 to 1992.



It is not by chance that “politics” and “city” have the same Greek root, *polis*. Politics is the organized effort to obtain and exercise power—the power to manage what is “public” and to govern society. Politics presupposes social interdependence, which in turn requires a government to coordinate a whole range of services and infrastructure available to everyone.

This interdependence is a typically urban phenomenon; it is in cities that the social division of labor makes the well being and even the survival of each individual dependent upon the work of others. The country, on the other hand, is characterized by the self-sufficiency of small groups—family, tribe, and village—that are capable of providing for themselves and of living in relative isolation.

Like so many other features of our social life, politics and cities have undergone a revolution in this century. Since the nineteenth century, industrialization has led to the rapid growth of cities; but another revolution began at the end of that century that has reached its peak in our own, namely the true urbanization of our cities.

Initially, industrial cities were actually rural communities—huge villages in which the packed, immigrant masses engaged in new forms of social production while entirely lacking any kind of collective consumption. The latter got underway with the introduction of potable water and sanitation networks, public transportation, mass transit systems, schools, creches, public clinics, police forces, trash collection, lighting, and other infrastructure culminating in our modern communications and entertainment systems—the telephone, radio, television, and all their infinite variations. The city

truly became urban when it began to offer inhabitants and visitors a lifestyle that was inconceivable in any other environment.

It was in these cities that the democratic revolution that was occurring concurrently had its greatest impact, since it was here that the discrepancy between the economic importance of the growing mass of wage laborers and their exclusion from the liberal political system was most obvious.

Cities world-wide were the scenes of major demonstrations and struggles, culminating, in the twentieth century, in the attainment of the right to vote by marginalized groups, including non-property owning workers, women, and minorities. In Oceania, Western Europe, and North America, where democracy triumphed during the first half of this century, the democratization of political life proceeded apace; in Asia, Africa, Eastern Europe, and Latin America, the democratic revolution is still going on.

The institutionalization of democracy occasioned deep changes in capitalist societies, resulting in what may be called “urban lifestyle”. This depends on the provision of the infrastructure and public services demanded by the vast mass of non-property owners, whose political power, embodied in the right to vote, ensures that they are heard. Part of the overall economic surplus is systematically appropriated by the state to finance the construction and operation of an expanding range of urban services.

In a nutshell, the growth of cities makes democracy probable and the existence of democracy “urbanizes” the cities. Public services become the main source of metropolitan well-being where they are plentiful, and of urban chaos where they are not.

However, in recent decades the urban-democratic symbiosis has begun to fall apart. Private capital has become increasingly international and can thus avoid the fiscal claims of federal and local governments. As a result, the economic surplus has in many countries grown more slowly and its partial expropriation by the state has been reversed.

Municipalities are being overtaken by a crisis, which is then resolved at the expense of their populations, who cannot afford to buy in the market the services that the public sector can no longer provide, at least not in line with the needs. Those who can afford these services are leaving the city to form their own communities, and the city now has to deal with a new proletariat made up of the chronically unemployed, clandestine immigrants in precarious occupations, delinquents of various kinds, along with the remainder of its “normal” citizens. While this new proletariat has political rights, it has no use for them because it has been deprived of its link to social production and the greater part of collective consumption.

The crisis does not stem from any decline in production; indeed, labor productivity continues to grow and new consumer products are being introduced constantly. The crisis lies not in the origin but in the destination of social production; the decline in some urban services and the privatization of others, making them more expensive, has increased disparities in

income and living standards, creating in the urban landscape small suburban oases of peace and prosperity amid a desert of decay characterized by idle resources and individuals, criminal and psychopathic violence, misery, and despair.

This picture is not universal, but applies to an astonishing extent to the large cities in the industrialized nations, the ex-communist countries, and the developing world, in which traditional backwardness is interlinked with the decline of an urban environment that never matured.

The current urban crisis is the result of the weakening of nation states; its solution will require the creation of multinational public agencies that must reclaim control, on behalf of democratic majorities, of the destination of the economic surplus. The experience of the European Community also suggests probable directions for other regions whose integration is less advanced.

It will in addition be necessary, in the urban context, to adjust the limits and relations between the public and private sectors and to ensure that public services are operated considerably more efficiently, transparently, and honestly. This is a difficult challenge, but one that must be met. There is nothing else that can possibly perform the economic, political, and cultural role of large democratic cities in contemporary civilization.

*The Urban Age aims to stimulate lively debate and interaction on various topics in developed and developing countries. The ideas expressed in articles appearing in The Urban Age reflect the personal comments of each author, and are not representative of any one agency or organization.*

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reduced resources for urban public infrastructure and services. Urban economic decline contributed to the development of political opposition, which in turn fueled more political diversity and turbulence than either country had known for decades. This pattern of secular urban decline, leading to increasingly vocal oppositional politics and demands for reform of the local government system, is also common in many other countries in Africa.

Although Kenya and Tanzania approached their urban areas very differently during the 1960s and 1970s (Kenya took a "capitalist" approach, while Tanzania took a "socialist" approach), public investments in urban services and infrastructure fell markedly in both countries during the 1980s. This resulted in two parallel tendencies: small-scale enterprises have taken up some of the slack by catering to popular needs; while squatter areas have burgeoned, public health conditions have deteriorated, and city-wide services have faltered.

In response to the changing "informalization" of their cities, the Kenyan government has intermittently attempted to "clean up" Nairobi with massive slum-clearance operations, while the Tanzanians have attacked their urban informal sector with the "Human Resources Deployment Act," a euphemism for forced resettlement. By the early 1990s, it was generally recognized that neither approach had been effective. Indeed, for a time the political unpopularity of these measures seriously reduced the legitimacy of the national governments in both countries.

In contrast, when either government supported rather than confronted the informal sector—as with the legalization of private passenger trucks or minibuses (*matatus* in Kenya and *daladalas* in Tanzania), or the government-sponsored *Jua Kali* program in support of the informal sector in Kenya—the political climate improved. But as the state progressively disengaged from providing services in the urban areas of both countries, local collective efforts took on more importance, for example, the work of non-governmental organizations (NGOs).

## Kenya

During the 1980s and early 1990s the Kenyan government has appeared to be more concerned with controlling local governments than with providing services. A prime example is the 1983 District Focus for Rural Development initiative, which aimed to decentralize the decision-making process and strengthen local institutions. This initiative—which in the end amounted to deconcentration rather than effective decentralization—was extended to the cities, where District Development Committees (DDCs) were established. The DDCs were actively functioning committees within the local authority structure made up of central government officials, members of parliament, and other nominated individuals. At the same time, a "rural-urban balance" strategy was put into place, in which urban infrastructure was to stimulate the economic development of both urban centers and agricultural hinterlands. However, the success of these strategies was hampered by recession and the introduction of structural adjustment policies.

The limited effectiveness of the government's management of urban services has increased the momentum of community based initiatives and strengthened and solidified the informal sector. Over time natural associations of people, such as migrants from the same home district, have attempted to respond to the specific needs of low-income communities. They have often received help from religious and charity organizations, and a variety of NGOs. As the central government supported fewer activities at the local level (either directly or through the local government) the role of NGOs became more important. A study of 80 NGOs in Nairobi shows they provide a wide range of basic services, including child

care, nutritional counselling, family planning, basic health services, and education.

## Reasserting central control

In their attempts to deliver urban services, local governments have been hampered by increasing central control exercised through the DDCs. For example, late in 1989 some of the DDCs mandated a new service charge to make up for local revenue deficiencies. While this new source of revenue has been considerable, services have not improved substantially. Many local authorities struggle to make ends meet; deficits and heavy debt burdens are common. Access to capital is insufficient, investment in infrastructure is generally inadequate, and maintenance is poor.

The most heralded failure in local government in Kenya is Nairobi. Early in March, 1983, the central government suspended meetings of the Nairobi City Council and excluded all elected officers (the mayor, the deputy mayor, and all councillors) from council activities, placing the council under the control of nominated officials. Several weeks later, the Minister for Local Government went even further, placing all municipal employees and all buildings and services under the direct control of a Commission that he had appointed to supplant the Council. Contradicting its original intention to clean up the Council and re-establish elected local government, the government passed motions through parliament extending the life of the City Commission until elections in December, 1992. Over this ten-year period, a string of political appointees chaired the Nairobi City Commission, and the Commission's finances went from bad to worse, with the central government running up big debts with the city agency. The quality of services also declined steadily.

Part of the motivation for dismantling the Nairobi City Council may have been to take the control of a substantial political base away from central province leaders, who tended to oppose President Daniel arap Moi's governing coalition. Indeed, none of the Ministers of Local Government during the 1980s and 1990s was from the central province of Kenya.

The 1992 multi-party elections ushered in a new chapter in Nairobi politics and in Kenyan politics in general. One of the major parties, Ford-Kenya, called for the granting of increased autonomy to local government, charging that the incumbent KANU regime had undermined the local council by giving power to corrupt, incompetent, unpopular leaders, while persecuting strong and popular councillors. But, whereas KANU had always captured both levels of seats in the urban wards and constituencies in the past, the opposition parties won most of the parliamentary seats in the major urban areas, and took control of 23 out of the 26 municipal councils, including Nairobi. In Nairobi, KANU won only one of eight parliamentary seats, and seven of the 55 elected seats on the City Council.

Soon after Nairobi's new mayor—Stephen Mwangi of the Ford Asili party—was elected a power struggle between the local councils and Daniel arap Moi's central government began to take shape. Aside from using his statutory power to nominate only KANU councilors to fill a certain number of seats in every council, the KANU-appointed Minister of Local Government issued a series of directives that curtailed the powers of Kenyan mayors. Tensions between the City Council and central government (such as those described in Owuor's article on page 1) continue.

## Tanzania

Thirteen years after its socialist proclamation in 1967, it was clear that Tanzania's development strategy had hindered urban areas. The goals of

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## KENYA AND TANZANIA

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imparting education for self-reliance, promoting collectivist rural production, and making the transformation into a modern agricultural economy did not occur as planned. Rural conditions were not attractive enough to stop the rapid migration to the cities. Between 1967 and 1978 alone, the population in urban areas doubled in size.

As part of the so-called "decentralization" policy of 1972-1978, urban councils were dismantled. Although the bureaucracy was extended to lower administrative levels, power and authority remained at the central level. The District Development Committees that were established in cities and towns focused on rural agricultural production, largely ignoring the maintenance of urban infrastructure. Revenue mobilization continued to be centralized—all taxes and fees were collected by the central government treasury and then remitted to the districts once suggested plans were approved. Urban development activities were considered consumption-oriented and unnecessary.

The strategy of deconcentrating economic activities away from Dar es Salaam backfired. Nine towns were identified to act as "growth poles" for future development and all planned industries were to be distributed to these nine towns. Yet, by 1985, more than 60% of all industrial establishments were still in Dar es Salaam. At the same time the basic industrial strategy was complicated by difficulties caused by the 1978/79 war with Uganda, the oil crisis, the break-up of the East African Community, and a severe drought.

### *The re-establishment of urban authorities*

In 1976 a special committee of high-level national officials recommended several major policy changes. Among the major changes suggested were: complementary development of rural and urban areas; allocation of an adequate number of competent personnel to high growth rate cities; and allocation of funds to the councils for basic services.

Urban councils were re-established in 1978 with passage of the Urban Council (Interim Provisions) Act. In 1980, the government issued a coherent urban development policy dealing with the operation, maintenance and development of urban centers. Forming the basis for the Local Government (Urban Authorities) Act of 1982, the policy gave citizens a say in urban development planning and execution.

Re-establishing urban authorities provided an institutional framework to manage Tanzania's urban centers, and elevated several medium-size towns to municipal status. However, the urban councils lacked sufficient manpower, equipment, and finance. The central government retained all the important sources of revenue and the final say in approving all development plans. Urban councils basically functioned as subsidiary departments of the central government.

### *Responses to the informal sector*

*Oparesheni Nguvu Kazi*, or Operation Labor-force, was an ill-fated and ill-advised state response to the urban crisis. "Unemployable" urban residents were rounded up and repatriated to their home villages. This included most people working in the informal sector. They were given travel allowances, and upon reporting to the party and government representatives at the destination, were in principle to be resettled on assigned pieces of land for farming. The arrests and repatriation of the "unemployed" created chaos in many urban areas, and was abandoned when the authorities realized that many of the "repatriated" immediately returned to the city.

A second component was the easing of licensing conditions for small-scale enterprises in urban centers, so informal sector operators could engage in legal, productive activities. The *nguvu kazi* licenses were

cheaper and did not involve paying income tax. This licensing component has continued, despite confrontations between informal sector operators and urban authorities. There has been considerable political pressure, from as high as the President's office, to protect the vendors. Some licenses have been abused, but since the mid-1980s, informal sector activities have been operating with fewer harassments compared with the 1970s.

