PANDEMIC EMERGENCY FINANCING FACILITY (PEF):
PROPOSED FINANCING FROM IDA

APRIL 19, 2017

Development Finance Vice-Presidency
Human Development Vice-Presidency
I. Introduction

1. Pandemics pose a serious threat to both global health and economic security, as well as to our ability to end extreme poverty and achieve the Sustainable Development Goals. The 2014 Ebola outbreak in West Africa infected almost 30,000 people, and resulted in more than 11,000 deaths, in Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone. The experience with Ebola pointed not only to the lack of capacity in low-income countries to deal with such a severe disease outbreak, but also to serious weaknesses in the ability of the international community to provide a rapid, predictable, coordinated, and scaled-up response.

2. Against this background, the Pandemic Emergency Financing Facility (PEF) has been designed by the World Bank, in collaboration with public and private partners, to tackle a financing challenge critical to managing severe disease outbreaks with pandemic potential.

3. The PEF is an innovative, insurance-based financing mechanism designed to finance response efforts in IDA-eligible countries to tackle rare, high-severity disease outbreaks, with the aim of preventing such outbreaks from becoming pandemics. While all countries are susceptible to disease outbreaks, IDA recipients have relatively weak health systems and are less capable of mobilizing the financial resources to respond quickly and effectively to major outbreaks. The PEF will fill the pandemic response funding gap that occurs after the period of immediate to early investigation, assessment and response – and before large-scale disaster and humanitarian relief funding is mobilized.

4. Executive Directors approved the establishment of the PEF as a Financial Intermediary Fund (FIF), including its specific financing modalities, on May 3, 2016\(^2\) and the FIF was established in July 2016. The G7 Leaders endorsed the PEF at the Ise-Shima Summit on May 26, 2016. Furthermore, the Development Committee welcomed the launch of the PEF and called on the World Bank Group (WBG) to ensure the early start-up of the PEF in its Communique of October 8, 2016.

5. The PEF’s financial structure includes complementary insurance and cash windows. The insurance window aims to provide coverage of US$500 million to IDA-eligible countries, over a period of three years, for pandemic threats. The coverage will be funded through proceeds from pandemic bonds issued by IBRD Treasury and/or insurance contracts (via swap agreements) entered into by IBRD (such bonds and swaps, hereinafter collectively referred to as PEF insurance) for the PEF. It was originally envisaged that premiums (including the insurance contract premium and/or bond coupon payments) would be financed fully by donor contributions. Subsequently, it has emerged that additional resources will be required to cover the premiums associated with PEF insurance and ensure its successful launch in a manner that is cost effective while optimizing the public health outcomes of the insurance coverage. This paper proposes a special allocation of

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1. For the purpose of PEF coverage under the Insurance Window in the initial three (3)-year period, defined as IDA only or blend countries, either or both: (a) under IDA17, or/and (b) at the time of submission of a request for funds.
US$50 million from the IDA17 Regional Program to the PEF FIF, for that purpose. IBRD will act as the Trustee for the FIF.

II. Background and Rationale for the Proposed IDA Allocation

6. The purpose of this initiative is to complete the financing package required to cover the premiums for PEF insurance. The lead managers for PEF insurance (Swiss Re, Munich Re and GC Securities) have carried out extensive pre-marketing since November 2016, reaching out to some 40 investors and insurers worldwide. The indicative price range for premium payments has been brought down and indications coming out of the pre-marketing process, which was completed last month, are that the price range is significantly lower than the initial estimates quoted in the May 2016 Board paper.

7. To date, the Bank has signed a contribution agreement with Japan for US$50 million for the insurance window (Japan’s initial installment in the amount of US$15 million has been received) and a contribution agreement with Germany, which we expect to be able to sign in early May, is being negotiated. Germany’s announced pledge is EUR75 million, of which EUR25 million (approx. US$27 million equiv.) is for the insurance window, to be paid in five equal annual instalments, from CY17 through CY21. The remaining amount of EUR50 million is for the cash window and expected to become available in CY18. This totals up to approx. US$67 million for the PEF’s insurance window for the first three years. In addition to the premiums, costs associated with the setting up and running of the FIF need to be considered.

8. A market execution strategy for PEF insurance that will allow, with the additional US$50 million from IDA, its successful launch in a manner that is cost effective, while optimizing the public health outcomes of the insurance coverage, is being developed. With these additional resources from IDA, the PEF team believes it will be possible to execute a large enough transaction that can set a meaningful benchmark for the market and provide substantial public health benefits in the event of a covered pandemic.

9. Since donor support has fallen short of expectations, the most pragmatic way forward to complete the financing package for the PEF’s insurance window in a timely manner is through an exceptional allocation to the PEF from IDA’s Regional Program. Management believes that this approach is justified at this stage on several grounds:

- The first set of reasons relate to the PEF’s global public goods nature and the benefits it will generate for IDA-eligible countries. The PEF fills a critical gap in the global health financing architecture by providing early and rapid surge financing for IDA-eligible countries to respond to pandemic threats, thereby preventing their escalation, saving lives, and containing economic losses.

- Second, the PEF complements such instruments as the IDA Crisis Response Window (CRW) and the planned extension under IDA18 of Catastrophe Deferred Drawdown Option (CAT-DDO) projects to IDA-eligible countries, which will significantly increase WBG’s ability to provide early financing to IDA-eligible countries for use during a disease outbreak of pandemic proportions.
Third, there is strong demand for the PEF from IDA-eligible countries – 40 countries, representing 89 percent of the population of IDA countries, have requested in writing that the Bank secure the necessary financing for the PEF and make it operational. These countries’ aggregate allocations represent 89 percent of IDA17 performance-based allocations.

Fourth, given the high risk of occurrence of disease outbreaks in IDA-eligible countries, there is an urgency to operationalize the PEF.

Fifth, PEF insurance allows the Bank to play a “first mover” role in creating a new market for pandemic risk insurance, similar to the role the Bank has played in the past in creating a market for catastrophe risk insurance.

10. This is not the first time IDA financing is being provided to cover insurance premiums for IDA countries. In 2015, as part of the Pacific Resilience Program (PREP), the Bank’s Board of Executive Directors approved IDA financing to enable countries participating in the Pacific Catastrophe Risk Insurance (PCRAFI) pilot to pay their premiums for risk coverage obtained through contracts that were entered into between the Bank and reinsurance companies.³

III. Mechanics of the Proposed IDA Allocation

11. The proposed US$50 million IDA allocation would be provided as a grant from IDA to IBRD as Trustee of the PEF FIF. The allocation would be sourced from the IDA17 Regional Program. For IBRD as Trustee of the PEF FIF to receive the IDA grant, IBRD (as Trustee) will enter into a Financing Agreement with IDA. IBRD will withdraw the IDA grant in full to be deposited into the PEF FIF, which is administered by the Trustee in accordance with the Trust Fund Standard Provisions and consistent with the terms of the PEF Framework.⁴

12. The proceeds of the IDA grant would be held in the PEF FIF together with other contributions to the PEF FIF. The option of creating a separate trust fund for the IDA allocation was considered, but it was determined that pooling the funds into the PEF FIF would be simpler.

13. The IDA grant would only be used to finance payment obligations to the noteholders under the pandemic bonds and/or the counterparties under the pandemic insurance. Such payment obligations may include any associated premiums (which may include risk coverage premiums⁵ and any call option premium in case of early redemption or termination) and other amounts payable to such noteholders or counterparties pursuant to the terms of the pandemic bond(s) or pandemic insurance(s) in connection with the risk coverage obtained under the bond/insurance. The IDA grant will not be used to cover any administrative costs related to the PEF.

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⁴ The PEF Framework is the governing document of the PEF which will be approved by the Steering Body.
⁵ The coverage period will be for the period of up to three (3) years, with possible extension(s) upon pre-defined extension event(s).
14. IDA’s contribution is refundable, if the funds are not used by the PEF. The PEF FIF would promptly return to IDA any remaining amount (not including investment income) of the grant proceeds that are not required to finance eligible expenditures after the closing date of the grant. Any refunds would flow into the general IDA pool and be a part of the commitment authority.

15. IBRD would provide IDA with (1) an annual report on the activities including the amounts of resources in the FIF committed and/or transferred to the Treasury Manager and receipts, disbursements and use of the resources by the Treasury Manager; (2) a report on the execution of the activities and the accomplishment of the purposes of the grant no later than 6 months after the Closing Date; and (3) a report on the receipts in, transfers from and fund balance of the FIF as well as an annual single audit report.

IV. Legal and Policy Considerations

16. The provision of IDA financing to IBRD as Trustee for the PEF FIF is consistent with IDA’s Articles of Agreement. IDA’s Articles of Agreement require that: (i) financing is to further development in less-developed areas included within its membership; (ii) financing is for a high developmental priority; (iii) financing is not available from other sources; (iv) specific Replenishment terms authorize the provision of grants; and (v) the recipient of IDA financing is an eligible recipient. Through the proposed financing, IDA would make an important contribution towards strengthening the menu of instruments available to IDA recipients to help manage future pandemics. As such, the proposed financing is intended to further the development of IDA members and is of high developmental priority to IDA. As explained above, financing is not available from other sources as the Bank has yet to secure enough resources to meet the financing shortfall of PEF insurance despite the immediate risk of occurrence of disease outbreaks in IDA countries. Furthermore, the IDA17 Regional Program allows for the provision of grant funding. Lastly, as regards the eligibility of the recipient of IDA financing, Article V Section 2(c) of IDA’s Articles of Agreement stipulates that IDA may provide financing to public international organizations.

