Report No: AUS11831 . Republic of the Philippines Philippines Open Government Support, Phase II Pork to Performance: Open Government and Program Performance Tracking in the Philippines . June 30, 2016 . GGO14 EAST ASIA AND PACIFIC . Document of the World Bank . Standard Disclaimer: . This volume is a product of the staff of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/ The World Bank. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper do not necessarily reflect the views of the Executive Directors of The World Bank or the governments they represent. The World Bank does not guarantee the accuracy of the data included in this work. The boundaries, colors, denominations, and other information shown on any map in this work do not imply any judgment on the part of The World Bank concerning the legal status of any territory or the endorsement or acceptance of such boundaries. . Copyright Statement: . The material in this publication is copyrighted. Copying and/or transmitting portions or all of this work without permission may be a violation of applicable law. The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/ The World Bank encourages dissemination of its work and will normally grant permission to reproduce portions of the work promptly. For permission to photocopy or reprint any part of this work, please send a request with complete information to the Copyright Clearance Center, Inc., 222 Rosewood Drive, Danvers, MA 01923, USA, telephone 978-750-8400, fax 978-750-4470, http://www.copyright.com/. All other queries on rights and licenses, including subsidiary rights, should be addressed to the Office of the Publisher, The World Bank, 1818 H Street NW, Washington, DC 20433, USA, fax 202-522-2422, e-mail pubrights@worldbank.org. World Bank and AidData. June 2016. From Pork To Performance: Open Government and Program Performance Tracking in the Philippines Samantha Custer Hanif Rahemtulla Kai-Alexander Kaiser Rogier van den Brink This volume is a product of the staff of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/ The World Bank. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper do not necessarily reflect the views of the Executive Directors of the World Bank or the governments they represent. The World Bank does not guarantee the accuracy of the data included in this work. The boundaries, colors, denominations, and other information shown on any map in this work do not imply any judgment on the part of the World Bank concerning the legal status of any territory or the endorsement or acceptance of such boundaries. Copyright Statement: The material in this publication is copyrighted. Copying and/or transmitting portions or all of this work without permission may be a violation of applicable law. The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/ The World Bank encourage dissemination of its work and will normally grant permission to reproduce portions of the work promptly. For permission to photocopy or reprint any part of this work, please send a request with complete information to the Copyright Clearance Center, Inc., 222 Rosewood Drive, Danvers, MA 01923, USA, telephone 978-750-8400, fax 978-750-4470, http://www.copyright.com/. All other queries on rights and licenses, including subsidiary rights, should be addressed to the Office of the Publisher, The World Bank, 1818 H Street NW, Washington, DC 20433, USA, fax 202-522- 2422, e-mail pubrights@worldbank.org. Citation: S. Custer, H. Rahemtulla, K. Kaiser, and R. van den Brink. From Pork to Performance: Open Government and Program Performance Tracking in the Philippines. World Bank and AidData. June 2016. II From Pork to Performance: Open Government and Program Performance Tracking in the Philippines. 2016. S. Custer, H. Rahemtulla, K. Kaiser, R. van den Brink Abstract From Pork to Performance illuminates the politics of how public resources are spent and the difficulty of the “last mile” of service delivery. Crumbling facilities, absentee teachers, and roads to nowhere waste resources and retard development in many countries around the world. These failures in last mile service delivery underscore a more intractable development problem – a breakdown in accountability relationships – as politicians and civil servants act with impunity to extract private benefits at the expense of public goods. This study examines the extent to which technology and transparency can disrupt this low accountability status quo through turning information into collective action to improve government performance by strengthening the accountability relationships between politicians, service providers and citizens. In 2010, a new president came to power in the Philippines with a compelling message – “no corruption, no poverty” – and embraced open government as a vehicle to burn avenues of retreat and advance governance reforms. This study features examples from five sectors - education, reconstruction, roads, municipal development, and tax collection – where government champions sought to open up the black box of service delivery and use digital platforms to disclose data and strengthen accountability. This research provides guidance for public, private, and civil society leaders committed to using technology and transparency to curb pork-barrel politics and create digital dividends for their communities. The study combines rigorous political economy analysis with practical diagnostic tools and recommendations for open government initiatives to go deeper in the Philippines and around the world. From Pork to Performance: Open Government and Program Performance Tracking in the Philippines. 2016. S. Custer, H. Rahemtulla, K. Kaiser, R. van den Brink III Table of Contents Foreword Acknowledgments About the Authors Figures, Tables, and Boxes Acronyms Overview Can Online Technologies Help Offline Politics & Performance in the Philippines? i 1 Service Delivery: When Politics, Transparency & Technology Collide 1 1.1 Problem-Driven Political Economy Analysis 2 1.2 Political Economy Drivers of Public Sector Service Delivery 3 1.3 Digital Accountability Platforms for Five Performance Challenges 13 1.3.1 Ghost Schools in the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) 15 1.3.2 Post-Disaster Recovery to Help Communities “Build Back Better” 17 1.3.3 Bottom-Up Budgeting to Strengthen Local Service Delivery 20 1.3.4 Increasing Scrutiny, Aligning Incentives for Local Road Investments 22 1.3.5 Curbing “Lost Revenues” and Tracking Compliance in SinTax Reforms 24 1.4 Technology, Transparency & Politics of Public Service Delivery 25 1.4.1 Causal Logic: Realistic Assumptions or Fatal Flaws? 28 1.4.2 Generating “Minimum Viable” Content for End Users 28 1.4.3 Extending Reach and Ensuring Inclusivity with an Online Channel: 29 1.4.4 Creating the Conditions for Choice & Opportunities for Action 30 1.4.5 Digital Meets Analog: The Consequences of Digital Platforms 33 2 Public Sector Performance: How Do Digital Accountability Platforms Measure Up? 35 2.1 The Perils and Promise of Measuring Performance 35 2.2 No More Flying Blind: Better Tools to Monitor Progress and Assess Impact 37 2.3 Methodology: Assessing Current Performance, Forecasting Future Trajectories 38 2.4 OpenARMM: Improving Schools in the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) 42 2.4.1 Performance Challenge 43 2.4.2 Technical Solution 43 2.4.3 Progress to Date 43 2.4.4 Institutionalization 44 2.4.5 Preliminary Assessment 45 2.5 OpenReconstruction: Helping the Philippines Build Back Better with Reconstruction Projects 46 2.5.1 Performance Challenge 46 2.5.2 Technical Solution 46 2.5.3 Progress to Date 47 2.5.4 Institutionalization 48 2.5.5 Preliminary Assessment 49 IV From Pork to Performance: Open Government and Program Performance Tracking in the Philippines. 2016. S. Custer, H. Rahemtulla, K. Kaiser, R. van den Brink 2.6 OpenBUB: Getting the Most from Bottom-Up Budgeting (BUB) for Municipal Development 50 2.6.1 Performance Challenge 50 2.6.2 Technical Solution 51 2.6.3 Progress to Date 51 2.6.4 Institutionalization 52 2.6.5 Preliminary Assessment 53 2.7 Open Roads: Ensuring Local Roads Lead to Greater Prosperity for All 54 2.7.1 Performance Challenge 54 2.7.2 Technical Solution 54 2.7.3 Progress to Date 55 2.7.4 Institutionalization 55 2.7.5 Preliminary Assessment 57 2.8 SinTax: Mobilizing Public Participation to Enforce the Law 58 2.8.1 Political Context 58 2.8.2 Technical Solution 58 2.8.3 Progress to Date 59 2.8.4 Institutionalization 59 2.8.5 Preliminary Assessment 60 2.9 Early Progress: Are Digital Accountability Platforms on the Right Trajectory? 61 3 Conclusion: Lessons Learned and Recommendations 64 3.1 Taking Transparency Online to Get From Pork to Performance 66 3.2 Agile Approaches and Big System Reforms: Is Small Indeed Beautiful? 66 3.3 Can Digital Transparency Help Close the Feedback Loop? 67 3.4 Problem-Driven Political Economy: Where Digital Meets Analog 68 3.5 Ingredients to Take Philippines Open Government to the Next Level 69 3.6 Final Words: Deepening Philippines Open Government in 2016 and Beyond 74 APPENDICES 76 REFERENCES 82 From Pork to Performance: Open Government and Program Performance Tracking in the Philippines. 2016. S. Custer, H. Rahemtulla, K. Kaiser, R. van den Brink V Foreword Roads, schools, and taxes are public goods that citizens depend upon every day. While there is a complex pipeline of decisions involved in delivering a service, for the vast majority of people their singular impression of government performance is at the “last mile” – on the road, in the classroom, and at the tax office. When governments fail to deliver accessible, predictable, and high quality public goods, we can all relate to the pain points, from disconnected roads to absentee teachers. The report Pork to Performance describes breakdowns in the delivery of public goods that are symptomatic of a deeper root issue: a stunted feedback loop where poor information creates friction and perpetuates anemic performance. With limited visibility on how public resources are spent and services delivered, citizens and policymakers have little recourse to question the status quo or make course corrections. As a result, citizens do not sanction politicians for poor results and civil servants receive a perverse signal that future performance need not change. The World Development Report 2004, Making Services Work for Poor People, points to two routes to close this feedback loop – one short and one long. In the “short” route, citizens directly engage with the frontline providers of public services such as school administrators or local government officials. In the “long” route, citizens use advocacy and voting for politicians and policy-makers to indirectly shape public service provision. Regardless of which route one takes, access to timely, relevant, and actionable information on public resources and performance is a critical ingredient to shift the conversation from the politics of “pork” to one of accountability for results. In the Philippines and around the world, there has been an explosion of interest in leveraging technology, information, and participation for more accountable governance. Over the past decade, increasingly ubiquitous mobile phones and Internet access are transforming the way we live, work, and communicate. A growing number of countries are pairing these technology advances with transparency commitments, as they adopt open data initiatives and embrace open government principles as the new default. For reform-minded governments, this digital revolution presents an opportunity to fundamentally reshape how they make decisions, deliver services, and interact with citizens. Essentially, the aspiration is that technology can assist government programs in becoming more responsive and effective in generating public goods. Yet, as the World Development Report 2016 on Digital Dividends underscores, digital development has the potential to divide as well as unify. Enthusiasts extoll the value of technology-enabled transparency to democratize information. However, the early adopters of these new technologies are more likely to be young, urban, educated, and affluent. Skeptics point to an overemphasis on technology at the risk of ignoring weak institutions and perverse “rules of the game”. The popularity of digital platforms to disclose public sector information has prompted criticism that governments pursue open data as an alternative, rather than a complement, to more durable freedom of information laws and view open government as a way to divert attention from a lack of progress on more difficult public financial management (PFM) reforms. From Pork to Performance illuminates the conditions under which transparency and technology are likely to disrupt the status quo and make politics work to improve public services. The study provides a much-needed framework to more systematically analyze the ability of technology- enabled open government initiatives to strengthen accountability, reduce information asymmetries, and spark constructive dialogue about service delivery priorities and results. Jointly produced by AidData at the College of William & Mary and the World Bank Group, From Pork to Performance provides a set of invaluable diagnostic tools for these initiatives to monitor progress, measure impact, and achieve their goals. VI From Pork to Performance: Open Government and Program Performance Tracking in the Philippines. 2016. S. Custer, H. Rahemtulla, K. Kaiser, R. van den Brink The debate about the possibilities and limits of technology-enabled transparency to enhance accountability and service delivery is particularly poignant in the Philippines. As the report highlights, the Philippines achieved an admirable recovery in recent years, garnering accolades for transparency and growth following decades of uneven governance and economic performance. A founding member of the Open Government Partnership in 2011, the government viewed open government as a means to restore public trust and realize inclusive growth. Nonetheless, the Philippines has not passed a freedom of information law and crosscutting reforms that would facilitate tracking of the national budget have stalled in the face of bureaucratic resistance. Inspired by the country’s first open data portal (data.gov.ph) and cognizant of the challenges in moving large-scale PFM forward, several champions within government sought creative workarounds to push forward a more bounded set of reforms. The World Bank Group partnered with these government champions to design a series of digital accountability platforms to disclose information on the whole service delivery chain – from upstream budgets to downstream implementation – within a given sector. The platforms intended to bolster internal financial management systems and make it easier for the public to monitor government expenditures and performance. From Pork to Performance makes the case that the success or failure of these platforms hinges on the ability to translate information into engagement and action on the part of elected officials, service providers, and citizens to close the feedback loop. Capturing lessons learned from digital accountability initiatives in five sectors – education, reconstruction, roads, municipal development, and tax collection – the report offer timely insights and recommendations to deepen open government in the Philippines as a new administration assumes office in 2016. The study’s broader contribution is to articulate a roadmap for Open Government 3.0 to move from information to engagement and ensure that technology and transparency initiatives generate tangible digital dividends for citizens. The upcoming World Development Report 2017, Governance and Law, will emphasize that governance should be assessed in terms of public sector capacity to deliver on goals that society values. This raises the stakes for politicians and civil servants to make inroads in getting services to work for citizens, as an essential barometer of government performance. From Pork to Performance highlights how technology-enabled transparency can contribute to meet this challenge and strengthen the accountability relationships between politicians, service providers and citizens. Mara Warwick Country Director World Bank Philippines From Pork to Performance: Open Government and Program Performance Tracking in the Philippines. 2016. S. Custer, H. Rahemtulla, K. Kaiser, R. van den Brink VII Acknowledgements We owe a debt of gratitude to numerous individuals for their generous donations of conceptual support, time, and encouragement in helping us write this volume. Several peer reviewers provided invaluable feedback through a panel chaired by Mara Warwick (Country Director, WBG Manila), including: Claudia Buentjen (Principal Governance Specialist, Asian Development Bank), Steve Davenport (Open Government, Global Solutions Lead, WBG), Nathaniel Heller (Managing Director, Results for Development), Zahid Hussain (Senior Public Sector Specialist, WBG), Philip Keefer (Inter- American Development Bank), Ron Mendoza (Dean, University of the Philippines), and Sanjay Pradhan (Chief Executive, Open Government Partnership). The authors express our appreciation to those who were willing to be interviewed or advise on the preparation of this report, including: Secretary Edwin Lacierda (Presidential Spokesperson, Office of the President), Richard “Bon” Moya (Under Secretary at the Department of Budget and Management and Chief Information Officer, Government of the Philippines), Ivy Ong (Program Officer, Department of Budget and Management, Government of the Philippines), Kenneth Abante (Deputy Chief of Staff, Department of Finance, Government of the Philippines), Alice Malquisto (Assistant Regional Director, Commission on Audit, Government of the Philippines), Henrik Lindroth (formerly Consultant, Asian Development Bank) , Malou Mangahas (Executive Director, Philippines Center for Investigative Journalism), Karla Michelle Yu (Research Associate, Action for Economic Reforms) Jo-Ann Latuja (Fellow, Action for Economic Reforms), Matthew Stevens (Senior Social Development Specialist, WBG Manila), Makiko Watanabe (Senior Social Development Specialist, WBG Manila), Assad Baunto (Social Development Specialist, WBG Manila), Lesley Jeanne Yu Cordero (Senior Disaster Risk Specialist, WBG Manila), Sabah Rashid (Senior Public Sector Specialist, WBG Manila) and Cecilia Vales (Senior Procurement Specialist, WBG, Manila). Aida Talavera, Stella Balgos, Edson Joseph Guido and Doods Siton (World Bank Group Consultants) and Jacob Sims, Lauren Harrison, and Tanya Sethi (AidData at the College of William and Mary), Dave Overton and Albert Padin (Symph) provided valuable comments and key references in writing of the report. Llanco Talamantes, Galina Kalvatcheva, Meggy de Guzman, and Rizza Garcia were invaluable in the design and layout of this publication. The Manila External Communications Team, led by Justine Letargo (Communications Lead) and David Llorito (Communications Officer), prepared the media release, dissemination and multimedia products for the web. This study was commissioned by the World Bank Group with the support of the Australian Government through the Australian-World Bank Philippines Development Trust Fund and produced in partnership with AidData, a research lab at the College of William and Mary. This research was overseen by James A. Brumby (Director, Governance Global Practice, World Bank), Robert R. Taliercio (Practice Manager, East Asia and the Pacific Region, Governance Global Practice, World Bank) and Brad Parks (Executive Director, AidData at the College of William and Mary). The report represents the views of the authors alone and does not speak for the agencies, organizations, or individuals who have contributed their insights or finances to the production of this study. Samantha Custer, Hanif Rahemtulla, Kai-Alexander Kaiser, and Rogier van den Brink June 2016 VIII From Pork to Performance: Open Government and Program Performance Tracking in the Philippines. 2016. S. Custer, H. Rahemtulla, K. Kaiser, R. van den Brink About the Authors Samantha Custer is Director of Policy Analysis at AidData, a research and innovation lab based at the College of William & Mary in the United States. Samantha leads AidData’s Policy Analysis Unit, which analyzes the uptake of data for decision-making and the role of external money and ideas on domestic policy reforms in low- and middle-income countries. She has co-authored numerous studies on open data, open government and citizen feedback with the World Bank and other development partners. Prior to her work with AidData, Samantha oversaw multilingual education projects in Indonesia and Bangladesh with SIL International, coordinated an Asia Multilingual Education Working Group for UNESCO, and taught a class on foreign policy at Georgetown University with former US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright. Samantha holds master’s degrees in Foreign Service and Public Policy. Hanif Rahemtulla is a Senior Operations Officer with the World Bank in Manila, Philippines where he has been since 2013. He has worked on a variety of issues relating to public financial management, public sector performance and service delivery. More recently, he leads efforts in support of the global transparency, accountability, results, citizen engagement, open government, open data, and open development agendas. Before joining the East Asia Region, he worked in Africa and Eastern Europe. He holds a PhD from University College London, United Kingdom. Kai-Alexander Kaiser is a Senior Economist with the World Bank in Manila since early 2012, where his engagement has focused primarily on issues of public finance and public sector governance reform. Prior to moving to the Philippines, he was Senior Economist at the (global) Public Sector and Governance Group, Poverty Reduction and Economic Management (PREM), in Washington, DC, with a focus on issues of public finance, inter-governmental relations, natural resource led development, and applied political economy/institutional reform issues. In the early 2000s, he was also based in Jakarta, Indonesia with the World Bank, working at the time mainly on the government’s fiscal decentralization and service delivery reforms. Rogier van den Brink is Lead Economist in the East Asia and Pacific Region of the World Bank since October 2008. He is currently the Lead Economist and Program Leader for the Equitable Growth, Finance and Institutions Practice Group for the Philippines. He has been with the World Bank since 1992. Before joining the East Asia Region, he worked in various positions in the Africa Region, including as Senior Country Economist in South Africa; Deputy Resident Representative in Zimbabwe; and Special Assistant to the Vice Presidents. From Pork to Performance: Open Government and Program Performance Tracking in the Philippines. 2016. S. Custer, H. Rahemtulla, K. Kaiser, R. van den Brink IX Figures and Tables Figures Tables Figure 1. Problem-Driven Political Economy Table 1. Problem-Driven Political Economy: Analysis: Where Technology and Politics Five Public Sector Performance Challenges Meet Table 2. Digital Accountability Platforms: Figure 2. An Information-Poor Environment Performance Pillars and Supporting Creates Friction in Accountability Indicators Relationships Figure 3. A Vicious Cycle: Accountability Boxes Breakdowns in an Information-Poor Environment Box 1. Reporting and Tracking of Budget Figure 4. A Virtuous Cycle: Digital Execution is a Challenge Accountability Platforms Provide a Box 2. Digital Meets Analog: When Do Technology Assist Technologies Empower Citizens? Figure 5. Phases of Reconstruction Box 3. Open Insights is the Next Step to Implementation Open Data Figure 6. Strengthening Feedback on Government Performance in Providing Local Roads Figure 7. Spectrum of the Reform Space Figure 8. Digital Meets Analog: Results Framework for Digital Accountability Platforms Figure 9. Performance Diagnostic: OpenARMM Figure 10. Performance Diagnostic: OpenReconstruction Figure 11. Performance Diagnostic: OpenBUB Figure 12. Performance Diagnostic: OpenRoads Figure 13. Performance Diagnostic: SinTax Figure 14. Performance Dashboard: Philippines Digital Accountability Platforms Figure 15. Variable Trajectories of Digital Accountability Platforms Figure 16. Tip of the Iceberg: Data Points to the Health of Underlying Government Programs X From Pork to Performance: Open Government and Program Performance Tracking in the Philippines. 2016. S. Custer, H. Rahemtulla, K. Kaiser, R. van den Brink Acronyms ARMM Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao NEDA National Economic Development Authority BUB Bottom-Up Budgeting OCD Office of Civil Defense CoA Commission on Audit OGP Open Government Partnership CPA Citizen Participatory Audit OPARR Office of the Presidential Assistant for CSO Civil Society Organization Rehabilitation and Recovery DAP Disbursement Acceleration Program OSM Open Street Map DBM Department of Budget and Management PDAF Priority Development Assistance Fund DFAT Australia’s Department of Foreign Affairs PEFA Public Expenditure and Financial and Trade Accountability Assessment DILG Department of Interior and Local PFM Public Financial Management Government PRDP Philippines Rural Development Project DPWH Department of Public Works and Highways T/A Transparency and Accountability DoA Department of Agriculture TRIP Tourism Road Infrastructure Program DoF Department of Finance UACS Unified Account Code Structure DSWD Department of Social Welfare and UHC Universal Health Care Development UK United Kingdom eMPATHY Electronic Management Platform US United States Accountability and Transparency Hub WBG World Bank Group e-PLC Electronic Project Life Cycle WDR World Development Report FAiTH Foreign Aid Transparency Hub FOI Freedom of Information FMR Farm-to-Market Road GAA General Appropriations Act GIFMIS Government Integrated Financial Management Information System ICT Information Communication Technology IMF International Monetary Fund KALSADA Good Roads for Inclusive Growth LGC Local Government Code LGU Local Government Unit From Pork to Performance: Open Government and Program Performance Tracking in the Philippines. 2016. S. Custer, H. Rahemtulla, K. Kaiser, R. van den Brink XI Overview Overview: Can Online Technologies Help Offline Politics and Performance in the Philippines? i. Government provision of roads, schools, iv. Open government can be a key element and clinics should be a straightforward of a strategy for inclusive growth. In theory, proposition: “sufficient funding, properly greater transparency should reduce discretion spent [equals] more and better services” and intensify scrutiny of how officials allocate (Hedger, 2015). However, the reality is more resources and provide public goods by complex, as pork-barrel politics can easily realigning incentives away from patronage derail performance-oriented reforms and poor and towards performance (Klitgaard, information hampers the ability of officials 2008). Yet, transparency is of limited use and citizens to insist on better results. In without specifics that enable the public this report, we examine whether and how to systematically track resource flows and technology-enabled transparency efforts in monitor programs “in their own backyards”. the Philippines can help disrupt the status Without this detailed information at their quo and shift the conversation from one of fingertips, citizens and officials remain in pork to performance. the dark as to how programs are actually operating and performing. ii. Crumbling facilities, absentee teachers, and roads to nowhere waste resources and v. The Philippines became a founding member retard development. These failures in last of the Open Government Partnership (OGP) mile service delivery also underscore a in 2011 and committed to its own national more intractable development problem – a action plan, seeking to burn avenues of breakdown in accountability relationships retreat and lock-in reforms. Embracing a – as politicians and civil servants act with wave of international interest in open data, impunity to “extract private benefits” at the the Philippines launched an open data expense of public goods (World Bank, 2004; portal (data.gov.ph) in early 2014, ultimately Devarajan and Widlund, 2007; Khemani et al., providing access to thousands of government 2015). datasets in accessible electronic formats. Yet, the question soon emerged: if the purpose iii. When a new president came to power is to enhance accountability and elicit in 2010, he committed to a strong message feedback from citizens, would opening up of good governance for the Philippines: “no government be more meaningful in the corruption, no poverty”.1 Open Government context of individual programs and targeted principles – transparency, participation, and performance metrics than aggregate budget collaboration – were put into practice through statistics? initiatives that required agencies to increase budget transparency, quantify performance vi. In 2014, the government sought to level objectives, and demonstrate how they would the information playing field to enable the spend the people’s money. public to more easily track and monitor the performance of flagship government programs. Using online technologies and open data policies, the government, with World Bank assistance, attempted to break open traditional information silos between agencies and the public that made it so difficult to capture program performance and evaluate results. 1. The original slogan in Tagalog was: “Kung Walang Kurap, Walang Mahirup.” XII From Pork to Performance: Open Government and Program Performance Tracking in the Philippines. 2016. S. Custer, H. Rahemtulla, K. Kaiser, R. van den Brink Overview vii. Digital platforms are highly visible xi. The report lays a foundation for future manifestations of open government evaluation through identifying the causal initiatives, but the true test of their value is logic of these initiatives, exposing critical in the ability of these tools to inform and assumptions to be tested, and recommending provoke critical conversations about how prospective monitoring indicators for future the government translates limited resources data collection. In light of the upcoming into public goods. The process of disclosing political transition in the Philippines and the information via digital platforms is a critical incoming presidency of Rodrigo Duterte, the first step to expose deficiencies in the paper also identifies five operating principles underlying quality of data collection practices to deepen open government initiatives and and systems. Such missing or inaccurate data ensure their staying power beyond any one on government programs is not strictly a political administration. data problem, but can be indicative of deeper performance challenges. THE AQUINO ADMINISTRATION viii. What happens when transparency, EMPHASIZED GOVERNANCE AND ANTI- technology, and politics collide? Can CORRUPTION REFORMS these forces disrupt the status quo and improve service delivery? Do technology xii. In March 2011, the newly-elected and transparency merely strengthen the government outlined a “Social Contract bargaining power of individuals or are there with the Filipino People” that promised to broader spillover benefits such as more “rebuild public trust in government” and accountable governance (Khemani et al., enumerated a far-ranging set of reforms in 2015)? Opinions on these topics abound, but his 2011-2016 Philippine Development Plan empirical evidence is in short supply. that his administration would pursue. The Aquino administration paved the way for the ix. This paper advances the conversation with Philippines to join the OGP in 2011, viewing new evidence gleaned from five government such international initiatives as a buttress programs that are using online technologies to their domestic reform agenda, providing to disclose information and engage citizens both international validation and scrutiny to to improve public services in the Philippines. ensure its actions matched its commitments. The report analyzes the performance of these “next generation” open government xiii. Increasing transparency in the allocation initiatives that attempt to close the feedback of public resources and delivery of public loop between those who provide, use, and services was a key feature of the Aquino finance these services. The five initiatives administration’s drive to improve socio- are assessed in the context of the broader economic outcomes and realize inclusive reform space they seek to influence in order to growth. The government set up a cabinet make government programs less susceptible cluster on good governance, cracked down to pork-barrel politics and generate “digital on several cases of high-level corruption, and dividends” for Filipino citizens (World Bank, appointed reform-minded leaders to clean up 2016a). agencies with reputations for graft. x. The broader contribution of the study is to provide a preliminary assessment of THE ADMINISTRATION CHALKED UP GAINS, the prospects and limits of technology- BUT PERFORMANCE CHALLENGES PERSIST enabled transparency initiatives to “make politics work for development” and navigate xiv. With the reform-minded Aquino a difficult landscape of vested interests, administration at the helm, the government captured institutions and information chalked up notable progress on several stovepipes (Khemani et al, 2015). This study metrics of growth and governance. The is not an impact evaluation: the initiatives Aquino administration also achieved in question are still relatively new and the significant gains during its tenure to increase available information is too limited to speak transparency, reduce graft, and expand with any certainty about impact. Instead, the dialogue with citizens around service delivery paper provides a rapid diagnostic to assess the priorities (World Bank, 2015f; Mangahas, current progress and likely future trajectory of 2015). In particular, the administration made the initiatives in achieving their stated aims. substantial inroads to open up traditionally From Pork to Performance: Open Government and Program Performance Tracking in the Philippines. 2016. S. Custer, H. Rahemtulla, K. Kaiser, R. van den Brink XIII Overview opaque processes of public sector budgeting higher productivity of capital and labor alone and procurement, as well as subjecting (IMF, 2015; World Bank, 2016b).3 Improved agencies to quantifiable output and outcome governance, in addition to the adoption of performance metrics. new technology, could also be an important contributor to the rapid and sustained GDP xv. In recognition of these efforts, the Global growth that the Philippines has enjoyed in Initiative for Financial Transparency (GIFT) recent years. identified the Philippines’ participatory budgeting program as one of its five best xviii. While the Philippines improved on practices in fiscal transparency and the Open indicators of transparency and participation, Budget Index ranked the country third in enforcement and accountability remain Asia for budget transparency and second problematic. For example, the Philippine for public participation in 2015 (GIFT, 2015; Congress provides relatively weak oversight IBP, 2016). The 2016 Public Expenditure and of the actual distribution of public resources Financial Accountability (PEFA) assessment (IBP, 2015; Social Weather Survey, 2015) . also rated the transparency of public finances Meanwhile, citizens remain skeptical about in the Philippines as strong, in light of the impact of anti-corruption efforts. In a progress made in: comprehensive budget recent survey, only 11 percent of Filipino classification, transparency of government executives agreed that the government revenues and expenditures, publication of punishes corrupt officials (Social Weather information on service delivery performance, Survey, 2015).4 and ready public access to fiscal and budget documentation (World Bank, 2016f). xix. The 2011-2015 Philippine Public Financial Management (PFM) Reform Roadmap was xvi. Following a period of marked decline an important centerpiece of the governance between 1998 and 2010, the Philippines reform agenda. It laid out an ambitious improved its ratings on several good program to implement: a Government governance indicators in recent years (World Integrated Financial Management Bank, 2016c; Transparency International, Information System (GIFMIS), new national 2016).2 The country marginally improved payroll system, and modernized procurement on five out of six Worldwide Governance system (Holmes and Sweet, 2016). Indicators between 2011 and 2015, surpassing other lower-middle income and Asian countries on regulatory quality and government effectiveness (World Bank, 2016c). The Philippines achieved similar gains on Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index, which increased the country’s rank from 138th out of 178 in 2010 to 95th place in 2015. xvii. There are early indications that the government’s emphasis on restoring public trust is making a positive impact not only on the country’s governance, but also on its economic growth (World Bank, 2016b). These growth rates cannot be fully explained by 2. Of the six Worldwide Governance Indicators, the Philippines declined on only one during the 2010-2014 period – Control of Corruption. Despite the country’s gains on Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index, survey respondents slightly downgraded the Philippines performance from 85th place in 2014 to 95th place in 2015. 3. Please see the Philippines IMF Article IV consultation: www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2015/cr15246.pdf. 4. Filipino executives gave the Philippine House of Representatives a poor rating with regard to their sincerity in fighting corruption and the Senate performed only marginally better, receiving a neutral rating on a recent Enterprise Survey of Corruption (SWS, 2015). Similarly, while the International Budget Partnership gave the Philippines relatively high marks on overall budget transparency, it rates the oversight of that budget by the Philippines legislature as quite weak (IBP, 2015). XIV From Pork to Performance: Open Government and Program Performance Tracking in the Philippines. 2016. S. Custer, H. Rahemtulla, K. Kaiser, R. van den Brink Overview xx. However, in translating their vision into GIFMIS (World Bank, 2015f; Mangahas, 2015; reality, government reformers soon realized Holmes and Sweet, 2016). The government that any systemic efforts to advance PFM was unable pass Freedom of Information (FOI) reforms had to overcome existing information legislation that would have created continuity systems that were highly fragmented and for transparency initiatives in the face of manually updated. Oversight agencies political transitions. were effectively in the dark as to how implementing agencies or local governments xxii. The length of time it will take for the were using public resources. Yet, these Philippines to decisively improve governance technical challenges were symptomatic of the quality and realize inclusive growth likely deeply vested interests of civil servants and outstrips a single six-year presidential term. politicians who benefited from opacity. However, it only takes one administration to reverse hard-won gains, as the history of the xxi. Despite successfully implementing many country shows. good governance initiatives, the Aquino administration encountered resistance in advancing crosscutting PFM reforms such as Source: Courtesy of Manila Times (2015) From Pork to Performance: Open Government and Program Performance Tracking in the Philippines. 2016. S. Custer, H. Rahemtulla, K. Kaiser, R. van den Brink XV Overview THE CHALLENGE OF PORK-BARREL xxiv. Political dynasties perpetuate a dynamic SPENDING REMAINS CENTRAL TO whereby “power rotates at the top with PHILIPPINES POLITICS little effective participation of those below” (Anderson, 1988; Hutchcroft, 2008). Caught in xxiii. Procedural democracy has long been a “low accountability trap”, reform-minded a staple of political life in the Philippines, officials struggle to combat patronage politics but one punctuated by corruption and and corruption (Fox, 2014). Meanwhile, in contestation (Hutchcroft, 2008; Dressel, 2011).5 a world with poor information, citizens The Philippines is a paradox: a long-standing are unable to effectively sanction their democracy with a persistent “democratic government for poor performance, influence deficit”, the country is stuck in “low quality priorities or coordinate action (Chambers, equilibrium” where elections fail to sanction 2010; Kosack and Fung, 2014) politicians for poor performance (Hutchcroft and Rocamora, 2003; Case, 2002; Anderson, xxv. In a competition for votes, allies and 1988). In this “delegative democracy”, access to public resources, the national budget politicians have perverse incentives to is a highly contested arena. Pork-barrel overprovide visible, excludable improvements discretionary funds have a long history in such as roads as “club goods” in exchange the Philippines, dating back to 1922; however, for votes and under-provide broad-based, public scrutiny intensified under the Aquino non-excludable services such as education administration in the face of a scandal and health-care (Cruz, 2014; Dressel, 2011; swirling around “ghost projects” and the O’Donnell, 1993; Diokno, 2016c). misuse of a Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF) worth billions of Philippine pesos. Pork-barrel politics has produced some of the largest popular protests to hit the nation in recent years. Source: Courtesy of Philippine Star (2013) 5. In February 1986, millions of Filipinos took to the streets in a non-violent People Power Revolution to depose the dictatorship of President Ferdinand Marcos, Sr. A four-day series of mass demonstrations, the People Power Revolution was a sustained campaign of civil resistance that brought millions of Filipinos to Epifanio de los Santos Avenue (EDSA). On the surface, a new Philippines constitution mandating a single six-year presidential term and a succession of orderly political transitions signaled a return to normalcy; however, People Power was resurgent in 2001. Filipinos forced the resignation of President Joseph Estrada following a political corruption scandal and accused President Gloria Macapagpal-Arroyo’s administration of vote buying. XVI From Pork to Performance: Open Government and Program Performance Tracking in the Philippines. 2016. S. Custer, H. Rahemtulla, K. Kaiser, R. van den Brink Overview xxvi. A major whistleblower scandal in A STRATEGY TO IMPROVE PUBLIC 2013 exposed PDAF as a lucrative form of FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT AND political pork that national-level politicians PERFORMANCE could use to channel public resources to their constituencies and allied local-level xxix. The World Bank Group, supported by officials. It also exposed the extent of systemic development partners such as Australia’s corruption and its various forms across the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade government bureaucracy at all levels. The (DFAT), sought to bolster the efforts of demand for transparency and accountability reformers at national and local levels to curb was sufficiently potent to draw Filipinos to the influence of patronage politics for more the streets to join a “Million People March” transparent, responsive and accountable demanding the reallocation of public service delivery using a two-pronged spending or the outright abolition of the pork- approach. barrel system. After the controversy erupted, President Aquino ordered the abolition xxx. A first track focused on crosscutting PFM of PDAF in its present form. However, the reforms to modernize upstream procedures, Supreme Court superseded this decision, incentives, and institutions in the allocation ruling that PDAF itself was unconstitutional.6 of public resources, such as the GIFMIS rollout and legislative reform (Holmes and xxvii. In 2014, the Supreme Court also Sweet, 2016). This emphasis was an extension ruled against the Aquino administration’s of a long-term partnership between the Disbursement Acceleration Program (DAP) Governments of Australia and the Philippines arguing that the government had abused its to improve the efficiency, accountability, constitutional mandate (Diokno, 2016b). The and transparency of public spending in the Aquino Administration introduced the DAP Philippines.9 in 2011 as a “reform intervention” to “speed up public spending and to boost economic xxxi. The focus of this paper is on a growth” (DBM, 2014).7 DAP allowed second track that was problem-driven and the government to reallocate savings and opportunistic: a series of digital platforms un-programmed funds from “slow moving” designed to mobilize the public to help projects to priority projects, and was a critical track expenditures in four government mechanism for the country’s economic programs and monitoring enforcement of resurgence.8 a new tax law. These digital accountability platforms leveraged political dynamics, online xxviii. While the Supreme Court rulings technologies, and transparency to unlock the were important steps forward to mitigate black box of how the government allocates opportunities for malfeasance, they did not resources, collects revenues, and delivers address the challenge of how to make the services. broader national budgeting process more transparent and accountable (Diokno, 2016b). xxxii. For this second track, the World Bank Following the PDAF and DAP episodes, the helped provide design solutions appropriate Filipino public and media turned their to the reform context of a specific sector. attention to other aspects of the national Each digital accountability platform sought budgeting process that remained opaque. to be responsive to a single public sector Meanwhile, government reform champions performance challenge. The platforms sought practical solutions to incrementally give officials and citizens the tools they strengthen the performance of public needed to track expenditures and convey programs and reduce the capture of resources their preferences via feedback, voting, and by special interests (Matsuda, 2014; Keefer and advocacy. Khemani, 2003; World Bank, 2015f). 6. The Supreme Court ruled that PDAF and previous pork barrel funds violated the constitutional principle of separation of powers of the executive and legislative branches as it “allowed legislators to wield, in varying gradations, non-oversight, post-enactment authority in vital areas of budget executions” which “impaired public accountability” and “subverted genuine local autonomy.” 7. The Aquino administration introduced the DAP as a course correction after its increased scrutiny of budgeting processes had inadvertently slowed down spending to the point that the government actually underspent against its resources in the first three quarters of 2011. 8. The Supreme Court declared the DAP as unconstitutional for usurping Congress’ power of the purse. DAP allowed the government to move around money 9. The Philippines–Australia Public Financial Management Program (PFMP) assists the Philippines Government to implement its PFM Reform Roadmap: Towards Improved Accountability and Transparency, 2011–2015. This comprehensive PFM reform agenda aims to simplify, improve and harmonize the financial management processes and information systems of the Philippines. From Pork to Performance: Open Government and Program Performance Tracking in the Philippines. 2016. S. Custer, H. Rahemtulla, K. Kaiser, R. van den Brink XVII Overview xxxiii. Why is such sector-specific expenditure xxxvi. Absent critical PFM reforms, tracking important? Effective expenditure stakeholders inside and outside of management depends on transparent, timely, government struggled to monitor public and accountable reporting processes. As the sector spending and performance in 2016 Philippines PEFA assessment notes, delivering services. Citizens could not track without strong expenditure management resources that were committed in the budget systems, it is difficult for officials to curb for flagship national programs and track what leakage and optimize the use of public funds the government spends at the local level. The (World Bank, 2016f). Digital accountability five digital accountability platforms reviewed platforms could conceivably improve both in this study offered a scalable solution to internal and external accountability though: track public spending and performance (1) strengthening internal government in specific sectors that was attractive to financial management systems; and (2) progressive government agencies that wanted demonstrating the practical value of PFM to move rapidly. reforms and budget tracking to mobilize greater scrutiny of public services. xxxvii. Digital accountability platforms were a more visible, practical way for reform champions to showcase the value of public DIGITAL ACCOUNTABILITY PLATFORMS financial management in the context of SOUGHT TO DEEPEN DIALOGUE AND something citizens could easily relate to: IMPROVE SERVICES public services they rely on every day (e.g., roads, schools). The second-generation xxxiv. Online transparency was central to platforms integrated disparate islands of the Aquino administration’s reform efforts existing government data to streamline to promote greater accountability and trust reporting, oversight, and communication of in government institutions. The government information. Government reformers and the launched a national open data portal (data. World Bank saw the opportunity to use these gov.ph) in early 2014 and released over initiatives to create a powerful demonstration 3,500 datasets from 35 national government effect – highlighting credible internal agencies, including previously undisclosed systems, exposing gaps, and marshaling a budget, procurement, and customs data. compelling case for more comprehensive PFM Subsequently, the government issued a series reforms with a broader audience. of executive branch memoranda that pushed national agencies and local government units xxxviii. Compared with other social to disclose information on public resources accountability initiatives in the Philippines, and performance in an interoperable the five digital accountability platforms in manner.10 this study uniquely bring together supply- side information from the government with xxxv. The popularity of data.gov.ph – visited front-end opportunities for citizens to validate by over 700,000 unique visitors since 2014 that information based upon their own – demonstrated the value of technology- experiences. The platforms systematically enabled transparency efforts. It sparked link upstream budget information, project interest in a second generation of digital execution data, and frontline validation accountability platforms to track public of feedback in a single system for citizens, spending and performance in specific sectors. officials, and oversight agencies to more easily Conceived as agile approaches that could track resources and monitor performance deliver quicker wins on a smaller scale, these throughout the entire project life cycle. platforms became a pragmatic solution for reformers to make inroads in improving PFM, even when traditional big systems reforms (e.g., GIFMIS, eProcurement) were stuck. 