### *Market reforms and informal networks*

The socialist policies of the mid-1960s and 1970s failed to meet people's basic needs, especially in cities. In the mid-1980s socialist policies gave way to market-oriented reforms. The disturbing side of the shift to capitalism was that inequalities became more glaring—most of the improvements in cities resulting from these reforms benefitted the middle or upper classes, not the poor.

In 1986 the government agreed to meet several International Monetary Fund loan conditionalities, including adopting a liberal, market-oriented development strategy. This unleashed private capital into the real estate sector, and brought some investment back into the larger cities in the form of luxury housing and commercial space. Import liberalization permitted the acquisition of conspicuous consumption goods. Today Dar es Salaam is a city of contrasts, with shacks and slums built close to beach front bungalows, and street hawkers selling cheap goods outside elegant boutiques in the downtown area.

Left to fend for themselves during the years of failed socialist reform and subsequent structural adjustment, informal sector workers created networks to cope with the scarcity of credit, services, and protection from corruption. In addition to the formation of associations of butchery owners, taxi drivers, *daladala* operators, market vendors, and cart pullers (*mikokoteni*), collective organizations were also formed among squatter communities. Lack of access to bank credit led to the creation of rotating credit networks.

Comparisons between large urban centers in Kenya and Tanzania illustrate two important, but contradictory tendencies that can be applied to many other African countries. The first is that as national governments lose their resource base, they must depend much more on urban residents to organize on their own. The less governments attempt to control this process, the more successful they will be. Second, governments can ignore their urban populations and reduce expenditures on needed services and infrastructure only up to a point, and only at their peril. As African countries move—albeit unevenly—toward more political pluralism, the voices of urban residents will play an increasingly critical role in the political life of African cities.

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# Marketplace Politics in Kampala and Quito

by Christie Gombay

**6** Christie Gombay is an urban management consultant with experience in Africa and Latin America. He is currently a Ph.D student at the University of Toronto affiliated with the Centre for Urban and Community Studies.

**KAMPALA** and **QUITO.** Abraham Musisi curses as he walks toward Owino Market. It's only 3:00PM, but already the hawkers have begun to congregate around the market gates. How things have changed. When Owino Market was opened in 1972, everything looked so neat and clean. It was planned to hold four hundred vendors. Who would have thought the market would turn into what it has become today—over five thousand stalls spreading out in all directions. Some say it is the

the huge illegal evening market that opens at 5:00PM every day just outside the main gate.

Half a world away in Quito, Ecuador, it is early dawn, and Senora Esperanza de Armas is busy negotiating with avocado wholesalers outside San Roque Market. She watches nervously over her shoulder as she brings out her money to pay the transporter. Last week, a vendor in the fruit section was robbed at knifepoint by delinquents. It has become dangerous since the market

vendors today in Kampala and Quito. And their musings on life in the markets are oddly similar, even though they are half a world apart. Both are squeezed by the prospects of increasing rents and competition from street vendors and informal markets. The vendors in both markets are in trouble; everyday survival has become an issue.

The markets are also in trouble. Each has a growing number of vacant stalls and the number of customers who come into the market is on the decline. For the city councils of Kampala and Quito, this means reduced revenues, public recrimination for failing to stem the tide of street hawkers, and increasing demands by the vendors for upgrading the markets to bring customers back.

As cities in developing countries continue to grow and urban poverty increases, more people rely on the urban market as a means of survival. At the same time, local governments are weakening in the face of apparently insurmountable demands for urban services. Deteriorating salaries within many local governments and the drive to restructure and modernize their functions has led to a growing tension between the objectives of local government, the objectives of their bureaucracies, and the conditions of the urban poor.

## Kampala's Illegal Evening Markets

The KCC is trying to improve the urban management of the formal Kampala markets. However a serious political and economic obstacle has emerged: the evening market undermines the city council's revenue base, and more importantly, challenges their authority and control of land-use within the city.

It is around the "illegal" evening market that expands out from

Owino that the politics of survival converge. It is here that the survival of vendors, resistance councils, KCC officers, and Ministry officials intersect and conflict. The dispute is not over how much the vendors pay, but over who gets the proceeds and how they are divided.

With over 5,000 stalls selling everything from clothing to hardware to traditional herbal remedies, the Owino Market is the single largest source of employment in the city—employing over 25,000 people. It provides KCC with approximately half of its entire market revenues for the city, and 16% of the city council's recurrent revenues.


In the late 1980s, the KCC announced that they would rehabilitate Owino Market. However, the market project has not gotten off the ground. In the meantime, conditions in Owino have continued to deteriorate.

During 1990, the Market Vendor's Association (MVA) pressed the KCC and the Ministry of Local Government to deal with the issue of the evening markets, but their efforts met with little success. In fact, in September 1990, the Minister of Local Government allowed vendors to "temporarily" trade from two of the streets adjacent to the market and in the parking lot after 5:00PM. This "informal" protection acted as a dramatic catalyst for the growth of the evening market, and the daytime market continued to decline.

Far from discouraging the evening market, the KCC and the Minister of Local Government were, in effect, managing it. Their responsibilities included security within the market, allocating stalls, and collecting revenue for cleaning the streets at the end of every evenings' selling. Each vendor in

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Daily street markets and street hawkers compete with San Roque market.



largest market in East Africa.

As he gingerly makes his way along the muddy channels leading to his stall, Musisi looks up apprehensively at the sky and mentally curses the pack of thieves at the Kampala City Council (KCC) for their broken and empty promises. For almost ten years now they have been promising to "rehabilitate" Owino Market but what has come of it? Increased rents and fewer customers.

Abraham has given up trying to make a living in his stall at Owino. Now, like many of his neighbors, he shows up in the early afternoon and prepares to do his business in

administration decided not to intervene in pre-market activities. The market administrator had been stabbed twice trying to break up disputes in the early morning hours. Senora de Armas wonders why she continues to work in San Roque. Most of her neighbors have kept their stalls but spend most of the week working in various "ferias libres" ("informal" street markets) which are set up in different zones of the city.

## Increasing Rent and Competition

Abraham Musisi and Senora de Armas could be any one of the real

## MARKETS

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the evening market had to pay a fee for a stall, and rent per evening to sell in the market. The fees were paid to collectors appointed by the Market Management Committee (MMC), and the daily dues were collected nightly by individuals who worked for the KCC.

Although no official statistics are available, the evening market is generating a conservatively estimated Ug. Shs. 10 million per month [1,161 Ug. Shs. = 1 \$US]. Where this money goes is something of a mystery, but the view among vendors in both Owino and the evening market is that it goes to individuals in the KCC and the Ministry of Local Government.

The economic imperative of survival drives vendors to sell at the evening market. The protection provided by the Minister and the neighboring Resistance Councils may have originally been due to benevolent concern for the urban poor, but is now a major financial concern that helps to ensure both their financial and political survival.

### **Privatization in Ecuador**

While the financial pressures that drive politicians and bureaucrats in Kampala to engage in market politics may not be as prevalent in Quito, the economic struggle for survival by market vendors is strong. Urban growth without the creation of formal sector jobs has led to an explosion of informal markets in Quito, and legal market vendors are caught in the crunch.

Real incomes of Ecuadorians have plummeted by approximately 60% in the past decade. Almost three-quarters of Quito's residents earn their living through commercial activities, many in the informal sector. As the formal economy has contracted, markets and marketing has come to play an increasingly pivotal role in the survival strategies of the urban poor. Between 1982 and 1988, self-employment in Quito grew by about 10% annually. According to the municipality of Quito (IMQ), the number of street

vendors tripled between 1976 and 1982 from 10,000 to 30,000.

During the 1980s the bulk of the IMQ's revenues came from central government grants. With the downturn in oil prices, and consequently central government revenues, transfers to municipalities in Ecuador have been significantly reduced. Local authorities have been encouraged to become more self-sufficient, develop their own sources of revenues, and reduce costs. One of the first steps the IMQ took in this direction was to announce the privatization of markets in March 1993.

Markets in Quito had been under pressure for some time. Quito has 29 recognized municipal markets with 6,170 stalls, 558 stores, and 204 warehouses. Their direct competition has come from two sources: "ferias libres" (daily street-markets), and street hawkers. Ferias libres were small daily markets which operated on streets in different neighborhoods of Quito on different days of the week. Under the administration of President Borja, they were legalized and regulated by the central government. Street hawking is one of the primary survival strategies of the urban poor in Quito.

The growth of informal hawking and free markets has led to the decline of the established municipal markets. Nowhere is this more apparent than in the San Roque market, where many of the stalls are either used as store-houses for vendors or are entirely vacant. The original market had 676 stalls, but street hawkers pressured the municipal governments for more land. Over the years the market was expanded and now there are almost 2,000 stalls, making this market the largest in Quito.

The reaction of the market vendors to the proposal of privatization was swift. Until the announcement of the privatization of the markets, market vendors had been rather loosely organized. Each individual market had its own market organization, and some had more than one. The city-level organization responsible for representing all vendors' views to

the municipality, the Market Union, had been formed in the late 1970s to counter an earlier Municipal effort at privatizing the markets. Since then, Quito's vendors felt this organization had weakened and was no longer capable of effectively countering the new threat of privatization.

At a general assembly of the Market Union in mid-March, a breakaway faction calling itself Frente por la Defensa de los Mercados (the Front for the Defense of the Markets) was formed and immediately challenged both the president of the Market Union and the IMQ. This was to have serious repercussions both for the speed with which positions on the issue were radicalized, and the ability of the IMQ to negotiate privatization with a credible interlocutor from the vendors' side.

The position of the Frente to the privatization of the markets hinged on two principles: market vendors are poor and therefore the municipal government has the social obligation of continuing to support the markets; and the privatization of the markets would lead to tremendous dislocation among the 100,000 people whose lives are directly dependent upon sales from the markets. The IMQ's position was that local authorities should not be responsible for managing and administering markets, in part because the existing administrative apparatus for doing so was corrupt, but more importantly, because the actual cost of maintaining the markets far outstripped the revenues being received from vendors for their upkeep. The IMQ invested ten times as much per year as it recovered from markets in the form of rents from vendors.

The municipality's objective was to move toward the privatization of the markets as quickly as possible. However, two months after the announcement of the transfer, the proposal for privatization had not yet been discussed with the vendors and

appeared to be mired within the bureaucratic channels of the IMQ.

The vendors launched an effective campaign to forestall the privatization of the markets. It involved both direct lobbying of municipal councillors, vendor mobilization rallies, and an attempt to convey their concerns through the media. In April 1993, a dam in southern Ecuador broke and displaced thousands of people. The Frente mobilized vendors of markets in Quito to donate goods to the victims in a highly publicized campaign. At the same time, there was a series of articles in Quito's papers attacking the resurgence of street hawkers in the city and calling on the IMQ to take more effective action. The IMQ was also stymied by the internal power struggle within the vendors's association. Promoting dialogue and participation of vendors in privatization is not possible without effective representation from the vendors. By the end of 1993, privatization, which was launched with such fanfare earlier in the year as the first major initiative of the new mayor, had yet to come to fruition.

### **The Power of Local Politics**

Each of these stories shows how struggles against local authorities managed to deflect or challenge initiatives launched to improve urban management. There is a tendency to forget that local authorities are also local governments and as such are sites of political struggle and contention. In matters which so directly affect the livelihoods and survival of people in cities—where alternative sources of survival are few—it is not surprising that local politics can take on a much larger dimension in the overall ability of local authorities to effectively implement restructuring programs. Not until these forces and challenges to urban management are addressed will substantial progress be made to improve cities in developing countries.



# The Municipality: Colombia's New Scene of Political Activity

by Fabio E. Velasquez C.

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CALI. After a series of reforms to dismantle a rigid, centralized system, Colombia's municipalities are becoming launching points for political change. While patronage and corruption persist, some positive effects are emerging from the recent reinstitution of mayoral elections. Local politics have renewed dynamism and citizens are becoming involved in resolving local problems.

mayors became representatives of the central government, and local authorities were placed under central supervision.

## The Weakening of Municipal Power

After 1886 municipalities lost political influence. Since the 1940s they have been steadily deprived of substantive power and re-

governors, mayors were political representatives of the regional bosses and intermediaries between the departmental and national authorities and vested local political interests. Because of corruption and the absence of genuine, broad-based representation or responsiveness to local needs, voter turnouts in local elections fell to all-time lows.