17. While there is no constraint with regards to Articles, IDA’s policies on the IDA Regional Grant Program in IDA17 require any recipient that accesses the grants from this Program to fulfill eligibility criteria, one of which is that the recipient has to be a regional organization that has the legal status and fiduciary capacity to receive grant funding and the legal authority to carry out the activities financed. Since IBRD is not an eligible Recipient for IDA financing under the policy framework governing the IDA17 Regional Program, a policy waiver is required from the Bank’s Board in order to provide financing from the IDA17 Regional Program to IBRD as Trustee of the PEF FIF.

18. The specifics of this proposal, wherein the proposed IDA grant is provided to IBRD as Trustee of the PEF FIF to cover costs of premium payments to be made by IBRD, do not lend themselves to a regular project. The Bank’s operational policies and procedures that ordinarily apply where financing is provided to a recipient via Investment Project Financing (IPF),

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6 Article V Section 1(a)
7 Article V Section 1(b)
8 Article V Section 2(a)(i)
Development Policy Financing (DPF), and Program-for-Results (PforR) will not apply to this upstream allocation to IBRD as Trustee of the PEF FIF. Bank policies and procedures that are not applicable include those associated with procurement, environment and safeguards, anti-corruption, financial management, and results framework.9

V. Financial Implications and Costs

19. Since IDA’s contribution is refundable, in the event that the funds are not fully used by the PEF, IDA can only account for the grant as an expense on its financial statements as the funds are disbursed out of the PEF FIF for the eligible expenditures covered by the IDA grant (payments to noteholders and swap counterparties).

20. The proposed IDA17 Regional Program grant to PEF will entail an expense to IDA, utilizing the existing commitment authority of IDA17 for grant making.

21. Core costs associated with the Trustee, Treasury Manager and secretariat services that the Bank will provide to set up and manage PEF will be recovered from donor resources to the FIF, based on annual budgets submitted for the approval of the Steering Body. Management is committed to ensuring a lean administrative structure and minimizing operating costs. (Note that the proposed IDA grant will not be used to cover any administrative costs, including those associated with the setting up and management of the FIF. IDA resources will be used only for the purposes of covering the insurance premiums, i.e., payment obligations to noteholders/counterparties of the bonds/swaps). Costs incurred by PEF Responding Agencies in relation to the implementation/supervision of the grants provided by the PEF to or through them will be covered from those grants.

VI. Alternatives Considered

22. In examining options for covering the funding shortfall associated with premiums for the PEF insurance, various alternatives were explored, including the possibility of redirecting uncommitted investment income from trust funds in the health sector and mobilizing resources from other donors. However, these efforts did not yield the resources needed to cover the shortfall.

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9 Accordingly, the Financing Agreement will only include the provisions of the General Conditions for IDA Credits and Grants, which relate to withdrawal procedures of IDA Grant and miscellaneous provisions. It may be noted that downstream PEF financing channeled to eligible countries through the Bank (IDA) as Responding Agency will be subject to Bank policies and procedures. When funds are transferred through other Responding Agencies, their respective policies and procedures will apply. Responding Agencies will be accredited by the Steering Body on the basis of their fiduciary and operational capacity; accreditation standards and procedures will be developed based on those for other FIFs and will need to be endorsed by the Steering Body. Furthermore, the Bank (as Trustee) will sign Financial Procedures Agreements with each Agency, which will include, inter alia, arrangements for financial reporting. The details of the accreditation process are covered in the 2016 Board paper: “Pandemic Emergency Financing Facility: Global Pandemic Response through Establishment of a Financial Intermediary Fund” (R2016-0071), World Bank, April 14, 2016.
VII. Risks and Mitigation

23. The following risks related this proposal have been identified and risk management solutions developed:

A. Strategic risk

- The unique nature of the PEF in a demand-driven context provides a strong justification for the proposed use of the IDA grant to operationalize the PEF on an exceptional basis. It may be noted that the PEF is a mechanism that will benefit all IDA-eligible countries, while non-IDA-eligible countries will have no access to PEF insurance window funds. With the obvious benefits of the PEF in mind, IDA-eligible countries have expressed their support for the operationalization of the PEF. As noted above, to date, 40 letters from countries representing 89 percent of the population of IDA countries have been received.

- There is a concern that the use of an IDA grant for this pilot phase of the PEF’s insurance window may set a precedent for similar support in subsequent phases. To minimize this risk, countries will be required to tap into their country IDA allocation for any future support from IDA to cover premium payments for subsequent phases of the PEF.

- How does the apparent lack of broad-based donor support impact the longer term viability of the PEF, beyond this first pilot? This exceptional request is being made to support the initial pilot phase of PEF insurance window. One of the key expected benefits of the PEF is that it will help catalyze the creation of a market for pandemic risk insurance; over time, IDA-eligible countries should be able to sustainably finance their own coverage. This is borne out by lessons from other, similar programs (like CCRIF and PCRAFI) in the catastrophe risk space, which indicate that, as markets mature, premiums fall and insured countries begin to see the value of insurance and are willing to contribute to the premium from their own resources, minimizing the need for donor subsidies.

B. Stakeholder/partnership risk

- Potential conflicts of interest related to IDA as a contributor to the PEF: Since IDA is among the group of Responding Agencies that can receive funding from the PEF, in order to avoid any perceptions of conflict of interest, IDA will not participate as a voting member on the PEF’s Steering Body. Japan and Germany will have voting seats on the Steering Body. The Bank will chair the Steering Body and will have a presence on the Steering Body as a non-voting member in its capacity as Trustee, Treasury Manager and Responding Agency. In addition, the Bank will serve as the coordinator and, in this capacity, will prepare the necessary policies and procedures for the Steering Body’s endorsement.

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10 The design features of the PEF, along with details of the governance and operational arrangements, and key risks and mitigation measures, are covered in the 2016 Board paper: “Pandemic Emergency Financing Facility: Global Pandemic Response through Establishment of a Financial Intermediary Fund” (R2016-0071), World Bank, April 14, 2016.
C. Donor shortfall risks

- The pandemic bonds and insurance contracts will be issued based on the contributions from IDA and other donors. Donors will pay in their contributions to the FIF in installments over multiple years under the contribution agreements with the Trustee. There are several options to address risks related to potential shortfalls that can arise from contributions that are not yet paid in cash. One option is to include, as required, an optional early termination clause in the bond and insurance contracts. This means that the Bank would issue callable bonds or enter into insurance contracts with optional early termination and return outstanding principal amounts of the bond to investors if there is a shortage of funds to pay the coupons/insurance premium.\(^{11}\) In terms of managing expectation of recipients (IDA countries) for PEF’s coverage, the PEF will clearly disclose to them that the bond and insurance contracts will include an optional early termination.

D. Operational/implementation risks

- To receive PEF funds in the event of a qualifying disease outbreak, countries are required to furnish a Response Plan outlining actions (and associated costs) that will be undertaken for immediate outbreak response interventions using PEF funds. A situation in which a country would be deemed ineligible to receive PEF funds for want of a suitable plan is not foreseen. First, most IDA-eligible countries as part of the World Health Organization (WHO) Pandemic Influenza Preparedness efforts in the last decade, have prepared “generic” response plans according to WHO guidelines.\(^{12}\) In addition, at least 69 IDA-eligible countries have developed generic or pathogen-specific response plans reflecting their particular epidemiologic risk profiles that further strengthen their response readiness. Furthermore, the time between the identification of an outbreak and the PEF activation (which is 6 weeks for influenza and 12 weeks for non-influenza pathogens) provides ample time to tailor existing response plans to the specific response needs of a particular outbreak event. Finally, as part of IDA18, a comprehensive process of developing robust preparedness and response plans is underway in collaboration with WHO, World Organization for Animal Health (OIE), Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), and other technical partners.

- It is important to note that there are several ongoing efforts within and outside WBG that target strengthening preparedness. In the last ten years, WBG has invested more than US$4 billion in health system strengthening in IDA countries. WBG is also investing in regional preparedness efforts, such as the ongoing US$129 million East Africa Public Health Laboratory Networking Project (operational in Burundi, Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania and Uganda) and a new US$347 million Regional Disease Surveillance Systems Enhancement (REDISSE) Project in West Africa. WBG’s ongoing support of US$1.62

\(^{11}\) Other strategic, operational, financial, partnership and stakeholder risks associated with the operations of the PEF were presented and discussed at the Board meeting on the establishment of the PEF on May 3, 2016 (R2016-0071).

billion for Ebola crisis response and recovery efforts in Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone, as well as US$150 million to countries in the Latin America and Caribbean region affected by the Zika virus outbreak are financing outbreak preparedness efforts in these countries. In addition, efforts are being made to strengthen frontline capacity, such as that of community health workers, to provide the foundation for prevention, early detection, and containment.

