Somalia

Somalia Education Programmatic Technical Assistance

Education in Federal Systems: Lessons from Selected Countries for Somalia

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<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ABE</td>
<td>Accelerated Basic Education</td>
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<tr>
<td>AET</td>
<td>Africa Educational Trust</td>
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<td>AMISOM</td>
<td>African Union Mission in Somalia</td>
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<td>ANA</td>
<td>Annual National Assessments</td>
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<td>ANC</td>
<td>African National Congress</td>
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<td>ASER</td>
<td>Annual Status of Education Report</td>
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<td>ASIDI</td>
<td>Accelerated Schools Infrastructure Delivery Initiative</td>
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<td>BECS</td>
<td>Basic Education Community Schools</td>
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<td>BIH</td>
<td>Bosnia and Herzegovina</td>
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<td>BISE</td>
<td>Boards of Intermediate and Secondary Education</td>
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<tr>
<td>BRICS</td>
<td>Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa</td>
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<tr>
<td>CAPS</td>
<td>Curriculum and Assessment Policy Statements</td>
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<td>CCC</td>
<td>Common core curriculum</td>
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<td>CCI</td>
<td>Council of Common Interest</td>
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<td>CEC</td>
<td>Community education committees</td>
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<td>CEM</td>
<td>Council of Education Ministers</td>
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<td>CoE</td>
<td>Council of Europe</td>
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<td>CoM</td>
<td>Council of Ministers</td>
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<td>CPD</td>
<td>Continued professional development</td>
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<td>CRC</td>
<td>Convention on the Rights of the Child</td>
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<td>DBE</td>
<td>Department of Basic Education</td>
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<td>DCF</td>
<td>Donor Coordination Forum</td>
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<td>DEO</td>
<td>District Education Officers</td>
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<td>DFID</td>
<td>UK Department for International Development</td>
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<td>DHET</td>
<td>Department of Higher Education and Training</td>
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<td>ECD</td>
<td>Early Childhood Development</td>
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<td>ECE</td>
<td>Early childhood education</td>
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<td>EFA</td>
<td>Education for All</td>
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<td>EMIS</td>
<td>Education Management Information System</td>
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<td>ESA</td>
<td>Education Sector Analysis</td>
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<td>ESSP</td>
<td>Education Sector Strategic Plan</td>
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<td>FAS</td>
<td>Foundation Assisted Schools</td>
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<td>FATA</td>
<td>Federally-Administered Tribal Areas</td>
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<td>FGS</td>
<td>Federal Government of Somalia</td>
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FMS  Federal Member States
FPE  Free primary education
FSQL  Fundamental School Quality Levels
GDP  Gross Domestic Product
GER  Gross Enrolment Rate
GPE  Global Partnership for Education
GPI  Gender Parity Index
GNI  Gross National Income
HDI  Human Development Index
HEDCOM  Head of Education Department’s Committee
HIPS  Heritage Institute for Policy Studies
ICT  Islamabad Capital Territory
IDP  Internally displaced persons
IMF  International Monetary Fund
IMU  Independent Monitoring Unit
INGO  International non-governmental organizations
IPEMC  Inter-Provincial Education Ministers Conference
KP  Khyber Pakhtunkhwa
KPA  Key performance areas
MDG  Millennium Development Goals
MFEPT  Ministry of Federal Education and Professional Training
MNSQE  Minimum National Standards for Quality Education
MOCA  Ministry of Civil Affairs
MOE  Ministry of Education
MoECHE  Somali Ministry of Education, Culture and Higher Education
MoEHE  Somaliland Ministry of Education and Higher Education
MOU  Memorandum of Understanding
MPAT  Management Performance Assessment Tool
NCC  National Curriculum Council
NDP  National Development Plan
NECF  National Education Curriculum Framework
NEP  National Education Policies
NER  Net Enrolment Rate
NFBE  Non-Formal Basic Education
NFC  National Finance Commission
NNSSF  National Norms and Standards for School Funding
NPDE  National Professional Diploma in Education
NSNP  National Schools Nutrition Programme
ODA  Overseas development assistance
OSCE  Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
OTL  Opportunity to learn
| PCS | Provisional Constitution of Somalia |
| PED | Provincial Education Department |
| PEF | Punjab Education Foundation |
| PGEB | Promoting Girls’ Education in Balochistan |
| PIRLS | Progress in International Reading Literacy Study |
| PPP | Public-private partnerships |
| PTA | Parents-teacher association |
| QA | Quality Assurance |
| QAAS | Quality Assurance and Standards Service |
| QAO | Quality Assurance Officers |
| REO | Regional Education Officers |
| RS | Republika Srpska |
| SA | South Africa |
| SAA | Standards and Assessment Agency |
| SACE | South African Council for Educators |
| SACMEQ | Southern and Eastern Africa Consortium for Monitoring Educational Quality |
| SADTU | South African Democratic Teachers Union |
| SARS | South African Revenue Service |
| SB | School Boards |
| SBM | School-based management |
| SGB | School governing bodies |
| SMC | School management committee |
| SNU | Somali National University |
| UNDP | United Nations Development Program |
| UNFPA | United National Population Fund |
| WCED | Western Cape Education Department |
Executive Summary

Overview and Objectives

I. Somalia’s education system has transitioned through three major phases since the country gained independence in 1960. The first, in the 1970s and 1980s, saw two decades of centralization and improvements to education. Following this, the overthrow of Siad Barre in 1991 resulted in a civil war and two decades of fragmentation and system breakdown. The third and current phase has seen nearly a decade of efforts by central, sub-national, local, and non-government actors to deliver schooling to the next generations of children who will need an education to grow to be effective parents, workers, and leaders in a strategically important country that is moving towards stability and prosperity.

II. The country’s education system can be described today as federal but with its core functions of planning, managing, financing, and service delivery distributed across central, state and some district jurisdictions that operate outside of an agreed constitutional framework at present. The roles and responsibilities for carrying out the core functions in an education system are therefore very much under development and part of ongoing negotiations.

III. Federal government education officials in Somalia aspire to establish a multi-level system of education in which the federal ministry of education would be the focal point of state ministries of education in unifying the policies, legislation, and curriculum in the country. Towards developing the new structure, the Ministries of Education of the Federal Member States (FMS) have met with federal MoECHE officials on multiple occasions to discuss ways to harmonize their systems and formulate a new structure.

IV. Provision of education will be a challenge for the Federal government since over half of primary students and 70% of secondary students are educated outside the public sector. Service delivery in the states in the Central and Southern parts of the country is dominated by private education providers, including from Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Yemen and Ethiopia. Further complicating the Somalia situation is the occurrence of periodic droughts as well as continued terrorist attacks by Al-Shabaab.

V. In this context, the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) has expressed its interest in learning from the experience of other federal countries that have also faced socio-political challenges related to how the functions of education are governed and managed across their jurisdictions at the national, sub national, or local levels. As well, there is a need for Federal Member States to implement their functions as assigned to Federal and FMS education ministries as per the recently signed Memorandum of Understanding (MOU).

VI. This paper examines and compares the education systems of three countries that have very different federal systems to Somalia’s own in order to draw comparisons and identify possible lessons for Somalia. These lessons are meant to help Somalia address challenges in education access, equity, and quality within the framework of a federal system.

Approach and Case Study Selection

VII. This paper uses a case study approach to examine how three countries; Pakistan, South Africa, and Bosnia Herzegovina, have constituted their education systems under a federal structure.
These countries were chosen because they all have federal-type systems of government\(^1\), but as importantly, they are all countries that have experienced conflict situations. The governance structures for education differ significantly between the three studies, presenting a spectrum of possible degrees of decentralization and central authority. The paper also provides a case study of Somalia to form a basis for comparison. Each case study follows an analytic framework that examines: (i) the politics, policies and legislative frameworks; (ii) service delivery; (iii) planning and finance; and (iv) the role of international development partners.

VIII. Pakistan. Education in Pakistan was centrally controlled and managed until a 2010 constitutional amendment curtailed presidential powers in an attempt to reduce the risk of a military coup by devolving authority over education (and a number of other services) to provincial governments. Today, provinces are coming together to harmonize some of the core functions of the education system on a voluntary basis.

IX. South Africa. To oversee the effective establishment of an integrated system from the patchwork of ministries operating post-Apartheid, the legislature in South Africa granted significant powers to the Minister of Education. This has allowed the central government to control multiple aspects of the education system through establishing norms and standards: the provincial governments were made responsible for service delivery and decision-making within the parameters established by the center.

X. Bosnia and Herzegovina. In the aftermath of the Bosnian war, under the strong guidance of international peace brokers, Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) was set up to ensure the separation of ethnic groups through the establishment of 14 separate government bodies responsible for policy-making and legislation of education in a country with only 480,000 students. This system was established with the principal aim of ending hostilities between the warring ethnic groups. The framework left no room for a central Minister of Education to exercise the authority or leadership to harmonize or standardize core education system components, including teacher qualifications, standards, curriculum, or assessments.

Rationale

XI. Somalia stands at a turning point in its desire to create a firm foundation for its education system. A governance structure with clearly defined roles and responsibilities lies at the core of this endeavor. The countries included in the case studies presented in this paper encountered many of the issues with which Somalia is now grappling. Their experiences will help to illuminate the various choices and consequences of those choices that will aid the FGS in its own decision-making.

XII. This report fulfills one of the commitments made under the Multi-Partner Fund to conduct a policy analysis and provide suggestions for a federal framework for education service delivery. There are major issues related to service delivery with which Somalia needs to contend. However, it should be noted that this study will not prescribe how to build a world class education system, but rather focus on the structures that will create an environment to make this possible in the future.

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\(^1\)South Africa’s system is akin to a federal system. It is a unitary republic with three spheres of government: national, provincial and local. The Constitution states that these spheres should not be seen as hierarchical but instead autonomous, distinctive, inter-related and inter-dependent. The Constitution also lays out the principals of cooperative government.
Somalia’s Education Context

XIII. **Policy Framework.** Legislation governing national and sub-national responsibilities for education has been under deliberation for some time. As such, Somalia’s education system lacks an agreed upon legal framework to guide the federal vis-à-vis the sub-national roles and responsibilities. Nonetheless, Federal Member States have gone ahead and established their own Education Ministries for overseeing planning and service delivery in their jurisdictions and have formulated their own Education Sector Strategic Plans. In part, the establishment of these separate ministries of education in the member states and other jurisdictions springs from a need to accommodate the country’s broader political system of power-sharing with both majority and disadvantaged clans in the country and to address associated inequalities in distribution of power and representation in decision-making.

XIV. **Access and Infrastructure.** The draft Constitution of Somalia and Draft National Education Policy state that free and compulsory education is the right of every child, thus placing the responsibility for access on the state. However, the inability to ensure access and acceptable quality of infrastructure contributes to Somalia having one of the lowest rates of enrolment in the world wherein gender disparity is notable. Non-state actors have emerged to help fill the access gap, which has contributed to unequal access rates: nomadic communities, internally displaced persons and the poor are not served by either the state or non-state system.

XV. **Curriculum and Educational Materials.** The National Education Curriculum Framework for FMS states in Galmudug, HirShabelle, South-West, Jubaland and Benadir was developed over a two-year period in an attempt to coordinate a highly fractured system. Until now, use of the new curriculum has not been enforced and many schools have been following foreign curricula. In addition, supply of education materials has been equally splintered and ad hoc, with textbooks often imported from Arabic and other African states. First steps to address this are now being taken as the FGS has recently launched lower primary textbooks based on the new national curriculum. As yet this framework has not been unified with that used by Puntland or Somaliland.

XVI. **Teacher Contracting and Performance Management.** There are significant differences between Somaliland and the rest of the country in terms of teachers. To start, there are more certified teachers in Somaliland than in the rest of the country, though employment of teachers lacking proper qualifications is a problem across the country. Further, in contrast to Somaliland, in the majority of the country most teachers are not paid by the government, reducing top-down accountability within the system and reducing the space for effective teacher performance management. The central Ministry of Education (MoECHE) has been almost completely removed from teacher payment, reducing leverage over provincial Ministries. This is changing, however, as World Bank financing has enabled some inter-governmental fiscal transfers, with the goal of gradually putting about 3,000 teachers on the payrolls of the Federal Member States.

XVII. **Monitoring and Accountability for Quality.** Data remains a key challenge in the Somali education system at all levels (inputs, outputs and especially outcomes) and the country lacks an integrated management information system (EMIS). This is exacerbated by the large number of non-state and informal schools. MoECHE has attempted to standardize quality assurance efforts through the Department of Quality Assurance, however the reality remains a patchwork of limited quality assurance approaches delivered within regions. In the absence of meaningful government funding for education, school committees and community associations have emerged as key actors in school monitoring and accountability. Somaliland has its own Quality Assurance and Standards Service, which also lacks fully qualified staff and well-developed standards for assessment.
Executive Summary

XVIII. Assessing Learning Outcomes. Whereas Puntland and Somaliland have clear indicators of learning outcomes achieved at the primary level, the MoECHE is just beginning to introduce standardized assessment at grades 4 and 8 in states in Galmudug, HirShabelle, South-West, Jubaland and Benadir. If effectively enforced, these will provide an important measure of school quality nationally and allow comparison between states. However, neither Puntland nor Somaliland currently take part in these assessments so there is no means to compare across states. Further, private schools do not all undertake the testing which, given they make up the majority of enrolment, undermines the effectiveness of the assessments.

XIX. Intergovernmental transfers. National revenue in Somalia is low, with the destruction of both the economy and tax infrastructure. What revenue that is available has been prioritized towards security and away from education, which accounts for just 0.95% to 1.2% of total government spending and less than 1% of federal spending. This is well below the 20% proposed by the Global Partnership for Education (GPE) and below neighboring countries (as well as the 7% allocated by the government of Somaliland). Until now, states in the Southern and Central parts of the country, Somaliland, and Puntland all have prepared separate Education Sector Strategic Plans with no specific coordination process or harmonization.

XX. The role of international donors. MoECHE is heavily dependent on international donors, both in terms of program funding such as running EMIS and data collection and staffing with 97% of ministry staff paid through external sources. While donors play a key role in the system, their activities have furthered the fractured nature of the education system: funders including the World Bank, have supported sub-national governments given the lack of central authority during the conflict.

Lessons Learned and Recommendations

XXI. Legislative and Policy Framework

Lessons: As Somalia’s leadership is debating the responsibilities and authorities of its federal ministry of education, it would be judicious to consider the factors that guided decisions on this issue for these case study countries. If Somalia is looking to education as an instrument for social cohesion and political integration, it would make sense to empower the federal ministry with the responsibility for strategy, policy formulation, and establishing system standards and norms as South Africa has done. If Somalia is concerned that increasing the federal ministry’s policy-making scope would risk a power grab and excessive centralization, then Pakistan’s approach to limiting the federal ministry’s authority could make sense for Somalia. This approach may also be appropriate in contexts where emerging or established regional groups are providing education services and it is therefore necessary to reach consensus on power sharing. BiH provides a good lesson for Somalia about what to avoid: the sub-national entities’ inability to cooperate combined with a powerless federal ministry has severely inhibited inter-province collaboration and system efficiency and effectiveness.

Recommendation:

a) Agree on a National Framework for Education Policy. Somalia’s regional education actors should work to agree on a national framework for setting education policy that provides for a federal role in establishing system-wide standards and norms.
XXII. Division of Responsibilities

Lessons: As Somalia’s political actors are moving closer towards an agreement on the distribution of roles and responsibilities in the education system, it would be useful to consider keeping flexibility in these structures. Pakistan and South Africa both formulated clear distinctions in roles between the national and sub-national authorities, but their legislation has permitted negotiation between the levels. This enabled the systems to evolve on the basis of performance and experience: in Pakistan for example the level of autonomy granted to provinces depends on the level of development and capacity in the provinces. Specifically, two of the more developed provinces (Punjab and Sindh) were granted greater autonomy than the others until recently as other provinces have caught up. Equally, as the system in Pakistan evolved and it became clearer that greater coordination was needed, legislation that created a coordinating body has permitted the autonomous sub-national governments to agree on coordinated policies. Thus, the distribution of powers and relationship between national and sub-national governments should not be seen as a fixed state. Somalia should avoid the errors made in BiH, which have locked in a structure that appears to make it all but impossible to harmonize policy and planning.

Recommendations:

b) **Agree on the federal government’s role in ensuring the right to education.** Somalia’s regional education actors should consider legislation or policy formulation that would empower the federal Ministry of Education to ensure the right to education with measures that compel states to comply, while allowing flexibility for roles and responsibilities to evolve as the system matures.

c) **Support emerging mechanisms for coordination across states.** Somalia’s regional education actors should deepen cooperation on inter-state agreements regarding standards and norms for curriculum and assessment, textbooks, teacher qualifications, capacity building, data collection, and donor-funded scholarships. Absence of a legal framework to mandate coordination and standard setting across states, it is essential to reinforce efforts (including through development partners) to strengthen Somalia’s emerging intra-state agreements on standards and norms for curriculum and assessment, textbooks, teacher qualifications, capacity building, data collection, and donor-funded scholarships.

d) **Ensure alignment and coherence across various legal and policy instruments, from the start.** Local government laws, decentralization policies, as well as education sector guidelines such as the Education Strategic Sector Plan (ESSP) need to reflect a common understanding of the division of functions and responsibilities across administrative levels, so as to strengthen the enabling environment for decentralized education services.

XXIII. Access and Infrastructure

Lessons: The experiences from the case studies suggest that whatever distribution of powers and funding within education is decided by stakeholders in Somalia, the Federal government should continue to play a role in guaranteeing the right to education. At a minimum, the experience of BiH shows the importance of a recognized central authority and responsibility in a country with ethnic divisions and the potential for discriminatory behavior. Further, there is strong argument for ensuring that the central MoECHE has budget for equity-targeted programs, either to supplement, or if needed to counteract, regional efforts. **Annex Box 1: Establishing fundamental school quality standards in Vietnam** provides an example from a non-case study country which established national standards for schools and then targeted resources directly to those schools.
with the greatest need. Vietnam’s fundamental quality school level program is a practical way to define a minimum standard of quality for all schools and to direct finances on a priority basis to schools falling below this standard.

Recommendations:

e) **Ensure equitable access to quality schooling across Somalia.** Somalia’s regional education actors should formulate policy initiatives to raise every school to at least a basic standard of quality and seek ways to target resources to schools that fall below that standard. For further discussion on mechanisms for funding federal interventions see Chapter 6 Paragraph 45.

f) **Strengthen oversight of non-state schools and networks.** Somalia’s regional education actors should establish mechanisms to recognize, register, monitor the performance of, and provide public information on non-state schools with a view to harnessing their contribution to helping Somalia achieve education and learning for all.

XXIV. **Curriculum and Educational Materials**

*Lessons:* The history and importance of clan-based relationships in the existing education ecosystem (numerous regional Ministries of Education) show the importance of flexibility and consensus building in curriculum, textbooks, and education materials. The case studies point out a variety of options that have allowed a degree of regional autonomy while pursuing coordination and harmonization. The recent voluntary move in Pakistan towards closer standardization of curriculum and education materials represents an explicit recognition by regional actors in the country of the need for coordination through collaboration, even without a central or federal mandate.

*Recommendation:*

g) **Ensure a common curriculum.** Somalia’s regional education actors should formalize and work to operationalize their agreement on a common curriculum framework and syllabus (allowing for local refinements), including with the integration of the Somaliland’s and Puntland’s curriculums.

XXV. **Teacher Contracting and Performance Management**

*Lessons:* Given the existing fragmentation of teacher payment in Somalia, it seems both unlikely and undesirable for MoECHE to be responsible for direct teacher payments. However, the case studies show how federal authorities in different countries can play a coordination and standard setting role in terms of initial teacher training and certification as well as quality standards for teachers and principals. In Somalia, such a role could become increasingly important as Somalia’s regional education actors take on greater responsibility for teacher salaries. Variation in remuneration could also lead to a competitive market for teachers across sub-national entities within the country, suggesting the importance of transparency and performance standards in teacher compensation.

*Recommendation:*

h) **Develop teacher standards.** Somalia’s regional education actors should support, through legislation or regulation, the federal ministry’s role in formulating national standards for teachers, including for qualification and performance standards.
XXVI. Monitoring and Accountability for Quality

Lessons: (i) In the absence of existing norms at state-level, there may be an opportunity for Somalia to establish a system-wide accountability framework that includes standardized school quality assurance and inspection tools based on a shared definition of school quality. An interesting example of such a framework is under implementation in the state of Madhya Pradesh, India. Annex Box 2: Improving schooling with system-wide accountability in India shows that, even in a setting with weak governance, evaluating and improving school performance at scale may be possible, although to have an impact such a framework must incorporate follow-through strategies to work with schools to improve weaknesses revealed in the school evaluations. Such a system would eventually allow comparison of school quality across state borders. Given the large percentage of schools in the non-state sector, any quality assurance tool should be designed to cover state and non-state schools and combined with registration of all schools (key recommendation d, above). Focusing on basic registration of non-state actors to ensure data is available for planning purposes may be a ‘quick win.’

(ii) Another lesson from the case studies is that school governance boards may not be a sufficient replacement for effective top-down accountability unless there is an adequate level of capacity. Annex Box 3: Raising quality with school-based management in Indonesia highlights a school-based management program in Indonesia in which grants of non-salary budgets were provided to school committees to decide how to spend the funds to increase access and quality. Research on the initiative showed that their effectiveness was dependent upon the capacity of the key actors, namely the school committees.

(iii) With regard to data systems, while responsibility for data collection may be devolved to state governments, there is a clear value for Somalia to adopt (from the global community) protocols for education indicators and a process for data flow between the levels of the education system for planning, analysis, transparency, and follow-up, or for reporting on donor commitments.

Recommendations:

i) **Develop a system-wide accountability framework.** Somalia’s regional education actors should seek to develop a framework for education system accountability that is reinforced through follow-up monitoring and actions.

j) **Invest in the capacity of school boards and community school committees.** Somalia’s regional education actors should agree on clear roles and responsibilities for community school committees and seek support to strengthen their governance capacity.

k) **Bolster data management system development and two-way data flows.** Somalia’s regional education actors should adopt uniform data protocols, establish a clear flow of data between schools, state authorities, and federal authorities for planning, open information exchange, and follow-up, as well as reporting on donor commitments.

XXVII. Assessing Learning Outcomes

Lessons: Case study findings show how different federal systems work to build standardized assessment systems as a means to shine a light on education system performance and generate information that can be used to pursue learning outcomes for all students. The benefits of national assessment have been recognized by the central government in South Africa, and there are renewed efforts to harmonize assessments in Pakistan. In the current climate in Somalia, where multiple assessments are conducted across school types (private, public) and territories, the use of sample-based testing, either through the federal and state governments or by
partnering with international organizations or even international civil society organizations, could allow the central government to benchmark and track system performance.

Recommendation:

I) Establish standardized assessments. Somalia’s regional education actors should seek support from international or African regional institutions to strengthen Somalia’s efforts to design and implement standardized learning assessments in public and private schools across Somalia in order to track learning outcomes and provide states and citizens with actionable information.

Intergovernmental Transfers

Lessons: In Pakistan the Basic Education Community Schools and the National Education Foundation are examples of Federal programs working with an explicit equity focus. In South Africa, the national government utilizes norms and standards as well as conditional grants such as the Accelerated Schools Infrastructure Delivery Initiative to promote equitable access. Furthermore, in South Africa, a pro-poor funding formula set at the national level has been instrumental in increasing access amongst the poorest. In the current fiscal climate in Somalia, it is important to consider what is a reasonable share of total revenue to allocate to education, and of that, what is spent directly through the national government. Both are questions of prioritization within highly restricted budget envelopes. While the capacity to expand a central role in any of the areas will be dependent on resources, it is worth noting specifically the potential role of the central government in directly funding equity-enhancing programs.

In addition to the experiences in the case study countries noted above, Annex Box 4: Ensuring equitable funding across jurisdictions with a federal program in Brazil shows how an equalization fund was established by the federal government of Brazil to ensure that every jurisdiction achieves a minimum per-student spending level through the topping up of financing to under-resourced jurisdictions. As highlighted above, an alternative pathway to closing educational finance disparities was established in Vietnam, where the national government chose to equalize resources across schools rather than across jurisdictions. Annex Box 1: Establishing fundamental school quality standards in Vietnam, referred to above, sets out how the national government set a minimum standard for all schools, measured each school to identify the resource gap that needed to be closed for that school to meet the minimum, and then provided the necessary resource transfer to each school to close that gap and help them achieve the fundamental quality level standard.

Recommendation:

m) Focus on equalization funding to target fiscal transfers to jurisdictions with inadequate revenue. Somalia’s federal and regional education actors should develop, with support of its donor partners, a funding model that provides top-up resourcing to the poorest jurisdictions or to the poorest schools.

XXVIII. Planning and Finance of Education

While it is impossible to examine causal links, analysis of the case studies suggests that closer coordination in education planning can help strengthen the system. The experience of South Africa shows the potential leverage of setting standards and being able to compel sub-national
bodies to adhere to those standards to create a degree of consistency and coherence across the system. In contrast, the lack of standards, coordinated planning and direct budget oversight by the national government in BiH has created a patchwork system of highly unequal service delivery.

**Recommendations:**

n) **Harmonize planning.** Somalia’s federal and regional education actors should consider empowering the federal government to develop national framework plans within which individual ministries have given flexibility for implementation.

o) **Ensure more efficient budget planning and execution between education and finance ministries as a precondition for increasing funding for education.** Somalia’s federal and regional education actors and finance authorities should seek to collaborate in fiscal forums to share financial data, build capacity for more efficient budget management, and ultimately increase the level of public spending on education.

**XXIX. The Role of International Donors**

*Lessons:* The onus for donor coordination is shared between donors and government, and recent efforts in Somalia to align all parties are promising. Agreeing on a national framework for donor coordination is an important step for Somalia to avoid the kind of challenges experienced in BiH in the initial post-war period. This is especially important where sub-national governments are able to negotiate directly with donors, as is the case already for example in Somaliland and Puntland. *The experience of Pakistan highlights the important role donors can play in supporting MoECHE to promote equity across Somalia as well as to build its authority and mandate through increased central programming.* **Annex Box 5: Raising country ownership of the education aid program in Zambia,** provides a country example outside of the case study countries in which education aid aligned with government policies, provided through a coordinated and harmonized process, may help support education system development.

*Recommendations:*

p) **Ensure coordination and federal Ministry of Education leadership.** Alongside establishing mechanisms for donor coordination, all donors should agree to work under the coordination of the federal ministry of education as the pivot point for education reform in Somalia.

q) **Establish a multi-donor trust fund.** Somalia’s regional education actors and the federal government should work with donor partners to establish a national multi-donor trust fund to build the authority and mandate of MoECHE through coordinated programming.

**XXX. A Note on Capacity Building**

*Lessons:* Strengthening capacity at national and sub-national level in Somalia remains a pressing concern for all actors. The country case studies show that good intentions and significant resources do not necessarily lead to positive outcomes. *Creating a national program (possibly through the support of external partners) to be coordinated at the central level could leverage sub-national capacity building efforts.* For example, resources for planning and budgeting could be provided to implement a national capacity-building framework.
Recommendation:

r) **Prioritize capacity building.** Somalia’s regional education actors and donors should prioritize capacity building at all levels with a focus on sustainability and local ownership. Encouraging alignment and coordination through funds for capacity building should be a key component of any multi-donor trust fund implemented by the federal Ministry of Education.
Chapter 1: Introduction

Conceptual Framework

Background to the study

1. This paper will explore options for how Somalia can structure its education system under a Federal government. The desire for a federal government is based on the political will expressed in the Provisional Constitution of Somalia (PCS) as submitted to the House of the People of the Federal Parliament on 07 September 2012, as well as by population surveys. According to a Heritage Institute survey conducted in 2015, the majority view federalism as the most suitable form of governance to decentralize Somalia, because it facilitates reasonable power sharing among clans, enables regional autonomy and ultimately leads to a reduction of conflict. However, as highlighted in the Somalia Economic Update 2015, the PCS outlines the broad terms of the Federal system but leaves much of the architecture open to ongoing negotiations, including the nature of intergovernmental fiscal arrangements and responsibility for delivery of public services.

2. This report fulfills one of the commitments made by the international community to conduct a policy analysis and provide suggestions for a federal framework for education service delivery as put forward under the Multi-Partner Fund. It focuses on issues related to governance arrangements and service delivery in Somalia, along with the roles and responsibilities of federal, subnational, and international actors in helping Somalia address these issues. It does not prescribe what Somalia would need to do to build a world class education system but will examine ways to improve the governance structures that could contribute to education system development. Further, despite the size of the non-state sector in Somalia, this study will not focus on non-state schooling since a separate study commissioned by the Multi-Partner fund provides an in-depth examination of this sector.

3. The uncertainty of this time presents a challenge but also an opportunity for the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) and Federal Member States (FMS) to determine the most appropriate division of powers and responsibilities for delivery of public services based on a comparative analysis of other countries with federal systems. Therefore, the report focuses on issues of governance and delivery of education services with relevance to Somalia in Pakistan, Bosnia Herzegovina, and South Africa, as well as draws on findings from other countries, where appropriate.

4. A 2015 report on education in a federal context, from which this paper has adapted the framework, was prepared to provide a basis for dialogue between the World Bank and the Yemen government authorities. The study for Yemen provides an analysis of the experiences of a sample of federal countries - Mexico, the United Arab Emirates, Malaysia and Ethiopia - in managing and delivering education services, including a description of how functions are distributed across different levels of government. It provides an ample review of findings of research to date on education decentralization (which is not repeated here), with a particular focus on school-based

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3 Multi-Partner Fund, [http://www.somaliampf.net/](http://www.somaliampf.net/)
management. The paper examines four basic issues as a framework for the country case study analyses: education politics and policy, education planning and financing, education management and service delivery, the monitoring and evaluation of educational performance, and school-based management. In addition, it highlights the ways in which education decentralization can be a major pillar of nation building in conflict and post-conflict situations as well as the importance of how the move to a federal system is handled.

**Somalia Country Context**

5. **The Federal Government of Somalia, established in 2012, is the first permanent central government since the start of the Somali Civil War (1991-2011).** Since the civil war began in 1991, intra-state borders have been redrawn and contested. The country is comprised of 6 states, each of whom has its own president: Somaliland, Jubaland, Southwest, Galmudug, HirShabelle, Puntland. The latter 5 comprise the Federal Member States (FMS). The 5 FMS presidents came together in 2017 to form the Federal Member States Council. Somaliland declared independence in the early 1990s so does not participate in the FMS Council, though there has been increasing collaboration between Somaliland and the FMS. Somaliland’s status as a sovereign state has not been recognized by most of the international community. Puntland holds a semi-autonomous status and has had an on-going border dispute with Somaliland, which flared again in early 2018. Clan identification continues to hold sway in the country, a dynamic that has yet to be effectively addressed.

6. **Nearly half of the 12.3 million population of Somalia is rural or nomadic, and over 40% live below the poverty line with an economy built on agriculture and livestock.** The World Bank estimates Somalia’s - including Somaliland - Gross Domestic Product (GDP) reached USD 6.2 billion in 2016, and the country is ranked as one of the least developed countries in the world, according to the United Nations. Conflict-driven migration has pushed at least 1 million Somalis to live outside the country, one of the largest diaspora groups in the world. Diaspora remittances serve large segments of the population, cushioning household economies and creating a buffer against shocks.

7. **Since 2012, the proportion of the national budget directly supported by donors has been growing, illustrating increased donor optimism about the country’s future.** Further, since 2012 Somalia has been ranked among the top 10 recipients of Overseas Development Assistance.

8. **Security throughout the country is still extremely fragile, with most major powers advising against travel to the country due to threats of terrorism and kidnapping.** Until now the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) has been key to maintaining security in the country, but this year begins a gradual handover of responsibility from AMISOM to Somali security, as discussed at a London Somalia security conference held in May 2017.

**Somalia’s Education System Context**

9. **In the 1970s and 1980s, Somalia’s centrally-controlled government created a unitary education system with a single language, national curriculum, national textbooks, and a mission to ensure universal literacy.** During this period, in addition to improvements in other development outcomes, the education system improved as evidenced by gross enrolment rates increasing

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5 See Chapter 5 for Somali Case Study.
10. **From 1991 to 2011 the education system became fractured, without direction or policy oversight, due to civil war and ongoing conflict.** Multiple official and unofficial actors, and non-state and private school operators across Somalia stepped forward to take responsibility for education policy and service delivery, with a substantial variation in performance. Indicators for gross primary enrolment managed to climb to 29% by 2007, although secondary enrolment rates are at 7%. By 2007, in most of the developing world, gross primary and secondary rates reached approximately 95% and 30%, respectively.

11. **Since the Federal Government of Somalia was established in 2012, Somalia’s education system has continued to evolve through political and social upheaval.** With a weak central government, regional governments and jurisdictions began to exercise increasing authority over education, forming their own ministries of education and introducing regulation and oversight.

12. **Access to education is limited, especially for girls, nomads, Internationally Displaced Persons, and in regions affected by security concerns.** Somali gross enrolment rates (GER) are among the worst in the world, with disadvantaged groups such as nomads and IDP well below 20%. The GER for girls is 28.9% in contrast to the 35% for boys in primary education, and in secondary education it is 13% for girls in comparison to 18% for boys. The primary GER for nomads/pastoralist is only 3.1% and at the secondary level, 0.9%. Many children in states in the central and southern part of Somalia are denied an education because of the ongoing violence, which has meant attacks on schools, military take-over of schools, school closures.

13. **Resources are limited across the country.** Administrative units overseeing education at the center and in sub-national jurisdictions are weak and almost entirely dependent on external financing.

**Objective, Purpose and Framework for the Study**

14. **The two primary objectives of this research are:** (i) to provide case studies on education in federal systems relevant to the post-conflict rebuilding process in Somalia; and (ii) to provide policy recommendations building on these experiences, contextualized to Somalia. It presents these in a framework similar to that used as a platform for dialogue with the country of Yemen, focusing on key actors across national, sub-national and local government.

15. **The paper presents studies of three countries that have constituted their education systems under a federal structure.** Chapters 2 to 4 focus on the case studies of Pakistan, Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) and South Africa respectively. These countries were chosen because they all have federal (or federal-type) systems of government, but as importantly, they are all countries that have experienced conflict situations. Spotlight 1.1, below, shows the relevance of a federal systems arrangement to federal, conflict and violence affected states. Chapter 5 provides a case study of Somalia’s education system, from which the above summary sections have been drawn. Chapter 6 draws findings from the lessons learned in each of the other three case studies that may resonate in the Somali context and provides recommendations for consideration by Somalia’s leadership and partners.

16. **Each case study examines the education system in that country in terms of the structures and functions and their alignment.** The framework sets out the different levels of government in the system, including the central, regional, state and local levels, as well as parastatal and private actors. It explores the role of the primary actors across 5 broad categories related to the core

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6 ESSP, p. 31
issue areas of the education system, including: (1) politics and policy, (2) management and service delivery, (3) monitoring and evaluation, (4) planning and financing, and (5) international aid. Challenges faced by the country as well as innovations and successes achieved by the case study countries are highlighted. Applying this framework, the case studies aim to generalize the experience and lessons learned from the selected federal countries. The recommendations section also brings in pertinent experiences relevant to Somalia from countries outside the three studied.

### Spotlight 1.1: Why Federalism for Somalia

A Federal government formally divides power between a central authority and a number of constituent regions so that each region retains some management of its internal affairs. Some countries are originally conceived in this form (e.g. the United States, Australia, Mexico, etc.). More recently, federalism has come to be seen as a possible peace engendering solution for countries in conflict. Soren Keil, Lecturer in International Relations at the Canterbury Christ Church University has noted, “Federalism has become an important tool of conflict-resolution in the past two decades. In countries that face violence between different territorially concentrated groups, federalism has been used to ensure autonomy for the different groups on one side and their inclusion through power-sharing mechanisms in central government on the other. Examples include BiH, Nigeria, Iraq, Nepal and Ethiopia”¹

The noted scholar and founder of the Research Committee on Comparative Federalism and Multilevel Governance Michael Burgess states simply that these new federal models are not founded on the values and norms that underpin federalism as an ideology (such as cooperation, peace, compromise) but rather used as a framework to promote these values in post-conflict societies. Notwithstanding these issues, all federal nations must determine how powers, revenues and service delivery are assigned. In cases of conflict or unrest, these power sharing arrangements are critical to the continued integrity of the country. Power sharing arrangements can be modified through various means, depending upon the original governmental structure. In countries where there is diversity and a highly centralized government, decentralization of authority can be used as an approach to more equitably and efficiently meet regional/local needs, while maintaining those services best handled at the central level. Examples are Ethiopia and Pakistan. At the other end of the spectrum, in countries where conflict has led to increasing fragmentation and increased regional power, the opposite is true. Harmonisation, or bringing the fragmented sub-national units together to address common challenges through a consensual process, is a method sought to address issues that underlie conflict. Nepal and BiH are examples of this, as is Somalia.

**Federalism in Somalia.** Abdi Aynte, director of the Heritage Institute for Policy Studies (HIPS) in Mogadishu, states that Somalia has come to see federalism as a viable solution to restoring peace. “Due to the prolonged civil war and the resulting trust deficit, Somalis are yearning for local control of their politics. Decentralization, or any other form of federalism, is the answer to their quest.”¹

The Heritage Institute study of the population’s opinion of federalism points to the important part that clan plays in identification and politics in Somalia, with clear implications for creating a functioning federal government.

With regard to how best to approach structuring the education system, the principle which should underpin this decision-making process is the concept of subsidiarity: responsibility should rest at the lowest level of government consistent with allocative efficiency (e.g., the central authority should have a subsidiary function, performing only those tasks which cannot be performed at a more local level.) At the same time, the importance of harmonization through federalism in the Somali context has important considerations for education service delivery in the country. Questions around language of instruction, curriculum and the
regulation of non-state and religious schools seen through this lens may modify considerations based solely on principals of subsidiarity.

17. This framework and the broader report draw on the distinction between ‘Classical’ and ‘Post-Conflict Federalism’. This study looks at decentralization of education⁷, but the focus is broader. In contrast to discussions of appropriate power sharing and decentralization in classical federal states (United States, Mexico) which presuppose a desire to remain part of a federal structure, post-conflict federalism has a fundamentally different set of aims. Sujit Choudhry, a leading expert in constitutional law and transition, emphasizes that the principal goals of post-conflict federalism “are not to combat majority tyranny or to provide incentives for states to adopt policies that match their citizens’ preferences, but rather to avoid civil war or secession. Federalism promotes not public accountability or state efficiency but rather peace and territorial integrity.”⁸ While these two objectives (accountability/efficiency and peace/integrity) are not mutually exclusive, the importance of harmonization through federalism in the Somali context has important considerations for education service delivery in the country.

18. The figure below depicts the roles and responsibilities of the different levels of government, i.e. national, sub-national, and local, in the three country cases examined. It is important, however, to recognize that, in most countries the demarcations are not as sharp and categorical as shown. Figure 1.1 portrays the fuzziness that occurs in reality. For example, in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the central education ministry can legislate, but can be blocked by the sub-national entities – Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (FBH) and the Republika Srpska (RS). The sub-national entities can also legislate. Further, under FBH the municipal cantons can legislate and also veto FBH legislation, but under RS they cannot; they must defer to RS.

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⁷ Elaborated in Education in Federal States: Lessons from Selected Countries: ‘Findings of Research to Date on Decentralization’ cited in footnote 4.
Case Study Country Selection

19. The case studies countries examined in this study – Pakistan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and South Africa – were selected because they have characteristics or experiences that could provide insights for Somalia.\(^9\) The criteria for selection included that the case study country: (i) has relevance for Somalia as an important comparator country; (ii) experienced a period of conflict or significant political transformation that influenced subsequent decisions about federalism; (iii) falls low or relatively low on the Human Development Index (HDI) and per capita income; (iv) was not previously a case study country included in the World Bank’s 2015 study *Education in Federal States: Lessons from Selected Countries—A Study of Decentralization and School-Based Management for the Republic of Yemen*.

20. These countries were also specifically chosen to represent a spectrum of possible degrees of decentralization and central authority: from South Africa, a unitary republic with three autonomous national, provincial, and local spheres; through the decentralized Pakistan, more recently seeking provincial harmonization; to the more fractured decentralization of BiH, looking to create a country from three warring ethnic groups. Findings from each country’s experience have been drawn based upon their commonalities with Somalia, focusing on how each country developed alternative solutions to common challenges.

21. The case study approach is ideal for providing a platform for discussion for Somalia, to illustrate the experiences of other countries that have faced comparable challenges. In countries similarly enmired in conflict, or with a recent history of conflict, where the central authority is unable to fulfil its functions, sub-national authorities have taken these on, and at the same time asserted their identities – be they political, ethnic, clan, or linguistic. While this gap-filling effort helps ensure basic services are provided, it can also exacerbate inequalities which risk ongoing efforts of peacebuilding and stability: some of these sub-national authorities are wealthier and more powerful than others, and therefore more capable of supporting educational services. This is particularly important in education, which plays a key role in forging national identity and harmony. The national government may be able to play a role in addressing these inequalities while recognizing the important role of the sub-national authorities.

Pakistan

22. Pakistan, created in 1947, is an ethnically and linguistically diverse country. Initially a dominion, Pakistan adopted a constitution in 1956, becoming an Islamic republic. An ethnic civil war in 1971 resulted in the secession of East Pakistan as the new country of Bangladesh. In 1973 Pakistan adopted a new constitution establishing, alongside its pre-existing parliamentary republic status, a federal government consisting of four provinces and four federal territories. In 2010, the parliament passed the 18th Amendment curtailing Presidential powers accrued under military rule and devolving authority over education and other services to Provincial governments. This was an explicit effort to reduce the motivation for military takeover, alongside a broader call for increased autonomy and authority for the Provinces. Pakistan also has a large and important non-state sector which is regulated and encouraged by government authorities as an active contributor to education for all. This includes numerous public-private partnership arrangements, which could provide some insights for Somalia in how to manage its large, unregulated private schools. Further, Pakistan’s experience in trying to expand educational opportunities to girls in a Muslim society could be of particular relevance to Somalia.

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\(^9\) This study avoided repeating studies of federal education systems in Ethiopia and Mexico, which had been treated in the study for Yemen. Nepal was originally included, though halfway through the work it was determined it was not far enough along in its process of federalization to render valid conclusions.
Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH)

23. After having been torn apart by a violent ethnic war, in 1995 the Dayton Peace Accords formally joined the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina with the Serb entity and the Republika Srpska into the state of Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH). BiH became a federal country in a very unique way. Federalism was brought in by the international community as a conflict-resolution mechanism to end the violence in the country and to establish a functioning government. To this day there is international oversight of the government in BiH. The constitutional framework of Bosnia and Herzegovina, education is under the responsibility of: The Republic of Srpska; ten cantons in the Federation of BiH; and Brcko District of BiH. Each of these twelve administrative units has its own ministry of education, education legislation, education budget, and education policy. It also has all the other rights and obligations arising from the mandate of an education authority responsible for the organization and functioning of education within its area of competence. The Federal Ministry of Education and Science at the level of the Federation of BiH has a coordinating role over the cantonal ministries of education. The Constitution of BiH therefore united previously independent regions under a new Federal structure, reflecting the current influence and experience of the Federal Government of Somalia.

South Africa

24. South Africa’s democratic constitution was approved in 1997 after seven years of intense negotiations and debate, overturning over 50 years of white minority rule under a system of apartheid. In the discussions leading up to the new constitution, the African National Congress (ANC) sought a unitary state based on majority rule. Smaller entities were afraid of majority rule without constitutional entrenched guaranties for minorities. However, there were political groups who saw strong federalism as a way to protect against the tyranny of the majority, which was eventually agreed upon. Today, South Africa’s political structure enables economically powerful provinces like the Western Cape to coexist and thrive alongside poorer provinces like Limpopo or the Eastern Cape. In terms of education, there is a tiered structure: Central - Provincial - District – School. The Ministry of Education sets national policy through the declaration of norms and standards (developed through the national department of education). Under apartheid there were multiple Ministries of Education setting policy for different demographic/geographic groups; these functions were integrated into a single Ministry of Education under the constitution, which could provide some lessons for Somalia. Each province has a set of education districts (and sometimes smaller units called circuits) with departmental officials responsible for that district’s schools, and (officially) schools are governed by a legally established school governance board composed of parents, teachers and, in the case of secondary schools, also learners.
Chapter 2: Country Case Study — Bosnia and Herzegovina

National Context

Bosnia and Herzegovina faces an uphill battle to achieve its ambition of joining the European Union in large part related to its unique constitutional makeup and complex power sharing model...

1. Bosnia and Herzegovina (Bosnia or BiH) is a country in Southeastern Europe with a declining population of 3.8 million, 60% of whom live in rural areas\(^{10}\). BiH is an upper-middle income country with a GDP per capita of $4,709 USD (see Table 2.1). Despite relatively strong Human Development Indicators (81\(^{st}\) on the HDI index), Bosnia’s rate of relative poverty has remained at 15% since 2007 and its economy and development indicators are well below comparator countries (Croatia and Serbia rank 45\(^{th}\) and 66\(^{th}\) respectively on the HDI)\(^{11}\). Unemployment remains high (25.4% in 2016), and extremely high among Bosnia’s youth (67%). Nearly 2 million people have migrated out of the country since the war.

2. The political system in Bosnia is very complex. The country is made up of two entities, each with high levels of autonomy (see Spotlight 2.1). The Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (FBH), and the Republika Srpska (RS) are recognized as sovereign entities within BiH and each have its own constitution. A third region, the Brčko District, is independently governed under local government. Overarching these entities is the central Bosnian government with a rotating presidency. FBH is further divided into ten cantons that themselves have large autonomy, including over education. Both FBH and RS have municipalities that form locally-elected governments\(^{12}\). BiH is a candidate for membership with the European Union and achieving this goal has become a guiding principal in what is otherwise a highly fractured political structure.

3. The current system evolved from a 1995 peace treaty to end the Bosnian civil war (1992-1995). In 1992 the Government of BiH declared independence from Yugoslavia, which triggered a subsequent declaration of secession by Bosnian Serbs who wished to remain connected with

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\(^{10}\) Progress towards the Realisation of Millennium Development Goals, 2013, Government of Bosnia; prior to the Bosnian War the population was estimated at 4.5 million. BiH has an aging population and low birth rates.

\(^{11}\) World Bank Country Partnership Framework; UNDP HDI

\(^{12}\) [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Political_divisions_of_Bosnia_and_Herzegovina](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Political_divisions_of_Bosnia_and_Herzegovina)

\(^{13}\) World Bank Country Partnership Framework, 2007, World Bank
Serbians in Yugoslavia. This led to an initial conflict between Bosnian Serbs and the Government of BiH but soon devolved into a brutal ethnic civilian war between Bosnian Muslims, Bosnian Croats and Bosnian Serbs that cost 100,000 lives over a five-year period. “Essentially, the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina was about the right of the Serbian and to a lesser extent also the Croatian population of Bosnia to secede from the country and either establish independent statelets or join Serbia and Croatia respectively.”