## Social Conflicts, Municipal Reform, and Mayoral Elections

The loss of popular confidence in local authorities created a gulf between society and the state. Because no channels existed for participation that would have enabled day-to-day interaction, this rift steadily widened. In response, from the 1970s through the mid-1980s, regional and local grassroots citizen action became increasingly common. Between 1971 and 1985, 300 citizen protest actions decried public service problems and the lack of effective government policies. By the mid-1980s the municipality was the most evident point of social conflict and the weakest link in the chain of state institutions. Calls grew for reforms to modernize municipal administration, democratize local power, and provide a relief valve for citizen pressure.

A broad reform program was initiated in 1986 that returned administrative power to the municipalities in the areas of education, health, housing, public works, and water supply and environmental sanitation. Additional resources were allocated to urban areas. Mechanisms were instituted for citizen and political participation, including the election of mayors by the people.

The election of mayors was not new to Colombia. Mayors had been elected at various times in the

nineteenth century, especially when the young republic was based on federalist ideas. After 1886, however, the position of mayor ceased to exist, although it became one of the proposals embodied in the Liberal Party's programs.

The election of mayors was formalized in 1986 to begin in 1988, with single two-year terms. Subsequently, the constitutional reform of 1991 extended the period of office to three years as of January 1995.

## Outcomes of the Reforms

The country pinned high hopes on the election of mayors. Despite opposition from conservatives afraid that the power of the executive branch would be eroded and from some on the left who saw decentralization and local elections as one more device by the dominant class to gull the public, most Colombians welcomed political change. Between the end of 1987 and the March 1988 elections, about 1,000 leaders and activists of left-wing parties and civic movements were murdered. Although marred by these acts of violence, the mayoral campaign of 1988 continued. The two elections that followed (1990 and 1992) aroused appreciable interest.

The repercussions of the three elections and the performance of the mayors since the 1988 reform can be summarized as follows:

- Voter turnout, although displaying a relative downward trend since reforms began (67% in 1988; 42% in 1992), has exceeded that of prior elections. The recent decline in turnout may be due to widespread political apathy, disappointment with the performance of many of the new mayors, and, in the 1992 election, voter



Local politics have become more dynamic, as seen in this Cali demonstration.

Civil wars and ideological disputes waged in Colombia in the 1800s were caused largely by disagreements about how to organize state institutions. Proponents of a strong federal system prevailed over those in favor of sovereign states. The constitution of 1886, based on "political centralization and administrative decentralization", centralized elections, law-making, the army, taxation, and control of currency. The state was given control over the manufacture and possession of arms and munitions.

The president's term of office was lengthened, while those of senators and representatives were shortened. Sovereign states were replaced by departments which, together with the municipalities, were assigned exclusively administrative functions. Governors and

sources, with the central authorities chipping away at local functions. This included removing the power to manage policy and to oversee education, health, urban transportation (routes and tariffs), water supply and sewerage, the management of property records (except in Bogota, Medellin and Cali) and the construction of schools, low-cost housing, and rural roads. The share of regional and local revenues in the national tax base has been declining since the 1920s. By 1978, revenues from the departments and municipalities were only 18% of national tax revenues.

By the end of the 1980s, Colombia's municipalities had become vehicles for the patronage-based perpetuation of the interests of the local economic and political elite. Appointed by the regional

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fatigue from the frequent elections held between 1990 and 1992.

- The Liberal and Conservative parties still dominate—in 1988 and 1990 they won 88% of the vote; and in 1992, 87%.

- The rise of new local political forces and the creation of many diverse coalitions. These groups are all locally oriented and seek their political identity outside of the nationwide political groups.

- Now that political parties and local leaders play an active role in preparing municipal proposals for their respective municipalities, urban areas are becoming catalysts for change.

The performance of elected mayors has been mixed, but post-reform trends have emerged:

- Patronage persists. The mayor negotiates under the table with political groups to protect their privileges, private political interests prevail over common concerns of the majority, and political supporters are granted favors. Colombia's culture of patronage is entrenched in the political process and such patronage goes hand in hand with corruption. There are currently 700 mayors and former mayors under investigation by the Attorney General on charges of embezzlement, unlawful enrichment or mismanagement of public funds.

- Citizen participation in local affairs has gained substantial ground among local authorities, social leaders, and citizens. The idea that participation is necessary for resolving local problems is shared by a steadily growing number of citizens and political leaders. Additionally, mayors are accountable to voters—if elected officials violate their terms of office, they know they can be terminated.

- Municipalities and cities have again become seats of reflection, debate, and political struggle. People have become involved in local issues. Community politics are now more dynamic and are generating proposals for resolving local problems. The election of mayors has been one of Colombia's most important political reforms of this century.

## Tackling Urban Violence: An Update

*Prepared by the Urban Management Programme, Regional Office for Latin America and the Caribbean, Quito, Ecuador*

*[Editor's Note: This is a follow-up to the Summer 1993 Urban Age issue on urban violence. It describes activities taking place in Latin America on this important topic.]*

QUITO. Disturbed by the spread of urban crime and by the meager results of efforts to combat it, the Municipality of Cali, Colombia, and the Latin America and Caribbean Urban Management Programme (UMP) began a process to help tackle the problem.

The process began with the organization of a National Workshop for Mayors, "Urban Violence in Colombia," held in Cali in September 1993. About 20 mayors attended, and over 200 people participated, including representatives from government, various professions, and academia. This event served as the preparatory meeting for the larger "Latin American and Caribbean Conference on Urban Violence" held in Cali in December 1993.

The conference created an awareness of the need to build a regional networking system for sharing experiences of action and research on urban violence. A network of specialists and organizations is being formed, complete with a research program and plans for future conferences to continue working to find solutions. Dr. Rodrigo Guerrero, the present mayor of Cali, the UMP, the University of Valle, and the Municipality of Cali are coordinating this networking effort.

Case studies of 15 cities in 12 countries in the region were presented by experts invited from the region. These documents will constitute the core of a book soon to be published.

While the twin issues of urban crime and public safety are not identical in all the cities of the region, they call for immediate attention. The statistics reveal a growing rate of urban violence, and

public safety has become one of the primary demands of people in cities.

We must not overlook the effects that violence and efforts to combat it have had on the public.

needs to play a more active role as the state institution that comes in closest contact with society and daily life.

There is a need to prepare action plans and proposals for



*Rodrigo Guerrero, Mayor of Cali (center) and other urban violence conference participants/Cali, December 1993.*

The sense of citizenship is being eroded and people are beginning to adopt self-defense measures such as changing their daily routines, purchasing weapons, dogs, or alarm systems, or taking lessons in self-defense. A new social behavior results: anxiety, feelings of helplessness, isolation, mistrust, aggressiveness, and individualism.

The city is losing its public spaces and community areas; fortress-like private urban developments are spreading, accentuating the social, spatial, and temporal segregation that already exists. The end result is a loss of community as the city gradually relinquishes its socializing characteristics.

Violence is a national problem that threatens the very fabric of society and its institutions. Citizens are both the source and the target of the problem. A new institutional framework needs to be created and the municipality

dialogue with public, private, and community entities. Organized efforts are needed, for example, to stop the stimuli for the violence by the media; modify our alcohol-based leisure culture; control firearms and disarm the public; improve lighting and local transport services; and organize citizen safety and civil defense campaigns.

Municipal management and public safety will play important roles in this new institutional framework. Changes in law and law enforcement will naturally play a central role, as will coordination with other levels of government and with the public.

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# Is Urban Politics Unique?

by K.C. Sivaramakrishnan

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"All politics is local" said the late Tip O'Neil, former Speaker of the United States Congress. What then is special about urban politics? Is it very different from rural politics?

Animus against the city has a long tradition. Thomas Jefferson viewed all cities as "pestilential to

country. The advocacy of needs may be more visible in the city, but the manner of securing political support for its redress is not dissimilar between rural and urban areas.

Then there is the politics of caste and creed, of language and culture, and the rising claims of

sions to new industries locating in green fields or less developed parts of a country tend to reduce investments in the existing cities; centrally administered raw material or transport prices are critical factors in locational decisions. In most developing countries the ability and resources of city administrations and local development authorities to lessen this impact and maximize the city advantages is rather limited.

## Redefining Urban Politics

The domain of urban politics is thus limited to the mayor or the municipal chair, the councillors and the constituencies, and other ostensible institutions of urban administration. As urbanization increases, as growth overtakes urban infrastructure and as pressures for decentralization build, most developing countries are struggling to rearrange these formal institutions of urban governance and redefine urban political processes. The far-reaching amendments to the Indian constitution, legislated by the Parliament in 1992, and ratified by the states in mid-1993, represent a comprehensive example of such efforts.

In British India, local self government was hailed as the cradle of democracy. Many of the national leaders, such as Jawaharlal Nehru and Vallabhai Patel, had served as chairmen of municipalities early in their political careers. City governments like the Calcutta Corporation had been in the vanguard of the freedom movement. Yet, the constitution of 1950 did not contain any specific mention of local bodies, rural or urban, as units of self government. Their creation, powers, and supervision were dealt with by the state governments. It was expected that the states would nurture local

bodies as before. Events turned out to be otherwise. In fact, the Calcutta Corporation was one of the first city governments to be superseded in 1949 even before the constitution had come into force.

In many states, basic functions like water supply were taken away from municipalities on grounds such as resource mobilization, the need to serve larger jurisdictions, and efficiency. Where municipal domain was not shortened or undermined, the institutions were just superseded. In the 45 years since independence, in close to half of the 2,500 municipalities, elected councils have been suspended and the administration taken over by the state governments. The rights of local bodies and a constitutionally secured mandate for their functions thus became critical issues.

In 1989 the Rajiv Gandhi government prepared an amendment to the constitution for these and other purposes. The draft ran into political heavy weather. The opposition, while recognizing the need for decentralization and empowering local bodies, questioned the rights of the central government enacting such legislation, bypassing the states. The amendment was passed in the Lok Sabha (the House of the People) but was lost by 3 votes in the Rajya Sabha (the upper house). In subsequent elections Rajiv Gandhi's Congress party lost, but the successor governments pursued diluted versions of the amendment. The 1992 version prepared by the present Norasimha Rao government was substantially enlarged by a Parliamentary committee, passed by both Houses, ratified by the state governments, and became law on June 30, 1993.

Embodied as the 73rd and 74th amendments of the constitution,

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## National vs. Metropolitan Politics

National sovereignty and local autonomy are often perceived to be in conflict in issues of metropolitan governance, as in the U.K. and the Philippines. Students of urban governance refer to the Greater London Council (GLC) as an early model of metropolitan governance. Some believe, however, that the GLC was abolished by the Thatcher government not because of its failures to address metropolitan issues but because it emerged as a significant political force, frequently at odds with national government.

The transformation of the Metropolitan Manila Commission from a service agency to a conspicuous power under the governorship of Imelda Marcos and its subsequent abolition by the Aquino government is another case in point. The current government is attempting a reorganization, with a metropolitan authority performing inter-municipal tasks. —KCS

the morals, the health and the liberties of man." Mohandas Gandhi perceived the city as a villainous product of colonialism. "The city sucked the country dry" wrote Spengler. Even at the turn of this century, the New York tenements were labelled as the "nurseries of epidemics, hiding places of local banditti." These views characterize urban politics mainly in terms of discontent and social dissent, exploding from time to time.

In reality, urban politics is a vast and complex arena. First, there is the politics of want, of basic services, of minimum security of life and property. The process by which these needs are perceived, combined, advocated, and fulfilled are the subject of numerous books and papers, particularly those on slums and squatter settlements. Janice Perlman, in her pioneering studies on the *favelas* of Rio, has helped to dispel the myths of marginality and establish that this process is not very different to what happens elsewhere in a

ethnicity. In theory, the city is the melting pot. Proximity, mobility, and economic opportunity are expected to bring about a reduction in economic and social inequality and consequently, render these factors less divisive. Unfortunately, recent experience has been otherwise. Religious clashes in some Indian cities, ethnic strife in Bosnia, and the unending conflicts in several parts of Africa underscore the fact that the politics of clan and tribe pervade whole countries. Years of city-building and city living are not sufficient to temper or deflect those politics. On the contrary, communal considerations color and influence political issues in urban areas to a greater extent than is realized.

In the politics of managing a country's economy, the involvement of the urban and rural may vary in content, but both seek to influence decisions that national and provincial governments make on wages, prices, taxes, and tariffs. Of course, these decisions have significant spatial impact. Conces-

these reforms:

- provide for mandatory elections to all local bodies;
- limit supersession to a maximum of six months;
- delineate an illustrative list of functions and powers to be assigned to local bodies;
- create planning committees at the District (units below States) and metropolitan levels to address rural-urban, intermunicipal, and environmental relationships;
- prescribe mandatory local finance commissions in each state;
- relate the work of these commissions to the Central Finance Commission, which reviews intergovernment transfers and devolutions every five years; and
- enable states to expand the number of elected representatives by creating zonal committees in large cities and neighborhoods or ward committees in all cities, in addition to the existing constituencies of municipal councils.