- Further, as part of our commitments under the proposed IDA18 package, the Bank is committed to developing pandemic preparedness plans in at least 25 countries and to strengthen their capacities to detect, prevent and respond to pandemics. Investing in preparedness involves a multi-sectoral approach that spans the health care, public health, animal health and disaster management sectors. A framework for financing preparedness developed by the WBG together with partners is informing both the nature and the magnitude of investments in preparedness required that are initially estimated at US$3.4 billion per year in IDA countries. This approach to financing preparedness will be integrated in the core work of several practices: in Agriculture to support strengthening of veterinary health; in HNP as part of efforts to strengthen health systems for Universal Health Coverage; and in SURR as part of the Sendai Framework on Disaster Risk Reduction.

VIII. Monitoring and Evaluation

24. A results framework for the PEF is being developed and will be presented to the Steering Body for approval. Lessons learned from the pilot will be carefully collected and assessed.

IX. Conclusion and Recommendation

25. The PEF’s insurance window will provide timely funding to support response efforts for events with clear pandemic potential in IDA-eligible countries, thereby saving lives and costs, and strengthening both economic and human security of these countries. Management is also satisfied that the proposed grant as outlined above is consistent with IDA's Articles of Agreement.

26. It is recommended that the Executive Directors approve:

   (a) a waiver of the eligibility criteria for a grant from the IDA17 Regional Program; and

   (b) a grant from the IDA17 Regional Program to IBRD as Trustee of the PEF for an amount of US$50million.

FROM: Vice President and Corporate Secretary

Pandemic Emergency Financing Facility: 
Global Pandemic Response through Establishment 
of a Financial Intermediary Fund

1. Attached is a Memorandum of the President and proposal entitled "Pandemic Emergency Financing Facility: Global Pandemic Response through Establishment of a Financial Intermediary Fund", dated April 13, 2016. This proposal will be discussed at a meeting of the Executive Directors scheduled for May 3, 2016. This document is being distributed with 3 days less than the required lead time for Board policy items. The timetable is driven by external deadlines. Subject to Board approval of the establishment of the FIF, the goal is to launch the PEF at the Ise-Shima Summit (May 26-27, 2016).

2. Questions on this document should be referred to Ms. Basu (ext. 82854), Mr. Chawla (ext. 81291), or Mr. Bennett (ext. 85099).

Distribution:
Executive Directors and Alternates
President
Bank Group Senior Management
Vice Presidents, Bank, IFC and MIGA
Directors and Department Heads, Bank, IFC and MIGA
MEMORANDUM TO THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTORS

Pandemic Emergency Financing Facility:
Global Pandemic Response through Establishment of a Financial Intermediary Fund

1. I submit for your approval a proposal for the WBG’s engagement in support of the Pandemic Emergency Financing Facility (PEF), a program that will provide surge funding for response efforts in IDA countries to help prevent rare, high-severity disease outbreaks from becoming pandemics.

2. One of the sobering lessons of the recent Ebola crisis in West Africa was how ill-prepared the world was for such a deadly disease. The experience with Ebola pointed not only to the lack of capacity in low-income countries to deal with such a severe disease outbreak, but also, to serious weaknesses in the ability of the international community to provide a timely, coordinated, and scaled-up financial response.

3. Developed by WBG in consultation with the World Health Organization (WHO) and other partners, the PEF will provide surge funding for response efforts that support the deployment of health workers; provision of drugs, vaccines, essential medical equipment and supplies, food, etc.; and coordination and communication. It will also help to encourage and strengthen ongoing efforts toward better pandemic preparedness.

4. The PEF will help fill a critical gap in the global pandemic financing architecture. It will step in by providing the much-needed financing required by IDA countries after the initial outbreak and before large-scale humanitarian relief assistance can be mobilized. The PEF will complement existing and new financing mechanisms including IDA’s Immediate Response Mechanism and Crisis Response Window as well as the WHO’s Contingency Fund for Emergencies.

5. The PEF will bring several benefits. First, it will enable a quick and timely response to crises – with crisp, contractual rigor that the private sector brings. Second, it will leverage private funds, helping to bring scale to response efforts. Third, and more broadly, by embedding preparedness in a strategic, long-term approach, the PEF will help strengthen both country and global focus on preparedness.

6. The World Bank Group will serve as PEF Trustee, coordinator, Responding Agency, and Treasury Manager.

7. The PEF satisfies the principles of selectivity applicable to new engagement by the World Bank Group in partnerships and financial intermediary funds as enumerated in the Management Framework for World Bank Partnership Programs and Financial Intermediary Funds: Strategic Engagement, Oversight and Management.
8. The strategic, operational, financial, partnership and stakeholder risks and risk mitigation strategies associated with the PEF are detailed in Section V of the paper.

9. I recommend that the Executive Directors approve the establishment and administration of the PEF. Specifically, this entails the following: (a) establishment of the PEF as a Financial Intermediary Fund, (b) Bank support to the PEF as Trustee, coordinator, and Responding Agency; and (c) Bank’s Treasury support to the PEF such that IBRD is authorized to issue bonds or enter into insurance arrangements to provide pandemic risk coverage, provided that the Trustee has cash contributions or legally binding commitments from development partners that are sufficient to cover all relevant coupon, premium, and other costs over the life of such coverage, as set out in paragraphs 72, 73, 74.

Jim Yong Kim
President

By Joachim Levy
Managing Director and Chief Financial Officer
PANDEMIC EMERGENCY FINANCING FACILITY -
GLOBAL PANDEMIC RESPONSE THROUGH A FINANCIAL INTERMEDIARY FUND

MAY 3, 2016

Development Finance, Human Development, and Treasury Vice-Presidencies
## Abbreviations and Acronyms

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tr>
<td>AIDS</td>
<td>Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome</td>
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<td>CCRIF</td>
<td>Caribbean Catastrophe Risk Insurance Facility</td>
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<td>CDC</td>
<td>Centers for Disease Control and Prevention</td>
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<td>CSO</td>
<td>Civil Society Organization</td>
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<td>CFE</td>
<td>WHO Contingency Fund for Emergencies</td>
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<td>CRW</td>
<td>IDA Crisis Response Window</td>
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<td>DDO</td>
<td>Deferred Drawdown Option</td>
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<td>DON</td>
<td>Disease Outbreak News</td>
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<td>ECOWAS</td>
<td>Economic Community of West African States</td>
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<td>FCS</td>
<td>Fragile and Conflict-Affected Situations</td>
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<td>FIF</td>
<td>Financial Intermediary Fund</td>
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<td>GAVI</td>
<td>The GAVI Alliance (formerly Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunization)</td>
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<td>GDP</td>
<td>Gross Domestic Product</td>
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<td>GHSA</td>
<td>Global Health Security Agenda</td>
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<td>GPAI</td>
<td>Global Program for Avian Influenza Control and Human Pandemic Preparedness and Response Project</td>
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<td>H1N1</td>
<td>Hemagglutinin 1 Neuraminidase 1 virus (referred to as “swine flu”)</td>
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<td>HIV</td>
<td>Human immunodeficiency virus</td>
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<td>HNP</td>
<td>Health, Nutrition and Population Global Practice</td>
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<td>IBRD</td>
<td>International Bank for Reconstruction and Development</td>
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<td>IDA</td>
<td>International Development Association</td>
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<td>IFC</td>
<td>International Finance Corporation</td>
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<td>IFRC</td>
<td>International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies</td>
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<td>IHR</td>
<td>International Health Regulations</td>
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<td>IMC</td>
<td>International Medical Corps</td>
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<td>IRM</td>
<td>IDA Immediate Response Mechanism</td>
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<td>JEE</td>
<td>Joint External Evaluation tool</td>
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<td>MDB</td>
<td>Multilateral Development Bank</td>
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<td>MERS</td>
<td>Middle East Respiratory Syndrome (also MERS Coronavirus)</td>
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<td>MSF</td>
<td>Médecins Sans Frontières</td>
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<td>OCHA</td>
<td>United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs</td>
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<td>OIE</td>
<td>World Organization for Animal Health</td>
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<td>PEF</td>
<td>Pandemic Emergency Financing facility</td>
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<td>REDISSE</td>
<td>Regional Disease Surveillance Systems Enhancement</td>
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<td>SARS</td>
<td>Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (also SARS-associated Coronavirus)</td>
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<td>TCIP</td>
<td>Turkish Catastrophe Insurance Pool</td>
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<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<td>UNHCR</td>
<td>United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees</td>
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<td>USAID</td>
<td>United States Agency for International Development</td>
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<td>World Bank Group</td>
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<td>World Food Programme</td>
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Executive Summary: Pandemic Emergency Financing Facility

1. Development Purpose: Pandemics pose a serious threat not only to global health security, but also to economic security and to our ability to end extreme poverty and achieve the Sustainable Development Goals. The Pandemic Emergency Financing Facility (PEF) tackles a financing challenge critical to managing severe disease outbreaks with pandemic potential. Learning from the lessons of Ebola, the PEF is designed to help fill the pandemic response funding gap that occurs after the period of immediate to early investigation, assessment and response – and before large-scale disaster and humanitarian relief funding is mobilized. Developed by the World Bank Group (WBG) together with the World Health Organization (WHO) and other partners, the PEF will provide the much needed surge funding for response efforts in IDA countries to help prevent rare, high-severity disease outbreaks from becoming pandemics. The PEF will be an important new complement to existing global and WBG financing mechanisms for investing in health system strengthening and outbreak preparedness.