10. This includes Joint Memorandum Circulars (2014-01 and 2015-01) issued by the Office of the President and Department of Budget and Management, inclusion into the General Authorization Act (2014, 2015 and 2016). XVIII From Pork to Performance: Open Government and Program Performance Tracking in the Philippines. 2016. S. Custer, H. Rahemtulla, K. Kaiser, R. van den Brink Overview xxxix. The digital accountability platforms xlii. The ultimate vision of the platforms sought to make information on public service is to aid citizens and officials in measuring delivery transparent by default in order outcomes and improve the impact of to provoke a paradigm shift from back- government programs using transparent room politics to an open dialogue about public performance data. If the platforms are performance. However, providing information successful, they could prove to be a powerful is not enough. Transparency will only have vehicle to increase budget credibility (i.e., limited utility if people – elected officials, realistic budgets implemented as intended) service providers, oversight agencies, and and strengthen accounting and reporting (i.e., civil society – do not put publicly available expenditures are recorded and reconciled) information to use. Therefore, a digital for the government programs they support accountability platform must not only – two areas in which the PEFA 2016 rated the transmit information about public sector Philippines as poorly performing (World Bank, performance, but also make it easier for 2016f).11 citizens to provide feedback and for the government to respond. xliii. Yet, the problems that digital accountability platforms aim to address xl. In the context of this study, we define require fundamentally transforming perverse feedback broadly, as including both inputs behavioral norms and political incentives from inside and outside of government on around the allocation of public resources a variety of topics from service delivery (Khemani et al., 2015). Irrespective of a priorities and access to issues of quality and platform’s “technical merits” (e.g., simplifying timeliness. In this respect, the platforms reporting and budget tracking), reformers reviewed in this study benefit from a rich seeking to transform the status quo of pork- heritage of learning from other transparency barrel spending must still navigate a highly and accountability initiatives in the political change process that is incremental, Philippines that attempt to mobilize feedback long-term, and fraught with challenges that and strengthen public sector accountability can substantially impede progress (Khemani and performance. et al., 2015; Fritz and Levy, 2014). xli. During the past two decades, civil society, government and development partners have experimented with a number of initiatives to enhance social accountability in the Philippines, that leverage both off- line and online approaches to increase their reach (Kaiser, 2014). The World Development Report (WDR) on Digital Dividends highlights two recent examples (World Bank, 2016a). Rappler – a media and advocacy organization – leverages digital technology and crowdsourcing, alongside investigative journalists and social mobilizers, to animate citizens to improve governance via community protests. Check-My-School is a participatory monitoring program that aims to improve service delivery in public education, established in 2011 as a joint initiative of the Affiliated Network for Social Accountability in East Asia and the Pacific and the Department of Education. (See Box 2 in section 1.4 for more information) 11. See http://www.pefa.org/es/node/23 for the seven PEFA assessment pillars. From Pork to Performance: Open Government and Program Performance Tracking in the Philippines. 2016. S. Custer, H. Rahemtulla, K. Kaiser, R. van den Brink XIX Overview xliv. This report examines the interaction • OpenReconstruction, which monitors of technology, transparency, and politics in post-disaster spending to increase the context of improving the quality and scrutiny and ensure reconstruction accountability of four public expenditure projects are being implemented programs and one revenue mobilization effectively to help communities affected initiative in the Philippines (see Table 1). by Typhoon Yolanda and the Bohol In each instance, the programs involved Earthquake in 2013 to recover from these significant amounts of public resources, and tragedies and rebuild their communities. areas where government leaders were looking for a different way of doing business. The five • OpenRoads, which increases the digital accountability platforms include: transparency of “last mile” access road investments through geo-tagging and • OpenARMM, which discloses information real-time monitoring of implementation on public education spending and school in order to reduce waste, improve locations in the Autonomous Region connectivity, and support inclusive of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) to curb development. a proliferation of “ghost schools” and absentee teachers that siphon resources • SinTax Open Data Dashboard, which and fail to deliver for students in one tracks compliance of companies and local of the most impoverished areas of the government units (LGUs) with enforcing country. cigarette tax legislation (the “SinTax”) in order to increase revenues for Universal • OpenBUB, which supports a popular Health Care (Kaiser et al., 2016). bottom-up budgeting (BUB) initiative to make municipal development less opaque and reduce the channeling of resources to political elites through transparent monitoring of projects proposed by local civil society and approved by poverty reduction action teams. 12. See http://www.pefa.org/es/node/23 for the seven PEFA assessment pillars. XX From Pork to Performance: Open Government and Program Performance Tracking in the Philippines. 2016. S. Custer, H. Rahemtulla, K. Kaiser, R. van den Brink Overview Table 1. Problem-Driven Political Economy: Five Public Sector Performance Challenges Table 1. Problem-Driven Political Economy: Five Public Sector Performance Challenges Sector Education Government Program(s) Government Investment Development Problem Technical Solution Potential of the Platform Primary and secondary education 2,514 primary and secondary Chronic teacher absenteeism OpenARMM: Track public Potential cost savings from in the Autonomous Region of schools in ARMM (Department and “ghost schools” waste education spending and eradicating an average ghost school Muslim Mindanao of Education, Philippines) limited education resources disclose school locations in in ARMM is US$ 80,000 (ARMM) order to eliminate leakage, strengthen targeting and improve school conditions Sector Post-disaster Reconstruction Government Program(s) Government Investment Development Problem Technical Solution Potential of the Platform Post-typhoon Yolanda and Post- PHP167-billion Pesos funding Incomplete, delayed and low OpenReconstruction: Monitor Potential cost savings from Bohol earthquake relief for Yolanda spanning a period quality post-disaster relief and post-disaster spending to eradicating an average ghost of 3 years (2014-2016) under the recovery projects reduce waste, improve quality reconstruction project is US$174,000 Comprehensive Rehabilitation and timeliness of reconstruction and Recovery Plan (CRRP) projects PHP2.3-billion Pesos for the Bohol Earthquake Assistance (BEA) programme. Over 14,000 reconstruction projects Sector Municipal Development Government Program(s) Government Investment Development Problem Technical Solution Potential of the Platform Bottom-up Budgeting (BUB) PHP74.1 billion Pesos funding Resource allocations for OpenBUB: Track BuB projects Potential cost savings from allocated to 54,047 projects municipal development become in order to eliminate leakage, eradicating an average BUB project (2014-16) a channel for political pork strengthen targeting and is US$28,000 captured by elites monitor cancelled or re- purposed projects Sector Roads Government Program(s) Government Investment Development Problem Technical Solution Potential of the Platform Local roads to support PHP232.5-billion Pesos funding Disconnected, low quality and OpenRoads: Monitor and Potential cost savings from agriculture, tourism and rural in road infrastructure across incomplete local road networks geo-tag road infrastructure eradicating an average road project development five flagship road programs spending and project is US$300,000 of 12,000 projects covering implementation to reduce provincial, secondary and rural waste, better target and roads improve quality and connectivity of road networks Sector Tax collection Government Program(s) Government Investment Development Problem Technical Solution Potential of the Platform Cigarette, beer and spirits tax n/a Enforcement of cigarette tax SinTax: Track compliance of Potential revenue generation from collection legislation (Sin Tax) blunted by local government units and an increase in tax stamp compliance tax evasion which undercuts private companies with the by 1 percentage point is US$20 revenue generation for social required tax stamp and monitor million services revenues generated by the cigarette tax Source: Adapted from Fritz and Levy, 2014; WB Governance Transition Note, 2016 Source: Adapted from Fritz and Levy, 2014; WB Governance Transition Note, 2016 From Pork to Performance: Open Government and Program Performance Tracking in the Philippines. 2016. S. Custer, H. Rahemtulla, K. Kaiser, R. van den Brink XXI Overview THE FOUR C’S: ASSESSING THE CURRENT xlviii. Pinpointing the “digital dividends” PROGRESS AND FUTURE TRAJECTORIES OF generated by specific platforms requires DIGITAL ACCOUNTABILITY PLATFORMS establishing clear performance metrics and assessing progress in the context of the xlv. What does success look like when existing reform space within a given sector. marrying technology and transparency The platforms may generate broad benefits if to “make politics work for development” they succeed in changing the expectations of (Khemani et al., 2015)? How do we set realistic politicians, providers and citizens regarding expectations and measure progress for digital public service delivery for the better, such as accountability platforms versus a broader solidifying the “right to know” or fostering constellation of good governance reforms new disclosure standards regarding spending to improve last mile service delivery (Fox, and progress on local development projects. 2014)? The contribution of this report is to present a comparative framework to assess xlix. Ultimately, if digital accountability what happens when digital accountability platforms are to achieve their desired platforms inject performance information consequences or impact, the platforms and into the public discourse and collide with the the programs they support must reshape “analog” factors of real-world politics and institutions – the formal and informal government programs. rules of the game – to facilitate greater “answerability” and “enforcement”, such xlvi. Digital accountability platforms that politicians and front-line providers attempt to act as a “lever to the national are responsive to the evidence and input of budget” to catalyze a chain reaction that citizens regarding last mile service delivery mobilizes citizens, politicians and front- (North, 1990; Goetz and Jenkins, 2005; World line providers to connect the dots between Bank, 2016a). government spending and the tangible services they experience in their daily lives. l. This report assesses the performance of The government discloses data on public digital accountability platforms from both resources and performance (content) and a political and technical perspective, using transmits this information to the public via an assessment rubric based upon four C’s: an interactive digital platform (channel), content, channel, choice, and consequences.12 whereby citizens and officials take action The four C’s represent something of to express their preferences individually a trajectory of maturation for digital and collectively (choice), with the intent of accountability platforms. Decisions regarding shaping the incentives of front-line providers, content and channel are broadly related to such that they deliver better and more the upstream inputs, activities, and outputs inclusive services (consequences). in a results framework that a small band of government reformers can more easily xlvii. However, the design of these control. Whereas, choice and consequences technology solutions involves assumptions are interlinked with the downstream that will either prove to be correct or outcomes over which reform champions have fatally flawed. Which information in substantially less control and yet are essential what formats will be most salient? Which barometers of whether the platforms are technologies are most effective in reaching likely to achieve their aims. Given the early the intended audiences? What mechanisms stage of the five platforms reviewed in this exist for citizens and officials to act upon study, we have better visibility on leading the information? What change will they indicators related to upstream decisions ultimately be able to achieve? on content and channel than on lagging indicators of downstream outcomes. 12. The 4Cs are an adaptation of Tiago Peixoto’s “minimal chain of events” for an accountability mechanism built on disclosure principles from “The Uncertain Relationship Between Open Data and Accountability: A Response to Yu and Robinson’s The New Ambiguity
 of “Open Government” (2013). XXII From Pork to Performance: Open Government and Program Performance Tracking in the Philippines. 2016. S. Custer, H. Rahemtulla, K. Kaiser, R. van den Brink Overview li. However, the long-term trajectories of The nascent progress of a digital digital accountability platforms are likely accountability platform to track the financing dynamic, responsive to changes in their of local road infrastructure (OpenRoads) is design, implementation, and the broader more impressive when seen in the context of enabling environment. Election cycles and the highly politicized allocation of resources focusing events (e.g., political scandals, around local roads.15 natural disasters) can rapidly shift priorities and alter reform prospects. Mainstreaming new norms and building strong reform DIGITAL FOUNDATIONS: A ROADMAP coalitions inside and outside of government TO DEEPEN OPEN GOVERNMENT AND typically occur over a longer period, but IMPROVE SERVICES FOR ALL can similarly shape the opportunities and constraints for a digital accountability liv. Unsurprisingly, the blending of technology platform to achieve its goals. and transparency is not a silver bullet to improve the performance of government lii. Platforms may experience different programs. Based upon the early learning trajectories, as they differ substantially from this study, we identify five operating in their starting points, the pace of their principles that will be critical to sustain progress in the face of opposition or support progress in translating the vision of digital for reforms, as well as their likely endpoints. accountability platforms into higher With this in mind, the study also situates the quality, more accountable last mile service relative progress of these platforms within delivery. Collectively these action-oriented the reform space of a specific government principles serve as a practical roadmap – an program in order to advance the conversation Open Government 3.0 Agenda – for reform beyond generalities. In this respect, champions across public, private, and civil performance is both comparative and context- society sectors to rally around as they work to specific. Reform programs have different deepen open government in 2016 and beyond. enabling environments and measuring progress requires considering the “delta” Operating Principle #1: High-level leadership between where platforms began and where and inter-agency coordination are essential to they might go. track the entire service delivery life cycle. liii. Two years into the experience of the five lv. Political commitment and bureaucratic Philippines digital accountability platforms, capability, reflected in compliance with progress has been variable across the disclosure standards and enabling policy platforms and intertwined with the reform guidance at the agency-level, are important space within which they were deployed. leading indicators of future performance. Some digital accountability platforms in However, in the absence of crosscutting this study, such as those supporting Bottom- PFM reforms such as GIFMIS and UACS, up Budgeting (OpenBUB) and SinTax digital accountability platforms quickly enforcement (SinTax Open Data Dashboard) encounter roadblocks. This is because they benefited from unusually high degrees of must manually integrate information across initial political commitment that served multiple, disconnected accounting systems as a springboard for rapid initial progress to monitor service delivery from upstream in a relatively short period.13 Conversely, resource allocation to downstream program platforms supporting reconstruction implementation. (OpenReconstruction) and the elimination of ghost schools (OpenARMM) began in more adverse political environments and have had trouble sustaining sufficient commitment to move forward.14 13. OpenBUB.gov.ph 14. OpenReconstruction.gov.ph 15. OpenRoads.gov.ph From Pork to Performance: Open Government and Program Performance Tracking in the Philippines. 2016. S. Custer, H. Rahemtulla, K. Kaiser, R. van den Brink XXIII Overview lvi. This dynamic puts the breakthrough idea Operating Principle #3: Design platforms of digital accountability platforms – tracking with a clear view of the performance performance throughout the entire process challenge to be solved and iterate with users of delivering public services – in jeopardy. The to ensure it is fit-for-purpose. incoming administration should put in place clearer institutional structures to facilitate lix. As agencies expend substantial effort to inter-agency coordination to: comply with reconcile disparate information management disclosure standards, report performance systems, they pay less attention to whether information in a timely fashion, and the information being disclosed via the harmonize information management systems platforms is fit-for-purpose – timely, for more seamless expenditure tracking. accurate, relevant, and useful to citizens, officials, and oversight agencies to solve Operating Principle #2: Integrate digital a specific performance challenge. In this accountability platforms within broader respect, it is understandable why the digital reform efforts, rather than as stand-alone accountability platforms reviewed in this initiatives. study appear to have, thus far, had a relatively easier time securing political commitment lvii. Agile technology may provide quick wins and strengthening bureaucratic capability to to cast a spotlight on performance, but there disclose information, than animating citizens is no substitute for major investments in and officials to use it. organizational capabilities at both national and local levels to deliver on major flagship lx. However, adoption and use is critical if programs. The experience of the five digital technology and transparency are to facilitate accountability platforms reviewed in this meaningful accountability gains in the form study underscores that the likelihood of of increased scrutiny of upstream resource success for technical solutions is inextricably allocation and more responsive downstream linked with the vitality of broader political service delivery. To deepen uptake, the reforms. incoming administration should prioritize rapid iteration with end users to ensure that lviii. Platforms that were well integrated with digital accountability platforms are releasing sector-specific reforms (e.g., the SinTax Open the right information, at the right time, and in Data Dashboard and SinTax legislation) or the right format so that citizens, officials, and cross-cutting international commitments (e.g., oversight agencies can turn publicly available OpenBUB and the OGP national action plan) data into actionable insights. have been more successful in galvanizing lasting political commitment, dedicated Operating Principle #4: Find ways that open resources, and buy-in across agencies and government can align incentives to make levels of government than standalone politics work for development. initiatives. As the incoming administration and development partners evaluate platform lxi. Traditionally, the Philippines election investments, they should prioritize those cycle produces a period of policy deadlock, sectors where digital technologies can uncertainty, and volatility, as patron-client complement reform efforts already underway, allegiances shift in anticipation of a change as this signals that national agencies and in political leadership alongside political LGUs may be more willing and able to make opportunism and rent-seeking behavior. critical investments to disclose information Getting digital accountability platforms to and respond to feedback as part of a broader “click”, or at least surmount the weight of strategy. inertia to maintain the status quo, requires at least some constellation of actors to view greater transparency as being in their interest. XXIV From Pork to Performance: Open Government and Program Performance Tracking in the Philippines. 2016. S. Custer, H. Rahemtulla, K. Kaiser, R. van den Brink Overview lxii. For incoming and outgoing reform DIGITAL DIVIDENDS DEPEND ON POLITICS champions, this requires crowding-in (rather AND PUBLIC DEMAND FOR BETTER than short-circuiting) the interests of local INFORMATION politicians concerned with visibility on resource flows to their own jurisdictions lxv. The Philippines stands at a critical or bureaucrats balancing pressures to juncture: will the new administration increase spending with worries regarding strengthen the tenuous gains made in accusations of impropriety. Next generation recent years to transition “from an opaque, open government initiatives need to reframe closed and unaccountable system” to a new the value-add of transparency as serving, paradigm of “transparent, performance-based rather than threatening, the interests of these management”? As the Duterte administration stakeholders to break through gridlock. gears up for its first hundred days in office, it Operating Principle #5: Broaden the support would do well to learn from the challenges base for digital accountability platforms of the last administration and build upon inside and outside of government to have some of the (digital) foundations left by its staying power. predecessors. This paper assesses the results achieved thus far, the lessons learned, and the lxiii. The proverbial plug can be pulled challenges that remain. overnight on any of the five online platforms presented in this report. If digital accountability initiatives are to translate investments in technology and transparency into real “digital dividends” for the Filipino people, they must secure a broader base of support across government, civil society, and the private sector (World Bank, 2016a). The enduring appeal of the BUB program and the passage of landmark SinTax legislation owe their success to their ability to mobilize a broad coalition of support inside and outside of government that could amass pressure for change that was both “bottom-up” and “top- down”. lxiv. However, the vast majority of support for digital accountability initiatives to date is coming from a small cadre of reform champions from the outgoing Aquino administration. As the incoming administration takes office, there is untapped potential to increase the demand for information on public resources and performance by focusing on two growth areas: (1) mobilize the public to help improve official data on service delivery and they may be more interested in using it; and (2) demonstrate the value of platform data as a management tool for civil servants to more easily plan, implement, and evaluate flagship government programs. From Pork to Performance: Open Government and Program Performance Tracking in the Philippines. 2016. S. Custer, H. Rahemtulla, K. Kaiser, R. van den Brink XXV Service Delivery 1 Service Delivery: When Politics, Transparency and Technology Collide 1. While “islands of good governance exist” from these digital accountability platforms in the Philippines, public services often miss provide guidance for public, private, and civil the mark in translating robust economic society leaders in the Philippines and around growth into prosperity for all (Matsuda, 2014). the world that are committed to leveraging Access to, and quality of, public services technology and transparency to create digital varies substantially across this geographically dividends for their communities. diverse and politically fragmented archipelago. Politicians in resource- 4. In this section, we discuss the reform space constrained local government units (LGUs) within which these platforms are deployed, buy votes for national-level officials in order including: (1) the political economy drivers of to access discretionary resources (Cruz, 2014; public service delivery failures; (2) the origins Dressel, 2012). Meanwhile, reform champions of digital accountability platforms to respond have struggled to curb pork-barrel politics and to these public sector performance challenges; elite capture of public services (Coronel, 1998). and (3) the causal logic of these platforms in overcoming historical accountability 2. Failures in service delivery – crumbling breakdowns in service delivery. To set the facilities, absentee teachers, and roads stage for this analysis, section 1.1 introduces to nowhere – waste resources and retard the Fritz et al. (2009) problem-driven political development. These symptoms also economy framework to examine what underscore a more intractable development happens at the intersection of technology, problem: a breakdown in accountability transparency, and politics in five different relationships. Clientelist politics, corruption, service delivery contexts. poor information, and low expectations encourage politicians and civil servants to act with impunity (Dressel, 2011; Acemoglu and Robinson, 2013). Weak institutions, co-opted organizations, and constrained implementation capacity create a permissive environment for policymakers to use public resources as political currency to advance their own interests (Keefer and Khemani, 2003). 3. Consistent with the anti-corruption agenda of the previous administration, reform champions sought to open up the black box of service delivery and use digital platforms to disclose data on public sector performance and turn information into action to improve accountability. In this study, we examine early evidence from technology and transparency initiatives that attempt to shift the conversation from pork to performance in the context of five sectors – education, reconstruction, roads, municipal development, and tax collection. The insights From Pork to Performance: Open Government and Program Performance Tracking in the Philippines. 2016. S. Custer, H. Rahemtulla, K. Kaiser, R. van den Brink 1 Service Delivery 1.1 Problem-Driven Political Economy existing institutions, and aligned with a Analysis country’s political realities (Levy, 2014; Booth and Cammack, 2013). Pursuing this direction 5. Political incentives and behavioral norms requires collaboration between policymakers, are frequently at odds with the adoption service providers, and citizens to identify of technical solutions to public sector what works (or not) in different contexts. performance challenges (Khemani et al., 2015). With an eye towards re-election, politicians 8. Through a comparative review of World favor policies and institutions that support Bank experiences, Fritz and Levy (2014) the exigencies of winning votes, maintaining capture these political economy drivers alliances, or increasing their status. This through a three-step framework centered implies the need for elected officials to on problem-driven governance and political make compromises and balance interests economy analysis. These drivers include: in order to strengthen their negotiating (a) relevant structural factors (both formal position with other power brokers. In highly and informal) that influence stakeholder decentralized political contexts such as the positions; (b) existing institutions, including Philippines, there is an additional central- institutional dysfunctions that channel local dynamic that influences the design of behavior, as well as ongoing institutional intergovernmental relations with a view to change; and, finally, (c) stakeholder interests maintaining some form of centralized control, and motivations, and the relationships rather than optimizing service delivery (Fritz and power balances between them. Figure and Levy, 2014). 1 visualizes the framework, originally developed by Fritz et al. (2009), in the context 6. At the same time, the interests of of this study. politicians can also broadly converge with development objectives to deliver growth, jobs, or social protection benefits as a way to secure legitimacy or re-election. Even when politicians seek development progress, they may struggle to pursue these goals effectively because of the need to maintain the support of vested interests and pressures to: favor family members or close allies, lead fractious coalition governments, or navigate a difficult mix of fiscal problems and public discontent. 7. Given the complexity of development challenges and the unpredictability of institutional change processes, there is increasing agreement that successful reform efforts require approaches that are problem- focused, iterative, and adaptive (Andrews, 2013; World Bank, 2015d). Others have built on this idea, emphasizing the need for reform processes to be politically informed and locally led (Booth and Unsworth, 2014; Overseas Development Institute, 2015). Brian Levy (2014) similarly acknowledges that incremental reforms offer a path to progress that is pragmatic in breaking down change into manageable pieces that cumulatively can make a difference. There is also a growing awareness that for reforms to be successful, they must be locally anchored, built upon 2 From Pork to Performance: Open Government and Program Performance Tracking in the Philippines. 2016. S. Custer, H. Rahemtulla, K. Kaiser, R. van den Brink Service Delivery Figure 1. Problem-Driven Political Economy Analysis: Where Technology and Politics Meet The Development Problem the service delivery issue or development challenge to be solved Structure Geography, demographics, resource constraints Technical Solutions Political Context Institutions Political Technical and economic analysis of feasible solutions to solve the Political economy analysis of the service delivery environment within Formal and informal rules Economy of the game service delivery challenge which technology is deployed Drivers Interests Stakeholder constellations, incentives and power Implications: What can best be done to make reforms happen or deliver progress? Implementation: implementing the identified approach to be solved Source: Adapted from Fritz et al. (2009) 1.2 Political Economy Drivers of Public 10. Despite this progress in growing the pool Sector Service Delivery of public resources, the government has struggled to systematically curb leakage in 9. One of the fastest growing economies public spending overall underscored by the in Asia, the Philippines now faces the COA Special Audit Report on PDAF (2013). challenge of reforming its upstream public The actual functioning of the country’s financial management practices to achieve democracy has been hampered by pervasive downstream improvements in service clientelism and non-programmatic political delivery. The country has sustained a robust parties, which have created perverse “rules of GDP growth rate in the last five years, up to the game” that make it difficult for citizens six percent from its prior long run trend of 2.5 to effectively sanction leaders for poor percent (World Bank, 2015c). However, only performance (Dressel, 2011; North, 1990). recently did this rapid economic growth start to translate into stronger job creation and faster poverty reduction.16 16. Official poverty statistics show a decline in the poverty rate between the first quarters of 2012 and 2013: from 27.9 percent to 24.6 percent, implying a poverty elasticity of growth of around -2 percent. The positive trend in poverty reduction is also confirmed by a higher growth of real income and lower underemployment among poorer households compared to the rest of the population. Government transfers to the poor under the conditional cash transfer program are a significant factor explaining the rise in real incomes of the poor. From Pork to Performance: Open Government and Program Performance Tracking in the Philippines. 2016. S. Custer, H. Rahemtulla, K. Kaiser, R. van den Brink 3 Service Delivery 11. Dynasties predominate elections, creating 14. Public resources in the Philippines are a form of political inequality as “leadership distributed across 18 administrative regions, 81 is passed down through family ties” rather provinces, 145 cities, 1,489 municipalities and than on the merits of policy positions or approximately 42,000 barangays, each with performance (Hutchcroft, 2008; Acemoglu their own elected executive and legislature. and Robinson, 2013). The reach of political With elections in more than 45,000 dynasties is substantial – an estimated 80 jurisdictions held every three years, elected percent of young Filipino legislators and 70 officials in the Philippines are perpetually percent of all elected officials at the national campaigning for office, which incentivizes and local levels are the scions of political them to use these scarce public resources to families (Mendoza, 2012).17 These dynastic secure their own positions and allow their offspring account for 60-80 percent of each of allies to “claim electoral credit” (Matsuda, the major political parties and appear to win 2014). In an information-poor environment, elections by much larger margins of victory. citizens have limited ammunition to reward They are also motivated to protect their or sanction their officials at the ballot box, interests, as Mendoza (2012) finds that “80 which creates little incentive for politicians to percent of dynastic legislators experienced an act accountably (Capuno, 2008; Khemani et al, increase in their net worth”. 2015). 12. The government has made inroads in 15. In 2010, Benigno “Noynoy” S. Aquino III devolving resources for service delivery to swept into power with a clear mandate to local governments (Hutchcroft, 2008; Dressel, make anti-corruption and inclusive growth 2011). In 1991, Republic Act No. 7160 otherwise priority areas for reform (World Bank, 2015f). known as the Local Government Code was With the outgoing administration tarnished enacted into law, transferring control and by allegations of corruption and vote responsibility of delivering basic services to buying, the 2010 election was effectively a the hands of LGUs, including the provision of referendum on corruption against a backdrop health, agriculture and social welfare (Cruz, of underperforming institutions (World Bank, 2014; Matsuda, 2014). 2015f). The newly elected president was able to attract a younger generation of reformers 13. Governors, mayors, and other LGU leaders eager to reconnect with the good governance garnered higher status and more resources and “people power” agenda first espoused from decentralization in the form of the by his mother, former President Corazon Internal Revenue Allotment (i.e., an inter- Aquino. Using his substantial presidential governmental transfer). However, in resource- powers, Aquino appointed key reformers to strapped LGUs, electoral considerations serve in critical leadership positions in several determine the delivery of services more agencies (Monsod, 2015; World Bank, 2015f). often than need, which has repercussions For many, Aquino represented an invaluable for which constituents and communities opportunity to usher in reforms to curb the will benefit from the “public purse” (Coronel, pernicious influence of patronage politics in 1998; Dressel, 2012). Structural deficiencies in last mile service delivery (Sidel, 2014; Dressel, the way the central government formulated 2012). the IRA exacerbates the situation, as revenue allocation patterns do not reflect actual needs (Matsuda, 2014). 17. These figures are from a 2012 study by Mendoza et al of the 15th Philippine House of Representatives during the 2003-07 period, the authors also extend this analysis to all elected officials at the national level and in local government units. 4 From Pork to Performance: Open Government and Program Performance Tracking in the Philippines. 2016. S. Custer, H. Rahemtulla, K. Kaiser, R. van den Brink Service Delivery 16. The Aquino administration took action 19. As an interrelated development, the early in its tenure to translate campaign Aquino administration endorsed a 2011- promises into transparency and governance 2015 Philippine PFM Reform Roadmap gains. The administration set up a cabinet- supported by the World Bank and Australia’s level cluster on good governance with the DFAT. Seeking to remedy the country’s poor President himself as Chairman. It published performance on a 2010 Public Expenditure an exhaustive list of laws, executive orders, and Financial Accountability (PEFA) proclamations, policies, and programs via Assessment, the Roadmap enumerates a the Official Gazette (World Bank, 2016b). The comprehensive PFM reform agenda, which administration increased scrutiny of project aims to simplify, improve, and harmonize and budget planning and ensured that annual financial management processes and budgets were enacted on time. President information systems across the government.20 Aquino also cracked down on high-profile cases of corruption: the Chief Justice was 20. The fruit of a long-term partnership impeached, the Ombudsman was forced to between the Governments of Australia and resign on charges of graft, and notoriously the Philippines, the PFM Roadmap aims to corrupt agencies such as the Bureau of improve the efficiency, accountability, and Internal Revenue were put under new transparency of the use of public funds in leadership (World Bank, 2016b). the Philippines. To this end, the roadmap laid out an ambitious program to implement 17. In March 2011, the Aquino administration an integrated GIFMIS, new national payroll adopted the Philippine Development Plan system and modernized procurement system. representing the government’s blueprint for The intent of these reforms was to change implementing its “Social Contract with the individual incentives and institutionalized Filipino People”. It represented an ambitious processes to make the upstream allocation of set of governance reforms with concrete public resources more accountable (Holmes outcomes. These governing documents and Sweet, 2016; World Bank, 2015f). emphasize the Aquino administration’s focus on implementation, rather then 21. There has been a growing public interest intent, to improve the transparency of in recent years in monitoring the allocation government spending and public services. of public resources via the national budget, In the same year, the Philippines became a galvanized by a series of scandals spotlighting founding member of the Open Government the misuse of public resources. In response, Partnership, which was a means to lock in the Aquino administration enacted early governance reforms beyond the end of the reforms to increase the transparency President’s term in 2016.18 of budget allocations, including for the controversial PDAF that legislators could 18. There are early indications that President use to disperse public resources to their Aquino’s emphasis on restoring public trust constituencies. A zero-based budgeting in government is making a positive impact initiative emphasized aligning public not only on the country’s governance, but also expenditures with the administration’s social its economic growth (World Bank, 2016b). The and economic objectives. The government IMF has suggested that improved governance also instituted a performance-informed and the adoption of new technologies could budgeting initiative requiring executive be important contributors to the rapid and agencies to orient future spending based sustained GDP growth that the Philippines upon past performance. has enjoyed in recent years, a phenomenon that is not fully explained by higher productivity of capital and labor alone (IMF, 2015; World Bank, 2016b).19 18. The OGP is a multilateral initiative that aims to secure concrete commitments from governments to promote transparency, empower citizens, fight corruption, and harness new technologies to strengthen governance. 19. For more discussion, please see the most recent IMF Article IV consultation for the Philippines. This is available at: http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/ scr/2015/cr15246.pdf. 20. The 2010 PEFA assessment, which was jointly conducted by the World Bank and DFAT, uses a standard set of performance indicators for measuring the performance of the government’s public financial management system against a 4 point scoring system with clearly defined objective criteria. The Philippines was rated as having satisfactory performance on less than a third of the PEFA indicators. From Pork to Performance: Open Government and Program Performance Tracking in the Philippines. 2016. S. Custer, H. Rahemtulla, K. Kaiser, R. van den Brink 5 Service Delivery 22. Yet, reforming the national budget is a 25. Government champions also face a tough highly contested arena for politics, pork, challenge in rallying public interest in, and and performance. A whistle-blower scandal support for, strengthening internal PFM in 2013 suggested that PDAF was subject systems that can seem quite distant and to major kickbacks and the Supreme Court abstract to citizens interacting with front- later ruled the program unconstitutional. line service providers in schools, clinics, The Supreme Court also ruled in 2014 against and LGU offices across the country. Yet, in the Executives Disbursement Acceleration reality, the absence of these “big system” Program (DAP), arguing that the executive reforms makes it more difficult for citizens, had abused its leeway in reallocating funds, officials, and oversight agencies to track despite its good intentions to move funds how these basic services are provided – from lagging to leading programs (Diokno, from resource allocation and expenditures 2016b). While the Supreme Court rulings to implementation status and outcomes against PDAF and DAP could be viewed as (Holmes and Sweet, 2016). In particular, the gains for budget accountability, they did introduction of the GIFMIS system would not address the fundamental challenge of have made it substantially easier for officials a national budget process that was highly to capture and disclose transaction-level data politicized and opaque. including commitments and disbursements. See Box 1 for a more in-depth discussion of 23. The challenge for Philippine reforms, the challenges of tracking and reporting on therefore, is to make the budget more the execution of the national budget in the transparent and accountable, while context of the Philippines. navigating the country’s political realities. The Philippines has already achieved notable gains in making its public finances “more comprehensive, consistent, and accessible” in line with the recommendations of a 2010 PEFA assessment (World Bank, 2010; World Bank, 2016f). However, the country still falls short on the credibility of its budgets (i.e., realistic budgets implemented as intended) and accounting and reporting (i.e., expenditures are recorded and reconciled) – two areas in which the PEFA 2016 rated the Philippines as poorly performing (World Bank, 2016f).21 24. Despite the government’s ambitions to advance crosscutting PFM and good governance reforms that would strengthen budget credibility and expenditure tracking, implementation has fallen short of aspirations. Despite common recognition that agency reporting systems are both weak and fragmented, reforms to implement the GIFMIS as a budget platform and standardize a Unified Account Code Structure (UACS) to harmonize budget reporting across government agencies have run aground in the face of bureaucratic turf battles between and within executive agencies (World Bank, 2015f; Holmes and Sweet, 2016). 22. See http://www.pefa.org/es/node/23 for the seven PEFA assessment pillars. 6 From Pork to Performance: Open Government and Program Performance Tracking in the Philippines. 2016. S. Custer, H. Rahemtulla, K. Kaiser, R. van den Brink Service Delivery Box 1: Reporting and Tracking of Budget Execution in the Philippines is a Challenge By: Rogier van den Brink et al. (World Bank, 2016b) 1. A challenge affecting transparency and accountability 2. There is no government-wide integrated financial in all sectors and spheres of government is that it is management information system (GIFMIS). Such a currently not possible to track individual budget items. system would allow the timely availability of complete Simply put, a particular budget item cannot be followed and accurate data essential for decision-making purposes. from enactment, disbursement, and procurement to Capturing transactions at all levels from budget execution. Line item budgeting was introduced to preparation to release, commitment and disbursement is enhance transparency. A Unified Account Code Structure essential for enabling transparent monitoring of public (UACS) was designed and adopted for a uniform funds. The introduction of such a government-wide classification system across planning, accounting and system was a key element of the government’s public reporting. However these were designed in the context of financial management strategy. However, after several ongoing efforts for automation through a government- years of preparation and two procurement processes, wide integrated financial management information the contract could not be awarded. Exact reasons for system (GIFMIS). Current systems comprise of several failure of the process are unclear but seem to be a lack automation solutions across the budget cycle in varying of sufficiently broad-based support for such a large, use by DBM and the sectors. Most accounting and potentially all pervasive reform. A scaled down version nearly all financial reporting is still done manually. The of the GIFMIS, a Budget and Treasury Management voluminous budget with detailed line items and UACS System (BTMS) limited to only the DBM and Bureau with 54 digits capturing all aspects of classification is of Treasury was contracted late in the administration. unwieldy to be applied in this scenario. Problems due Budget allocation for rollout to line agencies during the to limited ability to monitor in the absence of timely, FY17 is proposed but timing would be dependent on the complete, and credible data became acute in the successful implementation of the BTMS platform. aftermath of Super Typhoon Yolanda. Despite availability of funding with the national government, funds flow to and expenditures at the different levels of government for priority activities could not be accelerated. Until today, the challenge remains, due to a lack of enforcement of key budget tracking principles, such as uniform classification across all steps, which can then be monitored until execution. 22. The mandatory use of PhilGEPS is now part of agencies’ performance system: the Performance Based Bonus (PBB) system. However, full adoption and disclosure of contracts is a challenge. From Pork to Performance: Open Government and Program Performance Tracking in the Philippines. 