4. **The legacy of the war remains present in today’s political dynamics and decision-making processes.** All three ethnic groups (Bosnian Muslims, Bosnian Croats and Bosnian Serbs) continue to vote primarily according to ethnicity, while political representation is allocated along strict power sharing lines based on balancing the interests of the three groups. The current Constitution has been criticized for perpetuating ethnic divisions and causing political paralysis. The result is a governing system in stalemate and incapable of coordinating across the different levels of government: to quote one commentator, “the state as such remains contested.”

5. **A series of recent successes in national coordination show progress is possible.** In July 2015, a national Reform Agenda was agreed and endorsed by the BiH Council of Ministers (CoM), the Government of RS, and the Government of FBH. Following this, the BiH CoM adopted a Strategic Framework for BiH for the period 2015-2018, and Republika Srpska and the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina developed detailed Action Plans to implement the Reform Agenda. In February 2016, Bosnia formally submitted an application to join the EU, some eight years after signing the “Stabilization and Association Agreement” between the EU and the Western Balkan countries.

### Table 2.1: Development and education statistics for BiH

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Development statistics</th>
<th>Selected education statistics</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>GDP, current US$ million</td>
<td>16,910</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP per capita, current US$</td>
<td>4,709</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poverty Rate, % ($1.90/day)</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GINI Coefficient</td>
<td>33.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNDP HDI Index</td>
<td>81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infant mortality rate (per 1,000 live births)</td>
<td>5.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maternal mortality ratio (per 100,000 live births)</td>
<td>9.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prevalence of stunting, height for age (% children under 5)</td>
<td>8.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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14 Federalism as a Tool of Conflict-Resolution: The Case of Bosnia and Herzegovina, 2012, Kiel; BiH’s Constitution is Annex Four of the Agreement
16 Federalism as a Tool of Conflict-Resolution: The Case of Bosnia and Herzegovina, 2012, Kiel
17 Federalism as a Tool of Conflict-Resolution: The Case of Bosnia and Herzegovina, 2012, Kiel
18 World Bank Country Partnership Framework, 2015, World Bank
19 World Bank Statistics Database;
20 Progress towards the Realisation of Millennium Development Goals, 2013, Government of Bosnia
Chapter 2: Country Case Study — Bosnia and Herzegovina

July 5, 2018

Spotlight 2.1: Bosnia’s dysfunctional form of government

Bih’s governing structures were established through the Dayton Peace Agreement in 1995 and were essentially an internationally enforced form of federalism. This internationally negotiated solution ended hostilities immediately but also entrenched a governing structure that institutionalized ethnic divisions in political entities with no framework for subsequent integration or harmonization.

Technically BiH is not a Federal state, but a country made of two constitutionally protected entities reflecting ethnic majorities. “The general government sector consists of four units: BiH Council of Ministers, Government of Republika Srpska (population 1.3 million), Government of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (population 2.3 million), and Government of the Brcko District (population .09 million). Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina consists of 10 cantons, each with their own government.”

Bosnia’s entities reflect the ethnic split in the country and the Constitution prioritizes autonomy and self-governments. BiH is made up of a Bosniak-Croat FBH, and the Bosnian Serb RS, each with its own President, government including line ministries, parliament, police and other bodies. “A suffocating layer of ethnic quotas has been added, providing sinecures for officials increasingly remote from the communities they represent.” The result of the push for local autonomy and governance is that in education (and other line ministries) there are fourteen different Ministries of Education with varying and often overlapping responsibilities.

Nowhere is this careful power-balancing clearer than in the provision of a rotating Presidency. Bosnia’s Head of State is a directly elected tripartite Presidency, which is in charge of foreign, diplomatic and military affairs, and the budget of state-level institutions. A candidate from each of the major ethnic groups is elected for a four-year term and the Presidency rotates every eight months. The Presidency nominates the Prime Minister who runs the executive and leads the Council of Ministers.

Given its role in designing the peace agreement the international community became important actors in Bosnian politics. Alongside peacekeeping forces, the early years of post-war Bosnia were defined by international interference and control. The highest authority in BiH is the High Representative who reports to the international community. The Office’s representative is responsible for implementation of the Dayton Agreement and has the power to “compel the entity governments to comply with the terms of the peace agreement and the state constitution.” During the initial decade of BiH’s independence the High Representative regularly intervened through the proclamation of new laws or overruling decisions taken at the entity level. Since the mid-2000s the High Representative has directly intervened less often.

Each entity has a veto when central legislation is seen to unfairly impact its interests, limiting the central government’s power. “While generally federal law prevails, the decision-making competences of the central government have been limited and have only evolved over time... This is why Bosnia and Herzegovina can be qualified as a multinational federation. The federal system aims at ensuring a fair division and share of

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21 Federalism as a Tool of Conflict-Resolution: The Case of Bosnia and Herzegovina, 2012, Kiel
22 World Bank Country Partnership Framework, 2015, World Bank
23 According to Kiel 2012, “ethnic cleansing led to homogeneous territories and federalism was to ensure autonomy and shared-rule simultaneously, therefore providing the entities (and with them the national groups) with far-reaching autonomy, while at the same time ensuring the continued existence of Bosnia and Herzegovina as a united state by enforcing power-sharing in central institutions and avoiding all references to secession and indeed even federalism in the Constitution.”
25 Federalism as a Tool of Conflict-Resolution: The Case of Bosnia and Herzegovina, 2012, Kiel
26 Federalism as a Tool of Conflict-Resolution: The Case of Bosnia and Herzegovina, 2012, Kiel
27 http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-17211937
powers among the three constituent peoples and the provision of autonomy for these nations in their territorial units.”

This highly complex form of government, in particular the right to veto, has proven highly dysfunctional and led to limited development and constitutional stalemate. The 2010 elections led to 15 months of political stalemate followed by a six-party coalition dubbed the worst in modern Bosnian history: 106 laws were adopted during the four-year parliament, compared to 500 in Serbia and 750 in Croatia.

It has also led to an expensive and inefficient system with opportunities for graft and corruption. BiH’s complex state structure incurs high administrative costs, estimated at 50% of its GDP, with rebalancing the economy away from the public sector identified as a priority in the World Bank’s Country Partnership Framework 2016-2020. According to a UK newspaper, “Dayton spawned a political system that is a cash cow for politicians... The top-heavy political elite that fills this profusion of posts makes six times the average Bosnian wage, plus a wide array of perks. Relatively speaking, the country’s politicians are among the richest in Europe.”

While the country has avoided further civil war, numerous commentators have suggested that the existing system has caused a state of permanent constitutional crisis and political stalemate.

### Education Overview

6. **Bosnia Herzegovina**’s provision of free education at primary and secondary levels has resulted in relatively high enrolment rates for mainstream students, though not for the Roma population, the poor, and rural dwellers. Primary enrolment rates are nearly universal for the mainstream population at 97.6%, but for the Roma population are lower at 69.3% (See Table 2.2). Fully 46.2% of Roma children drop out at some point from primary school. Inequality is exacerbated at the secondary level, where the school attendance rate is 92% compared to only 22.6% for the Roma population. Generally, poorer households and rural dwellers had a lower percentage of children in secondary school.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Enrolment</th>
<th>Primary</th>
<th>Secondary</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>All Roma</td>
<td>All Roma</td>
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<td>Pre-School</td>
<td>13.1</td>
<td>97.6</td>
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<td>92</td>
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<td>Out of School</td>
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<tr>
<td>Richest Quintile</td>
<td>4.0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Poorest Quintile</td>
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<td>Urban</td>
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<tr>
<td>Rural</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>11.0</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

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28 Federalism as a Tool of Conflict-Resolution: The Case of Bosnia and Herzegovina, 2012, Kiel
29 At a glance September 2015- Bosnia and Herzegovina: Political parties, 2015, European Parliament
30 https://www.theguardian.com/global/2015/nov/10/bosnia-bitter-flawed-peace-deal-dayton-agreement-20-years-on
31 Source: National Education Profile, 2014 Update, EPDC
7. The Roma population is particularly badly served by the education system. As noted above, attendance rates for Roma children at both primary and secondary level are very low. Completion rates are also very low, especially for girls. Almost 80% of Roma girls fail to complete primary school, and only 45% of them complete secondary school. These outcomes are of special concern given that wellbeing of family, and particularly wellbeing of children, is closely related to the level of education of mothers.

8. Practices and prejudices still affect many children with disability. These children are marginalized starting from early childhood. The cycle starts when children with disability do not have access to basic education. In addition, there is a lack of trained staff and school curricula are not flexible or adapted to these children’s special educational needs.

9. The education structure is fragmented and inefficient. A complex governance and management structure holds back progress in the sector: there are 14 bodies responsible for education in BiH: 11 cantons in the FöH, one at the national level, and one each in the RS and Brcko District.

10. The structure of the education system is uniform across all jurisdictions, although the curriculum is not uniform. Education is free and compulsory through age 15. Primary education lasts for nine years, beginning at age 5 or 6. Secondary education is provided by general or vocational and technical secondary schools (See Figure 2.2). Vocational secondary schools offer courses lasting for three years and including a period of practical instruction. Technical secondary schools offer courses lasting for four years. Universities require students have a high school diploma and pass a qualifying examination that they administer.

![Figure 2.2: The education structure is uniform across the country](http://www.edufile.info/?view=school_systems&topic=topic_general_infos&country=13)
11. The education system is segregated on ethnic grounds. The phenomena of “two schools under one roof” is perhaps the most vivid example of segregation in schools in BiH. Students of different religions/cultural backgrounds often enter the same school building through separate entrances and have separate breaks while teachers of different backgrounds do not use the same teachers’ room. This system persists despite the 2014 judgment of the Supreme Court of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which found that the Herzegovina-Neretva cantonal authorities discriminated against Bosnian Croat and Bosniak pupils by separating them along ethnic lines in public schools. The cantonal authorities were ordered to take all necessary measures to ensure that integrated multicultural schools are established while respecting the pupils’ right to education in their own language. To date, this judgement has not been executed. As recently as 2016, schools were constructed using the segregated approach (See Spotlight 2.2).

Spotlight 2.2: Two Schools Under One Roof

“The phenomenon of ‘two schools under one roof’ describes a situation where a single pre-war school now houses two schools whose children study different curricula and are kept mostly or completely separate. ‘Two schools under one roof’ can take a variety of forms: for example, two legal entities, two branch schools, or one administratively unified school.”

A direct result of the return of forcibly displaced people and refugees to their previous homes, post-war education in Bosnia created difficult conditions for reconciliation and reintegration between ethnic groups, resulting in an ethnically segregated and discriminatory educational system. The complex state structure that had been formed around the different ethnic groups led to politicization of the education system. Since many returnee families were not willing to educate children according to ethnically biased curricula, they sent them to distant schools, which could be in another entity, with curricula corresponding to their ethnicity.

The introduction of the Interim Agreement on Accommodation of the Rights and Needs of Returnee Children was intended to create a more inclusive and tolerant environment for minority children in returnee areas with the addition of key subject areas (mother tongue, history, religion and geography). Former Minister of Science, Education, Culture, and Sport Fahrudin Rizvanbegović said that at the time, ‘two schools under one roof’ was a huge step forward, which was initially aimed at bringing schoolchildren together at least physically. (Tea Hadžiristić, “Two Schools Under One Roof”). However, long-term this has resulted in a failure of a policy of re-integration of returnees.

12. Citizens express a low degree of satisfaction with the quality of education. Citizens show low levels of satisfaction, according to a USAID poll conducted in 2016, with only one-quarter expressing satisfaction with secondary education, and slightly more, about 30%, expressing

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37 Commissioner for Human Rights of the Council of Europe (CoE) Visit to Bosnia and Herzegovina, 12-16 June 2017. https://rm.coe.int/report-following-the-visit-to-bosnia-and-herzegovina-from-12-to-16-jun/16807642b1
satisfaction with primary education\(^{39}\). Educational levels are below world standards, as indicated by the 2007 TIMSS assessment. BiH scored below the TIMSS scale average for comparator countries (i.e. Slovenia and Serbia) in both science and mathematics\(^ {40}\). Analysis suggests that teaching curricula are out-of-date, with little recognition of skills, values, and attitudes; teachers rely heavily on lecture and didactics\(^ {41}\).

13. **Analysis conducted as part of a World Bank Education Background Note suggest that one of the contributing factors for the low performance can be found in the quality of teaching**.\(^{42}\) The Note, completed in May 2015 observed that Mathematics teachers in BiH were less qualified than in the other countries surveyed. Namely, 91 percent of the students were taught by teachers who had completed only non-university post-secondary education, while only 9 percent were taught by teachers with a university degree or above. Compared to the international average, 21 percent of the students were taught by teachers with a postgraduate degree, 57 percent by those with an undergraduate degree, and only 18 percent by those with a non-university post-secondary education. The Note observes that part of the reason for the large proportion of low qualified teachers could be attributed to the teacher’s age: 50 percent of the students were taught by teachers over 50 years old, compared to the international average at 23 percent. On the other hand, only 6 percent of students were taught by teachers 29 years old or under.

14. **Education does not provide the skills demanded by the labor market, contributing to high youth unemployment**. Youth unemployment has increased quite dramatically since 2008, from less than 50% to 67% per cent in 2017\(^ {43}\). In 2009, World Bank analysis reported a mismatch between the skills available in the workforce and those sought by the marketplace,\(^ {44}\) which contributed to unemployment. Further, high unemployment was also affected by poor education outcomes, low enrolment rates at upper secondary levels, and inadequate vocational and technical training. Enterprise-level surveys indicate that recent secondary school graduates do not possess the skills or experiences demanded by employers. According to the International Monetary Fund (IMF), this has resulted in a widening mismatch between education and labor market skills required by businesses, adversely impacting the country’s growth potential\(^ {45}\).

15. **Furthermore, persistent unemployment has contributed to a brain drain**. According to the Ministry of Human Rights and Refugees, almost a million and a half natives of Bosnia and Herzegovina live outside the country, nearly forty percent of the total population. Adding second and third generation migrants who left during, or just after the conflict ended, estimates are as high as two million. Many young people who migrated out of BiH are highly educated and are seen as a huge potential for the country’s development in various sectors\(^ {46}\).

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\(^{39}\) National Survey of Citizens’ Perceptions in Bosnia and Herzegovina 2016, USAID  

\(^{40}\) Initiative for Monitoring the European Integration of BiH  

\(^{41}\) Brief Overview of Main Challenges in Primary and Secondary Education in BiH, March 2017  

\(^{42}\) Bosnia and Herzegovina Education Background Note, World Bank, (Draft, May 27, 2015)

\(^{43}\) Alfred, Youth Unemployment Rate in BiH,  

\(^{44}\) Are Skills Constraining Growth in Bosnia and Herzegovina? World Bank, 2009-12-01

\(^{45}\) Bosnia and Herzegovina Selected Issues, IMF, Oct 2015  

\(^{46}\) file:///C:/Users/robin/Downloads/Uspjesni_primjeri_eng_web.pdf
16. The functioning of institutions at all levels in BiH is undermined by corruption. According to the Council on Europe, “corruption is widespread in the education and health sectors, as well as in procurement”.47 In education in particular, the foundations of BiH society are being undermined, not only damaging the development of the education system itself but normalizing and breeding a social acceptance of corruption from an early age48. Fighting corruption has become a key objective of the government, supported by international donors.

Politics, Policies, and Legislative Framework

Education is highly decentralized in BiH, with entities, cantons and municipalities having large levels of autonomy and responsibility based on state and entity-level constitutions....

Political economy and key actors

17. The international community saw federalism as a way to bring peace to a war-torn Bosnia. In addressing the issues that led to ethnic hostilities during the war, the Dayton Accord also created a cumbersome educational structure to ensure a separation of the three groups in order to bring about peace. Since that time there have been some reforms in other areas (defense and taxation) to strengthen the central level, with the goal of further integrating the country. However, the divisions institutionalized in education continue with no significant integration over the past two decades49.

18. BiH guarantees free and compulsory education from 6-15, while one year of preschool is compulsory but not free50. The 2003 Framework Law on Primary and Secondary Education in BiH “regulates the principles of preschool, primary, and post-primary education. It sets out the obligations of education authorities in both entities and the District of Brčko to ensure educational services under equal conditions for all students.” Post-secondary education is also free for those who pass secondary school and consists of three to four years of general or vocational study51.

19. Article 3 of the Constitution of Bosnia gives entity governments exclusive authority over education. While the state government maintains a Department for Education within the Ministry of Civil Affairs to help coordinate efforts amongst the entities, neither it nor the national assembly have legislative oversight. In FBH responsibility for education is further devolved to the 10 cantons based on the entity’s own Constitution.

20. As a result, there are 14 Ministries responsible for education in BiH: the national Ministry of Civil Affairs (MOCA) and the FBH Ministry of Education play a largely coordinating role, while the RS Ministry of Education, the 10 canton Ministries of Education and the Education Department of Brčko District all play a policy-making and delivery role. Alongside this the independent Agency for Preschool, Elementary and Secondary Education of BiH was established to play a national

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47Parliamentary Assembly, Honouring of obligations and commitments by Bosnia and Herzegovina, Dec 2017 http://website-pace.net/documents/19887/3258251/20181215-+rapport-BosnieHerzegovine-EN.pdf/babe97e7-e41a-4d98-a541-b5b9d12677b9
50Table 1, Global Education Monitoring Report 2017/8, 2017, UNESCO
51Education and fragility in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 2010, IEPE UNESCO

25
coordination and standard-setting role (see Figure 2.3). The diagram below taken from a UNESCO IIEP report on BiH shows the complexity of the system.

21. One commentator has suggested that the legacy of Dayton in the education system is one of inevitable dysfunction. “From the very beginning, the Constitution created a decentralized, asymmetric and defective education management system that has undermined unity in educational policies, common educational goals, common values, positive and patriotic feelings for one’s country and homeland, etc.”

![Figure 2.3: Government Departments Responsible for Education Across BiH](image)

22. There is a lack of political will to coordinate education and make meaningful system changes. A recent USAID report notes that there have been no real reforms implemented in the past two decades. The current partnership framework between BiH and the World Bank excludes education (despite its importance for Bosnia and Herzegovina’s long-term growth) because political will and championship would require significant strengthening in order to achieve results in this area. Further, in 2009 the Bank cancelled a $10 million program due to weak governance and a lack of progress against project objectives.

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52 Pašalim-Kreso, cited in Education and fragility in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 2010, IIEP UNESCO
53 Education and fragility in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 2010, IIEP UNESCO
56 Note on Cancelled Operation Report (Ida-40800), 2009, World Bank
23. **Unions are weakened in BiH due to their focus on ethnicity.** No national teacher union exists as membership is closely aligned to ethnicity, thus reflecting wider social divides. No entity-level teachers union exists in FBH as Bosniak and Croat teachers belong to unions reflecting their ethnicity, and no agreement has been reached on forming a unified trade union to represent teachers’ voices.\(^57\)

The central government and independent national agencies are unable to exert influence

24. **The Department of Education, Ministry of Civil Affairs (DOE, MOCA) has a limited remit focused on coordination and enforcing international agreements.** It has a role in coordinating and consolidating entity-level plans, although it has no veto power. Similarly, it is responsible for international strategic planning and ensuring the entity’s meet BiH’s international obligations, however it has failed to produce a national education plan.

25. **The DOE, MOCA has no authority to enforce.** Several barriers inhibit coordination in the education sector. First, the Constitution places education within the exclusive responsibility of the entities, meaning that any legislation at the central level can be overridden. Second, as per the Constitution, the entities have right of veto: “under this extremely fragmented education system state-level or federation-level reforms cannot be decided and implemented without consent of each Entity and canton.”\(^58\) Third, even in the event of legislation having been passed, there is no mechanism to ensure compliance.\(^59\) This is part of a wider governance and rule of law issue in BiH: The Government of RS has repeatedly flouted judgements by the Constitutional Court. And there is no Supreme Court in BiH. “Coordinated, coherent, and uniform education policies are an impossibility since state-level education authorities do not have the means to enforce and monitor implementation of the legislation.”\(^60\)

26. **The independent Agency for Preschool, Elementary and Secondary Education (APOSEO) is mandated to develop standards and evaluating learning.** Established in 2007, the “Agency for Pre-Primary, Primary and Secondary Education is “responsible for developing the common core curricula, establishing the learning standards, and evaluating the achieved results in pre-primary, primary and secondary education, and further competency tasks in relation to the learning standards and evaluation of education quality as defined by specific acts and provisions.”\(^61\) However, despite being founded over a decade ago the Agency has yet to develop a common core curriculum.

27. **APOSEO has no authority to require entities to adopt any standards it establishes.** The Constitutional authority and right to veto enjoyed by the entities means that any judgement made by APOSEO is purely advisory.

The Role of the Ministries of Education differ in FBH and RS

28. **In RS, legislation and policy is formulated at the Entity level through the RS Legislature and MOE.** While the Constitution of RS places education as a shared responsibility of the Entity and

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\(^{57}\) Education and fragility in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 2010, IIEP UNESCO

\(^{58}\) World Bank Systematic Country Diagnostic, 2015, World Bank

\(^{59}\) This is a wider governance issue and the Government of RS has repeatedly flouted judgements by the Constitutional Court. No Supreme Court exists in BiH.

\(^{60}\) Education and fragility in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 2010, IIEP UNESCO

\(^{61}\) Electronic Platform for Adult Learning in Europe
Municipal Governments, authority over policy and standards rests at the Entity level, with the Municipal Government primarily responsible for implementation and delivery.\textsuperscript{62}

29. In FBH the Entity level MOE acts primarily as a coordinator, with limited policy or legislative dictate. The Constitution of FBH decentralizes policy and legislative authority to the canton level which themselves each have a veto over Entity-level legislation and policy: the FBH MOE “cannot intervene in cantons.”\textsuperscript{63}

30. The Education Department of Brčko District reports to the independently elected local government of Brčko District and sets policy independently.

Cantons in FBH operate with little effective coordination

31. In FBH the "development of educational policy, including regulation and provision of education" is the responsibility of the canton.\textsuperscript{64} The canton has equivalent powers to the MOE in RS, including over system planning and budgeting. However, the constitution allows this to be further devolved to municipal level. The result is a wide patchwork of education regulation and standards within FBH.

32. Efforts to better coordinate the sector in FBH have been ineffective. “The Conference of Education Ministers established with the aim of developing consensus on education policies among cantons, is only an advisory body with no binding authority. Though intended to meet on bi-monthly basis, in 2013 it met only twice, thus resulting in ineffective coordination.”\textsuperscript{65}

Municipal and school level authority

33. While in RS municipalities have little policy function, in FBH some cantons have delegated responsibility for primary and secondary education policy to municipalities, which then enjoy the same freedoms described above for the canton, including deciding on language policies and issues of ethnic integration. However, some cantons have not delegated education policy setting municipalities, leaving them responsible for carrying out the policies decided at the canton level.\textsuperscript{66}

34. Schools have no legislative or policy function in either entity, nor in Brčko District.

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Legislative change</td>
<td>Ability to legislate but can be blocked by entity</td>
<td>Ability to legislate and can veto central legislation</td>
<td>Ability to legislate and can veto FBH entity-level legislation</td>
<td>Dependent on canton-specific level of decentralization</td>
<td>No legislative authority</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\textsuperscript{63} World Bank Systematic Country Diagnostic, 2015, World Bank
\textsuperscript{64} https://portal.cor.europa.eu/divisionpowers/countries/Potential-Candidates/BAH/Pages/default.aspx
\textsuperscript{65} World Bank Systematic Country Diagnostic, 2015, World Bank
\textsuperscript{66} World Bank Systematic Country Diagnostic, 2015, World Bank
Policy formulation

| Policy formulation | Can set policy including international strategy but no ability to mandate | Primary source of education policy in RS | Primary source of education policy in FBH | Dependent on canton-specific level of decentralization at primary/secondary. Policy making at preschool | No policy-making authority. | APOS established to set standards but no ability to mandate |

Note: School level has been removed here as the school has no legislative or policy role

Service Delivery

Responsibility for service delivery is largely devolved to municipalities, although the RS Government and Canton governments play a role in numerous aspects...

Access and infrastructure

35. The national government is signatory to international agreements including the Millennium Development Goals and the Sustainable Development Goals. The central government passed the Framework Law on Primary and Secondary Education in Bosnia and Herzegovina in 2003, which guaranteed “every child shall have equal right of access and equal opportunities for participation in appropriate education, without any discrimination”.

36. However, as highlighted previously, the central government has no direct role in ensuring access, nor any mechanism for ensuring entities comply with BiH’s international commitments. The central government lacks the legal ability to compel entity or canton governments to carry out policies and lacks the funds to undertake compensatory programs targeting marginalized populations.

Spotlight 2.3: Access to Education in Bosnia – a Success Story

Upon declaring its independence in 1992, BiH inherited an education system from the Soviet era Yugoslavia which had prioritized education for citizens, including girls. As a result, unlike former colonies in Africa and Asia which were faced with the challenge of developing a universal education system from one previously focused on the elite (e.g. Uganda or India), the challenge in BiH was maintaining access.

The Bosnia conflict severely disrupted schooling during the war period. Prior to the breakout of hostilities (1990/91) there were approximately 540,000 students in 2,205 primary schools and 173,000 students in 239 secondary schools. During the conflict (1993/94), the figure fell substantially to 285 primary schools and 133 secondary schools. As the war drew to end (1995/95), the number of students and schools were still well below pre-war levels, with 252,000 primary students in 898 schools and 89,000 secondary students in 183 schools. In addition, over the war years many teachers left the profession and the country, resulting in the recruitment of a great many untrained teachers (prior to this the majority had degrees).

Following the end of hostilities, the donor community provided enormous support to rebuild the education system, providing a combination of funding and technical advisors. Bilateral and multilateral donors supported

reconstruction of the education system, assisting development of a legislative framework and reform (See Section 2.5). While the war disrupted education, the norm was to attend school.

Entity governments have financed the expansion of the education system, in line with national commitments under the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). In 2001 BiH was spending 5.2% GDP on education. While this dropped to 4.88 in 2012, it remains comparable to the EU average and neighboring countries. Further, there is limited difference nationally between the entities (4% in RS and 5% in FBH).

Public funding has ensured free education, ensuring high rates of enrolment and completion at primary and secondary levels. Funding for this comes from entity and canton budgets, based on national and local taxation. In contrast, in ECE enrolment remains low despite a mandatory one year of preschool since 2004. The MDG Report for BiH suggests this is largely due to fees being levied in preschool, especially in poorer municipalities which are responsible for provision but do not receive specific funding from entity/canton governments to ensure free access.

However, the majority of this funding goes to staffing and administrative costs. The result is that while access is high (97% since 2001) there has been limited progress in ensuring the system provides quality education. Further, while infrastructure exists it is in a poor state of repair, while many teachers and education managers fled the country following the war resulting in low capacity across the system (see Spotlight 2.4).

While overall BiH has achieved near universal access and gender parity, there are important exclusions within the system. While access is nominally 97.6% and 92% for primary and secondary school respectively, the system continues to discriminate against certain groups. As highlighted above, Roma communities face systematic exclusion (see Table 2.1). In addition, BiH continues to struggle to ensure universal access for refugees and internally displaced people.

In RS the Entity Government takes primary responsibility for ensuring access and providing educational infrastructure for primary and secondary school. The RS Government plans and undertakes major infrastructure projects as provides block funding to municipalities from which municipalities are required to ensure access for students. The municipal government are responsible for direct oversight of the schools and providing additional resources as deemed appropriate from the budget.

In FBH, this responsibility is devolved to lower levels of government. Responsibility for ensuring access has been devolved to cantons in FBH, and in many cases to municipalities, which are then responsible for the “establishment, management, funding and improvement of institutions.”

Provision of pre-school is the responsibility of the municipal government in both FBH and RS. The Framework Law on Preschool Education in Bosnia and Herzegovina (2007) mandated one year of compulsory preschool attendance for all preschool aged children before enrolment into primary school. Both entities devolved this responsibility (including responsibility for financing) to their respective municipal governments. This has led to limited and highly unequal funding for preschool in BiH, and in many instances fees continue to be levied at ECE which impact access especially for the poorest.

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68 Progress towards the Realisation of Millennium Development Goals, 2013, Government of Bosnia 
69 Education and fragility in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 2010, IIEP UNESCO 
72 Progress towards the Realisation of Millennium Development Goals, 2013, Government of Bosnia
Spotlight 2.4: Local Capacity

Analysis of capacity of all levels of government show that education management is not effective in Bosnia. According to a 2007 report by the EU the failure to appropriately allocated decision-making and resources occur at all levels. In RS, the centralization of policy making has led to limited capacity building and financing at the municipal level. In FBH, the canton governments have themselves failed to devolve decision-making and financing to municipal governments, instead retaining power and funds. The size and capacity of canton education ministries varies significantly.

A lack of resourcing limits the ability of municipalities to carry out their responsibilities, especially in cantons that have further devolved functions without providing sufficient funds. While there is limited information available, the highly decentralized nature of decision-making in FBH appears to create challenges around technical capacity alongside these budgetary restraints: finding sufficient technical expertise at a highly localized level is challenging in even the most developed systems.

Funding for non-salary costs is limited resulting in poor system quality management. With close to 90% of the education budget earmarked for salaries, there is limited funding at either the entity, canton or municipal level to manage the system: inspectorates are underfunded, and financial resources are not tied to educational reforms. Municipalities are increasingly reliant on the fees levied at ECE and higher education levels to supplement their budgets which are insufficient to cover all costs.

41. The issue of access in BiH is closely linked to social integration. The phenomenon of “one school, two classrooms” is only the most visible form of social segregation in schools in BiH. According to a 2017 report by The European Commission against Racism and Intolerance (ECRI), “public schools in Bosnia and Herzegovina are still not organised as multicultural, multilingual, open and inclusive institutions for all children. Ethnic segregation, based on a politicised notion of mother-tongue education, persists.”

42. The possibility of integrated education has been demonstrated by the autonomous and multiethnic Brčko District. “The district no longer operates segregated or monoethnic schools, but instead has moved to teaching children from the different ethnic communities together. Teachers in Brčko District receive training to facilitate the use of each of the three official languages by pupils and teachers.”

43. Pressure on the system to change is coming from the youth. A recent protest by students in the Central Bosnia Canton was able to force one municipality, Jajce, to abandon its policy of segregation by ethnicity. However, this small victory is the exception not the rule across BiH.

Curriculum and educational materials

44. The absence of a common national curriculum in BiH has resulted in a patchwork of alternative curriculum and textbooks being used. The Ministry of Civil Affairs only has a coordination role, with the Education Ministries at entity level mandated with this role by law. While approval of curricula is formally “conditional on adherence to the Framework Law on Education... there is no mechanism to ensure compliance.” Responsibility for curricula and textbooks in FBH is further

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73 Institutional and Capacity Building of Bosnia And Herzegovina Education System, 2007, EU
74 ECRI Report on Bosnia and Herzegovina, 2017, ECRI
75 ECRI Report on Bosnia and Herzegovina, 2017, ECRI
76 http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-40352486
decentralized to canton level\textsuperscript{77}, although the Framework Curriculum for the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina has been developed to provide some standardization and is implemented with varying fidelity\textsuperscript{78}. In both RS and FBH schools catering to predominantly (or exclusively) Croat students use a Croatian-language curriculum. Overall, this degree of decentralization has led to a lack of coordination, duplication of efforts and the politicization of education.

45. Efforts to develop a common core curriculum (CCC) have faltered amid politicization of education. Since 2008 the state-level Agency for Primary and Secondary Education (APOS\texttext{O}) has been attempting to develop a CCC. However, by 2018, this project remains incomplete in many subjects. In those subjects covered, the CCC details expected learning outcomes but does not include a framework for the actual curriculum. ECI\texttext{R} notes that, “political objections to the harmonisation of curricula remain particularly strong with regard to the so-called ‘national group of subjects:’ history, mother-tongue language and literature, geography, arts and music.”\textsuperscript{79}

46. Numerous commentators have seen the politicization of the curriculum as a hindrance to high quality education, but also damaging to peacebuilding efforts. A 2003 study found that “the current curricula do not contribute sufficiently to social cohesion and a peaceful BiH.”\textsuperscript{80} In a further case, in 2010 RS textbooks included references to Jehovah’s witnesses as a dangerous sect and threat to society which was seen to incite violence and hatred\textsuperscript{81}, while last year (2017) the president of RS ordered schools to remove references to the massacre at Srebrenica, which was ruled as genocide by the International Court of Justice in 2007\textsuperscript{82}.

47. Textbooks are another challenge facing the provision of quality education in BiH. In RS textbooks are produced by the entity who have a monopoly on production. The situation in FBH is far more complex where the FBH Government issues a tender on behalf of all cantons to produce textbooks. Cantons may then select from approved textbooks, which in one year led to 10 different history textbooks being adopted in FBH\textsuperscript{83}.

48. RS recently announced its intention to adopt the Serbian curriculum and textbooks for a number of subjects\textsuperscript{84}. While RS’ centralized system enables greater coordination, it has been used for political objectives including efforts to push for greater alignment between RS and Serbia. The weak constitutional position of the central government inhibits it from intervening.

49. It is common practice to segregate students within schools by means of curriculum and language of instruction. Schools regularly separate students based on language (Bosnian, Croatian and Serbian) which acts as an effective method of ethnic segregation within schools. The issue of language has been described as “only comprehensible from a standpoint of ethno-nationalistic ideology... when the three languages... are so similar that education professionals... confirmed that there is no objective linguistic barrier to fully integrated education.”\textsuperscript{85}

\textsuperscript{77} ECRI Report on Bosnia and Herzegovina, 2017, ECRI
\textsuperscript{78} Primary and Secondary Education in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 2015, Initiative for Monitoring the European Integration of BiH
\textsuperscript{79} ECRI Report on Bosnia and Herzegovina, 2017, ECRI
\textsuperscript{80} Stabback (2003) cited in Education and fragility in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 2010, IIEP UNESCO
\textsuperscript{81} ECRI Report on Bosnia and Herzegovina, 2017, ECRI
\textsuperscript{82} Victorious Bosnia students ‘will continue segregation struggle’, BBC, 21 June 2017, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-40352486
\textsuperscript{83} Primary and Secondary Education in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 2015, Initiative for Monitoring the European Integration of BiH
\textsuperscript{84} Bosnian Serbs to Adopt Same School Curriculum as Serbia, Balkan Transitional Justice, February 2018 http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/the-same-curriculum-for-pupils-in-serbia-and-rs-02-23-2018
\textsuperscript{85} ECRI Report on Bosnia and Herzegovina, 2017, ECRI
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July 5, 2018

Teachers contracting and performance management

50. The highly decentralized system has an impact on teacher standards and contracting. There is no country-wide qualifications framework, or clearly defined competencies or standards for teachers. Responsibility for teacher training programs is devolved to entities, and in FBH is further devolved to the pedagogical institutes in each canton. This decentralized system has inhibited a common framework by which qualifications are recognized nationally and "has had an adverse impact on teacher training and professional development in BiH." 

51. The RS Government and FBH cantons are responsible for contracting teachers and teacher assessment. In most cases, the responsibility for teacher monitoring and evaluation has been delegated to Pedagogical Institutes, which may be independent or sit under the relevant Ministry of Education. While monitoring is expected to occur twice a year, the institutes rarely have the capacity to do so, and such evaluations do not follow a common framework of quality.

52. Teacher pay in BiH is not standardized across the country. There is no single salary scale and teacher salaries across entities, between cantons and even within cantons can vary significantly. There is no movement in the direction of standardization of teacher pay.

53. School Principals do not require additional qualifications and their role in quality assurance and improvement is unclear. There is no official training offered at the state or entity level, although the law stipulates that principals should take part in continued professional development. Principals are expected to monitor and assess their teacher’s work but “it is unclear what happens with the result of these assessments... [and] no specific requirements are made for school principals to give guidance to teachers.”

54. School Boards are officially responsible for management of schools in BiH including confirming school principals and dealing with faculty issues. However, given teachers are centrally hired their ability to manage teachers is limited. Further, attempts by political parties to control the Boards (see Section 2.4 School Planning and Financing) and a lack of standards for selection and performance management of school principals leave the system open to politicization and nepotism.

Monitoring and accountability for quality

55. There is no national database for statistics on education in BiH. The lack of centralized data makes reporting on, and dealing with, exclusion of minorities challenging. It also makes effective planning, implementation and monitoring to raise quality even more difficult. Entities report data to the central government, but neither entity has an integrated EMIS system nor publishes data for public scrutiny. This is despite investment in developing an EMIS through an early World Bank funded project.

86 Analyses of Teacher Policies in BiH, 2012, Promente/Step-by-Step
87 There are eight pedagogic institutes in BiH: one in RS, two in the Herzegovina-Neretva Canton, and one each in the Sarajevo, Tuzla, Zenica, Bihac, and Gorazde cantons.
88 Education and fragility in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 2010, IIEP UNESCO
89 Analyses of Teacher Policies in BiH, 2012, Promente/Step-by-Step
90 Analyses of Teacher Policies in BiH, 2012, Promente/Step-by-Step
91 Analyses of Teacher Policies in BiH, 2012, Promente/Step-by-Step
92 Who rules the schools? 2016, Network of Education Policy Centers
93 Education and fragility in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 2010, IIEP UNESCO
56. This lack of data availability at all levels has negative consequences. “As reliable and standardized public information on educational inputs, outputs, and outcomes is not available, public discourse on education tends to focus almost exclusively on politics instead of on the quality of teaching and learning, potentially exacerbating an already fragile political situation.”

57. There are separate inspectorates within each entity and canton, making comparison of education quality impossible. Education Inspectors are responsible in BiH for supervision of the system and ensuring regulations are implemented. At RS the Inspectorate is centralized. The FBH entity government has an inspectorate, as does each individual canton. Taking into account Brčko District, there are 13 different Education Inspectorates, each operating with their own set of standards for quality. The data on these inspections is not publicly available and it is unclear what consequences and actions, if any, occur following inspections.

58. Poor legislation and low resourcing mean that Education Inspectors are unable to effectively hold the system accountable. According to a report by The Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe, this is “in part due to vague and inadequate legislation governing the role of education inspectors...” but largely due to “enormous practical constraints” including low resourcing and a lack of professional training.

59. The highly decentralized nature of Education Inspectors limits their effectiveness. Inspectorates have no common framework, meaning comparison of school quality across BiH, or even within FBH is impossible. Further, there are high administrative costs to running 13 inspectorates, resulting in each being underfunded. Inspectors are seen to be subject to local political interference in their work and appointment: they lack the independence and protection afforded by representing a national institution which creates a distance from local politics.

Assessing learning outcomes

60. There is no national assessment or standardized examination in BiH, even at the end of secondary school. No regular national assessment is conducted, even using survey sampling that would provide a comparison of the quality of provision in different municipalities, cantons or entities. BiH has only taken part in one international examination of learning, TIMSS 2007, which showed learning levels in BiH to be low.

61. External assessment of student learning does not occur in the majority of BiH. Entities and cantons may choose to implement end-of-cycle assessments, but these are not mandatory, nor comparable across boundaries. Their primary purpose is to screen students into secondary school (a legacy of secondary education being excluded from free schooling in the past). The Commission for the Development of the Qualifications Framework in BiH was established in 2013 following agreement at the Council of Education Ministers but has yet to develop an agreed framework for all entities and cantons.

62. Schools are not required to implement student assessments. While the school is expected to provide a report on each student’s achievement to the School Board and relevant Ministry, the nature of these evaluations is dependent on local policy. It is also unclear what actions result from these reports. There is no standard requirement for student assessment and so “practices vary from school to school as to whether or not these assessments take place, how and when

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94 Education and fragility in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 2010, IIEP UNESCO
95 Education Legislation and Inspectors, 2012, OSCE-BiH
96 Who rules the schools? 2016, Network of Education Policy Centers;
they are conducted, and what is done with the results.”

Analysis of quality and system management

63. Analysis of performance of the system in BiH is almost impossible due to the complexity of the system and lack of standardization. The lack of data availability, the absence of agreed standards on quality, taken together with the lack of standardized learning assessments makes assessment of the quality of provision at the school, municipality or even entity level impossible. The only available comparison point, TIMSS 2007, suggests the system underperforms internationally, although it is impossible to know with any certainty how the education system is performing a decade later, nor how regions within BiH compare.

### Table 2.4: Summary Roles and Responsibilities of Actors in Service Delivery

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Access and infrastructure</td>
<td>Responsible for ensuring access in RS</td>
<td>Responsible for access in FBH (delegated authority)</td>
<td>Responsible for preprimary</td>
<td>Responsible for preprimary</td>
<td>Keep records of enrolment and attendance</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Curriculum and educational materials</td>
<td>Responsible in RS including providing resources to municipalities for schools. Plays coordinating role in FBH.</td>
<td>Responsible in FBH. Provide resources to municipalities for schools</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>APOSO mandated to develop CCC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teachers contracting and performance management</td>
<td>Contract teachers in RS</td>
<td>Contract teachers in FBH</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>School Board appoints Principal</td>
<td>Pedagogical institutes train and monitor teachers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monitoring and accountability</td>
<td>Have Inspectorate within MOE</td>
<td>Have Inspectorate within MOE</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>Keep records of enrolment and attendance</td>
<td>Some Inspectorates are independent- Brčko District</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assessing learning outcomes</td>
<td>No standardized assessments</td>
<td>No standardized assessments</td>
<td>May implement assessments but no requirement</td>
<td>May implement assessments but no requirement</td>
<td>Keep records of school-level assessments</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Central Government has been removed from this table due to limited mandate in delivery.

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97 Analyses of Teacher Policies in BiH, 2012, Promente/Step-by-Step
Planning and Finance of Education

The complex, politically-determined structure of education management has led to inefficient education spending and duplication of provision ...

Intergovernmental Transfers

64. Education, like the majority of public services in BiH, is funded through intergovernmental block transfers determined by the Constitution and subsequent laws. The transfer is based on a predetermined formula to cover all entity government expenditure, not on educational need. In 2011 FBH and RS accounted for 57.8% and 32.5% of expenditure respectively, largely mirroring total government revenue generated within those entities.

65. Indirect taxes, specifically VAT, make up the majority of all government revenue in BiH, and since 2006 indirect taxes have been centralized within the Central Government. Consequently, entity and local governments are now reliant on intergovernmental transfers. Central institutions are funded through indirect taxation, after which revenue is allocated to the entities. Analysis shows that in RS 72% of indirect tax revenue is spent at the entity level with 24% at municipality. In contrast, in FBH just 36.2% is spent at entity level, 51.5% at canton level and 8.5% at municipal level. While this is not the only source of funding it is the largest and demonstrates the relative level of control exerted by each level within their respective entities.

Figure 2.4: Fiscal Flows in Education System (by Entity)

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98 Multi-level Fiscal System in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 2012, Governing Board of the Indirect Taxation Authority of Bosnia and Herzegovina

99 Prior to 2006 entities, cantons and municipalities all levied a complicated set of taxes. The inter-governmental Commission for Indirect Taxes was established with international supervision to streamline and rationalise the tax system. Multi-level Fiscal System in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 2012, Governing Board of the Indirect Taxation Authority of Bosnia and Herzegovina

100 Multi-level Fiscal System in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 2012, Governing Board of the Indirect Taxation Authority of Bosnia and Herzegovina
66. The Ministry of Civil Affairs does not have budget for education-specific grants nor implementation/programming costs. Its limited constitutional role described above is reinforced by the structure of intergovernmental transfers which limit its ability to play a role in equity enhancement or system innovation.

67. The level of decentralization and existence of 14 bodies legally responsible for education has led to a highly inefficient system. “Indeed, the fragmentation of educational administration in BiH—not only into 12 educational authorities but also into smaller than average school sizes—is partly responsible for the high level of public spending as a proportion of GDP. This in turn has had a knock-on effect on educational quality, as inefficiencies in spending have… resulted in unacceptably low education outcomes.”

Entity-level Expenditure

68. The level of decentralization and existence of 14 bodies legally responsible for education has led to a highly inefficient system. “Indeed, the fragmentation of educational administration in BiH—not only The majority of funding is dedicated to recurrent expenditure, which limits the ability of education managers and actors to greatly impact education quality and innovation. BiH spends around 5% GDP on education, however a high wage bill with slightly (FBH) or significantly (RS) overpaid teachers compared to GDP per capita reduces space for capital improvements and non-wage spending. Further, there is no financial incentive to encourage a more efficient management of students and the teaching process.”

69. Fiscal transfers from center to entity and canton are block transfers, with entity (in RS) and canton and municipal governments (in FBH) able to determine the percentage allocated to education: “neither the Entity governments nor the cantonal governments receive any earmarked allocations for education from the higher levels.”

70. In RS, the Ministry of Administration and Local Self Government is responsible for fiscal decentralization along with the Ministry of Finance. Following BiH’s membership in the CoE, RS passed new local governance laws in 2004 which established the roles and responsibilities of the municipalities, as well as established sources of revenues including own-source revenues for the municipality and fiscal transfers from the RS Ministry of Finance. The majority of funding for municipal budgets comes from entity transfers: in 2011, 62% came from RS (50% from unconditional grants, 10% from shared taxes and 2% from conditional grants) while only 24% was from own revenues.

101 Education and fragility in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 2010, IIEP UNESCO
102 Systematic Country Diagnostic, 2015, World Bank
103 Systematic Country Diagnostic, 2015, World Bank
104 Education and fragility in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 2010, IIEP UNESCO
105 BiH’s membership in the Council of Europe promoted more meaningful decentralization to local government and clearer rules for fiscal decentralization. Prior to 2002 there was a highly fragmented system with vertical imbalances in intergovernmental fiscal transfers (i.e. insufficient funding passed to entities given their expenditure responsibilities) and regional disparities in funding allocated to cantons and municipalities. These issues were addressed under the subsequent introduction of laws at entity-level embodying some of the principals of the European Charter.
71. In FBH the Law on the Principals of Local Self Government is the primary legislation, however no entity-level Ministry is responsible for coordination. Instead, the Ministries of Justice and Finance are in charge of overseeing transfers but play no role in coordinating activities of the cantons or municipalities. The majority of transfers made to cantons (and from them onwards to municipalities) are in the form of block grants (making up 30% of local government funding), rather than conditional or earmarked funding. Local government own revenues in FBH were 36% in 2011.107

72. No earmarked education funding is provided by the national government to entities. The result is that there are large financing disparities in funding per pupil. “A UNICEF supported case study analyzed preschool financing which shows disparities in economic cost per child. The study reports that in RS the economic cost varies from 400 KM in Banja Luka to 120 KM in Bileca, in FBH it is from 400 KM in Zenica-Doboj Canton to 150 KM in Canton Posavina, Central Bosnia and Canton 10. Municipality contributions as well as parents’ participation represent shares in the overall economic cost per child and partly explain these disparities.”108 The Central Government of BiH is, however, unable to intervene to correct such inequalities, restricted as it is by both the distribution of responsibilities and resources dictated by the Constitution.