2. The PEF will help fill this critical funding gap as a new financing mechanism that:
   - Channels essential, timely surge financing to key responders efficiently, including governments, multilateral agencies, and CSOs, to stop or slow down an outbreak with pandemic potential and to minimize its health and economic consequences; and
   - Helps catalyze the creation of a global market for pandemic insurance instruments by drawing on resources from reinsurance and capital markets.

3. The PEF will be an innovative insurance-based mechanism comprising insurance and cash windows. PEF funding under the insurance window will be provided by resources from the reinsurance market combined with the proceeds of catastrophe bonds issued by IBRD, and will provide a maximum coverage of US$ 500 million for an initial period of three years to IDA-eligible countries, which have relatively weak health systems and are less capable of mobilizing the financial resources to effectively respond to major outbreaks. Insurance premiums (defined to include insurance premiums and bond coupons) will be funded by development partners. To complement the insurance window, the PEF will include a donor-funded cash window of US$ 50-100 million for IDA-eligible countries.
4. The PEF’s insurance window will rely on clear parametric activation criteria designed with publicly available data. Unlike traditional indemnity insurance, parametric instruments work from an analytic model to calculate the payout of the insurance policy. Once activation criteria are met, parametric insurance can be settled in days, compared to the time it takes for traditional indemnity insurance payments to be disbursed. Using this approach, the PEF will be able to provide immediate resources to countries and international agencies to respond to situations with pandemic potential.

5. The PEF design seeks to maximize public health outcomes while achieving affordable premiums. PEF financing will be used to cover outbreaks of infectious diseases most likely to cause major epidemics, including new influenza, Coronavirus (e.g., SARS, MERS), Filovirus (e.g., Ebola, Marburg) and Crimean Congo, Rift Valley, and Lassa fevers. The targeted initial coverage will be a maximum of US$ 500 million for three years; annual premiums under the catastrophe bonds and insurance contracts are expected to be in the range of US$ 55-65 million and will provide the foundation for the PEF.

6. The PEF’s cash window will complement the insurance window, recognizing that severe outbreaks from unknown or newly emerging pathogens may occur that do not fit or have not yet met the activation criteria. The principles guiding the use of the cash window will follow those used for insurance but with greater flexibility in terms of the amount and frequency of payouts and the range of pathogens.

7. The PEF will provide a conduit for more harmonized and efficient pandemic response funding for PEF-eligible country governments and responding agencies including UN agencies, multilateral development banks and civil society organizations. To ensure efficient and fast disbursement, the PEF will have a simple governance structure as well as transparent and rapid allocation and payout arrangements. The PEF will also foster global and country preparedness, by incentivizing creation of specific plans, for direct management of PEF funds by countries. Indeed better preparedness is critical to effective pandemic response, and requires investments in core public health functions, such as disease surveillance, diagnostics, laboratory networks, infection prevention and control, and community engagement.¹

8. In summary, the PEF is a pilot effort in managing pandemic risk that is expected to yield several global public goods over time. First, it will provide a faster, timely, and more cost-effective response to severe outbreaks with pandemic potential, which will save lives and protect economies. Second, it will leverage private sector resources to scale up the outbreak response. Third, it will improve transparency and accountability in global and national response efforts. Fourth, the PEF’s design embeds crisis preparedness in a longer term, strategic approach by encouraging countries and the international community to develop pandemic response plans as well as to step up critical investments in health system strengthening and outbreak preparedness. Finally, the PEF is expected to play a key market development role by helping create a new market

¹See, for example, “Pandemics: An Ounce of Preparedness”, The Economist, March 19-25, 2016. The article refers to a recent report published by the National Academy of Medicine, which suggests that just US$4.5 billion a year (equivalent to about 3% of what rich countries spend on development aid) devoted to preparing for pandemics would make the world a lot safer. http://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21695036-crises-infectious-diseases-are-becoming-more-common-world-should-be-better-prepared.
for pandemic risk insurance. The private sector may take this forward on its own in a few years, but in the current landscape, WBG and development partners will be filling an important gap in the global development finance architecture by spearheading the development of a new, innovative instrument to deal with a novel risk. It is likely that over time, as the market matures, the PEF will scale up and pricing will become more competitive – as has been seen with catastrophe risk insurance facilities.

9. **Recommendation**: As detailed in this Memorandum, the PEF will make financing available to provide surge funding for a timely and effective response to disease outbreaks with pandemic potential, saving lives and protecting developing country economies. It is recommended that the Executive Directors approve the establishment and administration of the PEF. Specifically, Management recommends approval of the following: (a) establishment of the PEF as a Financial Intermediary Fund, (b) Bank support to the PEF as Trustee, coordinator, and Responding Agency; and (c) Bank’s Treasury support to the PEF such that IBRD is authorized to issue bonds or enter into insurance arrangements to provide pandemic risk coverage, provided that the Trustee has cash contributions or legally binding commitments from development partners that are sufficient to cover all relevant coupon, premium, and other costs over the life of such coverage, as set out in paragraphs 72, 73, 74.
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I. Introduction

1. One of the sobering lessons of the recent Ebola crisis in West Africa was how ill-prepared the world was for such a deadly disease. The experience with Ebola pointed not only to the lack of capacity in low-income countries to deal with such a severe disease outbreak, but also to serious weaknesses in the ability of the international community to provide a timely, coordinated, and scaled-up response.

2. Pandemics pose a serious threat to both global health and economic security, as well as to our ability to end extreme poverty and achieve the Sustainable Development Goals. The recent Ebola outbreak infected almost 30,000 people, resulted in more than 11,000 deaths, wiped out hard-earned development gains in Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone and cost more than US$2 billion in lost GDP in those three countries. Last year also saw the spread of the highly infectious MERS virus to the Republic of Korea, which contributed to a decline in the country’s GDP growth to a six-year low. The current Zika outbreak in the Americas has brought the threat of pandemics back to the top of the global health agenda. Estimates suggest that if the world were to face a fast-moving, airborne disease, such as the Spanish flu outbreak of 1918-19, it would kill more than 33 million people in 250 days and erode 4.8 percent of global GDP – more than US$3.6 trillion.

3. As the threat of pandemics grows in a globalized world where viruses move and mutate faster than ever before, so does the case for strengthening pandemic risk management. This requires first and foremost investments in pre-outbreak preparedness – i.e., to build resilient health systems in all countries that include strong core public health capacities (disease surveillance, detection, diagnostics, data sharing, etc.), particularly in the poorest countries. Second, it requires strengthening national and international capacity to respond to health emergencies, including the ability to provide timely and effective surge financing to contain severe outbreaks and prevent them from turning into pandemics. Third, it requires bolstering capacity and financing to deal with recovery from outbreaks. Indeed, these investments in pandemic risk management should be considered as vital to any country’s health and development agenda.

4. The proposed Pandemic Emergency Financing facility (PEF) is designed to help fill a critical gap in the international aid architecture, as one part of the global solution to strengthen pandemic risk management. The PEF will help fill the financing gap that occurs after the initial outbreak occurs and before large-scale humanitarian relief assistance can be mobilized. Funds made available quickly in this timeframe are essential to preventing a severe outbreak from becoming a pandemic. Developed by WBG in consultation with the World Health Organization (WHO) and other partners, the PEF will provide surge funding for response efforts that support the deployment of health workers; provision of drugs, vaccines, essential medical equipment and supplies, food, etc.; and coordination and communication. It will also help to encourage and strengthen ongoing efforts toward better pandemic preparedness, complementing and reinforcing the need to build strong and resilient health systems and accelerate the achievement of universal health coverage.

5. The PEF will bring several benefits. First, it will enable a quick and timely response to crises – with crisp, contractual rigor that the private sector brings. Second, it will leverage private funds, helping to bring scale to response efforts. Third, and more broadly, by embedding
preparedness in a strategic, long-term approach, the PEF will help strengthen both country and global focus on preparedness.

6. **Over the longer term, it is expected that the PEF will play a key role in developing a market for pandemic risk insurance – a novel risk area.**
   - The analytical research and design work underpinning the PEF’s development has already spurred wider research activity in the field of pandemic risk modelling and begun to spark investor interest in pandemic risk. The PEF’s analytical design builds on widely accepted probabilistic modeling, and on public data and historical experience from WHO and other sources. Standardizing data collection and analysis is essential to making pandemic risk an insurable and marketable asset.
   - Over time, the PEF should help encourage a better understanding of pandemic risk, which in turn can catalyze new products, attract new players and capital, build investor confidence in this risk class, and help develop a new market. As reinsurers and capital markets investors gain familiarity with pandemic risks, market interest will likely increase and the overall price of such coverage will fall, as seen in the catastrophe risk insurance space.
   - As the market develops, PEF coverage can expand to new risks and help develop regional pandemic insurance markets. For example, the PEF could help the development of regional insurance markets for filoviruses, which do not spread as rapidly as influenza.

7. The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section II provides the background and context for the PEF, outlining the importance of preparedness and response. Section III focuses on the design of the PEF. Section IV outlines the governance and operationalization of the PEF. Section V contains issues related to risks and risk mitigation. The paper concludes in Section VI.