2016. S. Custer, H. Rahemtulla, K. Kaiser, R. van den Brink 7 Service Delivery Reporting and Tracking of Budget Execution in the Philippines is a Challenge By: Rogier van den Brink et al. (World Bank, 2016b) 3. The 2014 Budget adopted a government-wide uniform management software that generates its own unique chart of accounts. This was the first time in the history project IDs. Some agencies and local governments have of budgeting in the Philippines that agencies applied a implemented the COA-mandated electronic bookkeeping uniform classification, which was to extend from budget system (eNGAS), which also does not capture the full formulation to execution and reporting. The 2014 budget digits for UACS. This means that manual adjustments was also the first performance-informed budget, in that are made at the aggregate level for reporting purposes. it published actual quantitative results objectives. This Efforts to abolish “continuing appropriations”, which was a major step forward from the pre-existing situation, straddle across years, have also been met with resistance. in which budget transparency and tracking was not Since budgets do not lapse annually, the incentives possible, given the use of different category codes by for agencies to accelerate procurement processes and different agencies. After successful training for UACS, execute with efficiency are not there. Additionally, in the implementation was only rolled out in late 2014; the absence of a GIFMIS, the ability to segregate and report financial reports for 2014, including annual accounts, are on commitments and expenditures pertaining to budget currently UACS compliant but transactions are not being allocations from different years is limited. captured on this basis thereby limiting usefulness for analysis. 5. Individual agencies’ reporting on budget execution is delayed. Line agencies generally comply with the 4. Tracking of individual budget line items remains requirement to submit to the DBM and COA the Budget elusive. With 54 digits, the UACS is comprehensive in Execution documents (BEDs) and Budget & Financial that it captures economic, administrative and functional Accountability Reports (BFARs), but these are nearly classifications as well as the Program, Activity, Project always delayed and of questionable credibility. However, (PAP) codes that can be unique identifiers for investment DBM posts the reports available on its website. Reports projects. In the absence of automated and integrated are prepared through manual consolidation of data from systems, the full UACS cannot be fully operationalized, as various offices of the agencies causing accuracy and it is impractical to manually code each transaction with completeness to be weak. Although there is some level all these aspects and then maintain ledgers that can be of data extraction from systems such as eBudget and used for tracking expenditures. The last part of the UACS eNGAS, not all agencies and departments have fully rolled i.e. the object codes are retained for all transactions and out these systems. the other parts, most importantly PAP codes are often lost at some point in the process flow from budget formulation to eventual disbursement. The automated government procurement system (PhilGEPS)22 also does not currently provide for inclusion of full UACS codes or even the PAP codes. DPWH, the primary agency for implementation of the infrastructure budget uses project 22. The mandatory use of PhilGEPS is now part of agencies’ performance system: the Performance Based Bonus (PBB) system. However, full adoption and disclosure of contracts is a challenge. 8 From Pork to Performance: Open Government and Program Performance Tracking in the Philippines. 2016. S. Custer, H. Rahemtulla, K. Kaiser, R. van den Brink Service Delivery 26. Champions within the Aquino 28. It is unsurprising, therefore, that the administration tried smaller-scale proof- participation of domestic media, civil of-concepts to spark dialogue and build society groups, and individual citizens in the buy-in across the bureaucracy. For example, discourse on democracy and public service the government is currently preparing to delivery has been episodic. Voter turnout pilot a scaled down Budget and Treasury is high, but the Philippines has relatively Management System (BTMS). This “baby few CSOs compared with older democracies GIFMIS” for the Department of Budget such as the US, UK, and Canada (Clarke, 2013; Management (DBM) and Department of Hutchcroft, 2008; Dressel, 2011).23 While a non- Finance (DoF) will capture two critical points violent “people power” revolution toppled the for financial tracking – budget and cash out Ferdinand Marcos regime and expanded civic at source. As one official described, “[the space for PFM reform, domestic civil society GIFMIS] could have altered the way that does not appear to be making a consistent government does business, but there was impact on the country’s social, economic, and too much resistance from the bureaucracy political life. This is underscored by a 2004 and it stalled. We tried for a big system and it global survey which ranks the Philippines didn’t happen, now we’re trying again with 28th out of 34 countries in terms of civil a different approach”. However, contracted society strength (Dressel, 2012; World Bank, late in the administration’s tenure, the BTMS 2015f).24 is a substantially scaled down version of the original GIFMIS vision and would not cover 29. Domestic media outlets have spotlighted actual spending in line agencies. incidences of government corruption and have been an important constituency 27. Attempts to pass legislative frameworks agitating for the passage of an FOI law and such as the FOI law or the Whistleblower other government disclosure policies (World Protection Act also remain stymied by limited Bank, 2015f). However, the space for media support within the Philippine Congress outlets to speak out has been constrained in a (Mangahas, 2015). This is unfortunate given country that has a history of violence against the high degree of public support for the FOI journalists and low scores on indicators of law, in particular, underscored by the fact that press freedom (Reporters without Borders, 90 percent of Filipino executives in a recent 2015; Dressel, 2011). Criticized for producing survey view the passage of a strong law on “black propaganda”, some domestic right to information as being critical to reduce journalists may perpetuate patronage politics corruption (Social Weather Stations, 2015). for a fee through helping legislators sabotage Against this backdrop, there has been a public their rivals’ chances of reelection. outcry against the misuse of public funds and popular disenchantment with perceived 30. Broad-based reform coalitions were corruption and capture of public resources active in the passage of two important pieces by political elites. Civil society organizations of recent legislation such as the SinTax (a (CSOs) express disillusion and skepticism at controversial tax on cigarettes to expand their ability to take a leading role in framing tax revenues) and reforms to expunge and shaping public discourse. ghost voters from the election rolls in the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (Sidel, 2014). However, many CSOs in the Philippines operate as “mutual benefit organizations” that exist to benefit the specific needs of their members, rather than “public benefit organizations” that seek to influence broader public policy, which may dilute their influence (Clarke, 2013). Moreover, Clarke (2013) and Franco (2004) suggest that CSOs in the Philippines may be prone to capture by political elites and become a “conduit for misuse of lump-sum funds”. 23. Clarke (2013) notes that the Philippines has 1.47 CSOs per capita compared with 4.89 in the US, 4.41 in the UK and 5.01 in Canada. 24. The 2004 Johns Hopkins Global Civil Society Index, a global survey to assess the strength of civil society in 34 countries, ranked the Philippines 28th, with the country’s civil society scoring lowest on the criterion on impact. From Pork to Performance: Open Government and Program Performance Tracking in the Philippines. 2016. S. Custer, H. Rahemtulla, K. Kaiser, R. van den Brink 9 Service Delivery 31. The role of social media and other online 32. In summary, the delivery of public services technologies may reduce barriers for Filipino in the Philippines is undercut by limited citizens to organize themselves and amplify implementation capacity and front-line their voice in shaping the priorities of elected providers that lack the incentives to curb officials. The September 2013 Million People the abuse of public resources for private March is case in point. Spurred on by Netizens gain or invest in improvements (Kosack and bloggers, Filipinos spontaneously and Fung, 2014). Meanwhile, crosscutting joined a non-violent protest in September PFM reform efforts appear distant and the 2013 to demand the abolition of the pork- benefits invisible for citizens, officials, and barrel system, or at least a reallocation of oversight agencies to see the value-add public resources. Extensive use of web- of strengthening internal government based platforms and social media enabled financial management systems in these mass protests to extend their reach concrete improvements to public services. throughout the country. The Philippines is Building upon the WDR (2004) original one of the largest social media communities accountability triangle, Figure 2 visualizes in the world: one in three people use the how an information-poor environment Internet, including 34 million on Facebook and causes friction and distorts signaling between Twitter, and the country boasts 106 million providers, politicians, and citizens regarding active mobile phone subscribers. Yet, many performance expectations. CSOs have mounted only token presence on the Internet, limited to an organizational webpage, and have done little else to tap the potential of the large Philippine online community. Figure 2. An Information-Poor Environment Creates Friction in Accountability Relationships The State Politicians / Policymakers An information-poor environment creates friction, distorts signaling and creates a stunted feedback Long route loop between providers, politicians and citizens. Friction Politics of Service Friction Delivery Short route Providers Citizens / Clients Frontline Agencies/Organizations Organized / Unorganized Friction Source: Adapted from the 2004 World Development Report, Making Services Work for the Poor. Source: Adapted from Making Services Work for the Poor, World Development Report, World Bank (2004) 10 From Pork to Performance: Open Government and Program Performance Tracking in the Philippines. 2016. S. Custer, H. Rahemtulla, K. Kaiser, R. van den Brink Service Delivery 33. Information asymmetries and weak 34. Absent rewards or penalties from the institutions create perverse incentives for electorate, national and local-level politicians all parties to maintain the status quo – a are not held to account for their performance, “low accountability trap” (Fox, 2014). Lacking thus there is little incentive, whether positive transparent information on government or negative, to change their behavior. Without performance and robust channels to express pressure from citizens or elected politicians their preferences, citizens are ill equipped in the executive or legislature, government to take corrective action, individually via agencies are unlikely to crack down on feedback and voting or collectively through the use of public resources for private gain community organizing and coalition building (Stapenhurst and O’Brien; Kosack and Fung, (Peixoto, 2013; Khemani et al., 2015; World 2014; Khemani et al., 2015). This vicious cycle Bank, 2004). As a result, unengaged citizens perpetuates a stunted feedback loop for public and unaccountable politicians fail to sanction services, depicted in Figure 3. their government for poor performance, sending a signal to civil servants that future performance need not change. Figure 3. A Vicious Cycle: Accountability Breakdowns in an Information-Poor Environment Accountability Breakdowns • Information asymmetries Information asymmetries and weak institutions Government Programs • Perverse incentives create perverse incentives • Allocate resources • Weak institutions for all parties to maintain the status quo – a “low • Create rules accountability trap”. • Monitor delivery Unwilling Providers Limited Capacity Unengaged Citizens Inconsistent Service Unaccountable Delivery Politicians • Less inclusive • Lower quality • Less accountable Stunted feedback loop: poor performance not effectively sanctioned 35. This paper examines whether and how has limited utility if people – elected officials, online technologies can be harnessed to service providers, oversight agencies, and democratize information, reduce friction, and civil society – don’t put publicly available strengthen feedback loops in order to change information to use. Therefore, technology- the prevailing narrative of service delivery enabled transparency initiatives must from one of patronage and pork-barrel politics not only transmit information, but also to an emphasis on performance. As Khemani make it easier for government programs to et al. (2015) describe, there is growing interest elicit and respond to feedback about their and experimentation in the use of online performance. In the context of this study, we technologies to monitor public resources, define feedback broadly, as including both reduce opportunities for graft, increase inputs from inside and outside of government access to information, and facilitate citizen- on a variety of topics from service delivery government dialogue regarding priorities priorities and access to issues of quality and and performance. However, transparency timeliness. From Pork to Performance: Open Government and Program Performance Tracking in the Philippines. 2016. S. Custer, H. Rahemtulla, K. Kaiser, R. van den Brink 11 Service Delivery 36. While standalone technology solutions effectively. Digital accountability platforms are likely to be displaced by entrenched could conceivably catalyze action for vested interests, using technology to disclose improved service delivery in two different information on public performance and ways: (1) strengthening internal government mobilize citizens to engage politically could financial management systems to better prove to be a potent combination to contest budget, plan, and monitor projects (supply- the political beliefs that support a culture of side); and (2) mobilizing greater public poor performance (Khemani et al., 2015; World scrutiny and support for PFM reforms by Bank, 2016a). However, translating technology demonstrating the practical value of budget inputs into “digital dividends” such as tracking to better service delivery (demand- better services and accountable governance side). Figure 4 depicts this as a virtuous “requires collaboration between policy actors feedback loop. and researchers to identify what specifically works (or not) in different contexts” (World 38. As we will further examine in the Bank, 2016a; Khemani et al., 2015). remaining sections of this paper, whether or not this theory of change holds true 37. The five digital accountability platforms for a given platform rests upon several analyzed in this report share an overarching assumptions that may prove to flawed or theory of change: when citizens and officials context-specific. Section 1.3 introduces each have access to relevant information on public of these digital accountability platforms, the sector performance and have the capacity performance challenges they aim to address to take action, individually or collectively, and the reform space they must influence to they will be more likely to give voice to their bolster PFM and improve service delivery. preferences and ensure their government resources and delivers local services more Figure 4. A Virtuous Cycle: Digital Accountability Platforms Provide a Technology Assist Political Mobilization • Voting and lobbying • Coalitions and organizations Improved Service Digital Accountability Delivery Engaged Citizens • More inclusive Platform • Greater transparency • Higher quality Government Programs • Better connectivity • More accountable • Allocate resources • Informs action • Create rules Accountable • Monitor delivery Politicians Digital accountability platforms provide a Commitment Capacity Engagement Responsiveness technology assist to help government programs create a stronger feed- back loop Stonger feedback loop: engaged citizens, accountable politicians, willing providers 12 From Pork to Performance: Open Government and Program Performance Tracking in the Philippines. 2016. S. Custer, H. Rahemtulla, K. Kaiser, R. van den Brink Service Delivery 1.3 Digital Accountability Platforms for 42. Collectively, the platforms reviewed in this Five Performance Challenges study aim to: streamline reporting, integrate disparate data points into a comprehensive 39. Over the past five years, the World Bank picture of service delivery, and make all of Group and other development partners such this information on government performance as Australia’s DFAT have sought to bolster the publicly available. With this information efforts of national and local level reformers at their fingertips, citizens and officials can to curb the influence of patronage politics more easily spark debate about “what [public] and strengthen the foundation for more money has been spent, but also what that transparent, accountable, and responsive spending has accomplished” (Khemani et al., PFM. However, despite efforts on the part 2015). Leveling the information playing field, of the Aquino administration to advance the platforms give citizens and officials the key transparency and good governance tools they need to track expenditures, monitor reforms, officials and citizens still struggle to performance, and convey their preferences via track public expenditures and monitor the feedback, voting, and advocacy. The platforms government’s efforts to deliver services and also open the door to mobilize public support raise revenues. In response, the World Bank to verify and supplement official information helped the government innovate a series of with citizen feedback and observations at the digital accountability platforms to help solve point of service delivery. five critical performance challenges. 43. While digital accountability platforms 40. The intuition of the digital accountability are a technical solution, the expectation is platforms is that timely and transparent that citizens and officials use information to information on government performance is engage politically, individually or collectively, critical for officials to make effective decisions to influence resource allocation decisions and and for citizens to hold them accountable sanction poor performance (Khemani et al., for policy outcomes that further the public 2015). Moreover, the government must meet interest. Effective expenditure management a higher standard of disclosing information depends on transparent, timely, and on the whole service delivery chain in a given accountable reporting processes. As the 2016 sector from upstream resource allocation (e.g., Philippines PEFA assessment notes, without budgets, procurement) to implementation strong expenditure management systems, (e.g., completion status, expenditures) it is difficult for officials to curb leakage and outcomes (e.g., service quality and and optimize the use of public funds (World inclusiveness). For these reasons, digital Bank, 2016f). Yet, information on government accountability platforms are inherently programs and public services is often political, in that they pose a challenge to those fragmented across multiple agencies and that use service delivery as currency to win administrative levels, inaccessible to officials, votes, allies, and status. citizens, and oversight agencies. 44. The five digital accountability platforms 41. Digital accountability platforms seek assessed in this study equip citizens and to connect the dots between an increasing officials with tools to track the performance supply of open government data and of flagship government programs worth over a nascent demand among Filipinos for ₱300 billion Philippine (US$6.48 billion).25 more inclusive, accountable governance as They disclose information, but seek to solve underscored by the Million People March. specific public sector performance challenges In doing so, the platforms represent the such as ensuring higher quality local roads confluence of transparency, technology, or curbing lost revenues from tax evasion. and political engagement, as these forces The four expenditure programs – Bottom-Up add up to larger than the sum of their parts Budgeting (BUB) for cities and municipalities, to buttress public sector institutions and schools in the Autonomous Regional of incentivize officials to use the national budget Muslim Mindanao (ARMM), post-disaster for the public interest, rather than private reconstruction, and “last mile” access roads – gain (Khemani et al., 2015). involve significant public resources and areas where government leaders were looking for a different way of doing business. From Pork to Performance: Open Government and Program Performance Tracking in the Philippines. 2016. S. Custer, H. Rahemtulla, K. Kaiser, R. van den Brink 13 Service Delivery The revenue mobilization example, cigarette 48. The specific sector focus of each digital taxation, is associated with one of the Aquino accountability platform requires that the administration’s early legislative victories, government and the World Bank deal with which raised billions of dollars to finance not only one generic, national environment, Universal Health Care (UHC) (Kaiser et al., but rather five distinct arenas of service 2016). delivery, each with a unique set of structural factors, institutions, and interests (World 45. While the substance of each digital Bank, 2016b; Fritz and Levy, 2014). The accountability platform is distinct to a platforms interact with other reform particular service delivery sector, there is a efforts to expand or align with the existing common focus on publishing real-time and political space to advance good governance granular data. Since the Local Government within a given sector (Fritz and Levy, 2014). Code devolved substantial responsibilities The bounded focus of the platforms also for service delivery to the LGUs, the digital provide a more visible, practical way for accountability platforms critically include the government to crowd-in support for geo-tagged information on the location broader PFM reforms through showcasing of project sites. The platforms disclose the value of expenditure tracking in the data that is dynamically linked with near context of something citizens could easily real-time government decision-making relate to: public services they rely on every processes to enable tracking of projects day (e.g., roads, schools). Table 1 in the from budget allocation all the way through Overview introduced each of the five digital implementation. accountability platforms and the performance challenge they intend to address. In the 46. Designed to be agile, digital accountability remainder of this section, we describe the platforms enable experimentation in a variety reform space and performance challenges of sectors without substantial risk. The World the digital accountability platforms seek to Bank employed a venture capital approach, address in greater depth. working with the Aquino administration to identify several flagship programs that would benefit from a digital accountability platform to support public expenditure tracking and advance key PFM reforms on a smaller scale, recognizing that only some of these interventions were likely to succeed. This required alleviating bureaucratic unease with increasing disclosure of government spending and implementation data, as well as thinking through how public feedback would generate meaningful improvements to solve last mile service delivery challenges. 47. Initially designed outside of government using developers and technical assistance provided by the World Bank, the aspiration was always to integrate the platforms within the day-to-day operations of the relevant government agencies. For this reason, ensuring the buy-in of the highest- level counterpart within the requesting government agency (e.g., Secretary, Governor) was a stated criterion for whether the World Bank would invest in a new digital accountability platform. 25. Currency conversion to US$ is in 2016 dollars. 14 From Pork to Performance: Open Government and Program Performance Tracking in the Philippines. 2016. S. Custer, H. Rahemtulla, K. Kaiser, R. van den Brink Service Delivery Source: World Bank (2015) 1.3.1 Ghost Schools in the Autonomous (World Bank, 2015a). The ARMM government’s Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) ability to disburse and manage education funds is undermined by fragmented planning, 49. Governor Mujiv Sabbihi Hataman has budgeting and execution functions across had the unenviable task of overcoming a multiple levels of government and weak “triple challenge of limited autonomy, violent integration between regional and national conflict and weak technical capacity” in the budgeting systems (World Bank, 2015a). Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao Patronage politics and institutionalized (World Bank, 2015a). Once described by corruption have further undercut attempts by President Benigno Aquino as a “failed reformers within the ARMM government to experiment”, the ARMM region’s development improve the stewardship and accountability has lagged behind, even as the country overall for the use of public funds (World Bank, 2015a). has “enjoyed a decade of economic growth” (Aquino, 2012; World Bank, 2015i; World Bank, 51. The paucity of data on basic education 2015a). It is in the education sector, which statistics is problematic as the government accounts for almost 60 percent of ARMM’s struggles to verify the number of kids in budget that places the challenges of public school and teachers in the classroom, as expenditure management in stark relief, as well as population and enrollment rates. the government has struggled to remedy poor Historically, politicians and officials have education outcomes – enrollment, completion, “manipulated” such statistics to “increase attainment rates – and allocate sufficient voter numbers and population-based share resources to schools in need of classrooms and of internal-revenue allotments” (World teachers (World Bank, 2015a). Bank, 2015a). Even basic information like the location of schools have been in short supply, 50. While the Aquino administration has making it difficult for officials and citizens reversed a chronic trend of under-investment, to work together to crack down on teacher increasing education budget allocations absenteeism and “ghost schools” which to the region by 38 percent in 2011 and 72 siphon off scarce resources. percent in 2012, the ability of the ARMM government to use this funding effectively has been hampered by several deficiencies From Pork to Performance: Open Government and Program Performance Tracking in the Philippines. 2016. S. Custer, H. Rahemtulla, K. Kaiser, R. van den Brink 15 Service Delivery 52. Governor Hataman took office in May local schools (Reinikka and Svensson, 2004).26 2013 with a popular mandate to advance OpenARMM connects to a mobile tablet that good governance, increase transparency, and allows third-party organizations to collect improve development outcomes. Beginning in real-time information such as geo-tagged the education sector, the ARMM government school photos and student attendance. The and the World Bank launched an open data platforms then disclose the results of these initiative to directly address prevailing independent surveys of elementary and concerns about ghost schools and absentee secondary schools in five ARMM provinces to teachers as a starting point to tackle broader the public. PFM issues (World Bank, 2015i). The ARMM government is committed to disclosing the 54. Through increasing timely access to exact location of each school and taking stock key data points on school locations and of school conditions to support performance performance, the platform aims to strengthen monitoring and increase the efficiency of the government’s PFM capacity to exert education investments in the region (World top-down accountability with school Bank, 2015i). administrators, as well as facilitate bottom- up accountability from the public in order 53. The World Bank developed OpenARMM to improve expenditure management and, in response to the Governor’s request for an ultimately, bolster education outcomes in online open data platform to monitor the ARMM. One way to capture the potential performance of schools in the region and value of such a platform to advancing ARMM visualize their exact locations. The original education outcomes is in estimating the inspiration for OpenARMM came from a cost savings of eradicating ghost schools – well-documented study of public expenditure approximately US$80,000 on average per tracking in Uganda and the revealed power of school – that are a drain on limited education democratizing information on public resource budgets.27 allocations to drastically reduce corruption in Source: ARMM Open Data Initiative (2016) 26. In their study “Evidence from Public Expenditure Tracking Surveys”, Ritva Reinikka and Jakob Svensson (2004) assessed the power of information in reducing corruption in the allocation of student capitation grants for primary schools. Whereas only an estimated 13 percent of such grants actually reached their intended destination during the period of 1991-95, based upon a well-known survey of public schools, the level of leakage fell significantly following an information campaign targeting local schools 27. The cost of an average school is calculated based on the number of primary and secondary schools in ARMM in 2011-12 (2471) and the aggregate government education spending from all sources in 2012. Sources: (i) World Bank Report “Making Education Spending Count for the Children of the ARMM” (ii) http://data.gov.ph. 16 From Pork to Performance: Open Government and Program Performance Tracking in the Philippines. 2016. S. Custer, H. Rahemtulla, K. Kaiser, R. van den Brink Service Delivery Source: World Bank (2014) 1.3.2 Post-Disaster Recovery to Help estimated 13 million people with losses to Communities “Build Back Better” infrastructure and agriculture ($51 million) and tourism ($1.1 million) revenues (NDRRMC, 55. Natural disasters represent a major 2013; Asia Foundation, 2013). “stress test”, not only in terms of the sheer devastation of people’s homes and livelihoods, 57. Promising to help the country but also a country’s PFM systems to effectively “build back better”, the Aquino administration assess, plan and execute reconstruction pledged US$4 billion in financing for the projects in a timely fashion (Austria et al., post-disaster recovery effort, in addition 2015; World Bank, 2015g). The government’s to funding from development partners. In ability to prioritize and expedite post-disaster fulfilling this commitment, however, the infrastructure projects (e.g. roads, schools, government faced substantial challenges. clinics) against objective criteria, disburse By law, LGUs are responsible to take the funds, and monitor program delivery is a lead in disaster recovery and reconstruction. powerful litmus test of how well underlying However, the reality is far more complex: ad budget tracking systems are functioning hoc task forces are appointed to coordinate (World Bank, 2015g; Diokno, 2016a). post-disaster recovery efforts, financing typically comes from the national level and 56. In 2013, disaster struck the Philippines implementation is discharged by various line twice in one year with the Bohol earthquake agencies in addition to their core mandates. In in October and typhoon Yolanda in November. this environment, the risks are substantially The 7.2 magnitude Bohol earthquake higher that investments to repair displaced over 370,000 Filipinos and affected infrastructure and provide relief to disaster- an estimated 3.2 million people with respect affected communities could be diverted from to the destruction of public infrastructure reaching the intended beneficiaries or that and private property, as well as the disruption reconstruction projects stall or fail to launch. of basic services (Asia Foundation, 2013; UN OCHA, 2013). The arrival of Typhoon Yolanda further devastated the region, affecting an From Pork to Performance: Open Government and Program Performance Tracking in the Philippines. 2016. S. Custer, H. Rahemtulla, K. Kaiser, R. van den Brink 17 Service Delivery 58. In the absence of more integrated systems, 61. OpenReconstruction took its inspiration public expenditure tracking in the Philippines from the Australian Queensland relied on a few limited “islands of electronic Reconstruction Authority, which brings information”. Given the significant allocation together needs assessment, planning, and of reconstruction funds, it was critically execution of reconstruction efforts and important that citizens, oversight agencies makes extensive use of geo-tagging to and LGU officials could easily monitor where support tracking of projects on a monthly this money was going and to what end. In basis. Figure 5 from Fengler et al. (2008) and this respect, the crisis was an action-inducing Austria et al. (2015) visualizes several phases event that substantially increased the political of post-disaster spending and delivery of will of national officials to improve the reconstruction projects. The custom-built, country’s PFM systems and track the spending open-source OpenReconstruction platform of the national budget. was designed to track project requests, budget releases, and project execution 59. In February 2014, the DBM requested through an e-ticketing system that would support from the World Bank to assist budget- allow the public to view the status of a tracking efforts in the wake of Super Typhoon request and promote accountability of all Yolanda. From a political standpoint, the DBM concerned agencies. The portal originally saw the importance of transparently tracking planned to consolidate all existing systems expenditures and soliciting public feedback in different government agencies involved to ensure more effective, timely delivery of in post-disaster relief and recovery. However, reconstruction efforts (World Bank, 2015g). In the system was subsequently scaled back response, the World Bank commissioned the as the Department of Public Works and development of OpenReconstruction.gov.ph Highways (DPWH) had the only operational to help track, disclose information on post- system capable of generating regular data disaster relief efforts, and unbundle lump on infrastructure projects implemented by sum allocations to the agencies charged with the agency. One way to capture the potential implementing reconstruction projects. In value of such a platform to supporting addition, the DBM launched a second system, post-disaster recovery is in estimating the Foreign Aid Transparency Hub (FAiTH) to the cost savings of eradicating a ghost monitor funds received from other countries reconstruction project – approximately to support disaster reconstruction. US$174,000 on average per project – that siphon scarce resources from disaster-affected 60. Operational within six months of the communities.28 disaster, the OpenReconstruction platform attempts to solve the problem of piecemeal information and create a master view of resourcing and implementation across five government agencies in order to facilitate expenditure tracking by the public and government oversight agencies alike. Launched in June 2014, the platform intends to highlight the benefits of leveraging online technologies to support greater transparency, citizen participation, and accountability in the selection and execution of reconstruction projects for those affected by natural disasters. 28. The average savings from eradicating a “ghost” reconstruction project is calculated based on total allocation to reconstruction projects during 2014-15 and # projects in the platform. Source: OpenReconstruction platform. 18 From Pork to Performance: Open Government and Program Performance Tracking in the Philippines. 2016. S. Custer, H. Rahemtulla, K. Kaiser, R. van den Brink Service Delivery Figure 5. Implementation Phases of Post-Disaster Reconstruction Source: Adapted from Austria et al. (2015) and Fengler et al. (2008) From Pork to Performance: Open Government and Program Performance Tracking in the Philippines. 2016. S. Custer, H. Rahemtulla, K. Kaiser, R. van den Brink 19 Service Delivery Source: World Bank (2015) 1.3.3 Bottom-Up Budgeting to Strengthen 64. Officials in many LGUs operate within Local Service Delivery institutional environments where monitoring and evaluation systems are deficient, 62. In 1991, the Philippines passed the Local elections are disconnected from performance, Government Code to devolve substantial and services are captured by local elites responsibilities to LGUs to deliver frontline (World Bank, 2016b; Matsuda, 2014). While services and raise revenues (Cruz, 2014; devolution has brought service delivery Dressel, 2012). In principle, devolution should closer to the people, it has also made the have made it easier for citizens to hold LGU resources to finance those services infinitely officials accountable for results through the more fragmented across numerous levels power of the ballot box and the ability to of administration. Cash-strapped LGUs “vote with their feet” (Tiebout, 1956). However, frequently grapple with fulfilling service slow progress in reducing poverty and uneven delivery responsibilities that outstrip the access to local services tell a different story pool of available resources and their own of resources captured by political elites and fiscal management capabilities to effectively services that fail to deliver benefits for Filipino mobilize resources and monitor their use citizens (World Bank, 2016b). responsibly (World Bank, 2016b). 63. Twenty-five years hence, substantial 65. In response, the government undertook disparities persist between and within an “unprecedented, interagency effort” provinces on various indicators from access to strengthen the supply and demand for to potable water and electricity to infant local government accountability through mortality rates and poverty incidence. increasing transparency, performance Several “binding constraints” hinder the incentives, and citizen participation in ability of LGUs to fulfill their mandate and municipal development (World Bank, provide universal access to basic services 2016b). On the supply side, for example, and support pro-poor growth, including: the Department of the Interior and Local weak accountability systems, fragmented Government (DILG) mandated via its 2010 service provision, insufficient resources and Full Disclosure Policy that LGUs publicly constrained administrative capacity (World disclose core budgeting, planning, and Bank, 2016b). procurement documents. In addition, the DILG 20 From Pork to Performance: Open Government and Program Performance Tracking in the Philippines. 2016. S. Custer, H. Rahemtulla, K. Kaiser, R. van den Brink Service Delivery instituted the Seal of Good Housekeeping municipalities (92 percent of the country). and Performance Challenge Fund to provide Through the BUB process, the government cash incentives for meeting transparency is able to fund municipal development standards and spark inter-jurisdictional projects via the national budget; however, competition among LGUs to improve implementation delays have disrupted the performance. disbursement of US$1.7 billion in financing for 60,000 BUB-approved projects. 66. The most visible of the demand-side initiatives, BUB was a major reform initiative 69. In 2014, the government and World Bank of the Aquino administration to support launched OpenBUB (openbub.gov.ph) to tracking of national budget allocations for disclose and publish timely information on municipal development priorities. The BUB approved BUB projects from budgets through program aims to advance broader PFM and implementation. The early inspiration for good governance reforms in several respects: OpenBUB was Solo Kota Kita, which provides (1) making national budgets more responsive a series of tools (e.g., maps, information on to local needs; (2) amplifying public development indicators) to help residents in participation in local planning and budgeting; Surakarta (Solo), Indonesia to knowledgeably and (3) increasing incentives of LGU officials participate in the annual participatory to improve targeting of public services and budgeting process.29 The OpenBUB platform reduce corruption. simplifies reporting procedures for agencies involved in financing, procurement, and 67. The significance of the BUB program is implementation of BUB projects via a single in opening the black box of public sector electronic system. With better information budgeting that historically made it difficult and the ability to provide feedback on specific to track the progress of a single municipal BUB projects, citizens and LGU officials development project from upstream can use the platform as a something of an allocation and disbursement of funds, to electronic billboard to track budget allocations downstream procurement and execution. BUB to public services in all municipalities, similar provided a new means for the government to to Solo Kota Kita. channel funds directly to LGUs and itemize individual BUB projects in the national 70. The platform has also become a real- budget which could be more easily tracked, time financial management and project as opposed to “lump-sum allocations” which implementation tool for DBM and DILG often conceal abuses of public resources, as in the nationwide rollout of BUB projects. the PDAF and DAP scandals attest. The intended outcome was to provide an electronic billboard, alongside a paper-based 68. Building upon the country’s success with map, to be displayed in community centers a large-scale community-driven development and municipal halls where citizens could see program (KALAHI-CIDSS), the government the location of projects in all municipalities initially piloted BUB in 2012 to reach 595 cities similar to Solo Kota Kita. One way to capture and municipalities with high concentrations the potential value of such a platform to of poverty (World Bank, 2016b). BUB features supporting monitoring of BUB projects is in a participatory planning and budgeting estimating the cost savings of eradicating a process undertaken at the city or municipal ghost project – approximately US$28,000 on level, through which CSOs and LGU officials average per project – that, in turn, become give input on development priorities through additional resources that can be reinvested in the preparation of Local Poverty Reduction inclusive municipal development projects.30 Action Plans. The government subsequently scaled the program to over 1500 cities and 29. http://solokotakita.org/en/about/ 30. Calculated based on total allocation to BUB projects during 2013-15 and # projects in the platform. Source: Open BUB Platform http://www.openbub.gov.ph From Pork to Performance: Open Government and Program Performance Tracking in the Philippines. 2016. S. Custer, H. Rahemtulla, K. Kaiser, R. van den Brink 21 Service Delivery Source: World Bank (2015) 1.3.4 Increasing Scrutiny, Aligning have perverse incentives to trade local roads Incentives for Local Road Investments as “club goods” for money and votes (Matsuda, 2014; Keefer and Khemani, 2003; World Bank, 71. Public infrastructure deficits are widely 2015j). Governors, mayors, congressmen cited as binding constraints to inclusive jockey to get more funds for their localities, growth across the Philippines (World which fragments road investments (e.g., Bank 2009). Yet, politics and institutional smaller lump sum budget allotments divided arrangements have made improving local across LGUs), at the expense of greater road “last mile” road connectivity a challenge. connectivity and quality. Building on a relatively favorable national fiscal position, the government’s commitment 73. With close to a dozen programs investing to scale-up public infrastructure investments in the same networks, the national financing to five percent of GDP means that cash is no of local roads is a critical test case to improve longer the main constraint to delivering on public expenditure management and foster roads. Specifically, the government aims to greater demand-side accountability.31 In connect over 180,000 kilometers of “last mile” an environment of poor coordination, lump access roads (World Bank, 2015j). sum budgeting, and siloed information management, concerns were raised as to 72. The dynamics of national-local political whether projects were being completed bargaining are particularly visible when – defined as concrete roads at a national it comes to the financing for local roads. standard – and if local governments would With national financing projected to be maintain these roads (World Bank, 2016d). In worth over US$1 billion in 2016, roads are the absence of a comprehensive local road “politically prominent investments” that map or inventory, officials and citizens could can either contribute to inclusive growth or not determine project locations, make better private coffers (World Bank, 2015j). While the decisions, or mitigate the risk of roads to responsibility for local roads falls to provinces, nowhere (i.e., ghost roads). 32 cities and municipalities, resource-poor LGUs 31. There are three main classes of local road programs: (i) those financed and implemented by national government agencies or government owned and controlled corporations (GOCCs); (ii) those financed by the national government, but implemented by local governments; and (iii) those financed and implemented by local governments themselves. The 2013-2016 national budgets appeared to be financing over 10,000 projects. 32. A broader question loomed regarding whether the national government should even be involved in implementing local roads projects, as opposed to merely financing them, given broader trends of devolution of responsibilities and resources for basic public services to LGUs. For example, the subsidiarity principle suggests that matters should be handled by the lowest level of competent administrative authority. 22 From Pork to Performance: Open Government and Program Performance Tracking in the Philippines. 2016. S. Custer, H. Rahemtulla, K. Kaiser, R. van den Brink Service Delivery 74. DBM-led fiscal transparency efforts to 76. The subsequent launch of KALSADA, a unbundle lump sum budgets, invest in geo- “landmark roads rehabilitation program”, tagging technology and apply unique project which offers performance-based financing identifiers presented an opportunity to make to upgrade local road networks, unlocked the tracking of road investments substantially an opportunity to institutionalize greater easier. The reforms improved the supply transparency of road investments. The of national road financing information government formally adopted the OpenRoads – namely, the location and status of “last platform as a key element of this performance mile” access road projects – and also laid the challenge fund, as part of its 2016 annual foundation for future demand side efforts to budget. Provinces could receive road engage feedback from stakeholders such as: rehabilitation funds for specific projects if executives, politicians, private companies and they submitted geo-tagged videos of these civil society groups. Meanwhile, programs projects for public disclosure, as well as supported by the World Bank such as the provincial road network plans. The KALSADA Philippines Rural Development Program program is investing just under US$150 (PRDP) led by the Department of Agriculture million in 2016. (DA) appeared to be systematically collecting location “geo-tagged” data for all their 77. A more comprehensive view of local roads investments. investments also provided the foundation for soliciting public feedback. The OpenRoads 75. Recognizing the need to register all platform aims to increase transparency local road investments, DBM and the World and enhance citizen monitoring of road Bank looked to Peru’s Sistema Nacional De investments in order to realign the incentives Inversion Publica, a government data bank for of politicians to road investments to advance infrastructure, for inspiration.33 The resulting inclusive growth, rather than private interests. OpenRoads platform (openroads.gov.ph) The prospective value of the OpenRoads helps government officials and citizens “see platform could be expressed in terms of the where the roads are”, showing the location, potential to generate cost savings amounting finances, and physical status of every local to approximately US$300,000 to eradicate an road, regardless of implementing agency. average ghost road (Table 1).34 OpenRoads leverages mapping, satellite, and smartphone technology to review and track public investments in the local road network (World Bank 2016d). Source: openroads.gov.ph (2016) 33. The Peru platform sets in place certain criteria for approval of investments before disbursing funding. 34. Given the differences among the various road programs, we calculated the potential cost savings to eradicate an average ghost road for each of these four programs: FMR (US$ 104,907), TRIP (US$ 4 million), BUB (US$ 53,218) and PRDP (US$ 1.8 million). Calculated the average cost per road based on estimated budget for various road programs (FMR, TRIP, BUB, PRDP) during 2013-15 and the estimated number of roads. Source: Multiple - DA, DBM, REID. From Pork to Performance: Open Government and Program Performance Tracking in the Philippines. 2016. S. Custer, H. Rahemtulla, K. Kaiser, R. van den Brink 23 Service Delivery Source: World Bank (2011) 1.3.5 Curbing “Lost Revenues” and Tracking As a result, tax revenues plummeted “from 0.9 Compliance in SinTax Reforms percent of GDP in 1997 to under 0.5 percent of GDP in 2012: equivalent to losses of over 78. Stuck in a “low-revenue, low expenditure US$2.5 billion” that could have funded access trap”, the Philippines saw its tax revenues to critical health care for poor communities and spending on basic public goods (e.g., (World Bank, 2015b). education, health, transportation) steadily decline between 1997-2009 (Sidel, 2015). 