73. In Brčko District, the Department of Education directly manages schools and accounts for 11.2% of the district budget.109

Education Planning

74. The Ministry of Civil Affairs is mandated to undertake international planning of the education sector. However, it has been unable to develop a national education strategy, nor enforce international commitments: The UN Special Rapporteur on the Right to Education has criticized the inability of BiH to credibly guarantee the rights of marginalized groups110, while the EU has been critical of efforts to segregate education (see Spotlight X).

75. Attempts to coordinate planning across the country have failed. In 2008 the Council of Education Ministers adopted the Strategic Guidelines for the Development of Education in Bosnia and Herzegovina with the Implementation Plan for 2008-2015. However, by 2015 the system had failed to change, as this guiding plan was largely ignored111. Efforts by APOSO to develop standards for education have similarly failed and the patchwork system prevails in BiH.

76. In RS, education planning is highly centralized. While education (preschool, primary and secondary school) is a shared responsibility of entity and municipal government according to the RS Constitution, education planning is undertaken at the entity level. As with policy-making, the role of the municipality is largely one of implementation of entity plans.

77. In FBH, education planning is far more decentralized. Where cantons have retained control over education planning and financing, the role of the canton is very similar to that of the RS Government. Where cantons have decentralized education in FBH funding will be allocated to municipalities in block grants. From these block grants it is then the role of the municipality to determine service needs and develop appropriate plans and budgets.

108 Systematic Country Diagnostic, 2015, World Bank
109 Education and fragility in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 2010, IIIEP UNESCO
110 Education and fragility in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 2010, IIIEP UNESCO
111 Primary and Secondary Education in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 2015, Initiative for Monitoring the European Integration of BiH
78. However, in all cases fiscal autonomy of municipalities is “very low” given the share of revenue which they can influence directly\textsuperscript{112}. As a result, their ability to significantly improve quality or even meet basic service delivery demands is limited. In municipalities which remain under the control of the RS Government or Cantons in FBH, education budgeting must be realized within the financial parameters set at higher levels. Fiscal autonomy of municipal governments is significantly lower in RS where almost all power is concentrated at the entity level. In those municipalities in which education planning and financing has been further decentralized, education managers must then compete for municipal funding with other local service needs such as health.

School Finance and Planning

79. School Boards (SBs) officially manage school governance in BiH. The Framework Law on Education, states that school boards and school principals have responsibility for governance, including selecting school directors, managing student disciplinary cases and faculty issues, and approval of school budgets\textsuperscript{113}. While the law also recognizes other stakeholders such as teachers, parents and students, “with exception of parents and teachers elected as school board members, Students’ and Parents’ Councils have very limited influence on the decision-making process.”\textsuperscript{114} The election of board members is highly politicized, with political parties still playing an active role in day-to-day management of schools despite laws forbidding this\textsuperscript{115}.

80. However, as decision making is concentrated at entity/canton/municipal levels, School Governing Bodies (SGBs) have limited influence. Though officially, SBs are responsible for management activities, SB members receive no training in school management. Furthermore, no standards for quality assessment exist to guide either SBs or monitoring bodies. The resulting “lack of competencies, such as development of school plans, conducting evaluation and data analysis, managing human resources and other, in school management, present one of the main obstacles to the school development.”\textsuperscript{116}

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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Revenue Generation</td>
<td>Generates revenue through national taxes</td>
<td>Generates revenue through entity-level taxes</td>
<td>Able to raise limited revenue through canton taxes</td>
<td>Able to raise limited revenue through local taxes</td>
<td>Able to raise limited revenue through local taxes</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fiscal transfers</td>
<td>Makes transfers to entities</td>
<td>Make transfers to cantons and municipalities</td>
<td>Make transfers to municipalities</td>
<td>Limited grants to schools</td>
<td>Limited grants to schools</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Financing - Expenditure</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>Finance entity-level</td>
<td>Finance canton-level responsibilities</td>
<td>Finance municipality responsibilities</td>
<td>Finance municipality responsibilities</td>
<td>SB develops school budget within</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\textsuperscript{112} Multi-level Fiscal System in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 2012, Governing Board of the Indirect Taxation Authority of Bosnia and Herzegovina
\textsuperscript{113} Education and fragility in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 2010, IIEP UNESCO
\textsuperscript{114} Who rules the schools? 2016, Network of Education Policy Centers
\textsuperscript{115} Education and fragility in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 2010, IIEP UNESCO
\textsuperscript{116} Who rules the schools? 2016, Network of Education Policy Centers
### Chapter 2: Country Case Study — Bosnia and Herzegovina

#### Borrowing and Aid

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Responsibilities (higher in RS)</th>
<th>Including Preschool</th>
<th>Including Preschool</th>
<th>Allocated Funding</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Bosnia</strong></td>
<td>Able to borrow internationally</td>
<td>Able to borrow</td>
<td>Able to borrow</td>
<td>Able to borrow</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>and domestically and sign</td>
<td>but require central</td>
<td>within entity-set</td>
<td>within entity-set</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>agreements with donors</td>
<td>approval. Not able</td>
<td>debt guidelines</td>
<td>debt guidelines</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Herzegovina</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>to sign agreements</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>with donors</td>
<td>with donors</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Planning

|                | Constitutional mandate for      | Responsible for     | When decentralized | Officially SGB      |
|----------------|---------------------------------| education planning  | responsibility for  | develops plan      |
|                | international planning but      | (unless further      | for planning but   | but in effect      |
|                | unable to implement.            | decentralized       | within narrow       | this is dictated    |
|                |                                 | guidelines           | fiscal window      | by higher levels   |
| **BiH**        | Highly centralized in RS. Devolved | for education       |                    |                   |
|                | to canton in FBH                 | planning             |                    |                   |
| **RS**         |                                 | (unless further      |                    |                   |
|                |                                 | decentralized        |                    |                   |

Note: ‘Independent Agencies’ removed from this table due to limited remit in financing and planning.

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### The Role of the International Community

The role of the international community in education must be understood within the wider post-conflict development agenda ...

81. **BiH was formed by international intervention.** Development aid has created a continuing dependency on the international community, with citizens feeling they have little input. In the first year following the war, overseas development assistance (ODA) to BiH ranked second in the world with $1.8 billion committed. BiH continues to be one of the largest recipients of ODA, 20% of which is targeted to education. In effect, the international community has imposed democracy, creating a situation where the Bosnian people do not claim Bosnia identify nor see it as legitimate. A 2016 USAID poll of Bosnians found that 86 per cent said their country was moving in the wrong direction. The poll also revealed that barely half of BiH citizens (52 percent) thought that the international community should have active engagement in BiH, though this was higher for FBH residents (70 percent) compared to the RS (21 percent).

82. **The multitude of donors and speed of re-construction efforts contributed to a chaotic post-conflict environment.** The return of refugees together with the need to rebuild the war-torn country put pressure on all actors. There was little time to re-think structures and approaches in the context of the education system’s role in economic transition, resulting in projects that re-enforced old structures and attitudes along ethnic lines. There was an immediate massive influx of aid and donors, with little coordination. The US and World Bank acted in 1996 to establish sectoral task forces, though a review showed that donors continued to work independently in project selection, priority setting and procurement. In 1997, the position of Deputy High Representative for Economic Reconstruction (OHR) was created to coordinate donor efforts as well as provide oversight and ensure compliance with all civilian aspects of the Accord. The

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118 Ibid.

119 World Bank OED Review 2000
United Nations Development Program (UNDP) brought the aid community together under the Donor Coordination Forum (DCF) in 2005. At this time the international donor community (excluding non-governmental organisations) comprised 37 bilateral and 30 multilateral donors\textsuperscript{120}. In 2009 the BiH Ministry of Finance and Treasury/Sector for Coordination of International Economic Aid took charge of the DCF.

83. Rebuilding the education sector was hindered by a lack of reliable information and analysis, as well as by the decentralization of education responsibility instituted in the Accord and unwillingness of the Federation’s two main constituent groups to cooperate on education matters. Projects focused on improving primary education (World Bank) through Teacher Training Institution grants and the establishment of the Standards and Assessment Agency (SAA), the development of the Education Management Information System (EMIS) and establishment of a Standards and Assessment Agency. Other projects focused on secondary and vocational education (Germany, France, Austria). Development partners also supported citizenship and human rights education (Soros Foundation, European Commission, UNICEF, Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, and Council of Europe), to address the needs of Returnee Children\textsuperscript{121}.

84. Initially there were few attempts to include local authorities in project planning or implementation. The result was a lack of buy-in from stakeholders. This had a direct impact on the effectiveness of the World Bank Education Restructuring Project of 2005, which was a follow-on to the First and Second Emergency loans intended to increase participation in general and secondary education and improve efficiency. The final report of this project noted that the project was never implemented due to a lack of government interest. It concluded that the Bank did not invest in the requisite stakeholder consultations or involve the line Ministry at the preparatory stage but instead tried to generate consensus for its project design after the fact.

85. In 2002, as part of the streamlining of the international community’s work in BiH, lead responsibility for education was given to the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE). The objective of the newly formed Education Department was to promote political and legislative changes to ensure the development of a holistic education system accessible, acceptable and effective for all citizens, irrespective of their ethnic background, gender or socio-economic status, thus supporting the long-term stability and security of the country\textsuperscript{122}. The OSCE continues to lead education reform efforts in the country. In addition to its Sarajevo office, the OSCE has education staff based at its 14 field offices overseeing reform implementation across BiH. At the end of 2017, the OSCE Head of Mission, together with the US Ambassador and the Head of European Union Delegation and EU Special Representative Ambassador jointly addressed the BiH Conference of Education Ministers, reminding them that further funding through the EU’s Instrument for Pre-Accession will only be made available if they cooperate and together implement already agreed upon reforms.\textsuperscript{123}

86. Donor support for anti-corruption and citizenship education is an attempt to address this major crisis faced by the country\textsuperscript{124}. Donors including USAID and the Council on Europe are providing funding on two fronts: (1) for civic education, by introducing curricula, training materials and

\textsuperscript{120} Donor Coordination: a Basic Requirement for More Efficient and Effective Development Cooperation, German Development Institute, 2004, \url{https://www.die-gdi.de/uploads/media/7_2004_EN.pdf}

\textsuperscript{121} Project Completion Report, June 2005, World Bank, p. 5.

\textsuperscript{122} Education and Fragility in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Clare Magill, 2010, \url{https://www.ulster.ac.uk/__data/assets/pdf_file/0017/233360/Magill-2010-Education-and-Fragility-in-Bosnia-and-Herzegovina.jsp.pdf}

\textsuperscript{123} OSCE Mission, U.S. Embassy and EU Delegation urge Education Ministers to advance inclusive quality education across Bosnia and Herzegovina, December 2017, \url{https://www.osce.org/mission-to-bosnia-and-herzegovina/362256}

\textsuperscript{124} Action Plan for Bosnia and Herzegovina 2015-2017, Council of Europe, \url{https://rm.coe.int/16802ee4d}
pedagogical tools to deliver training to help children to identify corruption and (2) for institutional strengthening, to eliminate corruption in the education sector, by improving transparency, accountability and social participation in the education sector.

87. The international community continue to support programs to include Roma children in education. UNICEF and the Soros Foundation, as well as USAID have had ongoing programs to improve Roma children’s participation in education. However, efforts are stymied by the structure of BiH education, favoring only the major entity populations.

88. The current educational landscape has not evolved significantly from the complicated and decentralized governing structure originally introduced in 1995, a fact that donors continue to grapple with. Many donors have turned their attention to the local entities. For example, the UNDP Integrated Local Development Project supports harmonization of sub-national strategic planning and development management for the social sector, including education.

89. The donor community sees potential for the diaspora, estimated at about 2 million people (1st and 2nd generation) to contribute to development in BiH. Past studies have shown a positive relationship between remittances and children’s educational attainment, and a negative relationship between remittances and child labor supply. Donors such as USAID, UNDP, and the Swiss now have projects in play to build diaspora consulting bodies (Diaspora for Development – D4D) to advise on steps forward and to make contributions to BiH development.

90. Finally, if it is to be accepted for EU membership, the country will need to fully harmonize its education system with the EU education system structures. It is promising to note that 3 of 4 Bosnians support accession to the EU, however there is division in that FBH is in favor, while citizens in RS do not support EU integration.

Key Findings

A highly decentralized system has led to multiple system challenges

91. Multiple ministries are responsible for the education of a relatively small number of students. BiH has fourteen government bodies responsible for policy-making and delivery of education in a country with 480,000 students. The administrative costs of this structure are substantial. Furthermore, the political decision to decentralize education has resulted in highly inefficient allocation of schools. Local school planning combined with a shrinking school population has left the average class size in BiH at 19.4 in RS and 21.6 in FBH, resulting in high unit costs.

92. Lack of a central authority to legislate or impel lower bodies to act has created a fractured, uncoordinated system. The need for consensus and approval at the central and entity levels leaves room for delay and political stalemate, exemplified by unsuccessful attempts to standardize qualifications, and develop a common core curriculum. Furthermore, the central government is unable to challenge the politicization of education in its more extreme forms nor

126 Systematic Country Diagnostic, 2014, World Bank
active discrimination or segregation within schools. This also threatens efforts to build a peaceful, tolerant society.

93. The central level is powerless to address inequities in the system. Despite being signatory to international agreements such as the Sustainable Development Goals, the central government is unable to compel entities to ensure equal access for all students. Further, the absence of any central funding schemes for education in BiH means that the government cannot undertake programs to reach those communities most marginalized by the existing system.

94. Coordinating bodies lack power and replicate wider power dynamics. The Council of Education Ministers, appears to suffer from the lack of clear leadership and consistent fighting between the 14 education ministries. The Council has no power to issue binding decisions and there is no clear coordinating or leading agent to drive an agenda of increased standardization and harmony between the constituent parts of the system.

95. There appears to be little hope of greater unity. The decision to devolve all powers in education and provide entities with almost absolute vetoes has created a power vacuum which the central government has no authority to fill without explicit agreement from all parties. Given the entrenched ethnic conflicts at play within the wider political context and between education ministries there appears to be little hope of future alignment without a wider shift in constitutional authorities.

Education in BiH reinforces social divisions

96. The highly decentralized education system has reinforced ethnic differences, which is especially problematic post-conflict. The phenomenon of ‘two schools under one roof’ is tied closely to the issue of ethnic cleansing in BiH during the war and the highly segregated society which emerged. The issue of segregation is common across the Bosnian system. This has inhibited the effective re-integration of refugees and internally displaced students and poses challenges to efforts to rebuild a tolerant society.

97. This decentralized education system has enabled the continued politicization of education. Political interference in education is rife as politics is highly localized and based on ethnic identity. Consequently, education is used as a platform for influence and enables local elites to monopolize all services within their control.

98. Curriculum and language of instruction continue to play an important role in segregation in BiH. The use of multiple curricula and languages of instruction were meant to form part of the process of rehabilitation and rebuilding while respecting ethnic differences. Though the differences in languages across the three groups are negligible, this has been used as an excuse for groups to maintain the system of segregation that is now perpetuated for political reasons.

The role of the international community

99. Donor funding, undertaken quickly to respond to the devastation of the war, entrenched ethnic divisions. First steps were taken with insufficient analysis and stakeholder consultation. Therefore, initial efforts to support the rebuilding of the education sector contributed to consolidating the ethnic divisions which had given rise to the conflict.

100. Lack of inclusion of the newly formed government of BiH and its citizens in state building contributed to creating a country without a national identity. The governmental structure and political system was determined by the international community under the peace accord. From
the very beginning citizens did not embrace the new nation, nor feel ownership of projects designed and implemented by external actors. The focus on ethnicity has created a citizenry without shared national ideals. This has impacted their interest in civic participation. As recently as 2016, a USAID survey revealed that 92% of the population had not participated in any civic activity, such as public hearings or citizen initiatives in the preceding 12 months.

101. **Multiplicity of donors led to gaps, mismatches, and surpluses across sectors.** In the early years of reconstruction, funding priority was focused on energy and infrastructure leaving education programs underfunded. The international aid sector in BiH remains complex today, with many actors, including 12,000 NGOs, which themselves rely on funding from external organizations that determine the objectives of their initiatives, rather than in consultation with citizens in the country.

102. **However, donors have contributed to keeping issues of disadvantaged populations (the Roma and handicapped) and anti-corruption in the spotlight.** Citizens recognize the prevalence of corruption and would like to see this addressed. But their concern for disadvantaged populations is less pronounced.

103. **The BiH diaspora is being leveraged by international donors.** The international community’s links with the diaspora has inspired innovative projects. The US, Switzerland and UNDP recognize that the diaspora have the capability to contribute know-how, skills, and investment in their home country. Since remittances to BiH are on the order of $2 billion a year (over 10% of GDP), harnessing this could have a critical impact on economic development.
Pakistan faces numerous challenges to achieve its national plan, Vision 2025 ....

1. The Islamic Republic of Pakistan, consisting of four provinces and four territories, is a lower-middle income country with a population of over 207 million, two thirds of whom live in rural areas. Since 2000 Pakistan has recorded consistent positive GDP growth with 5.472% in 2016, almost doubling GDP in the last decade and reaching a per-capita income of $1443 in 2016. However, rapid population growth has put pressure on public services and diluted the impact of GDP growth. Agriculture employs 42% of workforce and its primary exports include cotton, sugar, rice and textiles. Importantly for education, around two thirds (68%) of the population is under the age of thirty.

2. The country has achieved large reductions in poverty although Income inequality has not fallen in the last decade and millions remain at risk. Between 2001 and 2013 the incidence of absolute poverty fell from 28.6% to 6.1%. However, “Pakistan’s recent poverty gains remain fragile in part because many households are clustered near the poverty line.” Income inequality during that period has remained consistent based on the Gini Index - 30.4% in 2001 and 30.7% in 2013. Pakistan’s staggering fall in poverty over the last 14 years has not been accompanied by a similar improvement in wellbeing and Pakistan remains one of the lowest performers in the South Asia Region on human development indicators: it has the third-highest rate of stunting in the world at 43.7% and just 5.1 years mean schooling. Pakistan remains some distance from achieving the internationally accepted Sustainable Development Goals, especially in core public services including health and education.

3. Since Pakistan achieved independence in 1947 and was constituted as an Islamic Republic in 1956, it has experienced a civil war and 3 military coups before reaching a period of relative stability. An ethnic civil war in 1971 resulted in the secession of East Pakistan as the new country of Bangladesh. In 1973 Pakistan adopted a new constitution establishing a federal government alongside its pre-existing parliamentary republic status. Its political history has been one of instability and a constant struggle for power between political parties and the military. Since Independence, the country has experienced three military coups and four periods of civilian rule. In 2008 President Musharraf resigned, marking the end of the third period of military rule. In 2013, the Pakistan Peoples Party government became the first democratically elected civilian-led government to complete its five-year term in office. That same year saw the first democratic transition of power. The last decade has been an unprecedented period of relative stability in Pakistan’s history.

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127 Balochistan, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Punjab, and Sindh
128 The Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), Islamabad Capital Territory (ICT), Gilgit–Baltistan and Azad Kashmir. Gilgit–Baltistan was granted semi-provincial status in 2009, giving it a degree of self-government, while Azad Kashmir is a self-governing polity administered by Pakistan. Gilgit–Baltistan and Azad Kashmir are in the disputed Jammu and Kashmir region and are not formally integrated into Pakistan's federal state: as a result, this case study will focus exclusively on the four provinces, FATA and ICT.
129 Data for this section obtained from data.worldbank.org unless stated otherwise
130 Pakistan Country Partnership Strategy, 2014, World Bank
131 Gini index measures the extent to which the distribution of income among individuals or households within an economy deviates from a perfectly equal distribution. A Gini index of 0 represents perfect equality, while an index of 100 implies perfect inequality. It is the widely adopted international measure of wealth inequality.
Chapter 3: Country Case Study – Pakistan

July 5, 2018

4. **Pakistan faces significant challenges to stability including violence and the risk of natural disasters.**
The World Bank estimates that as of 2014 “more than 50,000 citizens, including members of the armed forces, civilian law enforcement agencies, and paramilitary organizations have been killed”, primarily in the US-led ‘War on Terror’ and the related insurgency. This has also resulted in the closure or damage of hundreds of schools nationwide: during the height of the Taliban insurgency in the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) province “over 900 girls’ schools were forced to close and over 120,000 girls stopped attending school”. Pakistan is further threatened by its vulnerability to shifting climatic patterns, which are made worse by the increasing population, scarcity of water and unregulated urbanization. In such a context, ensuring provincial harmony and buy-in to the national vision becomes especially important, as does the role of education in building national and individual resilience.

**Table 3.1: Development and education statistics for Pakistan**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Development statistics</th>
<th>Selected education statistics</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>GDP, current US$ million</td>
<td>27,055</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP per capita, current US$</td>
<td>1443</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poverty Rate, % ($1.90/day)</td>
<td>6.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GINI Coefficient</td>
<td>30.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNDP HDI Index</td>
<td>147th</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infant mortality rate (per 1,000 live births)</td>
<td>64.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maternal mortality ratio (per 100,000 live births)</td>
<td>250</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prevalence of stunting, height for age (% of children under 5)</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Education Overview**

5. **Pakistan is the world’s sixth-most populous nation; half of the country are less than 20 years old, placing great demands on education.** Officially the system provides 12 years of schooling from ages 5-16, educating 47,491,260 students, c.19 million of whom are at primary level while just 1.4 million continue to tertiary study. The system is composed of 191,065 public institutions and 112,381 private institutions at all levels (ECE-tertiary).

6. **The education system is highly decentralized and there are major structural and language differences across the regions.** Decentralization of education has taken place within the wider national debate and inter-governmental arrangements within Federal Pakistan. Throughout its federal history Provincial governments have had primary responsibility for the delivery of education. Consequently, there are multiple different structures in the education system (see Figure 3.1 which shows different combination of school structures in existence in Pakistan from

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133 Pakistan Country Partnership Strategy, 2014, World Bank
134 World Bank Statistics Database. All figures reported are 2016 or latest available data. Bank Database used for comparability across countries. Where these differ from national statistics used in report this is highlighted.
135 Pakistan Education Statistics 2015-16 2017, MFPT
all-through 5-16 years to structures using primary, middle, high and higher secondary schools). Further, no national language policy has ever been agreed after initial attempts in the 1970s.

**Figure 3.1: Within a Broad Framework, the Structure of the School Cycle Varies Across Provinces in Pakistan Leading to Multiple Routes to Graduation After Twelve Years**

7. **Non-state schools play a significant role in Pakistan, educating 38% of children.** This includes a number of public-private partnerships in provinces and Federally-Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), which are growing rapidly. The largest, Punjab Education Foundation, provides fee-free education to 2.5 million students. Deeni Madrassas (Religious Schools) offer free religious education, often with boarding and lodging (often managed by local communities and financed through charity and donations) and educate 2.26 million students. Since 2001 there has been more domestic and international focus on these schools which have been accused of promoting extremism. Around 500,000 children attend a network of Non-Formal Basic Education (NFBE) institutions which attempt to cater to the large out of school population across Pakistan. Around two-thirds of non-state provision from ECE-higher secondary is in fee paying, for profit schooling, with around 10 million children, compared to under 5 million in Foundations and Deeni Madrassas combined.137

8. **Education is poorly funded and falls short of educating many children.** Funding for education is low - in 2015 Pakistan spent 2.6% of GDP on education, which amounted to just 13% of

136 Source: Pakistan Education Statistics 2016
137 Ibid: author’s own calculation
government expenditure, significantly below GPE’s recommended 20%. Even with this low ceiling, there is substantial variation across provinces. The Government of Pakistan has acknowledged that this funding shortfall is directly responsible for the large out-of-school population.

9. Consequently, Pakistan has one of the world’s largest out-of-school population. 22.6 million children in Pakistan are out of school, resulting in low net enrolment rates at both primary and secondary (see table 3.2). At all levels and in all regions, girls are more likely to be out of school resulting in a Gender Parity Index of 0.85. Given the current rate of progress it will be year 2076 before every Pakistani child is in school.

## Table 3.2: Enrolment (%) by level and provider disaggregated by provinces in Pakistan

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Punjab</th>
<th>Sindh</th>
<th>Balochistan</th>
<th>KP</th>
<th>FATA</th>
<th>ICT</th>
<th>Pakistan</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>GER Pre-primary*</td>
<td>71.2</td>
<td>48.9</td>
<td>63.9</td>
<td>88.2</td>
<td>57.2</td>
<td>44.9</td>
<td>66.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NER Primary*</td>
<td>70.8</td>
<td>61.2</td>
<td>49.8</td>
<td>83.3</td>
<td>63.5</td>
<td>71.4</td>
<td>68.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NER Middle**</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NER High**</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-state/private (all levels)**</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Out of school (all ages)**</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

** Source: Alif Ailaan factsheets [http://www.alifailaan.pk/factsheets](http://www.alifailaan.pk/factsheets)

10. Enrolment and retention vary widely by province and based on gender, location, and wealth. In the Annual Status of Education Report (ASER) 2015 shows that wealthier children are three times more likely than poorer children to have learned basic arithmetic and reading. In the FATA, there is a 42% gender enrolment gap, and just 30% of girls survive to grade 5.

11. While limited data is available, quality indicators suggest the system is highly inefficient and failing the majority of students, particularly in rural areas. On average, Pakistanis spend only 6.1 years in school. Survival rate to grade 5 nationally is just 66%, NPE 2017 shows "The drop-out rate of enrolled students is above 70% from Grade1 to 10 in public sector schools". Nationally, around 50% of in-school students cannot read. The World Bank’s latest Pakistan Development Update states this number has remained unchanged since the 2010 devolution process. For females over 15 this drops to 45% (compared to 68% for males). Further, there is large variation between Provinces: in Balochistan 56% of Class 5 students cannot read a story fluently in Urdu or Pashto, which goes down to 31% in Azad Jammu & Kashmir.

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138 World Bank EdStats
139 [http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0025/002595/259549e.pdf](http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0025/002595/259549e.pdf)
140 The State of Education in Pakistan Factsheet, Alif Ailaan
141 It is worth noting that the pre-primary and primary NER for Pakistan, Punjab and Sindh from Alif Ailaan, an NGO, are roughly ten percentage points lower, suggesting a potential that government figures are inflated
142 ASER - The Annual Status of Education Report is a citizen led, household-based initiative that aims to provide reliable estimates on the schooling status of children aged 3-16 years residing in all rural and few urban districts of Pakistan. ASER was created by citizens to hold the education sector accountable for its poor performance.
143 NPE 2017
Politics, Policies, and Legislative Framework

Education is under the exclusive control of the provincial governments: following a national decentralization reform in 2010 the Federal Government’s role in policy guidance and oversight was removed...

Political economy and key actors

12. Pakistan’s democratic process has seen education, alongside a number of other public services, pass through phases of centralization and decentralization. According to the Constitution education is a provincial responsibility. Prior to 1973, education was thus largely coordinated at the provincial level. Following the introduction of the Concurrent List within national legislation in 1973, education became an area over which Federal government exercised oversight. During the proceeding decades the Federal role grew, until 2010 when a constitutional amendment once again placed education as a provincial responsibility and removed the Concurrent List, and thus the legislative role for the Federal government.\(^{144}\)

13. A recent amendment to the Constitution placed education exclusively within Provincial control. Passed in 2010, the 18th Amendment curtailed Presidential powers accrued under military rule and devolved authority over education and other services to Provincial governments. This was an explicit effort to reduce the motivation for military takeover, alongside a broader call for increased autonomy and authority for the Provinces.\(^{145}\) The reform has been described as redefining the “structural contours of the state through a paradigm shift from a heavily centralized to a predominantly decentralized federation.”\(^{146}\) As part of the devolution plan, a larger share of the national budget (from 47.5 to 56%) was transferred to Provinces according to the 7th National Finance Commission Award. These budgets are discretionary.

14. The Provinces and Federal government are key actors, alongside Education Foundations. Despite decentralization in 2010, education remains an area of negotiation between the center and the provinces through numerous coordination bodies (see paragraph 17). Alongside this, Education Foundations - autonomous bodies with mandates to manage large public private partnership programs (PPPs) - are significant stakeholders. The current period in Pakistan’s education evolution is of particular interest to Somalia precisely because it is one of such change, and because the role of the Federal government in education is being actively redefined through negotiation with the provinces, rather than through legislative dictate.

15. A major issue confronting the Pakistani economy, including the education sector, is corruption. The huge education bureaucracy provides opportunities for embezzlement and corruption at many levels and makes it difficult to trace. According to Transparency International Pakistan, 43% of people see the education system as corrupt or highly corrupt.\(^{147}\) Further, a 2015 report concludes damningly that elites “in Pakistan have created – either deliberately or through negligence – the public education system that the country has today”, due to the combination of the opportunities for rent-seeking and their own ability to opt-out through private schooling and foreign education for their children.\(^{148}\)

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\(^{144}\) Eighteenth Amendment: Federal and Provincial Roles & Responsibilities in Education, I-SAPS

\(^{145}\) As of 2010, the administrative units of Pakistan include four provinces, one federal capital territory, two autonomous and disputed territories, and a group of federally administered tribal areas. Pakistan has three lower tiers of government, including 34 divisions, 149 districts (zillas), 588 sub-divisions (tehsils), and several thousand union councils (sherwans).

\(^{146}\) Development Advocate Pakistan, Volume 2, Issue 1, 2015, UNDP

\(^{147}\) Global Corruption Report: Education, 2013, Transparency International

\(^{148}\) Pakistan’s Education Crisis: The Real Story, 2015, Wilson Center
16. **Teachers unions have limited influence.** Teachers’ Unions in Pakistan are seen as primarily focused on conditions and terms of service, rather than advocating for student wellbeing, while “most provincial governments and education departments are focused on punitive and coercive measures to ‘bring teachers in line’ rather than involving them as legitimate constituents and agents in the process of education reform... [and across provinces, little to no formal channels exist that guarantee teacher association participation in the formulation and assessment of education policies.”

**Spotlight 3.1: Recent decentralization of the education system in Pakistan**

Prior to the devolution of 2010 the Federal Government leveraged a number of key policy tools to influence a system that has always been largely implemented at the Provincial level. Legislation introduced in 1973 (*The Concurrent List*) gave the Federal Ministry of Education (MOE) influence over key areas including policy, planning, curriculum and standards. The MOE used these powers to develop seven National Education Policies (NEP) between 1969 and 2009: these were policy directives issued by the MOE designed to establish the overall national goals. The Provincial governments then developed their own planning and implementation schemes within this larger framework.

Alongside these explicit policy documents, perhaps the most tangible way the Federal government exerted influence over the education sector was through financing. However, as this came in the form of block grants to Provincial governments these inter-governmental transfers provided little clear directive to the Provinces. The Policy and Planning Wing of MOE was also mandated with supporting lower levels of government to develop education financing and planning strategies.

The MOE played a key role in coordination at the national level. Two forums, the Interprovincial Education Ministerial Committee and the Inter-Board Committee of Chairmen were established by MOE to ensure national coordination of education policy and planning. *The Federal Government also regulated curriculum and learning materials:* MOE developed National Curriculum and had final approval of textbooks developed by Provincial Textbook Boards.

The 18th Amendment dissolved the MOE, which has resulted in an ongoing, and ill-defined role for the Federal Government. As of 2010, Acts enacted by the MOE were also repealed, resulting in a legislative ‘white space’ for Provincial governments. However, in 2011 the Supreme Court ruled that the Federal Government could not abrogate its responsibility in ensuring Article 25-A and thus retains a role in upholding this right. The Federal government therefore established The Ministry of Federal Education and Professional Training (MFEPT) in response to the few remaining federal functions in education post 2010 to “set standards in higher education along with technical and scientific institutions and research... implementation of international treaties, and administration of education in Islamabad and federally administered areas.”

A redefined role for the Federal government

17. **Despite a weakened Constitutional mandate since 2010, the Federal government continues to play a coordinating and consensus-building role through a number of mechanisms/ forums.** The *Council of Common Interest (CCI)* functions as the “central political institution [which] regulates the competencies and settles disputes between the federal government and the provinces.”

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149 Reclaiming Dignity: The State of Teachers’ Unions and their Future, 2015, Alif Ailaan
After the 18th Amendment this entity has taken on increasing importance and analysis of agenda items shows it is largely driven by the Federal Government\textsuperscript{151}. While education does not feature on the list of common interests, the forum serves to increase alignment between Provincial Chief Ministers. An additional intra-governmental body that deals directly with education is the \textit{Inter-Provincial Education Ministers Conference (IPEMC)}, established under the National Education Policy 2009 (NEP). While no decision is binding on any Province, it acts as an important forum for collaboration and policy alignment as the examples below show. However, concerns have been raised that this primarily acts as a high-level, political forum; does not involved technical, bureaucratic education managers; and that there are few incentives to meaningfully coordinate education planning since the 2010 devolution reform\textsuperscript{152}.

18. Following a unanimous decision at the IPEMC in 2015, the Ministry of Federal Education and Professional Training (MFEPT) has spearheaded efforts to revise the National Education Policy, 2017 (NEP 2017, currently in draft phase). This has involved the collaboration and consensus of Provision Education Ministries and MFEPT. The foreword by the Federal Secretary highlights the objective of the document to develop and prepare both short and long term-plans with realistic targets. The Policy establishes agreed targets under 20 goals and 64 objectives in all areas of education, from ECE through secondary, non-formal education and religious and private provision.

19. The development of Pakistan’s first comprehensive set of standards for education illustrates another way in which the provinces have identified an issue of shared interests best addressed at the central level. The Minimum National Standards for Quality Education (MNSQE) was the result of consensus building on the vision of education in Pakistan. The MNSQE comprises seven standards i.e. (i) Standards for Learners (ii) Standards for Curriculum (iii) Standards for Textbooks & Other Learning Materials (iv) Standards for Teachers (v) Standards for Assessment (vi) Early Learning and Development Standards and (vii) Standards for School Environment. Initially agreed at an IPEMC meeting, this process was ultimately coordinated by bodies under the MFEPT.

20. However, it remains unclear how these standards can be enforced. The standards agree a common vision of quality education in Pakistan and thus present a major achievement of the newly structured education system. However, they remain aspirational rather than implementable in the Pakistani context, and there is no clear mechanism for enforcement by the Federal government, nor by citizens within each province should they fail to attain them.

21. In Federally-administered areas (ICT, FATA\textsuperscript{153}) the MFEPT continues to hold policy and legislative oversight and be responsible for delivery.

\textbf{Role of Provinces and District Governments}

22. The autonomy and responsibility of provinces was greatly increased by the 2010 devolution reform and currently each operates a separate education system depending on local needs and preferences. Provinces now have exclusive rights over education policy, although in practice, prior to 2010 national policies were open to interpretation at provincial level\textsuperscript{154}. Provincial Ministers of Education are appointed by the Chief Minister, and provinces develop Provincial Education Plans\textsuperscript{155} which outline their strategy for education and guide any necessary legislative change.

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{151} Development Advocate Pakistan, Volume 2, Issue 1, 2015, UNDP
\item \textsuperscript{152} Interview with former World Bank Pakistan staff
\item \textsuperscript{153} Islamabad Capital Territory and Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA)
\item \textsuperscript{154} Eighteenth Amendment: Federal and Provincial Roles & Responsibilities in Education, I-SAPS
\end{itemize}
23. **Provincial planning continued to reflect the National Education Policy 2009 even after devolution.** In Punjab for example, the School Education Department (PSED) has introduced legislation and policies covering all areas of education from provincial legislation on the right to education to teacher terms and conditions guided by the Punjab Education Sector Plan 2013-17. This plan reflects and explicitly references the National Education Plan 2009, as do the provincial plans for Sindh, Balochistan and KP.

24. **The 18th Amendment made the right to education an enforceable right.** Through the insertion of Article 25-A, the right to education was made an enforceable right and the responsibility of the state. Prior to this, it was a constitutional right, but was not enforceable. It also makes families responsible for ensuring children attend school. However, realities (particularly financing limitations and availability of infrastructure) have meant that the ambitions of Article 25-A are yet to be realized.

25. **Non-state schools and special education are included under provincial control.** This includes oversight of Deeni Madrassas and private schools as well as special education. A number of provinces have chosen to use public-private partnerships extensively to expand access to education (see spotlight in section 3.3).

26. **The 18th Amendment concentrated all authority in education at the Provincial level at the expense of the District authorities and reversed previous efforts at devolving more decision-making to the local level.** Decentralization to local government prior to 2010 had been highly political. Throughout periods of military government multiple decentralization efforts (ordinances) were introduced in an effort to undermine the authority of traditional political parties whose powerbase was concentrated at the Provincial level. The 18th Amendment permits provinces to unilaterally modify these ordinances and has placed local authorities under control of provinces, including the important functions of revenue and expenditure responsibilities. Provincial governments have thus consolidated power and reduced the role of district authorities; “preferring to use the district civil bureaucracy for policy implementation.”

27. **Provinces continue to be slow in granting power to the districts.** Currently district education offices function as local administrative units for service delivery and report to Provincial education departments. Although Article 140-A of the 18th Amendment provides for local devolution of policy-making and legislative authority; post-2010, provincial governments have been slow to enact reforms to devolve power further. Provincial authorities maintain sole responsibility for education sector plans, representation in national forums such as IPEMC and are the primary contributors to the national standards and curriculum processes. Despite all provinces passing local governance acts, it took a Supreme Court judgement to force three of the four provinces to hold local government elections. This delay can be seen either as a desire to concentrate power in the traditional strongholds of provincial political parties, or a reflection of weak local state capacity and administrative challenges.

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156 http://schools.punjab.gov.pk/governinglaws
157 "The State shall provide free and compulsory education to all children of the age of five to sixteen years in such manner as may be determined by law.” Constitution of Pakistan
158 Can the New Intergovernmental Structure Work in Pakistan in the Presence of Governance Challenges? Learning from China, 2013, Ahmad
160 Development Advocate Pakistan, Volume 2, Issue 1, 2015, UNDP
Spotlight 3.2: Analysis of provincial legislation and policy shows the limits of districts in setting the policies and regulations of schools within their authority

Analysis of the Punjab District Education Authority (Conduct of Business) Rules 2017 shows the limitation of district influence on policy. While appointment of the CEO role is based on open competition, the Punjab government appoints all other positions on the District Education Authority Commission, including the Chairman and Vice-Chairman. The District Education Officers are civil servant positions appointed centrally at provincial level. Provincial rules dictate that the district is responsible for implementing the policies set by the province in terms of curriculum, standards teacher codes of conduct and school management.

The Sindh Education Sector Plan 2014-18 similarly places the responsibility for “[o]verall policy-making and providing leadership in curriculum, educational standards, assessment, textbook development, programme design and implementation” at the provincial level, with districts led by District Education Officers (DEOs) responsible for implementation and management. This situation is mirrored in Balochistan and KP.

While Sindh, Punjab and Balochistan Education Sector Plans highlight the role of school management committees (SMCs), none assigns a policy role at the school level, which is primarily mandated to implement policies.

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**Table 3.3: Roles and Responsibilities of Actors in Legislative and Policy Domains**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Legislative change</td>
<td>Only within Federally-administered territories</td>
<td>Exclusive legislative rights within parameters of Article 25-A</td>
<td>No constitutional mandate – Provinces have not devolved power</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Policy formulation</td>
<td>Only within Federally-administered territories</td>
<td>Mandated to develop Provincial education policies</td>
<td>No constitutional mandate – Provinces have not devolved power</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>The Inter-Provincial Education Ministers Conference (IPEMC) plays a coordinating role</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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161 Sindh Education Sector Plan 2014-18, 2014, Sindh School Education & Literacy Department
Service delivery is the mandate of provincial governments, with district education offices functioning as administrative sub-units. Elected officials at the local district government do not have control over areas such as curriculum or teachers...

Access and infrastructure

28. Ensuring universal access is a core role of the Federal Government, although funding realities make any attempt at enforcement unrealistic. The Federal Government has a dual obligation to ensure access: ensuring provinces fulfil the rights to education up to the age of sixteen as enshrined in the constitution; and ensuring Pakistan fulfils international commitments including *Education For All*\(^{162}\) and the *Sustainable Development Goals*.

29. However, a lack of funds means that such universal access is impossible: a recent UNESCO analysis suggested the additional places required would cost USD $11.7 billion\(^ {163}\). In such a context, both the Federal and Provincial Governments have established medium-term targets to ensure universal access, although with high percentages of provincial education budgets allocated to recurrent expenditure (see section 3.4), the likelihood of a large increase in infrastructure and access is limited without significant increases in total funding.

30. The Federal Government directly funds compensatory programs targeting marginalized populations across Pakistan. This includes the Basic Education Community Schools (BECS) and the National Education Foundation. BECS was established in 1995 to provide non-formal education in areas where schools do not exist. It currently manages 15,000 schools and supports access for 500,000 students across Pakistan. Plans to expand this program to 75,000 schools did not occur due to political challenges despite government estimates that the program costs one-sixth of formal schooling. Punjab and KP support a further 10,632 and 1,430 centers respectively. The National Education Foundation is a public-private partnership in federally-administered areas and Gilgit-Baltistan.

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**Spotlight 3.3: Girls’ Education in Pakistan\(^ {164}\)**

Pakistan has the second-largest number of out-of-school female students in the world. 13 million girls in Pakistan are out-of-school, meaning that girls are more likely to be out of school than attending (just 48% NER at all levels). In Balochistan and FATA, three-quarters of all girls are out-of-school. Girls at all levels in all provinces are more likely to drop out of school.

The result is that women are more likely to be illiterate. In rural areas, 67% of women aged 15 and above have never seen the inside of a classroom. The result is that nationally, 55% of women aged 15 or older are illiterate, compared to 32% of men.

The reasons for drop out and non-enrolment are complex, but fundamentally point to failures in service delivery. According to a household survey, the most frequently reported reasons for girls not attending

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\(^{162}\) The *Education For All* (EFA) movement is a global commitment to provide quality basic education for all children, youth and adults. At the *World Education Forum* (Dakar, 2000), 164 governments including Pakistan pledged to achieve EFA and identified six goals to be met by 2015.

\(^{163}\) [http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0025/002595/259549e.pdf](http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0025/002595/259549e.pdf); exchange rate on 31/01/18 oanda.com

\(^{164}\) [Female Education in Pakistan Factsheet, Alif Ailaan](http://www.alifailaan.org)
school is the unwillingness of either parents or children. Factors contributing to this unwillingness include lack of basic facilities in schools, poor quality of education, teacher absenteeism and corporal punishment in some cases.165 A quarter of schools in the Alif Ailaan study had no toilet, a known barrier for girls’ education. This despite national and global evidence on the benefits of female education.

There have been some successes in ensuring girls enroll in school. In 2003 Punjab introduced a conditional cash transfer scheme for rural girls in Punjab (supported by the World Bank) which raised enrolment by 9%166 and by 2013 covered over 400,000 girls in the province.167 The Promoting Girls’ Education in Balochistan Project (PGEB) “rebuilt 123 girls’ schools that were previously shelter less. It also provided missing facilities including toilets, drinking water, boundary walls, solar panels, electricity, blackboards and furniture to 226 girls’ schools. Additionally, 260 new primary schools have been set up with community participation.”168 As a result of these changes 33,000 girls across Balochistan province enrolled in school.

Donors have played a key role in pushing girl’s education up the agenda and have supported projects. Alongside the two World Bank projects listed above girl’s education has been a major focus for GPE and the UK Department for International Development (DFID), including as key metrics for DFID’s support in Punjab and KP.

Civil society is playing an important role in challenging gender barriers. The Citizens Foundation, an NGO set up in 1995, runs 1400+ schools for marginalized communities with over 200,000 students. It employs a 100% female workforce to provide a safe environment for girls and maintains minimum 50% female enrolment. Additionally, organizations such as Alif Ailaan and ASER are publishing data on the gender gap to provide information for public pressure.

However, while positive examples exist, and provinces have made strong declarations, large gaps remain and show limited signs of closing rapidly.

31. Provincial Governments are responsible for ensuring access and providing educational infrastructure169. Under the Constitution, provincial governments are required to provide access to schooling for all children aged 5-16, however this does not happen. While official figures give primary NER in Pakistan, Punjab and Sindh as 69%,71% and 61% respectively, figures from Alif Ailaan, a Pakistani NGO suggests this is as low as 57%, 61% and 51%. This study suggests the % out of school children at all ages is as high as 47%. The issue of access to secondary schooling is particularly acute in Pakistan: out of 46,039 government schools in Sindh, 91% are primary schools and only 4% are high schools, resulting in a NER of just 12% at that level.170

32. Access, and issues around lack of schools varies by province. There are at least 6,164 non-functional and ghost schools in Sindh, while 71% government primary school buildings are in an ‘unsatisfactory’ condition.171. 16% of primary schools in Pakistan are single classroom schools.172 Within provinces there is further variation, with urban areas better resourced than rural areas.

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165 Female Education in Pakistan Factsheet, Alif Ailaan
166 https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/9260
169 MOFPT is responsible for ensuring access in ICT and FATA.
170 The State of Education in Sindh Factsheet, Alif Ailaan
171 The State of Education in Sindh Factsheet, Alif Ailaan
172 The State of Education in Pakistan Factsheet, Alif Ailaan
33. The new Minimum National Standards for Quality Education include standards for school environment although these are far from being achieved. While the quality of infrastructure varies significantly by province, the graph below shows that in all provinces basic infrastructure and school environment needs improvement.

*Figure 3.2: Availability of Facilities by Province (%)*\(^\text{173}\)

34. Education Foundations play an increasingly important role in increasing access to education in Pakistan. The Federal Government, Punjab, Sindh and KP all have Education Foundations which manage public private partnerships (PPPs). The foundations are autonomous bodies funded through provincial transfers with the express aim of utilizing private, NGO and community schooling to expand access to quality education where the state cannot guarantee it. In Punjab and Sindh these foundations cater to an estimated 3 million children through a variety of programs. Primarily these consist of one of three approaches:

a. adopt-a-school programs (public schools managed by private organisations);

b. subsidies (Government sponsors out-of-school children to attend private/NGO institutions – through a per student subsidy), and;

c. vouchers (Government provides voucher to parents to enroll their child in a private institution of their choice in the neighborhood).

**Spotlight 3.4: Punjab Education Foundation (PEF)**\(^\text{174}\)

The largest and oldest Education Foundation in Pakistan, the PEF currently supports education for 2.5 million students, including the cost of fees and textbooks. Since 2004 it has been an autonomous body which receives block grants from the Punjab Government, totaling 4% of the province education budget in 2016.

Initially focused on encouraging the growth of private schools, The Punjab Education Foundation was established under the Punjab Education Foundation Act of 1991 as an autonomous statutory body to encourage and promote education on non-commercial/ non-profit basis. Initially it focused on providing financial support to private schools to build schools in areas without public provision.

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\(^\text{173}\) Source: The State of Education in Pakistan Factsheet, Alif Ailaan

\(^\text{174}\) [www.pef.edu.pk](http://www.pef.edu.pk)
However, now the majority of its funding goes to the Foundation Assisted Schools (FAS) program, a subsidy scheme which enables 1.77 million children to attend eligible private schools for free. In areas with high incidence of poverty subsidized schools are paid for every child enrolled (currently in all 36 districts). To further expand coverage, an additional voucher scheme was established to provide vouchers for the poorest children in areas where the FAS scheme is not operational. A third scheme encourages private actors to set up in areas where existing provision is insufficient.