II. Background and Context

2.1 Pandemic Risk Management Framework

8. **Pandemic risk management must include financing to support a phased set of country-centered, globally supported activities.** These include: (1) pre-outbreak preparedness; (2) investigation, assessment, and immediate response; (3) response containment; and (4) recovery (see Figure 1). As response and support for country pandemic risk management plans moves through each of these phases, different funding amounts are needed, channeled through different partners, different planning processes, and different instruments. Traditional country and development financing – loans, credits, and grants – is used to build country preparedness as well as support recovery from pandemic loss. In the context of this overall pandemic risk management framework, financing from IDA and IBRD, as well as financing from other MDBs, bilateral donors and development partners, supports both preparedness and recovery efforts. It should be noted that the issue of pandemic preparedness will also be discussed in the context of the on-going IDA18 replenishment negotiations.
9. Over the past year, a series of deliberations and reports from experts and stakeholders has produced a comprehensive and consistent set of recommendations on what needs to be done to address systemic failures in country and global preparedness and response. Collectively, these recommendations urge far-reaching improvements in global, national, regional, and local public health systems, capabilities and infrastructure; in international leadership for preparedness and response; and in research and development related to infectious disease treatment and prevention.

10. These reports highlight actions needed globally, and include specific recommendations to the WBG and development partners related to the financing of preparedness and response to pandemics. The Harvard-LSHTM Panel suggests that multilateral development banks including WBG should create economic incentives for early reporting, and commit emergency funds to assist countries when outbreaks strike. The Commission on a Global Health Risk Framework for the Future at the National Academy of Medicine recommends that the WBG should convene other multilateral donors for preparedness financing. The UN High Level Panel on the Global Response to Health Crises also suggests that the WBG, together with WHO and other international organizations, development partners, foundations and the private sector, should mobilize financial and technical support to strengthen preparedness. Both the Commission and the UN High Level Panel ask the WBG to establish response financing mechanisms such as the PEF.

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2.2 The Critical Role of Preparedness

11. **Investing in preparedness yields significant returns.** Recent expert analyses have concluded that the expected impact of pandemic flu is US$570 billion per year, while just US$4.5 billion a year spent on preparedness – equivalent to about 3% of what rich countries spend on development aid – could make the world much safer. The WBG has estimated that system improvements in public health and animal health to meet the minimum standards of WHO and the World Organization for Animal Health (OIE) would cost US$ 3.4 billion a year. In comparison, the economic benefit of better preparedness is estimated to be ten-fold, or US$ 36.7 billion annually. Investing in preparedness contributes to shared economic prosperity, both by avoiding losses when disasters occur, and by stimulating innovation and economic development when investment risks are reduced.

12. **Smart and timely investments can make a difference.** The ability of the health system to mount an effective response to Ebola virus outbreaks in Nigeria, Democratic Republic of Congo and Uganda highlight the importance of preparedness even in the context of overall weak systems capacity. The experience of Vietnam, which implemented a comprehensive One-Health program encompassing agriculture, health and education sectors, illustrates what can be achieved when preparedness efforts are scaled up.

13. **Before the recent Ebola outbreak in West Africa, several global initiatives had established a set of guidelines, tools, and technical assistance to help countries improve their preparedness and response capacity.** The International Health Regulations (IHR) guide countries in detecting, assessing, and responding to all events that could potentially constitute public health emergencies of international concern and reporting them to WHO. Another WHO guidance expanded preparedness to include other sectors (e.g., veterinary, education, interior) in a One-Health approach. More recently, a number of countries have promoted a broader Global Health Security Agenda (GHSA), which provides technical targets that encompass key activities related to the prevention of outbreaks, promotion of key practices and actions to improve response capacity of countries.

14. **However, assessments have found that 80 percent of the world’s countries have not met their international legal obligations to implement the IHRs.** Of the 194 eligible states, 127 (65 percent) responded to a WHO questionnaire on their state of progress in 2013. Only 13 of the responding member states claimed to have fully put in place IHR capacities, and only 74 reported having developed national plans to meet their core capacity requirements. An assessment in 2013 reported that 43 of 46 African states had done core capacity assessments, but none had fully implemented their national IHR plans. Most countries had not updated their legal framework to incorporate IHR (2005) provisions.

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15. Despite available development assistance, country preparedness has been lagging because requirements for preparedness are complex. Preparedness requires an adequately trained and equipped public health workforce, a strong surveillance and response framework, a functional national public health laboratory, a solid legal and regulatory foundation, and robust multi-sectoral coordination. Many components reside in different parts of government (Figure 2). Many countries have struggled even to draft a national plan of action with specific activities, timelines, and budgets. Political willingness and commitment to act on preparedness and to sustain investments over time is a key factor.

**Figure 2: Framework for Financing Preparedness**

16. Together with WHO, USAID and other development partners, WBG is taking a fresh look at the financing of preparedness, and is developing a framework that identifies different levels of government that need to take on the financing responsibility. This framework will map available domestic and international public and private sector funds according to specific elements of preparedness, and help decision-makers complement and reinforce financing to specific uses and situations.

17. As part of its ongoing work on health system strengthening, WBG is also stepping up its support to help developing countries improve outbreak preparedness and response. In the last decade, WBG has invested US$ 4 billion in IDA and US$ 8 billion in IBRD countries in health system strengthening. In addition, the Global Financing Facility for Every Woman Every Child is making available resources in frontline capacity such as community health workers to provide the foundation for prevention, early detection, and containment.

18. WBG is investing in regional preparedness efforts such as the ongoing US$ 129 million East Africa Public Health Laboratory Networking Project, which is operational in Burundi, Kenya,
Rwanda, Tanzania and Uganda. A new US$310 million Regional Disease Surveillance Systems Enhancement (REDISSE) Project in West Africa seeks to address systemic weaknesses within the animal and human health systems that hinder effective disease surveillance and response, and strengthen epidemiological intelligence and laboratory capacity of selected ECOWAS member countries.

19. The WBG has also scaled up support for pandemic crisis response and recovery. Between 2014 and 2015, the WBG committed US$1.62 billion to support Ebola crisis response and recovery efforts in Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone, including strengthening their health systems and improving outbreak preparedness. This has included a US$450 million commitment from the IFC, aimed at enabling continuity of trade, investment and employment in the three countries. More recently, WBG made available US$ 150 million to countries in Latin America and the Caribbean affected by the Zika virus outbreak to support a range of activities to ensure a robust, well-targeted, well-coordinated and multi-sectoral response.

20. A number of development partners have also made available significant sums of money to help countries strengthen their preparedness and response capabilities. For example, as part of the GHSA, the US has committed US$1 billion to build core capacities in a number of developing countries, including Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone. To tackle future outbreaks of epidemics, the G7 in 2015 announced support for 60 countries to implement the International Health Regulations. Germany has led the launch of the Healthy Systems Road Map with a EUR 200 million commitment for health system strengthening. Japan is advancing investments in preparedness through its leadership to help developing countries accelerate achievement of universal health coverage. The EU and its Member States, which pledged over EUR 1.2 billion to fight the Ebola epidemic, committed a further EUR 414 million to provide emergency measures and longer-term support, as well as for the development of vaccines and treatments. The United Kingdom has launched the GBP 195 million Fleming Fund to tackle the global problem of drug-resistant infection. The Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation has committed funds for disease surveillance networks in Africa and Asia to prevent childhood mortality and help prepare for the next epidemic.

2.3 The Importance of Response

21. While much more needs to be done to strengthen preparedness, even a well prepared national system may be overwhelmed by a severe disease outbreak. Cash needs increase dramatically for severe events the longer it takes to mount a substantial and comprehensive response. WHO’s Contingency Fund for Emergencies (CFE), UN’s Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF), UNICEF and WFP, and humanitarian agencies like MSF and IFRC, come in with early response support for high-frequency outbreak— but these amounts are not sufficient if the outbreak escalates. After the severity and urgency of the crisis become apparent, humanitarian finance begins to flow in larger amounts. However, between these early response efforts in the US$ thousands and low millions, and larger, humanitarian response in the US$ billions, there is a critical funding gap for amounts in the US$ millions when it becomes clear that an outbreak has pandemic potential and is spreading rapidly, but before catastrophic loss may be evident.
22. Further, there are many known pathogens with pandemic potential that have no effective prevention or treatment. For unknown or new pathogens, neither treatment nor good diagnostics exist. When severe outbreaks do occur, the current approach to financing country and global response is slow, fragmented and crisis-driven. Dependent on “pass the hat,” donor-by-donor financing, it typically comes in too late for a fast-moving, deadly outbreak. The time that it took domestic and international authorities to mount an organized and efficient response during the recent Ebola outbreak demonstrated these deficiencies.

23. If the PEF had been in place as the Ebola outbreak began to spread in West Africa in 2014, the outcome could have been very different. Figure 3 shows how the availability of surge funding in the early summer of 2014, rather than in the fall, could have helped to save thousands of lives and avoided loss in the tens of billions of dollars in terms of both GDP and development assistance contributions for the Ebola crisis response and subsequent recovery to date. Significant amounts of donor assistance for the affected countries were made available only at the end of September 2014 and later, at which point the number of Ebola cases was already skyrocketing and the crisis was full-blown. The PEF as designed would have facilitated the mobilization of US$100 million as early as July 2014, with US$180 million in subsequent weeks thereafter – sums of sufficient size that they could have made a significant shift in the response and in the resulting trajectory of the outbreak.