80. With support from a broad and diverse The Aquino administration, seeking to stem coalition, the SinTax legislation simplified the tide of “lost revenues”, achieved a major the excise regime, increased taxes, and legislative victory in 2012 with the passage of raised revenues for health care financing a SinTax law that raised excise taxes on “sin” via the National Health Insurance program. products (e.g., cigarettes, alcohol) as a means SinTax reforms are quickly generating gains to increase the national budget for public for the Filipino people, as the government healthcare and other social services. has been able to double the Department of Health’s budget and extend subsidized 79. Before SinTax, powerful cigarette lobbies health insurance to the bottom 40 percent leveraged their influence with legislators of the population (World Bank, 2015b). to forestall reforms to complex excise Comprehensive tax reform remains a major tax regimes that made it easier for well- priority for the Philippines, but will likely informed companies to game the system and require legislative action under the next avoid higher tax rates (World Bank, 2015b). administration. The main challenge in the Incumbent producers were “grandfathered Philippines is not just that revenue effort in” to receive special lower tax rates and remains low, but that design is poor, leading cigarettes became increasingly affordable – to a narrow and distorted base. The 2012 as cheap as 2.5 US cents per cigarette in 2012 reform of tobacco and alcohol taxation will – due to rising incomes and the absence of likely stand as the Aquino administration’s adjustments for inflation (World Bank, 2015b). landmark tax reform. The reform not only 24 From Pork to Performance: Open Government and Program Performance Tracking in the Philippines. 2016. S. Custer, H. Rahemtulla, K. Kaiser, R. van den Brink Service Delivery raised an additional 0.4 percent of GDP SinTax legislation and create political pressure in revenues per year, but also allowed for to hold LGU officials accountable to crack significant scaling up of health expenditures. down on tax evaders. One way to express the prospective value of the SinTax Open 81. However, companies still employ a Data Dashboard is the potential additional range of “licit and illicit” tactics to evade or revenue generated with an increase in tax underpay taxes, from failing to pass along stamp compliance by 1 percentage point: taxes to consumers to outright smuggling. In approximately US$20 million. order to curb these abuses, the government has required that all cigarette packs bear a “holographic tax stamp” since 2014 (World 1.4 Technology, Transparency & Politics of Bank, 2015b). Enforcement of the legislation Public Service Delivery is key, if SinTax is to translate into sustained social welfare gains, but monitoring 84. The prospects of digital accountability cigarette prices has traditionally been a time platforms are potentially transformative: consuming paper-based exercise. harnessing online technologies and transparency to alter the playing field such 82. Since early 2015, the World Bank that citizens, providers, and policymakers are has supported the DoF to monitor the working from the same set of information implementation of SinTax legislation across to engage in dialogue about priorities, nine agencies, from both a tax collection and progress, and performance in last mile service revenue expenditure perspective. A priority delivery. Yet, all too often, technology-enabled area for investment was to harness the power transparency and accountability (T/A) of mobile phones and social media to monitor initiatives fail to measure up. The failure rate cigarette prices and tax stamp compliance. In is high and there is a propensity to fixate partnership with the US technology company on technology solutions at the expense of Premise, the government and the World paying adequate attention to the interaction Bank were able to mobilize paid contributors of technology with the politics, institutions, to report on cigarette prices in their local and incentives36. As one keen observer noted, communities and submit geo-tagged “if the core objective is transparency, it is not visual documentation of whether cigarette the platform that will institutionalize it”. The companies and distributors were complying ultimate measure of success is not to build with the required tax stamps (World Bank, information platforms, but “engagement 2015b).35 platforms”. The WDR 2016 on Digital Dividends put this to the test by analyzing 83. Launched in December 2015, the SinTax the extent to which digital channels are able Open Data Dashboard (dof.gov.ph) provides to motivate citizen uptake and government weekly updates on cigarette pricing and responsiveness to improve service delivery tracks compliance in the application of the (see Box 2). required “tax stamp” by cigarette brand and locality. With access to up-to-date information on cigarette tax prices and tax revenues, citizens and national officials have greater incentives to monitor the enforcement of 35. Anyone with an Internet connection can download the Premise app from the Google Play Store to create an account. Research tasks appear in the app for everyday products and services in a contributor’s community that involve taking pictures and/or answering questions. Contributors submit their answers and photos via the Premise app and earn money for completing the task upon review and approval of the submission quality. Source: http://www.premise.com/ contributors/ 36. Investing in digital accountability platforms are a high risk – high reward proposition. Less than 20 percent of large-scale, public sector information technology (IT) projects achieve their objectives in terms of time, budget and functionality (Beschel, 2015). Moreover, IT projects may be more prone to failure than other types of development projects. A study of World Bank supported IT projects found that 27 percent were unsuccessful, compared with an 18 percent failure rate for World Bank projects overall (World Bank, 2016; Beschel, 2015). From Pork to Performance: Open Government and Program Performance Tracking in the Philippines. 2016. S. Custer, H. Rahemtulla, K. Kaiser, R. van den Brink 25 Service Delivery Box 2: Digital Meets Analog: When do digital technologies empower citizens? Getting to better governance implies the need for public However, the WDR 2016 authors caution that while sector leaders to have both the will and capacity to collaboration with government may be a necessary govern in ways that advance the interests of citizens. In condition for success, it certainly is not sufficient. the past decade, a proliferation of digital technologies The second Philippines example, Check-My-School, to governments has boosted their capabilities in several is illustrative. Check-My-School, a “participatory respects, particularly through streamlining routine tasks. monitoring program” for local schools established in However, to what extent can digital technologies also 2011, is a joint initiative of the Affiliated Network for help change the incentives of public officials to overcome Social Accountability in East Asia and the Pacific and vested interests and respond to citizen feedback? the Department of Education. Despite leveraging both Unpacking this further, the 2016 World Development online and offline mobilization and CSO-government Report Digital Dividends asked the following question: partnerships, the WDR 2016 authors find that there has “can digital technologies encourage good leadership by been low citizen uptake and low government response empowering citizens to hold policy makers and providers from the Check-My-School initiative. The results arising accountable”? The report explores three possible from a 2014 Public Expenditure Tracking Survey and avenues by which digital technologies could empower Quantitative Service Delivery Study (PETS-QSDS) are citizens through facilitating: free and fair elections, more similarly sobering: fewer than 5 percent of schools informed voting, and citizen voice and collective action. provided feedback through Check-My-School and only 15 percent of elementary school principals and 20 percent of In theory, digital technologies promise to reduce high school principals were even aware of the initiative traditional barriers to reach the broadest possible (World Bank, 2016e). audience of citizens, aggregate their preferences and help them coordinate their actions. While digital technologies, The 2014 survey points to some additional environmental particularly social media, can spark episodic citizen factors that may partly explain why Check-My-School activism (e.g., one-off citizen protests), the 2016 WDR has been slow to realize its full potential. Community finds that they often fall short of solving classic collective involvement in local school systems appears to be action problems because they struggle to sustain weak across the board: nearly 75 percent of heads of engagement by citizens around service delivery problems. households surveyed were unaware that their child’s This sweeping statement aside, the WDR 2016 authors school had a School Governing Council – a forum for probe 17 examples from 12 countries to analyze under partners, students, teachers, and community members which circumstances “digital channels” are more or less to give input to school decisions. Forty percent of likely to have impact on improving service delivery. Two elementary school principals felt that the engagement of the case studies are from the Philippines, Rappler and with partners, local government, and other external Check-My-School, and their divergent results underscore stakeholders was relatively weak. In the face of this the difficulties in predicting what works and does not. seeming disinterest from parents and LGU officials, it is unsurprising that schools publish limited or Rappler – a media and advocacy organization – leverages dated information on how they spend discretionary digital technology and crowdsourcing, alongside resources from the Department of Education for investigative journalists and social mobilizers, to covering maintenance and other operating expenses. animate citizens to take action via community protests This vicious cycle – low initial interest on the part of to improve governance. As a case study of digital community members in the functioning of their local citizen voice, Rappler leverages both online and offline schools (unengaged citizens) and school administrators mobilization tactics, facilitates collective feedback, and disclosing limited information on their use of resources involves a civil society partnership with the government. (unwilling providers) in the absence of public scrutiny According to the WDR 2016, Rappler performs relatively or pressure from elected leaders (unaccountable well on two measures of impact: citizen uptake (high) politicians) – illustrates in stark relief that the impact and government response (medium). The most notable of digital interventions like Check-My-School that rely example of the fruit of their labor was a large-scale public on motivating community organizations and parents to protest regarding corruption in the use of congressional take action through giving feedback is easily blunted or discretionary funds, which the Supreme Court later negated by so-called analog factors. declared unconstitutional. 26 From Pork to Performance: Open Government and Program Performance Tracking in the Philippines. 2016. S. Custer, H. Rahemtulla, K. Kaiser, R. van den Brink Service Delivery 85. The success of a digital accountability 88. Yet, there are instances when transparency platform hinges not upon the sophistication and accountability (T/A) initiatives produce of its technology, but rather the ability of promising outcomes and technology the program it supports to anticipate how initiatives reach their objectives. Therefore, the technology will interact with what the the critical question is not whether a WDR 2016 refers to as the “analog” factors of technology-enabled T/A initiative adds value, development – institutions, skills, regulations but rather when, how, and why they do so – that disproportionately shape the politics (Overseas Development Institute, 2015; World of service delivery (World Bank, 2016a). Bank, 2016a). Consistent with the adage that “sunlight is the best disinfectant”, platforms can 89. Beyond the direct benefits they generate, disclose information and increase scrutiny digital accountability platforms may trigger of government performance, but these positive externalities for other reform efforts technical solutions must marry transparency to increase the supply of, and demand with political engagement to strengthen for, more accountable governance. The institutions, reward performance, and platforms support “supply side” efforts overcome persistent governance failures where government reformers are working (Brandeis, 1913; Khemani et al., 2015). This is with development partners to strengthen particularly important in the context of the the oversight role of the Commission on Philippines, as a growth industry for civil Audit, introduce performance-based bonuses, society organizations has not yet translated integrate financial management systems, into sustained examples of collective action and reduce discretion through criteria- and citizen-government dialog around based resource allocation for municipal improving access to, and quality of, basic development projects. Digital accountability public services. platforms can also work synergistically with participatory budgeting, citizen participatory 86. Nonetheless, the interaction between audits, and data journalism training, among technology, transparency, and politics is other “demand side” efforts. unpredictable (Kosack and Fung, 2014; Khemani et al., 2015). Previous studies have 90. This is promising, as Fox (2014) argues found that democratizing information on that social accountability initiatives are more public performance: reduces corruption successful when they apply a “strategic” in local schools and community-driven – coordinating efforts to expand voice development projects (Reinnika and Svensson, through information access and enabling 2004; Guggeinheim, 2006); influences more collective action with government reforms optimal resource allocations for municipal that encourage public sector responsiveness development (Touchton and Wampler, – rather than a “tactical” approach that 2013; Gonçalves, 2013); and facilitates depends upon “information-led, demand side improvements in health outcomes (Bjorkman interventions alone” (Fox, 2014). and Svensson, 2014; Bjorkman et al., 2014). 87. However, transparency is not a silver bullet, and other studies have found little or no impact of information on curbing malfeasance or improving outcomes (Banerjee et al., 2010; Lieberman et al., 2013; Ravallion et al., 2013). Moreover, transparency initiatives such as Open Data may create unintended consequences such as incentivizing states to eschew hard reforms, adopt international norms to hide dysfunctional institutions or “squeeze the balloon” in one aspect of service delivery only to divert corruption to other areas (Heller, 2011; Andrews, 2011; Fox, 2014). From Pork to Performance: Open Government and Program Performance Tracking in the Philippines. 2016. S. Custer, H. Rahemtulla, K. Kaiser, R. van den Brink 27 Service Delivery 1.4.1 Causal Logic: Realistic Assumptions or intended purpose depends upon several Fatal Flaws? key assumptions of: data integrity, system integration, and data salience. 91. Which information about government performance in what formats will be most 94. What makes data “good enough” for the salient to citizens, politicians, and providers public or government to effectively track to catalyze action? If a digital platform is the public resources and assess performance? transmission belt for that information – how There is substantial debate over the degree well does it actually function and reach the of effort that should go into tackling issues of intended audiences? Even when a digital data integrity – the accuracy and consistency platform functions well technically, will of data disclosed in a platform. However, citizens and officials use open government there is broad agreement that at least some data and in what ways? Finally, even if “minimum viable product” is needed in terms citizens and officials use information of sufficient coverage, timeliness, quality, and provided via digital accountability platforms accuracy of the data for citizens to use it to – what change will they ultimately be able to monitor government performance (Veracode, achieve? 2012; Peixoto, 2013; SyncDev, 2016). 92. As introduced in the Overview, the causal 95. Government agencies and development logic of digital accountability platforms, partners regularly assess how much to invest such as those reviewed in this paper, can in resolving issues of data integrity upfront, be expressed as the interaction of four C’s: considering the real possibility of diminishing content, channel, choice and consequences.37 marginal returns in the face of uncertain The government discloses data on public demand. Those decisions have consequences resources and performance (content) and in the context of digital accountability transmits this information to the public via platforms, as missing data, inconsistent an interactive digital platform (channel), geo-tagging, and absence of unique project whereby citizens and officials take action identifiers will likely raise the barriers to to express their preferences individually entry for the public by requiring greater and collectively (choice), with the intent of effort on their part to put transparent data to shaping the incentives of front-line providers, meaningful use. such that they deliver better and more inclusive services (consequences). However, 96. Digital accountability platforms also the design of these technology solutions face a unique system integration challenge. involves assumptions regarding each of these Absent an integrated reporting system such components that will either prove to be as the GIFMIS, digital accountability platforms correct or fatally flawed. have to pull in budget, procurement, and implementation data across numerous 1.4.2 Generating “Minimum Viable” agencies, each with their own fragmented Content for End Users information management systems. The adoption of a unique identifier such as 93. In theory, digital accountability platforms the UACS could have provided a common can simplify reporting requirements across structure and language to trace projects from multiple agency systems and make it easier their initial allocation through to delivery. for the government to disclose performance However, difficulties in the roll-out and information about the full service delivery implementation of UACS has necessitated chain from budgets and procurement to the manual matching of disparate datasets, implementation and outcomes. Citizens, as well as innovating techniques such as politicians, and providers can use this machine learning for automated matching. information to track the financing, location, implementation, and evaluation of public services. However, the extent to which government performance data is fit for its 37. This is an adaptation of Tiago Peixoto’s “minimal chain of events” for an accountability mechanism built on disclosure principles from “The Uncertain Relationship Between Open Data and Accountability: A Response to Yu and Robinson’s The New Ambiguity
 of “Open Government” (2013). 28 From Pork to Performance: Open Government and Program Performance Tracking in the Philippines. 2016. S. Custer, H. Rahemtulla, K. Kaiser, R. van den Brink Service Delivery 97. Finally, the “information provided [via needs of the public or government to a platform] must be salient to at least one effectively track public resources and assess group of users” – whether citizens, service performance? At minimum, the design and providers, politicians or civil society groups. implementation of the platform should be In their review of 16 experimental evaluations sourced on time, in scope, and consistent of T/A initiatives, Kosack and Fung (2014) with end user expectations. There are also suggest that public data is most compelling to choices regarding which functionalities end-users when it: facilitates comparability, to incorporate, which vendors to contract, includes both inputs and outputs (e.g., and whether the design process is broadly absenteeism and test scores), and features consultative. While agile systems may appear both objective and subjective measures (e.g., to be lightweight, they can still be subject medical stocks and perceived waiting times at to delays, information bottlenecks, and high clinics). supervision costs. Government agencies and development partners also face trade-offs in 98. However, the resonance of publicly the extent to which they consult with a broad available performance information also set of local partners and the speed with which depends upon the type of public service they can rapidly iterate and rollout a platform. in focus. Kosack and Fung (2014) note that 101. There has been a rapid proliferation of users must not only “want the service”, but information and communication technologies also be “dissatisfied” with the current level (ICTs) in recent years that is increasing of service, regardless of whether the service connectivity and collapsing traditional is meeting some international standard. barriers to sharing information (Chambers This is more likely to be the case if the direct 2010, ITU, 2015; World Bank, 2016a). This trend benefit of the service to an individual citizen is also taking hold in the Philippines, as the is high or they have raised expectations in number of Internet users has skyrocketed comparison to other districts, provinces, in the last decade from an estimated 5.7 or countries. Moreover, the likelihood that users per 100 people in 2006 to 66.6 users citizens and officials will use publicly per 100 people in 2015 (World Bank, 2016a). available information to track service delivery However, it is likely that uptake of these is increased when the service is based upon new technologies is “skewed to the young, routine tasks and the outcomes are easily educated, urban and financially better off” measurable and attributable to specific and may perpetuate a “digital divide” for politicians or policymakers (Beschel, 2015; those that lack the finances and data literacy World Bank, 2016a). needed to use digital accountability platforms (United Nations, 2012; Beschel, 2015). 1.4.3 Extending Reach and Ensuring Beyond access to ICT there are also issues of Inclusivity with an Online Channel differential usage of services where internet users in the Philippines are predominately 99. Employing digital technologies, the using social media (e.g. Facebook, Twitter) government can substantially reduce the compared to accessing government services cost, time and distance it takes to broadly online (see WDR 2016). disseminate relevant information on public resources and government performance 102. While digital accountability platforms (Kapur and Whittle, 2009). Moreover, digital are an exclusively online channel for accountability platforms also provide an communicating information and engaging outlet for citizens to provide online feedback feedback, they do interface with government on the quality and accessibility of existing programs that could leverage a broader set of services. However, the extent to which communication modalities - both online and online platforms are able to contribute to offline. Leveraging multiple communications strengthening the feedback loop depends vehicles is also critical if digital accountability upon several key assumptions regarding: platforms are to fulfill the “publicity responsive procurement, connectivity, condition” – “the extent to which disclosed and integration with other types of information actually reaches and resonates communication and participation channels. with its intended audiences” (Peixoto, 2013; Lindstedt and Naurin, 2010). 100. What makes the procurement of a platform “responsive” to the anticipated From Pork to Performance: Open Government and Program Performance Tracking in the Philippines. 2016. S. Custer, H. Rahemtulla, K. Kaiser, R. van den Brink 29 Service Delivery 104. What makes information “actionable” for 1.4.4 Creating the Conditions for Choice the public or government to effectively track & Opportunities for Action public resources and assess performance? The willingness of CSOs, media outlets, 103. ICTs expand connectivity and platforms and government agencies to serve as democratize data, but citizens, politicians, and infomediaries and interpret vast amounts policymakers must still use this information of open data into actionable insights is to shape program priorities, track progress critical (Norris, 2003; Peixoto, 2013; Fox, 2014). and sanction poor performance (Kosack Citizens and politicians must be able to use and Fung, 2014; Khemani et al., 2015). This is the data from the platforms to easily assess simultaneously the most critical link in the the performance of providers (Fung, Graham logic chain of digital accountability platforms and Weil, 2007; Kosack and Fung, 2014). and the most vulnerable to unraveling in the Identifying clearly the rights of citizens and face of untested assumptions regarding: the recommending concrete actions they can take “actionability” of information, the existence in response to the information could help of credible online and offline channels to take reduce barriers to action (Kosack and Fung, action, and the ability to get the incentives 2014). Box 3 showcases how the Philippines right to overcome collective action problems. Department of Finance is acting as a public sector infomediary in turning data into insights that motivates citizen action to curb tax evasion. 30 From Pork to Performance: Open Government and Program Performance Tracking in the Philippines. 2016. S. Custer, H. Rahemtulla, K. Kaiser, R. van den Brink Box 3: Lighting the Match Service Delivery Turning Data into Insights for Public Action Source: Abante, K. Open Insights is the next step to Open Data. World Bank Blog (Making Development Work for All, November 2015) Open government data is like a matchstick: it must Through these open actions, the DoF has been able to be taken out of its box and lit. In the Philippines, the build public trust and partnership in driving reforms Department of Finance (DoF) has taken this adage to forward. The initial results speak for themselves: heart by going a step beyond disclosing raw data to • Tax collections from professionals increased by 14%, generating actionable insights that the public can use to which could potentially fund the equivalent annual accelerate change. salaries of 21,000 nurses for the Department of Health; For example, the “Tax Watch” campaign combines • Local treasurer reporting compliance increased statistics with compelling visuals and intuitive from 30% in 2014 to 99.5% in 2015, with the public infographics to provoke conversations and public outcry disclosure of fiscal sustainability scorecards of 1,477 against tax evasion. Since 2013, the DOF Fiscal Intelligence municipalities, 144 cities, and 80 provinces. This Unit has published more than 100 weekly full-page ads doubled LGUs’ locally sourced income from P75 in national newspapers (e.g., The Philippine Star, The billion (USD 1.57 billion) in 2009 to P141 billion (USD Philippine Daily Inquirer) and social media. Each full-page 3.1 billion) in 2015, or 13% and 15% growth in 2014 and ad spotlights a distinct data nugget such as: 2015. • “Doctors pay less taxes than a public school teacher” • Compliance in the use of tax stamps on cigarettes • “The weighted average declared price of imported increased from 40% in March 2015 to more than 98% spam was only 5 pesos ($0.10) at the customs border” as of March 2016. In 2015, incremental revenues from • “Only 3 in every 10 local treasurers complied with sin tax reform was at P71 billion (USD 1.56 billion), local treasury reporting standards with some local above target by 23%. governments failing three times in a row at our • Customs, by releasing open data on the import scorecard,” entry level, has become one of the most transparent agencies in government. After the implementation However, open data, and even open insights, must be of this policy, cash collections increased by 21% year- paired with a commensurate commitment on the part of on-year. government to respond to feedback and deliver results. • A team of young civil servants who formed the In the case of the DoF, we have coupled disclosure of Bagumbayani Initiative and partnered with Kalibrr, tax insights that give “voice” to citizens with internal a jobs-matching platform, made 4,000 vacancies of mechanisms–policy levers–that have the “teeth” of more than 14 government agencies available online, enforcement – filing legal cases against tax evaders resulting in around 60,000 applications. and smugglers, imposing penalties for those that fail to comply with reporting standards, and using the threat of Open data, open insights, open actions and participation public exposure as moral suasion to deter potential tax altogether form an open public value chain. While offenders. transparency for its own sake is valuable, for open data to be truly effective, transparency must be linked to a reform goal and a clear big number that should be moved by the disclosure. This has allowed our open data initiatives to gain support from management, civil servants, and civil society. With good results, these public value chains create a virtuous cycle: better numbers generate more support, and more support generate better numbers for the public we serve. From Pork to Performance: Open Government and Program Performance Tracking in the Philippines. 2016. S. Custer, H. Rahemtulla, K. Kaiser, R. van den Brink 31 Service Delivery Reform Goal Open Data Open Insights Open Actions Open Participation Big Number Improving customs Customs released data Customs watch ad on Adjusting customs Publication of collection After customs reform revenue collection up to the import entry questionable valuations values for risk results and anonymous implementation, cash level of commodities such as management to trigger reporting of errant collections of the Bureau motor vehicles, plastic an additional valuation smugglers through Pera of Customs grew by 21% resins, iPads, processed review ng Bayan year-on-year. meat Post entry audits of Valuations of plastic importers and filing of resins improved by up to smuggling cases 60% in 2014 Performance review visits by the Secretary of Finance and Commissioner of Customs to ports Improving Local LGU eSRE system LGU tax watch ad on Issuance of fiscal Linking our fiscal Locally sourced revenues Government Unit (LGU) (Electronic Statement outdated schedules of sustainability scorecards sustainability scorecard have doubled since locally sourced revenue of Receipts and market values for real for seal of good local 2009, with 15% growth collection Expenditures) property tax purposes, Local treasury governance and LGU in 2015 alone. local governments professionalization awards who failed the through basic Local treasurer reporting fiscal sustainability competency exams for The budget compliance increased scorecards local treasurers department’s bottom from 30% in 2014 to up budgeting program 99.5% in 2015 with civil society organizations Improving BIR tax Electronic filing and Tax watch on doctors Performance review Anonymous reporting of Tax collections from revenues payment systems paying less taxes than visits by the Secretary complaints via the Pera professionals increased (especially from a public school teacher, of Finance and ng Bayan website by 14%, which could self-employed and payments by celebrities Commissioner of fund the annual salaries professionals) Internal Revenue to Publication of collection of 21,000 nurses for the revenue regions results Department of Health Filing of tax evasion cases Improving BIR tax Electronic filing and Tax watch on doctors Performance review Anonymous reporting of Tax collections from revenues payment systems paying less taxes than visits by the Secretary complaints via the Pera professionals increased (especially from a public school teacher, of Finance and ng Bayan website by 14%, which could self-employed and payments by celebrities Commissioner of fund the annual salaries professionals) Internal Revenue to Publication of collection of 21,000 nurses for the revenue regions results Department of Health Filing of tax evasion cases Improving sin tax Tax stamp compliance Data is presented Tax stamp system on The Premise mobile Cigarette tax stamp collections data uploaded on the according to company cigarettes app provides monetary compliance increased DOF website and city. incentives for the public from 40% in March 2015 to report tax stamp to more than 98% as of compliance March 2016 (via Premise and World Bank) Sin tax incremental revenues above target by 23% in 2015 Rationalizing tax Tax incentives Press release on the Pushing the Implementing rules ₱144 billion identified incentives management and Philippines foregoing fiscal incentives and regulations on the loss in tax revenue due transparency act at least ₱144 billion rationalization TIMTA to income tax holidays (TIMTA) which requires from income tax act disclosure holidays Democratizing the Release of job openings Destroying the Encouraging more Applications for 60,000 applications for government recruitment for 14 government misconceptions agencies to partner with government posts 4,000 government posts process offices/agencies via of working in the Kalibrr from 14 agencies Kalibrr government In a time of platforms, apps and smartphones, data Source: Adapted from Abante, K. Open Insights is like matchsticks must be taken out of their boxes and the next step to Open Data, World Bank Blog. lit. Policymakers should embrace this trend and take calculated risks towards it. 32 From Pork Pork From to Performance: to Performance: Open Open Government Government and Program and Program Performance Performance Tracking Tracking inPhilippines. in the the Philippines. 2016. S. July 2016. S. Custer, Custer, H. H. Rahemtulla, Rahemtulla, K. Kaiser, R. K. Kaiser, van den R. van Brink den Brink Service Delivery 105. Further, the likelihood that digital 1.4.5 Digital Meets Analog: The accountability platforms will catalyze Consequences of Digital Platforms action on the part of citizens and officials is fundamentally influenced by the extent to 109. Finally, the actions citizens, politicians which they are linked with credible online and policymakers undertake must ultimately and offline mechanisms to take action, make front-line service providers “more whether individually and collectively (Peixoto, sensitive” to scrutiny and pressure to make 2013; Khemani et al, 2015; Fox, 2014). Peixoto course corrections to deliver better and more (2013) captures this concept as the “political inclusive services. Digital accountability agency condition” or “the [participatory] platforms and the programs they support mechanisms through which citizens sanction must reshape political incentives, strengthen or reward public officials”, both at the ballot institutions, and overcome collective action box and beyond. problems if they are to trigger accountability gains (Khemani, 2007; Peixoto, 2013; Kosack 106. Khemani et al. (2015) differentiate and Fung, 2014). For this reason, Fox (2014) between two potential paths – individual proposes that ideally T/A initiatives are action (e.g., voting, feedback, advocacy) coordinated with other measures that “enable and organized group action (e.g., political collective action, influence service provider parties, CSOs, coalition building). While incentives, and/or share power over resource there is debate over the feasibility for T/A allocation”. initiatives to catalyze “group-based collective action”, digital accountability platforms 110. Digital accountability platforms blend will ultimately have to address how to not technology and transparency in the hope only aggregate individual feedback, but of changing the politics of how decisions also support broader political mobilization are made to resource and deliver services to affect change through the “scale up of that work for the Filipino people. Countless deliberation and representation” (Peixoto, assumptions go into the design of these 2013; Khemani et al., 2015; Fox, 2014). platforms from upstream inputs (what information disclose and how) to downstream 107. The ability of digital accountability outcomes (what people will do with the platforms and the programs they support to information and to what effect). There get the incentives right to overcome collective are many ambiguities in whether, when, action problems will be critical to their how, and why transparency can improve relative success or failure. The propensity to accountability in delivering better last mile “free ride” and depend upon others to take services. However, the four C’s framework action is exacerbated when the perceived sheds light on several enabling factors: the costs (e.g., lost anonymity, time, money, performance information disclosed must potential retribution) outweigh the benefits be timely and salient to their concerns of action, and the probability of making a (content); easy to access and use (channel); difference is assumed to be low (Baer et al., accompanied by credible outlets for people 2009; IRIN, 2008). to react and act upon it (choice); and that collective action must be sufficient to yield 108. Digital accountability platforms may a change in how policies are designed or have an easier time overcoming classic programs delivered (consequence). collective action problems if the nature of the services tracked (e.g., roads, reconstruction) 111. To further contextualize this concept, are “visible, proximate and of shorter Figure 6 visualizes the interaction between a duration” (Wampler, 2007; Shah, 2007; Gigler digital accountability platform (OpenRoads) et al., 2014; World Bank, 2016a). The extent to to support a government program (road which the platforms and the programs they works) and its role in changing the politics support can demonstrate that “citizen action surrounding the delivery of “last mile” access will have the backing of government allies”, roads. In section 2, we put these theories into may also effectively increase the perceived practice in assessing the current progress and benefits and “efficacy” of action (Fox, 2014). likely future trajectories of these platforms against their stated objectives and a set of key performance indicators. From Pork to Performance: Open Government and Program Performance Tracking in the Philippines. 2016. S. Custer, H. Rahemtulla, K. Kaiser, R. van den Brink 33 Service Delivery Figure 6. Strengthening Feedback on Government Performance in Providing Local Roads Shaped by Norms • Performance-based budgeting • Policy framework to mandate disclosure • Solicit and respond to feedback re: road projects Choice Key Decision Points • Voting and lobbying Allocate money to roads • Coalitions and organizations Implement road projects Monitor road projects Consequence • Greater incentive to respond to citizens, bolster performance GoP Road Works Programs • Farm-to-Market Roads (FMR) Stronger Feedback • Tourism Roads (TRIP) Loop • Rural development • Engaged citizens, accountable roads (PRDP) politicians, willing providers Improved Service Reconcile road project data across 5 agencies Delivery • More inclusive Disclose road budget and • Higher quality implementation data • More accountable Produces and manages data on local roads OpenRoads Content • Road budgets, locations, status and performance Channel • Transparent data • Better connectivity • Informs action 34 From Pork to Performance: Open Government and Program Performance Tracking in the Philippines. 2016. S. Custer, H. Rahemtulla, K. Kaiser, R. van den Brink Public Sector Performance 2 Public Sector Performance: How Do Digital Accountability Platforms Measure Up? 112. There are competing perspectives on how 115. In this section, the paper discusses: (1) to define success for digital accountability the implications of defining and measuring platforms, largely because project public sector performance; (2) insights on stakeholders view them as a means to achieve assessing the contributions of T/A initiatives; different objectives. Some reform champions (3) a proposed framework to assess the value the “deterrence effect” of openness to performance of digital accountability tame officials from abusing public resources platforms to achieve their objectives; and (4) for private gain and the success is in the an early diagnosis of current progress and mainstreaming of disclosure policies. For likely future trajectories for the five platforms others, the real value of digital accountability in focus. is in the actual use of information and participatory processes by citizens to curb leakage, strengthen targeting, and advocate 2.1 The Perils and Promise of Measuring for improvements to the quality of public Performance services. Others welcome voluntary disclosure and opportunities for participation, but view 116. Performance management affords these efforts as insufficient without more many benefits to help citizens and officials durable legal guarantees. work together to make public services more effective and accountable. It provides a 113. The focus of this study is to assess the mechanism to test what works and monitor extent to which digital accountability progress against defined metrics of success. platforms are able to catalyze a chain reaction Moreover, performance management to generate improvements to public services provides a common language of targets, in a specific sector. Digital accountability indicators, and measures with which to ‘drive’ platforms may be a technology solution, improvement across a wide range of public but if they are to assist the government agencies and services. programs they support in strengthening citizen feedback to improve service delivery, 117. Under the Aquino administration, they must navigate an inherently political performance-based management has become environment of vested interests, low levels a powerful mantra for reformers to push of public trust, and constrained political for progress, reward high performers, and mobilization (Fritz et al. 2003). penalize laggards. Intending to create a “race to the top” dynamic, the administration 114. Indeed, the path to success for digital constructed league tables for agencies accountability platforms in achieving their and LGUs, undergirded by extensive audit lofty aspirations is far from certain, replete and inspection regimes.38 In this context, with risk and reward. The net gains are performance not only increases access to “opaque and unpredictable” and there is little resources, but also enhances the perceived systematic evidence available to understand reputation and influence of individual whether, how and why technology-enabled agencies, units and organizations on a T/A initiatives are achieving the desired national stage. results (McGee and Gaventa, 2010; Kosack and Fung, 2014). 38. The Seal of Good Local Governance is one such example, which assesses performance of all LGUs against minimum standards, such as: good financial housekeeping, disaster preparedness and social protection. From Pork to Performance: Open Government and Program Performance Tracking in the Philippines. 2016. S. Custer, H. Rahemtulla, K. Kaiser, R. van den Brink 35 Public Sector Performance 118. Yet, understanding what constitutes 120. Given the uncertainties of institutional “performance” is problematic, particularly in reform in the face of pork-barrel politics, choosing what to measure: a result (outcome), sustaining improvements to public services an output (what is done), or a process or requires an approach that is adaptive to activity (how something is done). Moreover, changing circumstances and responsive does one define an improvement in public to reform environments. In other words, service as adherence to a pre-defined standard performance must be both relevant to current and, if so, to what extent is this standard realities and resilient in the face of changing appropriate and sustainable over time? needs. In measuring the performance of digital accountability platforms, one must: 119. Monitoring and measuring performance (1) balance considerations of current versus can be a double-edged sword. On the likely future performance; (2) distinguish one-hand, as Pidd (2012) acknowledges, between the performance of a platform performance measurement is “a crucial versus the broader government program; component of improvement and planning, and (3) contextualize progress in light of monitoring and control, comparison and the political reform space in which these benchmarking, and ensuring democratic technical solutions are deployed. See Figure 7 accountability”. However, performance for a visualization of the reform space. measurement can also create “perverse side effects”, such as: an overemphasis on scores versus actual outcomes, the supremacy of quantitative versus qualitative data, the desire to game the system to position oneself in the best possible light, risk aversion that undercuts innovation, and conformance to standards at the expense of organizational learning (Pidd, 2012). Figure 7. Spectrum of the Reform Space Adapt design to align with Expand reform space existing reform space Source: Fritz and Levy, 2014 Source: Fritz and Levy (2014) 36 From Pork to Performance: Open Government and Program Performance Tracking in the Philippines. 2016. S. Custer, H. Rahemtulla, K. Kaiser, R. van den Brink Public Sector Performance 121. The performance conversation becomes audits performed, laws enacted – rather than more tangible in the context of specific downstream consequences of their activities government programs, service delivery that are difficult to capture (Pritchett et al., challenges, and platform-specific objectives. 2010). Yet, digital accountability platforms are not envisioned as stand-alone interventions, but 125. Intending to close the gap, several rather contribute to a broader set of PFM retrospective studies attempt to further probe and good governance reforms that intend the evidence of T/A initiatives, including to amplify the “voice” of citizens in shaping those that leverage technology in some policy and strengthening enforcement such form. McGee and Gaventa (2010) synthesize that policymakers and politicians are more the literature on T/A initiatives across five accountable to their constituents (Fox, 2014). sectors, emphasizing the danger of adapting, Therefore, digital accountability platforms replicating, and scaling these efforts without should also be greater than the sum of their fully testing assumptions and understanding parts and be judged upon the extent to which the drivers of their success. Brockmyer and they foster broader transformation in how the Fox (2014) identify five drivers of success government works. among public governance-oriented multi- stakeholder initiatives, while acknowledging 122. In developing an assessment framework that T/A initiatives often “confuse outputs of for digital accountability platforms, we can information disclosure with outcomes and learn much from the increasing breadth of impacts”. literature on T/A initiatives, many of which integrate technology as a central component. 126. Kosack and Fung (2014) review 16 experimental evaluations of T/A initiatives, finding that both their design and the 2.2 No More Flying Blind: Better Tools to political environment (or “world”) in which Monitor Progress and Assess Impact they are deployed mediate their likelihood of success. Khemani et al. (2015) similarly 123. There is a growing recognition that the conclude that, “political engagement is tools to rigorously monitor progress and sensitive to transparency, but outcomes vary assess performance have not kept up with greatly within any institutional context and this explosion of interest in leveraging depend upon specificities of policy design”. technology, information, and participation to Meanwhile, Grandvionnet et al. (2015) argue achieve accountability gains. While Easterly that while it is “undisputed that context (2006) rightly warns against the perils of matters for the success of an intervention… over-planning and extols the benefits of a how and in which ways it does so are problem-driven approach to seek context- inadequately understood”. specific solutions, in their desire to be nimble and adaptive, technology-enabled T/A 127. In a re-examination of the evidence initiatives are vulnerable to poorly articulated on social accountability initiatives, Fox theories of change and weak performance (2014) asserts that T/A initiatives that monitoring systems (McGee and Gaventa, “combine information access with enabling 2010; Brockmyer and Fox, 2015). environments for collective action” are likely to have greater success than those 124. In light of limited real-time data, that are characterized by a narrow focus on divergent definitions of success and thorny information access alone. Extending this methodological challenges to parcel out the idea to assessing 23 technology-enabled T/A impact of a technology solution relative to platforms, Peixoto and Fox (2016) suggest the broader T/A initiative it may support, it that “public disclosure of feedback and public is unsurprising that much of the evidence collective action” are mutually reinforcing and available tends to be anecdotal and together incentivize downward accountability contested (McGee and Gaventa, 2010; Fox, – greater responsiveness on the part of 2014; Grandvoinnet et al., 2015). Moreover, policymakers and providers to input from T/A initiatives are often skewed towards citizens. measuring upstream outputs – datasets released, platforms developed, participatory From Pork to Performance: Open Government and Program Performance Tracking in the Philippines. 