Part of the public system. PEF schools take part in provincial assessments and students who attend them are considered part of the mainstream education system and are able to graduate and enter public education at higher levels. PEF schools are expected to use the approved curriculum and textbooks, although reports suggest this is not always the case. To promote quality education, PEF introduced the concept of continuous professional development in its partner schools by providing technical assistance in the form of trainings. It is not clear how effective this is.

Advocates argue PPPs allow government to focus efforts. Advocates of PPPs argue that such an approach allows the government (or independent agency) to focus on financing, regulating and quality assuring education, without the need for a large system devoted to service delivery. Schools are vetted in advance using strict criteria and continued registration as an eligible school is dependent on student outcomes. Subsidies and vouchers are targeted to the poorest areas and students. PEF has an independent monitoring and evaluation unit reporting directly to the Board of Directors.

However, the program is controversial. PEF has been criticized as privatization by stealth and evidence of the Punjab Government abdicating its mandate to provide high-quality, public schooling to all children. Union opposition focuses on the use of unqualified teachers in PEF-supported schools.

Results appear to show PEF is cost effective. An internal six-monthly assessment shows PEF schools outperforming public schools, at significantly lower cost per child. These results seem to be supported by the citizen-led ASER tests, which show minor improvements on the performance of public schools in Punjab.\(^{175}\)

Curriculum and educational materials

35. **Pakistan developed a national framework curriculum post decentralization.** The devolution of curriculum to Provincial level “raised national and global concerns for uniformity in curricula and standards... [Consequently, all] the federating units realized the need for creation of national forum to address these concerns constituted a national coordinating body called National Curriculum Council (NCC)... to steer and guide the development of curriculum in close collaboration and consultation with all the federating units to ensure minimum quality standards from Early Childhood Education to Grade XII.”\(^{176}\) The new national framework curriculum was approved in 2017.

36. **However, each province develops a provincial curriculum within the national framework.** This includes decisions regarding language of instruction, which differs across Pakistan.

37. **Textbook design and production is delegated to the provincial level, with each responsible for establishing a Textbook Board.** Provincial Textbook Boards will now be expected to work within the parameters established in recently developed Minimum National Standards for Quality Education. Prior to this there was no coordinating body/framework at the national level. Textbooks are provided free to all public schools in Punjab, Sindh, and KP.

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175 Sources: ASER Report (2016); Chief Minister’s Road Map Six Monthly Assessment Analysis
38. **Private schools and Deeni Madrassas do not necessarily follow official curriculum.** Despite 42% of children attending private schooling in the Punjab province, “only one-third of [private] schools are using textbooks from the Punjab Text Book Board”\(^\text{177}\). Nationwide, efforts to standardize and regulate the teaching of formal subjects in Madrassas have been largely unsuccessful\(^\text{178}\).

**Teachers contracting and performance management**

39. **Teacher contracting is centralized at the provincial level, while performance management happens within the district.** However, in the absence of established training and hiring standards, teacher hiring has long been problematic in Pakistan: “Political interference, nepotism, ghost teachers and non-transparent practices are frequent... cases still emerge in provinces like... Sindh where involvement of many stakeholders has caused excessive delays in hiring; and Balochistan where teachers with fake degrees have managed to enter the system.”\(^\text{179}\) Principals are appointed by the provincial government, or where delegated by district education offices.

40. **While teacher associations have around 400,000 members (60% of the total government workforce), their influence is limited.** The 17 teacher unions and associations have no automatic right to collective bargaining and provincial governments have been “selective (and often arbitrary) in their delegation of negotiating rights to teachers’ associations”\(^\text{180}\).

41. **Standards for teachers exist but are not implemented by provinces.** The 2009 National Education Plan has established standards for appointment: a bachelor’s degree in education for appointment as an elementary school teacher and master’s degree with B.Ed. for appointment as a secondary school teacher. However, the employment policies and practices of the provinces deviate from this and vary across provinces. Nonetheless, all provinces have now enacted a policy requiring all teachers to undergo a test from an external agent, the National Testing Services\(^\text{181}\). This policy does not apply to private and public-private-partnership schools, which predominantly hire unqualified teachers at extremely low salaries—less than half of the per capita GDP.

42. **Teacher professional development and initial teacher training are devolved to provincial governments.** While the broad capabilities are covered by the new standards, each province is responsible for developing and implementing its own teacher training curriculum and certifying teachers for practice. In Punjab, budget analysis shows that teacher training (both pre and in-service) was allocated 1.6% of the total provincial education budget\(^\text{182}\). Even in Punjab, where the situation is better, there is no mechanism in place to “address issues of untrained teachers, insufficient and irrelevant teacher education programmes, lacking operational standards for professional performance and professional development, inadequate service conditions and a clear lack of motivation among teachers.”\(^\text{183}\)

43. **Teacher performance management is usually delegated to district education offices.** Districts are responsible for teacher monitoring and recommending teacher transfers. Principals at the school are expected to manage teachers on a daily basis, although they are not able to hire, fire or effectively performance manage staff. Efforts being made to improve monitoring include the

\(^{177}\) The State of Education in Punjab Factsheet, Alif Ailaan

\(^{178}\) NEP, 2017

\(^{179}\) [http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0025/002595/259549e.pdf](http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0025/002595/259549e.pdf)

\(^{180}\) State of Teacher Unions, 2015, Alif Ailaan


\(^{182}\) Public Financing of Education in Pakistan- Analysis of Federal, Provincial and District Budgets 2010-11 to 2016-17, 2017, I-SAPS

\(^{183}\) [http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0025/002595/259549e.pdf](http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0025/002595/259549e.pdf)
Chapter 3: Country Case Study – Pakistan

KP Independent Monitoring Unit and the Punjab Programme Monitoring and Implementation Unit, dedicated to ensuring that data collection occurs monthly and captures information on teacher and student attendance, retention rates, infrastructure, and management.”\textsuperscript{184} Limited performance management of teachers is highlighted in NEP 2017 as a fundamental issue.

44. **Teacher accountability is low, although there are signs of improvement.** Ghost teachers are draining education resources, of which teaching makes up a dominant share. For example, in 2014 Sindh’s provincial government admitted that as many as 40\% of its schoolteachers are ghost employees.\textsuperscript{185} A variety of measures are being introduced to address this problem, including the introduction of a biometric verification system to record attendance of teachers, which has had positive results.\textsuperscript{186} Punjab brought down its absenteeism rate from 20 per cent in 2010 to six per cent by end of 2016 through the introduction of a systematic monitoring program.\textsuperscript{187}

**Monitoring and accountability for quality**

45. **Accountability for the quality of education, and thus monitoring its performance rests with provinces. However, accountability in the education sector is weak.** Locally elected politicians do not exert influence over policy or the quality for service delivery, creating a disconnect between the narrative of decentralization as a means for local ownership, and its reality in Pakistan. This is exacerbated by a lack of financial and human capacity amongst education departments and a bureaucratic and hierarchical performance management process open to issues of corruption and patronage.

46. **Provinces have developed a number of approaches to school monitoring including monitoring units; however, they have traditionally lacked the resources required to monitor effectively at the scale needed.** The Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Government has established the Independent Monitoring Unit (IMU) to oversee schools. This was in direct response to “minimal monitoring and accountability of service delivery agents for implementation integrity and performance; and… system capture by insiders and other special interest groups.”\textsuperscript{188} This system which is based on smartphone technology aims to provide monthly data on school-level indicators, including teacher attendance, to a central database for analysis and action by the Education Department.

47. **This reflects a wider trend in Pakistan to centralize monitoring at the Provincial level.** In Punjab, the Programme Monitoring and Implementation Unit is a parallel agency established to monitor schools which reports to the Education Secretary but sits outside the traditional departmental structure. At the district level new monitoring units are being established which report to neither the local authority, nor the local education office responsible for delivery.

48. **Provincial governments are required to collect data on the education system.** Sindh and Punjab have implemented monitoring systems, as part of an Open Government initiative which feeds into an education management information system (EMIS) that is open to the public\textsuperscript{189}. The National Education Management Information System housed within the MFEPT is responsible

\textsuperscript{184} http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0025/002595/259549e.pdf
\textsuperscript{185} https://www.dawn.com/news/1148388
\textsuperscript{186} https://www.dawn.com/news/1369505
\textsuperscript{187} https://epaper.dawn.com/DetailImage.php?StoryImage=12_07_2016_151_001
\textsuperscript{188} http://kpimu.gov.pk/background.php
\textsuperscript{189} http://open.punjab.gov.pk/schools/home/landing
for collating and aggregating this data for the purposes of national statistics and international reporting.

49. **Private school monitoring remains very limited.** “Despite the existence of some regulatory laws in Pakistan, private sector educational institutions have largely remained unregulated in the past with no mechanism for inspections, or quality assurance of facilities and services provided by the private institutions.”\(^{190}\) This excludes PPP schools, which are monitored by the relevant Education Foundation.

Assessing learning outcomes

50. **There is no national assessment or standardized examination in Pakistan.** Each Province determines its own leaning assessments. The Minimum National Standards for Quality Education include standards for assessment of learning outcomes, although this does not allow direct comparison of performance between provinces who each establish their own examinations. The Federal Government occasionally undertakes a sample-based National Achievement Testing in all provinces to help inform policy and planning.

51. **At secondary level 32 Boards of Intermediate and Secondary Education (BISEs) are responsible for administering examinations** at Matric (Grades 9/10) and Intermediate (Grades 11/12). BISE are accountable to the relevant province authority but are able to set examinations independently. An Inter Board Committee of Chairmen (consisting of Chairmen of Boards of Intermediate and Secondary Education) has been established at the national level to improve coordination.

52. **At primary school there is a more recent push towards assessing learning, although this is not yet fully established.** Punjab, Sindh and Balochistan have recently established examinations at the end of primary (Grade 5) and middle school (Grade 8) as well as the end of secondary school (grade 12). These are autonomous bodies in Punjab and Balochistan. KP is in the process of establishing and equivalent body.

53. **Civil Society Organizations play a key role in assessing learning levels.** In particular, the Annual Status of Education Report (ASER) tests students learning achievement annually through household surveys and publishes the findings. This acts as a key, and rare, element of public pressure on education managers and politicians.

Variation in learning outcome

54. **Learning outcomes are low across Pakistan with large variation by province.** According to a study by the NGO Alif Ailaan, “Students with eight years of schooling on average scored less than 50% in Urdu writing and mathematics.”\(^{191}\) With wide variation amongst provinces in relation to education expenditure, administrative capacity and level of development in aspects such as health and infrastructure there is significant variation in learning outcomes in Pakistan. **In the absence of significant financial resources at the Federal government for equity-enhancing policies these gaps in learning and provision are unlikely to be closed.**

\(^{190}\) [http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0025/002595/259549e.pdf](http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0025/002595/259549e.pdf)

\(^{191}\) The Quality of Education in Pakistan Factsheet, Alif Ailaan
### Table 3.4: Learning outcomes at Grade 4 and 8 by Province*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Grade 4 Average</th>
<th>Punjab</th>
<th>Sindh</th>
<th>Balochistan</th>
<th>KP</th>
<th>FATA</th>
<th>ICT</th>
<th>Pakistan</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Eng Reading</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eng Writing</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Science</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grade 8 Average</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urdu Reading</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urdu Writing</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maths</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Source: The Quality of Education in Pakistan: Alif Ailaan Factsheet

### Table 3.5: Roles and Responsibilities of Actors in Service Delivery

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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Access and infrastructure</td>
<td>Mandated to uphold right to education and international treaties</td>
<td>Mandated to ensure universal access. Undertake school building</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>Monitor access and undertake basic repairs</td>
<td>Keep records of enrolment and attendance</td>
<td>Education foundations provide grants to increase access</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Curriculum and educational materials</td>
<td>Responsible in federally administered areas</td>
<td>Develop provincial curriculum and regulate learning materials</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>Implementatio of provincial rules</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teachers contracting and performance management</td>
<td>Responsible in federally administered areas</td>
<td>Contracting managed at province. Highly centralized</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>Performance management of teacher</td>
<td>Head teacher manages school staff. Can report staff but no disciplinary power</td>
<td>NA192</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monitoring and accountability</td>
<td>Responsible in federally administered areas</td>
<td>Accountable for school quality. Increasingly centralized monitoring</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>Dependent on provincial structure</td>
<td>Keep records of enrolment and attendance</td>
<td>Education Foundations monitor grant-receiving schools</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assessing learning outcomes</td>
<td>Responsible in federally administered areas</td>
<td>Responsible for developing and administering assessments</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>Keep records of school-level assessments</td>
<td>BISEs set examinations at intermediate and secondary levels</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

192 Education Foundations provide grants to private schools through vouchers or subsidies but are not involved in direct contracting of teachers
Planning and Finance of Education

Despite efforts to decentralize policy and planning, the limited fiscal space of provinces limits the meaningful changes they can make to their education system...

Intergovernmental Transfers

55. Education, like the majority of public services in Pakistan, is mainly funded through intergovernmental block transfers determined by the National Finance Commission Award (NFC) and based on a predetermined formula to cover all provincial government expenditure, not on educational need. The NFC Award determines the percentage of national revenue that is allocated to each federating unit, including the Federal Government. The division between provinces is determined by a weighted formula which includes population, population density, poverty and revenue generation. Though the 7th NFC allocated a larger share of revenue (57.5%, up from 47.5%) to the four provinces to reflect increased responsibilities devolved in the 18th Amendment, this is not enough to compensate for their increased responsibility. To provide future guidance the 7th NFC was expected to cover five years (2010-15). In a sign of the complexity of negotiations involved the 7th NFC has been extended to cover the 2017-18 budget.

56. Despite a push to decentralize services, Pakistan has centralized tax services reducing provincial capacity to significantly influence their annual budget. Intergovernmental transfers account for an estimated 95% of provincial spending on education, with just 5% coming from other revenue sources. While provinces doubled the percentage of revenue they raised between 2010 and 2014, it was just 10% of the national total.

57. Provinces have failed to decentralize power to locally elected authorities and education funding remains within the Provincial structure. Funding is passed from the Provincial education department to district education offices which act as local administrative units. The money is not transferred to the local authority who may raise limited funds from permissible taxes, although this is insufficient to impact the education system beyond making limited grants around school building.

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193 Development Advocate Pakistan, Volume 2, Issue 1, 2015, UNDP
194 Can the New Intergovernmental Structure Work in Pakistan in the Presence of Governance Challenges? Learning from China, 2013, Ahmad
Provincial Education Expenditure

58. **Provinces are responsible for setting budgets, financing provincial projects and reforms and making appropriate transfers to districts for education service delivery.** The NEP 2017 suggests allocating 25% of total government expenditure to education, with 45-50% of provincial budget going to primary education and 30% of that to development spending. However, there is no requirement for provinces to spend a set percentage of government expenditure on education. The actual percentage varies from 17% in Balochistan to 24% in KP. Similarly, allocation of budget to sub-sectors is at the discretion of provinces: Punjab spends 39% on primary education and 47% on secondary education, while in Balochistan this is 32% and 34% respectively. Consequently, spending per pupil varies from Punjab (Rs. 18,087) to KP (Rs. 16,755). Data is not available for Sindh and Balochistan.

59. **Low education spending, the majority of which is dedicated to recurrent expenditure, limits the provincial ability to greatly impact education quality and innovation.** Numerous reports highlight the low level of funding for education in Pakistan. Despite provinces spending close to the 20% budget recommended by GPE, the low level of total funding available renders this figure moot in terms of ensuring quality and supporting reforms such as public private partnerships (PPPs). Compounding low spending on education, recurrent budgets, in particular salaries and related expenditures, consume the majority of provincial budgets. For example, Balochistan’s recurrent expenditure in education is 87%, 89% of which is salary expenditure.

60. **Development spending makes up a small percentage of total expenditure.** Development expenditure makes up between 8% of total expenditure on education, ranging from 5% (Punjab) and 22% (KP) in provincial budgets. This runs counter to the NEP 2017, which suggests 30% should be allocated to development spending. There is also a severe issue regarding utilization of development budget: just 23% of the allocated budget was used in Punjab in 2012-13. Limited development funding is responsible for the slow progress in solving Pakistan’s infrastructure shortage as well as the lack of teacher professional development offered.

Education Planning

61. **Education planning has also been decentralized to provinces, each of which develops its own plan.** Pakistan’s National Education Plan 2017 is a non-binding national plan based on consensus between the federating units in Pakistan. Ensuring free and compulsory education as mandated by the Constitution underlines all education planning in Pakistan, including the use of non-formal education and PPPs. Each province develops its own education plan based on its budget, which serves as the primary document determining the structure of the education system in its jurisdiction. The recently developed Minimum National Standards for Quality Education are an explicit attempt to ensure a degree of coordination and standardization across the provinces and federally administered territories.

62. **Ensuring equity in education remains a priority within NEP 2017 which is reflected in provincial plans.** In line with Article 25-A and the NEP, each provincial education sector plan includes sections focusing on equity; particularly inclusive/special education and non-formal schooling, as

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195 Public Financing of Education in Pakistan- Analysis of Federal, Provincial and District Budgets 2010-11 to 2016-17, 2017, I-SAPS
196 National Education Policy 2017, 2017, MFEPT
197 Public Financing of Education in Pakistan- Analysis of Federal, Provincial and District Budgets 2010-11 to 2016-17, 2017, I-SAPS
198 National Education Policy 2017, 2017, MFEPT
199 The Federal Government (MFEPT) is responsible for planning for federally-administered areas.
well as highlighting gender-specific issues and challenges. As highlighted, NFBE programs for out-of-school children exist at the Federal level, while Punjab’s Literacy and Non-Formal Basic Education Department manages over 10,000 non-formal schools catering to 355,000 children in the province.

63. District and school funding, and thus planning, is determined by provincial policies regarding fiscal transfers. These are usually provided as education-specific funds which cannot be redirected. Budget analysis shows that provinces retain around 50% of all grants received. School management committees are nominally the lowest unit for school planning and management, however due to unclear roles, limited ownership and training, and resistance from politicians and civil service to relinquish authority they play a limited role.

District and School Finance and Planning (focusing on Punjab case study)

64. Districts do not receive adequate funding to meet service delivery demands. In Punjab, decentralization of education administration has not been matched with fiscal decentralization. Districts are theoretically responsible for developing budgets, however, allocating is determined at the provincial level based on provincial budget and perceived need. Districts receive transfers from the School Education Department (PSED) and are then responsible for allocating funding based on agreed criteria. Given that the majority of funding is allocated to recurrent expenditure this leaves little fiscal space at the district level for innovation.

65. District planning is significantly constrained by provincial regulations as well as fiscal limitations. In Punjab, districts are mandated to deliver education following twelve sets of standards covering facilities, curriculum and school calendar. Further, organizational structures are determined by the province. For example, the PSED issued the Transitional Arrangements Under Punjab Local Govt. Act, 2013, which restructured the administration of education at the district level, including specific instructions on the structure, size and reporting lines of employees at district level.

66. School planning is largely done in the context of limited fiscal and regulatory space. School Management Committees in Punjab are expected to develop school improvement plans within their budget allocation, however their primary responsibility is to deliver education based on standards and policies developed at the provincial level and within their allocated budget. As a consequence, it is not unusual for fees in nominally free public schools to be levied.

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200 Interview with former World Bank Pakistan staff
201 https://www.pakistantoday.com.pk/2015/03/19/free-education-for-all-no/
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Revenue Generation</td>
<td>Generates revenue through national taxes</td>
<td>Able to raise limited revenue through provincial taxes</td>
<td>Dependent on provisional legislation – may be able to raise limited revenue through local taxes</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fiscal transfers</td>
<td>Makes transfers to provinces based on NFC Award</td>
<td>Make education-specific transfers to districts and Foundations based on own dispersal plans</td>
<td>Dependent on revenue generation may be able to provide limited grants to schools</td>
<td>Provide limited grants to schools based on provincial guidelines</td>
<td>Receive grants from district budget. Often delayed</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Financing - Expenditure</td>
<td>Finances federal plans and provision in federally-administered areas</td>
<td>Finances provincially administered projects</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>Use limited funding to purchase learning materials. Rarely spent due to concerns regarding audit&lt;sup&gt;202&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>Education Foundations spend grants from Federal/Provincial government on funding education through PPPs</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Borrowing and Aid</td>
<td>Able to borrow internationally and domestically and sign agreements with donors</td>
<td>Able to borrow internationally and domestically and sign agreements with donors</td>
<td>No mandate to borrow or sign agreements to receive international aid</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Planning</td>
<td>No constitutional mandate outside federally-administered areas</td>
<td>Exclusive mandate to develop education plans</td>
<td>No mandate</td>
<td>Required to submit budgets and plans to province</td>
<td>Develop school improvement plans</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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<sup>202</sup> Interview with former World Bank Pakistan staff
The Role of the International Community

67. Both federal and provincial governments are able to receive grants and agree loans with international development agencies. However, loans are still guaranteed by the Federal government (Economic Affairs Division) and loan agreements pass through the Ministry of Finance. Loan discussions primarily involve senior provincial ministers and are managed at the provincial level by planning and development departments. Consequently, education loans are agreed within a wider package of loans at the national and provincial level. Current large-scale reforms funded by loans from institutional donors exist in each province as outlined in table 3.7.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Donor(s)</th>
<th>Million US$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Federal Government</td>
<td>Tertiary Education Support Project</td>
<td>IDA</td>
<td>300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Punjab</td>
<td>Third Punjab Education Sector Project</td>
<td>IBRD/ DFID</td>
<td>300/ 150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sindh</td>
<td>Second Sindh Education Sector Project</td>
<td>IDA</td>
<td>400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Balochistan</td>
<td>Balochistan Education Project</td>
<td>GPE</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KP</td>
<td>KP Education Sector Programme</td>
<td>DFID/AUSAID</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

68. Donor funding has been catalytic when used to establish innovative projects. With limited development budgets, education departments at the provincial and federal level have utilized donor funds for system-level reforms such as the introduction of education management information systems (EMIS), school monitoring systems, and to implement PPPs through Education Foundations. Other donors have supported significant system capacity building efforts, notably USAID’s support for teacher education.

69. Donor support has played a key role in building provincial capacity. The decision to allow provincial governments to agree loans and grants directly with donors has allowed provinces to build capacity in their education departments. Alongside innovative system reform projects, donor funding has been heavily directed at strengthening government capacity\(^{203}\); however, there is limited evidence that this has supported further capacity building at the local level (see Spotlight 3.5). It is unclear the extent to which donors have exerted soft power in these negotiations to ensure/facilitate coordination and adherence to the NEP 2009, but it is feasible that this occurred.

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Donors in Pakistan have invested significant sums in capacity building plans. The approaches taken in Punjab and Sindh show two very different solutions to the issue of low levels of local capacity. However, both show how complex building local capacity is and neither can be taken as a model for effective reform.

The Punjab Education Roadmap is a much-vaunted reform initiative driven through a highly centralized delivery unit supported by donors. The Roadmap emphasizes accountability with high levels of oversight from the Chief Minister: poor performance by teachers and education managers is met with penalties including dismissal. The reform relies on the use of a special Monitoring Unit with consultants hired from the market, rather than employing new or existing civil servants. This ‘meritocratic’ hiring was seen as key to cutting through the nepotistic and un-accountable civil service system.

While this reform has been credited with gains in the education system it has had several unintended consequences in terms of both capacity building and sustainability. The Roadmap reacted to limited local capacity by creating a parallel infrastructure, undermining the existing system and deflecting new sources of funding away from local bodies and into the regional Monitoring Unit. Reports of conflicts between the Monitoring Unit teams and local education offices are common. Further, the reform effort is focused on short-term gains and is not sustainable: an initial upturn in school performance was based on fear of punishment, but with when the initiative ends (presumably when donor funding stops flowing) the underlying incentives and local capacity remain unchanged.

In contrast, in Sindh the pace of change has been far slower. Partly this is due to the preference in Sindh to underpin action and programming with policy and legislation. Under the donor-backed Reform Project II the Sindh Education Department created a central monitoring unit although there was less focus on punishment, with more attention to support through Local Support Units. However, these units were staffed from/by district and as a result they hired from the same pool and had identical capacity gaps.

Donor-backed reforms in Punjab and Sindh have seen a tendency to create implementation units which sit outside the traditional structure and report to either Chief Ministers or to the Education Secretary directly. These reforms can be seen then as reducing the push for further decentralization to locally-elected authorities.

70. The Sindh Digital School Monitoring System is being supported the World Bank, “to establish the first digital system in the education sector in Pakistan allows transparent and effective monitoring of staff, students and school infrastructure.” This is one component of the wider Second Sindh Education Sector Project which aims “to raise school participation by improving sector governance and accountability and strengthening administrative systems, and measure student achievement.” Similar EMIS projects are underway in Balochistan and KP with donor support.

71. Balochistan is expanding the reach of community schools with GPE support. Balochistan aims to build 725 community schools with Early Childhood Education (ECE) classes (as well as hiring 1710 female teachers) through the GPE-supported Balochistan Education Support Programme. These schools will be focused on areas underserved by the existing system, particularly those with low levels of female enrolment.

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204 Based on discussion with former World Bank consultant in Pakistan
207 http://www.gpeb.gob.pk/
72. PPPs, which provide targeted funding to low-income families and students, have been supported by donors. The largest PPP in Pakistan, the Punjab Education Foundation has been supported by the World Bank and DFID including most recently through the Third Punjab Education Sector Project. The Sindh PPP is being supported and expanded using DFID funding. This type of funding model may be relevant in the context of Somalia, in part due to the scale of non-state operators, but also when considering how to coordinate and employ donor funding in a fragile context with limited government capacity.

73. Donor coordination could be improved to reduce the risk of duplication and align better with government. Donor engagement in the education system is coordinated through provincial governments. According to a recent report by UNESCO, “bilateral and multi-lateral international organizations work very closely with the government of Pakistan and through their networks of implementing partners lead efforts to address the lingering gaps in education service delivery... however, sometimes there is duplication of effort and disconnect between donor funded programmes and government priorities.”

Key Findings

Establishing clear roles and responsibilities

74. Pakistan has developed into a system whereby de jure authority is highly devolved, but where all stakeholders have recognised the importance of coordination and assigned this role to the Federal government. The constitutional reform devolved all core education functions to the provinces and initially resulted in poorly defined roles, responsibilities, and oversight in the system. This occurred within a wider reform that explicitly aimed at curtailing federal powers. After an initial period of highly fractured approaches, the provincial education departments have increasingly coordinated their efforts through the federal ministry, leading to a number of major achievements in 2017 including a new draft National Education Plan, a unified National Curriculum Framework, and the development of an agreed set of National Standards for the first time in Pakistan’s history.

75. This power-sharing model and the redefined role of the Federal government has emerged through negotiations with and across the provinces. Clarity has been improving over time thanks to the efforts of multiple stakeholders, including especially provincial authorities. Specifically, provincial leaders agreed to the need for a common set of standards and jointly developed them, with the Federal Government playing the role of coordinating agent. Statutory bodies including the Inter-Provincial Education Ministers Conference appear to have played an important role in facilitating discussions. It should be noted that while the constitution devolved authority over education to provinces, the Federal Government and institutions such as the Supreme Court retained significant powers to coordinate national affairs and so education cannot be seen in isolation of wider power dynamics.

76. The Federal government has focused efforts since decentralization on standards and coordination. The Federal Government of Pakistan has played a key role in efforts to coordinate and

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208 http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0025/002595/259549e.pdf
standardize the education system by working to ensure that states adopt a common policy framework (curriculum, standards, planning) in the education sector.

77. Whether achieved through legislation or agreement, the experience of Pakistan shows that decentralization in the absence of coordination can lead to a proliferation of alternative approaches and the duplication of efforts by multiple provincial education departments.

Building provincial and local capacity

78. Weaknesses at provincial and district levels have impeded system improvement. When decentralization was initially introduced, provincial and district education planners and managers lacked the expertise to implement education policies and plans. For example, provinces have the responsibility for teacher contracting, preservice training, and in-service training. But even Punjab, the least disadvantaged province, has insufficient knowhow and mechanisms to address endemic teacher quality problems. And districts, which are responsible for teacher performance management, lack the tools and competencies to support teachers or hold them to account.

79. The need to deliver core functions without adequate technical and administrative capacity results in an inefficient use of limited resources. Shortages and inadequate capacity of school supervisory teams (district education officers) has resulted in irregular and low-quality delivery of instruction by teachers and support staff across schools, due to both financial constraints as well as politicized recruitment policies. This has been exacerbated by organizational conflicts inside the civil service: District Education Officers are civil servants who are paid by the provincial authority, not the district authorities, creating issues around line management and accountability.

80. Donor funding has played an important part in strengthening provincial and district-level education departments. In Pakistan, provinces are able to seek donor support for locally-developed education reform plans, including system and capacity strengthening. It’s not clear whether such funding has made an important contribution to ensuring that sub-national education plans are aligned to a national vision.

81. However, such an approach risks strengthening regional power at the expense of local government and civil servants. In Punjab and Sindh, the creation of parallel implementation and monitoring units undermines the incentive to meaningfully strengthen local education officers and relies on a parallel structure, by-passing the existing civil servants. The risk of such an approach is the concentration of power in strong regional authorities with local administrative arms that lack sufficient capacity, creating a system dependent on donor funding.

The role of the non-state sector

82. In the absence of formal schooling, Basic Education Community Schools (B ECS) have helped expand access. The centrally-managed BECS have proven to be a cost-effective way to expand access in areas with low enrolment such as Balochistan. With development partner support to both infrastructure costs and curriculum and standards, this has been achieved quicker and more cost effectively than through formal schooling.

83. Public private partnerships in education have contributed to a large expansion of schooling. The role of PPPs in expanding access to schooling in Pakistan is noteworthy. This has been done at

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significant scale (3 million children) in a limited time and at relatively low cost. Creating the right incentives to ensure private operators provide services in areas desired by the government has been complex but is being achieved. Donor support to these programs has been vital.

84. **Donor-supported “Education Foundations” have helped improve access and equity.** Subsidies and vouchers provided through World Bank or DFID-assisted “Education Foundations” have been targeted towards regions with low government supply and marginalized groups, such as girls, to address educational disparities in the country. These Foundations, now primarily government supported, are autonomous bodies set up with the express aim of utilizing private, NGO and community schooling to expand access to quality education where the state cannot guarantee it.

**Equity-enhancing funds and strengthening the central mandate**

85. **The Federal government has a small number of equity-enhancing projects funded directly which work across the country.** These projects, including BECS, not only serve an equity purpose, they also strengthen the central government’s mandate and authority within the system.

86. **Pro-poor projects have been funded in Pakistan without budgetary impact in the first instance.** In Pakistan, development partners, including the World Bank Group, have supported multi-donor trust funds to help address human development challenges in the poorest provinces, including Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa (KP) and Balochistan and through the central government. These funds have had the additional benefit of improving donor coordination in the provinces and reducing duplication.
Chapter 4: Country Case Study – South Africa

National Context

Despite significant progress since the end of Apartheid and its status as Africa’s richest nation, South Africa remains one of the most unequal countries in the world...

3. South Africa (SA) is an upper-middle-income country with a largely urbanized population of 56 million. From the end of Apartheid in 1994 to the start of the global financial crisis in 2007, South Africa achieved impressive and consistent economic growth matched with poverty reduction. In 2010, SA joined the BRICS (including Brazil, Russia, India, and China) as a leader in emerging markets.\(^{210}\) Between 2000 and 2011 the percentage of the population living on under $1 per day fell from 11.3% to 4%, while from 2002 to 2011 the percentage of people who reported experiencing hunger more than halved to 12.9%. Alongside growth in wages,\(^ {211}\) factors driving growth included social safety nets, decelerating inflationary pressure on households, the expansion of credit, and growth in formal housing.\(^ {212}\) South Africa has also seen a shift in demographics as a result of intense urbanization. As of 2014 urban areas accounted for 60% of population and nearly 80% of GDP.\(^ {213}\) In 2016, South Africa’s Gross National Income (GNI) per capita was $12,830.

4. **However, South Africa faces continuing social challenges, including poor healthcare outcomes and instability in poverty reduction.** Life expectancy at birth in South Africa is just 57.7 years on average, only two years more than in Somalia, due largely to high incidence of tuberculosis and HIV.\(^ {214}\) The fall in commodity prices and shocks from the financial crisis has contributed to the dip in South Africa’s economic growth and a stalling of efforts to reduce poverty.\(^ {215}\) Nearly 80% of South Africans experienced a period of poverty at least once between 2008 to 2015.\(^ {216}\) High levels of unemployment especially amongst black youths present a major challenge to citizens’ wellbeing, the economy, and peace. Combined with the country’s inability to effectively redistribute wealth since the end of Apartheid, South Africa remains one of the most unequal countries in the world based on nearly every measure\(^ {217}\) (see Spotlight 4.1). The result is that despite a relatively strong economy, South Africa only has a medium level of Human Development according to the UNDP HDI index – below Bolivia and Palestine which have ½ the GNI per capita.

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\(^ {210}\) Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa: the BRICS “represent the world’s emerging markets and act as a counterweight to the G8 and G20” [https://www.economist.com/blogs/economist-explains/2013/03/economist-explains-why-south-africa-brics](https://www.economist.com/blogs/economist-explains/2013/03/economist-explains-why-south-africa-brics)

\(^ {211}\) According to World Bank analysis, 58.3% of the poverty reduction between 2006 and 2015 was due to the labor income increase. [Overcoming Poverty and Inequality in South Africa, 2018, World Bank](http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/southafrica/overview#1)

\(^ {212}\) National Budget Review, 2014, National Treasury

\(^ {214}\) “South Africa’s adult mortality rate is still three times higher... than in middle income countries with similar income per capita.” (South Africa Country Partnership Strategy, 2014, World Bank)

\(^ {215}\) According to a recent report by the World Bank, at least 2.5 million more South Africans have fallen into poverty since 2011. [Overcoming Poverty and Inequality in South Africa, 2018, World Bank](http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/southafrica/overview#1)


Spotlight 4.1: Inequality in the ‘Rainbow Nation’

Despite strong economic growth since the end of Apartheid, more than half of the population currently lives below the national poverty line. “The chronically poor group is almost exclusively made up of black and coloured South Africans”\(^{218}\), while “women in South Africa are disproportionately affected by poverty: female-headed households have a 50 percent higher poverty rate than male-headed households, with rural women suffering more than their urban counterparts”\(^{219}\).

This is driven by high levels of wealth inequality. A study by the University of South Africa found that the top 1% of South Africans own 71% of the country’s wealth while the bottom 60% account for just 7%\(^{220}\). This in itself is closely tied to race: a white South African has a 69% higher probability of being in the top 60% of incomes compared to a black South African\(^{221}\).

Recently, the trajectory of poverty reduction has in fact worsened: “at least three million more South Africans slipped into poverty during this period ... Not only did poverty rates rise between 2011 and 2015, the level of poverty became deeper and more unequal.”\(^{222}\) Poverty remains concentrated in historically disadvantaged areas such as the former homelands which were utilized by Apartheid governments to separate and subjugate the majority black population\(^{223}\).

There is a strong relationship between education and the incidence and persistence of poverty. Of those who did not experience a single poverty spell, 93 percent lived in households where the household head had attained at least secondary schooling.\(^{224}\) Education for the poor under Apartheid had extremely low outcomes and remains a legacy of that period of South Africa’s history.

This is all despite concerted policy efforts to reverse the situation. The tax system is slightly progressive, and spending is highly progressive. In other words, the rich in South Africa bear the brunt of taxes, and the government effectively redirects these tax resources to the poorest in society to raise their incomes.\(^{225}\)

5. The 1994 Constitution of South Africa was developed as a result of negotiations ending the white-minority Apartheid regime, which saw the peaceful transition from one of the most repressive systems of government to full democracy for all citizens (see spotlight 4.2). The transition was hailed as one of the most significant political achievements in modern times.\(^{226}\) While peaceful, the transition was not harmonious or assured of success. It took four years to agree to the transitional constitution upon which the first free elections were held in 1994.\(^{227}\) The Constitution does not explicitly articulate the nature of the South African state (federal or otherwise). Nonetheless, it does set out the balance across three levels of government, akin to a federal model.

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\(^{218}\) Overcoming Poverty and Inequality in South Africa, 2018, World Bank

\(^{219}\) South Africa Country Partnership Strategy, 2014, World Bank


\(^{221}\) Overcoming Poverty and Inequality in South Africa, 2018, World Bank

\(^{222}\) Overcoming Poverty and Inequality in South Africa, 2018, World Bank

\(^{223}\) Overcoming Poverty and Inequality in South Africa, 2018, World Bank

\(^{224}\) South Africa Economic Update September 2017, 2017, World Bank

\(^{225}\) South Africa Economic Update November 2014, 2014, World Bank

\(^{226}\) "South Africa’s political transition took place in two stages: The political negotiations phase resulted in an interim constitution drafted by a multi-party forum (1993) which provided the rules for transitional government and constitution-making. The constitution-making phase (1994-1996) followed the country’s first democratic elections (1994) and saw an elected constitutional assembly draft the final constitution subject to a set of principles set out in the interim constitution.” (Transition to Cooperative Federalism, 2010, Powell)

\(^{227}\) Federalism and South Africa’s Democratic Bargain: The Zuma Challenge, Inman and Rubinfeld [https://www.law.berkeley.edu/files/Zuma.pdf](https://www.law.berkeley.edu/files/Zuma.pdf)
6. The Constitution established South Africa as a unitary republic with three spheres of government: national, provincial and local. The Constitution states that these spheres should not be seen as hierarchical but instead autonomous, distinctive, inter-related and inter-dependent. The Constitution also lays out the principals of cooperative government. There is a bicameral parliament at the national level, with single parliaments at provincial levels and local councils. Alongside this, the Judiciary is an independent body. **South Africa is thus a unitary state, but with many federal features.** The extent to which South Africa is federal remains a subject of debate in part reflecting the ongoing tension between center and provinces, and between minority and majority parties. The groups which supported maximum devolution of power and autonomy were those who had vested interests in maintaining elements of the Apartheid-era power structure.

7. The interim and final Constitutions were explicit peace-building documents. The Constitution created nine provincial governments whose boundaries were explicitly negotiated to assure that “the white (NP) and black (Inkatha) political minorities had control over public resources and policies in at least one province each.” In addition, they provided guarantees to the minority white elite that the resources and power accumulated through Apartheid would not be fully redistributed, which was an important factor that allowed negotiations to move forward.

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**Spotlight 4.2: Apartheid and its ongoing legacy**

**Apartheid** was “the Afrikaans name given by the white-rulled South Africa’s Nationalist Party in 1948 to the country’s harsh, institutionalized system of racial segregation,” which prevailed until the early 1990s. Under Apartheid, nonwhite South Africans who made up the majority of the population were forced to live in separate areas from whites while a series of land acts gave white South Africans ownership over 80% of the countries lands. Efforts to reduce contact between the two groups led the government to establish “separate public facilities for whites and non-whites, limited the activity of nonwhite labor unions and denied non-white participation in national government.” In education this resulted in the establishment of the Bantu school system (see Spotlight 4.3).

**The end of Apartheid was driven by a number of factors** including "years of violent internal protest, weakening white commitment, international economic and cultural sanctions, economic struggles, and the end of the Cold War."

**While the Apartheid era ended over 20 years ago, its impact is still being keenly felt in South Africa.** The structural inequalities in asset ownership, public service provision and housing, human capital and broader opportunities for advancement established under Apartheid remain a key factor in modern South Africa. This has been noted by numerous bodies including the National Planning Commission’s Diagnostic Report of the National Development Plan and a recent report on inequality by the World Bank, which refers to the “enduring legacy of Apartheid.”

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228 Federalism in South Africa: a Complex Context and Continued Challenges, 2016, Schwella
229 Federalism in South Africa: a Complex Context and Continued Challenges, 2016, Schwella
230 Federalism and South Africa’s Democratic Bargain: The Zuma Challenge, Inman and Rubinfeld
232 https://www.history.com/topics/apartheid
234 National Planning Commission: Diagnostic overview, 2011, NPC
235 Overcoming Poverty and Inequality in South Africa, 2018, World Bank
Table 4.1: Development and education statistics for South Africa\textsuperscript{236}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Development statistics</th>
<th>Selected education statistics</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>GDP, current US$ million</td>
<td>295,456.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP per capita, current US$</td>
<td>5274.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poverty Rate, % ($1.90/day)</td>
<td>16.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GINI Coefficient</td>
<td>63.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNDP HDI Index</td>
<td>119\textsuperscript{th}</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infant mortality rate (per 1,000 live births)</td>
<td>34.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maternal mortality ratio (per 100,000 live births)</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prevalence of stunting, height for age (% of children under 5)</td>
<td>23.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\textsuperscript{236} World Bank Statistics Database. All figures reported are 2016 or latest available data. Bank Database used for comparability across countries. Where these differ from national statistics used in report this is highlighted.

Education Overview

South Africa made huge progress in unifying the education system following Apartheid, however the powerful legacy of inequalities remains …

8. The South African education system consists of three phases: primary, secondary, and post-secondary, with a small private school sector. Learners spend an optional one to two years in early childhood development centers, with mandatory schooling starting in Grade R/0 of primary (the reception year). Students spend eight years in primary school, followed by five years in secondary school (grade 8-12), which should be completed by the time they reach age 18 (Table 4.2). Compulsory schooling ends at age 15. There are 30,000 schools in South Africa, enrolling over 12 million learners, 96% of whom attend public institutions.

Table 4.2: The official structure of schooling in South Africa\textsuperscript{237}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Phase</th>
<th>Grades covered</th>
<th>Official age</th>
<th>UNESCO level</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Primary</td>
<td>Grade R – Grade 6</td>
<td>5–12</td>
<td>Incomplete primary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Grade 7</td>
<td>12, 13</td>
<td>Primary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lower secondary</td>
<td>Grade 8</td>
<td>13, 14</td>
<td>Incomplete lower secondary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Grade 9</td>
<td>14, 15</td>
<td>Completed lower secondary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Upper secondary</td>
<td>Grade 10 – Grade 11</td>
<td>15–17</td>
<td>Incomplete upper secondary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Grade 12</td>
<td>17–18</td>
<td>Completed upper secondary</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\textsuperscript{237} Education series volume III: Educational enrolment and achievement, 2016, STATS SA
9. **Government spends 6% GDP on education, absorbing 19% of total government expenditure.** 63% of education spending is on primary and secondary education. The majority of expenditure is through provincial budgets and goes to salaries and benefits for administrators and teachers (65%). Since 1998 the poorest families are exempt from all fees (66% in 2013). However, in spite of Government commitment to education, and progressive funding allocation, the system is “one divided by wealth.”238 Schools receive a grant from the government which is based on the poverty of the children they serve, but are permitted to charge top up fees which creates a highly stratified system.

10. **The legacy of Apartheid in education is one of inequality of opportunity based on race and income.** According to Nic Spaull of University of Stellenbosch, “schools which served predominantly white students under apartheid remain functional, while those which served black students remain dysfunctional and unable to impart the necessary numeracy and literacy skills students should be acquiring by this level.”239 This finding is supported by the National Planning Commission’s Diagnostic Report of the National Development Plan, which finds that in the majority of schools with black learners, “the learner scores start off lower, and show relatively little improvement.”240

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**Spotlight 4.3: Bantu Education System**

The Bantu education system (1953-1994)241 was an explicit effort to subjugate the non-white population in South Africa through a low-quality education system and further widened inequalities between the groups. Under this system white and non-white children were taught in separate systems: one well-funded and focused on quality and cognitive development, the other poorly-funded and focused purely on building laborers and an easily manageable populace. The act banned the teaching of mathematics and Science and restricted the teaching of English.

The National Action Plan 2019 points out numerous legacies of the Bantu education system in modern South Africa, both in terms of spending and infrastructure and the quality of teachers. Spending per pupil in white schools was around five time higher than those serving minorities, the result of which is significantly poorer school buildings serving children of minority backgrounds. The Bantu system also led to separate training facilities and courses for white and non-white teachers, leading to a legacy of low capacity teachers for black communities.

The Bantu Education Act of 1953 set out to ensure that whites received a better education than blacks, who were, according to Hendrik Verwoerd, the future prime minister then in charge of education, to be educated only enough to be ‘hewers of wood and drawers of water’. Black pupils’ schools received about a fifth of the funding of their white peers’ schools. They were taught almost no math or science.

*(The Economist, January 2017)*

“One of Apartheid’s greatest crimes was the provision of substandard education to black people. Access to public education was limited and quality was poor.”

*(National Planning Commission, Diagnostic Overview, 2011)*

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238 South Africa has one of the world’s worst education systems, Economist, January 2017

239 [https://www.ekon.sun.ac.za/wpapers/2012/wp132012](https://www.ekon.sun.ac.za/wpapers/2012/wp132012)

240 National Planning Commission: Diagnostic overview, 2011, NPC

241 The Bantu Education Act, 1953 was repealed and replaced by the Education and Training Act, 1979 which continued the system. Although the system was being deconstructed from 1990 onwards, segregation in education was only formally made unconstitutional in 1994
11. South Africa has achieved gender parity in enrolment and there is now an attainment gap for boys. As early as 1996 the gender parity index in South Africa was 0.97, which is now 1. As Figure 4.1 shows, 17% more girls now matriculate than boys, a gap which widens at each level: 56% more women than men complete some form of undergraduate qualification.

Figure 4.1: The female-male education attainment gap increases at each level

12. While all provinces have achieved nearly universal enrolment at primary school, there is more variation at secondary and significantly more at Early Childhood Development (ECD). Enrolment at ECD243 (before formal schooling provided by the state begins) varies from just 24% in KwaZulu-Natal to 52% in both Free State and Gauteng. Interestingly, this is not clearly tied to wealth: while Gauteng and Western Cape are the wealthiest provinces and have relatively high ECD coverage, Limpopo is the eighth-poorest yet third-highest province by ECD enrolment.

242 The ‘Martha Effect’: The compounding female advantage in South African higher education, Stellenbosch Economic Working Papers, 2017, Broekhuizen and Spaull
243 ECD is defined as “The process of emotional, cognitive, sensory, spiritual, moral, physical and social and communication development of children from birth to school-going age. In South Africa this usually refers to the age group 0–6 years.” (Education series volume III: Educational enrolment and achievement, 2016, STATS SA)
Fig 4.2: Gross Enrolment Rate (GER) (%) by level, disaggregated by province

Spotlight 4.9: Exploring Provincial Variation

Table 4.4: Provincial rankings, spending and outcomes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Provincial rank order</th>
<th>GDP per capita245 (in thousands)</th>
<th>Spending per child in education246</th>
<th>2017 matric results</th>
<th>2016 MPAT results247</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Eastern Cape</td>
<td>Free State</td>
<td>Gauteng</td>
<td>KwaZulu-Natal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>9</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>8</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>8</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The table above ranks provinces by GDP per capita and spending per child alongside 2017 metric results. The table shows a number of features:

i. Firstly, spending per child is roughly aligned with GDP per capita, which indicates that spending inequalities in South Africa are driven by provincial wealth.

ii. Secondly, spending per child is not necessarily a proxy for outcomes – while the trend does hold in general, the Northern Cape has the highest per child spending and just the fifth best matriculation results. In contrast, Free State has the highest matriculation results (86%) despite only spending the 4th highest per child.