The provision relating to wards and zonal committees is of particular significance to the issue of local representation. The considerable variance in the population size of a municipal ward, ranging from 30,000–100,000 and in some large cities, to even 200,000 or 300,000, has been a matter of concern. Rajiv Gandhi's amendment sought to widen local representation by mandating the introduction of additional tiers in local bodies. For instance, in addition to wards in municipalities, there would be elected neighborhood committees; large cities would have elected "zonal" committees in addition to the city council. However, in the final version the provision for neighborhood or ward committees is limited to cities of 300,000 population or more; their composition has been left to the states.

The size of an electorate in a state assembly or parliamentary constituency has also been a difficult problem to resolve in urban areas. Adjusting boundaries to reduce disparities in the size of electoral districts is a well known mechanism, but in India, the

exercise has been deferred, pending the results of the Census of 2001.

The deferment has led to under representation of urban voters in the State Legislative Assemblies as well as the Parliament. In states like Maharashtra, Tamil Nadu, or Gujarat where urban population is about 30% to 35%, members of the Assembly from urban areas account for only 15% to 17%. In the Parliament, only 49 of 542 seats represent urban or metropolitan constituencies.

Inter-municipal relations in metropolitan areas is another special aspect of urban politics. Though many of the world's largest cities are getting larger, municipal boundaries in most metropolitan areas have remained as before. Multi-municipal situations call for a metropolitan wide perception of some critical tasks that cannot be performed by the individual municipalities. Transport, environmental management, strategic planning, and enhancing financial options for the metro area as a whole are some examples of such metropolitan-level tasks. Identifying such tasks and creating the organizational framework for their implementation is a highly sensitive and arduous political process. Because of the scale and variety of needs and multiple jurisdictions, agencies of the provincial and national governments are also involved.

Governments in both developing and developed countries have sought solutions through "single-tier" metro governments (where most of the metro area is under one municipality) as in Jakarta and Bangkok, and "two-tier" set ups (where a number of municipalities exist in addition to a metro level body) as in Tokyo or Toronto.

The two-tier arrangements require careful delineation of metropolitan and local level responsibilities, resources for their performance at each level, and arrangements for coordination and conflict resolution. This federal type of structure calls for political pluralism—not easy to sustain at the city level.

The Indian Constitutional

## Some Consequences of Decentralization

Decentralization is an additional complication in metropolitan politics. The 1974 constitution in Brazil created special multi-municipal organizations in the country's eight metropolitan areas. Because the initiative came from a military government, and since the composition of the metropolitan councils was dominated by state appointees, the municipalities regarded these arrangements to be an imposition and encroachment on their domain.

The 1988 constitution completely abrogated the metropolitan entities and all functions reverted to the municipalities. As a result, even the minimum levels of inter-municipal collaboration needed for some critical metropolitan-wide tasks such as traffic and transport, drainage, or environmental planning have suffered considerably. Municipalities in Rio de Janeiro and other metropolitan areas are currently attempting inter-municipal agreements.

—KCS

Amendment now prescribes a metropolitan planning committee to be set up in each large city with a population of more than 1 million. At least two thirds of the membership of these planning committees is to be drawn from the elected representatives of the municipalities and rural local bodies, in proportion to their population. This is a major change from the existing situation, since metropolitan-level planning and development functions are now being performed by state-appointed agencies.

### Perceptions of Difference

While there may not be much to set urban politics apart from the countryside, it is important to deal with some perceptions of difference. One is whether urban and rural people respond differently to "national" issues. In matters of race, religion, language, or culture, the differences in the reactions between the urbanite and the villager may be more apparent than real. The nation state is still a potent factor in many countries, notwithstanding global trading and communication. Myron Weiner's study of Indian elections over a period of time confirms that voting patterns on national questions do not vary much between the town and the village.

Proximity is another factor, perceived by many as a major difference between the rural and urban political scenes. Theories of people's participation in formal

structures of the government are no doubt influenced by Greco-Roman practices, or, in India, by the Gandhian ideals of village democracy. Indian villages vary in size from 5,000 to 50,000. Even assuming that social intercourse and proclivity to politics are intense in the villages because of their small size, the parallel does not apply to cities. A single platform for people's participation is not feasible in societies whose annual population increase is several times the size of ancient Athens.

In Calcutta, Manila, Lagos, or Rio, the voice of the people cannot be heard at all if the channels are limited to the formal structures of local government. Indeed, in the cities of the world, both developing and developed, several kinds of community organizations exist. They stand apart or come together, engage or disengage in political activity, as the need arises. The *barangays* of Manila, the *kampung*s of Jakarta, the *bustees* of Calcutta, and the *barriadas* of Lima all have a variety of such groups and associations. It serves no lasting purpose to force them into a formal relationship to merely secure uniformity in urban governance or political structure.

Life in the big city may not offer the compactness or cohesion of a small town. E.B. White wrote that New York City "bestows the gift of loneliness; the gift of privacy; . . . every event, in a sense, is optional and the inhabitant is able to choose his spectacle." It is this choice which perhaps distinguishes urban politics and urban life itself.

# More Power to the Cities

by Pasqual Maragall



Pasqual Maragall is the Mayor of Barcelona.



BARCELONA. "The 21st Century will be the century of the cities," I proclaimed to *The Washington Post* during a visit to the capital of the United States in December 1993. The newspaper added that my belief "sounds almost shocking to American ears." Perhaps it does. But during that trip I met United Nations Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali at his New York Headquarters where he fully endorsed the idea that myself and others have been harboring for a long time—the formation of a globe-girdling "United Cities" organization that would operate at the grassroots level under the aegis of the United Nations.

It was clear to me that Boutros-Ghali is urgently seeking effective measures to make the organization effective at the urban or local community level.

Cities are viewed increasingly as the place where human problems can be solved. Cities and municipalities represent the power closest to the people. We are trying to ensure that the voice of the cities is heard.

Inside the European Union, for example, we are firmly defending the principle of subsidiarity (I prefer the word "proximity" myself). Why attempt to resolve a problem at the national or regional level when it can be done so much better at the local level, where the people most involved really understand the situation?

That is why a number of us are hard at work trying to group the major city organizations of the world into one movement—"United Cities." That, too, is why I was so encouraged by my second encounter with Mr. Boutros-Ghali in Geneva on January 14, 1994. I was accompanied by the Mayor of Lisbon, Jorge Sampaio, president of the United Towns Organisation

## An Interview with Pasqual Maragall, Mayor of Barcelona

**UA:** *Barcelona is said by many to play a major role among European cities. Could you describe this role in more detail?*

**PM:** The 1992 Olympic Games, generally regarded as the most successful ever, sparked a city-wide process of regeneration and largely eradicated the urban blight that was affecting much of the metropolis. And what was carried out here—with the enthusiastic backing of the citizens and a vast civic consensus—was taken as an example of what could be achieved by cities around the globe.

Barcelona's key to success was its ability to create a general consensus for the changes, to define targets and to see them through, with the support of the public sector and all levels of administration. We enjoyed wholehearted collaboration—and investment—from private as well as public sources. This did not end with the Games, either. Reforms, many on a giant scale, are still being pushed ahead.



**UA:** *No mayor in any city in the world ever scores "a perfect 10 out of 10" as a city manager. How do you deal with the impossible task of trying to govern in an imperfect world?*

**PM:** All I can say is that my achievements, such as they are, would have been impossible without that consensus which I referred to earlier. The citizens here, for instance, had to put up with a lot of inconveniences during the city's pre-Olympic preparations. They never complained. And I have been re-elected mayor three times—which means that my administration team and I can't be doing all that badly.

**UA:** *No city ever has a large enough budget to meet all its needs. How do you use the political process to lessen or cushion the severity of budget constraints?*

What is our financial situation after such vast outlays over the past few years? The best reply is to quote a completely neutral source—Moody's Investors Service. In December, it awarded an "A2" rating to a 30 billion yen, seven-year issue of the city of Barcelona. It reported that its judgment was based "on the city's fiscal capacity, sound management, and declining financial needs." The Moody's assessment added: "In recent years the city's current savings have been increasing—so that the interest coverage ratio has been improving—The city plans to have only a small budget deficit in 1993 and to move into surplus in 1994."

and Italian Senator Riccardo Triglia, head of the International Union of Local Authorities. I am proud to be president of a similar organization, the European Council of Municipalities and Regions, which links some 30,000 communities in 24 countries.

Once more, Boutros-Ghali fully agreed with our views, which are as follows: In the face of many of the conflicts now afflicting parts of the world, there is an immense growth in civic consciousness. People are yearning for contacts, a community spirit, and collaboration. Urban centers are vital for meetings, dialogues, exchanges, contacts—and trade. They are also essential for building a multi-cultural and multi-racial society based on friendship and tolerance.

The "more power to the cities" project is snowballing—at least in Spain. At a summit meeting the mayors from seven of the country's biggest cities—Madrid, Barcelona, Seville, Malaga, Bilbao, Zaragoza and Valencia—launched an appeal to the central government urging that they be given greater leeway in running their own affairs, such as social services, cultural matters, transport, and education.

In January, I visited the southern French city of Perpignan, the first official visit of a representative of Barcelona to such a near neighbor for 400 years. We signed an agreement of mutual cooperation in matters such as urbanization and the environment. A main outcome is that Barcelona will play a key role in the design and construction of a new railway station there to handle the High Speed Train service which will link the two nations within a few years.

I am overjoyed that, when it comes to the vital issues regarding cities as the places to solve our basic problems, 1994 has started so promisingly.

# Redefining Politics in St. Petersburg

by Mikhail Berezin and Olga Kaganova

Mikhail Berezin and Olga Kaganova are Directors of the Agency for Urban Research and Consulting (AUREC) company in St. Petersburg, Russia. Mikhail Berezin is an architect specializing in urban development and housing issues. Olga Kaganova is a specialist on urban land use and real estate markets.



ST. PETERSBURG. A city of 5 million, St. Petersburg exhibits many symptoms of urban decline. The population size is shrinking, production output has dropped, the municipal budget has shrunk to a fifth of its 1991 level, unemployment is on the rise; housing construction has been cut dramatically, and industrial construction is almost nonexistent.

Interestingly, there are also several indications of growth and development. The number of new businesses has increased significantly; private sector participation is expanding in all areas of municipal economy; the intensive use of existing commercial property is unprecedented; property is being remodeled and utilized; and the share of private investment to finance new construction has grown substantially.

Such is the paradox of Russia today. While the economy declines, opportunities abound.

Residents of St. Petersburg are occupied with two fundamental activities: They are finding a political direction, identifying friends and foes, making and rearranging alliances in city politics, setting priorities, and adopting causes. At the same time, they are meeting the daily challenges of economic survival. Recently, the emphasis has been on the latter.

The word "democracy," perceived as the right to fight for one's interests (which are not necessarily identical with those of the state) has become a battle cry shared by the new city administration, new entrepreneurs, and a large segment of society, particularly urban youth and educated professionals. Until prices were liberalized, the economy had been running out of sheer momentum, and for most people the problem of

survival was not as urgent as the eagerness to break ground for new opportunities.

A number of conflicts have emerged, both social and political. The most important among these is the conflict between the central government and local authorities. The grassroots idea of democracy is focused on autonomy, and the new federal administration in Russia is not strong enough to counter these tendencies. This has drawn federal, regional, and local authorities into power struggles, further escalated by the personal ambitions of the players.

Another significant conflict is between the Executive Branch and the Legislature, as each tries to appropriate the right to shape economic policy, including privatization issues. The Executive Branch continues to rely on administrative methods and networking. The Legislature balances between demonstrating commitment to values with which the electorate can identify, while searching for a system that would be immune to the vagaries of the elections process.

Finally, there is conflict between those who embrace the emerging market, and those who are threatened by it. The period from January 1992 through September/October of 1993 witnessed an active confrontation between the administration and the Parliament which, as the December 1993 elections of the Russian legislature have shown, was also passively opposed by the public.

Currently the executive power in St. Petersburg, headed by Mayor Anatoly Sobchak, has absolute control of the city.

The capacities of the new legislative body, to be elected in March 1994, have been effectively reduced by a document drafted by the mayor himself, with the President's approval. The result will

be lesser politicians who will be content to operate within modest boundaries. It is possible, however, that the new legislature will launch a campaign to expand their power. In the meantime, the mayor continues to sign decrees and contracts that would require at least preliminary public

allowed the regions to grow stronger and fare relatively well.