2016. S. Custer, H. Rahemtulla, K. Kaiser, R. van den Brink 37 Public Sector Performance 128. Citizens continuously update their 2.3 Methodology: Assessing Current assessments of government performance and Performance, Forecasting Future their expected future outcomes based upon Trajectories the information they have available to them, as part of a feedback loop (Hakhverdian and 130. Reflecting on the implications of defining Mayne, 2012; Martinez-Moyano et al., 2007). and measuring public sector performance However, changing public attitudes such and insights from the literature on T/A that citizens are willing to expend effort and initiatives, this study proposes a preliminary expose themselves to risk by taking action is methodology to assess the performance of likely an incremental process of rebuilding digital accountability and apply this as a public trust in government (Hakhverdiran and diagnostic to examine how the platforms Mayne, 2012; Custer, 2013). This perspective is are interacting with critical “analog factors” consistent with public perceptions’ literature of development that will likely determine that notes a time lag between anti-corruption their relative success. It is important to reforms undertaken, for example, and state from the outset that this assessment changing public opinion regarding the level framework is the first of what we hope will of corruption in government (Johnston, 2008; be many iterations to refine performance Rao and Marquette, 2012). measurement tools that are useful for not only digital accountability platforms, but 129. Collectively, this review of past also a broader set of technology-enabled T/A evaluations of T/A initiatives yields important initiatives. insights for how to assess the performance of digital accountability platforms. The 131. This study presents a theory of change starting point for a performance assessment devised with the government and the is a coherent theory of change, or results World Bank for each digital accountability framework, with an explicit definition platform in a results-based framework of success (desired impact) and clearly comprising a series of incremental steps from articulated assumptions about the causal more controllable inputs and activities to logic of digital accountability platforms to intermediate outputs and less controllable be tested. Multi-dimensional performance outcomes and impacts (Kusek and Khatouri, metrics should take into account both 2006; UNDG, 2010; ADB, 2013). Figure 8 technological and “analog” (environmental) introduces a simplified results framework factors that have been found to be critical across all of the platforms that included to the success of T/A initiatives. Finally, underlying enablers (or constraints) and assessments should have realistic assumptions (or fatal flaws) regarding how expectations regarding the time horizon technology and politics interact at each stage for when we will feasibly see movement on of the theory of change (see Fritz et al., 2009).39 various metrics. 39. More detailed platform-specific results frameworks are available in Appendix II. See Section 2.4 for a more extensive discussion of the underlying assumptions. 38 From Pork to Performance: Open Government and Program Performance Tracking in the Philippines. 2016. S. Custer, H. Rahemtulla, K. Kaiser, R. van den Brink Public Sector Performance Figure 8. Digital Meets Analog: Results Framework for Digital Accountability Platforms Inputs Activities Outputs Outcomes Impact What resources are applied? What discrete tasks are being What are the short-term, Whose behavior must change What does long-term implemented? direct results? and in what ways? success look like? Develop platform: disclose Evidence-based data, enable online Transparency: data on decision-making: to feedback the budget, locations, allocate resources, conditions, completion of monitor progress & Produce data: collect, projects is being disclosed evaluate performance process and clean the data Improved local Access: public can easily Horizontal accountability: services = Money Verify data: third-party access timely, accurate Officials demand providers + verification of the project data on local services justify their budgets on the Reduced leakage Data data in the platform basis of their performance + + Capability: government has Better targeting Technical expertise Training and outreach: the capacity to produce Evidence-informed + + Document, build capacity, data and manage the dialogue: citizens advocate Higher completion Networks promote use of the platform; citizens and civil for: the elimination of ghost + platform society can use & verify it projects, improved quality Enhanced quality and timely completion Policy formulation: create Awareness: government, policy guidance, mandate civil society and citizens Vertical accountability: proactive disclosure of are interested and aware citizens audit, prioritize & data, integrate platform of the platform data evaluate projects; sanction into day-to-day functions poor performance Enablers or Constraints? Commitment Capability Engagement Responsiveness Assumptions or Fatal Flaws? Assumptions: Assumptions: Assumptions: Assumptions: Data integrity Responsive platform Mechanisms for action Answerability System integration Communications Actionable Enforcement Issue salience Connectivity information Institutions Incentives 132. As discussed in the Overview and 133. This report assesses the performance of presented in section 1, the four C’s framework digital accountability platforms from both – content, channel, choice, and consequences – a political and technical perspective, using provides a short hand for communicating the an assessment rubric based upon the four various stages of this theory of change. The C’s framework. Table 2 operationalizes this four C’s represent something of a trajectory as a performance management tool and of maturation for digital accountability outlines a set of performance pillars and platforms along the results chain from inputs supporting indicators that have been cross- to impact. Decisions regarding content and referenced to the results framework for each channel are broadly related to the upstream digital accountability platform (i.e., inputs, inputs, activities, and outputs in a results activities, outputs, outcomes, impact). The framework that a small band of government four pillars include: commitment to disclose reformers can more easily control. Whereas, salient information on program performance choice and consequences are interlinked with (content); capability to sustainably the downstream outcomes over which reform disseminate this content to key audiences champions have substantially less control, (channel); engagement mechanisms for and yet are essential barometers of whether people to react and act upon this information the platforms are likely to achieve their aims. (choice); and responsiveness of providers and policymakers to make changes to how policies are made and programs are delivered (consequences). From Pork to Performance: Open Government and Program Performance Tracking in the Philippines. 2016. S. Custer, H. Rahemtulla, K. Kaiser, R. van den Brink 39 Public Sector Performance Table 2. Digital Accountability Platforms: Performance Pillars and Supporting Indicators Pillar Political commitment Definition the degree of investment on the part of senior leaders at all levels of administration to ensure consistent compliance with disclosure requirements and the integration of digital accountability platforms into the day-to-day functions of government programs Supporting Indicators Indicator Definition Measurement High-level champion Lead government agency has been identified, including L/M/H In the assessment a senior official as a champion Dedicated resources Agency and/or LGU personnel dedicated to provide oversight L/M/H In the assessment Compliance with Records disclosed that include budget, location, completion L/M/H disclosure standards status, implementing agency and service performance metrics In the assessment Pillar Bureaucratic capability Definition the extent to which civil servants in agencies and LGUs operationalize these commitments through policy frameworks that reshape incentives in favor of transparency as “default” and dedicated personnel with the skills necessary to sustainably maintain digital accountability platforms Supporting Indicators Indicator Definition Measurement Platform sustainability Technical and financial responsibility to maintain the platform L/M/H In the assessment and process the underlying data has been transitioned to government Policy framework Policy guidance has been developed that enforces agency or Y/N In the assessment LGU-information disclosure requirements Policy coherence % compliance across categories of disclosed information n/a Not In the assessment - outlined in the policy guidance data not yet available Platform visibility % of target users including officials and citizens that express n/a Not In the assessment - data awareness of the platform’s existence not yet available 40 From Pork to Performance: Open Government and Program Performance Tracking in the Philippines. 2016. S. Custer, H. Rahemtulla, K. Kaiser, R. van den Brink Public Sector Performance Pillar Political engagement Definition the extent to which digital accountability platforms are integrated with online and off-line mechanisms that citizens can easily use to inform and contest decision-making processes at national and local levels, whether individually or collectively Supporting Indicators Indicator Definition Measurement Platform salience # of target users including officials and citizens that are directly L/M/H In the assessment accessing the platform Offline engagement Extent to which the platform is integrated with complementary L/M/H In the assessment mechanisms for citizens to take action (e.g., trainings, participatory budgeting and audits) Deficiencies reported # of projects identified that are behind schedule or not meeting n/a Not In the assessment - data quality requirements established by the relevant government not yet available program Leakage exposed # of ghost projects / phantom revenues identified n/a Not In the assessment - data not yet available Vertical accountability # of CSO advocacy campaigns, media reports or third-party n/a Not In the assessment - data audits that cite platform data in identifying priorities, tracking not yet available performance and evaluating results Horizontal accountability # of congressional testimonies, budget justifications, government n/a Not In the assessment - data audit reports & performance reviews that cite platform data to not yet available assess performance of govt programs Pillar Government responsiveness Definition the demonstrated willingness of providers and policymakers to incorporate citizen preferences and feedback into how public resources are allocated and services delivered Supporting Indicators Indicator Definition Measurement Leakage curbed % of ghost projects / phantom revenues that have been n/a Not In the assessment - data successfully reduced not yet available Higher completion % of projects identified as incomplete or off-schedule that are n/a Not In the assessment - data successfully redressed not yet available Better targeting % of new projects that approved that are consistent with the n/a Not In the assessment - data objectives of government programs (e.g., poverty reduction, not yet available economic growth) Improved quality % of projects identified as not meeting quality requirements n/a Not In the assessment - data that are successfully redressed not yet available From Pork to Performance: Open Government and Program Performance Tracking in the Philippines. 2016. S. Custer, H. Rahemtulla, K. Kaiser, R. van den Brink 41 Public Sector Performance 134. This multi-dimensional approach to 136. Ultimately, to get at questions of assessing performance encompasses both impact we would need better information technological and “analog” factors critical to on lagging indicators of engagement and the success of T/A initiatives and is aligned responsiveness related to downstream with the Fritz et al. (2009) problem-driven outcomes: are platforms triggering proximate political economy framework. The four changes in individual behavior (e.g., the performance pillars also correspond with decision to provide feedback) and longer-term the roles of the three key actors in the WDR improvements in discrete services (e.g., higher 2004 accountability triangle (World Bank, completion rates). However, the information 2004). The supporting indicators effectively for such indicators is not yet readily available become proxy measures to quantify what it and changes would likely be visible after a looks like to have committed politicians (e.g., substantial lag time. However, the report lays compliance with disclosure requirements, a foundation for future evaluation through dedicating resources), responsive providers identifying monitoring indicators for forward (e.g., sustaining platforms, curbing leakage), looking data collection and paired with a and engaged citizens (e.g., accessing baseline measure of service delivery. information, reporting service deficiencies) working together to ameliorate accountability breakdowns and improve service delivery. 2.4 OpenARMM: Improving Schools in the See Table 2 for a full list of the supporting Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao indicators. (ARMM) 135. This paper applies this framework to 137. The Autonomous Region of Muslim provide an early baseline performance Mindanao, as introduced in section 1.3.1, assessment for each of the digital is home to the “highest proportion of accountability platforms.40 Since the impoverished families in the country” initiatives in question are still relatively new after decades of instability, conflict, and and the available information too limited, this underinvestment (World Bank, 2015a). The is not an impact evaluation, but rather a rapid election of Governor Mujiv Sabbihi Hataman diagnostic to assess the current progress and in May 2013 with a popular mandate to the likely future trajectory of the platforms advance good governance presented a unique in achieving their stated aims. Given the policy window to advance PFM reforms in one early stage of the five platforms reviewed in of the most difficult subnational governance this study, we primarily focus on the leading contexts in the Philippines. At Governor indicators of commitment and capability Hataman’s request, the World Bank supported related to upstream implementation: are the government to launch OpenARMM as a platforms fully operational and being digital accountability platform to disclose sustainably maintained. and visualize information on the locations of public schools, as well as publicize the results of surveys of school conditions from basic infrastructure to teacher attendance. Accounting for almost 60 percent of ARMM’s budget, the education sector places the challenges of public expenditure management in stark relief. 40. Table 2 breaks down the four pillars and 17 supporting indicators for measuring the performance of digital accountability platforms. However, for the purpose of this initial baseline assessment, we were only able to use 9 of the indicators due to limited information availability, as the projects are not yet collecting this information. Moreover, it should be noted that this performance assessment is based upon a bounded set of information available from: key informant interviews with government, civil society and development partners; primary documents; and review of the platforms themselves. 42 From Pork to Performance: Open Government and Program Performance Tracking in the Philippines. 2016. S. Custer, H. Rahemtulla, K. Kaiser, R. van den Brink Public Sector Performance 2.4.1 Performance Challenge 2.4.3. Progress to Date 138. Even under the reform-minded 141. Initially, political support for OpenARMM administration of Governor Hataman, the appeared to be strong, as the Hataman ARMM government struggles to effectively administration was already interested in geo- allocate increasing resources from the tagging and tackling the problem of ghost national government in recent years to projects.41 The ARMM government agreed tackle historically poor education outcomes. to implement a full geo-tagging census of Fragmented budgeting and execution all schools to the municipal-city level in May across multiple levels of government further 2015. The ARMM government even made exacerbate the negative effects of entrenched a public commitment on the OpenARMM corruption. The absence of basic information platform to: disclose the exact geographic to verify the locations of schools and teacher location of every school in the region and take attendance abets corruption as politicians stock of basic infrastructure conditions and can more easily redirect resources and civil the presence of teachers and students. servants can eschew their responsibilities with impunity. 142. However, since OpenARMM became operational twelve months ago, the limits 139. In a region with such a substantial of this initial political commitment have amount of its budget focused on education, become clear. Progress on geo-tagging has the Governor and the World Bank saw stalled at only 789 of 2514 schools across the that getting governance reforms right ARMM region (31.4 percent), as of March in this one sector could be a gateway for 2016.42 Most provinces are lagging behind, strengthening PFM in ARMM across the including: Tawi-Tawi (38 percent), Lanao board. An underlying motivation for the del Sur (26 percent), Sulu (29 percent) and ARMM government was “an understanding Maguindanao (16 percent). The lack of that better governance would result in greater progress in Maguindanao is particularly budget allocations to the region from the striking, in light of a 2014 operational order national government” (World Bank, 2016i). from the ARMM Department of Education, which mandated the collection of this data 2.4.2. Technical Solution in that province.43 The platform does include 163 surveys of school facility conditions 140. The Hataman administration and the (i.e., electricity, walls, libraries, laboratories), World Bank viewed open data and technology challenges (i.e., textbooks, classrooms, through OpenARMM as an innovative way qualified personnel) and attendance rates to leverage the power of online technologies of students and teachers; however, this data and open data to better visualize the location is extracted from an independent World of ARMM public schools and monitor their Bank Group survey and is only available for performance. The platform aims to redress 2013. Moreover, while it is possible to sort for chronic shortages in information about information on school conditions by location local schools to support the government’s (e.g., province, municipality, barangay), the ability to allocate resources effectively, as information is out of date and disconnected well as to facilitate bottom-up accountability from the map view of geo-tagged schools, through disclosing information on public which makes it more difficult for citizens and school conditions and locations. OpenARMM local school administrators to easily monitor also connects to a mobile tablet that allows the performance of their local schools based third-party organizations to collect real-time upon timely data points. information such as geo-tagged school photos and student attendance. 41. See http://deped.armm.gov.ph/2014/02/deped-armm-goes-geo-tagging.html. 42. The remaining 1725 schools have only an approximate location (ARMM DepEd, OpenARMM Dashboard, 2016). 43. See http://deped.armm.gov.ph/2014/02/deped-armm-goes-geo-tagging.html From Pork to Performance: Open Government and Program Performance Tracking in the Philippines. 2016. S. Custer, H. Rahemtulla, K. Kaiser, R. van den Brink 43 Public Sector Performance 143. The ability of OpenARMM to realize information on school performance to be its ambition of serving as a performance integrated within the OpenARMM platform. platform to root out ghost schools is The initiative also lacks a clear mandate in the compromised by issues of data integrity; absence of a Memorandum of Understanding however, the more fundamental blocker (MoU) or alternative policy guidance that appears to be political not technical. While spells out the government’s commitments the Hataman administration has received to collecting, disclosing and maintaining accolades for being a “ghost buster” and information on ARMM schools via the eradicating over 100 ghost schools, the OpenARMM platform. The Executive Secretary government is only willing to go so far to has recently delegated the Regional Planning advance their anti-corruption campaign. The and Development Office as the chair of the ARMM government has been unwilling to ARMM Regional Statistical Committee, to lead fully operationalize the platform, including a the work on Open Data. However, while this commitment to dedicate personnel, purchase delegation is a positive step forward, it will tablets to conduct the mobile survey, etc. still be critical to establish a formal MoU in Interviews conducted with officials and order to provide a clearer political mandate non-government observers suggest a moving forward. lack of political will to do more to tackle ghost schools and concerns that greater 146. Local civil society and university groups, transparency will turn into a “blame game” such as the Consortium of Bangsamora (World Bank, 2016i). Civil Society (CBCS), Basilan State College, and Mindanao State University have 144. Despite initial enthusiasm for open been identified as having the potential to data to demonstrate the government’s supplement the state’s capability to collect anti-corruption credentials, there appears data on public schools. In fact, students and to be less appreciation of the value of the researchers have become involved in past OpenARMM platform as a decision-making data collection efforts. However, the absence tool to support the operational planning and of a firm commitment to implement its data management of education programs. This collection and management efforts through impression was likely exacerbated by an the open data platform has held up the ability overall low level of familiarity and facility to more intentionally engage a third-party with data management and analysis within institution such as CBCS to improve upon the the ARMM government to begin with, as data in the platform. well as delays in developing the platform and differences in expectations between 147. Historically, few CSOs have been involved the government and development partners in monitoring public services in ARMM, regarding what OpenARMM would be able to understandably so, given ongoing security help the government achieve.44 Moreover, for issues. The prospects for constructive some officials within the ARMM government, government-civil society engagement delaying the process of geo-tagging also appeared to increase with the ascendance allowed them to forestall the necessity of of the Hataman administration on a popular taking decisive action. anti-corruption mandate. Unfortunately, the dearth of actual performance and location data on public schools in the 2.4.4. Institutionalization OpenARMM platform has failed to animate CSOs to use this information to advocate for 145. While the Office of the Executive Secretary improvements in education services. Low in ARMM serves as a high-level champion to Internet connectivity and limited data skills provide oversight, school mapping initiatives are further challenges that may dampen the remain fragmented between numerous prospects for civil society and civil servants to departments and the government has been put OpenARMM to use. unable to push forward with data collection to complete the work of geo-tagging and capture 44. Several development partners had been collecting the locations of local schools and OpenARMM was to consolidate this information. 44 From Pork to Performance: Open Government and Program Performance Tracking in the Philippines. 2016. S. Custer, H. Rahemtulla, K. Kaiser, R. van den Brink Public Sector Performance 2.4.5. Preliminary Assessment 149. At this time, OpenARMM is not on a trajectory to achieve its objectives. Without a 148. Despite the presence of a champion/lead substantial increase in political commitment agency, overall commitment for OpenARMM to create an authorizing environment, the is low due to limited follow-through by the ARMM government is unlikely to address ARMM government to comply with disclosure breakdowns in data collection and dedicate standards (e.g., geo-tagging and school resources to the day-to-day operations of the performance data) and dedicate resources platform. Figure 9 provides a visual summary to strengthen data collection. Capability is of the progress of OpenARMM against similarly constrained by the lack of clear achieving its objectives to date. policy guidance setting expectations and creating the right incentives to collect, disclose and process data on public schools via the platform. While there is potential for engagement in future, at present there is limited data upon which citizens and CSOs can take action. Figure 9. Performance Diagnostic: OpenARMM Political Disclosure Champion/ Dedicated No / Low Commitment compliance lead agency resources Bureaucratic Platform Policy Policy Platform No / Low Capability sustainability framework coherence visibility Political Platform Offline Leakage Leakage Platform Platform No / Low Engagement salience engagement curbed exposed salience salience Government Leakage Higher Better Improved Inconclusive Responsiveness curbed completion targeting quality Key No/Low Moderate Yes/High Data Not Available Inconclusive From Pork to Performance: Open Government and Program Performance Tracking in the Philippines. 2016. S. Custer, H. Rahemtulla, K. Kaiser, R. van den Brink 45 Public Sector Performance 2.5 OpenReconstruction: Helping the 152. The projected costs of reconstruction Philippines Build Back Better with following the Bohol and Yolanda disasters Reconstruction Projects were substantial.45 Yet, the Secretary of DBM, Butch Abad, notably declared that the 150. As described in section 1.3.2, the Aquino greatest challenge for the government to live administration faced a substantial stress up to its promise to help the country build test during its tenure in the face of two back better was not the sourcing of funds, natural disasters that wrecked havoc in the but the “assessment, preparation, execution, Philippines in 2013: the Bohol earthquake in and delivery [of reconstruction projects]” October and typhoon Yolanda in November. (Mangahas and Caronan, 2015). Committing US$4 billion in financing for the post-disaster recovery, the government was 153. The establishment, but early closure, of a under heightened scrutiny by international new agency to coordinate the reconstruction and domestic watchdogs to prioritize, program – OPARR – compounded the disburse, and monitor funds for post-disaster challenge of effective tracking. OPARR infrastructure projects (e.g. roads, schools, showed little appetite for leading an effort clinics). Given the highly fragmented nature to strengthen and harmonize disparate of disaster recovery and reconstruction in accounting and reporting systems across line the Philippines, the government knew that agencies and LGUs. Moreover, OPARR had a its existing PFM systems were not up to limited mandate to compel line agencies or the task. In this respect, the DBM and the LGUs to fully comply on issues of tracking or World Bank commissioned the development execution of reconstruction projects. Even of OpenReconstruction, to help solve the with the dismantling of OPARR and transition problem of piecemeal information on of coordination responsibilities to the opaque post-disaster relief efforts and National Economic Development Authority enable officials and citizens alike to more (NEDA) in April 2015, the shortcomings of easily track spending and implementation siloed manual and electronic information of reconstruction projects across myriad systems to track reconstruction expenditures government agencies. and project status persist (Sabater, 2015).46 2.5.1. Performance Challenge 2.5.2. Technical Solution 151. In the absence of a single agency with 154. When Yolanda and Bohol struck, the a centralized mandate for post-disaster Aquino administration was in the midst recovery, tracking reconstruction project of promoting budget transparency and expenditures and implementation is good governance reforms, including the extremely difficult in the Philippines. While unbundling of lump sum allocations to LGUs are legally responsible for disaster line agencies that were a black box and recovery, in fact, six national agencies finance notoriously difficult to track by citizens and implement reconstruction projects, and oversight agencies (see Section 1.2). In each with their own disparate information addition, 2014 was the first full budget year management systems. These agencies subject to a UACS that would allow budget include: Office of Civil Defense (OCD), allocations and project implementation Presidential Assistant for Rehabilitation and details for the first time.47 Recovery (OPARR), Department of Budget and Management (DBM), Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH), Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG), and the Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD). 45. The National Economic Development Authority proposed a government-spending envelope of ₱360.89 billion for post-disaster reconstruction assistance for Yolanda alone based upon its post-disaster damage and loss assessment completed within two months of the disaster. In its 2014 Comprehensive Rehabilitation and Recovery Plan, OPARR estimated a funding requirement of ₱163 billion (approximately US$4 billion) and encompasses 9,000 projects. Funding came from annual budget allocations in 2014-2016, which could be carried over across years. In late-2015, the government reported that one third of these projects were respectively completed and ongoing. As of June 2015, the government had released ₱84.70 billion for reconstruction, despite promises to complete reconstruction by 2017 (World Bank, 2015). 46. See http://www.mb.com.ph/oparr-put-under-neda/. 47. This was a major breakthrough for PFM reform, and centered on collaboration across DBM and the Commission on Audit which are responsible for budget and accounting codes, respectively. 46 From Pork to Performance: Open Government and Program Performance Tracking in the Philippines. 2016. S. Custer, H. Rahemtulla, K. Kaiser, R. van den Brink Public Sector Performance 155. The DBM leadership recognized early 158. OpenReconstruction leverages the routine on the value of more granular tracking of reporting of DPWH’s electronic Project Life reconstruction expenditures and sought Cycle (e-PLC) to support tracking of post- to mandate electronic tagging of Yolanda- Yolanda and Bohol physical infrastructure related releases aligned with the UACS. projects on a monthly basis.49 DBM and the OpenReconstruction was seen as a way World Bank initially operationalized a pilot for the government to quickly impart for a subset of about 1,000 projects, but soon information to the public about its funding realized that in the absence of standardized for reconstruction efforts. The World Bank project identifiers manual coding was recommended an eTicketing system in early necessary to join project information, from 2014 and commissioned the development of budget allocation to implementation. OpenReconstruction to link with the DBM’s internal budget allocation management 2.5.3. Progress to Date systems (eBudget). This enabled, for the first time, real-time reporting on project status, 159. The OpenReconstruction platform has from proposal to implementation. improved the transparency of information on post-disaster relief and recovery, at 156. The World Bank and DBM launched least to some degree. Today, users of the OpenReconstruction in June 2014 to help the platform can publicly view a list of over 6,200 government disclose information on post- reconstruction projects that received ₱48.62 disaster relief efforts and unbundle lump billion in public funds between 2014-2015, sum allocations to the agencies charged with including: the assessing agencies that validate implementing reconstruction projects.48 The the suitability of the budget request, the platform sought to make it easier for officials, implementing agencies to whom the budget citizens, and oversight agencies to effectively was dispersed and the LGU that originally monitor the government’s performance. In requested the funding. Detailed project fulfilling its mandate, OpenReconstruction records also identify: the project location (e.g., had to address a persistent challenge from region, city/municipality and/or barangay), the start: the propensity of agencies to rely on the type of project funded and the associated manual reporting and reconciliation. disaster that motivated the reconstruction effort. 157. The state of financial and physical reporting systems for reconstruction projects 160. Nonetheless, OpenReconstruction does varies substantially across agencies. Lack not yet provide an integrated, timely view of standardized project identifiers and the of relief efforts across agencies and for all extent of manual accounting systems made reconstruction projects and has several data it difficult to ensure that information on the integrity issues. Coverage in the platform is status and funding of reconstruction projects limited to physical infrastructure projects remained up-to-date. With the introduction from DPWH. As a result, OpenReconstruction of OpenReconstruction, DBM and the was only able to track an estimated 28 percent World Bank intended to use the platform to of the estimated ₱170 billion in reconstruction consolidate disconnected reporting systems spending. Even for those included in the across all government agencies involved in platform, the majority of projects are missing post-disaster relief and recovery. However, critical pieces of information. Only a tiny among these agencies, only DPWH had an fraction of projects include their exact operational electronic system capable of physical location (0.3 percent) and just 9 regularly generating data on infrastructure percent of projects list their status (e.g., active, projects implemented by the agency. dropped, completed) and the implementing agency. The World Bank manually updated the information in OpenReconstruction, importing data from excel spreadsheets on 48. OpenReconstruction.gov.ph 49. On a monthly basis, under the ePLC, DPWH consolidates financial program information from the electronic New Government System (eNGAS) and physical project information from its Project Management System (PMS). While DPWH also maintains a Contract Management System (CMS), in the absence of a standardized mapping, it has been challenging to link this to the Philippines Government Electronic Procurement System (World Bank, 2015). From Pork to Performance: Open Government and Program Performance Tracking in the Philippines. 2016. S. Custer, H. Rahemtulla, K. Kaiser, R. van den Brink 47 Public Sector Performance a monthly basis until August 2015 when the 163. Limited internal political will and the government restricted further disclosure absence of palpable external pressure has of the data until it had been reviewed. This created an environment where implementing manual entry increases the likelihood that the agencies have limited incentives to: disclose platform contains errors. up-to-date information, harmonize budget and expenditure codes, or integrate their 161. Despite the original vision to leverage reporting systems. The government’s the routine reporting of DPWH and expand capability to sustain the OpenReconstruction this structure to other agencies, post-disaster platform is further undercut by the lack of spending remains fragmented and requires clear policy guidance mandating consistent cumbersome coordination across multiple reporting and disclosure standards. While agencies with siloed systems and manual NEDA placed due emphasis upon the role of processes that result in significant lag time. tracking, in the absence of a functional cross- Two measures were proposed to alleviate agency system, NEDA reverted to manually this problem: (1) e-ticketing to track budget processing the collating of reports. allocations to reconstruction expenditures that would allow projects to proceed once 164. Meanwhile, increased scrutiny of they had satisfied basic criteria; and (2) reconstruction expenditures prompted the building a master-list for all projects, aligned development of parallel disaster tracking with the UACS. While agreed to in principle, systems – the FAiTH and the UNDP-financed the government implemented neither e-Management Platform Accountability Hub measure in practice (World Bank, 2015g). for Yolanda (eMPATHY). While eMPATHY Accounting and project management systems was a positive step forward to the vision of across agencies are often still manual, follow granular tracking of reconstruction projects very different coding schemes and UACS and funding, the absence of UACS codes and adoption has lagged behind. geo-tagged information to verify project locations led to inconsistent reporting. FAiTH 2.5.4. Institutionalization provides insight into foreign assistance funds, but does not integrate domestic 162. Underlying the aforementioned technical commitments and expenditures for a more difficulties are critical deficiencies in political comprehensive picture of reconstruction commitment. Monitoring post-disaster tracking. Yet, political uncertainty prevents recovery and reconstruction projects is any one platform from becoming the substantially more difficult in the absence standard and DBM’s attempts to assess of a single official authoritative body or options to leverage the functionalities of both a streamlined process mandated for all eMPATHY and OpenReconstruction have not agencies to collaborate on expenditure yet born much fruit. A challenge for both DBM tracking. In this fragmented environment, and NEDA continues to be the absence of core OpenReconstruction struggled to overcome staffing to implement and institutionalize the perception that uniform reporting this expenditure tracking function. standards would threaten implementing agency autonomy and deeply entrenched information silos. 48 From Pork to Performance: Open Government and Program Performance Tracking in the Philippines. 2016. S. Custer, H. Rahemtulla, K. Kaiser, R. van den Brink Public Sector Performance 165. There is little evidence of broad-based advantage of the opportunity to participate in public awareness regarding the existence the CPAs for various reasons, such as: personal of OpenReconstruction. Yet, in fairness enrichment (e.g., developing new skills), a this may reveal less about the value of the sense of civic duty and the hope that joining platform than the absence of an intentional with CoA would increase the likelihood that communications campaign to spread the LGU officials would listen to their input. word. The launch of the platform received little fanfare and there have been few public 2.5.5. Preliminary Assessment promotion activities since then which makes the relatively low traffic to the site 168. In the case of OpenReconstruction, unsurprising. One exception has been a overall political commitment to comply fledgling partnership with the Philippines with disclosure standards or dedicate Center for Investigative Journalism and resources is low due to fragmented nature of the Open Knowledge Foundation to train implementing reconstruction projects and journalists in the use of data from the the existence of parallel systems. Bureaucratic OpenReconstruction platform (among other capability is similarly constrained by the lack sources) to generate media articles about the of clear policy guidance setting expectations distribution of reconstruction funds. and creating the right incentives to collect, disclose and process data on reconstruction 166. While overall public awareness of the projects via the platform. In spite of low OpenReconstruction is generally low, there public awareness, a partnership with the CoA is an emerging channel for citizens to take affords an opportunity for citizens to use open action upon the data in collaboration with the data on reconstruction projects to engage CoA. Through their CPAs program, the CoA has politically through citizen participatory mobilized the involvement of students and audits, which may also increase the likelihood civil society groups to assist in the auditing of of responsiveness on the part of LGU officials. “big ticket infrastructure projects”, including monitoring of reconstruction projects in the 169. At present, OpenReconstruction is not on disaster-affected areas of Tacloban, Leyte and a trajectory to achieve its objectives, at least Tagbilaran, Bohol. Since 2014, the CPAs have in the way that it was originally envisioned. leveraged geo-tagging and geo-referenced Unless there is a substantial change in the open data to conduct audits of reconstruction national-level political environment, such projects. as the creation of a single agency with a centralized mandate to oversee reconstruction 167. The CPAs are an example of getting the projects, it is unlikely that the underlying incentives right on all sides. The CoA was able data problems will be addressed through to appeal to the desire of its auditors to have the implementing agencies. See Figure 10 LGU officials to pay more attention to their for a visual summary of the progress of audit recommendations. Including citizens OpenReconstruction against achieving its in the auditing process was a way for the objectives to date. CoA to effectively increase local constituent pressure and incentivize LGU officials to take action. Anecdotal observations indicate that this strategy may be paying off, as it was reported that there has been a substantial jump in the implementation of CoA audit recommendations with the CPAs relative to other audits that do not include citizens. A number of CSOs – faith-based, student- based and community-based – have taken From Pork to Performance: Open Government and Program Performance Tracking in the Philippines. 2016. S. Custer, H. Rahemtulla, K. Kaiser, R. van den Brink 49 Public Sector Performance Figure 10. Performance Diagnostic: OpenReconstruction Political High level Disclosure champion/lead Dedicated No / Low Commitment compliance agency resources Bureaucratic Platform Policy Policy Platform No / Low Capability sustainability framework coherence visibility Political Platform Offline Leakage Leakage Platform Platform No / Low Engagement salience engagement curbed exposed salience salience Government Leakage Higher Better Improved Inconclusive Responsiveness curbed completion targeting quality Key No/Low Moderate Yes/High Data Not Available Inconclusive 2.6 OpenBUB: Getting the Most from data on all BUB projects, making it easier for Bottom-Up Budgeting (BUB) for Municipal citizens, officials, and oversight agencies to Development monitor municipal development projects from approval through implementation.51 170. Bottom-Up Budgeting (introduced in section 1.3.3) was a departure from traditional 2.6.1. Performance Challenge top-down budgeting. In line with the Aquino administration’s commitment to inclusive 172. Both internationally acclaimed and growth, the flagship reform initiative politically popular in the Philippines, the aims to amplify the voice of citizens and BUB program has had to navigate its share of LGU officials to: determine how funds are implementation difficulties.52 Rapidly scaled spent for municipal development projects, up from a small pilot to almost nationwide reduce corruption and align national budget coverage, the government’s capacity to allocations to be responsive to locally demonstrate progress in disbursing funds and identified needs. The DILG initially piloted completing BUB projects is lagging behind the BUB in 600 cities and municipalities in 2012, participatory process of identifying municipal subsequently scaling the program to over development priorities via Local Poverty 1500 cities and municipalities (92 percent of Reduction Action Plans (Ateneo de Manila the country).50 University, 2013; Pastrana and Lagarto, 2014; Manasan, 2015 and 2016). Over time, delays 171. In a political environment of high public in implementation are compounding and distrust of pork-barrel spending following will likely compromise the reputation of the the PDAF and DAP scandals, the government BUB program to fulfill its stated objectives. and the World Bank commissioned a digital As of March 2016, completion rates for BUB accountability platform, OpenBUB, to open up projects approved in the 2013 and 2014 fiscal the process of these municipal development years were only 51 percent and 40 percent, allocations to public scrutiny. OpenBUB respectively. sought to promote greater accountability through publishing physical and financial 50. The government identified 609 municipalities/cities for the initial phase of BuB in FY2013, of which 595 responded and submitted Local Poverty Reduction Action Plans (LPRAPs). In FY2014, the government expanded the program to cover 1,233 municipalities/cities. In FY2015, the government extended BUB to over 1500 municipalities/cities across the country. 51. openbub.gov.ph 52. The Philippines BUB program has garnered substantial international recognition, including: a 2014 Gold Open Government Award from the Open Government Partnership and being coined one of five Best Practices in Fiscal Transparency by GIFT (Dalangin-Fernandez, 2016). 50 From Pork to Performance: Open Government and Program Performance Tracking in the Philippines. 2016. S. Custer, H. Rahemtulla, K. Kaiser, R. van den Brink Public Sector Performance 173. Independent evaluations have found resources for private gain. In response to that general public satisfaction with BUB has this challenge, the DBM and the World Bank been high, especially among LGUs, and that launched a digital accountability platform, BUB adds value to making the local planning OpenBUB, to simplify procedures for agencies process more transparent and participatory involved in the financing, procurement and (Ateneo de Manila University, 2013; Pastrana implementation of approved BUB projects to and Lagarto, 2014; Manasan, 2015 and 2016). report and disclose information via a single However, while the government emphasizes electronic system. the inclusiveness of the BUB program in incorporating CSOs alongside local 176. All proposed participatory budgeting government officials in identifying municipal projects are itemized General Appropriations development priorities, the quality of CSO Act (GAA) National Expenditure Program and participation is mixed (Ateneo de Manila are publicly disclosed and published online. University, 2013; Pastrana and Lagarto, 2014; This presented an attractive opportunity to Manasan, 2015 and 2016). While BUB aimed demonstrate that OpenBUB could enable the to bring community-driven development public to track and monitor proposed BUB principles to the municipal level, the BUB projects along the whole service delivery process has fallen short of substantively chain, from budgeting through execution. influencing local development planning While the World Bank recommended the and budgeting at the city/municipal level. adoption of UACS, the GAA list of BUB projects Moreover, the long-term impact of the did not have established unique project program remains uncertain and vulnerable to identifiers due to the lagging adoption of the election cycles and the oscillating priorities of standard. changing administrations. 2.6.3. Progress to Date 174. Ensuring greater transparency of BUB- approved municipal development projects 177. The DBM now largely operates and and enabling the public to more easily maintains OpenBUB, which was nationally track progress is of substantial importance, scaled for agencies to record the allocation given the politicized nature of center-local of municipal development funds. OpenBUB transfers and chronic implementation delays. was the first of the Philippines digital Proponents of BUB view its mandate as accountability platforms to transition to facilitating meaningful devolution of both being wholly maintained by the government resources and responsibilities for service and has a strong policy mandate enshrined in delivery to the LGUs, in line with the Local several joint memoranda circulars, however, Government Code. Skeptics counter that monitoring and evaluation capability remains BUB is, in fact, merely a lucrative avenue for weak, as does the quality and timeliness of political pork that national politicians can the data. use to channel resources to secure votes, allies and clout with local officials and their 178. As political commitment to the BUB constituents, particularly in an election year program has been high, the OpenBUB has (Dalangin-Fernandez, 2016). likely benefited by that association. The government has dedicated resources to 2.6.2. Technical Solution support the oversight of the platform through the creation of an OpenBUB Technical 175. From a PFM perspective, BUB represents Working Group and has made moderate a large-scale transfer of resources from progress in adhering to disclosure standards. the national budget: ₱74.1 billion between Over 99 percent of projects in OpenBUB 2013 and 2016 to 54,049 projects to be include the implementing agency and a implemented under the auspices of 14 sectoral standardized geographic identifier. As of July agencies in all of the LGUs across the country 2015, the management information system except for the ARMM. In the absence of a of OpenBUB reports 48,558 participatory GIFMIS or broad-based adoption of UACS, it budgeting projects worth ₱56 billion and would have been extremely cumbersome, covering the period from 2014 to 2015. if not impossible, for officials or citizens to effectively monitor expenditures and safeguard against the siphoning of public From Pork to Performance: Open Government and Program Performance Tracking in the Philippines. 