24. Recognizing this need for responsive financing at critical points, a wide range of global leaders and health experts, including the aforementioned expert assessments of lessons learned from Ebola, G7 leaders, leaders at the World Economic Forum, and others have called for development of a quick disbursing financing mechanism to provide surge funding for response efforts to help prevent a severe outbreak from becoming a pandemic. The 2015 G7 Summit
Communique stated that, “The Ebola outbreak has shown that the timely mobilization and disbursement of appropriate response capacities – both funding and human resources – is crucial… We support the initiative taken by the World Bank to develop a Pandemic Emergency Facility.”

25. The proposed PEF, which has been developed by the WBG in consultation with WHO and other partners, addresses this critical financing gap. In the context of an outbreak that demonstrates sustained growth, geographic spread and severity in terms of loss of life or morbidity, financing from the PEF would be activated after early investigation and response to an outbreak, when it shows clear signs of reaching pandemic potential, and before significant humanitarian flows arrive. Mobilizing public and private financing and relying on pre-set and objectively measurable activation criteria, the PEF will provide timely surge funding to governments, multilateral agencies and Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) to help prevent low-frequency, high-severity outbreaks with pandemic potential from becoming pandemic – and prevent the human and financial costs from escalating.

26. WBG has worked closely with WHO to design the PEF and ensure that it complements existing pandemic response finance instruments, including WHO’s CFE. Launched in May 2015, WHO’s CFE is designed to provide the organization with immediate liquidity to address an early-stage event. The CFE aims to replenish WHO’s own finances for the first three months, and under exceptional circumstances, six months of an event. In this way, the CFE is an internal cash flow mechanism that helps ensure that WHO has the resources at hand to fulfil its mandate and responsibilities, and to meet the expectations of the global community in the earliest phase of an outbreak or emergency with health and humanitarian consequences.

27. The PEF will complement the WHO’s CFE. The CFE, which is aims to replenish WHO’s own financing, is meant to provide support when an emergency event is verified, and before funds from other financial mechanisms, including the PEF, begin to flow. The PEF, which triggers after an outbreak reaches a significant size, is designed so as to not overlap with or duplicate the role of the CFE. The CFE is designed to respond to all hazards, i.e., disease outbreaks as well as all other emergencies with health and humanitarian consequences including natural disasters. In contrast, the PEF is designed to respond to outbreaks from a defined set of viruses. A further distinction between the CFE and the PEF is that payouts from the CFE are determined through expert judgement in the case of very early releases up to US$ 100 thousand and thereafter by the outcome of a systematic risk assessment process that takes into account context and other qualitative as well as quantitative factors. The PEF insurance mechanism trigger function is dependent on quantitative data gathered on the outbreak which will determine whether the trigger conditions have been reached. In the event of a serious epidemic that the PEF would address, any...
interim period between CFE’s three month limit and the PEF triggering would be filled through appeals to donors and other financial facilities including UN mechanisms.

28. **The PEF complements WBG’s existing emergency response mechanisms, including the IDA Crisis Response Window and Immediate Response Mechanism (IRM).** The IRM aims to facilitate a rapid response in the aftermath of a natural or man-made crisis or emergency that is likely to cause major adverse economic and/or social impacts. Disbursements can be made within two weeks of a request from the borrower. The PEF can supplement IRM financing to existing IDA projects, once restructured. Another channel through which IDA countries can currently receive resources to address emergencies is through the Crisis Response Window (CRW). New or restructured IDA projects that receive co-financing from the PEF can receive supplementary funding down the road from the CRW, if required. The IFC will also respond in a complementary way with investments aimed at enabling continuity of trade, investment and employment in pandemic-affected areas. The IFC will seek to provide comfort to the private sector to continue support to local companies and small and medium-sized enterprises.

29. **The PEF is expected to complement other existing and new initiatives, including the African Risk Capacity (ARC).** ARC, which is a sovereign disaster risk insurer established by the African Union, is exploring the possibility of developing an insurance contract against outbreaks on behalf of countries, and is expected to provide funding for African governments that implement peer-reviewed and approved contingency plans against outbreaks. These contracts would be an ideal complement to the global coverage provided by PEF.

III. Design of the Pandemic Emergency Financing Facility

3.1 **Alternative approaches and reasons for selecting the proposed design**

30. **Various alternatives were considered before selecting the proposed design for the PEF.** One option considered was to rely fully on grant contributions from development partners. Initial discussions with development partners indicated a limited appetite for such a solution, to meet both the immediate as well as future requirements for funding the facility. Options involving the use of public funds to mobilize and leverage private sector resources were thus explored. Among the alternatives considered, a design that could leverage public funding to mobilize funds from insurance and catastrophe bond markets was found to be the most attractive as a workable and sustainable solution. An especially striking appeal of this option is that it makes it possible to use a relatively modest amount of public resources to mobilize a significant volume of private risk capital and deliver these resources in a timely manner to where they are most needed.

31. **Experience from catastrophe risk instruments developed by the WBG has informed the choice of the PEF’s design.** Catastrophe risk instruments have helped to create new markets and a growing culture of risk management in novel risk areas.

- One example is the Caribbean Catastrophe Risk Insurance Facility (CCRIF), designed to provide participating countries with access to affordable and effective coverage against natural disasters. CCRIF was established as a legal entity in 2007 as the world's first multi-country risk pool, and it was also the first insurance instrument to successfully employ a parametric policy backed by traditional insurance and capital markets (cat bonds issued by
the World Bank), to cover less frequent and more severe events, coupled with small, donor funded cash retention window, which has provided a flexible pool of funds to cover more frequent events that do not meet the specific activation criteria for insurance or events that the insurance coverage could not foresee or model. CCRIF was initially supported by funding from the World Bank, the Caribbean Development Bank and a number of governments, including Japan, the United Kingdom, France, Ireland and Bermuda. In 2014, CCRIF was expanded to include participation by Central American countries, with the support of grants from Canada, the United States and Mexico. CCRIF has helped grow the market and prices have fallen over time. Furthermore, while cost of premiums were initially covered by donors, client countries now pay their own premiums after evaluating their critical exposures.

- Another example is the Pacific Catastrophic Risk Facility (PCRAFI), a risk insurance pool of five small Pacific islands that was incubated by the WBG. Established in January 2013, this program now provides critical coverage against earthquake and tropical cyclone risk, as well as tsunami. PCRAFI was initially sponsored by the donor community, but now client countries pay their own premiums.
- A third example is Mexico’s MultiCat Catastrophe Bond program, developed with support from the WBG. Mexico issued its first catastrophe bond in 2006 to cover response costs to major earthquakes. Mexico invested substantially in risk mitigation and in its management of public assets and exposure. Since then, spreads on catastrophe bonds have narrowed, and Mexico’s increasing familiarity with reinsurance and capital markets has led to large reductions in premiums. This reflects both Mexico’s strong risk management culture and the acceptance by the market – as well as its demand for – this type of risk.
- The WBG helped establish the Turkish Catastrophe Insurance Pool (TCIP), a mandatory scheme for homeowners’ earthquake insurance. TCIP, which was backed by WBG financing at inception, has an insurance limit of over EUR 3.2 billion for the country and almost 90 percent of the pool is transferred to the private and international markets. Over time, TCIP has successfully created a growing culture of risk management and risk ownership in Turkey, which is mirrored in the growth of its domestic homeowner insurance market.

3.2 PEF: Key Design Features and Financial Structure

32. **PEF-eligible countries:** The PEF is designed to make resources available to help IDA countries respond to disease outbreaks before they take on pandemic proportions. While all countries are susceptible to disease outbreaks, low-income countries with relatively weaker health systems tend to be more vulnerable and less capable of mobilizing the financial resources to effectively respond to major outbreaks. Accordingly, the PEF will offer coverage to the IDA-eligible (i.e., IDA only and blend countries) countries, which would be eligible to receive funding in the event of a qualified outbreak.

33. **Eligible Responding Agencies could include MDBs, including the WBG; UN Agencies such as WHO, WFP, UNICEF, and other UN agencies; and CSOs in the initial phase.** Additional responding agencies may be accredited in due course.6 PEF funding allocated for PEF-

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6 The accreditation process is presented in Section IV.
eligible countries may be implemented by: (i) countries under the supervision of MDBs as Responding Agencies (country implementation modality); or (ii) Responding Agencies directly (Responding Agency implementation modality). In either case, responding agencies will assume the fiduciary responsibility for the use of funds received from the PEF.

34. **Eligible expenditures:** Resources from the PEF may be used to cover a range of pandemic response activities, including, but not limited to: (i) deployment of human resources; (ii) essential medical and non-medical supplies and equipment and lifesaving goods (medicines, personal protective equipment, disinfectants, power generators, food, etc.); (iii) logistics and supply chain; (iv) minor civil works and refurbishments (temporary care centers); (v) services (counseling, transportation, evacuation, needs assessment, maintenance, etc.); (vi) incentive mechanisms (hazard pays); and (vii) coordination, communication, management and information systems. PEF resources are not intended to finance preparedness or reconstruction efforts, such as national and regional disease surveillance and control institutions. These vital activities would need to be financed through existing channels, such as countries’ own budgets, bilateral assistance, UN agency or MDB financing including IDA credits or IBRD loans.