The final column shows the results of the 2016 Management Performance Assessment Tool (MPAT), an annual departmental assessment which measures management practices in national and provincial government departments. MPAT focuses on management practice in four key performance areas (KPAs): strategic management, governance and accountability, human resource management, and financial management. The results show that Free State performs highly on this test, while Northern Cape is middling. This suggests that while spending is a significant factor, provincial management capacity is key, something commented upon in the Action Plan 2019 and National Development Plan.

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244 Education series volume III: Educational enrolment and achievement, 2016, STATS SA
This is supported by the results of a natural experiment in Gauteng, another high performing province as measured by MPAT:

“Due to an unusual administrative change in 2005, some schools were reallocated to different provinces. This was due to the changes of provincial boundaries in 2005 to ensure that no municipality was split between two provinces. As a result of the re-drawing of the provincial boundaries, 158 high schools were effectively placed under new administrations. For example, 29 schools ‘moved’ from the north West (a traditionally underperforming province) into Gauteng (a traditionally better performing province). The researchers found that for those schools that ‘moved’ to a more functional province there were significant improvements in matric results within five years. As the researchers note ‘The school-level improvements ultimately brought about were considerable, about as large as one year of progress in a rapidly improving schooling system elsewhere in the world.’

The researchers note that Gauteng seems to have implemented a deliberate strategy of appointing top education officials on fixed-term (as opposed to permanent) contracts. In 2005 95% of the top-paid 100 public servants in Gauteng were on permanent contracts, but by 2014 this had dropped to 60%. This research shows the clear need to improve the province-level administration of underperforming provinces, notably the Eastern Cape and Limpopo.”

(Identifying Binding Constraints in Education, 2016, Van der Berg, Spaul, Wills, Gustafsson & Kotzé)

13. **Variation in enrolment by race continues to be substantial.** The high gross enrolment rates (GER) at both primary and secondary level are due to high numbers of repeaters and overage children amongst black students. White students are significantly more likely to attend ECD, a factor known to be critical importance to children’s later ability to learn.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Educational level</th>
<th>Black African</th>
<th>Coloured</th>
<th>Indian/Asian</th>
<th>White</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ECD</td>
<td>39.0</td>
<td>30.9</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary</td>
<td>124.3</td>
<td>115.1</td>
<td>115.9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secondary</td>
<td>112.1</td>
<td>82.8</td>
<td>85.9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post-secondary</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>4.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

14. **Completion is strongly influenced by income.** Figure 4.3 shows completion rates vary by 10% and 30% at grades 3 and 9, respectively, for the richest and poorest 20% of the population.

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248 Education series volume III: Educational enrolment and achievement, 2016, STATS SA
15. **The education system is highly inefficient and fails to produce an educated population.** Only 37% of children starting school go on to pass the matriculation exam, while just 4% earn a degree. While matriculation outcomes reflect a complex cross-section of factors (intake, grade transition rate, completion rate, and passing test rate), the system nonetheless fails to graduate the majority of students entering the system.

16. **International testing shows that many children in the system are failing to learn basic literacy and numeracy and shows South Africa performing badly by international standards.** The 2016 Progress in International Reading Literacy Study (PIRLS, an international comparison testing of reading proficiency) results show 78% of SA Grade 4 students cannot read for meaning, with South Africa 50th of 50 countries including other middle-income countries such as Iran, Chile and Morocco. As shown in Figure 4.4, there is an international mathematics test almost 90% of children were under the intermediate level where students can “apply basic mathematical knowledge in simple situations”.

17. **Attainment and graduation rates of black youth have soared since 1994.** Years of sustained government attention and investment in education have had a real impact on outputs even though learning outcomes are seriously lagging. In particular, black youth have higher educational attainment today than at any point in South Africa’s history. Between 1994 and 2014 the number of black graduates with degrees each year has more than quadrupled, from about 11,339 (in 1994) to 20,513 (in 2004) to 48,686 graduates (in 2014). Between 2004 and 2014, the number of black graduates increased by about 137 percent (compared to a 9 percent increase for whites, while the black population grew by only 16 percent).²⁵⁰

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²⁴⁹ South African Child Gauge 2017, 2017, Children’s Institute, University of Cape Town
Figure 4.4: South African performance in TIMSS relative to selected countries

Spotlight 4.4: Binding constraints in the system

A major EU-funded analysis undertaken by Stellenbosch University in 2015/16 cited a lack of accountability and a lack of capacity as the “root causes” of low outcomes in the system.

According to the report, four ‘binding constraints’ interact and hold back system performance:

1. **Weak institutional functionality.** “Given the decentralisation of educational powers to provinces in South Africa, and consequently that policy implementation is largely a provincial competency, the quality of policy implementation depends to a large extent on province-level functionality. The National Development Plan emphasised this point and stressed that the quality of provincial and local governance is uneven and too often of an unacceptably low standard.”

2. **Excessive union influence.** “The researchers identified five mechanisms through which undue union influences undermines the functionality of provinces and the learning outcomes of children. These are (1) Compromised post-provisioning processes and consequent overspending on teacher salaries, (2) Compromised design and implementation of accountability systems, (3) Compromised independence and accountability function of the South African Council of Educators, (4) Compromised bureaucratic accountability, and (5) Compromised levels of citizen trust in the public education sector.”

3. **Weak teacher content knowledge and pedagogical skill.** “A large body of local research has shown that many teachers lack basic levels of content knowledge and pedagogical skills... weak teacher knowledge creates a low ceiling which South Africa, as a country, cannot circumvent.”

4. **Wasted learning time and insufficient opportunity to learn (OTL).** “A number of South African studies have aimed to measure OTL and have frequently found that less than half of the official curriculum is being covered in the year and fewer than half of the officially scheduled lessons are actually taught.

Identifying Binding Constraints in Education, 2016, Van der Berg, Spaull, Wills, Gustafsson & Kotzé

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251 South Africa has one of the world’s worst education systems, Economist, January 2017
Politics, Policies, and Legislative Framework

Education policy-making is de jure a shared responsibility between national and provincial government although de facto much of the decision-making remains centralized…

Division of responsibilities across the three spheres

18. The Constitution differentiates functions between the three spheres of government. Some functions are exclusive to each sphere, while some are shared responsibilities (see Spotlight 4.5). Where responsibilities are shared (such as education) the national government is expected to set norms and standards in consultation with the provinces, while the provincial government is responsible for financing, planning and delivery. The primary planning document which guides policy in South Africa is the National Development Plan, which was recently revised.

19. Despite the formal delineation of roles and responsibilities, the lines are blurred in practice. According to the Treasury analysis in the 2014 Budget Review, “[i]n practice the lines of responsibility and accountability are often blurred.” This can lead to repetition, as well as the risk that no party feels responsible for system failure/Attempts to blame another. South Africa thus suffers from a problem of clearly defining roles and responsibilities, and the conflict between de jure and de facto powers: this has led to central government monopolizing control.

20. There are a number of coordinating mechanisms established by the Inter-Governmental Relations Framework Act, 2005. These are formal bodies for senior stakeholders in each government line Ministry to achieve collaborative decision-making in service delivery as envisioned in the Constitution. Nonetheless, despite efforts to establish statutory bodies to improve cooperation across provinces, co-ordination remains a challenge and service delivery suffers as a result, especially given the complexity of South Africa’s distribution of powers across multiple levels of government252. An example of how this manifests is matriculation (school leaving examinations) and university entrance. Each province sets their own matriculation examinations and have no incentive to align with other provinces. Indeed, there is controversy and competition between provinces with the Democratic Alliance (who control Western Cape) criticizing the ANC-run Free State for effectively gaming the system to improve results253. Universities are under the remit of the central government and thus have little incentive to align themselves with the provincial government matriculation examinations. This results in the duplication of work and a lack of portability and credibility in school completion certificates.

21. In practice the system is centrally controlled, with the central government as the ultimate power to overrule provincial and municipal authorities’ decisions and direct policy in a unitary manner.254 Fear of provincial control and a desire of the ANC towards a centralized state in 1994 ensured that in areas with shared responsibility between center and provinces, the national government retained “overall policy making and coordinating functions.”255 This allows the central government to compel provinces to accept central mandates in the national interest: further, the

252 Federalism in South Africa: a Complex Context and Continued Challenges, 2016, Schwella
https://www.hss.de/download/publications/Federalism_2016_06.pdf
254 Federalism in South Africa: a Complex Context and Continued Challenges, 2016, Schwella
https://www.hss.de/download/publications/Federalism_2016_06.pdf
255 Decentralisation in South Africa, 2006, Wittenberg in Decentralization and Local Governance in Developing Countries

82
central government has the power to take over management of services when it deems it necessary\textsuperscript{256}.

\begin{center}
\begin{tabular}{|l|}
\hline
\textbf{Spotlight 4.5: Distribution of responsibilities in South Africa} \\
\hline
\textbf{National government} has exclusive responsibility for macroeconomic policy, foreign affairs, trade, mining, justice, social benefits, public enterprises and defense; and also sets norms and standards for health, education, housing and infrastructure. \\
\textbf{Provincial governments} are responsible for economic affairs, tourism and share responsibility with national government for health, education, housing, transport, agriculture and policing. \\
\textbf{Local government} is responsible for basic service delivery. Poverty alleviation and redressing historical backlogs to engender greater equality are explicitly identified as principles of service delivery. \\
\textit{(Decentralisation: The South African Experience, 2015, Feinstein)} \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\end{center}

\textbf{Division of responsibilities in Education}

22. The Constitution states that education is a shared responsibility between central and provincial governments, however in reality the roles are separated between policy setting and implementation. The 1996 South Africa Schools Act gave significant powers to the national Minister of Education over policy setting and legislation (see Spotlight 4.8).

23. Consequently, the national government is primarily responsible for setting norms and standards, policies and legislation, while the provincial governments are responsible for service delivery and decision-making within the parameters established by the center. While provinces are constitutionally permitted to legislate regarding education “in practice, most provinces have chosen not to legislate in the education space, and even those that have, have not conflicted with the national legislation.”\textsuperscript{257a}

\begin{center}
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\hline
\textbf{Spotlight 4.6: Creating a National Department of Education} \\
\hline
Under Apartheid, 18 different education departments existed: 10 homelands, four racially-based departments, and four White-only departments representing the ‘white’ provinces\textsuperscript{258}.

With the proclamation of the new Constitution and the Bill of Rights, education became more prioritized in the new South Africa. Creating a single education system which united rather than separated ethnic groups was necessary.

Segregation in the education system was outlawed and the Bantu system repealed. The ANC government created a national Department of Education (now split into the Department of Basic Education (DBE) and

\textsuperscript{256} *Section 44.2 allows the Parliament to intervene in [exclusive Provisional areas]... when it is necessary to maintain national security, economic unity, essential national standards, to establish minimum standards and to prevent unreasonable action taken by a province which is prejudicial to the interests of another province or to the country as a whole. Similarly, the national executive may intervene in provincial administration... by issuing a directive to the provincial executive or assuming responsibility for a relevant obligation.* https://welections.wordpress.com/guide-to-the-2014-south-african-election/south-africas-political-system/

\textsuperscript{257a} Processes for Financing Public Basic Education in South Africa, 2017, Cornerstone Economic Research

Department of Higher Education and Training (DHET)) which had oversight of nine provincial education departments (PEDs).

Political economy and key actors

24. Politics is dominated by the ANC, limiting meaningful democratic pressure for change and accountability for outcomes. “The ruling African National Congress (ANC) has a majority of over 60% in the National Assembly, and as of 2018, governs in eight of the nine provinces. The majority of local councils are also controlled by the ANC.” Local and provincial ANC governments often adopt national policy despite their formal autonomy due to party loyalty, further centralizing policy-making in the country\(^{259}\).

25. Coordination in education happens through numerous statutory bodies including The Council of Education Ministers and The Head of Education Department’s Committee. These are high level bodies with the respective political and civil servant education leads for the national and provincial governments represented. There are also numerous bureaucratic committees at national and provincial level.

26. However, while the existence of these committees is mandated by legislation, their recommendations are non-binding: “while these committees do strive to reach consensus, the national government ultimately still has responsibility for the establishment of national norms and standards.”\(^{260}\) They thus serve primarily as a forum for dialogue and political negotiation between the central government and provinces, and between different provinces. This is both a constitutional and practical consideration: The Constitution compels all spheres of government to work together, while the central government knows that implementation will be smoother with broad buy-in and consensus, for example with the introduction of a new curriculum in 2009. Legislation ultimately preserves the central government’s ability to impose decisions as needed in the national interest.

Spotlight 4.7: Coordinating a decentralized system

The Council of Education Ministers (CEM) and The Head of Education Department’s Committee (HEDCOM) CEM and HEDCOM are important statutory bodies for coordination, consensus-building and discussion: the DBE Annual report highlights that the Draft Basic Education Laws Amendment Bill was approved by HEDCOM and the CEM before being finalized.

CEM comprises the nine Members of the Executive Council for Education (effectively the provincial minister of education and member of the cabinet of provincial governments) and the national Minister of Basic Education. HEDCOM is a parallel body for the Principal Education Secretary (chief education civil servant).

The CEM primarily serves as a high-level forum for discussion of key issues including presentation of annual performance results, discussions of legislative changes within the sector, and highlighting of pressing concerns at either the center or provincial level.

HEDCOM serves a more operational role as Heads of Department are the chief civil servants in education within their provinces. The HEDCOM structure includes a number of subcommittees which deal with many of the core responsibilities of the education departments and help ensure coordination and the pooling of

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\(^{259}\) Decentralisation: The South African Experience, 2015, Feinstein

\(^{260}\) Governance and Finance in the South African Schooling System, 2005, Motala and Pampallis

27. A recent Economist article claimed the strength of teachers’ unions was “central” to the failures within the education system. This view is supported by a report jointly-supported by the EU and the South African Presidency which sees undue union strength as one of four major constraints to better learning outcomes. According to a report by Stellenbosch University, The South African Democratic Teachers Union (SADTU) is closely aligned with the ruling ANC government and systematic nepotism between the ANC, education departments, SADTU and teachers is rife including promotions and protection from accountability.

28. Corruption is cited in all major studies, government reports, budgets and national plans. This includes acts of nepotism in appointments as well as examples of financial corruption including theft of public funds and embezzlement. Such acts of corruption erode public trust in government and public institutions.

Legislation and policy making primarily happens at the national level

29. The two main legislative Acts in South Africa are the South African Schools Act and the National Education Policy Act. These are themselves subservient to the Bill of Rights in the Constitution which establishes that, ‘Everyone has the right to a basic education, including adult basic education.’ The National Education Policy Act centralized a significant amount of power in the national Minister for Education (see Spotlight 4.8).

30. While education budgets are discretionary and provincial autonomy is protected by the Constitution, the central government uses norms and standards to influence the education landscape by effectively limiting space for provincial variation (see Section 4.4).

Spotlight 4.8: Centralized powers in South Africa in 1996

Two pieces of legislation passed in 1996 centralized significant powers in education and were significant in creating a more integrated and equitable national system of education.

The South Africa Schools Act was key to creating a standardized, equitable system. It outlined the responsibility of the state to fund education and what level of funding each province was required to provide per child (based on their income). It made provincial governments responsible for establishing and operating public schools, and mandated that every public school should have a governing body (and formulated the roles and responsibilities of the school governing bodies). The act also authorized public schools to charge school fees if the majority of parents agreed to fees.

The National Education Policy Act granted significant powers to the Minister of Education in determining the future shape of education policy in South Africa despite decentralization.

261 “South Africa has one of the world’s worst education systems,” The Economist, January 2017
262 Identifying Binding Constraints in Education, 2016, Van der Berg, Spaull, Wills, Gustafsson & Kotzé
“Subject to the Constitution, national policy shall prevail over the whole or a part of any provincial policy on education if there is a conflict between the national and provincial policies. The Minister shall determine national policy for the planning, provision, financing, co-ordination, management, governance, programmes, monitoring, evaluation and well-being of the education system and, without derogating from the generality of this section, may determine national policy for –

i. education management information systems, including the provision of data in accordance with the international obligations of the government;

ii. the organisation, management and governance of the national education system;

iii. facilities, finance and development plans for education, including advice to the Financial and Fiscal Commission;

iv. innovation, research and development in education;

v. the ratio between educators and students;

vi. the professional education and accreditation of educators;

vii. the organisation, management, governance, funding, establishment and registration of education institutions;

viii. compulsory school education;

ix. the admission of students to education institutions...;

x. the minimum number of hours per day and days per year...;

xi. co-ordination of the dates of school terms among provinces;

xii. curriculum frameworks, core syllabuses and education programmes, learning standards, examinations and the certification of qualifications...;

xiii. language in education;

xiv. control and discipline of students at education institutions...;

xv. education support services, including health, welfare, career and vocational development, counselling and guidance for education institutions...;

xvi. co-operation between the Department and - other state departments; provincial education departments; local government; and non-government organisations - with a view to advancing the national education policy...;

xvii. international relations in the field of education;

xviii. executive functions required to implement national education policy...”

(National Education Policy Act 1996)

Role of Provinces and District Offices

31. Under the Constitution, provinces have an obligation to fulfil basic rights and national legislation in education. Provinces must uphold the constitutional right to basic education and are accountable to citizens. Further, “where national legislation prescribes norms and standards for the delivery of basic education, provinces are required to provide the budget and put in place the administrative arrangements necessary to comply with the norms and standards. Failure to do so may result in the national executive intervening in the province.” This ruling restricts provincial flexibility and fiscal space for innovation.

32. The judiciary has played a key role in defining the role of the state in education. According to a judgement of the Constitutional Court, the provincial government acts through the Member of the Executive Council for Education “who bears the obligation to establish and provide public

schools, and together with the Head of the Provincial Department of Education exercises executive control over public schools through principals.\textsuperscript{265}

33. \textbf{Provincial governments make policies and pass legislation specific to their province within the parameters of national frameworks, norms and standards.} Primarily, “the provincial Departments of Education have the responsibility for establishing, managing and supporting schools and other pre-tertiary educational institutions in their province\textsuperscript{266} and thus policy and legislation is directed towards delivery, rather than challenging norms. On average provinces spent 47.1\% of the equitable share of annual provincial budget on education (see Section 4.4).

34. \textbf{District and circuit offices are the local administrative offices of provincial governments but have no independence and do not report to locally elected municipal governments.} Local governments have no responsibility for education in South Africa. According to a call for comments on the policy on the organization, roles and responsibilities of education districts, a “district office receives devolved management authority from a PED [Provincial Education Department] in the form of delegations, and is accountable to the PED for the execution of its functions.”\textsuperscript{267}

35. \textbf{Districts are the local implementation arm of PEDs.} They play no role in policy decision but are the administrative unit connecting the school and the provincial office. While the official role of districts will vary by provinces, the following roles and responsibilities are proposed by the DBE: planning, school support, oversight and accountability and public engagement\textsuperscript{268}.

The role of the School Governing Body

36. \textbf{As part of the efforts to expand democracy post-Apartheid the South African constitution commits to participatory democracy with public involvement.} In education this resulted in the establishment of school governing bodies (SGBs) with significant autonomies and powers. These include deciding policies relating to admission, language, religious practices and in some cases subject choices (within national and provincial frameworks and in accordance with the Constitution).

37. \textbf{While specific literature on their impact is sparse, there is suggestion that SGBs lack the training and capacity required to raise the quality of education.} In 2017 the chairperson of the National Association of School Governing Bodies was cited in a national newspaper as stating “SGBs need to be trained on the admission process and on how to safeguard our learners. SGBs are clueless on how they should be functioning at schools.” The chairperson highlighted the low levels of many SGB members themselves as a barrier to their effectiveness and that racial tensions in society spillover into SGBs\textsuperscript{269}. A 2011 DBE analysis found that just 48\% of schools had SGB that met the minimum standards required\textsuperscript{270}. According to a 2011 report for the National Planning


\textsuperscript{266} Governance and Finance in the South African Schooling System, 2005, Motala and Pampallis


\textsuperscript{267} http://pmg-assets.s3-west-1.amazonaws.com/doc/2012/120509eduction-organisationroles.pdf

\textsuperscript{268} https://www.education.gov.za/Informationfor/EducationDistricts.aspx


\textsuperscript{270} “(i) The SGB membership had to be correctly constituted; (ii) minutes for each SGB meeting; (iii) various policies for the school, as well as a constitution for the SGB, and audited financial statements for the previous year; (iv) the SGB must have met three or more times by the time the data for this project was collected.” (Report on the National School Monitoring Survey, 2013, DBE)
Commission on improving accountability in the system, “effective functioning of SGBs... is constrained by a lack of capacity amongst parents in many poor communities.”

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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Legislative change</td>
<td>Establish national laws and regulations</td>
<td>Establish provincial laws</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Policy formulation</td>
<td>Establish national policies and frameworks</td>
<td>Develop provincial policies</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>SGB plays a role in setting limited policies for school</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Service Delivery

Service delivery is the mandate of provincial governments, with district education offices functioning as administrative sub-units. Elected officials at the local district government do not have control over areas such as curriculum or teachers...

Access and infrastructure

38. **Expanding access to the majority black population is one of post-Apartheid South Africa’s signature achievements.** Between 1989 and 2014 enrolment rates at secondary school went from 62.7% to 98.8%, with the largest increases seen in black communities. Perhaps more significantly than the increases in enrolment was the conception of the right to education: many black children under Apartheid were enrolled in segregated Bantu schools which systematically discriminated against minorities. Creating an inclusive, non-racial system was achieved through broad political consensus (led by the new ANC government) and the prioritization of education by the executive and legislature. Expanding infrastructure and rebalancing education funding was key: “[i]n 1994, for every two rand spent on an African child [non-white], government spent about five rand on a white child; today, recurrent per capita public spending is higher for African than white children.”

39. **The government introduced a mandatory reception year in recognition of the importance of early childhood education (ECE) funded by the state but implemented by provinces through the formal schooling system.** This resulted in enrolment rates jumping from 22.5% in 1996 to 80.9% in 2007 and the numbers attending more than doubled between 2002 and 2015 as the graph below shows.

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271 Improving Education Quality in South Africa, 2011, Report for the National Planning Commission, University of Stellenbosch, van der Berg et al

272 National Planning Commission, Diagnostic Overview, 2011
40. Nonetheless, inequities in access remain before reception age: 70.2% of white children aged 3–4 attended ECD facilities compared to the national average of 36%\textsuperscript{274}. This disparity is partly explained by low quality according to analysis by the National Planning Commission which finds ECD for “black communities is inadequate and generally very poor. Early childhood development is underfunded by government” despite the importance of ECD provision to limit gaps in readiness for school\textsuperscript{275}.

41. A significant factor in expanding access at all levels was the introduction of a nutrition program using conditional grants. Malnutrition was (and remains) associated with poverty in South Africa and international evidence shows the long-term impacts of malnutrition on cognitive development along with numerous health challenges. The National Schools Nutrition Programme (NSNP) was introduced by Nelson Mandela in 1994 and was run until 2003 by the Department of Health before being transferred to DBE. NSNP was originally targeted at a limited number of students in the poorest primary schools but in 2004 was expanded significantly and by 2012 included secondary students\textsuperscript{276}. It currently reaches the majority of the schooling population, around 8 million children. This is delivered by provinces using conditional\textsuperscript{277} (non-transferable) grants allocated during the national budgeting process.

42. While one of the core roles of national government is to ensure that provinces uphold the constitutional right to basic education, the responsibility for ensuring access rests with provincial governments. A strong civil society and independent judiciary have been important factors in ensuring the government delivers on the promise of the right to education. Despite this, in 2011 just 47% of children were funded to the national minimum standard, which is dictated by the DBE based on income quintile:

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{attendance.png}
\caption{Attendance of pre-school 2002-2015\textsuperscript{273}}
\end{figure}

\textsuperscript{273} National Planning Commission, Diagnostic Overview, 2011
\textsuperscript{274} Education series volume III: Educational enrolment and achievement, 2016, STATS SA
\textsuperscript{275} National Planning Commission, Diagnostic Overview, 2011
\textsuperscript{276} Case Study of the National School Nutrition Programme in South Africa, 2013, DBE
\textsuperscript{277} The conditionality of these grants is in their use by the province, i.e. they must be used for their stated purpose and may not be transferred. The term does not denote conditions for the beneficiaries of the program
“The situation varied quite substantially for learners in the different income quintiles. Almost three-quarters (76 percent) of learners in Quintile 5 schools were funded at the minimum level. Only 37 percent of learners in Quintile 1 schools (the poorest schools), 42 percent of learners in Quintile 2 schools and 39 percent of learners in Quintile 3 schools were funded at the minimum level. Considering that the Quintile 1, 2 and 3 schools are non-fee schools and completely dependent on government funding, these figures are a serious concern”.

43. The Norms and Standards for School Infrastructure are referred to in the South Africa Schools Act. These norms, first drafted by the national DBE in 2008 and finalized in 2012 must be implemented by provincial governments. They were introduced in response to a perceived policy gap and subsequent lack of clarity for provinces. The funding for this comes through a combination of core provincial funding and conditional grants made by the government (10% of all conditional grants to provinces are for school infrastructure). Provincial budgets make up 80% of infrastructure funding, with the national government spending just 20% (see Spotlight 4.9).

44. There are large infrastructure gaps particularly in the poorest areas. With much of the allocated budget going to staffing this has led to a consistent underinvestment in infrastructure: in 2014 just 50% of schools complied with the national standards. The largest issues were in the Eastern Cape, KwaZulu-Natal and Mpumalanga, areas that have consistently suffered from a lack of access since the Apartheid era. Schools serving the poorest children were the most likely to lack basic infrastructure.

**Spotlight 4.10: The Accelerated Schools Infrastructure Delivery Initiative**

In addition to conditional grants and provincial budgets, when the national government deems a province unable to take on school building (or feels it has a competitive advantage), it may undertake the project itself and transfer the assets to the province upon completion – an indirect transfer.

The Accelerated Schools Infrastructure Delivery Initiative (ASIDI) started in 2012 and is focused on those schools needing complete replacement. By 2014 the project had completed construction of 49 schools, with a further 196 under construction. Upon completion, these schools are transferred as assets to the relevant provincial government.

45. While near-universal access has been assured, the expansion of the system has not been matched by resources to ensure quality. “In spite of the strides towards improvement of the school system in current era, many schools in South Africa do not have the required resources for effective teaching and learning. In terms of infrastructure and staffing, majority of schools in the townships and rural areas are still regarded as under resourced. More so, the school system is increasingly being confronted with social problems; poverty, unemployment, violence, child abuse and HIV/AIDS amongst others.”

Curriculum and educational materials

46. Curriculum standards are set at the central level with DBE developing Curriculum and Assessment Policy Statements (CAPS) for grades R-12. Provinces are expected to comply with the national

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278 Report on the National School Monitoring Survey, 2013, DBE
279 National Action Plan 2019
280 Accountability in the Education Section of South Africa, 2017, Global Education Monitoring Report
curriculum as established by the authorities reserved by the central government/Minister of Education. As the curriculum is tied closely to assessments (and thus perceptions of quality – see below) there is limited flexibility for straying from the curriculum at either the provincial or school level and it is closely followed. The curriculum has been criticized for being overly ambitious/unrealistic and not responsive enough to the actual learning levels of the majority of South Africans.\textsuperscript{281}

47. \textbf{Registered independent schools are expected to follow a recognized curriculum, however they may opt-out of the national curriculum.} Many choose to follow international curriculum including the British and American.

48. \textbf{South Africa has 11 official languages:} Afrikaans, English, IsiNdebele, IsiXhosa, IsiZulu, Northern Sotho, Sesotho, Setswana, SiSwati, Tshivenda and Xitsonga. The curriculum has been translated into these languages. Government policy states that students have the right to be educated in their (officially-recognized) home language when admitted to school. From grade 3, pupils are obliged to take another approved language in addition to their language of education. At secondary levels students are able to learn in one of the official languages as offered within their district/province. Given the importance of English in the labor market and as the common language of instruction at higher education the majority of students choose English even if it is not their first language.

49. \textbf{Based on pressure by civil society groups textbooks have now become a legally-enforceable right within the broader right to education in South Africa.}\textsuperscript{282} In 2012 the DBE was taken to court over the failure to provide new textbooks to students in schools in Limpopo province which reflected the new curriculum. The case was ultimately decided by the Supreme Court of Appeals who determined that it was the responsibility of the state (with DBE expected to provide sufficient funds for provinces to make purchases). Depending on local policy textbooks may be sourced and distributed by the province, district or school.

50. \textbf{Textbooks are purchased by provinces based on a list of pre-vetted books produced by the central government.} In 2011 the DBE determined there was a need to provide quality assurance on textbooks and reduced choice to increase economies of scale and facilitate teacher in-service training. These books are produced by private companies, not the DBE itself. Alongside this, the DBE introduced national workbooks, currently covering grades R–9 which are provided by the state. “This more interventionist role of the national department in the area of books was partly a response to insufficient access to textbooks in the classroom, and partly aimed at addressing the need for stronger signals relating to minimum learning requirements.”\textsuperscript{283}

\section*{Teachers contracting and performance management}

51. \textbf{Negotiations with the unions and salary setting occurs at the national level, while teachers are contracted at the provincial level.} School-level power over staff is limited: Principals and SGB do not have the power to dismiss teachers who fail to meet expected standards. Equally, SGB cannot dismiss Principals. The process for teacher complaints is often highly bureaucratic and takes time, essentially reducing the ‘stick’ approach to performance management.\textsuperscript{284}

\begin{footnotes}
\footnotetext{281} Identifying Binding Constraints in Education, 2016, Van der Berg, Spaull, Wills, Gustafsson & Kotzé


\footnotetext{283} National Action Plan 2019

\footnotetext{284} National Planning Commission: Diagnostic overview, 2011, NPC
\end{footnotes}
52. The lack of consequences for non-performance appears to have resulted in low levels of teacher efficiency and effectiveness. Aside from strike action (which consumes as much as 5% of school days according to the Diagnostic Overview of the National Planning Commission), teacher absenteeism is a significant efficiency concern in South Africa. A 2010 study by the Human Sciences Research Council found that “a conservative, optimistic leave rate of educators in South Africa is between 10% and 12%”285 while the national planning commission suggests that in any given month up to a third of teachers have been absent from school at least one day. The Action Plan 2019 highlights the low levels of capacity amongst some teachers but also references that many teachers produce lower outcomes than would be expected given their levels of training, implying a lack of effort.

53. Initial teacher training is provided in higher education institutions, which fall under the remit of the Department of Higher Education and Training (DHET). DHET certifies universities which provide teaching degrees; however, it is the DBE which approves qualifications to teach in public institutions and thus ultimately controls entry to the profession. The standards for teacher training are set by DBE at the national level through the Norms and Standards for Educators and National Policy Framework for Teacher Education and Development in South Africa which accredited institutions must follow. There are two routes into teaching – a BEd which includes one year’s classroom practice, or an initial degree in another subject followed by a post-graduate certificate. While standards for entry into teaching are designed to ensure a basic level of technical competency there are numerous reports of nepotism or clientism in teacher appointments which undermine efforts to create a high-quality workforce.

54. Standards for teacher and responsibility for coordinating continued professional development (CPD) rests with the South African Council for Educators (SACE). SACE is a national, independent body established by legislation and all teachers must register with them. SACE has developed a code of ethics as well as Professional Teaching Standards. The role of DBE (as laid out in the Action Plan 2019) is to support the work of SACE and to provide information for teachers on the availability of training.

55. Provinces are responsible for providing continued professional development based on the SACE framework but fail to do so in enough regularly and to the level of quality required. The latest Action Plan highlights the need for more training and a lack of capacity amongst the existing workforce. This is put more starkly in a UNICEF report: “[t]here is widespread recognition that many educators in South Africa lack the necessary skills and knowledge” yet spending on teacher development remains low.286 Teachers are expected to spend 80 hours per year on training based on national standards, however a DBE report on school monitoring showed that the average was around half this amount in 2011287.

56. The expansion of the system following the end of Apartheid led to a large number of teachers with qualifications below the national standard. As a result, in 2002 the government introduced the National Professional Diploma in Education (NPDE) to upgrade teachers’ qualifications and skills. An analysis of the program in 2010 by a group of academics found that while imperfect, the NPDE did increase efficacy amongst teachers288.

57. Unions have actively opposed efforts to increase teacher performance management and accountability. According to the Stellenbosch report union influence has compromised the

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285 Cited in Identifying Binding Constraints in Education, 2016, Van der Berg, Spaull, Wills, Gustafsson & Kotzé
286 Children and South Africa’s Education Budget, 2017, UNICEF
287 Report on the National School Monitoring Survey, 2013, DBE
independence of both SACE and bureaucratic accountability given the prevalence of union membership amongst senior civil servants at district, province and national level. Efforts to introduce teacher and principal testing have been met with opposition and significant lobbying. Given the size of the unions (75% of all teachers with SADTU alone accounting for 250,000 members) and their close historic association with ANC in fighting Apartheid, they wield a large degree of influence in policy making.\footnote{South Africa has one of the world’s worst education systems, Economist, January 2017}

**Monitoring and accountability for quality**

58. Weak accountability is widely cited as one of the key challenges facing the system: a multi-year analysis conducted by Stellenbosch University identified it as one of two core weaknesses undermining the system\footnote{Identifying Binding Constraints in Education, 2016, Van der Berg, Spaull, Wills, Gustafsson & Kotzé} (the other being low capacity). The National Development Plan and Action Plan 2019 highlight the importance of strengthening accountability in schools through increased monitoring and transparency in information.

59. Provinces are responsible for school monitoring and accountable for outcomes. Monitoring is done largely through district offices as a delegated responsibility. The DBE at the national level previously undertook annual school monitoring surveys, however the last survey appears to have been 2011. While the DBE commissions reports which look at the status of the system, it no longer undertakes a formal monitoring program. Instead it focuses on standards prescribed in the *Policy on the Organisation, Roles and Responsibilities of Education Districts*, 2013.

60. *Many of the weaknesses in schools are a reflection of weaknesses at the district level.*\footnote{National Development Plan 2030, 2012, National Planning Commission} District officials, as the local administrative arm of the provincial education departments, undertake school monitoring with a focus on supporting school improvement. The national standard set by DBE states that each school “must have received at least two visits from a district official for monitoring or support purposes during the year.” However, the above-mentioned report by Stellenbosch University found that 45%/61% of a random sample of primary/secondary school teachers had been monitored by a district official in 2011. In the same year, 34% of Principals judged the district support services as satisfactory.\footnote{Report on the National School Monitoring Survey, 2013, DBE}

61. There is no national inspection or monitoring framework: consequently, there is no national benchmark for what quality looks like. No standardized inspection framework exists across the country although some provinces have created inspection tools/frameworks within their territories. The Western Cape Education Department (WCED) for example has a province-level inspection tool, although due to resourcing constraints the frequency of inspection remains low. Due to union opposition it is not possible to implement unannounced spot checks.

**Assessing learning outcomes**

62. Matriculation examinations have traditionally served as the primary assessment of a child’s learning. The National Senior Certificate is awarded at the end of upper secondary. While the DBE establishes the broad expected learning levels each province has an examination board which develops examinations (there is also an Independent Examinations Board catering largely to private schools).

63. Since 2011 South Africa has introduced the standardized Annual National Assessments (ANA) which now cover all basic education grades. They are primarily designed “to assist teachers, parents and
school and district managers to understand their teaching and learning challenges better, and to identify what remedial steps to take”. They are an important tool for supporting provinces to measure learning outcomes and thus inform school and system improvement support. Standardization also allows a clearer national picture of actual learning levels relative to expected learning according to the curriculum.

**Spotlight 4.11: The Annual National Assessments**

The current Action Plan states that their introduction was “[p]erhaps the policy intervention that has shifted school management more than any other in recent years... There is much anecdotal evidence that ANA has made it easier for school principals to engage with teachers on the matter of education outcomes.

The limited standardisation in assessments that had existed in many schools before ANA had made it difficult for school principals to identify in which grades and subjects the largest problems were. ANA has assisted in highlighting which teachers require the greatest support, and which teachers might be suitable as mentors.”


64. **South Africa takes part in international benchmarking learning surveys including TIMSS (mathematics and science) and PIRLS (literacy) as well as being part of the Southern and Eastern Africa Consortium for Monitoring Educational Quality (SACMEQ).** While these examinations show South Africa’s learning levels are low (see Section 4.2) and often lead to intense national debate they serve as important benchmarks by which citizens, CSOs and the relevant departments of education can measure progress in the system.

**Variation in learning outcome**

65. **Learning outcomes are strongly correlated with factors such as wealth and location.** As the table shows, literacy rates are significantly lower amongst the poorest children and boys. Analysis of results by location show that the rural/urban divide masks more significant asymmetries: remote rural and township communities face special disadvantage compared to both urban, but also village communities.

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293 Due to limitations in national standardized data in South Africa, all results reported are based on sample testing (SACMEQ, prePIRLS, PIRLS, Trends in International Mathematics and Science Study)
Learning outcomes vary significantly by region with the wealthiest regions likely to perform more strongly. The graph below shows that Gauteng and Western Cape, the two richest provinces and homes to cities which drive significant economic growth, outperform the rest of the nation and do better than the national average. In contrast, poorer provinces (as measured by GDP per capita) such as Limpopo perform far below the national average.
### Table 4.6: Roles and Responsibilities of Actors in Service Delivery

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Access and infrastructure</strong></td>
<td>Establishes standards and provides conditional grants</td>
<td>Constitutionally responsible for ensuring access and builds and maintains infrastructure</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>SGB uses funds to pay for maintenance and local services</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Curriculum and educational materials</strong></td>
<td>Sets national curriculum and vets textbooks</td>
<td>Responsible for providing materials and required to follow curriculum</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>In some circumstances district purchases education materials on behalf of SGB</td>
<td>In some circumstances SGB uses funds for education materials</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Teachers contracting and performance management</strong></td>
<td>Negotiation and pay scale setting occurs nationally</td>
<td>Teachers are contracted by Provinces who are responsible for providing CPD</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>SGB can hire (and pay) additional teachers</td>
<td>Higher Education institutions provide initial training. SACE responsible for CPD.</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Monitoring and accountability</strong></td>
<td>No national inspection framework. Sets standards</td>
<td>Responsible for ensuring districts visit schools</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>Responsible for supervision and support of schools</td>
<td>Expected to keep records</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Assessing learning outcomes</strong></td>
<td>Sets ANA and enters into international testing</td>
<td>Examination Board sets matriculation test. Administers ANA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>Meant to support learning outcomes through supervision and support. Usually administer ANA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Planning and Finance of Education

Planning and financing of education in South Africa is largely devolved to provincial governments, with central government relying on a clear set of norms and standards to shape the sector…

Intergovernmental Transfers

67. **South Africa has a largely centralized tax administration, which then provides intergovernmental transfers according to an agreed national framework**. In the 2018 budget 48% of nationally raised funds are allocated to national government, 43% to provincial government and 9% to local government. In addition, provincial and local government are able to levy limited taxes, although this makes up just 5% of their total budget.

68. **Public basic education is largely funded by provinces from discretionary funds, the majority of which come from intergovernmental transfers**. The DBE accounts for 2-3% of education spending. Provisional funding for education includes a combination of provincial equitable share, provincial own revenues and national conditional grants to provinces (see Spotlight 4.12). Conditional grants make up just 5-7% of the total, with provincial equitable share and provincial own revenues making up around 90%. In addition, central government undertakes limited direct grants including infrastructure, although this remains small: 80% of infrastructure spending is Provincial.

69. While spending on conditional grants and DBE programming is low, it is an increasing component of the total education budget. The percentage allocated to these two categories tripled between 2005 and 2011, since when they have remained relatively steady.

70. **Aside from conditional grants, the majority of education spending is discretionary**. Provinces have de jure discretion over allocation of their provincial budgets across priorities and departments. “National and provincial government departments are required to prepare budgets following a prescribed budget template. During the provincial budget process, each province identifies their budget priorities and allocates their discretionary funds according to their chosen priorities.”

71. **However, the national government influences decisions through norms (such as the right to education, pupil-teacher ratios, and minimum spending per child) which “indirectly coerce” provincial expenditure by limiting fiscal space**. The negative consequence of this can be that provincial options for innovation and variation are limited: 79% of budget is absorbed by staff compensation.

72. **Budget monitoring is institutionalized in South Africa**. Provinces submit budgets to the national Department of Finance using a standardized template and process. Further, the “national Auditor-General has provincial offices and produces an annual report of the spending and performance of each Province for the relevant Provincial Legislature to consider.”

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297 Strong tax reforms have underpinned much of the successful state-building post Apartheid in South Africa. According to the World Bank’s Country Partnership Strategy, “Revenue collection quadrupled and the number of taxpayers more than doubled between 1996 and 2007. At the heart of the fiscal achievements were dramatic improvements in revenue collection by the South African Revenue Service (SARS) and disciplined spending choices.”

298 Budget Review, 2018, National Treasury RSA


302 Decentralisation: The South African Experience, 2015, Feinstein
Spotlight 4.12: Financing Public Services in South Africa

There are three main pots of funding available to provinces for service delivery in South Africa:

i. The provincial equitable share (80% of transfers) funds operating expenditure including the salaries of teachers and nurses as well as administration and basic service delivery needs. These are discretionary funds that can be allocated according to provincial rules and priority setting. The amount is established by the Finance Commission.

ii. Conditional grants (20% of transfers) cover specific costs including HIV, AIDS and tuberculosis treatment and the National School Nutrition Programme. These are grants allocated for specific purposes and cannot be repurposed.

iii. Own revenue makes up just 5% of provincial budgets. These are discretionary funds that can be allocated according to provincial priorities.

In addition, the central government may undertake direct and indirect financing/grants. In 2014 central government spending accounted for just 2.8% of the total education budget.

i. Direct financing can include projects managed directly by the center. In education this is focused on higher education spending.

ii. Indirect financing. This in-kind financing allows the central government to spend resources on behalf of the province as needed, including infrastructure projects to build assets that are then transferred to the province (such as the Schools Backlogs Infrastructure Grant). This can be for numerous reasons including due to efficiency savings or limited capacity at the provincial level. According to the Budget Review 2014 “Growth in indirect grants has accelerated markedly in recent years. This reflects government’s intention to ensure delivery takes place while it is developing more institutional capacity. As provinces and municipalities improve their ability to spend funds efficiently, indirect grants may be converted back to direct grants.”

Source: Budget Review 2018, National Treasury RSA

Provincial Education Expenditure and Planning

73. The national government establishes the overarching framework for education planning through the five-year Education Action Plan. Provincial governments are then responsible for developing their own five-year strategic plan and annual performance plans. According to the Action Plan “The DBE works hard at ensuring that the annual plans of the ten departments (the DBE and the nine provincial departments) are aligned to each other, to the Action Plan, and to the National Development Plan (NDP).”

74. The National Norms and Standards for School Funding (NNSSF) establishes the norms and standards for school funding in South Africa. It deals with i) public funding and ii) exemption of parents who are unable to pay fees. It also establishes the procedures by which resource allocations to schools are made to ensure equitable financing (i.e. within the total education budget which is discretionary).

75. Based on these norms and perceived political priorities, provincial allocation to education varies. As the column three in the table below shows, expenditure on education as a percentage of total equitable share available (total provincial budget) varies from 42.5% in Western Cape to 50.6% in Limpopo. However, given the number of children in these two states (9% and 13.7% respectively)
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the Western Cape actually spends a higher amount per learner, amounting to each Limpopo learner receiving 88% of what was spent in Western Cape.

Table 4.7: Actual provincial share and amounts allocated to education 2016/17

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>2016/17 PROVINCE AND (POVERTY RANKING)</th>
<th>TOTAL EQUITABLE SHARE ALLOCATION (R MILLION)</th>
<th>OF WHICH, ALLOCATED TO EDUCATION</th>
<th>% OF EQUITABLE SHARE ALLOCATED TO EDUCATION</th>
<th>SHARE OF TOTAL PROVINCE EDUCATION EXPENDITURE</th>
<th>SHARE OF LEARNERS INSIA</th>
<th>LEARNERS AS A % OF PROVINCE’S TOTAL POPULATION</th>
<th>EQUITABLE SHARE ALLOCATION TO EDUCATION PER LEARNER</th>
<th>2015 MATRIC PASS RATE RANKING</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Limpopo (1)</td>
<td>48 709</td>
<td>24 635</td>
<td>50.6% (1)</td>
<td>13.7%</td>
<td>12.7%</td>
<td>28.2% (2)</td>
<td>R14 058 (9)</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eastern Cape (2)</td>
<td>58 050</td>
<td>28 207</td>
<td>48.6% (2)</td>
<td>15.2%</td>
<td>14.6%</td>
<td>24.3% (5)</td>
<td>R14 473 (8)</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North West (3)</td>
<td>28 062</td>
<td>12 624</td>
<td>45.7% (7)</td>
<td>6.4%</td>
<td>6.6%</td>
<td>17.0% (9)</td>
<td>R15 771 (4)</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mpumulanga (4)</td>
<td>33 450</td>
<td>16 234</td>
<td>48.5% (3)</td>
<td>8.4%</td>
<td>8.4%</td>
<td>26.3% (3)</td>
<td>R15 058 (6)</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KwaZulu-Natal (5)</td>
<td>87 898</td>
<td>41 505</td>
<td>47.7% (4)</td>
<td>22.5%</td>
<td>21.6%</td>
<td>30.6% (1)</td>
<td>R14 575 (7)</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Free State (6)</td>
<td>22 995</td>
<td>10 693</td>
<td>46.5% (5)</td>
<td>5.3%</td>
<td>5.5%</td>
<td>25.1% (4)</td>
<td>R15 695 (5)</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northern Cape (7)</td>
<td>10 863</td>
<td>4 769</td>
<td>43.9% (8)</td>
<td>2.3%</td>
<td>2.5%</td>
<td>24.7% (6)</td>
<td>R16 488 (1)</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gauteng (8)</td>
<td>79 600</td>
<td>35 857</td>
<td>46.3% (6)</td>
<td>17.6%</td>
<td>19.0%</td>
<td>21.9% (7)</td>
<td>R16 400 (2)</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western Cape (9)</td>
<td>41 062</td>
<td>17 455</td>
<td>42.5% (9)</td>
<td>8.6%</td>
<td>9.0%</td>
<td>17.7% (8)</td>
<td>R15 944 (3)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total / average</td>
<td>410 699</td>
<td>193 580</td>
<td>47.1% (1)</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>23.3%</td>
<td>R15 148</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

76. Provinces can top-up government funding as deemed necessary and possible based on available budget. The tradeoffs to top-ups are apparent in South Africa. It increases funding to education but also plays a role in maintaining the gap between the education funding per child in the richest and poorest provinces.