2016. S. Custer, H. Rahemtulla, K. Kaiser, R. van den Brink 51 Public Sector Performance 179. However, the OpenBUB platform 2.6.4. Institutionalization must still overcome several troubling inconsistencies in the implementation of 182. OpenBUB has capitalized on its its disclosure standards. The lack of UACS association with the popular BUB program to compliance (i.e., unique project IDs), has build a relatively strong coalition of interested contributed to notable inconsistencies in the stakeholders among community-based listed number of projects and total project organizations and government officials at the cost by fiscal year between the GAA list and local and national levels. These stakeholders what is shown in OpenBUB. For example, the value the additional resources that the BUB GAA for 2014 reported 19,533 projects worth program makes available, as well as enhanced ₱20 billion, compared with 23,826 projects opportunities to influence municipal worth ₱26 billion published via OpenBUB development planning beyond the previous for 2014.53 None of the projects in OpenBUB status quo of “rubber-stamping” plans via include their exact location, which reduces the Local Development Councils (Manasan, the utility of the location information. Delays 2015). This creates positive incentives for across participating agencies in reporting and civil society actors to participate in planning publishing approved projects via OpenBUB processes, but also to be interested in have undercut the ability of the platform to monitoring the outcomes. facilitate real-time program monitoring. As of March 2016, the approved projects in the 183. Instead of developing an engagement January 2016 GAA worth ₱24.7 billion have strategy from scratch, OpenBUB can position not yet been published via OpenBUB. itself as a resource to support, offline participatory processes embedded within 180. While OpenBUB provides information on the BUB program, consistent with the the final list of approved BUB projects, it does original vision of Solo Kota Kita adapted for not capture the reasons why projects were the Philippines. Examples of such off-line subsequently cancelled or repurposed. Since participatory process include the LPRATs and agencies may replace, drop or cancel proposed civil society organization assemblies. Just over BUB projects as listed in the GAA, following a year old, there is moderate revealed interest deliberations of the local poverty reduction in the OpenBUB platform from the public action teams (LPRATs), this remaining based upon an estimated 76,000 unique users “black box” is likely still vulnerable to undue per year. influence from politicians, companies and others that may seek to extract private 184. Nonetheless, there is still substantial benefits. For example, a World Bank (2015h) room for improvement in the efforts to assessment found that the number of BUB engage the public in municipal development, projects increased by 6,460 projects or as well as the integration of OpenBUB within US$197.18 million dollars between December these processes. BUB rapidly expanded 2014 and July 2015, which raises questions without everything in place to sustainably about the discretion of officials to replace bring the project to scale. Opportunities to viable projects selected using a participatory crowdsource information via the LPRATs and process with political pork. civil society assemblies to facilitate ongoing monitoring and fill data gaps regarding the 181. Moreover, only 26 percent of projects implementation status of BUB projects has include an updated project status, making it not yet been fully explored. Civil society difficult for the public to monitor progress.54 participation in the BUB processes has been The gap in information about what happens uneven and particularly limited in isolated to projects subsequent to approval is and underdeveloped areas of the country. concerning in light of past evaluations The benefits of the OpenBUB platform are which highlight chronic delays in the also likely to be lower in these less connected implementation of BUB projects (Manasan, areas. 2015; Mangahas, 2015). 53. It should be noted that in reviewing differences between the project counts and budgeted costs in the GAA and OpenBUB, the variance substantially improved in 2015, compared with previous years (World Bank, 2015h). 54. For tracking purposes, a project status is considered to be up-to-date if it is current within the last four months. 52 From Pork to Performance: Open Government and Program Performance Tracking in the Philippines. 2016. S. Custer, H. Rahemtulla, K. Kaiser, R. van den Brink Public Sector Performance 185. Whether a new administration continues policy guidance in the form of creating to support the OpenBUB platform is highly the right incentives to collect, disclose and interlinked with the continued visibility and process data on municipal development popularity of the broader BUB program with projects via the platform. However, a the electorate. Meanwhile, a critical issue substantial time lag in updating the data in both the program and platform is the via the platform raises some questions current limited ability to monitor and ensure regarding sustainability. OpenBUB boasts implementation of BUB in a timely fashion. As the most organic opportunities for citizens previous research has shown, “participation to engage politically, since it builds upon the or consultation fatigue” is a real concern participatory processes that are part of the and government failure to respond to the broader BUB program. There is a stronger input of citizens exacerbates this dynamic expectation at national and local levels for the (OECD, 2001). If low implementation rates of government to be responsive to the municipal BUB approved projects continue and there is development priorities outlined limited information to monitor progress, it is by the LPRATs. possible that public enthusiasm for the BUB program could wane in the medium-term. 187. Given the high degree of Moving forward, there is need for stronger institutionalization of OpenBUB in the monitoring and evaluation mechanisms to context of the broader BUB program, facilitate accountability in the upstream OpenBUB is likely to be on a trajectory selection of BUB projects, as well as support to achieve its objectives if it can address downstream implementation in a timely persistent time lags in publishing information manner. Broader adoption of UACS would on approved projects. However, it is unclear support tracking and monitoring of BUB whether this progress will continue with the projects from budgeting to implementation, transition to a new administration. A major as well as ensure greater harmonization strength of the BUB program has been its between the projects and budgets published status as a signature initiative of the Aquino via the GAA and OpenBUB. administration and its integration into the Philippines national action plan. Yet, this close 2.6.5. Preliminary Assessment association between BUB and an outgoing presidential administration may also make it 186. OpenBUB appears to enjoy a relatively vulnerable to changes in political fortunes if high level of political commitment and an incoming administration from a different has made moderate progress against political party desires to de-emphasize past disclosure standards under the oversight accomplishments. See Figure 11 for a visual of the OpenBUB Technical Working Group. summary of the progress of OpenBUB against Bureaucratic capability is enhanced by clear achieving its objectives to date. Figure 11. Performance Diagnostic: OpenBUB Political Disclosure Champion/ Dedicated High Commitment compliance lead agency resources Bureaucratic Platform Policy Policy Platform Moderate Capability sustainability framework coherence visibility Political Platform Offline Leakage Leakage Platform Platform Moderate Engagement salience engagement curbed exposed salience salience Government Leakage Higher Better Improved Inconclusive Responsiveness curbed completion targeting quality Key No/Low Moderate Yes/High Data Not Available Inconclusive From Pork to Performance: Open Government and Program Performance Tracking in the Philippines. 2016. S. Custer, H. Rahemtulla, K. Kaiser, R. van den Brink 53 Public Sector Performance 2.7 OpenRoads: Ensuring Local Roads Lead 191. The launch of KALSADA, a “landmark to Greater Prosperity for All roads rehabilitation program” that offers performance-based financing to upgrade local 188. As introduced in section 1.3.4, local road networks, unlocked an opportunity to access roads are critical to advancing the institutionalize greater transparency of road government’s commitment to inclusive investments.55 According to DBM (2016), the growth and, yet, particularly vulnerable program is intended to support local road to the pernicious influence of patronage management that “enhances connectivity and politics. With the Aquino administration economic productivity”. Provinces must meet targeting over US$1 billion to connect 180,000 good governance standards and establish kilometers of “last mile” access roads, the monitoring and evaluation mechanisms for national financing of local roads is a critical local roads projects to access financing via test case to improve public expenditure KALSADA. Initially begun as a pilot exercise, management and mobilize citizens to as of April 2016, the government has scaled demand greater accountability. up this program to 172 projects worth US$150 million for 2016 alone. 189. Fragmented information on the state of road networks has traditionally shielded 2.7.2 Technical Solution suboptimal road investments from scrutiny. In this respect, DBM-led fiscal transparency 192. National and local governments in the efforts to disaggregate lump sum budgets, Philippines, supported by development apply unique project identifiers, and invest partners, have pursued a variety of mapping in geo-tagging technology present an efforts. However, two fundamental gaps opportunity to make the tracking of road remained: (1) the physical locations of roads investments substantially easier. DBM, DILG were not being systematically linked with and the World Bank launched OpenRoads in information on budgets, expenditures and August 2015 to disclose information on the performance; and (2) there were no clear location, financing, and physical status of protocols and systems to manage geo-tagging local access road investments. The unique across local roads program portfolios. With a value-add of OpenRoads was not to duplicate substantial scale-up of investments in local existing road tracking efforts, but facilitate roads in recent years, the government was greater coordination across different roads in search of a timely, cost-effective solution programs. to disclose, visualize, and monitor “last mile” road investments against clear performance 2.7.1 Performance Challenge criteria. 190. Disconnected, unfinished, and poor 193. In response to this challenge, the DBM quality road investments remain a challenge and the World Bank deployed OpenRoads as in the Philippines. More comprehensive and a digital accountability platform to increase up-to-date information about Philippines the transparency of nationally financed road network and investments is vital for local roads programs and enable public improving planning, implementation and tracking of road expenditures from initial feedback. Yet, before local communities can project selection through to execution. The provide systematic feedback on local roads OpenRoads platform supports the public programs, they need to be able to answer disclosure of road investments, facilitates the more basic question of where roads geo-tagging of road project locations, and are being built. While the DPWH annually offers a set of tools to promote basic local updates a map of the national road network, road network mapping. The platform this information is not readily available for links official government data on roads “last mile” access road networks. Officials, with video imagery on road quality and oversight agencies, and citizens need access completion submitted by the public via a to a comprehensive overview of road network mobile application, Routeshoot. OpenRoads connectivity at all levels – province, district, also includes a network mapping review and municipality. component as an easy tool to conduct electronic reviews of the connectivity of road investments. 55. KALSADA stands for Konkreto at Ayos na Langsangan at Daan Tungo sa Pangkalahatang Kaunlaran. 54 From Pork to Performance: Open Government and Program Performance Tracking in the Philippines. 2016. S. Custer, H. Rahemtulla, K. Kaiser, R. van den Brink Public Sector Performance 2.7.3 Progress to Date 2.7.4 Institutionalization 194. To date, OpenRoads has integrated 197. The strategy for engaging agencies budget and implementation data on five involved in the financing and implementation local roads programs: farm-to-market of local roads has evolved substantially since roads (FMR), tourism roads (TRIP), roads the launch of OpenRoads (World Bank, 2016d). approved by bottom-up budgeting processes DBM has expended significant effort to (BUB), roads for rural development (PRDP), improve the prioritization and transparency and, most recently, roads for prosperity of local roads programs, but establishing (KALSADA). Five agencies implement these a coherent policy framework for all local programs, each with their own proprietary road investments has been elusive. While information systems, including: the DPWH, OpenRoads was initially built to track the DILG, DBM, Department of Agriculture (DA) more established roads programs of FMR, and the Department of Transportation (DoT). TRIP, and PRDP, ultimately it is finding the OpenRoads promises to bring information greatest chance of institutionalization as on road investments from these disparate part of one that is relatively newer, KALSADA. programs together in one place to track the The GAA 2016 outlines special provisions entire life cycle of road projects. for the KALSADA program and includes a requirement for provinces to develop 195. The OpenRoads platform has made a provincial road network plan. In this substantial inroads to improve public access respect, KALSADA is the only road program to project-level budget data on public roads portfolio that has a clear policy framework projects worth US$186.5 billion (₱8.6 trillion). to incentivize greater disclosure of data on Over 12,000 road projects, comprising 52 the quality of road projects as part of its percent of the local roads portfolio across five performance monitoring. programs, have been geo-tagged. OpenRoads also provides a vehicle to scrutinize road 198. Bureaucratic capacity to support investments against basic performance OpenRoads is moderate, at present. The criteria such as: completion status, road platform sought to “take the technology quality, etc. For example, 88 percent of TRIP excuse off the table” for agencies that projects are verified for physical and financial previously said they lacked the capacity to execution. systematically geo-tag and map their road projects with smartphone and satellite 196. However, the limits of political technology, as well as share this information commitment are seen in variable compliance with other agencies and the public. The with disclosure requirements across agencies project and road network tools provided and the difficulties of stitching together siloed by OpenRoads aim to bring it all together. systems to follow roads from budgeting However, the World Bank still largely through implementation. Many road works maintains the OpenRoads platform, which is projects involve multiple contracts over not yet fully integrated into the government’s several years, making it difficult to capture operations. road project locations across these different contracting vehicles. Automated processes to 199. OpenRoads is still relatively unknown track road expenditures and completion are in among the public. The World Bank and place in some agencies, but not in others. Geo- the government have taken some small tagging standards for public infrastructure steps forward to increase public awareness have not been systematically applied and of, and interest in, the platform. Data only portions of the road portfolios are journalism training with the Philippines geo-referenced. Significant differences in Center for Investigative Journalism and data integrity make it difficult for users to the Open Knowledge Foundation sought systematically review tabular and geo-tagged to encourage journalists to develop media information across implementing agencies. articles based upon data from the OpenRoads platform (among other sources) about road projects. Working with the social media group, Rappler, OpenRoads piloted a public awareness campaign in Northern Mindanao titled #openroads, “Roads that Matter to Me”. Loosely modeled around the “Adopt a From Pork to Performance: Open Government and Program Performance Tracking in the Philippines. 2016. S. Custer, H. Rahemtulla, K. Kaiser, R. van den Brink 55 Public Sector Performance Source: Rappler (2016) Highway” movement in the US, where civic 201. The strong performance-based allocation organizations commit to keeping parts of the focus of KALSADA and the bottom-up highway clean, the pilot sought to mobilize selection criteria for TRIP roads present critical users of local roads from motorcycle an attractive opportunity for technology riders to transport operators to give feedback to support fledgling reforms that seek to and raise expectations regarding what change the current equilibrium of local road constitutes a “good” road. The initiative investments. Meanwhile, the interest on the prompted thousands of responses via part of citizens and reform-minded officials Twitter and Facebook on which roads needed to monitor public expenditures on local roads improvement. The photo above showcases is likely to increase in the coming years, as some of these responses.. Philippines devotes more of its budget to local road infrastructure projects (Diokno, 200. There is also an emerging mechanism to 2016a). As one official observed, since the engage students, engineers, and civil society DPWH intends to complete improvements on members to assist the CoA with CPAs of local national roads and bridges by the end of 2016, farm-to-market roads. The CPAs leverage the bulk of infrastructure spending is likely to geo-tagged project information to select shift towards local roads, which may capture projects and prepare audit recommendations the imagination of the public to help monitor for LGU officials. This included digital capture these funds. of road conditions and reviews. Engaging citizens to act politically through the CPAs is also generating a beneficial side effect: greater interest and support at CoA for institutionalizing geo-tagging standards. 56 From Pork to Performance: Open Government and Program Performance Tracking in the Philippines. 2016. S. Custer, H. Rahemtulla, K. Kaiser, R. van den Brink Public Sector Performance 2.7.5 Preliminary Assessment 203. Although still in the early stages of its formation, there are many reasons to believe 202. OpenRoads enjoys a moderately that OpenRoads could be on a trajectory to high level of political commitment and achieve its objectives. Some of the enabling bureaucratic capability, as evidenced by ingredients are already present, but questions modest progress against disclosure standards remain as to the extent to which government and the presence of enabling policy guidance programs to increase accountability in local at the agency-level and within the context roads can mobilize sufficient top-down of the GAA 2016. The government and the and bottom-up pressure to counterbalance World Bank have had lower success to date entrenched clientelist politics in this sector. with regard to increasing the broad visibility See Figure 12 for a visual summary of the of the platform and sustaining engagement progress of OpenRoads against achieving its with the public. However, there are nascent objectives to date. channels for citizens to leverage geo-tagged data on local roads to assist with CoA audits, engage in social media conversations about their expectations for local roads, and crowdsource information on road quality. Figure 12. Performance Diagnostic: OpenRoads Political Disclosure Champion/ Dedicated Moderate Commitment compliance lead agency resources Bureaucratic Platform Policy Policy Platform Moderate Capability sustainability framework coherence visibility Political Platform Offline Leakage Leakage Platform Platform curbed No / Low Engagement salience engagement exposed salience salience Government Leakage Higher Better Improved Inconclusive Responsiveness curbed completion targeting quality Key No/Low Moderate Yes/High Data Not Available Inconclusive From Pork to Performance: Open Government and Program Performance Tracking in the Philippines. 2016. S. Custer, H. Rahemtulla, K. Kaiser, R. van den Brink 57 Public Sector Performance 2.8 SinTax 207. The DoF’s enforcement of the SinTax legislation is no easy task, especially in view 204. The government’s ability to effectively of resourceful companies that are experienced generate revenue for public service delivery in employing a variety of tactics to evade or is critical to inclusive growth, but undercut underpay taxes. In order to curb potential when companies collude with politicians to abuses, the government required that all avoid paying taxes. In this respect, the passage cigarette packs bear a “holographic tax of a new SinTax legislation in 2012 offered a stamp”, but traditional means of monitoring window of opportunity for the Philippines to cigarette prices were inefficient and prone reverse a debilitating trend of low revenues to gaps in coverage (World Bank, 2015b). and low expenditures through increasing While national statistical agencies collect taxes on “sin products” (e.g., cigarettes and information on cigarette prices as part of the alcohol) in order to expand the national Consumer Price Index, the frequency with budget for public healthcare and other social which this data is collected is insufficient services. However, as discussed in section 1.3.5, to keep up with rapidly changing market the developmental impact of SinTax is highly conditions (World Bank, 2015b). dependent on whether the government is able to enforce compliance effectively – 2.8.2 Technical Solution something that it has traditionally struggled to do in the face of patronage politics and 208. In December 2015, the DoF and the powerful lobbies. World Bank launched the SinTax Open Data Dashboard to enhance the government’s 205. Given the linkage between tax revenues capacity to enforce SinTax compliance and the budget for national health programs, through mobilizing public participation enforcing SinTax legislation became a public in tracking cigarette prices. The platform expenditure management issue: tax evasion harnesses the power of mobile phones translates into phantom revenues and fewer and paid citizen monitors to crowdsource resources for critical public services. Through reporting on cigarette pricing in their a series of initiatives, the DoF had already communities. The SinTax Open Data embraced the potential of open data as an Dashboard then provides weekly updates on opportunity to inform, motivate, and mobilize cigarette prices and the application of the citizens to help raise tax revenues and required “tax stamp” by cigarette brand and crack down on tax evaders. In 2015, the DoF locality. requested support from the World Bank to launch the SinTax Open Data Dashboard as a 209. The SinTax platform’s approach to digital accountability platform to animate the collecting and publishing data is somewhat public as an “ally” to help monitor cigarette distinct from the other four digital prices and turn tax revenues into resources to accountability platforms. In contrast to support social welfare gains for the country. traditional, “paper-intensive” methods of tax monitoring, the SinTax platform 2.8.1 Political Context extensively relies upon crowdsourced data from paid contributors to provide a more 206. A major political victory for the Aquino comprehensive, up-to-date picture of cigarette administration, officials in both the DoF and tax compliance and revenues. Contributors DBM attribute much of the credit for the can report on compliance with the required successful passage of the SinTax law to the cigarette tariffs by brand, shop, and location, President’s personal advocacy with members using Android apps (DevEx, 2015). Premise of Congress that was critical in “last mile” then updates this data on a weekly basis. deliberations. Through moving to a unitary excise tax structure, the legislation reduced the discretion of companies and LGUs to undervalue cigarette brands and avoid paying taxes. 58 From Pork to Performance: Open Government and Program Performance Tracking in the Philippines. 2016. S. Custer, H. Rahemtulla, K. Kaiser, R. van den Brink Public Sector Performance 2.8.3 Progress to Date 212. Despite the innovative approaches used by the SinTax platform, data gaps remain that 210. The SinTax Open Data Dashboard has undercut the utility of the platform by both had a shorter track record than the other four the public and the DoF. The dashboard does digital accountability platforms assessed in not yet include information on taxes paid per this study, but initial signs are promising. cigarette brand or the use of the earmarked Political commitment to the SinTax program funds collected, for example. Civil society overall appears to be high and has extended representatives have expressed interest in favorably into support for the SinTax platform, being able to access this information more as part of a broader package of tax reforms readily for use in media articles and advocacy and open data initiatives being led by the DoF. efforts. Even for information types that Bureaucratic capability also appears to be the dashboard does report, there appears moderately high. The SinTax 2012 legislation to be substantial variance in coverage by and additional agency-level policy guidance geographic area and many tax districts have provide a clear mandate and incentives for no reported observations. DoF civil servants to advance efforts to collect and disclose information on cigarette taxes. 2.8.4 Institutionalization 211. Supported by citizen monitors, the 213. The DoF assumed oversight of the SinTax platform collected over a thousand cigarette platform quickly. Given the strong data prices in just two weeks and expanded to analytics capacity of the Fiscal Intelligence cover more than 10,000 prices within the Unit, which produces “data-driven insights” first three months of the project (World related to a number of open data initiatives, Bank, 2015b). The dashboard aggregates, it is likely that the DoF is well-positioned to analyzes, and visualizes information from not only publish this information, but to use its citizen reporters in order to display it for evidence-based decision-making and information on cigarette prices on a weekly as part of their public awareness campaigns. basis since March 2015. As of April 2016, the However, Premise still largely maintains dashboard includes information on tax stamp the platform and the World Bank provides penetration as a measure of tax compliance financing, which raises concerns regarding for 13 cigarette brands, as well as information sustainability. on observed tax stamp presence in 10 cities as a percentage of retail values. Forty-nine 214. In some respects, there is a high potential maps show the average price per cigarette for the SinTax platform to capitalize on the across brands for barangays in some tax revealed interest of a broad-based public districts, but not all. The dashboard also coalition mobilized to pass the legislation in includes basic information regarding prices 2012. However, it is unclear that the platform of alcohol, rice, and fuel. While the number itself or the broader SinTax program at the varies substantially from week to week, at the DoF has taken full advantage of the apparent platform’s high point it captured over 318,000 salience of cigarette tax collection to translate crowdsourced observations across cigarette that into use of the data for advocacy and brands in a single week. Reportedly, the paid research. The primary mechanism for citizens contributor model has been particularly to get involved with the SinTax platform effective in capturing local level information, would be as a paid contributor, which Premise as an estimated “half of the observations reaches via ads or links on WhatsApp and are from rural convenience stores that other Facebook (DevEx, 2015). methods have failed to track”. From Pork to Performance: Open Government and Program Performance Tracking in the Philippines. 2016. S. Custer, H. Rahemtulla, K. Kaiser, R. van den Brink 59 Public Sector Performance 215. In light of the success of its other open private company Premise largely maintains data initiatives, the DoF is well positioned, the platform and the project continues to arguably more so than any other government rely on World Bank funding, which raises agency, to marshal meaningful public questions about long-term sustainability. engagement around the SinTax platform. The The platform has moderately succeeded in DoF’s “Tax Watch” campaign is case in point crowdsourcing data from paid contributors; (see Box 3). Seeking to translate raw open however, the program has not, as yet, fully data into actionable open insights, the DoF capitalized upon the broader SinTax coalition publishes weekly full-page ads in domestic or engaged the public beyond the one-way newspapers that combine killer statistics, transmission of information. intuitive infographics, and compelling visuals in order to provoke conversations and public 217. The SinTax platform is still in the early outcry against tax evasion. While officials stages of its formation, but there are many admit that it is unclear whether these ad reasons to believe that it could be on a campaigns have directly provoked citizens to trajectory to achieve its objectives. With the take action, it is evident that these creative future of SinTax enshrined in legislation tactics have caught the public’s attention as a that would be difficult to reverse, it is likely starting point. The DoF has not yet extended that the platform and program will continue these approaches to support the uptake of even with a new presidential administration. the SinTax platform and that is a missed Moreover, many of the enabling ingredients opportunity. are present for the SinTax platform to take off. However, questions remain regarding the extent to which the DoF is interested 2.8.5 Preliminary Assessment in, and capable of, mobilizing deeper engagement with the public around the use 216. The SinTax platform appears to enjoy a of SinTax revenues beyond the collection relatively high level of political commitment of crowdsourced data. See Figure 13 for a and bureaucratic capability, as evidenced by visual summary of the progress of the SinTax good progress against disclosure standards platform against achieving its objectives. and the presence of enabling policy guidance at the agency-level and within the context of the 2012 SinTax legislation. However, the Figure 13. Performance Diagnostic: SinTax Political Disclosure Champion/ Dedicated High Commitment compliance lead agency resources Bureaucratic Platform Policy Policy Platform Moderate Capability sustainability framework coherence visibility Political Platform Offline Leakage Leakage Platform Platform No/Low Engagement salience engagement curbed exposed salience salience Government Leakage Higher Better Improved Inconclusive Responsiveness curbed completion targeting quality Key No/Low Moderate Yes/High Data Not Available Inconclusive 60 From Pork to Performance: Open Government and Program Performance Tracking in the Philippines. 2016. S. Custer, H. Rahemtulla, K. Kaiser, R. van den Brink Public Sector Performance 2.9 Early Progress: Are Digital that the Philippines experience with digital Accountability Platforms on the Right accountability platforms has had mixed Trajectory? results to date with some hits, some misses and some question marks. Figure 14 visualizes 218. The problems that digital accountability the results of a preliminary performance platforms seek to address require assessment for the five digital accountability fundamentally transforming norms and platforms based upon the four performance institutions around the allocation of public pillars and seven key performance indicators resources that will likely involve a process that for which information was available at this is highly incremental, long-term, and fraught early stage. with challenges. Therefore, it is unsurprising Figure 14. Performance Dashboard: Philippines Digital Accountability Platforms Performance Measures Supporting Indicators OpenARMM OpenReconstruction OpenBUB OpenRoads SinTax High-level champion Dedicated resources Political Commitment Disclosure standards Commitment Score Platform sustainability Bureaucratic Policy framework Capability Capability Score Platform salience Political Offline engagement Engagement Engagement Score No data available Government Responsiveness Responsiveness Score Key No/Low Moderate Yes/High Data Not Available Inconclusive From Pork to Performance: Open Government and Program Performance Tracking in the Philippines. 2016. S. Custer, H. Rahemtulla, K. Kaiser, R. van den Brink 61 Public Sector Performance 219. The long-term trajectories of digital 220. The implication of this for accountability platforms are likely dynamic, contextualizing the progress of digital responsive to changes in their design, accountability platforms is that they will implementation, and the broader enabling likely experience highly different trajectories, environment. Election cycles and focusing as they differ substantially in their starting events (e.g., political scandal, natural points, the pace of their progress in the face disaster) can alter the prospects for a digital of opposition or support for reforms, as well accountability platform and the program it as their likely end points (i.e., long-term supports through rapidly shifting priorities or impact). In this respect, we should view this attention. Similarly, the more subtle processes performance assessment as a snapshot in of adaptive learning, updating of perceptions a single moment in time, revealing new and mainstreaming new norms, occur over insights about possible course corrections, a longer period, but can similarly shape the risks, or opportunities, but not deterministic opportunities and constraints of a digital of whether the platforms will ultimately accountability platform to achieve its goals. succeed or fail. Figure 15 visualizes the likely future trajectories of the five digital accountability platforms reviewed in this study based upon their performance to date. Figure 15. Variable Trajectories of Digital Accountability Platforms Information Quality HIGH + Performs well on both coverage AND timeliness MODERATE + Performs well on SinTax either coverage OR timeliness OpenRoads OpenBUB LOW Limited coverage, poor timeliness OpenReconstruction OpenARMM LOW MODERATE HIGH Limited to a narrow cadre + Support from the + Broad coalition of stakeholders Degree of of government reformers bureaucracy inside and outside of government Institutionalization Key Off-track: Low probability Ambiguous: moderate On-track: higher of success probability of success probability of success 62 From Pork to Performance: Open Government and Program Performance Tracking in the Philippines. 2016. S. Custer, H. Rahemtulla, K. Kaiser, R. van den Brink Public Sector Performance 221. The long-term success of a digital accountability platform in achieving its objectives may be somewhat mediated by the characteristics of the particular services they seek to address. For example, the WDR 2016 argues that the capability of digital technologies to change the behavior of citizens and governments is largely shaped by the answers to three critical questions about the nature of the service in focus: do citizens have the incentive to monitor; is the delivery based on routine tasks; and can outcomes be easily measured and attributed to specific politicians or providers (World Bank, 2016a). If the answers to these questions are yes, the likelihood that a digital accountability platform will be able to induce some constructive action and response is higher. From Pork to Performance: Open Government and Program Performance Tracking in the Philippines. 2016. S. Custer, H. Rahemtulla, K. Kaiser, R. van den Brink 63 Conclusion 3 Conclusion: Lessons Learned and Recommendations for Action 222. What is the value of a digital 224. The change of government in accountability platform: is it merely an mid-2016 will be another watershed moment information technology solution or an entry for open government in the Philippines. As point to advance a broader reform agenda? the incoming administration of Rodrigo The premise of these next generation Duterte takes office, they will set in place platforms is that disclosing information expectations for the first 100 and 1,000 days on government performance can level the that will inevitably influence the prospects playing field across stakeholders, enhance for sustaining big system PFM reforms, as accountability within the bureaucracy, well as smaller-scale digital accountability engage citizens, and incentivize politicians to initiatives. The new administration will overturn the status quo of pork-barrel politics. have to quickly demonstrate visible policy In essence, digital accountability platforms wins to build credibility with the public and aspire to change the rules of the game to the Congress. Consistent with the spirit of reward performance over patronage. open government principles – transparency, participation, and collaboration – digital 223. In this paper, we scrutinized the interplay accountability platforms are an attractive of five digital accountability platforms mechanism to buttress legitimacy of public with the flagship government programs sector programs. The new leadership would they support as demonstration cases to do well to maintain the current two-track understand whether and how technology- approach to deploying digital accountability enabled transparency could yield digital platforms as a stepping-stone to crosscutting dividends for Filipino citizens. The crucible PFM reforms. for digital accountability platforms will not be their form, but their function: the 225. Digital accountability platforms are the extent to which they are able usher in a tip of the iceberg in the Philippines’ reform new era of politics that transcends pork and landscape: one small piece of a larger set demands performance. In their early days, of performance challenges, they signal the these digital accountability platforms have relative health of the programs that underpin achieved some successes, particularly with them (see Figure 16). Upstream budget regard to increasing transparency standards, transparency on the use of public resources yet significant unfinished business remains and detailed project-level allocations gives before these initiatives are able to realize their officials, oversight agencies and citizens full potential of sparking constructive citizen- greater clarity on what line agencies, GOCCs, government dialogue about the priorities and LGUs in the Philippines have committed and performance of public sector programs. to deliver.56 Opening up downstream The conclusion of this paper seeks to both information on project execution enables the distill the main lessons learned to date from public to assess performance and hold their these second-generation experiments in open government to account for results. However, government, and to identify the ingredients digital accountability platforms are only as critical to going deeper in the next phase. useful as the information the government chooses to disclose. In this respect, the 56. GOCCs receive a significant share of public investments and are charged with delivering many services in the Philippines. 64 From Pork to Performance: Open Government and Program Performance Tracking in the Philippines. 2016. S. Custer, H. Rahemtulla, K. Kaiser, R. van den Brink Conclusion Figure 16. Tip of the Iceberg: Data Points to the Health of Underlying Government Programs presence or absence of timely, comprehensive, initiatives are, in fact: (1) sustainable in the and accurate information on the performance midst of political transitions; and (2) capable of government programs speaks volumes of attracting broad-based reform coalitions regarding the enabling environment for inside and outside of government to move reform in terms of political commitment or beyond fragmented information systems and bureaucratic capability. artificial islands of good governance. 226. Yet, a digital accountability platform 227. The answers to these questions are not with the best information in the world falls straightforward, nor were they apparent from short of its potential if it does not contribute the start of the five digital accountability to institutionalized change. Best-case initiatives. In this section, we take stock scenario: digital accountability platforms are of what has been learned thus far, as the low-hanging fruit that provide a powerful Philippines transitions from one presidential proof of concept to build political will for administration to the next. With the benefit of large-scale PFM and governance reforms. hindsight, we then propose recommendations Worst-case scenario: the platforms become for the incoming administration and reflect a convenient excuse to prioritize form over on the salience of the Philippines experience function or distract busy civil servants from to other country settings. making progress on hard reforms that, if realized, could be transformational. Since digital accountability platforms aim to fundamentally change norms and behaviors, it is paramount to identify whether these From Pork to Performance: Open Government and Program Performance Tracking in the Philippines. 2016. S. Custer, H. Rahemtulla, K. Kaiser, R. van den Brink 65 Conclusion 3.1 Taking Transparency Online to Get From 231. However, for many government programs, Pork to Performance becoming a transparency first-mover is seen as a risky strategy and even reform-minded 228. How much transparency is required officials often prefer to operate under the to alter the dynamics of service delivery radar. In environments were opacity is from one of carving up public resources as the norm, agencies that forge ahead with political pork to a new reality of animated transparency are subject to a number of dialogue between citizens, officials, and threats. Vested interests that prefer operating front-line providers about the performance in the shadows see sunlight as a threat and of government programs? In juxtaposing seek to forestall reforms. Voters may be performance versus pork, we do not want unaware of the benefits of transparency or to suggest that it is possible to short-circuit cynical of theatrics, which means that even real world politics. All programs must, to committed open government champions some extent, go “with the grain of politics” may reap few rewards for their efforts at the (see Levy, 2015). The challenge is discerning ballot box. Transparency may also be chalked when prevailing politics undermines up as opportunism; if programs begun under program performance, versus when the two the banner of openness revert to black box strands offer room for creative tension and dealings once they are institutionalized. innovation. Overall, these realities in the Philippines context make it more difficult to scale up 229. Many government programs function digital transparency and accountability perfectly well in the absence of digital initiatives. systems. Yet, in view of a low accountability equilibrium of opaque government programs, weak institutions and high-profile corruption 3.2 Agile Approaches and Big System scandals, digital transparency is an important Reforms: Is Small Indeed Beautiful? beachhead in a campaign to improve transparency and accountability. This online 232. Conceived as agile approaches that could disclosure generates a degree of “sunlight” deliver quicker wins on a smaller scale, digital that facilitates greater scrutiny of how accountability platforms became a pragmatic public resources are used that makes it more solution for reformers to make inroads in difficult for politicians and civil servants to improving PFM even when traditional big turn a blind eye to mounting evidence of poor system reforms (e.g., GIFMIS, eProcurement) performance. were stymied by bureaucratic politics. The idea was that these smaller systems 230. The Philippines will not realize the would either integrate disparate islands vision of inclusive growth without services of existing administrative information, or that work for the poor. Absent timely and innovate to provide fresh data from scratch. accessible information on the resourcing and Digital accountability platforms sought execution of government programs, citizens, to systematically link upstream budget officials, and oversight agencies cannot assess information, project execution data and results and have little basis upon which to frontline validation of feedback in a single evaluate performance. Reducing barriers to system for citizens, officials, and oversight entry for government agencies and LGUs to agencies to more easily track resources and regularly report and disclose information on monitor performance throughout the entire key indicators could contribute to constructive project life cycle. dialogue on progress, priorities, and performance. In this respect, leveraging online 233. Why is such sector-specific expenditure technologies are an attractive alternative to tracking important? Effective expenditure quickly organize and disseminate information management depends on transparent, timely, on public sector programs to the broadest and accountable reporting processes (World possible audience. Bank, 2016f). Without strong expenditure management systems, budgets devolve into creative fiction – aspirational, but removed from reality. Digital accountability platforms can strengthen internal government systems by making it easier to reconcile budget commitments, disbursements, and actual expenditures. With this information in hand, 66 From Pork to Performance: Open Government and Program Performance Tracking in the Philippines. 2016. S. Custer, H. Rahemtulla, K. Kaiser, R. van den Brink Conclusion officials have better tools with which to curb 236. Yet, digital accountability platforms are leakage and optimize the use of public funds also deployed within a broader sector reform (World Bank, 2016f). The sector-specific focus space and it is necessary to consider not of the platforms also offer the opportunity only the individual contributions of a given to mobilize greater scrutiny of government technology initiative, but also whether and performance and support for PFM reforms by how these smaller scale efforts may add up to demonstrating the practical value of budget be greater than the sum of their parts within tracking in the context of something citizens a country’s reform narrative. For this reason, could appreciate: improving public services an important criterion for the World Bank to they use every day. invest in a new platform was identifying a high-level reform champion (e.g., Governor, 234. However, the result of an emphasis on Secretary) that could create an authorizing smaller systems could have unpredictable environment for a technology-enabled outcomes. On the one hand, these agile transparency initiative to add value to reform approaches could create a powerful efforts already underway. demonstration effect – highlighting internal systems that were credible, exposing gaps 237. Bringing these ideas together, the most and marshaling a compelling case for more attractive environments to deploy future comprehensive PFM reforms. On the other digital accountability platforms will likely hand, it was critical that these smaller be those in which: (1) there is a strong systems did not become more palatable commitment to openness and broader substitutes in place of more difficult systemic capacity for reform on the part of the relevant reforms or that the experience of tackling government actors; and (2) public services inevitable data integrity challenges (e.g., are most salient to citizens (e.g., frequently interoperability across siloed systems, used, easily monitored) in order to more automated reporting and reconciliation) easily animate demand and use data on did not deter officials from more ambitious government performance. information systems. 