35. **The PEF will be established in the form of a financial intermediary fund (FIF) within WBG; its financial structure will include an insurance window and a cash window, which will complement each other.**

3.2.1 **Insurance window**

36. **The insurance window** will provide a targeted initial coverage of US$500 million over three years to cover infrequent, severe events. The insurance window will be funded through (a) reinsurance markets and (b) capital markets via a Catastrophe Bond. Under the insurance window, the World Bank through its Treasury will issue catastrophe bond(s) or enter into insurance contract(s) in the market. Insurance contracts will be entered into with major insurers and reinsurers, while the catastrophe bond will be placed with so-called Insurance-Linked Securities investors, who invest in catastrophe bonds linked to natural events as well as to longevity, mortality, and extreme mortality events (see Figure 4). Payments received by the World Bank Treasury from the insurance contract or the catastrophe bond will be transferred to the FIF (”pay-in”).

37. **Buying coverage in both the insurance market and the capital market helps lower the cost and increase the amount of coverage the PEF can obtain.** Different investors focus on different layers of risk. For example, some prefer the larger premiums that come from covering more frequent events, while others prefer to provide coverage for highly unlikely “tail” events. The private risk-takers, bond investors or insurance companies, will be paid a premium (hereafter referring to both insurance premia and bond coupons) commensurate with the risk they are taking.

38. **Premiums are estimated to be in the range of US$55-65 million annually.** They will need to be covered by development partner funding. This range reflects the trade-off between coverage and costs. Larger and earlier payments from the insurance window result in higher premiums relative to lower and late payments. Several permutations and combinations were
examined in order to arrive at the above least-cost option providing the desired public health outcome.

Figure 4. Overview of the PEF mechanism

39. Covered diseases: Coverage under the insurance window will be provided for high-severity events caused by the following pathogen groups: New Orthomyxoviridae (new Influenza virus A, B and C), Coronaviridae (SARS, MERS), Filoviridae (Ebola, Marburg) and other zoonotic diseases (Crimean Congo, Rift Valley, and Lassa). These diseases cover the top emerging diseases likely to cause major epidemics, and for which few or no medical countermeasures exist (WHO, 2015). Other diseases with epidemic potential – such as HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, malaria, and Dengue – are not covered because major financing and disease control networks, such as the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria and the GAVI Alliance, are already in place for these infections. Events related to endemic diseases, such as cholera, will not be covered since they do not assume pandemic proportions. Seasonal flu outbreaks will not be covered, as the risk is too high to be managed cost-effectively through insurance. The cash window will allow flexibility to provide response funding in terms of the frequency of payouts and the range of pathogens.

7 The initial list of disease priorities needing urgent R&D attention comprises: Crimean Congo hemorrhagic fever, Ebola virus disease and Marburg, Lassa fever, MERS and SARS coronavirus diseases, Nipah and Rift Valley fever. Three other diseases were designated as 'serious': chikungunya, severe fever with thrombocytopenia syndrome, and Zika. Other diseases with epidemic potential, such as HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis, Malaria, Avian influenza and Dengue, were not included in the list because there are major disease control and research networks for these infections, and an existing pipeline for improved interventions. See http://www.who.int/medicines/ebola-treatment/WHO-list-of-top-emerging-diseases/en/
Activation Criteria

40. The insurance coverage will use a carefully designed “parametric trigger”. Parametric triggers use publicly available and observable data to determine the payment amounts. As these triggers are based on observable data, they provide more transparency, increase the speed of payment and allow for an objective benchmarking of risk. No assessment of actual losses is required; if the activation criteria are met, the insurance will pay regardless of actual costs incurred on the ground. Two main advantages of parametric insurance are that: (i) it can be settled in days, compared to the longer time periods it may take to settle payments under traditional indemnity (re)insurance products; and (ii) it will provide immediate resources to countries and international agencies to respond to a pandemic situation. Both these are integral elements of the PEF’s value proposition.

41. To activate the insurance window pay-ins to the PEF, an event must meet specific criteria of “severity”. These criteria are based on outbreak size (i.e., number of cases or number of deaths), outbreak growth (i.e., the outbreak must be growing over a defined time period) and outbreak spread (i.e., two or more countries affected by the outbreak). The thresholds are based on the epidemiological characteristics of the diseases and associated outbreaks, and incorporate constraints stemming from affordability and risk appetite of investors and reinsurers.

- For influenza, there must be 2,000 confirmed cases (counted from all countries worldwide) within a rolling four-month period. For these cases, there must be epidemiological evidence of human to human transmission of a new influenza virus whose hemagglutinin gene is of animal origin and which is antigenically distinct from recently circulating human seasonal influenza viruses. The growth criterion is met if an outbreak increases from 2,000 confirmed cases to over 5,000 confirmed cases within one month. At that point, the influenza pandemic would be confirmed and 100% payout of the maximum US$300 million coverage would be paid out.

- For Coronavirus and Filovirus, local outbreaks (within one country) are not considered to be pandemic and thus are not covered by the insurance mechanism; they are expected to be covered by the WHO CFE, countries themselves, or other sources of funding. Regional outbreaks affecting two to seven countries would activate insurance payments at three stages as the number of confirmed deaths increases. Global outbreaks affecting eight or more countries also activate payments at three stages but provide access to higher funding levels at the first two stages. Payout for coronavirus, filovirus and others will occur based on a rolling number of probable and confirmed cases observed within a 3 month period in IDA and IBRD countries. Filovirus and other diseases (Lassa Fever, Rift Valley, and Crimean Congo) will need to surpass 250 confirmed cases, or a combination of confirmed and probable cases where at least a third of cases are confirmed, in order to meet the outbreak size criteria. For coronavirus, the outbreak would need to surpass at least 150 confirmed cases or a combination of confirmed and probable cases where at least a fifth of cases are confirmed. For filovirus, coronavirus, and other non-influenza diseases, exponential growth greater than zero will also have to be achieved.

- For purposes of the activation criteria, classification of single or multi-country outbreaks and aggregate number of deaths is applied to both IDA and IBRD countries; however, only IDA

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8 Payouts from the cash window will be used to support one-country disease outbreaks which meet the other criteria of severity and growth. Please also see para 46.
countries are eligible to receive payment from the PEF. That is, an outbreak in two countries, one an IBRD (middle-income) country that is not a PEF participant, and the other an IDA (low-income) country, could trigger the activation criteria (i.e., pay-ins), but PEF funding would be available only to the IDA-eligible country (i.e., payouts).

42. **Both insurance and catastrophe bonds would be constructed around the same transparent and indisputable activation criteria**, based on a stochastic model developed by AIR Worldwide. A leading modeling firm in the insurance-linked securities market, AIR Worldwide was engaged through a competitive bidding process to build the underlying risk model for the PEF. The core of the model is AIR’s statistical database tracking historical disease outbreaks back to the beginning of the 20th century. The model applies a series of assumptions to this extensive database, including the state of development of the local health systems, economic conditions, time to response, and social factors.

43. **Pay-ins from catastrophe bonds or insurance are expected to be quick.** The post-event loss calculation, or activation criteria process, will start with a notification (Event Notice) from the PEF or the WB Treasury to the calculation agent (AIR Worldwide). The event notice may be issued as soon as Disease Outbreak News (DON) or a Situation Report is published by WHO. AIR is expected to take up to three business days from the reception of the Event Notice to the declaration of the activation criteria and will continue to report on the event covered for each subsequent weekly or bi-weekly period until the event covered is, for all intents and purposes of the coverage, over. As soon as the event is declared a qualifying trigger event, the WB Treasury will submit either a claim to insurers under the insurance contracts, expected to be paid within a week, or send a notification of a reduction of principal amount to the bondholders.

44. **Real time data are essential element of the design of the PEF insurance mechanism.** Real time data for a given epidemic/pandemic will come directly from WHO, which has pledged its support to maintain the provision of the data necessary for generating the output of any loss trigger.