The disintegration of the power elite has reduced the possibility of their fusion with big business. However, it is important that the administration and business groups adopt more civilized practices in their competition and settlements,



*While the economy declines, opportunities abound in Russia.*

scrutiny and accountability in most societies.

The Government of Russia and the President are too busy forming a new government to intercede, and the residents of St. Petersburg are too busy trying to survive to care. Frustration is high. Numerous decisions by both the mayor and the president have been issued and are soon rescinded or forgotten.

There is, however, some benefit from the loss of confidence in the authorities and the reduced credibility of official decisions and proclamations. People become engaged in practical activities and are less susceptible to political rhetoric.

Moscow's lack of ideological, political, or economic arguments needed to wield new strong central power have

based on law rather than on illegal methods or networking within the administration.

How soon can the new entrepreneurs gain reasonable influence in city politics? There are already signs of their consolidation and improved professionalism in the areas of banking, real estate and management; the creation of new associations; discussions of codes of ethics; and the emergence of an information infrastructure.

There is no doubt about people's capacity to adapt. Everything requires time, however, and the question of practical relevance is what will happen first. This will be an explosion set off by economic decline and political controversy, as well as an integration based on new opportunities and interests.

# Politics in Culturally Diverse Los Angeles

An interview with Michael Woo

**4** Michael Woo was the first Asian American and urban planner to serve on the Los Angeles City Council. In 1993 he was a candidate for mayor of Los Angeles. He was recently a fellow at the Institute of Politics at the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University. He is currently a candidate for Secretary of State for California and adjunct lecturer at the University of California at Los Angeles (UCLA) and the California Institute of Technology.

**UA:** Los Angeles has often been described as a Third World City. What comparisons can you draw between Los Angeles and developing country cities?

**MW:** There are both similarities and differences. Los Angeles doesn't exhibit the same kind of rapid growth as do developing world cities like Jakarta and Cairo. But there are similarities—such as the gradual erosion of the middle class, although this may not be as apparent in Los Angeles as in some of the cities in newer developing countries. There is also a growing contrast between the “haves” and the “have nots”.

**UA:** What is the role of coalition government in Los Angeles?

**MW:** There are not strong coalitions in Los Angeles, but rather shifting alliances with unsteady relationships among allies that assist in assimilating new immigrants. Many newcomers are unfamiliar with the social and political processes in the city, and many long-term residents have difficulty relating to newcomers.

**UA:** Can the city cope with the rising numbers of newcomers in terms of still being able to provide residents with basic services?

**MW:** In providing services the city doesn't distinguish between legitimate and undocumented residents. It would create fear if city government officials providing services were seen as trying to find out whether citizens had legal status or not. For example, this would inhibit immigrants from testifying when they have been witnesses to a crime because they would be afraid to talk to police for fear they would be questioned about their immigrant status. This would severely undermine law enforcement in the city.

**UA:** How is Los Angeles governed?

**MW:** In Los Angeles, the form of government reflects a widespread distrust with centralized authority. The mayor is the chief executive but is not given independent authority to hire or fire city officials. The City Council is defined as the governing body, which creates some practical problems. For example, there is no mechanism to compel city council members to make tough decisions. The vast majority of city employees work under a merit-based civil service system, which is intended to safeguard people against nepotism and corruption. Unfortunately this also protects against the accountability of its government. There needs to be a balance between the demand for decentralized government services and the realistic need for accountability.

**UA:** How can this be related to the growing decentralization in the developing world?

**MW:** It must be very difficult for decentralization to work in countries that do not have strong traditions of democratic systems. Even in Los Angeles it's hard to make decentralization work. The challenge is how to reconcile the competing demand for accountability with the demand for decentralization, and the fact that many problems are large-scale in nature. Leaders must be flexible in adapting to a new way of governance, particularly in areas of accountability and in defining the appropriate local arena for action.

**UA:** How does that apply to Los Angeles?

**MW:** There needs to be some way of decentralizing certain kinds of decisions below the city-wide level, for example, to the neighborhood

level. This would also give neighborhoods the ability to influence government more, but the city also needs to have the ability to elevate certain decisions to a higher authority such as a city council. Examples of city-wide decisions could include those regarding water pollution, traffic, or the location of affordable housing. On the other hand, the neighborhood level could concentrate on the enforcement of neighborhood priorities rather than the city-wide allocation of resources. For example, police staffing would have to be determined at the council level, because of differing priorities among neighborhoods, but neighborhoods could make decisions about law enforcement within their neighborhoods.

Decentralization and regionalization raise certain paradoxes. We need greater accountability at the local level and at the same time we must compete economically by maximizing our city-wide and regional advantages.

**UA:** Are people in Los Angeles satisfied with city government?

**MW:** There is a cynicism throughout the United States with city government as an institution. But citizens, because they are more aware of the track record of their own representative and because it is easier to conceptualize government in the form of a person than in the form of an institution, are less cynical about their elected representative.

**UA:** What is the relationship between Los Angeles and the state of California?

**MW:** The city-state relationship in California is different than it is in other parts of the country. Los Angeles city and Los Angeles county are separate government

entities with different responsibilities. The city government provides basic municipal services such as police, libraries, and parks. The county government has responsibility for health care, welfare, and the criminal justice system. The city government is much more independent from the state than is the county government, which is defined under the California constitution as a subdivision of state government and is legally responsible for the delivery of state-mandated services. Seventy percent of the county's budget is mandated by the state. Yet the state is not necessarily responsible for giving the county money to fulfill its mandates; therefore counties suffer. City governments are not subdivisions of state governments; therefore, a smaller percentage of their budgets is dictated by state government. City governments are at a financial advantage, they also have a greater ability to generate revenue through taxation.

**UA:** How difficult is it for a city government official to advance to the national level?

**MW:** In countries other than the United States there is a greater degree of respect for municipal governments. For example, the mayor of Taipei is a major figure in Taiwan's political life; the mayor of Paris is a major political player in French politics. But in the United States, mayors are seen as being stuck in a dead-end position. This may have something to do with the strain of anti-urbanism in the United States; a general disparaging attitude that dates back to Thomas Jefferson.

# The Mayor's Hour in Latin America

by Fernando Carrión

Fernando Carrión is an architect and specialist on urban issues. He is a staff member of the Latin American and Caribbean Regional Office of the Urban Management Programme in Quito, Ecuador.

QUITO. In the past, being a lawyer with a record as a member of parliament was practically a prerequisite for the presidency. Today what counts is experience as a mayor, along with professional training in a practical and/or technical field such as economics, business administration, engineering, or architecture.

In many upcoming elections in Latin America a new and interesting political trend has emerged—presidential candidates are often former mayors. Among the most well known names are: Andrés Pastrana of Bogota, Colombia; Jaime Lerner of Curitiba, Brazil; Paulo Maluf of San Pablo, Brazil; Tabaré Vasquez of Montevideo, Uruguay; and Rodrigo Paz, of Quito, Ecuador.

One reason for this growing phenomenon is that Latin America's urban areas carry more weight in present day politics than ever before. Over 70% of the region's population is now urban, so their relative weight in terms of numbers of voters is substantial.

In Ecuador, something unprecedented happened in August 1992. Sixto Durán Ballén, architect and former mayor of Quito, assumed the presidency of the Republic; León Febres Cordero, engineer and former president, became mayor of Guayaquil; and Jamil Mahuad, lawyer and former presidential candidate, became mayor of Quito. In these elections there was a definite polarization at the local level—the winners came from different political parties.

The political system appears to be changing course, placing greater value on politicians and civil servants who are adept at handling complex issues and at gauging public sentiment. In this context, the municipalities are seen as the state organs most directly linked with day-to-day life. The municipalities, in close contact with urban

citizens, have focused on such social issues as those involving young people, women's interests, and environmental issues.


The municipalities of major cities perform multiple tasks. In many instances these tasks, because of their origin and importance, are of national significance. Exercising local power generates little political wear and tear, as it is focused mainly

was the first form of citizen participation. However, excessive urban growth whittled away the power of citizens as the state became increasingly complex. Eventually the separation between the state and its citizens became very marked. Mechanisms for participation gradually turned into delegations, and simple voting arrangements that

needs and problems of urban dwellers.

Political parties and government policies have not proven capable of generating global proposals for cities. The city is turning over its best people to the service of national politics, but there is not much sign of movement in the other direction.

The city's contribution to



Sixto Durán Ballén, President of Ecuador and former Mayor of Quito, shakes hands with León Febres Cordero, former President of Ecuador and current Mayor of Guayaquil.

on physical works. The fundamental demands of society, and therefore the disenchantment and disappointments caused by crises, are directed toward the central authorities. Central agencies are left to handle such politically unpalatable issues as managing the currency and national debt, and often bear the brunt of public disillusionment with government.

## The Inseparable Triad

In ancient Greece, the city and politics developed simultaneously. The city was not differentiated from the state. The Greek *polis*, rooted in democracy, integrated citizens into its activity, which citizens considered their business. Thus the inseparable triad of the city, the state, and the citizenry was formed.

Urban history tells us that the city

did not commit the voters.

In the context of the re-democratization taking place in Latin America, people are looking for greater political representation through an interesting rapprochement between politicians and the city. This finds its expression in the election of mayors, some of whom then set their sights (with good chances of success) on national level positions.

## Returning Politics to the City

While the presence of a new type of politician has renewed the relationship with the city, the same cannot be said of the political parties, which pay little attention to the people, largely ignore new urban social issues, and show no understanding of the

democracy accordingly needs to be potentiated anew and will be, to the extent that politics is returned to its birthplace—the city.

This restoration of the *polis* in its original sense must follow from development of a future built in social terms in which the duty of all to work toward a democratic city is made a reality, and in which the political parties will have to assume the role of actively presenting, discussing, and developing a blueprint for an alternative city.

In this context the municipality—unquestionably one of the most important democratic elements in the consolidation of the emerging democracies—will be rethought and reinforced.

*This article originally appeared as "¿La hora de los alcaldes?" in the Ecuadorian newspaper, HOY on October 13, 1993.*

# Tegucigalpa: The Rejection Vote of the Urban Settlers

by Celina Kawas and Mario E. Martin

**6** Celina Kawas is a Honduran sociologist who is a consultant on informal urban settlements and NGOs. Mario E. Martin is a Honduran architect and urban planner who contributed to the revision of the housing and settlement sector from 1990-93.

TEGUCIGALPA. In Honduras, social compensation programs and efforts to widen social participation have not gone far enough to alleviate the negative impacts of the country's Structural Adjustment Program (SAP). Voters made this clear in the recent 1993 election when the incumbent National Party lost to the Liberal

where patronage and unhealthy collusion between politicians and residents of settlements of informal origin persisted despite reforms and where the underlying problems of poverty and poor city management have not been resolved. The victory of the Liberal party in Tegucigalpa was especially surprising, since, in the past 20

## The Urban Context

Tegucigalpa's population has more than doubled to 800,000 in the past 20 years, mainly due to migration and the resulting expansion of informal urban settlements. These settlements are often situated in geologically unsound areas where the installation of basic urban services is extremely costly. Neighborhoods of informal (unplanned, uncontrolled, and substandard) origin house 60% of the population of Tegucigalpa.

The government's priority in the past four years has been the implementation of the SAP, which reduced resources allocated to the social sector while mobilizing funds for remedial short-term compensatory programs. The resulting price increases have shrunken the disposable income of the urban poor and middle segments of society.

Poverty levels have risen at a shocking rate: between 1988 and 1990 the number of households below the poverty line nationwide increased from 68% to 71%. In Tegucigalpa in 1988, 52% of all households were below the poverty line; by 1991, the number rose to 67%.

Tegucigalpa appears to be an unlikely success story for the newly elected officials. Poverty is increasing, unemployment and underemployment are high, and local authorities are unable to legalize land tenure and provide basic services to informal urban settlements. According to the new municipal law, the central government can transfer up to 5 percent of the national budget to local governments, but also passes on responsibilities for services and infrastructure, so necessary to absorb the new waves of urban settlers.

Why, despite recent social compensation programs and policies, is this panorama so bleak? Why has Tegucigalpa grown in such a disorderly way with major problems of land tenure and provision of services? It is a small capital and thus should not be so difficult for urban planners. The problems, however, are not technical but essentially political.

## Adjustment and Social Compensation Measures


Urban improvement and social compensation measures were supposed to be tickets to political success. These programs, a fairly standard part of the SAP recommendations by international financial organizations, showed overall positive results, but growing conditions of urban poverty made them insufficient. These programs have been questioned by NGOs as undermining existing community organization and sustainability. The core issues—employment security and political participation—have not been adequately addressed.