77. Subsidies to private schools are at the discretion of provincial governments although the DBE has established maximum funding guidelines. Around 4% of students attend private school in South Africa. Subsidies are not allowed to exceed 60% of the amount given to public schools, and the level of subsidy decreases as school fees rise. Schools which charge 2.5 times the government fees receive no subsidy.

78. Compensation of employees in provincial education departments accounts for an average 77.3% of the basic education sector expenditure and 79% of total provincial education budgets.

School Fees in the Public System

79. Public schools in South Africa charge tuition fees to supplement state funds. Fee levels are determined by the SGB within parameters set by the DBE based on the income level of the community served by the school. Schools in the highest banding are able to charge fees and consequently receive lower levels of state funding (USD $17 for the schools serving the richest vs $97 for those serving the poorest) for schools serving the poorest. In addition to these tuition fees numerous other fees exist including for uniforms. Families from the bottom three quintiles (roughly 60% of children) are exempt from all fees. This system of fees has been widely criticized

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for entrenching segregation and social segregation within the education system (see Spotlight 4.13).

**80. In addition, schools serving the bottom three quintiles are fee free. In these schools no fee is permitted although contributions are allowed.** These schools primarily fund schools in areas serving the poorest. A list of no-fee schools is published annually by DBE and provincial departments.

**Spotlight 4.13: Pro-poor Financing?**

On paper, the school financing system in South Africa represents best practice: the state provides the highest per-pupil subsidy for the poorest communities and charges top-up fees from those most able to pay.

However, the reality is somewhat different. Firstly, Government analysis however shows that many of the fee-free schools serving the poorest are funded below the minimum threshold and are of low quality.

Secondly, as table 4.7 shows, the actual spending per student varies by province and is higher in richer states with larger overall budgets and a smaller share of the student population. In the absence of significant DBE funding to correct these inequalities the system is unlikely to change.

Lastly, schools in richer areas have access to significantly greater funds than those in poorer areas despite government pro-poor financing. Equally concerning, it effectively prohibits children from poorer backgrounds attending institutions with higher fees. Despite quotas and fee exemptions these schools remain the preserve of the privileged, predominantly white communities.

**School participation in planning and budgeting (case study of Gauteng Province)**

**81. Schools are expected to prepare a budget and school improvement plan each year based on their allocation from the provincial budget** (determined by student numbers). DBE records show that in 2011, 88% of schools nationally had school improvement plans. In fee-charging schools, the SGB is also responsible for collecting, managing and disbursing all school fees.

**82. In Gauteng the provincial education department (PED) details the use of these funds as follows:**

i. Learning, teaching and support materials (50%; 70% of which must be spent on textbooks)

ii. Services including payments for municipal services (38%)

iii. Maintenance (12%)

The percentage allocations can only be modified with the written authorization of the District Officer. This differs from the Western Cape where expenditure guidelines provide suggestions, and do not set fixed percentages.

**83. Autonomy over budget is linked to the responsibility level of the SGB.** Section 21 schools (those with greater responsibilities given to SGBs) are expected to develop budgets and spend against them using funds transferred to them by the District Education Office. For section 20 schools (those with less responsibilities), the District Office will develop a budget and allocate but withhold funds, which they will then spend against the budget (see spotlight 4.14).

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Spotlight 4.14: Roles of SGBs and Levels of Responsibility

The Constitutional focus on participatory democracy manifests in education in the form of SGBs which are expected to play a key role in school management and accountability.

The SGB consists of:
- the school principal
- elected representatives (parents, educators, other staff members, and learners in grade 8 or above)
- optional co-opted members who do not have the right to vote (for example, members of the community, or the owner of the school property).

The SGB must:
- Adopt a constitution setting out how the SGB will operate.
- Adopt a school mission statement setting out the values and beliefs of the school.
- Decide the times of the school day.
- Administer the school's property, buildings and grounds.
- Make recommendations regarding the appointment of educators at the school.

In addition, a governing body can be given any of these functions [by the Provincial Minister]:
- maintaining and improving the school's property, buildings and grounds
- deciding on the extramural curriculum and the choice of subject options according to provincial curriculum policy
- buying textbooks, educational material and/or equipment for the school
- paying for services to the school.


Schools given extra responsibilities are classified as Section 21 schools. The distinction between section 20 and 21 schools is the perceived level of capacity.

Those SGBs deemed to have sufficient capacity to manage finances can be delegated these authorities by the provincial minister. However, it is unclear that classification as a Section 21 school is closely aligned to any formal assessment of capacity: The Northern Cape Province for example has classified all schools as Section 21.

Those schools deemed to lack sufficient management capacity, Section 20 schools, will have their budget managed by the District Education Office.
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Table 4.8: Roles and Responsibilities of Actors in Planning and Finance of Education

<table>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Revenue Generation</td>
<td>Generates revenue through national taxes</td>
<td>Able to raise limited revenue through provincial taxes</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>Fees levied in some schools</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fiscal transfers</td>
<td>Makes transfers to provinces based on agreed formula</td>
<td>Make transfers to districts to provide services</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>Transfers to school dependent on provincial policy</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Financing - Expenditure</td>
<td>Finances national plans and direct and indirect financing</td>
<td>Finances service delivery</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>Uses grants from provincial grants to fund service delivery</td>
<td>Spend against school budget (materials, municipal services, maintenance)</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Borrowing and Aid</td>
<td>Able to borrow internationally and domestically and sign agreements with donors</td>
<td>Able to borrow internationally and domestically and sign agreements with donors</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Planning</td>
<td>Develops National Action Plan</td>
<td>Develops provincial plans within national framework</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>Required to submit budgets and plans to province</td>
<td>Develop school improvement plan</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Role of the International Community

84. According to the National Treasury guidelines for official development aid two core principals exist:
   
   i. The three tiers of government have the right to attract, plan and use ODA, in accordance with their own strategic priorities taking into account the basic tenets of the overall government policies, plans and priorities, and
   
   ii. ODA must be aligned to overall national strategic policies which means that any ODA intervention must be designed to support the overall government policies as stipulated in

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the Medium Term Strategic Framework, MTSF and should address the government programme of action.

85. However, there are no guidelines as to how these principles should be applied in practice. “While the national government has the overall responsibility for ODA management, provincial and local governments have the right to establish their own ODA policies and structures, and to pursue their own ODA practices within the broad national policy framework and guidelines... [While] contracts need [central] government approval, and are checked for compliance with domestic and international law and compatibility with the department of finance guidelines... Contracts are signed by the finance minister or the relevant departmental minister... In summary, donors have a relatively high level of discretion because the central government does not act as a gatekeeper and they can negotiate with municipalities directly.”

86. During the Apartheid era, most foreign government cut ties with South Africa, consequently the new ANC government in 1994 had to rebuild without an established donor network. In 1990 total ODA was just USD $270 million, rising to $486 million by 2000. At this point it still accounted for just 0.4% GNI or $11 per South African. The World Bank’s first major infrastructure investment for example came in 2010, after a 25 year pause in partnership during Apartheid.

87. According to the World Bank Country Partnership Framework South Africa’s success in mobilizing its own revenues has reduced the demand for, and supply of, external financing. Instead, donors “are focused on aligning their programs with those of the Government. Government officials often assess the transaction costs of dealing with individual donors as too high compared with the limited benefits.” Whether limited reliance has led directly to better coordination and alignment is unclear but South Africa represents an example of a government-driven aid flows.

88. ODA remains a limited factor at just 1.2% of the education budget and roughly the same of total national budget. Further, the vast majority is allocated to higher education: “DBE records a total of R0.3 million in donor funding in 2016/17, as against nearly 1,000 times as much – R314.5 million – for the DHET.” The only significant education project funded by donors is the EU-supported Primary Education Sector Policy Support Programme which is €123 million annually to support improvements in primary outcomes.

Key Findings

Establishing effective governance of the education system across the provinces.

89. To guarantee education for all, the legislature created a national education department in 1996 by integrating and assimilating 18 separate, divided, and unequal departments of education. This integration was legislated to enforce the Constitutional principles of the universal right to education and equity in education provision. Simultaneously, to ensure a balanced governing structure, the legislature established 9 parallel provincial education departments which among other objectives re-balanced the distribution of races across jurisdictions. These steps

310 2013
311 Children and South Africa’s Education Budget, 2017, UNICEF
represented very significant accomplishments that created a new political foundation for the governance of education.

90. To oversee the effective establishment of an integrated national education system, the legislature granted significant powers to the Minister of Education. The legislature inscribed in law the policy, regulatory, and monitoring responsibilities of the Minister of Education. It also determined that national policy would prevail in case of any conflict between national and provincial policies.

91. To help the provinces and center cooperate with one another and collaborate the law established a Council of Education Ministers, although this is dominated by the national government. This inter-governmental council, composed of the national and the provincial education ministers, provides the forum to formulate, *inter alia*, curriculum, assessment, and education quality assurance. However, as national legislation is binding on sub-national governments and decisions made at the Council are non-binding it is effectively dominated by the national government. Empowering this body to issue binding agreements would increase the incentives for the national government to reach consensus and somewhat redistribute the balance of power towards the provinces.

92. To enable participatory democracy and a sense of ownership in every school, the legislature requires that each and every public school has a school-governing body. This statutory body consists of parents, educators, non-teaching staff, and students (in secondary schools). The school governing body has significant autonomies and powers, including deciding school practices related to admission, levying of school fees, language of instruction, religious practices and in some cases subject choices. However, lack of training and support has meant that they are unable to play this role effectively.

The risk of inequality in a decentralized system

93. Minimum funding requirements and pro-poor financing rules have not succeeded in reducing the large variation in provincial education budgets. As provincial budgets are discretionary there is an inevitable variation in allocation to education. However, this is exacerbated by the legacy of weak infrastructure and human development in some provinces, as well as the large numbers of students in poorer provinces.

94. The use of school top-up fees paid by parents has exacerbated existing inequalities. Initially designed to supplement a stretched national budget, the result of top-up tuition fees being levied by School Governance Boards is a highly stratified education system in which inequality is measured not between the public and private systems, but instead across schools within the public system.

Support for low-capacity provinces

95. Raising the administrative capacity of a province in South Africa enables it to boost the quality of poorly performing schools under its responsibility. One clear measure used to improve provincial administrative capacity in South Africa’s Gauteng Province was to make sure the technical leadership positions were set up as fixed-term positions as opposed to open-ended, permanent staff positions. This province, however, is the exception rather than the rule.

96. Grants from the national government to support low-capacity provinces are becoming more and more significant. Alongside conditional grants which are passed directly to provinces, the national government has increased its use of indirect grants, whereby the government directly undertakes an activity when the province is unable to do so. This has proven attractive given the disparity in provincial capacity in South Africa.
97. The Department of Basic Education has used conditional grants to provinces to improve infrastructure and child welfare. Alongside the percentage spent by Provinces from discretionary funds the government uses conditional grants to improve education infrastructure and child nutrition in schools. While this makes up only 5-7% of the education budget, it allows the central government to finance equity-focused programs directly.

98. Despite its small contribution to funding provincial education (5%-7%), these national government funds play a disproportionately large role in funding innovation and special projects. This is because the provinces have very limited fiscal space -- 79% of their budgets are absorbed by staff salaries and benefits.

Financing national priorities in a decentralized system

99. The national government utilizes its authority for standard-setting and establishing uniform delivery norms to influence provincial education budgeting and ultimately service provision. Provinces are required to fulfill these legislated service delivery obligations even though the planning, budgeting, and lion’s share of financing for education services is the responsibility of the province (approximately 90%) and any direct interference by the national government in the provincial budgeting process would be unconstitutional.

100. Funding and service provision inequalities are also being addressed by the national government’s pro-poor financing rules. Alongside the above examples of redistributive policies, the use of exemption rules and pro-poor funding formulas have been significant in increasing enrolment amongst the poorest South Africans. Central rules and policies regarding exemptions from fees and the use of poverty weighting in provincial and school-level grants have helped redress the imbalances in the system.

National schemes to target the poorest

101. A significant factor in expanding school enrolment has been a nationwide school feeding initiative implemented by provinces and in many provinces delivered by School Governance Bodies. Introduced by Nelson Mandela in 1995 as the National School Nutrition Programme, the initiative today serves mid-morning school meals to over 8 million children. Funding for the program is transferred from the center to the provinces via conditional grants (which are non-fungible). Provinces and SGBs implement the program. In 2016, the World Bank found that the initiative contributes to both increased school enrolment and improved health outcomes for poor children.

102. The national government established a special “Accelerated Schools Infrastructure Delivery Initiative to address an urgent infrastructure gap by building new schools on behalf of poor provinces, and then transferring the completed schools to these provinces. The accelerated programme was launched in 2012 as a complement to the ongoing norms and standards for school infrastructure policy which stipulates that responsibility for school infrastructure rests with the provinces. These norms had not succeeded in addressing infrastructure gaps in poor and low capacity provinces due to provincial budget pressure for staffing and implementation challenges.

103. The expansion of South Africa’s education system following the end of Apartheid led to a large number of teachers with sub-standard qualifications. In 2002 the national government introduced a program to upgrade teachers’ qualifications and skills. An analysis of the programme in 2010 by a group of academics found that while imperfect, the programme did increase efficacy amongst teachers.

National standardization and quality control
104. The national department of education exercises quality assurance through curriculum and assessment standards. Provincial education departments are functionally independent of the national department of education. Nonetheless, the national department has the mandate to quality assure provincial education services. In the absence of a fully-functioning inspection and monitoring system at the central level, the government has been able to use standardized curriculum and standardized assessments to quality assure the system.

105. The first post-Apartheid government recognized the importance of curriculum early. At the heart of efforts to reform the inequalities of Apartheid was the push for a unified national curriculum which would replace the 18 separate curriculums. The government continues to revise the curriculum: it is primarily through the priority given to curriculum adherence in monitoring and reporting that the national department of education is able to standardize education delivery across the nine provincial education departments.

106. In 2011, the national department of education stepped in to take over textbook quality control and procurement. This more interventionist role of the national department in the area of books was a response to insufficient access to textbooks in many schools, a determination to reduce variation in titles and textbook quality, an interest in sending stronger signals relating to minimum learning requirements, and a desire to increase economies of scale.

107. The introduction of standardized assessments was an explicit effort to increase accountability in the system. The ANA provides a standardized measure of quality that allows all stakeholders (national and provincial government, unions, teachers, parents, CSOs) to compare the relative quality of schools and regions. These tests, based on national curriculum also serve to reinforce the importance of the curriculum, and thus help to standardize education delivery.

108. The national department of education works hard to ensure provincial strategic plans and budgets are aligned. Provincial governments are responsible for developing their own five-year strategic plan and annual performance plans, but only the center has the mandate to promote inter-provincial alignment and alignment between the provincial plans and the national development plan.

National ownership

109. The limited level of ODA in South Africa is a stark contrast to many other countries in the Global South and has ensured national ownership of education policy making and planning. While it is difficult to state that a lack of ODA has been a net positive for the sector (there is no counterfactual) it is clear that one result has been a high level of government ownership over the system and policy making. However, the ability of sub-national governments to negotiate with donors and the lack of coherent coordination mechanisms has resulted in a patchwork of relationships with donors and arguably reduced the impact of aid flows as a result.

Accountability and capacity

110. Despite implementing many of the reforms literature would recommend (national curriculum, standardized assessments, equitable funding) South Africa continues to fail the majority of students in the system. This report concurs with the finding that accountability and capacity remain the root cause of problems in South Africa, and that these two challenges interact to restrict improvements.

111. There is a lack of performance management and accountability for staff at all levels, in particular teachers, combined with widespread corruption. Despite efforts to empower local communities and school leaders through SGBs, management of teachers happens outside their control at
district and provincial level. Consequently, there is a disconnect between action and consequence in-line with principal-agent problem espoused in economics. Widespread corruption, patronage networks and clientism further reduce the level of accountability in the system, supported by powerful unions which span both teachers and education managers.
Chapter 5: Country Case Study — Somalia

National Context

1. The Federal Government of Somalia, established in 2012, is the first permanent central government since the start of the Somali Civil War (1991-2011). Somalia’s government officially comprises the executive branch of government, and a Federal Parliament, which is responsible for electing the President and Prime Minister and has the authority to pass and veto laws. The Parliament is bicameral and consists of a 275-seat lower house as well as an upper house capped at 54 representatives. It is headed by the elected President of Somalia, to whom the Cabinet reports through the Prime Minister. Since the election of President Hassan Sheikh in 2012, the country has experienced improved political stability and governance with the development of new institutions within the federal system, and the drafting of the Provisional Constitution of 2012 Vision 2016, a strategic plan and framework established in 2013 to translate the Provisional Constitution into an achievable and broadly acceptable framework to implement legal, security, and institutional reforms.

2. The country is comprised of five Federal Member States (FMS) and Somaliland. Jubaland, Southwest, Galmudug, Hirshabelle, and Puntland comprise the five Federal Member States (see map below). Each state administration has its own president, who all came together in 2017 to form a Federal Member States Council. Somaliland declared independence in the early 1990s and has been isolated by the international community as a result. Puntland has had an on-going border dispute with Somaliland, which flared again in early 2018.

3. Nearly half of the 12.3 million population of Somalia is rural or nomadic with a growing urban population driven by natural disasters as well as employment opportunities. The distribution is 22.8% rural and 25.9% nomadic, with 42.4% urban and 9% internally displaced persons (IDPs). Urbanization is estimated at 3.4% per annum. The main driving forces for rural-urban migration include natural disasters such as drought and flooding in poorly served rural areas, and employment opportunities in urban areas (Table 5.1).

4. Federal Member States of HirShabelle, Galmudug, South West and Jubaland, situated in the central and southern part of Somalia, are the center of continuing conflict and has the largest number of difficult-to-serve persons, including 2.3 million rural dwellers, 1.7 million nomads, and nearly 1 million IDPs. Taken together, this accounts for 40 percent of the total population of Somalia (including Somaliland).

5. Of the Somali states, northwestern Somaliland has the strongest government and economy. Somaliland, which declared independence from Somalia in 1991, introduced a more democratic mode of governance effected by integrating customary laws and tradition within the modern state structure. Further, there has been little if no international intervention. Together, this has conferred a “greater governmental legitimacy.” In addition, “…the territory’s comparatively homogeneous population, relatively equitable income distribution, common fear of the south, and absence of interference by outside forces...has obliged local politicians to observe a degree of accountability.” 312 Though Somaliland’s economy is largely private sector based, it is hampered by its exclusion from foreign markets.

6. The World Bank estimates that Somalia’s (including Somaliland) GDP reached USD 6.2 billion in 2016, and the country is ranked as one of the least developed countries in the world, according to the United Nations. Economic development has been slow and remains fragile due to poor...
security in the region, poor infrastructure and limited financial resources. Though data are difficult to confirm, all agree that Somalia’s GDP is at most USD 450, with the UNDP Somalia Human Development Report 2012 ranking it at USD 284, compared to the average GDP of USD 1,300 across sub-Saharan Africa. This report estimated that 43% of the population lived below the poverty line. Settlements for internally displaced people (IDP) have the highest poverty rate, at 71.0%. Agriculture and livestock account for 65% of the GDP and employment in the workforce. The IMF estimates real GDP to be rising annually by 2.7% in 2015, driven by growth in agriculture, financial services, construction and telecommunications. (See Table 5.2 for key development and education indicators)

Table 5.2: Development and Education Statistics for Somalia

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Development statistics</th>
<th>Selected education statistics</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>GDP, current US$ billion</td>
<td>Expenditure as % of GDP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>450 Expenditure as % of public spending</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP per capita, current US$</td>
<td>GROSS enrolment rates (% - primary) 32%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poverty Rate, % ($1.90/day)</td>
<td>GROSS enrolment rates (% - secondary) 15.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GINI Coefficient</td>
<td>UNDP HDI Index (2012) .285 Out of school children (6-18) 3 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infant mortality rate (per 1,000 live births) 92</td>
<td>Gender parity index (primary/secondary) .76/.64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maternal mortality ratio (per 100,000 live births) 1000</td>
<td>Completion rate (% - primary/secondary)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prevalence of stunting, height for age (% of children under 5) 25%</td>
<td>Literacy rate, youth total (%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Life Expectancy at birth (years) 56</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

7. Though foreign direct investment accounts for 7.6% of the GDP, remittances (estimated at USD 1.3 billion) and international aid are the main buffers for the economy. Conflict-driven migration has occurred since 1991, which has pushed at least 1 million Somalis to live outside the country, one of the largest diaspora groups in the world. Diaspora remittances serve large segments of the population, cushioning household economies and creating a buffer against shocks.

8. Since 2012, the proportion of the national budget directly supported by donors grew to 38% in 2017 (or just over USD 102 million), illustrating increased donor optimism about the country’s future. This is a significant increase from 2012, when as much as 86% of the total national budget came from domestic revenue while the remaining 14% was provided by direct budgetary support from donors and development partners. Since 2012 Somalia has been in the top 10 recipients of Overseas Development Assistance (ODA).

9. Somalia is highly vulnerable to weather events and climate change, which have also deprived children of education. The highest numbers and proportions of children ‘forced out’ of education due to drought, potential famine and associated economic pressures on families are located in regions and states that have been most affected by conflict. In these cases, the proportions of children forced out of school reached over 25% and in the most extreme case was above 42% (Sool). For Somalia as a whole, the total proportion of children forced out of schools reached an estimated 8% by May 2017 of all children enrolled in education. The situation is exacerbated by the fact that there are weak or non-existent capacities for responding to humanitarian emergencies.

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314 Multiple sources, including World Bank Edstats
10. Security throughout the country is still extremely fragile, with most major powers advising against travel to the country due to threats of terrorism and kidnapping. According to a recent UN report, the armed conflict in Somalia due to Al-Shabaab’s insurgency has left over 2,000 people dead and more than 2,500 wounded since January 2016. Until now the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) has been key to maintaining security in the country, but this year begins a gradual handover of responsibility from AMISOM to Somali security, as determined at the London Somalia Conference held in May 2017. The Federal Government of Somalia and the federal member States agreed to develop a transition plan in the first quarter of this year, working closely with international partners, most importantly the African Union and countries contributing troops and police, and major international investors in Somalia’s security, including the European Union.

Education Overview

11. Somalia’s education system has evolved through political and social upheaval (see Spotlight 5.1 below).  

Spotlight 5.1: History of Education in Somalia

Somalia gained independence from Britain and Italy in 1960. It subsequently held free and fair elections and was ruled democratically from 1960 to 1969. In 1969 General Siad Barre led a military coup, holding onto power for 22 years. Barre established a centrally-controlled “scientific socialist” state whose goal was to wipe out clan conflict and ignorance through mass education. Barre soon introduced the Somali language (Af Soomaali) as the official language of business and education and selected the modified Latin script as the nation’s standard orthography. From then on, all education in government schools had to be conducted in Somali. Textbooks and curriculum were developed to reflect the values and ideals of the Somali society, and a mass literacy campaign was launched to teach every Somali how to read and write. For the first time in its history, students across the country were taught in the same language, using the same textbooks. Substantial progress was achieved over the seventies and eighties in educational attainment.

The overthrow of the Barre government in 1991 and ensuing civil war led to a disruption of normal economic life, the destruction of most public facilities, the disappearance of many professionals, and the collapse of the national government. By 1994, school enrolment had reached its lowest point, with most if not all schools destroyed, materials unavailable, and teachers and student abandoning the educational process. With no central government to fund or oversee educational development, local groups, NGOs and private citizens began to fill in the enormous educational vacuum, providing education in myriad different systems across the country. Regional governments (FMS) began to exercise increasing authority over education, forming their own MOEs and introducing regulation and oversight usually performed by central actors. Since Somaliland had seceded, and in large part has been protected from the continuing violence experienced by states in the Southern part of the country, its education sector has had a more stable environment in which to develop. Similarly, Puntland has been more shielded from attacks and therefore provides better access to education than do states in the Southern and Central parts of the country.

316 The UK government hosted this international conference, to accelerate progress on security sector reform, build on the international response to the ongoing drought and humanitarian crisis, and agree to the new partnership needed to keep Somalia on course for increased peace and prosperity by 2020.

317 Unless otherwise noted, data for this chapter is drawn from the Federal Government of Somalia Ministry of Education, Culture and Higher Education, Education Sector Strategic Plan (ESSP) 2018-2020.
12. **There are two distinct systems of educational cycles in the country**, one in public schools and the other for private Arabic medium schools. The 9-3 system is mainly used by private Arabic medium institutions and the 8-4 system is currently practiced in public schools. It should be pointed out that at present many post-secondary institutions offer 4-year degree courses (Table 5.3)

Table 5.3: **Structure of Education in the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The 9-3 system</th>
<th>The 8-4 system</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Early Childhood Care and Education</strong> (including pre-school)</td>
<td>1-2 Years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Primary Schools</strong></td>
<td>9 Years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Secondary Schools</strong></td>
<td>3 Years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Post-secondary institutes</strong></td>
<td>2-4 Years</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


13. The use of multiple languages of instruction and diverse curriculum in schools has also potentially created barriers to children’s learning, particularly as few learning materials are available in the Somali language. Currently about 13 curricula mainly from the Arab World and Africa are in use in Somalia. These curricula are taught to children of Somalia in the primary, secondary and Madarasa Schools. These curricula are not based on Somali culture and some contain foreign ideology. The recently completed national curriculum framework has been an important development for the Federal Government of Somalia to harmonize learning within the sector and ensure relevance of education to learning. In most primary schools, Somali is used as the language of instruction, although special consideration is given to Arabic and English, which are taught as language subject courses. In most secondary schools English is the medium of instruction, except for Islamic studies, Arabic and Somali, but some schools teach arts subjects in Arabic and scientific subjects in English. For post-secondary institutes, the medium of instruction is set according to the nature and need of the institute and may include English or Arabic.

14. **Somali gross enrolment rates (GER)** are among the worst in the world, with disadvantaged groups such as nomads and IDP well below 20%. In 2015/16 the country’s gross enrolment ratio for primary school was 32%, with less than a quarter of children in Galmudug, HirShabelle, Jubaland and South West States enrolled. Primary GER for nomads/pastoralist was only 3.1% and secondary GER 0.9%, primary GER for IDPs only 16.6% and secondary GER for IDPs only 12%, compared to a national secondary GER of 15.8%. Youth among these groups are also considered at ‘high risk’ of exploitation, resorting to violence or criminality and recruitment into armed groups like Al-Shabaab. (Table 5.4)
Table 5.4: Weighted Primary and Secondary Gross Enrolment Ratios (GER)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Primary</th>
<th>Secondary</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Female</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HirShabelle, Galmudug, South-West, Jubaland and Benadir Central 2015/16 Total</td>
<td>24.5%</td>
<td>19.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Puntland 2014/15 Total</td>
<td>68.3%</td>
<td>53.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somaliland 2014/15 Total</td>
<td>53.4%</td>
<td>44.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somalia Total</td>
<td>35.0%</td>
<td>28.9%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Total enrolment using weighted figures, upper/lower ratio derived from PESS\(^{320}\) weighted on EMIS ratios

15. Girls’ participation and survival rates lag far behind those for boys. The Gender Parity Index (GPI) at primary school level across states in the Southern and Central part of the country, Puntland and Somaliland range from .72 to .79 at primary level and even lower at the secondary level, ranging from .53 to .66. Girls face critical barriers to achieving equity in education due to social pressures for early marriage, expectations that girls support households and rearing of smaller siblings and greater ‘social value’ in boys accessing education over girls. Risks of gender-based violence in and around schools also create further barriers to girls for accessing education services. (Table 5.5)

Table 5.5: Primary and Secondary Enrolment by Region and Gender

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Male</th>
<th>Female</th>
<th>% Total</th>
<th>Male</th>
<th>Female</th>
<th>% Total</th>
<th>GPI</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Primary(^{321}) Level</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HirShabelle, Galmudug, South-West, Jubaland and Benadir Central</td>
<td>453,545</td>
<td>264,771</td>
<td>57.7%</td>
<td>191,013</td>
<td>42.1%</td>
<td>.72</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Puntland</td>
<td>151,278</td>
<td>84,949</td>
<td>56.2%</td>
<td>66,329</td>
<td>43.8%</td>
<td>.78</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somaliland</td>
<td>382,285</td>
<td>213,960</td>
<td>55.8%</td>
<td>169,043</td>
<td>44.2%</td>
<td>.79</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>987,108</td>
<td>563,680</td>
<td>56.9%</td>
<td>426,385</td>
<td>43.1%</td>
<td>.76</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Secondary Level(^{322})</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central South</td>
<td>93,165</td>
<td>56,140</td>
<td>60.3%</td>
<td>37,025</td>
<td>39.7%</td>
<td>.66</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Puntland</td>
<td>14,823</td>
<td>9,662</td>
<td>65.2%</td>
<td>5,161</td>
<td>34.8%</td>
<td>.53</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somaliland</td>
<td>87,817</td>
<td>53,792</td>
<td>61.3%</td>
<td>34,025</td>
<td>38.7%</td>
<td>.63</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>195,805</td>
<td>119,594</td>
<td>61.1%</td>
<td>76,211</td>
<td>38.9%</td>
<td>.64</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Weighted averages of PESS\(^{323}\) and EMIS)

16. Over half of Somali students attend private schools, putting the poor at a significant disadvantage. The share of students enrolled in government-managed primary schools across all of Somalia is 47.9%. In Somaliland and Puntland most schools are public.\(^{324}\) However, in states in the southern and central part of the country, only 7.4% of primary students are enrolled in government schools with the remainder in some form of private or community schools. Private providers play an even

\(^{318}\) ESSP, Table 30
\(^{319}\) ESSP, Table 40
\(^{320}\) Population Estimation Survey Somalia, 2014, UNFPA
\(^{321}\) ESSP, Table 27
\(^{322}\) ESSP, Recalculated from Table 38
\(^{323}\) Population Estimation Survey Somalia, 2014, UNFPA
\(^{324}\) Office of the Commissioner General for Refugees and Stateless Persons, Belgium (https://landinfo.no/asset/3517/1/3517_1.pdf)
more significant role at the secondary level, as nearly 70% of students are enrolled in non-government schools. For the Federal States of Galmudug, HirShabelle, South-West, Benadir and Jubaland, similar to primary education, only 8% of the students are in government schools with the remainder in private or community schools. In Somaliland and Puntland, just over half are enrolled in government schools. The limited availability of public schools handicaps those who cannot afford private fees. Often private schools are not even an option since operators do not find it viable to run schools in poor and disadvantaged areas. *(Table 5.6)*

**Table 5.6: Primary and Secondary Enrolment by Region and School Management**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Primary(^{325})</th>
<th>Secondary(^{326})</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>% Gov't</td>
<td>% Non-gov't</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Galmudug, HirShabelle, South-West, Jubaland and Benadir Central</td>
<td>7.4%</td>
<td>92.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Puntland</td>
<td>ND</td>
<td>ND</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somaliland</td>
<td>ND</td>
<td>ND</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somalia Total(^{327})</td>
<td>47.9%</td>
<td>52.1%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

17. **There is a large rural-urban divide in enrolment across Somalia.** At the primary level, 65% of students are enrolled in urban schools, while only 35% of students are enrolled in rural areas. There is an even greater imbalance between urban and rural enrolment for secondary students – only 5.5% of students at this level are found in rural areas. In states in the southern and central part of the country, only 1.3% of the secondary school enrolment is in rural areas. This has important implications for student success since, for Somalia overall, survival rates are more than 22% higher in urban areas compared to rural areas (urban 70.8% compared to rural 47.9%). This discrepancy points to significant inequities in the distribution of educational resources (e.g. schools, teachers, learning materials, water facilities) between rural and urban areas. *(Table 5.7)*

**Table 5.7: Primary incl. IQS\(^{328}\) and Secondary Enrolment by Region and Urban vs. Rural**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Primary(^{329})</th>
<th>Secondary(^{330})</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>% Urban</td>
<td>% Rural</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Galmudug, HirShabelle, South-West, Jubaland and Benadir</td>
<td>63%</td>
<td>37%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Puntland</td>
<td>67%</td>
<td>33%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somaliland</td>
<td>65%</td>
<td>35%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>65%</td>
<td>35%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

18. **Over half of children in Somalia are out of school, and most of these are located in states in the southern and central part of the country.** Data from United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA)

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\(^{325}\) ESSP, p. 57  
\(^{326}\) ESSP, p. 77  
\(^{327}\) Some data drawn from ESSP text; totals are approximation due to data discrepancies in original sources  
\(^{328}\) Integrated Quranic Schools  
\(^{329}\) ESSP, p. 55 - weighted figures, urban / rural ratio derived from PESS  
\(^{330}\) ESSP, p. 76
suggest that the number of out-of-school children and youth (aged 6-18 years) is 3 million\textsuperscript{331}. At the secondary level, the number of out-of-school children is vast - For states in the south, Education Management Information System (EMIS) data suggests that some 92% of children and adolescents within the official age range for secondary school are not in secondary school. Those who are most excluded from formal education are from clearly defined groups including nomadic and pastoralist communities, those from rural areas, IDPs, and those from the poorest wealth quintiles across the country. Formal schooling systems do not cater to lifestyle needs of rural and pastoralist communities, with potential biases in curriculum against such groups. Further, the absence of school feeding programs in famine and drought zones affects the attendance, retention, and nutrition status of the poorest children.

19. **Child labor in Somalia is a significant barrier to education.** According to the United States Bureau of International Labor Affairs\textsuperscript{332}, 39.8% of children (aged 5-14 years) in Somalia are engaged in child labor, including street work, while 20.2% of children aged 4-14 combine work and school. Reasons for child labor in the survey are poverty and the inability to provide for all family members, which causes some families to give over custody of their children to extended family members and leaves children vulnerable to sexual exploitation, forced labor, trafficking to Europe and North America as well as other countries in Eastern Africa and Saudi Arabia.

20. **The teaching force is largely uncertified and predominantly male.** Only 37.9% of primary teachers across all Somalia are qualified, with the lowest number qualified in states in the southern and central part of the country (20.8%). At the secondary level, only 34.4% of teachers are classified as qualified according to the government EMIS. This is highest in Somaliland at 55%; Puntland has 35.6% teachers certified, and states in the southern and central part of the country have the lowest proportion of qualified secondary school teachers at only 21.1%. It is important to note the predominance of male teachers over female. At the primary level 91.8% of all teachers are male and at the secondary level this is 97%.

21. **EMIS activities are dependent upon external donor support and, on the whole, have been implemented on a minimal budget over the past few years.** A clear policy framework for EMIS has yet to be developed in states in the southern and central part of the country, though Somaliland has made more progress in this area.

22. **The unemployment rate in Somalia is 54.3%, and 67.6% of the youth are unemployed.** In states in the southern and central parts of the country, the proportion of unemployed youth is estimated to be 54.4%. In Puntland, the proportion of unemployed youth is 62% (74.3% female), compared to overall unemployment rates of 47 (67% female). Reasons for these high levels include imbalances between available education and training, and the skills actually required for jobs, as well as the multiple shocks that have devastated the Somali economy. The lack of employment opportunities contributes to youth emigration in search of alternative livelihood opportunities.

23. **There is a clear correlation between level of security in the three regions and enrolment levels in education.** As detailed by Amnesty International, attacks on innocent children and teachers in learning institutions have warranted parents’ skepticism about sending their children to school as they are vulnerable to abduction and other life-threatening consequences during raids at


\textsuperscript{332} US Department of Labor, \(https://www.dol.gov/ilab/reports/child-labor/findings/tda2009/somalia.pdf\)
There is a strong correlation between the Composite Security Indicator and levels of enrolment across the regions: Enrolment rates are higher in Somaliland where the security index is higher (48% with an index of 44%) and lower in states in the southern and central part of the country, where the security index is lower (18% primary net enrolment with an index of 32%).

Conflict in states in the southern and central parts of the country creates the potential for disengaged and unemployed youth to be recruited into militias, exacerbated by the erosion of social norms and traditional resilience and conflict management mechanisms. Political pressures with regional states hoping to become independent states, criminality, weak governance and food insecurity also drive conflicts and make it easier for vulnerable adolescents and youth to be recruited to armed groups.

Politics, Policies, and Legislative Framework

“Strengthening the relationship between the Federal government and Federal member states is the highest priority, and essential to the success of Somalia’s state building”. - UN envoy for Somalia and UNSOM lead (United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia) Michael Keating

A Country in Transition

Federalism is currently being introduced across Somalia. Somalia officially became a federal government in 2012 after a new provisional constitution was adopted. The constitution outlines the connections between the central government and future “Federal Member States,” but the precise roles and responsibilities of each level of government are not specified. Power sharing between the central government and federal member as defined in Article 54 of the provisional constitution states: “The allocation of powers and resources shall be negotiated and agreed upon by the Federal Government and the Federal Member States pending their creation, except in the areas of foreign affairs, national defense, citizenship and immigration, and monetary policy, which are all under the purview of the central government, based in the capital, Mogadishu.” The constitution is still under consideration and has yet to be voted into law. However, encouraging efforts have been underway since 2015 to bring together all stakeholders, including Federal, State authorities and civil society, to review the country’s provisional constitution. In May 2018, the Federal Government re-launched the constitutional review process ahead of “one-person, one-vote” elections scheduled for 2020, and pledged funding to finalize the process.

Addressing issues of governance and the imperative of clan dynamics emerges as one of the key challenges as federal government officials attempt to establish a decentralized system. Harmonization of federal and state institutions is critical to enable the effective and efficient delivery of education services and the emergence of a coherent education sector aligned to achieving National Development Plan priorities. Key governance challenges in Somalia persist, including the appropriate delegation of duties and authorities between different levels of government.
government. In part, this springs from a need to accommodate the country’s broader political system of power-sharing with majority and disadvantaged clans (as reflected in parliamentary power-sharing arrangements) and to address associated inequities in distribution of power and representation in decision-making. It is important to note that some progress has been made at improving relationships between different levels of government, though the absence of formalized laws or constitutional powers creates ongoing challenges for improving local level service delivery.

27. Different forms of decentralization exist that involve different objectives and forms of decision-making authority, from higher to lower levels or across organizations and units, the implications of which have not yet been considered in tentative steps taken toward decentralizing education services. It appears the government may be leaning toward devolution, as noted in the Education Sector Strategic Plan 2018-2020 (ESSP). This is because experience in Somaliland, and to a lesser degree Puntland, has demonstrated it is possible to successfully transfer decision-making, finance and management responsibilities to districts for the delivery of primary education services.

Legislation and key actors

28. Despite the recently established federal government structures, laws or acts on local government and decentralization of administration, functions for social services such as education have not yet been finalized. As such, Somalia’s education system lacks an agreed upon legal framework to guide decentralizing education services.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Spotlight 5.2: Key Education Acts and Policy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>1. Draft National Education Policy 2017.</strong> The policy is under review and consideration by the cabinet. The overall goal is to provide equitable and inclusive education system that affords all learners access to free and compulsory basic education (K1-12) followed by the opportunity to continue with lifelong learning, so enhancing their personal development and contributing to Somali’s cultural development, social economic growth, and global competitiveness.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>2. National Development Plan for Somalia 2017- 2019.</strong> According to article 30 of the constitution of the federal government, the education sector must be compulsory and free for the children aged 6-18 years. The NDP will work towards the direction to increase access, affordability and quality of primary and secondary education. The government will also make education relevant and inclusive for all children of Somalia regardless of any affiliations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>3. National Education Act 2017 (Sharciga Waxbarashada Qaranka 2017).</strong> The Act provides the principles, goals, and management of the education system in Somalia. This act is still under consideration by Cabinet.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>4. Teacher education and training policy 2017.</strong> The aim of this policy is to provide an overall strategy for the successful recruitment, retention, and professional development of teachers.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

336 The three main forms of decentralization include: (i) Deconcentration: The redistribution of authority and responsibility among different levels of the central government, often from the capital city to local regions, provinces or districts; (ii) Delegation: This is the transfer of authority and responsibility from the central government to an organization of local administration accountable to, but not fully controlled by, the central government; and (iii) Devolution: The transfer of authority and responsibility from the central government to local administrations, quasi-autonomous or separate from the central government – ESSP, p. 129
5. **National Curriculum framework 2017.** This defines how the education system in Somalia is structured and the main pillars for the education sector (for further details see full Education Sector Analysis (ESA) report which details the national curriculum framework).

6. **Quality Assurance School Inspection manual.** This manual is aimed at providing a basic guide for the training of the quality assurance officers in Federal Republic of Somalia. The training content provides a general focus on key issues in quality assurance and standards. This comes with a quality assurance checklist.

7. **Public Procurement, Concessions and Disposal Act, 23 November 2015.** This Act aims to establish institutional structures for managing public procurement and provide procedures for procurement of goods, works and services and other contract terms.

8. **Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC).** This includes key rights such as the right to access education.

9. **Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between the Federal Government and State level ministries on roles and responsibilities** provides the details on how the states are expected to work with each other.

29. **The five Federal Member States and Somaliland have their own presidents and Education Ministries.** Jubaland, Southwest, Galmudug and HirShabelle, the 10 regions across those states, and 58 districts across those regions, together with Banadir, are regarded as more squarely being under the direct administrative authority of the Federal Government (FGS). These states have, until recently, viewed themselves as entities separate from federal government political representation mechanisms. While the newly elected Federal government has taken steps towards concluding the political agreements with the FMS, important issues pertaining to the new federal structure, including allocation of powers, jurisdiction and resources, remain to be resolved, though progress has been made, as seen at the April 2018 meeting between the FGS MoECHE and the FMS Ministers of Education. (see Highlight 5.3).

30. **Civil Service employment is governed by the Education Act, which has been developed and endorsed, the rules of which have been outlined in the government Human Resource Policy Manual (2015).** This includes other rules such as promotions, transfers and seconding of staff. The policy further lays out the categories of employment as Permanent and Pensionable, Replacement of Next of Kin, Contract and Temporary appointment.

31. **Weak state capacities with poor financial accountability mechanisms have led to multiple problems for education.** The inability to provide security and services to the population and lack of control over revenue generation have led to a lack of legitimacy. It contributes to grievances among excluded groups. In addition, there exist few communication channels between State and communities. Key drivers of conflict across the regions are: (1) weak governance and corruption; (2) resource-based competition; (3) clan identification; (4) marginalized and unemployed youth; (5) breakdown of social norms/growing acceptance of violence; (6) Al-Shabaab; (7) migration of IDPs to urban centers; and (8) food insecurity. Somalia has been ranked by Transparency International as the ‘most corrupt’ country in the world for ten consecutive years. High risks exist regarding corruption and the potential for collusion in procurement processes that undermine transparent and quality contracting services.

**Role of Federal government**

32. **The MoECHE at federal government level is responsible for the overall guidance and administration of education in Somalia.** Its mandate is to ensure that a viable system is in place to promote quality education and training for all citizens in order to optimize individual and national development. The ministries of education in the southern and central states and the Federal
Government MoECHE agreed in an MOU to work cooperatively in all matters related to the education sector and agreed upon the roles and responsibilities of each jurisdiction. The agreement states that the FGS MoECHE is mandated to develop regulatory frameworks, e.g. Education Acts and policies and coordination while the regional states are mandated to implement education programs and policies. Currently, the MoECHE is led by a Minister under which is a Permanent Secretary followed by two Director Generals (who report to the Permanent Secretary). Appointments to these senior positions typically adhere to an agreed ‘power sharing’ system that reflects the parliamentary principle of power-sharing between different majority and minority clans in Somalia so as to ensure an inclusive governance approach that guarantees the meaningful representation of different clans in political and governance processes.

33. Administrative structures of the MoECHE, having been established only several years ago, started from virtually scratch, and as a result, capacity within the ministry remain generally low in relation to staffing, skills and training of personnel. The ministry has six departments and 16 sub-departments in charge of the various functions in the sector: Departments of Administration and Finance, Public Schools, Policy and Planning, Quality Assurance, Umbrella and Private education, and Examination and Certificate. Gender disparities are especially prevalent among the ranks of education ministry personnel and teachers. Poor alignment of strategies and targets between the FMS and with the MoECHE is also a problem. Further, there is limited infrastructure in place to support the organizational capacity of the MoECHE (offices, vehicles, computers, and logistics). Transparency, accountability, and financial utilization capacities of the MoECHE remain low at all levels, which undermines its ability to absorb funds and deliver activities. Less than 1% of all MoECHE personnel are paid from the government budget (this includes teachers, ministry officials and other officers from the ministry).

34. Due to resource scarcity, there is a perception of mistrust and disconnect between the federal government and FMS MOEs. A further complication is that FMS MOEs in those states believe that they are mandated under the federal rules to deal directly with development partners while FGS believes that they are the ultimate entity entrusted to manage bilateral arrangements with development partners.

35. There is progress in building a harmonized approach to education through increasing collaboration between FMS MOEs and the MoECHE. A positive note was struck when, in 2013 the Presidents of the FMS joined to discuss education issues and made a declaration of intent to work together to improve education (the National Education Conference Declaration). A further commitment of collaboration was the Cooperation Framework and Memorandum of Understanding announced by the Somalia Ministry of Education on September 19, 2016 with three of its Federal governments: Jubaland, Galmudug and Southwest Administration. This new policy set a platform for the two levels of government to work together to ensure smoother management of the sector of education in Somalia. Somalia and its allies agree that combined management and interaction of the National and Federal Governments is a necessary step to provide quality education for all Somali children. There have been additional meetings since, including several in 2018, culminating in actions taken at the Consultative Meeting held on 15 April 2018 (see Spotlight 5.3).

338 ESSP, p. 129.
339 The MoECHE has a structure that is based on its pre-civil war size and capacity when there were over 50,000 personnel within the ministry, which at that time included ministry staff and teachers.
Spotlight 5.3: Efforts to Harmonize Education Across States in Somali
Consultative Meetings Between the Federal Government Ministry of Education, Culture and Higher Education and The Ministries of Education of the Federal Member States
16-17 April 2018, Dusmareeb, Galmudug

There have been a number of consultative meetings between the MoECHE and the FMS MOEs since 2013. On April 16-17, 2018 the Ministry of Education, Culture and Higher Education of the Federal Government of Somalia met with the Ministries of Education of Jubaland, South West, and Galmudug, and Hirshabelle, and agreed to fully endorse and implement jointly, the Memorandum of Understanding on Cooperation in Education reached on 19 September 2016 to facilitate smooth management of education and provide a collaboration platform between the national and state levels of government.

The MoECHE and MOEs of the Federal Member States (FMS) further agreed on:

1. **Capacity Building in the Ministries:** The Federal Ministry of Education will assist in supporting the capacity building of all Ministries of Education of the FMS in cooperation with the donor community.

2. **Community Managed Schools:** All community managed schools to be registered at the respective ministries of education;

3. **Teacher Certification:** By the academic year of 2022, all teachers should have certificated teaching qualification.

4. **The Syllabus:** (i) In this academic year all schools at regional and district level, will be using the national syllabus driven by the national curriculum framework; (ii) The new approved national textbooks for the Lower Primary schools of grade 1-4; based on the new national syllabus will be printed by July 2018; (iii) The new approved national textbooks for the Upper Primary schools of grade 5-8; based on the new national syllabus will be printed by December 2018; and (iv) The new approved national textbooks for the Higher Schools of grade 9-12; based on the new national syllabus will be printed by July 2019.