235. In this study, we agree with the 2016 3.3 Can Digital Transparency Help Close WDR assessment that technology-enabled the Feedback Loop? transparency, no matter how agile, is not a silver bullet that automatically translates 238. Seeking to disrupt the status quo, digital into digital dividends (World Bank, 2016a). accountability platforms make information Moreover, the nature of those dividends may on public service delivery transparent by vary depending on the specific services in default in order to provoke a paradigm question. As the 2016 WDR implies, citizens shift from the back-room politics of pork may have greater incentives to track budgets to a national dialogue about performance. and give feedback on services they use more However, transparency has only limited frequently and are easily monitored. In this utility if people – elected officials, service context, digital accountability platforms providers, oversight agencies, and civil society may credibly produce a double benefit: – don’t put publicly available information strengthening internal government systems to use. Therefore, a digital accountability and mobilizing public participation in platform must not only transmit information, improving services. Conversely, for services but also make it easier for government that are less frequently used or are more programs to elicit and respond to feedback difficult to monitor digital accountability about their performance. In the context of platforms can still add value, but the this study, we define feedback broadly, as expectations may need to be more modest including both inputs from inside and outside and bounded to the value that technology- of government on a variety of topics from enabled transparency can bring to breaking service delivery priorities and access to issues down information silos within government. of quality and timeliness. From Pork to Performance: Open Government and Program Performance Tracking in the Philippines. 2016. S. Custer, H. Rahemtulla, K. Kaiser, R. van den Brink 67 Conclusion 239. If government officials are to be 242. Digital accountability platforms can help successful in “making services work for close the feedback loop through increasing the poor”, they need to hear from those internal bureaucratic accountability, such as that depend upon these basic public goods: reducing discretion through automation and the farmer taking her produce to market, standardization of reporting or increasing the father seeking a better education scrutiny through reconciling information for his child or the family displaced by a along the entire project life cycle. Digital catastrophic earthquake. In this respect, transparency can also facilitate the auditing digital accountability platforms must also be of government programs benchmarked assessed with regard to the extent to which against their stated aims and performance they spark political engagement on the criteria. Have approved projects met the part of citizens and incentivize government selection criteria, as stated in the budget? responsiveness to feedback from the end Were funds released with all required users of public services. documentation? Were projects started and finished? In an ideal world, audit agencies 240. While national open data portals and digital transparency initiatives should sometimes have difficulty articulating a clear work hand in hand: as a partnership with target audience for transparency efforts, the public to extend auditing capabilities. digital accountability platforms theoretically In the Philippines, the World Bank pursued have an easier time identifying “last mile” a strategic partnership with the CoA, which beneficiaries (e.g., farmers and hoteliers ultimately spawned CPAs related to roads and for local roads, parents for local schools). reconstruction projects. However, identifying a target audience and motivating people to put transparent information into action are two very 3.4 Problem-Driven Political Economy: different propositions (Khemani et al., 2015). Where Digital Meets Analog In practice, digital transparency initiatives have to start with raising awareness and 243. The technology choices made by the dissatisfaction of end users with the status World Bank in commissioning the digital quo. Imagine, for example, a farmer who has accountability platforms also involve had little opportunity to travel outside of his trade-offs of ease of entry versus long-term immediate village. How would he assess the sustainability and replicability. For example, quality of his local roads with little in the the digital accountability platforms featured way of comparison? What is the best way to in this report have been developed using represent that farmer’s interests: a survey, both open source and commercial software. feedback via a smart-phone or working with Open source software is versatile, enabling an intermediary group such as a farmer’s use without intellectual property restrictions association? or being tied to a single vendor, but may require non-trivial initial investments in 241. Yet, there are two routes to closing the development. Off-the-shelf commercial feedback loop, as the WDR 2004 famously products typically have well-developed demonstrated – one short and one long.57 existing functionality that can be further Ideally, technology-enabled transparency customized for specific applications, but initiatives should support both routes further replication and adaptation are through leveling the playing field for subject to intellectual property restrictions. citizens and providers, oversight agencies To what extent could other countries feasibly and elected officials to work off the same adopt the Philippines’ digital accountability set of information to spark dialogue about platforms to address similar performance performance and incentivize action.58 challenges? 57. In the “short” route, citizens directly engage with the frontline providers of public services such as school administrators or local government officials. In the “long” route, citizens use advocacy and voting with politicians and policy-makers to indirectly shape public service provision (World Bank, 2004). 58. In the context of the Philippines, a significant driver of the push towards digital accountability platforms was about oversight agencies getting a better sense of what agencies or local governments were implementing. 68 From Pork to Performance: Open Government and Program Performance Tracking in the Philippines. 2016. S. Custer, H. Rahemtulla, K. Kaiser, R. van den Brink Conclusion 244. As the WDR 2016 rightly points out, 3.5 Ingredients for Taking Philippines Open the ability of technology to translate into Government to a Next Level digital dividends for citizens depends upon how it interacts with the analog factors 246. In many respects, the digital of development – institutions, skills, and accountability platforms reviewed in this regulations (World Bank, 2016a). Looking report embody the spirit of a second phase at the broader political economy of the of open government in the Philippines: Philippines – fragmented information an embrace of open data, an appreciation systems and entrenched pork-barrel politics for the role of technology, and an interest – raises critical questions about the optimal in experimentation to advance critical prioritization and sequencing of digital reforms. The contribution of this phase is accountability platforms vis-à-vis large- primarily evident in the unprecedented scale PFM reforms. In supporting the five opening up of government data in a variety platforms reviewed in this report, the World of sectors via publicly available platforms, Bank employed a venture capital approach the strengthening of internal government to be responsive to emerging demand for financial management systems, and the technology solutions related to requests for formation of norms that make openness the impact evaluations (e.g., roads, SinTax) or new default. Nonetheless, Open Government focusing events (e.g., natural disasters and 2.0 has its limits. Disclosing data does not reconstruction, Mindanao peace process ensure use. Coordination constraints create and ARMM education), knowing that only roadblocks even on a “digital highway”. some of these experiments would succeed, Building a platform does not constitute while others would miss the mark. Would engagement, even if it is designed with that a smaller or even a larger number of digital intent. accountability initiatives have been better? Were the correct choices made in light of the 247. As the new administration of Rodrigo likely enabling environments for meaningful Duterte comes into office, there is an reform? opportunity to build upon this promising foundation and go deeper to translate 245. The World Bank’s support was structured disclosure of government performance around a programmatic governance reform data into broadening engagement with facility and World Bank-executed Trust citizens and ensuring responsiveness Funds offered the basis for both a mix of to their concerns. Based upon the early ongoing analytical work, agile systems learning from this study, we identify five development, and capability strengthening operating principles that will be critical to in and outside of government. Moreover, sustain progress in translating the vision of the emphasis on digital accountability digital accountability platforms into higher platforms took place in parallel with other quality, more accountable last mile service efforts to support the government’s rollout delivery. Collectively these action-oriented of a number of big system PFM reforms (e.g., principles serve as a practical roadmap – an GIFMIS, eProcurement, payroll system). To Open Government 3.0 Agenda – for reform what extent where agile approaches and big champions across public, private, and civil systems reforms complementary in practice, society sectors to rally around as they work to as well as in theory? Could these two paths deepen open government in 2016 and beyond. to advancing PFM reforms have been more deeply integrated for greater results, such as in the selection of service delivery sectors that had already benefited from previous World Bank involvement? From Pork to Performance: Open Government and Program Performance Tracking in the Philippines. 2016. S. Custer, H. Rahemtulla, K. Kaiser, R. van den Brink 69 Conclusion Operating Principle 1: 250. The experience of the Philippines’ High-level leadership and inter-agency Open Data Task Force, which included coordination are essential to track the entire high-level representatives from the Office service delivery life cycle. of the President and the DBM, is instructive in thinking through how to mobilize an 248. The breakthrough idea of second- interagency response to deepen open generation open government was an government (Capili, 2015). Instituted in May emphasis on tracking performance 2013, the joint task force built inroads for throughout the entire process of delivering the transmission and adoption of open data public services – from upstream resource standards across government agencies, allocation to downstream program providing a venue to coordinate efforts related implementation. Yet, the unique value- to technical support, policy development add of digital accountability platforms – and outreach across government agencies to integrating all of this information into one advance open data principles (Capili, 2015). comprehensive and up-to-date resource – is “Open data champions” serve as liaisons also where these initiatives face the greatest between the taskforce and each agency. Clear difficulty in getting beyond form to function. open data standards have been put in place The review of the five digital accountability – date must be publicly available, machine- platforms in this study underscore that readable, openly licensed, and timely. Open political commitment and bureaucratic Data Joint Memoranda have institutionalized capability, reflected in compliance with policy frameworks for disclosure standards disclosure standards and enabling policy linked to the national budget and provided an guidance at the agency-level, are important ongoing mandate to maintain the platform. leading indicators of future performance. Yet, across the board, the platforms perform better 251. As development partners and a new on getting the appearances right, but struggle administration look to deepen open with making more fundamental changes to government and realize the full potential of overcome chronic challenges of data that is digital accountability platforms, they should incomplete, out-of-date and disconnected. put in place clearer institutional structures to facilitate interagency coordination in order 249. In the absence of integrated information to ensure: (1) compliance with agreed upon management systems (e.g., GIFMIS, UACS), disclosure standards; (2) timely reporting of digital accountability platforms quickly performance data; and (3) harmonization encounter roadblocks. Public expenditure of information management systems to tracking relies on the fragmented and often support more seamless public expenditure manual disclosure of information by multiple tracking. To make a difference for government agencies and levels of government involved performance, stakeholders need to agree in delivering a single service. Disconnected that moving from transparency as theater, to accounting systems make it difficult to transparency with teeth for accountability, monitor service delivery from upstream will require both focus and a commitment to resource allocation to downstream program greater data integrity. implementation. Data quality is variable, depending upon the authorizing environment and champions that drive it at the agency level. Central finance agencies that serve upstream budgeting, cash management and auditing functions (e.g., CoA, DBM, DoF) have been relatively more welcoming of digital accountability platforms, though still have room for improvement in adhering to their own disclosure standards. However, closing these gaps also necessitates deepening inroads with implementing agencies that provide front-line public services (e.g., roads, schools, emergency assistance) to harmonize financial codes, share information and maintain transparency standards. 70 From Pork to Performance: Open Government and Program Performance Tracking in the Philippines. 2016. S. Custer, H. Rahemtulla, K. Kaiser, R. van den Brink Conclusion Operating Principle 2: 254. The comparatively narrow focus of digital Integrate digital accountability platforms accountability platforms offers a unique within broader reform efforts, rather than as opportunity to anchor these technology stand-alone initiatives. solutions within more expansive sector-based reform efforts. The best example to date has 252. Agile technology may provide quick wins been in relation to municipal development to cast a spotlight on performance, but there and the ability of OpenBUB to benefit from its is no substitute for major investments in association with the broader BUB initiative. organizational capabilities at both national Yet, the KALSADA program, which is rapidly and local levels to deliver on major flagship increasing investments in local roads and programs. As the five digital accountability strengthening oversight requirements, may platforms reviewed in this study illuminate, be an up and coming opportunity for closer the likelihood of success for technical integration between OpenRoads and far- solutions is inextricably linked with the reaching road sector reforms. In looking to vitality of broader political reforms. Platforms deepen open government under the new that were well integrated with sector-specific administration, development partners reforms (e.g., the SinTax Open Data Dashboard and reform champions would do well to and SinTax legislation) or cross-cutting more explicitly make these connections international commitments (e.g., OpenBUB between digital accountability platforms as and the OGP national action plan) have a complement and catalyst for sector reform been more successful in galvanizing lasting strategies. political commitment, dedicated resources, and buy-in across agencies and levels of Operating Principle 3: government. Design platforms with a clear view of the performance challenge to be solved and iterate 253. Some platforms benefited from unusually with users to ensure it is fit-for-purpose. high degrees of initial political commitment that served as a springboard for rapid progress 255. At the end of the day, digital in a relatively short period, while others began accountability platforms must be judged in more adverse political environments and on the extent to which they help officials, had trouble sustaining sufficient commitment oversight agencies, and the public solve to move forward. Rather than a one-off critical performance challenges. Yet, as technical solution, digital accountability agencies expend substantial effort to platforms will be more successful if they are reconcile disparate information management integrated with crosscutting international systems, they pay less attention to whether or national reform efforts that focus high- the information being disclosed via the level attention, resources and commitment platforms is fit-for-purpose – timely, accurate, like the OGP or the Aquino administration’s relevant, and useful to citizens, officials, “Social Contract” to overcome inertia or and oversight agencies to solve a specific vested interests. For example, the popularity performance challenge. While technological of Bottom-Up Budgeting likely benefited innovation is valuable, even in the span of from their inclusion as explicit commitments time between initial consultations with a within the Philippines OGP national action government or CSO counterparts and the plan. In the next phase of open government, final delivery of a platform, circumstances the administration might consider integrating can change and enthusiasm can wane. In this all five of the digital accountability platforms respect, it is understandable why the digital into the next OGP national action plan to give accountability platforms reviewed in this these initiatives higher visibility, priority, study appear to have, thus far, had a relatively and scrutiny (such as through the OGP’s easier time securing political commitment Independent Review Mechanism). and strengthening bureaucratic capability to disclose information, than animating citizens and officials to use it. From Pork to Performance: Open Government and Program Performance Tracking in the Philippines. 2016. S. Custer, H. Rahemtulla, K. Kaiser, R. van den Brink 71 Conclusion 256. Getting to use is critical if technology Operating Principle 4: and transparency are to facilitate meaningful The goal of Open Government 3.0 should be accountability gains in the form of increased to find ways that digital accountability can scrutiny of upstream resource allocation align incentives to make politics work for and more responsive downstream service development. delivery. To deepen uptake, the incoming administration should prioritize rapid Since politics is a perpetual contest for votes, iteration with end users to ensure that digital allies and resources, the quest for pork is accountability platforms are releasing the not likely to disappear as a result of PFM or right information, at the right time, and in good governance reforms. The three-year the right format so that citizens, officials, and recurring election cycles at national and oversight agencies can turn publicly available local levels clearly conditions entry points data into actionable insights. for digital transparency in the Philippines, as does bureaucratic politics across oversight 257. Agile or adaptive design refers to a and implementation agencies that straddle process of continuous learning that is national and local levels. Showy public responsive to change and often carried out commitments to transparency are insufficient in collaboration with end users (Highsmith without changing actual behavior. Attention- and Cockburn, 2001; World Bank, 2015d). The grabbing banners dot the Philippines World Bank and the government sought to landscape, paid for by politicians using public try many things on a small scale and quickly funds and programs, typically emphasizing make a determination to move on or scale personality over performance. The up these innovations. However, this learning information content of these banners may be was more often applied to the development low, or even erroneous, causing this type of of new platforms rather than integrated back promotion to frowned upon or even banned, into improving existing platforms. Since each if in proximity to public works projects, but it platform is deployed within its own distinct still exists. reform space, this is a missed opportunity to test more rigorously what works and does 259. Open government ideally injects a not in bringing technology, information, continuous and fresh supply of information to and politics together to solve specific service those stakeholders interested in monitoring delivery problems. or highlighting performance. Neither politicians nor civil servants will advocate 258. For example, there is growing for better information if they do not see that appreciation for the fact that publishing doing so is clearly in their interest. Assuming vast amounts of raw data on the budgets, that officials (or citizens for that matter) locations, status and quality of local services can be cajoled into acting altruistically in is not enough to animate the public to put the interests of good governance is unlikely this to use in the way it was envisioned. to succeed (Thomas, 2015). Getting digital Substantial questions remain regarding accountability platforms to “click”, or at the most effective ways in which to distill, least to surmount the weight of inertia package and disseminate information to maintain the status quo, requires at in so that it reduces the costs for citizens least some constellation of actors to view and officials to take meaningful action. greater transparency as serving, rather than Yet, there is a “market failure” in the threatening their interests. dearth of organizations willing to serve as infomediaries and interpret vast amounts 260. Open government initiatives need to of open data for public consumption. The find ways to crowd in, rather than short- government can play a more active role circuit, the interest of these political actors in bridging the gap through proactively in favor of more transparent information curating, visualizing, and packaging data on the performance of politicians and as information and “actionable insights”. government programs. If local governments This has implications for not only the do not have adequate information on final presentation of data via a digital national-level projects, they may become accountability platform, but also how strong advocates for transparency if they government agencies prioritize which types can get more visibility on resource flows to of data to disclose in order to generate the their jurisdictions, as compared with other greatest public interest. municipalities, for credit-taking or lobbying. 72 From Pork to Performance: Open Government and Program Performance Tracking in the Philippines. 2016. S. Custer, H. Rahemtulla, K. Kaiser, R. van den Brink Conclusion Bureaucrats are under significant pressure will need to work intentionally to mainstream to increase spending, but at the same time a commitment to openness among the worry that they may be liable for compliance. “organic” bureaucracy and build interest in Instead of the default tendency to simply slow tracking public expenditures among private down or defer execution of projects, open companies, media outlets and civil society government platforms could help resolve groups so that there is a stronger feedback this dilemma and provide political cover loop to sanction or reward performance.59 for bureaucrats to present a case that their decisions are subject to public scrutiny. 263. As several of the platforms reviewed in this report have shown, citizens, civil society, Operating Principle 5: media, and the private sector can play an Broaden the support base for digital important role in crowdsourcing real-time accountability platforms inside and outside data on tax compliance and service delivery, of government to have staying power that from reports on tax stamp penetration outlasts a single administration. via the SinTax Open Data Dashboard to geo-tagged videos on road quality and 261. The proverbial plug can be pulled completion via the RouteShoot application of overnight on any of the five online OpenRoads. Moreover, these non-government platforms presented in this report. If digital stakeholders may be an untapped resource accountability initiatives are to translate to help overcome persistent gaps (e.g., investments in technology and transparency implementation status, missing locations) into real “digital dividends” for the Filipino or inaccuracies (e.g., cancelled or duplicate people, they must secure a broader base of projects) in official data. However, the support across government, civil society, and willingness of these groups to engage will the private sector (World Bank, 2016a). The depend upon whether they think open enduring appeal of the BUB program and the government platforms are likely to make a passage of the landmark SinTax legislation difference and their ability to identify a clear both owe their success to their ability to way to contribute. mobilize a broad coalition of support inside and outside of government that was able 264. Many of the platforms reviewed in this to amass pressure for change that was both study would likely struggle to fulfill the “bottom-up” and “top-down”. However, “publicity condition” – the extent to which the vast majority of support for digital disclosed information actually reaches and accountability initiatives to date is coming resonates with its intended audiences – as from a small cadre of reform champions from there has been less attention paid historically the outgoing Aquino administration. to a broad-based communication and outreach strategy with citizens, civil society, 262. Strengthening existing coalitions or and LGU officials. Digital accountability catalyzing new ones will be critical to the platforms do enable users to give online ability of open government to translate feedback, but these features are underutilized digital technologies and open data into and there is much greater scope to harness accountability gains. As the incoming the full “wisdom of the crowds” to augment administration takes office, there is and validate official data through inputs from untapped potential to increase the demand citizens at the point of service delivery. This for information on public resources and may be, in part, due to lack of forethought performance by focusing on two growth regarding how government agencies would areas: 1) mobilize the public to help improve use or act upon the feedback they receive. official data on service delivery and they may Moreover, it is not necessarily clear to be more interested in acting upon it; and (2) prospective contributors– citizens, officials, demonstrate the value of platform data as a and oversight agencies – what their role management tool for civil servants to more should be in providing feedback and for what easily plan, implement, and evaluate flagship purpose? government programs. Reform champions 59. In this context, “organic” refers to the fact that government bureaucracies take on a life of their own, replete with cultural norms, values and accepted rules of behavior for career civil servants that are only superficially influenced by political appointees which cycle in and out. From Pork to Performance: Open Government and Program Performance Tracking in the Philippines. 2016. S. Custer, H. Rahemtulla, K. Kaiser, R. van den Brink 73 Conclusion 265. Refocusing these feedback mechanisms to plan, implement and evaluate their own for the explicit purpose of crowdsourcing programs, they have a much greater incentive unofficial information on locations, to ensure that publicly available data is timely, implementation status and performance accurate and complete. This creates a virtuous could help overcome persistent gaps and cycle, as career civil servants may also be inaccuracies in the official data.60 For more inclined to expend the effort to sustain example, imagine calling on parents and the platform once political appointees leave. community members in ARMM to submit The degree to which digital accountability geo-tagged photos to the OpenARMM platforms are integrated into the day-to-day platform to highlight problems of functions of the bureaucracy – dedicated teacher absenteeism, asking members of team, in-house platform maintenance, clear disaster-affected communities to confirm policy guidance – will also make it harder for the completion status of large-scale a new administration to reverse course. infrastructure projects via videos uploaded to OpenReconstruction or request feedback from citizens on approved BUB projects. 3.6 Final Words: Deepening Philippines In mobilizing people to help improve the Open Government in 2016 and Beyond data, this may also effectively increase their interest in acting upon it. 268. In the midst of a political transition and the new presidential administration of 266. External pressure for openness and Rodrigo Duterte set to take office in June 2016, feedback may be one way to sustain and the forecast for open government initiatives deepen reforms, but bringing along the is uncertain. Digital accountability platforms government bureaucracy will also be critical. are “high risk, high reward” engagements Career civil servants are the backbone of that take time and investment to bring to government agencies that remain as political scale. The Philippines stands at a critical appointees come and go. The Philippines juncture: will the new administration upend legal system exposes bureaucrats to personal or strengthen the tenuous gains made in liability for decisions made in the line of recent years to transition “from an opaque, duty. On the one hand, this would appear closed and unaccountable system” to a new to enhance accountability, but on the paradigm of “transparent, performance-based other hand, it imposes an understandable management”? pattern of diffused accountability. Beyond perfunctory maintenance of a platform to 269. As the Duterte administration gears up keep up appearances, national government for its first hundred days in office, it would do agencies and local government officials lack well to learn from the challenges of the last clearly defined incentives to actively respond administration and build upon some of the to feedback, data requests, or lobbying by the (digital) foundations left by its predecessors. public related to service delivery. Under the Aquino administration, the government made significant gains to: 267. Therefore, the ability of a digital enhance transparency, improve PFM, and accountability platform to outlast any one reduce corruption. Reform champions administration depends upon its integration (particularly in the DBM and CoA) promoted into the day-to-day functions of government, open government as central to their strategy such as supporting monitoring and to increase credibility, foster participation, and evaluation or data analytics. To be successful, restore public trust in the national budgeting reform champions will need to convince process.61 In view of a legislative branch more career civil servants at national and local focused on securing constituency pork than levels that open government initiatives can providing a critical accountability check on actually make their work easier, rather than the national budgeting process, making the exposing them or making their lives more link to the public was critical. difficult. When agencies are leveraging the data from digital accountability platforms 60. Two avenues could be explored simultaneously, extending the paid contributor model (e.g., SinTax) to other platforms and more intentionally leveraging partnerships with local universities (e.g., OpenARMM) to mobilize student volunteers that may view this work as an opportunity to build skills that enhance their future employability. 61. The People’s Budget publications were good examples of making the budget more intelligible, granular, and responsive to the public. 74 From Pork to Performance: Open Government and Program Performance Tracking in the Philippines. 2016. S. Custer, H. Rahemtulla, K. Kaiser, R. van den Brink Conclusion 270. From the start, digital accountability interest in deepening performance-informed platforms sought open up resource flows budgeting through the inclusion of a Program and program implementation to public Expenditure Classification for the 2017 budget. scrutiny were a vehicle to advance the Nonetheless, the question is then whether broader PFM reform agenda. In an ideal and how these upstream improvements world, open government initiatives would provide a better foundation for downstream have been sequenced to build upon the transparency and accountability in the foundation of crosscutting PFM reforms that execution of government programs. As digital put in place integrated systems to seamlessly accountability platforms have shown, getting manage public expenditure information — credible program performance information whether at the budgeting, procurement, or will require getting “under the hood” of the disbursements stages. However, in the face of mechanics of program implementation – how bureaucratic resistance, digital accountability money is spent and to what end. This will platforms ultimately became a way to require closer operational collaboration across jumpstart the process to make incremental the DBM, CoA, the President’s office, as well as improvements in PFM systems even when those agencies and LGUs that are responsible large-scale efforts stalled. This approach, of for implementing flagship government course, poses its own risks, particularly if programs. systemic solutions continue to lag behind. Agile platforms can help officials, oversight 272. Proponents of deepening open agencies, and citizens visualize what the government, inside and outside of end-results of budget transparency should government, will soon have a number of look like (e.g., as in the case of reconstruction). choices to make to succeed in the next phase, However, platforms will quickly encounter including: which programs to focus on, how the quicksand of remedial data processing to design initiatives for success and how to that they will need to face alone without measure short-term progress versus long- support from the cavalry of back end systems term impact. We hope that the lessons learned upgrades. from the experience of digital accountability platforms and the five operating principles 271. The reality is that tracking pesos and identified in this study serve as an effective monitoring program performance will not roadmap for the next administration and be resolved overnight. A recent 2016 PEFA development partners as they endeavor to study (World Bank, 2016f) outlines the take open government to the next level in challenge that the next administration will 2016 and beyond. need to take up, suggesting that while the Philippines made great strides to increase the credibility and transparency of the national budget, oversight and accountability over execution is still problematic. One promising development is the DBM’s From Pork to Performance: Open Government and Program Performance Tracking in the Philippines. 2016. S. Custer, H. Rahemtulla, K. Kaiser, R. van den Brink 75 Appendices Appendices Inputs Activities Outputs Outcomes Impact What resources are applied? What discrete tasks are being What are the short-term, Whose behavior must change What does long-term implemented? direct results? and in what ways? success look like? Money Develop platform Transparency Evidence-based Improved local services = + decision-making Data Produce data Access Reduced leakage + Horizontal accountability + Technical expertise Verify data Capacity Better targeting + Evidence-informed + Networks Training and outreach Awareness dialogue Higher completion + Policy formulation Vertical accountability Enhanced quality Enablers or Constraints? Commitment Capacity Engagement Responsiveness Assumptions or Fatal Flaws? Assumptions: Assumptions: Assumptions: Assumptions: Data integrity Responsive platform Mechanisms for action Answerability System integration Communications Actionable Enforcement Issue salience Connectivity information Institutions Incentives 76 From Pork to Performance: Open Government and Program Performance Tracking in the Philippines. July 2016. S. Custer, H. Rahemtulla, K. Kaiser, R. van den Brink Accountability Platform Results Framework: ARMM Education Inputs: What financial, human and Activities: What discrete tasks are being Outputs: What are the short-term, direct Outcomes: Whose behavior must change in Impact: What does long-term success look physical resources are applied? implemented? results? the medium-term and in what ways? like? How will the world look different? Evidence-based decision-making: Key Improved service delivery: The Government and development Transparency: ARMM government is government officials (national-level and Platform development: Design and government of ARMM is providing better partner financial and technical proactively disclosing more information on its ARMM) are using platform information to fielding of the ARMM digital open public education services to its citizens resources supporting ARMM public schools, including: locations, conditions and allocate resources, monitor progress and government platform through: eliminating leakage, strengthening schools quality measures. evaluate performance among its local targeting and improving school conditions. schools Top-down accountability: National Data production: Collection, processing Access: Government, civil society groups and Data inputs from government, government officials are demanding that and geo-tagging of data on public school citizens can easily access timely, accurate development partners and civil ARMM justify its education budget allocation locations, conditions and other quality and hyper-local information on ARMM society into the ARMM platform on the basis of its performance via measures schools via an open data platform information in the ARMM platform. Evidence-informed dialogue: ARMM Government and World Bank Capacity: Government officials, school citizens and civil society groups are using Data verification: Third party verification financial and technical resources administrators and civil society have the platform information to advocate for the of the locations and conditions of geo- supporting maintenance of ARMM capacity to produce, manage, use and verify elimination of ghost schools/teachers, as well tagged schools platform and related activities geo-tagged data on ARMM schools as improvement of school conditions and performance. Training: Documentation and training for Awareness: Government officials, school Bottom-up accountability: ARMM citizens government officials, school administrators administrators and civil society are interested and civil society groups are leveraging data and civil society in geo-tagging, data in using the ARMM platform to track public on public school locations, conditions and management and use of the ARMM schools, inform advocacy efforts and performance to activiely participate in platform influence decision-making auditing, prioritizing and evaluating schools Institutionalization: Creation of policy guidance mandating proactive disclosure of data school locations, conditions, and performance Outreach: Awareness-raising with government, civil society and the public regarding the benefits and uses of the platform Indicators Commitment to curbing leakage: (a) % of Coverage: # of public schools identified Breadth of disclosure - ARMM: average % Total public resources in Ghost schools & teachers identified: (a) % identified ghost schools that are via the ARMM platform / total known compliance for provinces and LGUs in geo- question: peso/$ allocations to of ghost schools identified; (b) % of ghost successfully eliminated; (b) % of identified portfolio of public school projects, as tagging of schools and reporting of public schools, by year and LGU teachers identified ghost teachers that are successfully registered in the DepEd system performance metrics via the ARMM platform eliminated from the payroll. Efficiency of education service delivery: School infrastructure deficiencies Information intervention costs: Policy coherence: % of schools, LGUs and $ / peso savings in costs associated with identified: % of schools deemed to have peso/$ allocations to sustain Geo-tagged schools: % of ARMM public provinces that are compliant with their stated eradicating ghost schools & ghost teachers insufficient insfrastructure (e.g., roofs, toilets, reporting and management to the schools geo-tagged in the platform policy mandates regarding geo-tagging, that can be reallocated to overall education furniture, textbooks) relative to the entire ARMM platform, by year and LGU disclosure and data management. service delivery as a % of the ARMM portfolio of schools in ARMM budget Information salience for upstream Platform visibility to target users (direct): % Performance metrics: % of schools that allocation (indirect): # of ARMM (including of government officials (ARMM, province and Corruption deterrence effect: % of new have published information on school provincial and LGUs) school system planning LGU level), school administrators and ghost schools/teachers that show up conditions (e.g., infrastructure gaps) and budget processes that cite ARMM citizens/civil society groups express relative to total schools in successive years available on the ARMM platform platform data in tracking schools and awareness of the ARMM platform targeting new resources Information salience for downstream Platform salience to target users (direct): # evaluation (indirect): # of LGU and ARMM Commitment to improving Verified schools: # of schools whose of ARMM officials (including province and school system performance reviews that cite infrastructure: % of school infrastructure existence and location has been verified LGUs), school administrators and citizens/civil ARMM platform data in monitoring progress gaps identified that are successfully by third-party monitoring efforts society groups that are directly accessing the and evaluating the success of ARMM public redressed ARMM platform schools Information salience for top-down accountability: (a) # of citations to Rates of return on accountability User documentation/training: # of information from the ARMM platform in platforms - curbing leakage: annual costs training manuals and technical/user guides congressional testimonies and budget of maintaining the ARMM platform versus developed for the ARMM platform and geo- documentation; (b) # of third-party audit $/peso savings in costs associated with tagging reports that utilize ARMM data on public ghost schools/teachers schools Information salience for bottom-up Rate of return on accountability People Trained: # of government officials, accountability: # of CSO advocacy platforms - improving conditions: annual CSOs trained in geo-tagging, data campaigns that cite ARMM platform data and costs of maintaining the ARMM versus net management and use of the ARMM the existence of ghost schools in the context gains from redressing school infrastructure platform of demanding improvements in school gaps (e.g., roofs, textbooks, furniture) conditions Rate of return on accountability Policy Guidance: existence of policy platforms - improving quality: annual guidance mandating geo-tagging, costs of maintaining ARMM platform per information disclosure requirements on unit increase in average school quality public schools, etc. metrics (student/teacher ratios, teacher attendance, test scores) 1 Accountability Platform Results Framework: OpenBuB Inputs: What financial, human and Activities: What discrete tasks are Outputs: What are the short-term, direct Outcomes: Whose behavior must change in Impact: What does long-term success look like? physical resources are applied? being implemented? results? the medium-term and in what ways? How will the world look different? Improved service delivery: The government of Evidence-based decision-making: DBM the Philippines is providing better quality public Platform development: Design Transparency: The government is officials and implementing agencies are using Government resources allocated services to its citizens through the BuB scheme and fielding of the ARMM digital proactively disclosing more information on platform information to allocate resources, via BUB through: eliminating leakage, strengthening open government platform the locations and status of BuB projects monitor progress and evaluate performance targeting and tracking of cancelled or re- among the LGUs purposed projects. Top-down accountability: National Data production: Collection, Access: Government, civil society groups Government and World Bank government officials are demanding that processing and geo-tagging of and citizens can easily access timely, resources supporting maintenance implementing agencies and LGUs justify their data on BuB project locations and accurate and hyper-local information on of OpenBUB platform BuB budget allocation on the basis of status. BuB projects via an open data platform information in the OpenBuB platform. Capacity: Government officials, Evidence-informed dialogue: Citizens and Data platforms and sources Data verification: Third party implementing agencies and civil society civil society groups are using platform providing inputs into the OpenBUB verification of the locations and have the capacity to produce, manage, information to advocate for projects they feel platform status of geo-tagged projects use and verify geo-tagged data on the are better suited to their needs OpenBuB platform Training: Documentation and Awareness: Government officials, school training for government officials, Bottom-up accountability: Citizens and civil administrators and civil society are implementing agencies and civil society groups are leveraging data on interested in using the OpenBuB platform society in geo-tagging, data OpenBuB to activiely participate in auditing, to track BuB projects, inform advocacy management and use of the prioritizing and evaluating BuB projects efforts and influence decision-making OpenBuB platform Institutionalization: Creation of Verification: Publicly available audit policy guidance mandating reports regarding the existence, proactive disclosure of BuB project completion and location of specific BuB locations and status projects Outreach: Awareness-raising with government, civil society and the public regarding the benefits and uses of the platform Indicators Breadth of disclosure - agency level: Coverage (#): # of BUB financed average % compliance of a front-line Commitment to curbing leakage: % of local development projects Cancelled projects identified: # of existing implementing agencies across all 7 identified ghost BUB projects that are identified via the OpenBUB ghost BUB projects identified OpenBUB information disclosure successfully eliminated Total public resources in platform indicators question: peso/$ allocations to Efficiency of BUB project delivery: $ / peso BUB projects, by year and LGU Coverage ($): $ value of BUB Depth of disclosure - agency level: % of Rationale for cancelled projects: % of savings in costs associated with maintaining financed local development information disclosure indicators for which cancelled projects where cancelling stage in ghost projects that can be reallocated to overall projects identified via the a front-line implementing agency has approval process is noted BUB program funds as a % of the LGU budget OpenBUB platform achieved at least 90% compliance AND national budget Breadth of coverage - LGU/province Process integrity progress: % of new projects UACS compliant: % of BUB Repurposed projects identified: % of BuB level: average % compliance of across all approved by LPRAT that are eventually projects that are use UACS via projects that changed after LPRAT 7 OpenBUB information disclosure approved and implemented by national Information intervention costs: OpenBUB agreedment indicators for a given LGU or province agencies peso/$ allocations to sustain Depth of disclosure - LGU/province Rate of return on accountability platforms - reporting and management to Geo-Tagged : % of BUB projects level: % of OpenBUB information Rationale for repurposed projects: % of improving coverage: annual costs of OpenBUB, by year and agency that are geo-tagged in the disclosure indicators for which an LGU or repurposed BuB projects where cancelling maintaining OpenBUB versus increasing net OpenBUB platform province has achieved at least 90% stage in approval process is noted beneficiaries of new BUB-financed project compliance allocations Information salience for upstream Updates on Physical Completion Policy coherence - agency level: % of allocation of BUB investments (indirect): # Rate of return on accountability platforms - Status: % of BUB projects for agencies that are compliant with their own of LGU and national BUB performance improving quality: annual costs of maintaining which there is an updated stated policy mandates regarding geo- reviews that cite OpenBUB platform data in OpenBUB platform per unit increase in average completion status via OpenBUB tagging, disclosure and data management. evaluating results and identifying ghost BUB project quality metrics within the last 4-months projects Platform visibility to target users Information salience for downstream Implementing agency/contractor: (direct): % of LGU officials, officials in evaluation of BUB results (indirect): # of % of projects with implementing front-line implementing agencies and LGU and national BUB performance reviews agencies and contractors noted citizens/civil society groups express that cite OpenBUB platform data in evaluating awareness of the OpenBUB platform results and identifying ghost projects Information salience for top-down Platform salience to target users Verified BUB projects: % of BUB accountability: (a) # of citations to (direct): # of LGU officials, officials in front- projects that have been verified by information from OpenBUB in congressional line implementing agencies and CoA audits or other third-party testimonies and budget documentation; (b) # citizens/civil society groups that are monitoring efforts of CoA audit reports that utilize OpenBUB directly accessing the OpenBUB platform data Information salience for bottom-up User documentation/training accountability: # of CSO advocacy guides: # of training manuals and campaigns that cite OpenBUB platform data technical/user guides developed and the existence of ghost projects in the for OpenBUB context of demanding improvements in BUB project quality or anti-corruption efforts # People Trained: # of government officials, CSOs trained in geo-tagging, data management and use of OpenBUB Agency-Level Policy Guidance: # of agencies that have developed policy guidance mandating geo- tagging, information disclosure 2 requirements on BUB projects, etc. Accountability Platform Results Framework: OpenReconstruction Inputs: What financial, human and Activities: What discrete tasks are being Outputs: What are the short-term, direct Outcomes: Whose behavior must change in Impact: What does long-term success look physical resources are applied? implemented? results? the medium-term and in what ways? like? How will the world look different? Improved service delivery: The Government Evidence-based decision-making: Key Government and development Transparency: The government is of the Philippines is helping the country "build Platform development: Design and government officials (national, province, LGU) partner financial and technical proactively disclosing more information on back better" through: eliminating leakage, fielding of the OpenReconstruction digital are using platform information to track resources supporting its reconstruction projects including: strengthening targeting and improving open government platform reconstruction projects from allocation to reconstruction projects locations, conditions and completion. completion rates and quality in reconstruction completion. projects. Top-down accountability: National Access: Government, civil society groups Data inputs from government, Data production: Collection, processing government officials are demanding that front- and citizens can easily access timely, development partners and civil and geo-tagging of data on line providers and LGUs justify their accurate and hyper-local information on society into the reconstruction project locations, reconstruction budget allocation on the basis reconstruction proejcts via an open data OpenReconstruction platform conditions and completion status of information in the OpenReconstruction platform platform. Evidence-informed dialogue: Citizens and Government and World Bank civil society groups are using platform Data verification: Third party verification Capacity: Government officials and civil financial and technical resources information to advocate for the elimination of of the locations, conditions and society have the capacity to produce, supporting maintenance of the ghost reconstruction projects, reassess completion of geo-tagged reconstruction manage, use and verify geo-tagged data OpenReconstruction platform and contractor relationships and ensure projects projects on OpenReconstruction platform related activities are completed on time and with a high degree of quality. Awareness: Government officials and civil Bottom-up accountability: Citizens and civil Training: Documentation and training for society are interested in using the society groups are leveraging data on government officials and civil society in OpenReconstruction platform to track locations, conditions and completion status geo-tagging, data management and use reconstruction projects, inform advocacy to activiely participate in auditing, prioritizing of OpenReconstruction efforts and influence decision-making and evaluating reconstruction projects Institutionalization: Creation of policy Verification: Publicly available audit guidance mandating proactive disclosure reports regarding the existence, of reconstruction project locations, completion and location of specific conditions, and completion reconstruction projects Outreach: Awareness-raising with government, civil society and the public regarding the benefits and uses of the platform Indicators Breadth of disclosure - agency level: Coverage (#): # of reconstruction project average % compliance of a front-line Ghost projects identified: # of existing Commitment to curbing leakage: % of identified via the OpenReconstruction reconstruction provider across 7 ghost reconstruction projects identified / identified ghost reconstruction projects that platform OpenReconstruction information entire portfolio of reconstruction projects are successfully eliminated Total public resources in disclosure indicators question: peso/$ allocations to Efficiency of reconstruction project reconstruction projects, by year Depth of disclosure - agency level: % of Completion rate and on-time status delivery: $ / peso savings in costs associated and LGU Coverage ($): $ value of reconstruction OpenReconstruction disclosure indicators identified: % of projects completed and on- with maintaining ghost projects that can be projects identified via the for which a front-line road reconstruction time out of all reconstruction projects reallocated to overall reconstruction delivery OpenReconstruction platform provider has achieved at least 90% identified as a % of the LGU budget and national compliance budget Breadth of coverage - province/LGU: Commitment to improving completion and UACS compliant: % of reconstruction average % compliance of across all 7 Reconstruction deficiencies identified: % on-time rates: % of projects identified as projects that are use UACS via OpenReconstruction information of reconstruction projects that fail to meet incomplete or off-schedule that are Information intervention costs: OpenReconstruction disclosure indicators for a given LGU or documented quality requirements successfully redressed peso/$ allocations to sustain province reporting and management to Information salience for upstream Depth of disclosure - province/LGU: # of Rates of return on accountability platforms OpenReconstruction, by year and Geo-Tagged Projects : % of allocation (indirect): # of LGU and national provinces and LGUs that have achieved at - curbing leakage: annual costs of agency reconstruction projects that are geo- reconstruction program planning and budget least 90% compliance on the 7 maintaining OpenReconstruction versus tagged in the OpenReconstruction processes that cite OpenReconstruction OpenReconstruction information $/peso savings in costs associated with ghost platform platform data in tracking reconstruction disclosure indicators reconstruction projects projects and targeting new resources Information salience for downstream evaluation of reconstruction project results Rate of return on accountability platforms - Policy coherence - agency level: % of Implementing/executing agency: % of (indirect): # of LGU and national improving coverage: annual costs of agencies that are compliant with their own projects with implementing and executing roadreconstruction program performance maintaining OpenReconstruction versus stated policy mandates regarding geo- agencies noted reviews that cite OpenReconstruction increasing the net beneficiaries of new tagging, disclosure and data management. platform data in evaluating results and reconstruction projects identifying ghost projects Information salience for top-down Platform visibility to target users accountability: (a) # of citations to Rate of return on accountability platforms - Verified reconstruction projects: % of (direct): % of LGU officials, officials in information from OpenReconstruction in improving quality: annual costs of reconstruction projects that have been front-line providers of road works projects congressional testimonies and budget maintaining OpenReconstruction per unit verified by CoA audits or other third-party and citizens/civil society groups express documentation; (b) # of CoA audit reports or increase in average reconstruction project monitoring efforts awareness of the OpenReconstruction other 3rd party verification that utilize metrics (completion rate, level of service platform OpenReconstruction data on reconstruction provision) projects Information salience for bottom-up Platform salience to target users accountability: # of CSO advocacy Updates on completion status: % of (direct): # of LGU officials, officials in front- campaigns that cite OpenReconstruction reconstruction projects for which there is line agencies implementing reconstruction platform data and the existence of ghost an updated completion status within the projects and citizens/civil society groups projects in the context of demanding last 4-months that are directly accessing the improvements in reconstruction targeting or OpenReconstruction platform anti-corruption efforts User documentation/training: # of training manuals and technical/user guides developed for OpenReconstruction # People Trained: # of government officials, CSOs trained in geo-tagging, data management and use of OpenReconstruction and associated applications Agency-Level Policy Guidance: # of agencies that have developed policy guidance mandating geo-tagging, information disclosure requirements on reconstruction projects, etc. % Performance Metrics: % of reconstruction projects for which information on completion and on-time status of the project are available in OpenReconstruction Accountability Platform Results Framework: OpenRoads Inputs: What financial, human and Activities: What discrete tasks are being Outputs: What are the short-term, direct Outcomes: Whose behavior must change Impact: What does long-term success look physical resources are applied? implemented? results? in the medium-term and in what ways? like? How will the world look different? Evidence-based decision-making: Key Improved service delivery: The government Platform development: Design and Transparency: The government is government officials (national, province and of the Philippines is providing better quality Government and development fielding of OpenRoads and supporting proactively disclosing more information LGU) are using platform information to road infrastructure to its citizens through: partner financial and technical applications (e.g., GeoStore, on the locations, conditions and allocate resources, monitor progress and eliminating leakage, strengthening targeting resources supporting local roads Routeshoot) completion of road works projects evaluate performance among local road and improving road conditions and projects completion rate. Top-down accountability: National Data inputs from government, Verification: Publicly available audit government officials are demanding that Data production: Collection, processing development partners and civil reports regarding the existence and front-line providers of road projects justify and geo-tagging of road project society into the OpenRoads quality of specific FMR road works budget allocation on the basis of locations, status and quality platform projects performance via information in the OpenRoads platform Government and World Bank Access: Government, civil society Evidence-informed dialogue: Citizens financial and technical resources Data verification: Audits of Farm-to- groups and citizens can easily access and civil society groups are using platform supporting maintenance of the Market Roads to verify the existence and timely, accurate and hyper-local information to advocate for the elimination OpenRoads platform and related quality of road projects geo-tagged information on local roads via an open of ghost roads, as well as the improvement activities data platform of local road conditions and completion. Bottom-up accountability: C itizens and Training: Documentation and training Capacity: Government officials, front-line civil society groups are leveraging data on for government officials, front-line roads providers and civil society have the local road locations, conditions and providers and civil society in geo- capacity to produce, manage, use and performance to activiely participate in tagging, data management ad the use of verify geo-tagged data on local roads auditing, prioritizing and evaluating road the OpenRoads platform projects Awareness: Government officials, front- Institutionalization: Creation of policy line providers and civil society are guidance mandating proactive interested in using the OpenRoads disclosure of data on road locations, platform to track local roads, inform conditions, and completion advocacy efforts and influence decision- making Outreach: Awareness-raising with government, civil society and the public regarding the benefits and uses of the platform Indicators Coverage (#): # of road projects, Breadth of disclosure - agency level: Commitment to curbing leakage: % of segments and km identified via the average % compliance of a front-line Ghost roads identified: % of ghost road identified ghost road projects that are OpenRoads platform / total known road works provider across all 9 projects identified out of all road projects successfully eliminated portfolio of road projects OpenRoads dashboard indicators Total public resources in question: Efficiency of road service delivery: $ / peso/$ allocations to road works Depth of disclosure - agency level: % peso savings in costs associated with projects, by year and LGU Coverage ($): $ value of road projects Completion rate and on-time status of OpenRoads dashboard indicators for maintaining ghost roads that can be identified via the OpenRoads platform / identified: % of projects completed and which a front-line road works provider reallocated to overall road infrasatructure total known portfolio of road projects on-time out of all road projects identified has achieved at least 90% compliance service delivery as a % of the LGU budget and national budget Road infrastructure deficiencies Breadth of coverage - LGU level: Unique agency ID: % of road projects identified: % of road projects that fail to Anti-corruption progress: % of new ghost average % compliance of across all 9 for which the implementing agency meet documented quality requirements road projects that show up relative to total OpenRoads dashboard indicators for a includes a unique ID via Open Roads (e.g., % length by surface type, ride quality, road projects in successive years Information intervention costs: given LGU width in meters, etc) peso/$ allocations to sustain Information salience for upstream reporting and management to Geo-Tagged Projects : % of road Depth of disclosure - LGU level: % of allocation (indirect): # of LGU and Commitment to improving completion OpenRoads, by year and agency projects for which the full road from start OpenRoads dashboard indicators for national road infrastructure planning and and on-time rates: % of projects identified to end is geo-tagged in the Open Roads which an LGU has achieved at least 90% budget processes that cite OpenRoads as incomplete or off-schedule that are platform (and GeoStore) compliance platform data in tracking road projects and successfully redressed targeting new resources Information salience for downstream Commitment to "rational" road-targeting: Gateway Access: % of road projects Policy coherence - agency level: % of evaluation (indirect): # of LGU and % of projects that meet established criteria for which an access track is geotagged agencies that are compliant with their national road infrastructure system for more rational road-targeting (e.g., in the OpenRoads platform from the own stated policy mandates regarding performance reviews that cite Open Roads average length of road, gateway access, start of a national highway and/or geo-tagging, disclosure and data platform data in evaluating results and minimum viable surface quality, consistent nearest municipal hall management. identifying ghost roads with program objectives) Platform visibility to target users Information salience for top-down (direct): % of LGU officials, officials in accountability: (a) # of citations to Photographed: % of road projects (out Rates of return on accountability front-line providers of road works information from OpenRoads in of the entire portfolio) for which at least platforms - curbing leakage: annual costs projects and citizens/civil society groups congressional testimonies and budet one set of geo-tagged pictures is of maintaining OpenRoads versus $/peso express awareness of the Open Roads documentation; (b) # of CoA audit reports available via the OpenRoads platform savings in costs associated with ghost roads platform (or its supporting applications - that utilize OpenRoads (GeoStore) data on GeoStore, RouteShoot) roads projects Platform salience to target users Information salience for bottom-up Routeshoot: % of road projects (out of (direct): # of LGU officials, officials in accountability: # of CSO advocacy Rate of return on accountability platforms the entire portfolio) for which there is a front-line agencies implementing road campaigns that cite Open Roads platform - improving coverage: annual costs of geo-tagged video available via projects and citizens/civil society groups data and the existence of ghost roads in maintaining OpenRoads versus increasing Routeshoot and the OpenRoads that are directly accessing the Open the context of demanding improvements in RIA value of new road allocations platform Roads platform (or its supporting road service quality or anti-corruption applications - GeoStore, RouteShoot) efforts Geoprocessed/validated: % of road Rate of return on accountability platforms projects (out of the entire portfolio) for - improving quality: annual costs of which digital data has been converted maintaining OpenRoads platform per unit into summary performance indicators of increase in average road quality metrics (% % length by surface type, ride quality, length by surface type, ride quality, width in width in meters, etc. meters, etc) Updates on Physical Completion Status: % of road projects (out of the entire portfolio) for which there is an updated completion status within the last 4-months Audited Road Projects: # of road (FMR) projects that have been verified by CoA audits or other third-party monitoring efforts User documentation/training guides: # of training manuals and technical/user guides developed for OpenRoads and associated applications (RouteShoot, GeoStore) People Trained: # of government officials, CSOs trained in geo-tagging, data management and use of OpenRoads and associated applications Agency-Level Policy Guidance: # of agencies that have developed policy guidance mandating geo-tagging, information disclosure requirements on road projects, etc. Accountability Platform Results Framework: SinTax Inputs: What financial, human and Activities: What discrete tasks are being Outputs: What are the short-term, direct Outcomes: Whose behavior must change in the Impact: What does long-term success look like? physical resources are applied? implemented? results? medium-term and in what ways? How will the world look different? Evidence-based decision-making: DoF-BIR is using information gathered through the digital Transparency: DoF-BIR and LGUs are Government and development platform on cigarette prices and tax stamp Platform development: Design and fielding disclosing more information about the partner resources allocated via SinTax penetration to take action (and influence LGUs to of the digital SinTax platform cigarette tax compliance and funds raised via collection take action) against companies, wholesalers and SinTax. retailers that fail to include the full cigarette tax in their prices (phantom revenues). Evidence-informed dialogue: Citizens and civil Access: Government, civil society groups society groups are using digital platform Data production: Collection and processing and citizens can access timely and accurate Government revenues raised from information on cigarette prices and tax stamp of data on cigarette tax compliance and information on cigarette tax prices, tax stamp cigarette tax collection penetration to advocate with DoF, LGU officials and revenues penetration and cigarette tax revenues companies, wholesalers and retailers to ensure collected via an open data platform. compliance with tax laws in cigarette prices. Top-down accountability: Congress and national The government of the Philippines is increasing Capacity: Government officials and civil leaders are using the information from the digital resources available for public service delivery Data verification: Third party verification of Data platforms and sources providing society have the capacity to produce, platform to hold DoF-BIR and LGU officials through eliminating leakage in the form of the locations and conditions of geo-tagged inputs into the digital platform manage, use and verify data on cigarette accountable to crack down on companies, phantom revenues (lost tax revenues from schools prices and tax collection wholesalers and retailers that are not compliant cigarette prices that don't include the tax stamp). with the cigarette tax regime. Bottom-up accountability: ARMM citizens and Verification : Publicly available audit or 3rd Training: Documentation and training for civil society groups are leveraging data on to party monitoring reports regarding cigarette government officials and civil society in use activiely participate in auditing and monitoring tax prices, tax stamp penetration and of the digital platform cigarette tax prices, tax stamp penetration and cigarette tax revenues collected cigarette tax revenues collected. Institutionalization: Creation of policy Awareness: Government officials and civil guidance mandating proactive disclosure of society are interested in using the platform to cigarette tax prices, tax stamp penetration track cigarette prices and revenues, inform and cigarette tax revenues collection advocacy efforts and influence enforcement Outreach: Awareness-raising with government, civil society and the public regarding the benefits and uses of the platform Indicators Coverage: (a) # of cigarette prices tracked via the digital platform; (b) % of cigarette Breadth of disclosure - agency level: Phantom revenues identified: # of cigarette Commitment to curbing leakage: % of prices which don't fully include mandated average % compliance of DoF across all 4 prices identified that are not compliant / total identified phatom revenues that are successfully taxes (tax stamp penetration) tracked via the information disclosure indicators cigarette prices remedied digital platform; (c) $ value of cigarette tax Total public resources in question: revenues reported via the digital platform peso/$ revenues from cigarette tax Information salience for upstream tax collection by year and LGU Efficiency of SinTax project delivery - LGU compliance tracking (indirect): # of LGU and User documentation/training guides: # of Depth of disclosure - agency level: % of level: $ / peso savings in costs associated with national DoF performance reviews that cite the training manuals and technical/user guides information disclosure indicators for which phantom tax revenues that can be reallocated to digital platform data in evaluating tax compliance developed for use of the digital platform DoF has achieved at least 90% compliance overall public service delivery funds as a % of the and identifying phantom revenues from lost LGU budget cigarette taxes Information salience for downstream evaluation Efficiency of SinTax project delivery - national Information intervention costs: Policy coherence - agency: % compliance # People Trained: # of government officials, of tax revenues collected and allocated level: $ / peso savings in costs associated with peso/$ allocations to sustain for DoF with their own stated policy CSOs trained in geo-tagging, data (indirect): # of LGU and national DoF performance phantom tax revenues that can be reallocated to reporting and management to the mandates regarding disclosure and data management and use of the digital platform reviews that cite the digital platform data in overall public service delivery funds as a % of the digital platform, by year and agency management. evaluating the use of tax revenues collected national budget Policy Guidance: # of agencies and LGUs Information salience for top-down that have developed policy guidance Platform visibility to target users (direct): accountability: (a) # of citations to information the Anti-corruption progress: % of new non- mandating information disclosure % of LGU officials, DoF officials, companies digital platform in congressional testimonies and compliant cigarette prices that show up relative requirements on cigarette tax revenues and citizens/civil society groups express budget documentation; (b) # of third-party audit to total projects in successive years collected, tax stamp penetration rates and awareness of the digital platform reports that utilize the digital platform data cigarette prices Information salience for bottom-up Rates of return on accountability platforms - Platform salience to target users (direct): # accountability: # of CSO advocacy campaigns curbing leakage: annual costs of maintaining Removals: $/peso value of removals by tax of LGU officials, DoF officials, companies and that cite the digital platform data and the existence the digital platform versus $/peso savings in bracket citizens/civil society groups that are directly of phantom revenues in the context of demanding costs associated with phantom revenues from accessing the digital platform improvements in tax compliance and tax collection lost taxes efforts Rate of return on accountability platforms - increasing revenues: annual costs of maintaining the digital platform versus increasing net tax revenues References References Abante, K. (2015, November 27). Open Insights Andrews, M. (2013). The Limits of Institutional is the Next Step to Open Data. [Web log post]. Reform in Development: Changing Rules for Retrieved from http://blogs.worldbank.org/ Realistic Solutions. New York, NY: Cambridge eastasiapacific/openo-insights-is-next-step- University Press. to-open-data. Asia Foundation. (2013, November 20). Despite Access Info Europe and the Open Knowledge Double Disasters, Bohol’s Local Response Foundation. (2011). Beyond Access: Open Strong. [Web log post] Retrieved from http:// Government Data and the Right to (Re)use asiafoundation.org/in-asia/2013/11/20/ Public Information. Access Info Europe and despite-double-disasters-bohols-local- the Open Knowledge Foundation. response-strong/. Acemoglu, D. & J. Robinson. (2013). Political Ateneo de Manila University. (2013). Bottom- Dynasties in the Philippines. Retrieved April Up Budgeting Process Evaluation. Final Report. 2016 from Why Nations Fail Blog: http:// May 2013. Ateneo de Manila University. whynationsfail.com/blog/2013/1/9/political- dynasties-in-the-philippines.html Austria, P., Kaiser, K. and Newton G. (2015). Minding the Gap: Strategic thinking for ADB. (2013). Results-Based Management Success in Recovery and Reconstruction, Framework in the Philippines: A Guidebook. mimeo Retrieved from http://www.adb.org/sites/ default/files/publication/148792/results- Baer, W., Borisov, N., Danezis, G., Dutton, W.H., based-management-framework.pdf Gurses, S.F., Klonowski, M., Kutylowski, M., Maier-Rabler, U., Moran, T., Pfitzmann, A., ADB. (2015). Philippines:Economy. Retrieved Preneel B., Sadeghi, A., Thierry, V., Westen, T., December 2015, from Asian Development & Zagorski, F. (2009). “Machiavelli Confronts Bank: http://www.adb.org/countries/ 21st Century Digital Technology: Democracy philippines/economy in a Network Society.” Working Paper, Oxford Internet Institute, University of Oxford. Anderson, B. (1988). Cacique Democracy and the Philippines: Origins and Dreams. New Left Banerjee, A. V., Banerji, R., Duflo, E., Review , 169, 3-33. Glennerster, R., and Khemani, S. 2010. “Pitfalls of Participatory Programs: Evidence from a Andreesen, M. (2007, June 25). Product/Market Randomized Evaluation in Education in India.” Fit. [Web log post]. Retrieved from http://web. American Economic Journal: Economic Policy 2 stanford.edu/class/ee204/ProductMarketFit. (1): 1–30. html. Beschel, R. P. (2015). Digital Government in Andrews, M. (2011). Which organizational Developing Countries: Reflections upon the attributes are amenable to external reform? Korean Experience. Unpublished draft. An empirical study of African public financial management. International Public Björkman, M. and Svensson, J. (2009). Power to Management Journal, 14(2), 131-156. doi:10.1080 the People: Evidence from a Randomized Field /10967494.2011.588588 Experiment on Community-Based Monitoring in Uganda. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 124(2). 82 From Pork to Performance: Open Government and Program Performance Tracking in the Philippines. 2016. S. Custer, H. Rahemtulla, K. Kaiser, R. van den Brink References Björkman, M., D. de Walque, and Svensson, J. Coronel, S. S. (Ed.). (1998). Pork and other perks: (2014). Information Is Power: Experimental Corruption & governance in the Philippines. Evidence of the Long-Run Impact of Institute for Popular Democracy. March 23, Community-Based Monitoring. Policy Research 1998. Paper 7015, World Bank, Washington, DC. Cruz, C. (2014). Buying One Vote at a Time Booth, D., & Cammack, D. (2013). Governance or Buying in Bulk?: Politician Networks for Development in Africa: Solving Collective and Electoral Strategies. Institute of Asian Action Problems. Lond, New York: Zed Books. Research. University of British Columbia. Booth, D., & Unsworth, S. (2014). Politically Cruz, C., and Keefer, P. (2015). Political Parties, smart, locally led development. Discussion Clientelism and Bureaucratic Reform. IDB paper. Overseas Development Institute. Working Paper Series , 604. September 2014. Custer, S. (2013) Does Openness Enhance Public Brockmyer, B., & Fox, J. (2015). Assessing the Trust: A Cross-Country Assessment of the Evidence: The Effectiveness and Impact of Relationship Between Openness of Budgeting Public Governance-Oriented Multi-Stakeholder Processes and Perceptions of Government Initiatives. Transparency and Accountability Corruption. Georgetown University. Initiative. London, UK: Open Society Foundation. Dalangin-Fernandez, L. (2016, March 19). BUB| Better budgeting or ‘Bribe Ur Barangay’? [Web Capili, M. F. (2015). Philippines - e-Government log post]. Retrieved from http://interaksyon. transformation : open government Philippines com/article/125421/bub--better-budgeting-or- and open data Philippines. Washington, bribe-ur-barangay. D.C. : World Bank Group. Retrieved from: http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/ Department of Budget and Management. en/2015/07/25816758/philippines-e- (2016, April 22). Funds for Local Road Upkeep government-transformation-open-government- to Grow Six-Fold to P39B. [Web log post]. philippines-open-data-philippines http://www.dbm.gov.ph/?p=15507. Carothers, T., and Brechenmacher, S. (2014). Devarajan, S. (2014, March 11). What the Closing Space: Democracy and Human Rights 2004 WDR Got Wrong. [Web log post]. Support Under Fire. Carnegie Endowment for Retrieved from http://blogs.worldbank.org/ International Peace. futuredevelopment/what-2004-wdr-got- wrong. Case, W. (2002). Politics in Southeast Asia: Democracy or Less. Psychology Press. Devarajan, S., and Widlund, I. (Eds.). (2007). Chambers, R. (2010). Paradigms, Poverty, and The Politics of Service Delivery in Democracies: Adaptive Pluralism. University of Sussex, Better Access for the Poor. Stockholm, Sweden: Brighton, Institute of Development Studies. Expert Group on Development Issues, Ministry for Foreign Affairs. Chambers, R. (2010). Paradigms, Poverty, and Adaptive Pluralism. University of Sussex, DevEx, (2015, October 1). Who will lead Brighton, Institute of Development Studies. development’s big data revolution? [Web log post]. Retrieved from https://www.devex. Clarke, G. (2013). Civil Society in the Philippines: com/news/who-will-lead-development-s-big- Theoretical, Methodological and Policy data-revolution-87023. Debates. Abingdon Routledge. Diokno, B.E. (2016a, ). 6.9% economic growth in Commission on Elections, Special Audits an election year is no big deal. [Web log post]. Office Report No. 2012-03 Government-wide Retrieved from Performance Audit on Priority Development http://www.econ.upd.edu.ph/perse/?p=5398. Assistance Fund (PDAF) and Various Infrastructures including Local Projects Diokno, B. E. (2016b, April 3). The ABCs of (VILP). Retrieved from http://www.gov. budget preparation and execution. [Web log ph/2013/08/16/special-audits-office-report- post]. Retrieved from http://www.econ.upd. no-2012-03-pdaf-and-vilp/ edu.ph/perse/?p=5302. From Pork to Performance: Open Government and Program Performance Tracking in the Philippines. 2016. S. Custer, H. Rahemtulla, K. Kaiser, R. van den Brink 83 References Diokno, B.E. (2016c, February 24). Efficient and Goetz , A.M. & Jenkins, R. (2005). Reinventing effective government is a public good. [Web Accountability: Making Democracy Work log post]. Retrieved from http://www.econ. for Human Development. In: T. Shaw (Ed.), upd.edu.ph/perse/?p=5257. International Political Economy Series. New York, NY: Palgrave MacMillan. Dressel, B. (2012). Targeting the Public Purse: Advocacy Coalitions and Public Finance in the Gonçalves, S. (2014). “The Effects of Philippines. Administration and Society. Participatory Budgeting on Municipal Expenditures and Infant Mortality in Brazil,” Dressel, B. (2011). The Philippines: How Much World Development, 53, January, 2014. Real Democracy. International Political Science Review , 32 (529). Grandvoinnet, H., Aslam. G., & Raha, S. (2015). Opening the Black Box: The Contextual Drivers Easterly, W. R. (2006). The White Man’s Burden: of Social Accoutability. New Frontiers of Social Why the West’s Efforts to Aid the Rest Have Policy. World Bank. Done So Much Ill and So Little Good. New York: Penguin Press. Guggenheim, S. (2006). Crises and Contradictions: Understanding the Origins Fox, J. (2007). The Uncertain Relationship of a Community Development Project in between Transparency and Accountability. Indonesia, in Anthony Bebbington, Michael Development in Practice 17 (4): 663–71. Woolcock, Scott Guggenheim and Elizabeth A. Olson, eds., The Search for Empowerment: Fox, J. (2014). Social Accountability: What Does Social Capital as Idea and Practice at the World the Evidence Really Say? Global Partnership Bank, Bloomfield Ct: Kumarian. for Social Accountability Working Paper No. 1. World Bank. Hakhverdian, A., & Mayne, Q. (2012). Institutional Trust, Education, and Corruption: Franco, J. (2004). ‘The Philippines’ in Alagappa, A Micro- Macro Interactive Approach. The Muthiah ed., Civil society and political change Journal of Politics, 1(1), 1-12. in Asia: expanding and contracting democratic space, Stanford University Press: Stanford. Hedger, E. (2015). Managing money and delivering services. In: Public Services at Fritz, V., Kaiser, K. & Levy, B. (2009). Problem- the Crossroads: Ten Years after the WDR Driven Governance and Political Economy 2004: reflections on the past decade and Analysis: Good Practice Framework. implications for the future. Overseas September 2009. World Bank. Development Institute. Prepared for the WDR 2004 anniversary conference: Making Fritz, V., & Levy, B. (2014). Problem-Driven services work for poor- people: the science Political Economy in Action: Overview and and politics of delivery. 28 February – 1 March, Synthesis of the Case Studies. In B. L. Verena World Bank: Washington, DC. http://www.odi. Fritz (Ed.), Problem-Driven Political Economy org/sites/odi.org.uk/files/odi-assets/events- Analysis. Washington, DC, USA: World Bank. documents/5073.pdf GIFT. (2015). Meet the winners of Fiscal Heller, N. (2011). Is Open Data a Good Idea Transparency Best Practices. Global for the Global Partnership?[Web log post]. Initiative for Fiscal Transparency. http:// Retrieved from https://www.globalintegrity. fiscaltransparency.net/winners_FOWG_one_ org/2011/09/open-data-for-ogp/. pager_GIFT.pdf. Highsmith, J., & Cockburn, A. (2001). Agile Gigler, B.-S., Custer, S., Bailur, S., Dodds, software development: the business of E., Asad, S., & Gagieva-Petrova, E. (2014). innovation. Computer , 34 (9), 120-127. Closing the Feedback Loop: Can Technology Amplify Citizen Voices? In B.-S. Gigler, and S. Hogge, B. (2011). Open data study: Bailur (Eds.), Closing the Feedback Loop: Can New technologies. Transparency and Technology Bridge the Accountability Gap? Accountability Initiative. London, UK: Open World Bank. Society Foundation. 84 From Pork to Performance: Open Government and Program Performance Tracking in the Philippines. 2016. S. Custer, H. Rahemtulla, K. Kaiser, R. van den Brink References Sweet, S. & Holmes, R. (In Review). Vision Kapur, D., & Whittle, D. (2009). Can the & Reality of Public Financial Management Privatization of Foreign Aid Enhance Reform in the Philippines: A Marriage Made in Accountability? Paper presented at the Heaven? World Bank, In Review. symposium “Financing Development: The Privatization of Development Assistance,” New Hutchcroft, P.D., & Rocamora, J. (2003). Strong York University, School of Law, December 4–5. Demands and Weak Institutions: The Origins and Evolution of the Democratic Deficit in the Keefer, P., & Khemani, S. (2003). The Political Philippines. Journal of East Asian Studies 3: Economy of Public Expenditures. Unpublished 259–92. draft. Hutchcroft, P. D. (2008). The Arroyo Imbroglio Khemani, S. (2007). Can Information in the Philippines. Journal of Democracy , 19 (1), Campaigns Overcome Political Obstacles to 141-155. Serving the Poor? in Shantayanan Devarajan and Ingrid Widlund, eds., The Politics of Service IBP (2015). Open Budget Survey. Philippines Delivery in Democracies: Better Access for the Country Scorecard. Retrieved from: http:// Poor, Stockholm: EGDI Secretariat, Ministry for www.internationalbudget.org/wp-content/ Foreign Affairs. uploads/OBS2015-CS-Philippines-English.pdf. Khemani, S. (2015). Making Politics Work for IMF. (2015). Philippines. Country Report Development: Harnessing Transparency and No. 15/246. International Monetary Fund. Citizen Engagement. Unpublished draft. Retrieved from: http://www.imf.org/external/ pubs/ft/scr/2015/cr15246.pdf. Klitgaard, R. (2008). A Holistic Approach to the Fight Against Corruption. Remarks to the IRIN. 2008. Beneficiary Feedback: Thanks but Second Session of the Conference of State No Thanks? June 9. http://www.irinnews .org/ Parties to the United Nations Convention Report/78640/GLOBAL-Beneficiary-feedback- against Corruption. January 29, 2008. Bali, thanks-but-no-thanks. Indonesia. Retrieved from: http://www.cgu. edu/PDFFiles/Presidents%20Office/Holistic_ ITU. (2015). ICT Facts and Figures: The World Approach_1-08.pdf. in 2015. Retrieved from: https://www.itu. int/en/ITU-D/Statistics/Documents/facts/ Kosack, S., & Fung, A. (2014). Does ICTFactsFigures2015.pdf. Transparency Improve Governance? Annual Review of Political Science , 17, 65-87. Johnston, M. (2008). Bringing the Metrics Down to Earth: Government Performance, Kusek, J.Z., & Khatouri, M. (2006). Results-based Citizen Participation and Comparing Monitoring and Evaluation in Bank Projects. Corruption. Prepared for the 2008 Annual Washington, DC: World Bank. Meeting of the American Political Science Association. Boston, MA. August, 2008. Levy, B. (2014). Working With the Grain: Retrieved from: http://www.u4.no/ Integrating Governance and Growth in recommended-reading/bringing-the-metrics- Development Strategies. Oxford University Press. down-to-earth-government-performance- citizen-participation-and-comparing- Lieberman, E., Posner, D., & Tsai, L. (2013). Does corruption/downloadasset/2090. Information Lead to More Active Citizenship? Evidence from an Education Intervention Kaiser, K. (2014). Open Government & Digital in Rural Kenya, MIT Political Science Dept., Feedback Loops for Public Infrastructure Working Paper, 2013-2. Delivery in the Philippines. December 7, 2014. Unpublished draft. Lindstedt, C. & Naurin, D. (2010). Transparency Is Not Enough: Making Transparency Effective Kaiser, K., Bredenkamp, C. &Iglesias, R. in Reducing Corruption, International Political (2016). SinTax Reform in the Philippines: Science Review, 31(3), 303–05. 
 Transforming Public Finance, Health, and Governance for More Inclusive Development. From Pork to Performance: Open Government and Program Performance Tracking in the Philippines. 2016. S. Custer, H. Rahemtulla, K. Kaiser, R. van den Brink 85 References Manasan, R. G. (2016). Assessment of Bottom- NEDA. (2014). NEDA Annual Report 2014: up Budgeting: FY 2016 Cycle, Presentation, Greater Solidarity, Better Results. Retrieved 20th August, pp. 46 from http://www.neda.gov.ph/2015/06/30/ neda-annual-report-2014-greater-solidarity- Manasan, R. (2007). IRA design issues and better-results/ challenges. PIDS Policy Notes National Disaster Risk Reduction and Mangahas, M. (2015). Independent Reporting Management Council, NDRRMC. (2013). Mechanism: The Philippines Progress Report: Retrieved from http://www.ndrrmc.gov.ph/. 2013-2015. Open Government Partnership. http://www.opengovpartnership.org/sites/ Norris, P. (2003). Digital Divide: Civic default/files/Philippines%202nd%20IRM%20 Engagement, Information Poverty, and the Report.pdf. Internet in Democratic Societies. Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press. Mangahas, M. & Caronan, R.F. (2015). The Government and Yolanda: A lot of money, North, D. (1990). Institutions, Institutional impact too little too late. Philippines Center Change and Economic Performance. for Investigative Journalism. Retrieved from: Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. http://pcij.org/stories/a-lot-of-money-impact- too-little-too-late/. O’Donnell, G. (1993). On the State, Democratization and Some Conceptual Martinez-Moyano, I.J., Samsa, M.E., Problems: A Latin American view with Baldwin, T.E., Willke, B.J., Moore, A.P. (2007). Glances at some Postcommunist Countries, Investigating the Dynamics of Trust in World Development, 21(8). Government: Drivers and Effects of Policy Initiatives and Government Action. OECD. (2001). Citizens as Partners: OECD Handbook on Information, Consultation, Matsuda, Y. (2014). Strengthening Local Service and Public Participation in Policy-Making. Delivery in the Philippines: The Use of Political Governance. OECD. Economy to Craft Bank Operational Strategies. In B. L. Verena Fritz (Ed.), Problem-Driven Overseas Development Institute. (2015). Public Political Economy Analysis. Washington, DC, Services at the Crossroads: Ten Years after the USA: World Bank. WDR 2004: reflections on the past decade and implications for the future. Overseas McGee, R., and Gaventa, J. (2010). Synthesis Development Institute. Prepared for the report: Review of Impact and Effectiveness of WDR 2004 anniversary conference: Making Transparency and Accountability Initiatives. services work for poor- people: the science Annex 2 – Budget Processes. Prepared and politics of delivery. 28 February – 1 March, for the Transparency and Accountability World Bank: Washington, DC. http://www.odi. Initiative Workshop. October 14-15. Institute of org/sites/odi.org.uk/files/odi-assets/events- Development Studies. documents/5073.pdf Mendoza, R. U. (2012). Dynasties in Peixoto, T. (2013). The Uncertain Relationship democracies: The political side of inequality. between Open Data and Accountability: Retrieved from VOX CEPR’s Policy Portal. (n.d.). A Response to Yu and Robinson’s The New Retrieved April 09, 2016, from http://www. Ambiguity of Open Government. UCLA Law voxeu.org/article/dynasties-democracies- Review , 200 (60), 202-213. political-side-inequality Pastrana, C.S. &Lagarto, M.B. (2014). Process Monsod, T. (2012). Presidential appointments Assessment of the Bottom-up Budgeting: The in the executive branch: trends, effects and Case of Quezon Province. Philippine Institute implications for Development Studies. 86 From Pork to Performance: Open Government and Program Performance Tracking in the Philippines. 2016. S. Custer, H. Rahemtulla, K. Kaiser, R. van den Brink References Peixoto, T. and Fox, J. (2016). When Does ICT- Social Weather Stations. (2015). The 2014/15 Enabled Citizen Voice Lead to Government SWS Survey of Enterprises on Corruption: Responsiveness? Background Paper for the Record-low 32% of executives have personal World Development Report 2016: Digital knowledge of corrupt transaction with Dividends. January 2016. government in the last 3 months. Special Report. 27 August, 2015. Pidd, M. (2012). How you measure performance is important. Retrieved from SyncDev. (2016). MVP. (n.d.). Retrieved April http://www.theguardian.com/public-leaders- 09, 2016, from http://www.syncdev.com/ network/2012/feb/22/measure-performance- minimum-viable-product/ important Thomas, M.A. (2015). Govern Like Us: US Pritchett, L., Woolcock, M., & Andrews, M. Expectations of Poor Countries. Columbia (2010). Capability Traps? The Mechanisms of University Press. May 2015. Persistent Implementation Failures. Center for Global Development Working Paper Series, 234. Touchton, M. and B. Wampler. (2014). Improving Social Well-Being Through New Rao, S. &Marquette, H. (2012). Corruption Democratic Institutions, Comparative Political indicators in Performance Assessment Studies. Frameworks for budget support. U4 Anti- Corruption Resource Centre. March Issue No. 1. Transparency International (2016). Corruption Perceptions Index 2015. Retrieved from Ravallion, M., van de Walle, D., Dutta, P. Transparency International: http://www. &Murgai, R. (2013). Testing Information transparency.org/cpi2015. Constraints on India’s Largest Antipoverty Program, World Bank, Policy Research Working United Nations. (2012). E-Government Survey Paper, No. 6598, September, 2013 2012: E-Government for the People. New York. Reinikka, R., & Svensson, J. (2004). The Power United Nations Development Group. (2010). of Information: Evidence from a Newspaper Results-Based Management Handbook: Campaign to Reduce Capture, Quarterly Strengthening RBM Harmonization for Journal of Economics, 119(2). Improved Development Results. Retrieved from: http://www.un.cv/files/UNDG%20 Reporters Without Borders. (2015). 2015 World RBM%20Handbook.pdf Press Freedom Index. Retrieved December 2015, from Reporters Without Borders: https:// UN OCHA (2013). Philippines. Retrieved April index.rsf.org/#!/ 2016: http://www.unocha.org/philippines. Sabater, M. (2015, April 25). OPARR Put Under Veracode. (2012). What is Data Integrity? Learn NEDA. [Web log post]. Retrieved from http:// How to Ensure Database Data Integrity via www.mb.com.ph/oparr-put-under-neda/. Checks, Tests, and Best Practices. Retrieved April 09, 2016, from https://www.veracode. Shah, A. Ed. (2007) Performance, com/blog/2012/05/what-is-data-integrity. Accountability and Combating Corruption. Public Sector Governance and Accountability Wampler, B. (2007). A Guide to Participatory Series. World Bank. Budgeting. In Participatory Budgeting, edited by A. Shah, chapter 1. Washington, DC: World Sidel, J. T. (2014). Achieving Reforms in Bank. http://siteresources.worldbank .org/ Oligarchical Democracies: The Role of PSGLP/Resources/ParticipatoryBudgeting.pdf. Leadership and Coalitions in the Philippines. Development Leadership Program Working World Bank. (2004). World Development Paper Series, 27. Report 2004: Making Services Work for the Poor. Washington, DC: World Bank. Stapenhurst and O’Brien, (undated). Accountability in Governance. Retrieved from: http://siteresources.worldbank.org/ PUBLICSECTORANDGOVERNANCE/Resources/ AccountabilityGovernance.pdf. From Pork to Performance: Open Government and Program Performance Tracking in the Philippines. 2016. S. Custer, H. Rahemtulla, K. Kaiser, R. van den Brink 87 Conclusion References World Bank (2009). Philippines: Transport World Bank. (2016a). World Development for Growth An Institutional Assessment of Report 2016: Digital Dividends. Washington, Transport Infrastructure. Manila, World Bank, DC: World Bank. Report No. 47281-PH, pp. 114. World Bank. (2016b). Transition Note – World Bank. (2015a). Philippines: Making Improving Local Service Delivery. March 19, Education Spending Count for the Children of 2016. Unpublished draft. the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao. Public Expenditure & Insitutional Review for World Bank. (2016c). Worldwide Governance ARMM Basic Education. Unpublished draft. Indicators. Retrieved January 1, 2016, from: http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/ World Bank. (2015b). Sin Tax Reform in the index.aspx#home. Philippines: Transforming Public Finance, Health, and Governance for More Inclusive World Bank. (2016d). OpenRoads for Prosperity Development. Synthesis Report. Unpublished Paper. May 2016. Unpublished draft. draft. World Bank. (2016e). Assessing School-Based World Bank. (2015c). Philippine Economic Management in the Philippines: Education Update - January, 2015 Edition. (n.d.). Retrieved Note. May 2016. Unpublished draft. April 09, 2016, from: http://www.worldbank. org/content/dam/Worldbank/document/EAP/ World Bank (2016f). Philippines: Public Philippines/PEU%20Jan%202015%20PDF.pdf Financial Management and Accountability Assessment. 23 March 2016. Unpublished World Bank. (2015d). World Development draft. Report 2015: Mind, Society and Behavior. Washington: World Bank. Yu, H., & Robinson, D. G. (2012). The New Ambiguity of Open Government. UCLA Law World Bank. (2015e). Internet users (per 100 Review , 178 (59), 180-208. people). (n.d.). Retrieved April 09, 2016, from http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/IT.NET. USER.P2?page=1. World Bank. (2015f). Public Financial Management Report. Unpublished draft. World Bank. (2015g). Philippines Post-Disaster Expenditure Tracking Evaluaiton. Preliminary Draft. Version August 1, 2015. Unpublished draft. World Bank. (2015h). Bottom-Up Budgeting – Program Summary Report. Prepared for the World Bank-DFAT Public Sector Governance Programmatic Final Review. August 22, 2015. Unpublished draft. World Bank. (2015i). Open Government and Mapping for Results in ARMM. Field report. Unpublished draft. World Bank. (2015j). Open Government for Results Transparency and Accountability. Unpublished draft. 88 From Pork to Performance: Open Government and Program Performance Tracking in the Philippines. 2016. S. Custer, H. Rahemtulla, K. Kaiser, R. van den Brink