The FHIS (social investment fund) invested significant funds, mostly external, in such social infrastructure projects as schools, parks, street paving, and water and sewerage systems. These projects provide part-time employment to many urban settlers in Tegucigalpa, but not long-term job security.

PRAF, a pilot food coupon program, was directed both to the rural and urban areas. It provided food coupons twice a year to children and to households headed by women.

Initiated in 1990, the second pilot food coupon program, Bono Materno Infantil (BMI), targets poor children under five, pregnant women, and nursing mothers. BMI

*continued on page 17*



Urban informal sector settlers are voicing discontent with their votes.

Party in contests in Tegucigalpa, the capital city, and at the national level. The SAP and the compensatory social programs fell short in large part because they did not educate policy makers and officials in participatory processes. The safety net measures, while important, were short-term and not rooted in the local socio-economic political process, nor did they provide long-term job security or promote self-sufficiency.

These shortcomings were strikingly apparent in Tegucigalpa

years, the city has had only one Liberal party mayor. Exercising the "punishment vote" either by voting for the Liberal party or by absenteeism, is the most recent strategy used by urban informal sector settlers to voice their discontent. The punishment vote occurred despite pre-election improvements to urban areas and bargains struck between informal sector urban settlers and National Party politicians guaranteeing services and land in exchanges for votes and work on the mayoral campaign.

benefits are distributed monthly through public health centers.

The fourth compensation program focused on housing. At the outset of the new government in 1990, the National Housing Institute (INVA), later replaced by a social housing fund (FOSOVI), designed and implemented an urban land titling program called PROLOTE. Between 1990 and 1993, PROLOTE legalized 7,000 urban lots at the national level, 4,000 of which are in Tegucigalpa. Money allocated in the national budget and through workers' savings and employers' contributions are being collected, but are not yet reaching the poor.

The SAP compensation programs have been emergency measures, not integrated or articulated social strategies to address urban poverty. For example, although diesel, cooking gas, electricity, and transportation were subsidized for those households with low consumption bills and for the poor in the case of transport, these subsidies will not be permanent. Indeed, the effect of wider coverage of water, sanitation and transportation systems, given the added value and cost recovery approach in the municipal decentralization scheme, will mean higher living costs for households living in the informal settlements that are targeted for regularization. The resulting pressure may force poor families to sell their revalued property and take refuge again in the informal sector.

The incoming government, with its commitment to "human development" and the balance between responsible macro-economic and social policies, faces a major challenge. The forecast is that pressures from the urban settlers will be renewed and that the new authorities will have to take temporary attenuating measures. However, unless an integral social policy is adopted that promotes empowerment through participation, social and political results will not be sustainable in the long term.

## Women's Political Activism In Nigeria: A Stepping Stone to Government Participation

by Bolanle Awe

*Bolanle Awe, a professor of history at the University of Ibadan in Ibadan, Nigeria, was formerly the director of the Institute of African Studies, and is currently the chairperson of its Women's Research and Documentation Centre. She was the first chairperson of the Nigerian National Commission for Women.*

IBADAN. There is a near universal appreciation of the need for women to have input into the decisions that affect their lives and to participate in the political process. However, statistics on women in government prepared by the United Nations' Division for the Advancement of Women (March 1992), showed that "women still play a minor role in high-level political and economic decision making."

Nigeria is no exception to this picture of poor female participation in the political process. Nigerian women vote in large numbers, but few run for office, and even fewer are elected. In the 1992 National Assembly elections, female voters in some cases made up 75% of the electorate, yet only twelve women were elected into the House of Representatives (which has 584 members), and only one woman in the Senate (which has 170 members).

Female performance in Nigeria today is in marked contrast to pre-Colonial society, where there was a long tradition of female participation in politics and government through the institutions of female chiefs, first-born daughters, and age-grade associations.

During the Colonial period in Nigeria, urban settlements grew rapidly to meet the needs of the colonial masters as headquarters for their administration. Such towns, with their commercial, educational, and religious institutions, attracted Nigerian men, who took advantage of Western education and became familiar with the Western political process. The towns became the

foci of Nigerian politics. Men could be found in large numbers in the political parties which they organized to build opposition to colonial rule and were later used to struggle for participation in political decision-making. By contrast, women remained in the rural areas, where they still constitute the majority of the population. Most women had little contact with these new political developments, and could not perform effectively within the Western political system. Consequently, the emerging female politician is inexperienced and must learn the art of modern politics while struggling to voice women's concerns and mobilize the large female electorate.

The National Commission for Women has highlighted several socio-cultural factors that also contribute to the lack of effective female participation.

In Nigeria, it is a woman's reproductive role—not her productive role—that is regarded as important. Women have to contend with male dominance and patriarchy. Women are regarded as inferior, and female leadership is largely unacceptable.

Even where the government appears to have subscribed to the principles of equal participation, as in the constitution, the institutional structures set up for political activities often do not encourage female participation. In the political parties, women were often poorly represented in the leadership. In the first two civilian republics, women were herded into women's wings of political parties, where their issues were marginalized.

During this last "transition" to

civil rule, women were found at the local and state executive councils of their parties, but not at the national level, where crucial decisions, such as the procedure for nominating candidates and deposits to be paid for contesting elections, were made.

Nigerian women cannot afford a long learning process. As the country becomes poorer and the standard of living continues to fall, women feel the impact most sharply. In a gesture of protest against the political system that virtually excludes their participation, Nigerian women have become political activists.

In 1988, a boycott by the Obono Clan Women's Association of Abia State forced the local government to provide a good drainage system and water supply. More recently, the Women's Association in Lagos rose up in protest against the closure of schools. In response to the annulment by the military regime of the June 1993 election (which would have given Nigeria a civilian president and civil rule), women boycotted the markets in solidarity with the civil rights movement. It is interesting to note that these were urban-based movements. Unfortunately, many female political activists respond only to crisis situations; organizations that can be sustained over a long period have yet to evolve.

However, as government becomes increasingly less responsive to the needs of women, and the existing political structures continue to stifle their participation, women's activism will gain strength and a firmer stepping stone for direct political participation will be created.



# The China Open Cities Project

**8** In May 1993 the Federation of Canadian Municipalities (FCM) and the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) signed an agreement for Phase II of the China Open Cities Project to continue through 1998. "Open cities" in China are those cities targeted by China's central government for foreign investment and that have preferential tax policies for foreign investors.

This project will help China's open cities plan and develop the managerial and administrative skills needed to lead China's economic development. The open cities are at the forefront of economic reform and modernization and have experienced high

growth rates as well as rapid increases in foreign trade.

Activities include in-China training in globalization and international finance, joint venture management, and urban environmental management. In Canada, training consists of three-week study tours for Chinese policy- and decision-makers, practical training in urban planning and management, and long-term training for faculty from Nankai University. Information and communication are important aspects of the China Open Cities Project, which is a valuable Canadian source of contacts in China's key cities.

Up to 80 cities will be part of the project's expanding network, with priority given to 22 cities.

These will include the biggest, most advanced cities, and those to which the Chinese government attaches the highest priority.

During its first Phase (1987-1993), the project increased environmental awareness in economic areas, strengthened economic and trade links between Canada and China, facilitated municipal relationships aimed at specific, tangible results, and raised the standards of teaching at two institutions that train municipal officials. FCM also established solid working partnerships with the Special Economic Zones Office of the State Council and the Canada-China Business Council.

Phase II will allow FCM to improve its network of contacts in

China's major cities. Through FCM's nation-wide network of Canadian professional resources, Phase II will be able to contribute to environmentally sound urban management and economic development in China's open cities.

In addition to the China Open Cities Project, FCM also manages the Partnership Program. *[Editor's Note: Details on the Partnership Program can be found on page 21 of this issue.]*

For further information, contact: The Federation of Canadian Municipalities, International Office, 24 Clarence Street, Ottawa, Ontario K1N 5P3. Tel: 613-241-8484, Fax: 613-241-7117.

## Open Cities Project Links Jinan and Regina

Since 1991, several delegations have been exchanged between the sister cities of Jinan in China and Regina in Canada as part of the FCM China Open Cities Project. The information that follows draws on interviews with the Open Cities Project staff, Mayor Xie Yutang of Jinan, and Mayor Douglas R. Archer of Regina.

Located in southern China, Jinan City, the capital of Shandong Province, is home to more than 5.3 million people, with an urban population of 2.3 million. Jinan, one of China's 20 largest cities, has become one of the most important industrial centers of China. Over 2,000 industrial enterprises operate in Jinan, of which 160 are large or medium scale. Jinan exports more than 400 products to over 120 countries worldwide.

Regina, the capital of the province of Saskatchewan, Canada has a population of approximately

180,000. It is a major financial and service center located in the western Canadian prairie. Regina is an urban center that offers an excellent quality

of life, and whose services and facilities rival those in much larger cities. Over 4,500 private companies operate in Regina, many in telecommunications, financial services, manufacturing and processing, and agricultural related industries.

"In my visits to Canadian cities" reflects Mayor Yutang, "what has struck me the most is that Canadian city governments govern less, while

Chinese ones govern too much. We are trying to make reforms along these lines."

One of the most interesting differences Mayor Archer sees between Chinese and Canadian cities is that in China "the government is responsible for all aspects of the

economy." In Canada, the mayor "is active as a facilitator in promoting economic development in both the public and private sectors."

In drawing lessons from exchanges with Canadian cities, Mayor Yutang says that "Chinese cities must do more to streamline government departments, and become more efficient." In addition, "Exchanges between faculty and students of the University of Regina and Shandong University in Jinan encourage a sharing of culture, information, and technology that will have lasting value."

Another worthwhile lesson is summed up by Mayor Archer: "Our experiences with our sister city of Jinan have shown us the value and many benefits of spending time in developing strong relationships based on trust, mutual respect, and good will."



Mayor Yutang of Jinan City and Mayor Archer of Regina.

# City Challenge: Regenerating Local Economies

by Christine Booth

*Christine Booth has over 17 years of local government planning experience, specializing in development planning and public consultation. She currently teaches and conducts research at the School of Urban and Regional Studies at Sheffield Hallam University.*

SHEFFIELD. The communities of the South Yorkshire coal field in the United Kingdom were dominated by the coal industry for over 100 years. However, the industry has been in rapid decline in the past decade and the area suffers acute economic depression. The communities face massive economic, cultural, physical, and demographic change. There has been little inward investment, and consequently, high levels of unemployment have developed. Politically, the area has been a traditional male working class stronghold with allegiance to the labor movement. Today, there is a growing distrust and cynicism toward local political structures.

As part of central government's response to the need for economic regeneration in South Yorkshire, the local authorities have been awarded City Challenge funding for two of their most deprived areas. City Challenge is a central government funded initiative. Local authorities, in partnership with local businesses and the community, bid for funds to assist in the regeneration of their urban areas through a combination of economic, environmental, and social programs. City Challenge gives local authorities and communities a key role to play in urban policy after a decade of government initiatives that have centralized planning and by-passed local democratic processes.

The Dearne Valley Partnership was initiated in 1991. It lies at the heart of the coal field, straddles three local authorities, and encompasses a series of mining towns with a combined population of 80,000. A second City Challenge was created in the town of Barnsley, with a population of 17,000.

The City Challenge initiatives have led to new policy processes, but have also raised questions: who is included in the decisionmaking process? Has it really led to the empowerment of local communities and previously neglected interests? Has the initiative led to a new agenda for these areas?

Recently, the Centre for Regional, Economic and Social Research (CRESR) at Sheffield Hallam University worked with the Dearne Valley and Barnsley partnerships to collect information to help develop action programs. CRESR undertook data collection and consultation with local communities to establish attitudes, identify needs, and determine the local community's views concerning priorities for the area. CRESR's studies would help ensure a broad representation of all interests in the community, particularly those groups traditionally excluded or neglected from the decisionmaking process. CRESR's work not only involved traditional quantitative data collection techniques (such as surveys of 1,000 households, desk top exercises, social and community audits), but also included various consultation exercises with key sectoral interests to provide supplementary qualitative data. In short, the studies attempted to tap into the seldom-heard voices of grassroots community groups.

At an organizational level, the first step was to draw up the household questionnaire in consultation with community forums and set up a curriculum initiative with a local secondary school. Second, all known groups in the community, key individuals, professionals and voluntary workers were identified. Representatives and individuals were invited to one of a series of meetings to be held for a cross-section of the

population: women and children; the elderly; young people; people with disabilities; adult leisure/community groups; and professions/key agencies.