5. **Exams:** (i) The final centralized national examination of the high school leavers of grade 12 will be held on 19 May 2018; and (ii) The security personnel at Federal and at Federal Member States level should fully insure, the security of the designated location for the examinations.

6. **Education Data Collection:** (i) The establishment and implementation of a national education data collection policy with an agreed and unified system; (ii) The Federal Ministry of Education will engage in upgrading the capacity of the Federal Member States education departments designated for data collection; and (iii) All implementing agencies involved in data collection should adhere and follow the instruction of the Federal Ministry of Education as well as Federal Member State levels.

7. **To reinforce the accountability of the education developmental implementing agencies** at Federal as well as FMS level: Through collaboration between the Federal Ministry of Education and developmental agencies.

Role of Regional Governments

36. The May 2017 London Conference’s emphasis on strengthening sub-national levels of administration and increasing the accountability of public officials has focused attention on the role that district-level governance structures can play in extending access to education services. Outside of Puntland, however, there are only a few functioning district level governance structures to date (Adado and Benadir). Federal and state governments have prioritized district council formation in Jubaland, Southwest, Galmudug and Hirshabelle, with a focus on building nascent,
accountable and representative local governance structures capable of delivering basic services to the populations they serve.

37. Regional states within the southern and central part of the country have varied administrative structures and departments in place, each of which suffer similar (or more severe) capacity deficits compared to the federal level MoEHE. This structure is very similar to the structure of the ministry prior to civil war when domestic financing was greater and when the ministry had some 50,000 personnel under its authority (government staff and teachers combined). The current structure has not been updated to reflect the realities of the country, a much more poorly resourced government, and state institutions with a much fewer number of personnel to manage. Further, weak staff skills in key portfolios undermine the ability of the education sector to deliver services effectively. Management capacities at regional state level are particularly weak in states with areas recently liberated from Al-Shabaab control or that are at risk of attacks by Al-Shabaab.

38. Somaliland made a commitment to provide free primary education in 2018[^343], and Puntland President Mohamud Muse Hirsi "Adde" made a similar commitment in April 2018.[^344]

Somaliland

39. Somaliland has a Ministry of Education and Higher Education (MoEHE) with 26 District Education Officers (DEOs) across 13 regions. There are two directors at the MoEHE— for general education and for higher education. The DEOs in the regional offices are charged with: Coordination of various sub sectors of education under their jurisdiction; Planning and establishing new schools including upgrading and renovating old schools; Planning the human resources and equitable deployment of teachers across schools; Monitoring, evaluating and assessing the quality of education programs; and Advising the Regional Education Officers (REOs) on all matters of education and school development.[^345] (Figure 5.2 - Structure of Somaliland MoEHE)

40. The Somaliland MoEHE has received considerable international assistance in strengthening its capacity. This includes capacity building in the five areas of Finance & Administration, Human Resource Management, Quality Assurance & Standards, Policy & Planning, and Gender.

Role of Communities

41. After the collapse of the government education system in the civil war of 1991, various community entities assumed responsibility for starting and running schools. Whatever schooling was offered was a result of some sort of non-state initiative. Even now, the vast majority of schools in Somalia are owned by private individuals or groups. While such a radical (unintended) decentralization provides community ownership of schooling, it has posed challenges for ensuring equity, quality, and access. At the same time, it allows for considerable resilience in the system when government is absent or unable to provide support or when security conditions permit only local activity.[^346]

[^344]: Puntland (Somalia) to introduce free primary schools, Afrol, April 6, 2018, [http://www.afrol.com/articles/16083](http://www.afrol.com/articles/16083)
[^345]: Education Sector Plan, p. 80.
42. **At local levels, community education committees (CEC) play a key role in school support and management.** Communities own and/or manage almost half the schools in the country. Community management and financing of schools helps ensure that schools can sustain themselves when government is unable. CEC members include parents, religious leaders, members of women's and youth groups or businessmen and women. Community ownership has been particularly important in the states in the Southern and Central parts of the country where government structures are weakest.

43. **Education facilities, personnel, and pupils face risks related to violence and attacks.** The greatest proportion of security conflicts have been recorded in Jubaland and Hirshabelle. Many of these are related to clashes between communities and school leadership and tensions between different clans regarding aspects of school management and utilization of school resources. Some of these incidents have been very serious, including abduction of children, attacks against pupils, and threats against education personnel. Few threats or attacks were reported against Alternative Basic Education for Pastoralists (ABE) facilities, Technical and Vocational Training locations or private schools. It appears that Qur’anic schools were the institutions schools with the highest number of threats or attacks.

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Role of Independent Agencies

44. The contribution of (unregulated) community-based civil society organizations, local NGOs (LNGOs), and private organizations over the last decade has been substantial. These entities have played a major role in providing education services over the years of state failure and continue to play an important role in supporting education services in the central and southern states. International NGOs, over recent years, have also begun taking a more active role in supporting education services in these states. Much of this work has occurred outside the control of government. This has resulted in an uneven application of government policies and quality standards and a lack of alignment of the activities of these different organizations. This weak coherence calls for greater coordination between Civil Society, LNGOs, private organization and international non-governmental organizations (NGO)s, especially in the current context of resource constraints, and the need for greater efficiencies.

45. In Somaliland, two parallel contrasting systems came into existence, a public educational system formally controlled by the government, and a relatively stronger private educational system run by privately owned individuals. Each system has its own curriculum and expectations for students as there are no other means of educational guidelines to be followed.349

Service Delivery

Access and infrastructure

46. The legacy of the war and continued conflict which destroyed the country’s schools have contributed to Somalia having one of the world’s lowest enrolment rates. These low enrolment rates persist despite the fact that Somaliland introduced Free Primary Education policy in 2012. The fact that more than 75% of schools that existed before the civil war were destroyed has meant that education had to be rebuilt from the ground up. Schools in place are not of a high quality - for example, in the Central and Southern states, the majority of schools, or 55.9% across all types of infrastructure, are regarded as being in ‘poor’ condition, 40.7% in ‘fair’ condition, and only 3.4% in ‘good’ condition. The decimation of schools also gave rise to the large number of private schools that have cropped up to meet demand for education.

47. Access is limited for pastoralist communities (with a GER of 3.1 percent), and Internally Displaced Persons (with a GER of 16.8%).350 Nomadic pastoralists account for 65 per cent of the population in Somalia. Problems prohibiting access for these populations include the lack of flexibility of the formal education system to fit into the herding life style of the pastoralist communities, and for IDPs, the limited water and sanitation facilities, classrooms and supplies and a shortage of teachers in host communities. To address this the FGS has put forward plans for a mapping and priority needs assessment for new school buildings as well as rehabilitation of existing schools in underserved areas where the demand for education services is high.351

48. Extremely high rates of poverty in communities across Somalia make it difficult for parents to afford school fees. In many areas, parents are required to pay for their children’s education, and poverty

remains the main reason they give for not sending their children to school. Somaliland declared free primary public education in 2011 but has had great difficulty in retaining teachers at the salaries the government can afford to pay. With parents and communities no longer paying for public primary education, schools have almost no funds to cover their running costs.

49. Girls’ participation in education is significantly lower than that for boys because the administrations and federal government have not put in place the necessary facilities/conditions to enable them to attend. Fewer than 50% of girls attend primary school (Table 5.5), and the last countrywide survey from 2006 showed that only 25% of women aged 15 to 24 were literate. The low availability of sanitation facilities (especially separate latrines for girls), a lack of female teachers, safety concerns and social norms that favor boys’ education are cited as factors inhibiting parents from enrolling their daughters in school.

**Spotlight 5.4: Global Partnership for Education Calls Puntland “a role model for other regions emerging from conflict”**

The Global Partnership for Education heralds Puntland for having made major strides in the past few years to improve access to education. According to the 2015-2016 education statistics yearbook, the primary gross enrolment rate increased from 41% in 2011/12 to 58% in 2015/16. In addition, the percentage of certified teachers increased from 27% to 52% and drop-out rates are also remarkably lower, decreasing from 16% in 2014/15 to 9.4% in 2015/16. Gaps persist in learning outcomes and gender parity but the positive trends demonstrate that the government’s efforts towards expanding access to quality education are fruitful.

Nazlin Umar Rajput, chairwoman of the National Muslim Council of Kenya and a human-rights advocate for minority groups across East Africa has noted, “...the education sector in Puntland has progressed systematically despite periods of civil war, unrest and drought that left thousands of people dead.” “Almost every child in Puntland is able to access education.” She added that, “the country has harmonized its curriculum and centralized examinations, unlike other regions.”

**Curriculum and educational materials**

50. The National Education Curriculum Framework (NECF) for states in the southern and central part of the country was developed over a two-year period and included consultative workshops with a range of educationalists and representatives from all the private sector educational providers including private for-profit schools, community schools and representatives of non-state actors’ umbrellas. Once developed, the draft framework was then taken out for consultations, a process led by the youth and funded by UNICEF to help develop a conflict-sensitive and inclusive curriculum that could support peace building objectives of the government through education. The NECF is seen by the Ministry as an important first step towards unifying all the types of schools that were, at the time, offering different curricula, syllabi and textbooks, or teaching materials.

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353 The Framework includes a language policy which states that: Somali should be the foundation of instruction; the schools’ structure will follow an 8:4:4 system to fit in with the broad learning outcomes; the methodology will be learner centred and activity-based; and an assessment system with the formal system using the learning outcomes as the basis for summative assessment at grade 8 and 12.
51. Despite the fact that syllabi have been developed for primary and secondary levels, there remains a huge need to develop and disseminate learning materials to schools, especially for textbooks which need to be developed, printed and supplied to learners. Currently all available materials are drawn from sources outside Somalia or procured on an ad hoc basis, which created unique challenges for aligning learning to the objectives of the National Development Plan and supporting state building efforts in Somalia. As indicated in Spotlight 5.3, this issue is currently being addressed and the NDP objectives are being fulfilled.

52. The NECF and centralized examinations are not being fully implemented as can be seen by the varied learning materials and divergent curriculum materials in use across schools in southern and central states. This is in contrast to Somaliland and Puntland where over 85% of schools keep to their ministry’s curriculum and take the centralized exams at the end of each cycle. Progress is recognized here as the numbers taking the Form 4 exam (for university admittance) in the southern and central states have been growing over the past 4 years, and in May 2018 reached 32,000.\textsuperscript{354}

53. In contrast to the problems encountered in states in the southern and central part of the country, Puntland and Somaliland have established national curricula which are followed by 85% of schools in their respective states.

Teacher contracting and performance management

54. Women are extremely underrepresented in the teaching profession across Somalia. Overall, the highest representation is at the primary level, where they account for about 12 percent of teachers; at the secondary level that figure is about 3 percent.\textsuperscript{355} There is a likelihood that the lack of female role models in education has a negative impact on girls’ engagement in education and how they view their own futures.

55. Teacher competency standards do not exist or are not enforced. As noted in para. 20, there are large numbers of unqualified teachers in primary and secondary school across the country. Further, the government relies heavily on donor initiatives for in-service training. Reliance on external support for such a critical aspect of the sector shifts in-service training to being determined by availability of funding from the donors and education partners and not periodical cycles determined by need.\textsuperscript{356}

56. Currently, there is no coordination or coherence across the various subsectors that addresses ongoing teacher development. It is given short shrift across states and across levels. There is a lack of clear criteria for in-service training approaches and in-service training is not linked to school supervision strategies. This lack of standards and practices affects teacher quality and performance.

57. Regulatory measures to assure teacher management and ethics are also weak. Poor information systems create risks that ‘ghost teachers’ continue to be on the government payroll. Further, weak recruitment processes and lack of standards undermine transparency and effective staff performance.

58. Significant numbers of teachers are paid outside the public system. Overall, at the primary level, 36.2% of teachers are paid by government through different ministries of education, 24.6% are

\textsuperscript{354} Delegation of the European Union to Kenya, Somali School Examinations Set a New Record in Student Candidature, 24 May 2018.
\textsuperscript{355} ESSP, Tables 32 and 42
\textsuperscript{356} ESSP, p. 129
paid through the community, and the next largest portion of teachers are paid by private sources. For states in the Central and Southern parts of the country, over 90% of teachers receive payment from non-government sources. Community contributions to the payment of teacher salaries is highest in Puntland (69.4% of teachers), while in Somaliland the majority of teachers are paid by government (66.4%)\textsuperscript{357}. At the secondary level, overall half of teachers are paid by private sources, 22% by ministries of education, and 17% by the community. Breaking this down by states, in Jubaland, Southwest State, Galmadug, Hirshabelle and Banadir, fully 97% of teachers are paid through private (79%) and community (9%) sources. Community sources play an even more important role in teacher salaries in Puntland, where they fund 85%. In contrast, almost 60% of Somaliland secondary teachers are paid by the MOE. \textsuperscript{358} (Table 5.8).

\textbf{Table 5.8a Sources of Primary Teachers' Salaries}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>States</th>
<th>Community</th>
<th>MoE</th>
<th>NGOs</th>
<th>Private</th>
<th>Others***</th>
<th>Not</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>States in Central and Southern part of country 2015/16</td>
<td>24.8%</td>
<td>8.0%</td>
<td>6.1%</td>
<td>47.3%</td>
<td>2.7%</td>
<td>10.9%</td>
<td>6,085</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Puntland 2014/15**</td>
<td>69.4%</td>
<td>21.6%</td>
<td>2.4%</td>
<td>1.2%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>5.4%</td>
<td>3,970</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somaliland 2014/15**</td>
<td>1.0%</td>
<td>66.4%</td>
<td>2.5%</td>
<td>13.3%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>16.7%</td>
<td>7,586</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somalia Total</td>
<td>24.6%</td>
<td>36.2%</td>
<td>3.8%</td>
<td>22.3%</td>
<td>0.9%</td>
<td>12.2%</td>
<td>17,641</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: FGS, MoECHE Education Statistics Yearbook 2015/16

\textbf{Table 5.8b Sources of Secondary Teachers' Salaries}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Community</th>
<th>MoE</th>
<th>NGOs</th>
<th>Private</th>
<th>Others</th>
<th>Not</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>States in Central and Southern part of country 2015/16</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>79%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>2,845</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Puntland 2014/15**</td>
<td>85%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>779</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somaliland 2014/15**</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>59%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>1,804</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somalia Total</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>5,428</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


59. Guidelines for monitoring and verifying teacher salary payments have not been established. As a result of the different sources of payment across schools and school types, there is no uniform means to track whether every teacher who has a teaching contract gets paid regularly and that individuals without teaching contracts are not receiving teacher salary payments.

Somaliland

60. The introduction of the free primary education (FPE) policy may have had a negative impact on teacher quality in public schools. Previous to this policy, government schools were charging supplemental fees to parents, which the headteachers used to help cover operating costs and top-up salaries of their teachers. In Somaliland, which has the largest share of teachers in Somalia paid by the government (66.4%), the move by the government to make good on its promise of

\textsuperscript{357} ESSP, p. 61
\textsuperscript{358} ESSP, p. 84
free primary education resulted in lowering teacher salaries in state schools as they were no longer permitted to collect additional fees from parents.

61. Lower salaries that were imposed on government school teachers after FPE drove numbers of teachers to move to the private sector, and ultimately caused teachers to impose their own student fees. Teachers who remained in public schools introduced per-student fees (e.g. $2.50 in 2018) both to cover costs of supplies, as well as to supplement their salaries. This move caused thousands of parents to withdraw their children, as reported in March of 2018. The MoEHE director has said that the ministry is aware of the problem and that the government planned to raise the salaries for teachers to cover the amount being charged to the parents. 359

62. Somaliland has five universities that provide teacher training, which is monitored by the teacher education unit within the MoEHE. Teacher education units in the universities, in close collaboration with the international development agencies and MoEHE, manage teacher development programs. These programs provide primarily in-service training for the practicing teachers to update their pedagogical skills and ensure professional certification. Selected universities also provide pre-service programs.

63. Since head teachers are not adequately trained or supervised, they have limited capacity to support or manage their teachers effectively. There are not yet any specific regulations and standards for the organization and administration of schools, nor a regular program of in-service orientation and communication relating to policies, curriculum issues or instructional strategies. REOs, DEOs and CECs are expected to play a role in school governance and supervision, although their actual powers in this respect are not clear.

States in the southern and central parts of the country

64. Teacher remuneration is ad hoc; there is no structure in place to assure teacher salaries. Only 8% are paid by the government. Sources of payment from private organizations include groups such as the private sector, the School Association for Formal Education, the Formal Private Education Network in Somalia, Somali Community Concern, Somali Education Development Association and Gedo Education Network.

65. Since the large majority of teachers are supported by funds through a variety of private sources, there are no means for oversight. The lack of established guidelines for monitoring teachers together with the multiplicity of organizations providing educational services makes teacher management a serious challenge.

66. Somali National University (SNU) has played a central role in the training and certification of teachers. Teacher training systems are largely driven by development partners and as a result are fragmented and not based on standardized competencies and standards outlined in government policy documents. An example of a recent such project is the EU-funded Elmidoon (Seeking Knowledge) project. Primary and secondary school teacher trainees received in-service training at SNU for trainers of teachers. Benadir University in Mogadishu has also been a source of teacher training since 2002.

67. Similar to Somaliland and Puntland, the number of female teachers in states in the southern and central part of the country is extremely low. There are slightly more female teachers in rural primary and secondary schools, and at the secondary level. (Graph 5.1: Proportion of Female

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Monitoring and accountability for quality

**Somaliland**

68. The Quality Assurance and Standards Service (QAAS) in Somaliland has the power to inspect schools and services as set out in Somaliland’s Education Act 2007 and the revised Somaliland National Education Policy of 2012. The mandate covers monitoring and evaluation of all aspects and levels of education and training including monitoring of the institutional capacity that supports education delivery, except universities where the Commission for Higher Education is in charge. However, there is a need to establish minimum standards and standardized methods of assessing educational delivery at the level of the teacher, the class, the school and the region.

69. One key policy that is holding back quality improvement in Somaliland is the unwritten rule no student should fail the fail certificate examination. There is also a widespread belief that the current system appears to allow cheating in examinations, such as permitting students to use their mobile phones during test-taking, in order to achieve higher scores – tolerated and perhaps even encouraged by parents.

70. The international community has been a key supporter of developing an EMIS.

**States in the southern and central part of the country**

71. The management of quality assurance systems and the implementation of minimum standards of education is the responsibility of the Department of Quality Assurance. The Department uses a combination of capacity building, inspections and external evaluations to achieve the desired

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outcomes of quality and reliable education. The department uses several key tools including internal evaluations, external evaluations, and school supervision.

72. Central and Southern states have received extensive international support in the development of an Education Management Information System (EMIS). Progress has been made over the past three years on developing a functioning EMIS system to support better monitoring of progress with key education sector indicators. Specifically, UNICEF enhanced the capacity of the Ministries of Education across Somalia in support of EMIS development.³⁶² The use of EMIS was mainly piloted in Banadir region in 2013-2015 and has been scaled up to cover most of the states in the central and southern parts of the country. There are however pockets of inaccessible areas where insecurity has made it all but impossible to collect data (e.g. Middle Juba).

73. Over the past several years the MoECHE has made progress with developing school supervision and monitoring systems. During this time the Department of Quality Assurance has led training of federal, state and district level education personnel on EMIS. This has included 50 REOs and Education umbrella staff representatives trained on how to conduct census and validation of the EMIS data. However, key challenges remain and experience in carrying out quality assurance activities are summarized in Spotlight 5.5 below. These spring from: coordination and lack of clarity over roles between different levels of government and limited engagement of some regional offices, insufficient funds to carry out routine school supervision because of reliance on donors and limited allocations from the MoECHE budget. As a result, while the overall approach and design of quality assurance systems are sound, the capacity weaknesses within Department of Quality Assurance has undermined effective implementation and the overall quality assurance role of the MoECHE.

Spotlight 5.5: Summary of organizational capacity constraints – Quality Assurance and School - FGS

At design level the MoECHE has in place several important and well-thought-out quality assurance mechanisms covering ‘external and internal evaluations’, ‘Quality Improvement Officers’, ‘Quality Improvement Managers’ and ‘Quality Improvement Coordinators’.

i. Insufficient budget allocations for ‘investment expenditures’ has meant that these mechanisms have remained poorly developed with few officers in government receiving any training on these mechanisms. This gap is particularly acute at State and Regional levels. Few officers are actually in place to operationalize Quality Assurance mechanisms within the MoECHE, and there is virtually no operational budget to support the actual implementation of Quality Assurance activities.

ii. School level supervision and quality assurance activities are also not implemented effectively for reasons outlined above. As a result, little support is provided to head teachers or teachers in schools to improve the quality of learning and teaching via government quality assurance (QA) systems.

iii. Given the lack of a coherent policy to regulate the different types of private schools, there have also been challenges with regulating the quality of private schools and access to high risk geographic locations has further undermined the ability of the MoECHE at all levels of administration to regulate the quality of services across the overall education sector.

iv. Staff salaries are not paid on a regular basis, due to aforementioned shortfalls in budget.

74. Over 90% of secondary schools in the central and southern states are managed by non-governmental institutions, namely community organizations, private sector and NGOs. Ownership of formal secondary schools at district level in Somalia is predominantly by the community. Most secondary schools (85.3%) have a school management committee (SMC). Conversely, only 51.4% have a parents-teacher association (PTA). PTAs in the form of Community Education Committees (CECs) are composed of parents and community members, local elders, local education authorities, and teachers.

Assessing learning outcomes

75. Whereas in Puntland and Somaliland there are clear indicators of learning outcomes being achieved at the primary level based on exit examination and Minimum Learning Assessment results, this is far more difficult to assess within states in the southern and central part of the country. Africa Educational Trust (AET) has supported umbrellas/private education providers in setting the Grade 8 exams for the last eight years and centralized Form 4 exams for the last three years. About 8 education foundations/umbrellas were supported by AET on Form 4 examinations prior to MOE centralized school leaving examinations. These results could provide a basis for measuring learning outcomes and improvements in these outcomes over the last eight years.

76. Although figures from states in the southern and central part of the country indicate marginal improvements in results these should be treated with caution. The figures available are neither totally reliable nor comprehensive. The numbers taking the exams remain very low as schools in the two largest foundations/umbrellas have not participated in the government exams at Grade 8 level and only in the last year have they agreed to take the Form 4 exams. It is for this reason that, unlike the numbers in Puntland and Somaliland, the numbers taking the Grade 8 exams have remained low. In addition, pass rates at Grade 8 in all regions are usually very high at over 90% as can be seen from table below, the exception being 2012. In general, the Grade 8 exams do not appear to be a barrier to secondary school entry as even the few that fail and want to continue find ways through the system and thus they are not high stakes exams. Thus, while exams can be used as an indicator, they remain a very broad measure. The improved pass rate between 2012 and 2016 may be little more than a shift in the criteria. (Table 5.8)

Table 5.8: Enrolment and pass rates from states in the southern and central part of the country in Form 4 and Grade 8 exams

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>2012</th>
<th>2013</th>
<th>2014</th>
<th>2015</th>
<th>2016</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Grade 8</td>
<td>Enrol</td>
<td>Pass</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>Enrol</td>
<td>Pass</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3774</td>
<td>3039</td>
<td>81%</td>
<td>3279</td>
<td>2980</td>
<td>91%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Form 4</td>
<td>Enrol</td>
<td>Pass</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>Enrol</td>
<td>Pass</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1140</td>
<td>759</td>
<td>67%</td>
<td>1318</td>
<td>389</td>
<td>30%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11574</td>
<td>10104</td>
<td>87%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NB. * No exams were conducted in 2014

363 ESSP, p. 80
364 ESSP, p. 64
Intergovernmental Transfers

77. **National budget allocation to the Education sector varies by region.** The share of the education sector allocation in FGS, which is extremely low by international standards, has even declined slightly from 1.2% in 2014 to 1.07% in 2016. In contrast, Puntland has more than doubled its percentage allocation from 3% to 7% between 2012 and 2015. Furthermore Somaliland, which allocates approximately 7% to 8% of its overall budget to education and records the highest percentage and the highest gross amount of allocation to education across the three administrative groups (*Table 5.9*). Such differences in the share of government funding allocated to the education sector can easily be linked with the stage of fragility and conflict each administration has experienced. Somaliland has had a relatively longer period of peace and has made significant progress in State building thereby stabilizing its focus on revenue collection while committing less to military and recovery budgets. The FGS on the other hand, is only now emerging from conflict and long periods of fragility.

78. **Though no explicit records exist, the MoECHE finance department estimates direct funding support from external sources at approximately USD 1.25 million annually.** Donor and education partner support also takes other forms such as training of MoECHE staff, support for important meetings such as the Annual Joint Reviews as well as providing technical support to key Ministry functions through payment of Technical Advisors (*Figure 5.3*)

*Figure 5.3: Total MoECHE Budget against estimated donor support*[^365]

79. **Weaknesses with financial management and audit systems create risks of funds leakage.** Inadequate expertise in procurement of services and construction contracts can lead to ‘loose contracts’ and poor delivery of services procured by the government.

[^365]: ESSP, p. 158
Regional Education Expenditure

Table 5.9 Proportion of National Budget allocated to MoEs in Somalia (FGS, SL & PL)\textsuperscript{366}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total Government</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Budget</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somaliland</td>
<td>100,000,000</td>
<td>125,000,000</td>
<td>152,000,000</td>
<td>180,000,000</td>
<td>203,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Puntland</td>
<td>30,158,200</td>
<td>38,622,800</td>
<td>39,277,340</td>
<td>60,182,157</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FGS</td>
<td>35,100,000</td>
<td>114,300,000</td>
<td>145,000,000</td>
<td>141,200,000</td>
<td>168,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MoE actual budget</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somaliland</td>
<td>7,823,156</td>
<td>8,895,312</td>
<td>12,418,867</td>
<td>12,793,592</td>
<td>14,618,336</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Puntland</td>
<td>1,069,526</td>
<td>1,384,565</td>
<td>1,186,658</td>
<td>4,212,751</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FGS</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>1,763,594</td>
<td>1,335,008</td>
<td>1,800,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MoE % of Total</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Budget</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somaliland</td>
<td>7.8%</td>
<td>7.1%</td>
<td>8.2%</td>
<td>7.1%</td>
<td>7.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Puntland</td>
<td>3.5%</td>
<td>3.6%</td>
<td>3.0%</td>
<td>7.0%</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FGS</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>1.21%</td>
<td>0.95%</td>
<td>1.07%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Computations from SL ESA, PL ESA and FGS MoECHE Finance Dept; World Bank 2017

Somaliland

80. Somaliland has devoted a consistently higher share of its budget to education than the FMS MoEs. The MoHE of Somaliland receives some appropriations from the Ministry of Finance (7.2% of the budget in 2016), though not sufficient to fully fund education. In the National Education Plan for 2012-2016, the government included plans to move (as fiscal resources allow) towards strengthening free provision of primary education through small block grants to the schools.

81. Direct bilateral aid has been constrained by the lack of recognition of Somaliland. However, through the UN/World Bank Joint Needs Assessment process and the recent efforts of the European Union countries and the European Commission, there is a move towards a more direct dialogue on aid. Meanwhile, UN agencies and international NGOs, using funds from the multilateral and bilateral donors, contribute significant direct resources to humanitarian efforts. Until 2012, there were often only limited attempts at transferring capacity from the NGOs and agencies to the Ministry, which Somaliland made provisions to address.

82. Somaliland also receives significant diaspora funding, as well as funding through a Development Trust. For the most part the diaspora funding went directly to subsistence for its citizens, but the government has planned to harness some of these funds to develop the education sector. Additionally, the government hopes to augment its own budget with monies from the Development Fund, set up in 2012 with support from the Adam Smith Institute\textsuperscript{367}.

States in the southern and central part of the country

83. The spending of the federal government on the education sector has remained largely stagnant in absolute terms despite a significant growth in government revenue and direct donor support to the FGS. As a result, the proportion of the total national budget spent on the education sector, already negligible in 2014 at 1.21%, has decreased further to 1.07% (Table 5.9). The National

\textsuperscript{366} ESSP, p. 159
\textsuperscript{367} Somaliland Development Fund, http://www.somalilanddevelopmentfund.org/
Development Plan commits to increasing the national budget allocation to the education sector by 4.3% per year, and ultimately looks to increase the share to education to 10%.

84. Available data shows the MoECHE consistently fails to execute the budgeted funds allocated to the education sector. This has resulted in the ministry losing millions of dollars annually from the national budget, as demonstrated by planned budget allocations for 2016 (at 4.7% of the national budget) compared to execution (of only 1.07% of national budget funds). In 2016 alone, this translated into a loss of some USD 5.7 million dollars for education available from domestic financing.

85. Budget allocations to the sector render it unable to support key functions. This includes training and capacity building of education personnel, covering recurrent expenditures for quality assurance, and paying salaries of essential staff and teaching personnel. More fundamental problems exist with the broader regulatory and taxation systems at federal and regional state levels, the absence of which prevent sufficient revenue generation for government to cover costs of essential social services such as education. At the same time, Government policy-makers have had to prioritize investments in security over education. Funding problems are exacerbated in conflict and famine/drought-affected communities, where education struggles to secure funds and maintain its programming.

86. Over the past several years the federal government has regularly disbursed funding to education ministries at the regional level to support education service delivery in states in the southern and central part of the country. Disbursements from federal level to state and regional levels have been limited given the small size of the national budget over recent years. Recently, however, several state administrations have demonstrated a capacity to generate local level government revenues that can be used to support education service delivery at state and regional level.

Education Planning

87. Planning capacity over all states in Somalia has been weak, and international donors have sought to help to strengthen the capacities of the regional MOE administrations. Inadequately skilled staff in key portfolios reduces the ability of the education sector to deliver services effectively. There is also very limited participation of teachers and representatives of civil society in planning and budget allocation processes. Weak data management systems further hinder effective planning and priority setting at all levels of education service delivery. An early UNICEF-EU project launched in 2010 helped to build an EMIS as well as provided development in strategic planning, policy development, human resources management, organizational development, financial management, quality assurance and girls' education promotion. FINNSOM is currently recruiting for its South-Central Somalia Project, which aims to facilitate the transfer of skills, competencies and knowledge of qualified Somali expatriates for strengthening the capacity of the ministry in policy development, strategy planning and policy implementation.

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369 National Development Plan (draft), p. 25

370 ESSP, p.159

371 [https://ei-ie.org/en/detail/1287/eu-funded-education-support-programme-for-somalia-launched](https://ei-ie.org/en/detail/1287/eu-funded-education-support-programme-for-somalia-launched)

Somaliland

88. Somaliland has had an education planning group in place since 2005, which has made progress across a range of strategic areas. There is also a Somaliland Education Sector Strategic Plan for the period 2007-2011 and an Operational Plan for 2009. The National Development Plan (2012-2016) remains the most recent policy document. Additional official documents include a Strategic Plan for Primary Education for Disadvantaged Groups, a document outlining Strategic Issues in Teacher Management and Development (approved in 2008) a Funding Plan for Expanded Access to Primary Education, a Secondary Education and Technical and Vocational Training Strategic Document for the period 2008-2009, a Teacher Education Policy, a Teachers’ Code of Conduct, and an Accelerated Basic Education (ABE) Curriculum, Transfer Policy and Implementation Strategy. In addition, a Gender Policy has been drafted and a Gender Scholarship Fund is in place. The International Office for Migration and the EU currently finance the services of four technical assistants for Policy and Planning in the Somaliland MoECHE.

Role of International Donors

89. Since 2012, Somalia has been among the top 10 of recipients of overseas development assistance, with three percent on average devoted to education. Though comprehensive data are not available, there is no doubt that significant funding from donors and partners directly supports educational programs and projects. Support ranges from direct assistance to programs and projects across the sector, training of Ministry staff through short courses and seminars to payment of technical advisors for the various departments in the Ministry in an effort to strengthen capacity. Donors and partners have also played a role in the funding of initiatives that promote the availability of educational data such as population surveys and the annual educational statistics yearbooks. Further, EMIS activities are dependent upon external donor support and have, on the whole, been implemented on a minimal budget over the past few years. Table 5.10 provides a rough estimate based on available data regarding investments made in the education sector from 2011 to 2017 and includes confirmed additional funding up to 2020.

90. Significantly, most ministry personnel (97%) are paid with external funding sources from donors/development partners, without which the MoECHE could not function. This includes some 23% of the Regional Education Officers (REOs), 86% of Quality Assurance Officers (QAOs) and 100% of District Educational Officers (DEOs). Further, much of the technical assistance to the MoECHE is in the form of technical advisors, the majority of whom are taken up by the Department of Policy and Planning. The other departments of Gender, Quality Assurance, Finance, HR, Higher Education and Public Schools each has one technical advisor.

91. The Somali government actively solicits support from the diaspora, as evidenced in the Ministry of Human Development and Public Services Directorate of Education Interim Education Sector Strategic Plan 2013/2014 – 2015/2016 for South Central ZONE. One of the specified priority actions was to, “Mobilise funding from government, the donor partner community and other

373 The recent “UNICEF Somalia Education Strategy Note 2018-2020” sets out UNICEF’s own strategy for helping Somalia improve education enrolment, equity, quality and provides a results framework for the organization’s program of support to the country. UNICEF will continue to support the EMIS.
sources, including the Diaspora,” to finance both institutional development activities as well as service delivery activities. Somaliland also actively solicits Diaspora contribution to education.

Table 5.10: Investments made in the education sector from 2011 to 2017

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Donor</th>
<th>Partner</th>
<th>Project Name</th>
<th>Regions</th>
<th>Value (USD)*</th>
<th>Period</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>USAID</td>
<td>MERCY CORPS</td>
<td>Somali Youth Learners Initiative</td>
<td>SL, PL &amp; CSS</td>
<td>37,042,403</td>
<td>2011-2017</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>UNICEF</td>
<td>Peacebuilding, Education and Advocacy Program (PBEA)</td>
<td>SL, PL &amp; CSS</td>
<td>14,000,000</td>
<td>2012-2016</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qatar</td>
<td>UNICEF</td>
<td>Education a Child</td>
<td>SL, PL &amp; CSS</td>
<td>10,000,000</td>
<td>2014-2017</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GPE</td>
<td>UNICEF</td>
<td>Global Partnership for Education</td>
<td>SL, PL &amp; CSS</td>
<td>14,000,000</td>
<td>2012-2017</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USAID</td>
<td>UNICEF</td>
<td>Alternative Basic Education</td>
<td>Gede, Bay &amp; Bakool</td>
<td>9,999,999</td>
<td>2015-2020</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DFID</td>
<td>UNICEF</td>
<td>Resilience Program</td>
<td>CSS</td>
<td>3,000,000</td>
<td>2014-2016</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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https://www.globalpartnership.org/download/file/fid/4123
Chapter 6: Lessons from Case Studies for Somalia

1. **Introduction.** This chapter provides an analysis of ways that other federal systems have addressed education system challenges similar to those faced by Somalia. The aim is to help the Government of Somalia consider ways to organize its education sector to take advantage of lessons from other countries in the context of its own history and political reality. It presents a summary of the experiences of three federal case study countries and derives key lessons that may help Somalia improve its education access, equity, and quality under a federal system.

2. **Analytical framework.** The chapter follows the analytical framework adopted throughout the case studies. The first section looks at the governance structures in terms of the politics, policies and legislative frameworks. The second looks at service delivery, while the third and fourth deal with planning and finance and the role of international donors respectively.

3. **Structure.** Each section presents a summary of the context in Somalia. After that key lessons from the case studies are presented based on common themes that have emerged and may relevant to Somalia. Finally, we draw on these case-study lessons to present suggested recommendations for policy makers in Somalia.

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**Politics, Policies, and Legislative Framework**

**Legislative and Policy Framework**

4. **Somalia’s Context:** The Ministries of Education in the Federal Member States in Somalia have signed a memorandum of understanding with the Federal Ministry of Education (MoECHE) in which they have agreed to work cooperatively in all matters related to the education sector and agreed upon the roles and responsibilities of each level. It states that the MoECHE is mandated to develop regulatory frameworks, policies, and oversee coordination, while the regional states are mandated to carry out all implementation. Federal government education officials in Somalia aspire to establish a multi-level system of education under which state and regional officials play a strong role in policy formation and in managing and delivering education services.

5. **Education is often subject to larger politics.** In the aftermath of the Bosnian war, BiH ensured the separation of ethnic groups through the establishment of 14 separate government bodies responsible for policy-making and legislation of education in a country with only 480,000 students. This system was established with the principal aim of ending hostilities between the warring ethnic groups. Education in Pakistan was centrally controlled and managed until a 2010 constitutional amendment to curtail presidential powers by devolving authority over education (and a number of other services) to provincial governments. This move was part of an effort to reduce the motivation for military takeover alongside a broader call for increased autonomy and authority for the provinces. In South Africa under Apartheid, education policy and programs were divided across 18 different education departments to enforce racial and ethnic segregation. In order to create a new, integrated nation, the post-Apartheid constitution created a single education system with provinces that were established as more multi-racial and multi-ethnic jurisdictions intended to unite, rather than separate, groups.
6. **The importance of a continued role for central government.** In BiH, the constitution left no room for a central ministry of education to exercise the authority or leadership to harmonize or standardize core education system components, including teacher qualifications, standards, curriculum, or assessments. Furthermore, constitutionally, the federal authority is neither able to challenge the politicization of education in its more extreme forms nor prevent active discrimination or segregation within schools. In Pakistan, as a result of the Constitutional amendment in 2010, legislation and policy-setting within education became the exclusive right of provinces, with no central authority established to define norms and standards. However, the reality is that through negotiation and consensus, Pakistan has been able to agree on a set of national standards for the country that cover a range of policy issues from teachers to quality assurance. While these standards are not fully implemented, and the Federal government has little recourse to compel provinces to adhere to them, the example of Pakistan shows that even in a highly decentralized system, sub-national jurisdictions need to agree on standards and coordination to reduce policy duplication and conflict and to strengthen the system as a whole. To oversee the effective establishment of an integrated system from the patchwork of ministries operating post-Apartheid, the legislature in South Africa granted significant powers to the Minister of Education. This has allowed the central government to control multiple aspects of the education system through establishing norms and standards. The provincial governments are responsible for service delivery and decision-making within the parameters established by the center.

7. **Implications for Somalia:** As Somalia’s leadership is debating the responsibilities and authorities of its federal ministry of education, it would be judicious to consider the factors that guided decisions on this issue for these case study countries. If Somalia is looking to education as an instrument for social cohesion and political integration, it would make sense to **empower the federal ministry with the responsibility for strategy, policy formulation, and establishing system standards and norms as South Africa has done.** If Somalia is concerned that increasing the federal ministry’s policy-making scope would risk a power grab and excessive centralization, then Pakistan’s approach to limiting the federal ministry’s authority could make sense for Somalia. This approach may also be appropriate in contexts where emerging or established regional groups are providing education services and it is therefore necessary to reach consensus on power sharing. BiH provides a good lesson for Somalia about what to avoid: the sub-national entities’ inability to cooperate combined with a powerless federal ministry has severely inhibited inter-province collaboration and system efficiency and effectiveness.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Key Recommendations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a) <strong>Agree on a National Framework for Education Policy.</strong> Somalia’s regional education actors should work to agree on a national framework for setting education policy that provides for a federal role in establishing system-wide standards and norms.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Division of Responsibility Between Levels of Government

8. **Somalia’s Context:** Legislation governing sub-national responsibilities for education is still under deliberation. As such, Somalia’s education system lacks an agreed upon legal framework to guide the federal vis-à-vis the sub-national roles and responsibilities. Nonetheless, a number of jurisdictions have established their own education ministries for overseeing planning and service delivery and have formulated their own Education Sector Strategic Plans. The establishment of these separate ministries of education in the sub-national entities springs from a need to accommodate the country’s broader political system of power-sharing with both majority and disadvantaged clans and to address associated inequalities in distribution of power and representation in decision-making. While the newly elected federal government has been negotiating political agreements with a number of the member states, important issues related to allocation of powers and resources remain to be agreed. The roles and responsibilities of the districts are also under discussion in Somalia, although there are only a few functioning district level governance structures in place.

9. **Coordinating bodies.** In all three case study countries, high level coordination bodies were set up to facilitate exchanges between groups responsible for education. In South Africa, this includes forums for political and civil servants leading education to cooperate and collaborate with the aim of formulating, inter alia, curriculum, assessment, and education quality assurance systems. An equivalent body in BiH, the Council of Education Ministers, appears to suffer from the lack of clear leadership and inability to find any consensus across the 14 education ministries. When they operate well, these coordinating bodies can support the development of a shared vision, frameworks for action and build trust in the authority of the central government, such as appears to have been the case in Pakistan. In Pakistan this has been possible partly due to the recognition by the Provinces of the important role of the central government in coordinating common policies. In the absence of a strong central government in Somalia it may be appropriate for donors to support such a forum, both financially and with technical support and guidance.

10. **Power and responsibilities can shift over time.** In Pakistan, the balance of legislative and policy power held at each level has changed over time. Although changes to the constitution in 2010 gave provinces the responsibility for overseeing education policy, planning, service delivery and financing, a new role of the federal government has been emerging through negotiations with and across the provinces. After an initial period of poorly defined roles and responsibilities and fractured approaches across the provinces, the provincial and federal education departments have increasingly coordinated their efforts, leading to a number of major achievements in 2017 including a new draft National Education Plan, a unified National Curriculum Framework, and the development of an agreed set of national learning standards for the first time in Pakistan’s history. In contrast, in BiH, the constitutional arrangements which essentially removed any central authority led to internal conflict that has frustrated numerous national and international attempts to improve coordination and threatened efforts to build a peaceful and tolerant society.

11. **Centralizing tendencies within sub-national governments.** In Pakistan provinces continue to be slow in granting power to the districts despite clear guidelines in the Constitution. Currently district education offices function as local administrative units for service delivery and report to provincial education departments, rather than locally elected officials. In BiH, one of the sub-national entities (Republika Srpska) managed to centralize all education responsibility at the entity level, with municipal offices acting as local administrative arms.

12. **Clarity of responsibility for capacity building.** In none of the case study countries was the responsibility for capacity building of recently empowered local authorities made clear. In this
absence, there was a proliferation of individual programs supported by donors in BiH and Pakistan. This impeded coordination within their newly decentralized systems.

13. Implications for Somalia. As Somalia’s political actors are moving closer towards an agreement on the distribution of roles and responsibilities in the education system, it would be useful to consider keeping flexibility in these structures. Pakistan and South Africa both formulated clear distinctions in roles between the national and sub-national authorities, but their legislation has permitted negotiation between the levels. This enabled the systems to evolve on the basis of performance and experience: in Pakistan for example the level of autonomy granted to provinces (not just in education) depends on the level of development and capacity in the provinces. Specifically, two of the more developed provinces (Punjab and Sindh) were granted greater autonomy than the others until recently. Equally, as the system in Pakistan evolved and it became clearer that greater coordination was needed, legislation that created a coordinating body has permitted the autonomous sub-national governments to agree on coordinated policies. Thus, the distribution of powers and relationship between national and sub-national governments should not be seen as a fixed state. Somalia should avoid the errors made in BiH, which have locked in a structure that appears to make it all but impossible to harmonize policy and planning.

Key Recommendations

b) Agree on the federal government’s role in ensuring the right to education. Somalia’s regional education actors should consider legislation or policy formulation that would empower the federal Ministry of Education to ensure the right to education with measures that compel states to comply, while allowing flexibility for roles and responsibilities to evolve as the system matures.

c) Support emerging mechanisms for coordination across states. Somalia’s regional education actors should deepen cooperation on inter-state agreements regarding standards and norms for curriculum and assessment, textbooks, teacher qualifications, capacity building, data collection, and donor-funded scholarships. Absence of a legal framework to mandate coordination and standard setting across states, it is essential to reinforce efforts (including through development partners) to strengthen Somalia’s emerging intra-state agreements on standards and norms for curriculum and assessment, textbooks, teacher qualifications, capacity building, data collection, and donor-funded scholarships.

d) Ensure alignment and coherence across various legal and policy instruments, from the start. Local government laws, decentralization policies, as well as education sector guidelines such as the ESSP need to reflect a common understanding of the division of functions and responsibilities across administrative levels, so as to strengthen the enabling environment for decentralized education services.

Service Delivery

Infrastructure and Access to Quality Schooling

14. Somalia’s Context. The draft Constitution of Somalia and Draft National Education Policy state that free and compulsory education is the right of every child, thus placing the responsibility for access
on government. However, the inability to ensure access with an acceptable quality of infrastructure is a significant challenge facing Somalia. With growing stability, regional governments have emerged and established ministries of education. The central MoECHE currently plays a limited role in ensuring access or for the construction and maintenance of infrastructure, though it is embarking on a needs assessment over the 2018-2020 period, to prioritize construction of new school buildings in underserved areas where the demand for education services is high. In the long period of conflict, and in the effective absence of state provision and oversight, a patchwork of non-state actors has emerged to help fill the access gap (52% and 70% at primary and secondary levels, respectively, as noted above in Chapter 5). This has resulted in highly unequal access rates for the disadvantaged, such as children among nomadic communities, internally displaced persons, and the poor – all of whom are neither served by state or non-state schools. It also places the burden of financing education disproportionately on families, further reducing access for the poorest.

15. **Right to education and the role of the central government.** All three case-study countries have enshrined the right to education in legislation and are signatories to international conventions on the right to education. Responsibility for providing services is decentralized to regional authorities in all three countries. In **Pakistan** and **South Africa**, the role of central government is to ensure provinces undertake this responsibility using their respective share of national revenue. While significant gaps in provision remain, and on occasion it has fallen to the judiciary to enforce these rights, there is a common recognition that the central government plays an oversight and guarantor role. In contrast, in **BiH** the legislative structures put in place following the war and lack of funds allocated to the central MOE undermine any efforts to enforce the right to education.

16. **The role of the non-state sector.** In **Pakistan** the non-state sector plays an important role in providing education and is increasingly being harnessed by the Federal and provincial governments through public-private partnerships and community schools. In both cases, donor support has been channeled into these programs.

17. **Implications for Somalia.** The experiences from the case studies suggest that whatever distribution of powers and funding within education is decided by stakeholders in Somalia, the Federal government should continue to play a role in guaranteeing the right to education. At a minimum, the experience of **BiH** shows the importance of a recognized central authority and responsibility in a country with ethnic divisions and the potential for discriminatory behavior. Further, there is strong argument for ensuring that the central MoECHE has budget for equity-targeted programs, either to supplement, or if needed to counteract, regional efforts. **Annex Box 1: Establishing fundamental school quality standards in Vietnam** provides an example from a non-case study country which established national standards for schools and then targeted resources directly to those schools with the greatest need. Vietnam’s fundamental quality school level program is a practical way to define a minimum standard of quality for all schools and to direct finances on a priority basis to schools falling below this standard.
Key Recommendations

e) Ensure equitable access to quality schooling across Somalia. Somalia’s regional education actors should formulate policy initiatives to raise every school to at least a basic standard of quality and seek ways to target resources to schools that fall below that standard. For further discussion on mechanisms for funding federal interventions see Chapter 6 Paragraph 45.

f) Strengthen oversight of non-state schools and networks. Somalia’s regional education actors should establish mechanisms to recognize, register, monitor the performance of, and provide public information on non-state schools with a view to harnessing their contribution to helping Somalia achieve education and learning for all.