Meetings were held at nurseries, primary and secondary schools, youth clubs, elderly person centers, and local church halls. Publicity for the meetings was the responsibility of the local community liaison officer, local school teachers, adult education workers, local vicars/priests, youth workers, and the partnerships themselves. A combination of newspapers, posters, letters, leaflets, and informal networks were used to publicize meetings. Where good community networks existed, publicity was successful and attendance at meetings was high. Conversely, where it had always been assumed that only limited community networks existed, attendance was poor. This was particularly true in areas suffering the most acute socioeconomic problems. Here, local feedback suggested that any future meetings should advertise "refreshments" and "bingo" as inducements to attend.

In general the meetings addressed existing problems and issues, future needs and proposals, and future involvement. These informal roundtable discussions provided useful information on community attitudes, projects, and activities. The meetings also generated introductions and contacts, information sharing, concerns, and alliances between groups—and, most importantly—an energy to get projects off the ground and to become involved in City Challenge.

The CRESR case studies were neither radical nor innova-

tive, but their relevance is two-fold. First, the consultation exercises challenged the traditional local political frameworks. They did not just involve organized and influential groups, but instead empowered previously excluded interests. For example, women and young people were brought into the consultation process and given the opportunity to articulate their needs. They may not have secured a permanent seat at the table of local politics—dominated by middle-aged males—but their inclusion through the consultation process has demonstrated an alternative means of sharing in decision making.

Additionally, while crime and employment were the dominant concerns of the community, the inclusion of a wider range of interests put issues on the agenda that might well have been overlooked, such as community crèches and the concerns of young people and children. Women questioned public sector control and management of local community facilities, and argued for the introduction of partnerships between the local authorities and the community. The results of the studies are being used to establish action programs, to initiate projects, and to target resources in the areas.

This approach to community participation requires political support, and the techniques to relate to the aims of the projects. Consultation without the power to influence decisionmaking is at best tokenism. The hope is that future project implementation truly reflects local needs and that City Challenge can work in partnership with communities such as those in South Yorkshire to respond more effectively to major changes and forces outside their control.

# Building Consensus in Cajamarca

by Luis Guerrero Figueroa

Luis Guerrero Figueroa is the Mayor of Cajamarca, Peru.

CAJAMARCA. The Municipality of Cajamarca developed a planning system to define the two basic roles to be performed by the Provincial Council: promoting development and providing community services.

In Peru, municipalities have always had such responsibilities as street cleaning and park maintenance, but have never performed the key role that a local government should play—that of promoting local development. Because of funding shortages, several different public and private institutions are operating in urban and rural affairs without proper coordination. They often duplicate each other in terms of work plans and functions performed, all for

lack of a planning system at the regional government level.

The Provincial Council of Cajamarca decided to optimize the use of funds by preparing a Provincial Development Plan. It is essential that this plan meet the needs and expectations of local community representatives, farmers, and entrepreneurs as well as those of state institutions and national governing organizations. To enlist the participation of all these forces, and to develop a democratic dialogue and discussions between the community and the state, Cajamarca devised a strategy of consultation in order to build a minimum consensus (*mesa de concertación*).


Six consensus building forums

have been held so far. Each has focused on one of the community's central problems: (1) education, (2) natural resources and agricultural production, (3) production and employment, (4) cultural heritage and tourism, (5) urban environment, and (6) women's issues, population and family. Each forum is responsible for formulating a strategic plan to be implemented by all the institutions involved in the activities of the operating plan, via the signing of inter-institutional agreements.

The entire conceptual framework of the Provincial Development Plan hinges on the need to tie economic growth to sustainable development and to ensure balanced ecosystem

management in both the urban and rural environment. For example, a major challenge faced by Cajamarca is to improve the living conditions of small farmers by combatting soil erosion on the hillsides where the farmers live. Another major challenge is to ensure that the Yanacocha mine does not pollute the environment, and to ensure that the state reinvests a proportion of the revenues generated by the gold mines.

Each subject-specific forum discusses the main problems and tries to find solutions. Cajamarca believes that this experiment is already bearing fruit and can serve as a bridge for democratic and participatory dialogue between the state and the community.



We actively seek our developing country readers' input for this section. Our intention is to facilitate networking among developing country city managers and their constituents.

## METROPOLITAN RESEARCH INSTITUTE, BUDAPEST

Contact: J. Hegedüs and I. Tosics, Metropolitan Research Institute, Budapest, H-1093 Budapest IX Lonyay u. 34. Tel: (36-1)216-0578, 217-9041, Fax: 36-1-216-3001, Internet: H2091os@ella2.szaki.hu.

The Metropolitan Research Institute (MRI), was established in Budapest in September 1989. MRI provides research in the fields of housing and public finance in Hungary; its staff have backgrounds in economics, sociology, and architecture. The two principals, József Hegedüs and Iván Tosics, have published widely on the politics and economy of housing and urban issues. MRI has worked on housing policy, urban development, and



municipal finance, including the problems of the public rental sector, real estate market trends, housing rehabilitation, central budget trends, and the economy of local governments.

The Institute has worked closely with international donor agencies, such as the World Bank and USAID. MRI is an institutional member of the European Network for Housing Research (ENHR); its experts are represented in the Coordination Committee of ENHR, and are organizers of its East European Housing Policy Working Group.

## THE FEDERATION OF CANADIAN MUNICIPALITIES, OTTAWA

Contact: The Federation of Canadian Municipalities, Partnerships Program, 24 Clarence Street, Ottawa, Ontario K1N 5P3; Tel: 613-241-8484, Fax: 613-241-7117.

The Partnerships Program seeks to improve management skills of employees of municipalities in developing countries, and to increase public participation in decision making processes. The program includes technical exchanges and access to funds for in-country training, programs, and special projects.

The Partnerships Program establishes working relationships between Canadian municipalities and their partners in developing countries. In its first five years, the program has had a strong focus on Africa, with some 35 partnerships between Canada and 16 African countries. In addition to establishing strong community bonds between Canadian and African counterparts, management skills have been reinforced, especially in the areas of municipal finance, information systems, public works, and environmental issues. The Partnerships Program is now expanding its activities to Southeast Asia and Latin America.

## ASSOCIATION OF METROPOLITAN DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITIES, NEW DELHI

Contact: Shri G.R. Sood, Director, Association of Metropolitan Development Authorities, 7/6, Sirifort Institutional Area, Khel Gaon Marg, New Delhi-110 049, India. Tel: 646-3486, Telex: 031-71301 ASTUND.

The Association of Metropolitan Development Authorities (AMDA) represents 44 Urban Development Authorities in India and engages in research, training, and policy development on urban issues. Recently, AMDA concluded a study on low-income settlements in Delhi and is currently engaged in reviewing the development and infrastructure plans of the Surat Urban Development Authority and Surat Municipal Corporation. AMDA is also carrying out a study of Bangalore and Madras to help the Planning Commission of the Government of India to identify infrastructure priorities. AMDA is also preparing an action-oriented plan on employment generation for women living in the slums of Calcutta. AMDA is planning a future study of traffic patterns in Ranchi and Dhanbad.

## INTERNATIONAL CITY/COUNTY MANAGEMENT ASSOCIATION, WASHINGTON, DC

Contact: International City/County Management Association, 777 North Capitol Street, NE, Suite 500, Washington, DC 20002-4201. Tel: 202-962-3574, Fax: 202-962-3500.

Founded in 1914, the International City/County Management Association (ICMA) is the professional and educational association for more than 8,000 administrators and assistant administrators serving cities, counties, and other local governments and regional entities throughout the world. ICMA's membership also includes directors of state associations of local governments, other local government employees, members of the academic community, and concerned citizens who share the goal of improving local government.



The purposes of ICMA are to enhance the quality of local government through professional management and to support and assist professional local government administrators internationally. To that end, the association provides technical assistance, training, management assistance, and publications for local government professionals to help them improve their skills and increase their knowledge. ICMA also serves as a clearinghouse for the collection, analysis, and dissemination of information and data about local government.

## The State in Africa: The Politics of the Belly

by Jean-Francois Bayart. Longman Group UK Limited, Longman House, Burnt Mill, Harlow, Essex CM20 2JE, U.K., 1993. ISBN 0-582-06421-X. First published in French as *L'Etat en Afrique. La politique du ventre.* (1989).

Drawing directly from African sources wherever possible, Jean-



Francois Bayart attempts to uncover the reality of African politics and dispel the

myth of Africa as a chaotic continent devoid of a political history that predates colonialism. He covers most of Sub-Saharan Africa, but the focus is on Senegal, Guinea, Côte d'Ivoire, Ghana, Nigeria, Cameroon, the Congo, Zaire, Kenya, and Tanzania.

Rejecting the cliché of Africa under a yoke of isolationism, of colonialism, of hunger, and of war, the author draws a paradigm of politics in Sub-Saharan Africa based on indigenous foundations and the reappropriation of colonial institutions. According to Bayart, what makes African politics difficult to define is its heterogeneity—rather than evolving into an integral state, governments in Africa function as a conglomerate of personal networks. This assures the centralization of power through the agencies of family, alliances, and friendships.

Bayart repeatedly touches on “the politics of the belly”. Taken from a Cameroonian phrase, this refers to basic greed and the lust for wealth and power. It is manifested in nepotism, clientelism, witchcraft, and other forms of corruption. The politics of the belly also refers more generally to real physical hunger and to the accumulation of wealth and social mobility.

Noting the predominant traits in Africa of heterogeneity and incompleteness juxtaposed with the

politics of the belly, the author debunks the popular view of the continent as exotic and unique; “In many respects Africa is a mirror. However distorting it may be, it reflects our own political image and has a lot to teach us about the springs of our western modernity.”


## The New Localism: Comparative Urban Politics in a Global Era

by Edward G. Goetz and Susan E. Clarke, (eds.), Sage Publications, Inc. 2455 Teller Road, Newbury Park, California 91320, 1993, ISBN 0-8039-4922-7.

Predicting a new localism, this book presents analyses by public policy experts, political scientists, and urban specialists who focus on Kenya, Nigeria, Poland, Hungary, the Caribbean, the United Kingdom, and the United States. The authors explore local political restructuring in the face of massive global economic change. City- and country-specific data are used to illustrate the vitality of local politics and the importance of local variations.

Local activism has taken a new form, with local leaders acting as entrepreneurs in markets dominated by private investors who operate at a global scale. In industrialized countries this leads to a shift away from elected bodies and popular control toward those controlling private resources, albeit often through quasi-public agencies.

Taking a cross-national perspective, this book asserts that, although complicated by political considerations, the notion of the local public entrepreneur may hold promise. If local authorities are given sufficient autonomy and access to resources, the interaction of democratization and restructuring pressures at the local levels will link the legitimacy of local regimes



to local economic performance and create a demand for public entrepreneurs.

## “Rethinking Local Government—Views from the Third World”

in Environment and Urbanization, Volume 3, Number 1. International Institute for Environment and Development, 3 Endsleigh Street, London WC1H 0DD, U.K., April 1991.

Drawing on original research and experiences in Kenya, Indonesia,



South Africa and Colombia, this issue focuses on the need for more participatory local government struc-

tures. The authors—several of whom contributed to this issue of *The Urban Age*—question whether current government structures will permit the participation and “bottom up” development that many governments claim to embrace.

Writing about Africa, Richard Stren and Diana Lee-Smith stress that more attention should be paid to potential local government partnerships with citizen groups, community organizations, cooperatives, nongovernmental organizations, and business groups.

Hilda Herzer and Pedro Pirez describe some encouraging instances of new partnerships between municipal authorities and community-based organizations in Latin America. They see the presence of a political system with a certain degree of democratic development as an essential precondition for such partnerships.

Reviewing the democratization and decentralization of Cartagena and Santander de Quilichao in Colombia, Fabio Velasquez points out that sustained reform will only be achieved if institutional and non-institutional participatory mechanisms are deepened.

## The Power Broker: Robert Moses and the Fall of New York


by Robert A. Caro, Vintage Books, New York, New York, 1975, ISBN 0-394-72024-5

First published over twenty years ago, this Pulitzer Prize-winning biography provides timeless lessons about urban growth and the use and misuse of power.

Unquestionably America’s most prolific physical creator, Robert Moses was singularly responsible for building New York’s greatest dams, highways, monuments, and parks, from Lincoln Center to the great bridges that link the city with the mainland. For 34 years he played a key role in setting the priorities for the city’s public works: for seven of those, he established *all* its priorities.