Curriculum and Educational Materials

18. Somalia’s Context. The National Education Curriculum Framework for states in the Southern and Central parts of the country was developed over a two-year period in an attempt to increase coordination in a fragmented system. As yet this framework has not been unified with that which is used by Puntland or Somaliland. In reality, even in states in the Southern and Central parts of the country, the deployment of the curriculum framework is not enforced. Supply of education materials is equally splintered and ad hoc, with textbooks, like curriculum, often imported from other countries.

19. Degrees of curriculum flexibility. In South Africa, schools and provinces are expected to follow the National Curriculum, and the national department of education uses this to exercise authority in the system. In Pakistan the provincial and Federal Ministries of Education agreed on a common framework curriculum. However, each province develops a provincial curriculum within the national framework which includes language policy. In BiH, no national curriculum exists despite multiple efforts to develop a common core curriculum. This has resulted in a patchwork of curriculums being used with no standardization. BiH is notable for its efforts to politicize the curriculum at local levels.

20. Textbook standardization. In BiH, there is no national textbook quality assurance, with entity and canton governments responsible for sourcing as they see fit. This is in contrast to recent efforts in South Africa and Pakistan to standardize/harmonize textbooks. In 2011, the South African national department of basic education determined there was a need to provide quality assurance on textbooks. Textbooks are now pre-vetted and provinces can only buy from a list that meets minimum standards (including adherence to national curriculum). In Pakistan, textbook design and production is delegated to the provincial level, with each responsible for establishing a Textbook Board which will now be expected to work within the parameters established in recently developed Minimum National Standards for Quality Education. Previously there was no coordinating mechanism.

21. Language policy. In all three case studies, sub-national governments have control over language policy. However, the extent of central oversight again differs significantly. In South Africa, the national department of basic education has established standards within which all provinces and schools must operate, increasing consistency and harmony within the system. In contrast, language policy is used in BiH to segregate children by ethnicity, even when there is no significant linguistic barrier to fully integrated education.
22. **Implications for Somalia.** The history and importance of clan-based relationships in the existing education ecosystem (numerous regional Ministries of Education) show the importance of flexibility and consensus building in curriculum, textbooks, and education materials. *The case studies point out a variety of options that have allowed a degree of regional autonomy while pursuing coordination and harmonization.* The recent voluntary move in Pakistan towards closer standardization of curriculum and education materials represents an explicit recognition by regional actors in the country of the need for coordination through collaboration, even without a central or federal mandate.

### Key Recommendations

**g) Ensure a common curriculum.** Somalia’s regional education actors should formalize and work to operationalize their agreement on a common curriculum framework and syllabus (allowing for local refinements), including with the integration of the Somaliland’s and Puntland’s curriculums.

### Teacher Contracting and Performance Management

23. **Somalia’s Context.** There are significant differences between Somaliland and the rest of the country in terms of teachers. In the majority of the country, most teachers are not paid by the government (just 8% in states in the Southern and Central parts of the country), reducing top-down accountability within the system and the space for effective teacher management. In Somaliland, in contrast, the government is responsible for 66% of salaries. The central MoECHE is almost completely removed from teacher payment, reducing influence over the ministries of education in the other sub-national entities. In Somaliland, teacher training is coordinated by the government and delivered through universities: in the rest of the country, Somali National University has played a central role in the training and certification of teachers, although this is primarily paid for by donors/NGOs and government coordination is lacking. In all cases the focus is on in-service training and up-skilling the workforce.

24. **State-level teacher hiring.** In all three case studies, teacher hiring is handled by sub-national governments who pay teachers directly. This centralization process is designed to reduce administrative burdens at the school level, standardize the appointment and promotion process, and ensure a clear structure for performance management. However, in each of the three cases centralization of hiring has the trade-off of effectively reducing the ability of school leadership to manage teacher performance within the school. It also offers opportunities for corruption and rent-seeking behavior, a significant challenge in Pakistan.

25. **Setting national standards.** In Pakistan and South Africa, the central government has developed standards for teacher quality, but no such framework exists in BiH. These standards are designed to provide guidance both to sub-national governments on appointment and promotion as well as to teacher training bodies (primarily universities). Further, in South Africa, it is the central government that sets the nationwide pay scale based on collective bargaining with the unions.

26. **Collective bargaining and unions.** Of the three case studies, only in South Africa do unions hold significant power. In South Africa, the largest teacher union has historic ties to the ruling ANC party. It is also through the single pay scale and collective bargaining agreement that provinces are protected from inter-province competition for teachers, and teachers are able to move around South Africa. In Pakistan and BiH, teachers’ unions advocate for teachers but are seen as peripheral to policy-making and salary setting.
27. **Implications for Somalia.** Given the existing fragmentation of teacher payment in Somalia, it seems both unlikely and undesirable for MoECHE to be responsible for direct teacher payments. The case studies who how federal authorities in different countries can play a coordination and standard setting role in terms of initial teacher training and certification as well as quality standards for teachers and principals. In Somalia, such a role could become increasingly important as Somalia’s regional education actors take on greater responsibility for teacher salaries. Variation in remuneration could also lead to a competitive market for teachers across sub-national entities within the country, suggesting the importance of transparency and performance standards in teacher compensation.

### Key Recommendations

#### h) Develop teacher standards.
Somalia’s regional education actors should support, through legislation or regulation, the federal ministry’s role in formulating national standards for teachers, including for qualification and performance standards.

### Monitoring and Accountability for Quality

28. **Somalia’s Context.** MoECHE has attempted to standardize quality assurance efforts through the Department of Quality Assurance, however the reality today is that there is only a patchwork of quality assurance approaches delivered within regions. This is exacerbated by the large number of non-state and informal schools. In the absence of meaningful government funding for education, school management committees and community education committees have emerged as important actors in school monitoring and accountability. This role is strengthened by their financial role as these school councils represent communities that own or manage almost half the schools in the country and cover a larger share of teacher salaries, on average, than the state (outside Somaliland). Reliable data remains a key challenge in the Somali education system at all levels, covering inputs, outputs and especially outcomes. Somalia lacks an integrated education management education system.

29. **The importance of a national accountability framework.** A robust accountability framework that establishes clear lines of responsibility and develops processes and mechanisms for monitoring performance, assuring quality, and delivering follow-up, is critical in the development of a well-functioning education system. Nonetheless, the experience of South Africa highlights the importance of the political economy of accountability, namely that formal structures and processes will still be ineffective if corruption and a widespread acceptance of nonperformance or underperformance are prevalent.

30. **Holding non-state schools accountable.** In Pakistan, despite a large non-state sector, private sector educational institutions have largely remained unregulated in the past with no accountability mechanism for school inspections or quality assurance of the facilities and services provided by the private institutions. Regulatory efforts need to account for the risk that such approaches could put up unrealistic barriers to entry or to service provision, reducing incentives for a private school to seek to become formalized. A balance is needed that considers tradeoffs and unintended consequences.

31. **The role of school boards and school committees for accountability.** Despite legislation asserting the importance of school boards in BiH and South Africa, the case studies point out that they have a limited role in school management. Experience from all of the case studies shows that the
establishment of school boards or school committees in themselves is insufficient as a link in the school accountability chain. This is especially true when the school boards are not equipped with the capacity or tools to hold their schools accountable, as has been the case in these case study education systems.

32. **State-level responsibility for school monitoring and educational data systems.** In all case study countries, responsibility for data collection, school monitoring and quality assurance is devolved to sub-national governments. In **Pakistan**, **South Africa** and **BiH** (in Republika Srpska) where responsibility is held at the equivalent of state level, there are local administrative arms, that is, district education offices, which carry out many of these functions but are not autonomous bodies. In all cases, there is a lack of resourcing and capacity for monitoring. While donors have often supported the development of quality assurance tools, there is less support for follow-up actions that use quality assurance information to inform actions.

33. **The need for national data.** In **South Africa** and **Pakistan**, provincial governments are required to report data in standardized formats to the central government, which feed into a central database for purposes of national planning and reporting on international commitments. In **BiH**, entity governments are expected to similarly report but there is no national database for statistics on education. National student-level data that can be mapped to wider demographic data is also key for equity monitoring and efforts by the government to play a role in promoting equity: in **South Africa** for example, the government uses this data to determine conditional grants including the school feeding program, and to determine per-pupil funding levels for each income quintile. A lack of data can also lead to the politicization of education: in **BiH**, as standardized public information on educational inputs, outputs, and outcomes is not available, public discourse on education tends to focus almost exclusively on politics... potentially exacerbating an already fragile political situation.

34. **Implications for Somalia.**
   a. In the absence of existing norms at state-level, there may be an opportunity for Somalia to establish a system-wide accountability framework that includes standardized school quality assurance and inspection tools based on a shared definition of school quality. An interesting example of such a framework is under implementation in the state of Madhya Pradesh, India. **Annex Box 2: Improving schooling with system-wide accountability in India** shows that, even in a setting with weak governance, evaluating and improving school performance at scale may be possible, although to have an impact such a framework must incorporate follow-through strategies to work with schools to improve weaknesses revealed in the school evaluations. Such a system would eventually allow comparison of school quality across state borders. Given the large percentage of schools in the non-state sector, any quality assurance tool should be designed to cover state and non-state schools and combined with registration of all schools (key recommendation d, above). Focusing on basic registration of non-state actors to ensure data is available for planning purposes may be a ‘quick win.’

   b. Another lesson from the case studies is that school governance boards may not be a sufficient replacement for effective top-down accountability unless there is an adequate level of capacity. **Annex Box 3: Raising quality with school-based management in Indonesia** points out a school-based management program in Indonesia in which grants of non-salary budgets were provided to school committees to decided how to spend the funds to increase access and quality. Research on the initiative showed that their effectiveness was dependent upon the capacity of the key actors, namely the school committees.
c. With regard to data systems, while responsibility for data collection may be devolved to state governments, there is a clear value for Somalia to adopt (from the global community) protocols for education indicators and a process for data flow between the levels of the education system for planning, analysis, transparency, and follow-up, or for reporting on donor commitments.

**Key Recommendations**

i) **Develop a system-wide accountability framework.** Somalia’s regional education actors should seek to develop a framework for education system accountability that is reinforced through follow-up monitoring and actions.

j) **Invest in the capacity of school boards and community school committees.** Somalia’s regional education actors should agree on clear roles and responsibilities for community school committees and seek support to strengthen their governance capacity.

k) **Bolster data management system development and two-way data flows.** Somalia’s regional education actors should adopt uniform data protocols, establish a clear flow of data between schools, state authorities, and federal authorities for planning, open information exchange, and follow-up, as well as reporting on donor commitments.

**Assessing Learning Outcomes**

35. **Somalia’s Context.** MoECHE has made recent attempts to introduce standardized assessment at grades 4 and 8 in states in the Southern and Central parts of the country, which if effectively enforced, may provide an important measure of school quality nationally and allow comparison between states. However, neither Puntland nor Somaliland currently take part in these assessments since each has its own assessment, which prohibits comparison across the states. Further, private schools do not all undertake the testing which, given they make up the majority of enrolment, undermines the effectiveness and utility of the assessments.

36. **National assessments and entry/exit exams.** The lack of standardized assessment in BiH exacerbates the previously highlighted lack of data for evidence-based decision making to improve quality. In South Africa, the government recently introduced standardized annual national assessments to support provinces to measure learning outcomes and thus inform school and system improvement. The use of a national standard also allows annual progress and provisional quality to be analyzed and tracked. In all countries, the traditional means of assessing quality has been the use of entry/exit exams, either to progress to secondary school or university. These assessments are rarely standardized and are usually issued either by the province (matriculation exams in South Africa) or directly by the university (university entry exams in BiH).

37. **Sample-based testing for national benchmarking.** Sample-based testing is Pakistan is used by the Federal Government to take a snapshot of education quality in an attempt to track system progress in an affordable way in a context where national standardized assessments are not possible. South Africa participates in a number of international sample-based assessments that have allowed the country to track system progress in comparison to other countries.

38. **Citizen-led assessments.** The lack of assessment in BiH creates a situation in which citizens, stakeholders, education managers and politicians are unable to hold schools to account or be
held accountable for results. In Pakistan, the use of citizen-led assessments has emerged in response to a lack of reliable, standardized data on learning outcomes. These assessments serve as advocacy and accountability tools for citizens and the annual publication of citizen-led assessment findings in Pakistan represents a momentous date in the education calendar.

39. **Implications for Somalia.** Case study findings show how different federal systems work to build standardized assessment systems as a means to shine a light on education system performance and generate information that can be used to pursue learning outcomes for all students. The benefits of national assessment have been recognized by the central government in South Africa, and there are renewed efforts to harmonize assessments in Pakistan. In the current climate in Somalia, where multiple assessments are conducted across school types (private, public) and territories, the use of sample-based testing, either through the federal and state governments or by partnering with international organizations or even international civil society organizations, could allow the central government to benchmark and track system performance.

### Key Recommendations

1) **Establish standardized assessments.** Somalia’s regional education actors should seek support from international or African regional institutions to strengthen Somalia’s efforts to design and implement standardized learning assessments in public and private schools across Somalia in order to track learning outcomes and provide states and citizens with actionable information.

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### Planning and Finance of Education

#### Intergovernmental transfers

40. **Somalia’s Context.** National revenue in Somalia is low, largely as a result of the breakdown of in economy growth and tax infrastructure. What revenue is available is often prioritized away from education, which accounts for just 0.6% to 1.2% of total government spending. This is well below the 20% recommended by the Global Partnership for Education, and below neighboring countries (as well as the 7% allocated by the government of Somaliland).

41. **Generating sub-national revenue for education.** Although such decisions are related to the larger issue of intergovernmental transfers, fiscal decentralization and tax autonomy, it is notable that in all case study countries, sub-national governments are expected to top-up central government funding through means of local tax revenue generation.

42. **Conditional grants and federal expenditure.** In South Africa and Pakistan, central ministry budgets are partly used for equity-enhancing programs and to support low-capacity states. The use of indirect grants in South Africa for infrastructure is an example of the latter, while conditional grants for school feeding have an expressly equity-enhancing purpose and are additional to provincial budgets through tax distribution. In Pakistan, Basic Education Community Schools and

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375 The Peoples Action for Learning network is the coordinating framework for citizen-led assessments across the world, including ASER in Pakistan, ASER in India, and Uwezo in East Africa - http://palnetwork.org/
the National Education Foundation are federally-administered entities which fund compensatory programs targeting marginalized populations across the country. While each of these programs represent a small percentage of total and federal education spending, they are examples of the role federal government can play in ensuring equity even when delivery of education is decentralized. Such equity-focused grants are also highly amenable to inclusion in donor funded programs and multi-donor trust funds.

43. Fees and cost-sharing. South Africa provides an interesting example of the trade-offs in fees in public schools. The use of user and top-up fees helped bring funds into a system that was expanding rapidly post-Apartheid. As funds have become available, South Africa has managed to increase the number of children eligible for fee exemption by broadening the criteria from the very poorest to some 60% of the country’s children in 2018. However, the use of school fees has been perceived to have maintained, if not exacerbated, a stratified education system. In the initial years, fees were also viewed as a significant barrier to the poor who were above the threshold for fee exemption. Another source of funding being utilized in BiH is the Diaspora. A recent project, Diaspora for Development, aims to harness the $2 billion in remittances in a more coordinated way.

44. Equity-targeted funding and exclusions. The result of a disempowered central MOE in BiH is the emergence of exclusionary and discriminatory practices within education, at both school and entity level. Not only is the BiH government unable to effectively compel entity and canton governments to abide by right to education legislation, it is unable to provide funding to incentivize equitable policies or counteract discriminatory practices.

45. Implications for Somalia. In Pakistan the Basic Education Community Schools and the National Education Foundation are examples of Federal programs working with an explicit equity focus. In South Africa, the national government utilizes norms and standards as well as conditional grants such as the Accelerated Schools Infrastructure Delivery Initiative to promote equitable access. Furthermore in South Africa, a pro-poor funding formula set at the national level has been instrumental in increasing access amongst the poorest. In the current fiscal climate in Somalia, it is important to consider what is a reasonable share of total revenue to allocate to education, and of that, what is spent directly through the national government. Both are questions of prioritization within highly restricted budget envelopes. While the capacity to expand a central role in any of the areas will be dependent on resources, it is worth noting specifically the potential role of the central government in directly funding equity-enhancing programs. In addition to the experiences in the case study countries noted above, Annex Box 4: Ensuring equitable funding across jurisdictions with a federal program in Brazil shows how an equalization fund was established by the federal government of Brazil to ensure that every jurisdiction achieves a minimum per-student spending level through the topping up of financing to under-resourced jurisdictions. As highlighted above, an alternative pathway to closing educational finance disparities was established in Vietnam, where the national government chose to equalize resources across schools rather than across jurisdictions. Annex Box 1: Establishing fundamental quality school standards in Vietnam, referred to above, sets out how the national government set a minimum standard for all schools, measured each school to identify the resource gap that needed to be closed for that school to meet the minimum, and then provided the necessary resource transfer to each school to close that gap and help them achieve the fundamental quality level standard.
Chapter 6: Lessons from Case Studies for Somalia

July 5, 2018

Key Recommendations

m) Focus on equalization funding to target fiscal transfers to jurisdictions with inadequate revenue. Somalia’s federal and regional education actors should develop, with support of its donor partners, a funding model that provides top-up resourcing to the poorest jurisdictions or to the poorest schools.

Planning and financing at national and sub-national level

46. Somalia’s Context. States in the Southern and Central parts of the country, Somaliland, and Puntland prepare separate Education Sector Strategic Plans with no specific coordination process or harmonization. Further, the planning capacity across Somalia remains weak despite the efforts of international donors. The current budget allocation is insufficient to support core functions of an effective public education system including payment of teachers and school construction.

47. National plans, frameworks and standards. In all case studies, sub-national administrations are responsible for education planning. However, the degree of central oversight and coordination across education plans varies. In South Africa, the national government sets the overarching plan through the Education Action Plan and the National Budget, within the parameters of which provinces develop their own strategic plans. This is in addition to a large body of national legislation and policy that establish norms and standards. In Pakistan, where education is fully devolved, the National Education Plan 2017 is a non-binding national plan based on consensus between the federated units. Further, the recently developed Minimum National Standards for Quality Education are an explicit attempt to improve coordination and standardization. In BiH, the Ministry of Civil Affairs is mandated to undertake national planning of the education sector; however, it has been unable to develop a national education plan and the efforts in 2008 to increase coordination and coherence in the sector were ignored despite high-level commitments from all Education Ministries.

48. Influencing provincial budgets. In all three case studies, education expenditure is mostly financed by provinces using core funding from provincial budgets. The degree of control exerted by the central government on provincial budgets varies: from high levels in South Africa to almost none in BiH. In South Africa, the use of detailed standards (including teacher salaries and pupil-teacher ratios) effectively limits the fiscal space of provinces and forces them to spend a minimum percentage of budget on education. Minimum funding levels, weighted for equity, are a key measure that drives budget allocation but also ensures some equivalency. In contrast, in BiH, the lack of central authority over entity and canton affairs and budgets leads to large differences in per-pupil expenditure across the country.

Implications for Somalia. While it is impossible to examine causal links, the analysis of the case studies suggests that closer coordination in education planning can help strengthen the system. The experience of South Africa shows the potential leverage of setting standards and being able to compel sub-national bodies to adhere to those standards to create a degree of consistency and coherence across the system. In contrast, the lack of standards, coordinated planning and direct budget oversight by the national government in BiH has created a patchwork system of highly unequal service delivery.
Key Recommendations

n) Harmonize planning. Somalia’s federal and regional education actors should consider empowering the federal government to develop national framework plans within which individual ministries have given flexibility for implementation.

o) Ensure more efficient budget planning and execution between education and finance ministries as a precondition for increasing funding for education. Somalia’s federal and regional education actors and finance authorities should seek to collaborate in fiscal forums to share financial data, build capacity for more efficient budget management, and ultimately increase the level of public spending on education.

The Role of International Donors

49. Somalia’s Context. MoECHE is heavily dependent on international donors for funding programs such as data collection and education management information as well as ministry staffing (97% of ministry staff are paid through external sources). While donors play a key role in the sector, their activities have exacerbated the fractured nature of the education system. Donors including the World Bank, have supported sub-national governments throughout the period of conflict when central authorities were unable to act.

50. State-level mandate to receive institutional funds. In all case studies, sub-national governments are able to negotiate agreements with international donors. While the central government continues to serve as the signatory and funding runs through the central ministry of finance, sub-national education ministries have utilized this authority to undertake priority projects through grants and loans. In Pakistan, donors have supported major, multi-year education reform projects, with the Punjab and Sindh governments successfully negotiating second and third cycles of support. Coordination of loans within the country is necessary to ensure national debt management. In Pakistan, loan discussions primarily involve senior provincial ministers and are managed by provincial planning and development departments through which other line ministries including education, request and secure loans and grants. In BiH, after a period of weak coordination the international community agreed to align approaches through UNDP’s stewardship of the Donor Coordination Forum, which has since passed to the national Ministry of Finance.

51. Donor coordination. Donor engagement in BiH and Pakistan points to the complexity of the donor landscape and problems in coordination, which led to duplication and lack to alignment with national priorities. The experience of post-war BiH is significant: the multitude of donors and speed of re-construction efforts contributed to a chaotic post-conflict environment and helped entrench ethnic divisions. The existence of 14 largely autonomous governments with no single focal agency continues to cause challenges within the country, although there have been efforts to improve coordination including appointing the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe as international lead for education in BiH.

52. The importance of government leadership. Ensuring national governments have true ownership of their education system is a practical imperative. In South Africa the strength of the government
has ensured far greater coordination and alignment of donor initiatives with national planning than in BiH or Pakistan.

53. **Equity-enhancing projects and strengthening the mandate of the central government.** In Pakistan and BiH, donors have focused on equity. In BiH, donors have contributed to keeping issues of disadvantaged populations (the Roma and handicapped) in the spotlight and pressured entity governments to adopt the central government’s policy of non-exclusion. In Pakistan, donors have played a more active role through funding projects at the national (and provincial) level which focus on the most marginalized. These projects not only serve an equity objective, they also strengthen the central government’s mandate and authority within the system. An additional advantage of such projects is the ability to fund them without budgetary impact in the first instance, through financing models such as the widespread use of multi-donor trust funds in Pakistan, which also strengthen donor coordination.

54. **Implications for Somalia.** The onus for donor coordination is shared between donors and government, and recent efforts in the country to align all parties are promising. Agreeing on a national framework for donor coordination is an important step for Somalia to avoid the kind of challenges experienced in BiH in the initial post-war period. This is especially important where sub-national governments are able to negotiate directly with donors, as is the case already for example in Somaliland and Puntland. The experience of Pakistan highlights the important role donors can play in supporting MoECHE to promote equity across Somalia as well as to build its authority and mandate through increased central programming. **Annex Box 5: Raising country ownership of the education aid program in Zambia,** provides a country example outside of the case study countries in which education aid aligned with government policies, provided through a coordinated and harmonized process, may help support education system development.

### Key Recommendations

**p) Ensure coordination and federal Ministry of Education leadership.** Alongside establishing mechanisms for donor coordination, all donors should agree to work under the coordination of the federal Ministry of Education as the pivot point for education reform in Somalia. This should include oversight and coordination of capacity building within sub-national governments.

**q) Establish a multi-donor trust fund.** Somalia’s regional education actors and the federal government should work with donor partners to establish a national multi-donor trust fund to build the authority and mandate of MoECHE through coordinated programming.
55. One cross-cutting issue which impacts all aspects of a decentralized education system is the capacity of the key actors. As a system decentralizes core functions, the capacity of actors at local level becomes increasingly important to the effectiveness of delivery.

56. **Somalia’s Context.** As federal government structures were only established several years ago, capacities within the ministry remain generally low. Critical capacity deficits are widespread: covering the regulatory environment (policies and regulations including clear accountabilities between different levels of administration), organizational capacities (weak systems, procedures, staff management and insufficient resources such as computers, stationary, transportation and security for facilities and personnel to support operations), and deficiencies with staff skills (which are also sometimes not always aligned to functions) and not supported through clearly articulated staff development strategies aligned to key priorities within the ministry. Due to inherent system and staffing weaknesses, the MoECHE (like many other ministries) relies on additional support in the form of technical advisors who typically come from the Somali diaspora community with the aim of supporting State building and recovery processes inside the country.

57. **Locally-relevant, sustainable capacity building.** The experience of Punjab, Sindh, and BiH show the importance of donors in supporting sub-national capacity building. However, each also shows the complexity of effective capacity building: of reinforcing a fractured system by ignoring the role of the central government (BiH); of potentially undermining the existing infrastructure by creating a parallel system (Punjab); or of simply multiplying the number of underperforming staff without strengthening capacity (Sindh).

58. **The role of international community.** It is important that donor efforts to strengthen the constituent elements of the Somali education system consider the health of the whole system. Funding programs and reforms that are not aligned to national plans may strengthen capacity in the short-term, but risk creating further fragmentation of the system in the longer-term as seen in BiH. In contrast, while sub-national authorities in South Africa are able to sign agreements with donors, the central government’s oversight of the system and standard setting ensures that these efforts ultimately contribute to the overall capacity and strength of the system.

59. **Implications for Somalia.** Strengthening capacity at national and sub-national level in Somalia remains a pressing concern for all actors. The country case studies show that good intentions and significant resources do not necessarily lead to positive outcomes. *Creating a national program (possibly through the support of external partners) to be coordinated at the central level could leverage sub-national capacity building efforts.* For example, resources for planning and budgeting could be provided to implement a national capacity-building framework.

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**Key Recommendations**

- **r)** Prioritize capacity building. Somalia’s regional education actors and donors should prioritize capacity building at all levels with a focus on sustainability and local ownership. Encouraging alignment and coordination through funds for capacity building should be a key component of any multi-donor trust fund implemented by the federal Ministry of Education.
Annex 1: Examples of Innovations from Non-Case Study Countries

Box 1 - Vietnam
Box 2 – India
Box 3 - Indonesia
Box 4 – Brazil
Box 5 - Zambia
### Annex Box 1: Establishing fundamental school quality standards in Vietnam

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Background</th>
<th>After reunification of North and South Vietnam in the 1970s, the education system was seen to have many positives, including a culture that placed a high value on schooling and equal access for women, and structured around a decentralized model. However, repetition and dropout rates were very high and quite varied across schools and provinces.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The problem</td>
<td>Substantial numbers of schools had inadequate resources and very poor performances as evidenced by high levels of repetition and dropout.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Why this is important</td>
<td>Vietnam introduced the concept of Fundamental School Quality Levels (FSQL) in 2003 to ensure that no school falls below a minimum quality standard and also to help ensure all schools achieve at least the minimum level. FSQL was developed through a participatory process involving key stakeholders across different levels of the decentralized education system, including parents and school staff. It was envisaged as an objective basis for allocating resources to schools, with the aim of allocating educational funding to schools where it was needed the most. By the time FSQL was adopted for pilot use in 2003, it included 35 different quality measures, including short- to medium-term targets. The FSQL Input Index was created through collecting data on classroom infrastructure and sanitation, furniture, textbooks, learning materials, teacher training, and community engagement. This FSQL index was used to monitor progress, and to assess the degree to which different inputs lead to learning. The largest components in the index were school organization and management, infrastructure, and teaching staff, including teacher education levels.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Result</td>
<td>Vietnam has made great progress in education results since FSQL was introduced. In the 2015 PISA assessment, although Vietnam had the lowest GDP per capita, performance of their students exceeded that of many OECD countries with high levels of equity. Likewise, findings from the Young Lives longitudinal study show that Vietnam has been able to promote equitable service provision by using these benchmarks for the resources and facilities it expects every school to provide. This contrasts with many developing countries where there is still a legacy of education systems that were designed to serve a small bureaucratic elite.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Key message</td>
<td>Basic standards help ensure teaching and learning in each and every school, providing resources to schools in most need. Vietnam’s fundamental quality school level program shows a practical way to define a minimum standard of school quality inputs and services and to target resources to schools falling below this standard.</td>
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Annex Box 2: Improving schooling with system-wide accountability in India

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Background</th>
<th>Madhya Pradesh, an Indian state with a population of 72 million and home to 122,000 schools and is one of the country’s most deprived states. It has higher illiteracy rates and poverty rates than the national average, and has the country’s largest population of Scheduled Tribes (historically disadvantaged peoples). The state government is challenged in providing education in this largely rural (72%) state.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The Problem</td>
<td>Many schools in M.P. are small in size and have a shrinking enrolment. Further, there is a decline in daily student attendance, and high teacher absenteeism. Not surprisingly learning levels are low - only 31% of Grade 5 students could read a text at Grade 2 level, and only 15.3% of Grade 5 students can do division.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How the problem was addressed</td>
<td>Based on global best practice, the government introduced a reform program to improve service delivery with the following components, which is currently reaching 25,000 schools: (1) developing a school rating scorecard with assistance from external school inspectors and developing customized school improvement plans; (2) regular follow ups on progress with ongoing monitoring and support; and (3) leveraging technology to enhance implementation and follow-up. Program design and implementation has been supported by an independent, rigorous, world-class randomized control study.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Why this is important</td>
<td>This was an ambitious effort to improve school governance at scale. Built on global best practice, the program was designed to evaluate schools, identify strengths and weaknesses, and support programs of school quality improvement.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Result</td>
<td>Rigorous, independent research found that the school evaluations were able to meaningfully evaluate school quality with scores being predictive of future student value-added and teacher absence. Unfortunately, the government has not ensured that supervisors follow up the evaluation with subsequent monitoring the schools and support for improvement. Without this, the expected outcomes have not yet been realized. That is, according to the research findings, there has been a lack of impact on teacher absence, teacher effort in classrooms, student engagement or the engagement of parents, and, consequently on student learning outcomes. It is hoped that government will expand the program to all 122,000 schools in the state, taking these findings into consideration to improve its impact.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Key message</td>
<td>This program shows that, even in a setting with weak governance, evaluating school performance at scale may be possible. However, for this to have an impact, government officials must incorporate follow-through strategies to work with schools to improve weaknesses. These must include monitoring recommended plans of action, as well as providing incentives for improvement.</td>
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### Annex Box 3: Raising quality with school-based management in Indonesia  

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Background</th>
<th>Spurred by the Asian economic crisis that spanned 1998-2000, Indonesia mandated decentralization of the government in 1999 and education followed suit.</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The problem</td>
<td>There was a high level of disparity in education quality across provinces, districts and cities, and schools, and an inadequate ability and reach of the government to allocate funding to address the problem.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How Indonesia addressed the problem</td>
<td>In 2005, the introduction of the School Operational Assistance (Bantuan Operasional Sekolah - BOS) Program, a school grant program for all basic education schools, significantly strengthened community governance of schools. The main objectives were to reduce the financial burden for students, improve access to, and raise the quality of, basic education, and further strengthen school-based management (SBM) reforms that had started in 2003. To fill the gap between the national-level BOS grant that schools received and their actual operating cost, some regional governments introduced in 2007 a local school grant that complemented the national BOS grant. The aim was to reduce inequalities and introduce incentives for performance with specific indicators that can be monitored.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Why was this important</td>
<td>Indonesia’s BOS program set up and empowered school committees with the authority to plan and make decisions over non-salary operational expenditures. It gave schools block grants based on a per-student formula and provided management training to school committees that were elected by the community into their positions. The block grants were used to pay for more student support activities and to hire more staff, with results indicating a significant increase in teacher attendance and student scores in language and mathematics.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Result</td>
<td>The effects of the program were seen to be generally positive. It contributed to expanding access, particularly to poor and disadvantaged children. Enrolment rates grew at both primary and junior secondary level, with the largest increases within the poorest income quintile. Reductions in dropout rates and improvements in transition rates were also measured. Although there has been considerable progress, the assessment of reform indicates it has not resulted in enough changes in school practices to have a sustainable impact on student learning. As a result, the national government identified changes to improve the model: (1) strengthen capacity of school councils, principals and teachers to implement school-based management; (2) develop district capacity to support school-based management; (3) provide schools councils, parents, and the public with comparative information on school performance; and (4) address resource disparities among schools.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Key message</td>
<td>School-based management shows promise for addressing school weaknesses, but their effectiveness is dependent upon the capacity of the key actors – school councils, principals, teachers, and parents.</td>
</tr>
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Education in Federal States: Lessons from Selected Countries, pp. 94-95.
Annex Box 4: Ensuring equitable funding across jurisdictions with a federal program in Brazil

**Background**
In just 15 years, Brazil had moved from one of the worst-performing education systems of any middle-income country to one that demonstrates strong and sustained improvement year on year, not only in primary and secondary school access but also in terms of learning. One of the major contributions to getting Brazil on this path was the establishment of a federal education equalization fund.

**The problem**
Into the 1990s, Brazil’s federal system had not been able to address huge inequalities in financing of education across the 26 states and approximately 5500 municipalities. The inequities stemmed from the fact that states and municipalities were awarded federal funding based on a formula that did not take into account actual student enrolments. This meant that there were significant differences in per-student funding across states and municipalities, with some unable to even meet nationally agreed minimum per-student funding levels. These persistent differences in financing were considered to be a cause of large disparities in educational access and quality, and the very low performance of students in the poorest jurisdictions.

**How Brazil addressed the problem**
In 1996, Brazil established a federal basic education fund to rationalize the allocation of public education resources and to redistribute finances among the states and the municipalities to close the funding gap. More specifically, the resources of the fund were distributed according to the number of students enrolled annually in the schools maintained by each jurisdiction based on a minimum spending-per-student level established by the federal government. The federal government also supplemented (“topped up”) the funding levels in each jurisdiction each year when data collected by the federal government showed that a state or municipality was not able to reach the minimum spending-per-student.

**Why this was important**
This approach illustrates an important and successful case of redistributing federal fiscal resources in a country with a long tradition of centralized federalism. Prior to the new fund being established, the richer states and almost all major capital cities were able to spend substantially more resources on education because the largest source of financing for them corresponded to state and municipal tax revenues.

**Result**
By raising minimum spending levels in basic education, the federal basic education fund drove a significant increase in real terms in overall education spending in Brazil. From approximately 2% of GDP in 1995, basic education spending rose to 4% of GDP in 2008.

**Key message**
This fiscal transfer reform transformed Brazilian education both by ensuring that every jurisdiction could achieve a minimum per-student spending level by stimulating an overall increase in basic education spending after 1998.
Annex Box 5: Raising country ownership of the education aid program in Zambia

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Background:</th>
<th>Country ownership is a core tenet of the aid effectiveness agenda promoted through the Paris Declaration, the Accra Agenda for Action, the Busan Partnership Agreement, and the Nairobi Outcome Document. Because many donor agencies come to recipient countries with their own priorities and agendas and often tend to be technocratic, even when well-intentioned, their programs may not be aligned with the specific needs of the country, nor take into account the unique cultural, historical and political landscape of the country. In order to be effective and efficient, country-led development is required. The Paris/Accra agenda is for donors to reduce aid fragmentation by promoting coordination and harmonisation of their activities as well as better aligning them with the recipients' own preferences and administrative systems. To achieve this, the Paris/Accra agenda strongly advocates for the use of recipients' own systems and processes for planning, managing and controlling the use of aid resources.</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The Problem</td>
<td>Zambia's economic problems during the 1980s and 1990s meant that average real government expenditure to education fell by 40 percent. Severely underfunded and with little donor support, the basic education sub-sector in particular suffered from declining enrolment rates and low quality.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How the problem was addressed</td>
<td>The government together with its development partners developed the ‘Basic Education Sub-Sector Investment Programme’ (BESSIP). BESSIP was intended to harmonise education aid through: (1) a Joint Assistance Strategy was introduced, which created a formalised Division of Labour process. This established a lead donor arrangement under which two donors would act jointly as sector lead to coordinate the support and dialogue of other partners in that area; and (2) the setup of a basket fund mechanism, which was extended into a sector pool when the project expanded and became the main education funding modality supported by nine donors. By 2010, the sector pool, together with donor budget support, accounted for about 12 percent of the total resources of the Ministry of Education.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Why was this important?</td>
<td>BESSIP facilitated the coordination and harmonisation of donor aid to education through the introduction of Division of Labour and the creation of a single sector funding pool.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Result</td>
<td>The move to a Paris-style programme-based approach in the form of a basket mechanism and the formalised Division of Labour under the joint assistance strategy undoubtedly helped to improve coordination and alignment in education. The congruence of government and donor priorities, in combination with strong analytical and dialogue capacity on both sides, has enabled donors to have a (positive) influence on the country's education policies. This, together with the coordinated support and the use of aligned aid modalities, contributed to substantial improvements in education outcomes. Moreover, overall transaction costs of education aid appear to have been reduced substantially as a result of the move to basket and budget financing and donors' Division of Labour.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Key message</td>
<td>The Zambia initiative illustrates that aid aligned with government policies, provided through a coordinated and harmonised process, can help improve education system development in low income countries.</td>
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### Pakistan: Roles and Responsibilities of Actors in Legislative and Policy Domains

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Legislative change</strong></td>
<td>Only within Federally-administered territories</td>
<td>Exclusive legislative rights within parameters of Article 25-A</td>
<td>No constitutional mandate – Provinces have not devolved power</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Policy formulation</strong></td>
<td>Only within Federally-administered territories</td>
<td>Mandated to develop Provincial education policies</td>
<td>No constitutional mandate – Provinces have not devolved power</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>The Inter-Provincial Education Ministers Conference (IPEMC) plays a coordinating role</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### South Africa: Roles and Responsibilities of Actors in Legislative and Policy Domains

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<tr>
<td><strong>Legislative change</strong></td>
<td>Establish national laws and regulations</td>
<td>Establish provincial laws</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Policy formulation</strong></td>
<td>Establish national policies and frameworks</td>
<td>Develop provincial policies</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>SGB plays a role in setting limited policies for school</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Bosnia and Herzegovina: Summary of Roles and Responsibilities of Actors in Legislative and Policy Domains

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<tr>
<td><strong>Legislative change</strong></td>
<td>Ability to legislate but can be blocked by entity</td>
<td>Ability to legislate and can veto central legislation</td>
<td>Ability to legislate and can veto FBH entity-level legislation</td>
<td>Dependent on canton-specific level of decentralization</td>
<td>No legislative authority</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Policy formulation</strong></td>
<td>Can set policy including international strategy but no ability to mandate</td>
<td>Primary source of education policy in RS</td>
<td>Primary source of education policy in FBH</td>
<td>Dependent on canton-specific level of decentralization at primary/secondary. Policy making at preschool</td>
<td>No policy-making authority.</td>
<td>APOSO established to set standards but no ability to mandate</td>
</tr>
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### Pakistan: Roles and Responsibilities of Actors in Service Delivery

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<tr>
<td><strong>Access and infrastructure</strong></td>
<td>Mandated to uphold right to education and international treaties</td>
<td>Mandated to ensure universal access. Undertake school building</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>Monitor access and undertake basic repairs</td>
<td>Keep records of enrolment and attendance</td>
<td>Education foundations provide grants to increase access</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Curriculum and educational materials</strong></td>
<td>Responsible in federally administered areas</td>
<td>Develop provincial curriculum and regulate learning materials</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>Implementation of provincial rules</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Teachers contracting and performance management</strong></td>
<td>Responsible in federally administered areas</td>
<td>Contracting managed at province. Highly centralized</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>Performance management of teacher</td>
<td>Head teacher manages school staff. Can report staff but no disciplinary power</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Monitoring and accountability</strong></td>
<td>Responsible in federally administered areas</td>
<td>Accountable for school quality. Increasingly centralized monitoring</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>Dependent on provincial structure</td>
<td>Keep records of enrolment and attendance</td>
<td>Education Foundations monitor grant-receiving schools</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Assessing learning outcomes</strong></td>
<td>Responsible in federally administered areas</td>
<td>Responsible for developing and administering assessments</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>Keep records of school-level assessments</td>
<td>BISEs set examinations at intermediate and secondary levels</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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381 Education Foundations provide grants to private schools through vouchers or subsidies but are not involved in direct contracting of teachers
## South Africa: Roles and Responsibilities of Actors in Service Delivery

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Access and infrastructure</strong></td>
<td>Establishes standards and provides conditional grants</td>
<td>Constitutionally responsible for ensuring access and builds and maintains infrastructure</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>SGB uses funds to pay for maintenance and local services</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Curriculum and educational materials</strong></td>
<td>Sets national curriculum and vets textbooks</td>
<td>Responsible for providing materials and required to follow curriculum</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>In some circumstances district purchases education materials on behalf of SGB</td>
<td>In some circumstances SGB uses funds for education materials</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Teachers contracting and performance management</strong></td>
<td>Negotiation and pay scale setting occurs nationally</td>
<td>Teachers are contracted by Provinces who are responsible for providing CPD</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>SGB can hire (and pay) additional teachers</td>
<td>Higher Education institutions provide initial training. SACE responsible for CPD.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Monitoring and accountability</strong></td>
<td>No national inspection framework. Sets standards</td>
<td>Responsible for ensuring districts visit schools</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>Responsible for supervision and support of schools</td>
<td>Expected to keep records</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Assessing learning outcomes</strong></td>
<td>Sets ANA and enters into international testing</td>
<td>Examination Board sets matriculation test. Administers ANA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>Meant to support learning outcomes through supervision and support. Usually administer ANA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Access and infrastructure</td>
<td>Responsible for ensuring access in RS</td>
<td>Responsible for access in FBH (delegated authority)</td>
<td>Responsible for preprimary</td>
<td>Responsible for preprimary</td>
<td>Keep records of enrolment and attendance</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Curriculum and educational materials</td>
<td>Responsible in RS including providing resources to municipalities for schools. Plays coordinating role in FBH.</td>
<td>Responsible in FBH. Provide resources to municipalities for schools</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>APOSO mandated to develop CCC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teachers contracting and performance management</td>
<td>Contract teachers in RS</td>
<td>Contract teachers in FBH</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>School Board appoints Principal</td>
<td>Pedagogical institutes train and monitor teachers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monitoring and accountability</td>
<td>Have Inspectorate within MOE</td>
<td>Have Inspectorate within MOE</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>Keep records of enrolment and attendance</td>
<td>Some Inspectorates are independent- Brčko District</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assessing learning outcomes</td>
<td>No standardized assessments</td>
<td>No standardized assessments</td>
<td>May implement assessments but no requirement</td>
<td>May implement assessments but no requirement</td>
<td>Keep records of school-level assessments</td>
<td>NA</td>
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</table>

**Bosnia and Herzegovina: Summary Roles and Responsibilities of Actors in Service Delivery**
### Pakistan: Roles and Responsibilities of Actors in Planning and Finance of Education

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Revenue Generation</strong></td>
<td>Generates revenue through national taxes</td>
<td>Able to raise limited revenue through provincial taxes</td>
<td>Dependent on provisional legislation – may be able to raise limited revenue through local taxes</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Fiscal Transfers</strong></td>
<td>Makes transfers to provinces based on NFC Award</td>
<td>Make education-specific transfers to districts and Foundations based on own dispersal plans</td>
<td>Dependent on revenue generation may be able to provide limited grants to schools</td>
<td>Provide limited grants to schools based on provincial guidelines</td>
<td>Receive grants from district budget. Often delayed</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Financing - Expenditure</strong></td>
<td>Finances federal plans and provision in federally administered areas</td>
<td>Finances provincially administered projects</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>Uses grants from provincial grants to fund service delivery</td>
<td>Use limited funding to purchase learning materials. Rarely spent due to concerns regarding audit <a href="#">382</a></td>
<td>Education Foundations spend grants from Federal/Provincial government on funding education through PPPs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Borrowing and Aid</strong></td>
<td>Able to borrow internationally and domestically and sign agreements with donors</td>
<td>Able to borrow internationally and domestically and sign agreements with donors</td>
<td>No mandate to borrow or sign agreements to receive international aid</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Planning</strong></td>
<td>No constitutional mandate outside federally-administered areas</td>
<td>Exclusive mandate to develop education plans</td>
<td>No mandate</td>
<td>Required to submit budgets and plans to province</td>
<td>Develop school improvement plans</td>
<td>NA</td>
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[382](#): Interview with former World Bank Pakistan staff
## South Africa: Roles and Responsibilities of Actors in Planning and Finance of Education

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Revenue Generation</strong></td>
<td>Generates revenue through national taxes</td>
<td>Able to raise limited revenue through provincial taxes</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>Fees levied in some schools</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Fiscal Transfers</strong></td>
<td>Makes transfers to provinces based on agreed formula</td>
<td>Make transfers to districts to provide services</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>Transfers to school dependent on provincial policy</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Financing - Expenditure</strong></td>
<td>Finances national plans and direct and indirect financing</td>
<td>Finances service delivery</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>Uses grants from provincial grants to fund service delivery</td>
<td>Spend against school budget (materials, municipal services, maintenance)</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Borrowing and Aid</strong></td>
<td>Able to borrow internationally and domestically and sign agreements with donors</td>
<td>Able to borrow internationally and domestically and sign agreements with donors</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Planning</strong></td>
<td>Develops National Action Plan</td>
<td>Develops provincial plans within national framework</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>Required to submit budgets and plans to province</td>
<td>Develop school improvement plan</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
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## BIH: Summary Roles and Responsibilities of Actors in Planning and Finance of Education

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Revenue Generation</strong></td>
<td>Generates revenue through national taxes</td>
<td>Generates revenue through entity-level taxes</td>
<td>Able to raise limited revenue through canton taxes</td>
<td>Able to raise limited revenue through local taxes</td>
<td>Able to raise limited revenue through local taxes</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Fiscal transfers</strong></td>
<td>Makes transfers to entities</td>
<td>Make transfers to cantons and municipalities</td>
<td>Make transfers to municipalities</td>
<td>Limited grants to schools</td>
<td>Limited grants to schools</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Financing - Expenditure</strong></td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>Finance entity-level responsibilities (higher in RS)</td>
<td>Finance canton-level responsibilities</td>
<td>Finance municipality responsibilities including preschool</td>
<td>Finance municipality responsibilities including preschool</td>
<td>SB develops school budget within allocated funding</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Borrowing and Aid</strong></td>
<td>Able to borrow internationally and domestically and sign agreements with donors</td>
<td>Able to borrow but require central approval. Not able to sign agreements with donors</td>
<td>Able to borrow within entity-set debt guidelines</td>
<td>Able to borrow within entity-set debt guidelines</td>
<td>Able to borrow within entity-set debt guidelines</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Planning</strong></td>
<td>Constitutional mandate for international planning but unable to implement.</td>
<td>Highly centralized in RS. Devolved to canton in FBH</td>
<td>Responsible for education planning (unless further decentralized)</td>
<td>When decentralized responsible for planning but within narrow fiscal window</td>
<td>Very limited space for planning</td>
<td>Officially SGB develops plan but in effect this is dictated by higher levels</td>
</tr>
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