With multiple terms as Parks Commissioner, Construction Coordinator, and Planning Commissioner of New York City, Moses held power during the administrations of six governors and five mayors. He used fear and economic influence to hold sway over city officials, governors, and even presidents. He kept the most powerful men in the city and state in line by awarding them huge retainers, fees, and commissions. “He gave everybody involved in the political setup in this city whatever it was they wanted,” one official says in the book. “Therefore they all had their own interest in seeing him succeed.”

The author pulls Moses’ life achievements into a story of epic proportion. Moses shaped New York like no one who preceded or followed him. His story tells how



the great modern American city emerged and how the focus on vast public works backfired by

making the car king and by ignoring public participation and the needs of the poor.

*Below is a selection of urban events and training courses culled from The Urban Age's current files. We are not always able to list events more than once, given space limitations. Please refer to past issues of The Urban Age for additional events scheduled in 1994. Send your announcements to: The Editor, The Urban Age, Room S4-031, The World Bank, 1818 H Street NW, Washington DC 20433. Facsimile: 202-522-3224. Internet: bbradford@worldbank.org*

## Conferences



**Bogota, Colombia**—April 14–16, 1994. **Housing Settlements.** Contact: Jaime Hernandez Garcia, Director, Research Department, Architecture Faculty, Universidad La Gran Columbia, Carrera 5 No. 13-39, Santafe de Bogota, Colombia. Tel: 286-8200 ext. 214 or 211, Fax: 256-7517.

**San Francisco, CA, USA**—April 16–20, 1994. **Region and City: Merged Destinies, 1994 APA National Planning Conference.** Contact: Woodroe Claiborne, American Planning Association, Lock Box 94343, Chicago, IL 60678-4343. USA. Tel: 312-955-9100, Fax: 312-955-8312.

**Philadelphia, PA, USA**—April 17–20, 1994. **Making Urban Economies Work: Leading the Transformation.** Contact: Jenny Murphy, National Council for Urban Economic Development, 1730 K St. N.W. Suite 915, Washington, DC 20006, USA. Tel: 202-223-4735, Fax: 202-223-4745.

**San Luis, Argentina**—April 26–29, 1994. **First Annual Conference on Municipalities and the Environment.** Contact: Professor Isabel Gimenez, Universidad Nacional de San Luis, Chacabuco y Pedernera, San Luis 5700, Argentina. Tel: 54-0652-25107, Fax: 54-0652-20827.

**Ibadan, Nigeria**—May 16–18, 1994. **International Conference on Urban Governance and Urban Poverty in Anglophone, West Africa.** Contact: The Coordinator, Urban Governance and Urban Poverty Conference, Centre for African Settlement Studies and Development (CASSAD), PO Box 20775, U.I. Post Office, Ibadan, Nigeria. Tel: 022-712727. Fax: 022-414536.

**Beijing, China**—May 23–25, 1994. **International Symposium on Non-Motorized Transportation.** Sponsored by the Beijing Polytechnic University, Transportation Research Board USA, and Florida International University. Contact: Setty Pendakur, Professor of Planning, University of British Columbia, Vancouver, BC, Canada V6T 1Z2. Tel: 604-822-3394, Fax: 604-822-3787. Internet: pendakur@unixg.ubc.ca

**Washington, DC, USA**—June 21–24, 1994. **Urban Health Challenges for the 21st Century.** Contact: International Medical Services For Health, 45449 Severn Way, Suite 161, Sterling, VA 20166, USA. Tel: 703-444-4477, Fax: 703-444-4471.

**Arlington, Virginia, USA**—June 26–29, 1994. **Population and the Quality of Life: A Dialogue on Values.** Contact: Diane Randall, National Council for International Health, 1701 K St. NW, Suite 600, Washington, DC 20008, USA. Tel: 202-833-5903, Fax: 202-833-0075.

**Cairo, Egypt**—September 5–13, 1994. **International Conference on Population and Development, 1994 (ICPD).** Contact: ICPD Secretariat, 220 E. 42nd St. 22nd Fl., New York, NY 10017, USA. Tel: 212-297-5244/5245, Fax: 212-297-5250. **NGO Forum '94.** Contact: Mary Beth Powers, Non-Governmental Organization Planning Committee for ICPD, 777 United Nations Plaza, 8th Floor, New York, NY, 10017, USA. Tel: 212-545-7344, Fax: 202-545-7581.

**Washington, DC**—September 11-14, 1994. **Building Partnerships: Worldwide and at Home.** Contact: Jerry Delli Priscoli, International Association of Public Participation Practitioners, P.O. Box 82317, Portland, Oregon, 97282, USA. Tel. and Fax: 503-236-6630.

**Washington, DC**—September 19–21, 1994. **The 2nd Annual World Bank Conference on Environmentally Sustainable Development: The Human Face of the Urban Environment.** Contact: Aissatou Seck, The World Bank, Room J3-083, 1818 H Street, NW, Washington, D.C. 20433, USA. Tel: 202-473-5546, Fax: 202-473-3112, Internet: aseck@worldbank.org

**San Jose, Costa Rica**—October 24–28, 1993. **The Third Meeting of the International Society for Ecological Economics.** Contact: ISEE-94 Costa Rica Conference Secretariat, P.O. Box 555-3000. Heredia, Costa Rica. Tel: 506-60-1600, Fax: 506-37-6868.

**Hong Kong**—November 7–12. **World Congress on Urban Growth and the Environment.** Contact: Congress Secretariat, 10 Tonsley Place, London SW18 1BP, UK. Tel: 081-871-1209, Fax: 081-875-0686.

**Cincinnati, Ohio, USA**—November 17-20, 1994. **Urban Public Housing.** Contact: Professor Wolfgang F. E. Preiser, School of Architecture, University of Cincinnati, Mail Location 0016, Cincinnati, Ohio, 45221-0016, USA. Tel: 513-556-6743, Fax: 513-556-3288.

**Bali, Indonesia**—December 5–9, 1994. **Health, Economics and Development: Working Together for Change, The Seventh International Congress of the World Federation of Public Health Associations.** Contact: WFPHA Secretariat, c/o APHA, 1015 15th St. NW, Suite 300, Washington, DC 20005, USA. Tel: 202-789-5696, Fax: 202-789-5681.

## Education Programs and Courses

**Harvard University**—The Harvard International Tax Program and the Lincoln Institute of Land Policy are offering a Program on Information Technology for Fiscal Systems, April 17–May 13, 1994. Contact: Ms. Mary Helen Black, Program Administrator, Harvard University International Tax Program, 113 Brattle St., Cambridge, MA 02138-3400, USA. Tel: 617-661-3016, Fax: 617-661-7235.

**Loughborough University of Technology**—Offers a certificate course May 8–July 2, 1994 in Upgrading and Management of Urban Water Supplies. Contact: Water Engineering and Development Centre, Loughborough University of Technology, Leicestershire LE11 3TU, UK. Tel: 44-509-222885, Fax: 44-509-211079.

**United States Environmental Training Institute** offers courses for mid- and senior-level managers in developing countries, including Urban Development and Environmental Policies in Asia, May 23–June 2, 1994 in Bangkok, Thailand. Contact: USETI Selection Committee, 1000 Thomas Jefferson Street, NW, Suite 106, Washington, DC 20007, USA. Tel: 202-338-3400, Fax: 202-333-4782.

**Management Sciences for Health** offers courses on "Global Challenges of Urban Health" November 14–December 2, 1994 and "Financing Options and Cost Control," October 3–October 21, 1994 in Kenya. Additional courses are offered in Boston, MA, USA. Contact: Management Sciences for Health, 400 Centre St., Newton, MA 02158, USA. Tel: 617-527-9202, Fax: 617-965-2208.

LETTERS TO THE EDITOR

continued from page 2

The program's long term objectives are to:

- develop a balanced and cost effective urban mobility system, that supports an efficient internal urban economic market and is affordable to the entire urban population.
- develop a choice of construction and maintenance technologies for transport infrastructure and vehicles that realistically reflects the economic and social conditions of Sub-Saharan African cities.
- support an urban development model that allows acceptable environmental conditions to be maintained in Sub-Saharan African cities, including reasonable air quality, noise levels, tree cover, and safety.

The contrast between the "world market" urban trends and our objectives is large. Expectations that one can have of the effectiveness of isolated efforts to influence certain trends are very modest. But we know that many efforts in different places exist. We are very interested in contacts and cooperation with people actively involved in urban transport and development—in East and Southern Africa in particular—to increase the chances of making a positive contribution.

T. Rwebangira, J. Nguma, A. Mbelle  
University of Dar es Salaam  
Faculty of Engineering  
P.O. Box 14550  
Dar es Salaam, Tanzania  
Fax: 255-51-43380

M. Omwenga, S. Obiero, J. Malombe  
University of Nairobi  
ADD-Mamlaka Road  
PO Box 30197  
Fax: 254-2-718549

M. de Langen (coordinator)  
MLP&T, Crabethstraat 38k, 2801  
ANGOUDE, The Netherlands  
Fax: 31-1820-11296

Editor:  
Your Fall 1993 issue on Urban Transportation was excellent. The first spectrum of efforts needs to address how we can attain ecological sustainability, social equity, and economic efficiency. This will require flexibility (modes that are not fixed), encouraging non-motorized modes (saving money, increasing air quality, saving road space), land use planning supporting walk and bicycle trips and reducing motorized travel, and requiring road users to pay a substantial portion of infrastructure investment and maintenance.

This is easier said than done. Recent studies show that many light rail transit and mass rail transit systems cost more than estimated, patronage is less than estimated, and decisions are made for reasons other than efficient transport. The question for major lending agencies ought to be one of choosing the modes appropriate for the country, incomes, stage of

development, ability to pay, and environmental quality. There are non-transportation solutions to transportation problems! The persistent questions are: who pays, who benefits, who has the ability to pay higher costs of technology, and do transportation networks drive development or the other way around? Perhaps you could have another issue of *The Urban Age* soon on analytical methods and policy processes.

V. Setty Pendakur  
Professor  
The University of  
British Columbia  
School of Community and  
Regional Planning  
Vancouver, BC, Canada

Editor:  
Your Fall 1993 issue focused very appropriately on the relationship between urban transportation planning and the ultimate quality of urban life. Many of the observations made by the writers were echoed in my *Washington Post* "Shaping the City" column (1-29-94) headlined "L.A. Earthquake Underscores Need for Multiple Transportation Options." In that column I wrote: "Concerned designers and technologists have long advocated land use patterns supported by urban transportation systems that are not only safe and well maintained, but also multi-modal. An effective multi-modal system employs

complementary modes of travel—walking, private cars, taxis, buses, trolleys and light rail lines, subways, even boats—to create a balanced, interwoven regional and subregional transportation network . . . Los Angeles may be the world's least multi-modal city, being almost totally dependent on private passenger automobiles and high-capacity freeways. Low densities and scattered patterns of settlement sprawling over hundreds of square miles make Los Angeles dysfunctional when it loses only a few hundred yards of its vast freeway system."

A transportation paralysis struck Los Angeles after the January 1994 earthquake, illustrating the risks of depending solely on the automobile. The benefits of redundancy and interconnectivity inherent in multi-modal systems include convenience, safety, variety, and choice.

Of course, the lessons of the recent Los Angeles earthquake may or may not be heeded. "Will Los Angeles do anything about its transportation network other than reinforcing and reconstructing failed or failing freeway bridges? Possible but unlikely—at least not until the 'big one' knocks down all the freeways."

Roger K. Lewis  
Architect and Planner  
Professor of Architecture,  
University of Maryland  
Columnist,  
The Washington Post

Photo credits: p. 1 (Nairobi) Rebecca Nduku, Courtesy of Nation Newspapers, Nairobi; p. 6 (Quito) Inter-American Development Bank Photo; p. 8 (Colombia) Carlos Gonzalez; p. 9 (Cali) Courtesy of the Mayor's Office, Cali, Colombia; p. 12 (Mayor of Barcelona) Courtesy of the Mayor's Office of Barcelona, (Barcelona) Quim I lenas; p. 13 (St. Petersburg) Vladimir Antoschenko; p. 15 (Quito) Press Office of the President of Ecuador; p. 16 (Tegucigalpa) Patricia Ahern; p. 18 (China Open Cities) Courtesy of the City of Regina; p. 21 (Budapest) Csilla Sárkány; p. 21 (ICMA) Deborah Albers.

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Next Issue

The Spring 1994 issue of *The Urban Age* will focus on the phenomenon of massive movements of people across international boundaries into cities in search of a better way of life. We look forward to receiving your comments, thoughts, and suggestions on this topic. We also encourage you to send us your feedback on this and past issues of *The Urban Age*.

To receive *The Urban Age*, please fill out the information below and return to The Editor, *The Urban Age* Rm S4-031, 1818 H Street NW, Washington, D.C. 20433

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