45. **Pay-in from the insurance window under the PEF varies by disease, severity and geographic spread.** The maximum payment under the PEF per event is capped at US$ 300 million for influenza, US$ 200 million for Filovirus (Ebola), US$ 250 million for Coronavirus (SARS, MERS), and US$ 100 million for other diseases. With the exception of influenza, for which the entire payment will be made when the criteria thresholds are reached, payment for other diseases will be disbursed in tranches according to the number of deaths. For outbreaks in more than one but less than eight countries, PEF will pay 30 percent, 60 percent and 100 percent of the maximum amount if the total number of deaths are 250, 750 or 2500 respectively. For outbreaks in eight or more countries, the PEF will pay 35 percent, 70 percent and 100 percent of the maximum amount if the total number of deaths are 250, 750 or 2500 respectively (Table 1).
Table 1. Pay-in from Capital and Insurance Markets

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>New Pandemic Influenza</th>
<th>Maximum Coverage:</th>
<th>Pay-in based on:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>$300m</td>
<td>Aggregate Number of Confirmed Cases</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>At 5000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>100% (US$300m)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*To qualify, an outbreak must increase from 2,000 confirmed cases to over 5,000 confirmed cases within one month.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Coronavirus</th>
<th>Maximum Coverage:</th>
<th>Pay-in based on: Aggregate Number of Confirmed Deaths within IBRD/IDA Countries</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>$250m</td>
<td>At 250</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional (i.e., outbreaks affecting more than one but less than eight countries)</td>
<td>30% (US$ 75 m)</td>
<td>60% (US$75 m)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Global (i.e., outbreaks affecting more than eight countries)</td>
<td>35% (US$ 87.5 m)</td>
<td>70% (US$87.5m)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Filoviridae</th>
<th>Maximum Coverage:</th>
<th>Pay-in based on: Aggregate Number of Confirmed Deaths within IBRD/IDA Countries</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>US $200m</td>
<td>At 250</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional (i.e., outbreaks affecting more than one but less than eight countries)</td>
<td>30% (US$60m)</td>
<td>60% (US$60m)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Global (i.e., outbreaks affecting more than eight countries)</td>
<td>35% (US$70m)</td>
<td>70% (US$70m)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ADOM (Rift Valley, Lassa Fever, Crimean Congo)</th>
<th>Maximum Coverage:</th>
<th>Pay-in based on: Aggregate Number of Confirmed Deaths within IBRD/IDA Countries</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>$100 m</td>
<td>At 250</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional (i.e., outbreaks affecting more than one but less than eight countries)</td>
<td>30% ($US 30m)</td>
<td>60% ($US 30m)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Global</td>
<td>35% ($US 35m)</td>
<td>70% ($US 35m)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

9 Although the activation criteria for pay-ins to the insurance window are based on cases which occur in both IBRD and IDA countries, payouts will be channeled to IDA-eligible countries only.
3.2.2 Cash Window

46. To provide greater flexibility and allow for a response to a severe event that fails to meet the PEF’s activation criteria for an insurance pay-in, the PEF will include a cash window. The cash window has four purposes: (i) to provide supplemental financing for pathogens covered by insurance, but that clearly merit larger or earlier payouts than provided by the activation criteria and allocation arrangements; (ii) to provide financing to severe single-country outbreaks; (iii) to provide coverage for new or unknown pathogens not covered by insurance; and (iv) to serve as a conduit for efficient and effective surge financing during crisis for development partners to channel resources to affected countries. The cash window would be administered following the basic principles underpinning the activation criteria. Disbursements from the cash window will have similar procedures as those for insurance or capital market proceeds, but with a greater degree of flexibility.

47. An initial cash window of US$ 50-100 million, with amounts to be replenished annually, would ensure an effective public health response and would be an appropriate complement to insurance coverage of US$ 500 million. This amount also represents the maximum payment for pathogens such as the Crimean Congo, Rift Valley, and Lassa fevers, which the WHO considers meaningful to finance a response in the event of a severe outbreak.

3.3 Funding by Development Partners

48. Funding from development partners is sought in support of both the insurance and the cash windows of the PEF. It should be noted that these contributions may be provided in a number of forms, including direct cash payments and promissory notes, and also through arrangements to pay in installments. To cover the needs for funding under the cash window, payments could be conditioned on specified replenishment need. Costs associated with the administration of the FIF will also be recovered from development partner contributions.

IV. Governance and Operationalization of the PEF

4.1 Governance and Administration of the PEF

49. The PEF will be governed by a steering body, which will serve as the decision-making body responsible for setting the strategic direction, policy-making, allocation of payouts, and monitoring and evaluation. Representatives from all donor countries contributing to the PEF are proposed to be members of the steering body. Key partners, such as IDA borrower country representatives, WBG and WHO may be asked to join the steering body as non-voting members.

50. Individuals from an expert roster will be available for the steering body to provide technical advice related to outbreaks for which funds have been requested. The expert roster will be a group of individuals selected from leading academic and research institutions globally, with specific expertise in epidemiology for infectious diseases.

51. An advisory committee representing the global community engaged in pandemic response will meet periodically. This committee will be drawn from academia, research agencies,
public health agencies, UN agencies, CSOs, and other relevant entities. It will meet to share information and consider global issues relating to pandemic preparedness, response and financing, and it will have a sponsoring role for simulations and annual drill exercises.

52. **WBG will designate a coordinator who will be charged to manage the PEF.** The coordinator will, *inter alia,* (i) interact with the various WBG units involved in the implementation of PEF; (ii) serve as the interface between the PEF, its steering body and advisory committee, development partners, PEF-eligible countries, responding agencies, and technical experts, as necessary; (iii) be responsible for stakeholder engagement and communication; and (iv) undertake such other tasks as may be assigned by the steering body.

53. **Working with partners, WBG will prepare an operations manual** that details standards, policies and procedures governing payouts from the PEF to countries and responding agencies, including all necessary forms such as the Request-for-Funds application form.

54. **In addition to its role as coordinator, issuer of the catastrophe bond and beneficiary of the insurance contracts, the World Bank will also serve as the Trustee of the FIF established to support the PEF.** The Trustee will administer the FIF for purposes of receiving funds from contributors, bondholders and insurance companies via the World Bank’s Treasury and holds those funds. The roles and responsibilities of the Trustee include establishing and managing the FIF at the WBG; signing agreements with contributors, Responding Agencies and others as necessary; managing contributions, payment and funds transfers; investing funds held in the PEF; reporting to the steering body on financial status and activity; preparing financial reports and single audit reports; and coordinating with the PEF coordinator. Costs related to the functions of coordinator, Trustee, issuer of the catastrophe bonds and beneficiary of the insurance contracts will be recovered on a full cost basis from the FIF.

55. **Funds transferred by the Trustee to Responding Agencies are expected to be used and administered in accordance with their applicable policies and procedures,** including procurement, financial management, disbursement and safeguards (environmental and social) policies, framework to prevent and combat fraud and corruption, and screening procedures to prevent the use of PEF resources to finance terrorist activity. The Trustee will have no responsibility or accountability for the use of funds transferred to responding agencies. In particular, the Trustee has no responsibility, fiduciary or otherwise, for the use of funds by responding agencies or for the underlying operations financed by PEF resources. Responding agencies will bear fiduciary responsibility for the end use of funds they receive from the Trustee.

4.2 Accreditation Process

56. **The PEF steering body will determine whether the applicant entity is an appropriate partner.** An outside expert, such as an international accounting firm, will be engaged to review accreditation candidates. The Trustee will check that the outside expert is a reputable entity whose terms of reference, contracts and interests ensure independent review of the applicants. The outside expert will review whether candidates have appropriate institutional capacity and fiduciary controls in place to be an effective implementing partner.
57. The process to identify major Responding Agencies has been initiated. These include the traditional MDBs (African Development Bank, Asian Development Bank, Inter-American Development Bank, European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, and European Investment Bank), who often co-finance projects with the Bank. The compatibility of their safeguards and fiduciary rules with those of the Bank has been demonstrated. Many UN agencies have standing fiduciary agreements with the Bank, particularly in the context of emergencies. MDBs and UN agencies that have recently co-financed operations with the Bank or that have standing fiduciary agreements with the Bank could be eligible to receive or supervise the use of PEF resources without further due diligence. Other institutions interested in being Responding Agencies, including CSOs, would need to be accredited through a process under the PEF steering body.

58. Responding Agencies may charge costs related to the implementation of PEF resources which should be identified in the funding request and should follow each responding agency’s applicable cost recovery policies and procedures. The roles and responsibilities of the responding agencies are expected to include, as relevant: (i) coordinating and exchanging information with relevant country level coordination mechanisms; (ii) supporting countries in preparing funding requests for which they are designated responding agencies; (iii) implementing or providing implementation support to countries under the approved terms of allocations; (iv) ensuring that PEF resources are administered in accordance with the responding agencies’ applicable policies and procedures; (v) providing financial and progress reporting to the steering body through the Trustee and the PEF coordinator(s); (vi) providing inputs to the annual reports of the PEF through the PEF coordinator(s); and (vii) cooperating with reviews or evaluations of the PEF commissioned by the steering body under terms acceptable to the responding agencies. As with any FIF, other MDBs could supervise response operations led by the country. Each Responding Agency would adapt its role to the country circumstances following its own policies and procedures.

4.3 Payout Process

59. The payout process is guided by the principles of speed, adequacy and flexibility; it is designed to be as predictable as possible in terms of timing and allocable amounts. In situations where there is no ambiguity regarding the type, severity, growth and spread of the outbreak, and in which the pay-in is activated by unequivocally measured parametric criteria under the insurance window, the payouts will be made with minimum deliberation and will follow ex-ante established procedures. In all other cases, payouts will be made following due consideration by the steering body based on expert advice and evidence, and will be tailored to the outbreak situation. Time limits will be set to ensure that the deliberation process does not delay payouts.

60. In order to initiate the process for a payout, the eligible country will submit a Request-for-Funds application. The application will contain details of the outbreak, including the name of the virus family, name of the specific virus member, outbreak start date, outbreak size (cases), outbreak growth (record of weekly cases), deaths if any, amount requested, designated responding agencies, and risk profile prepared or endorsed by WHO. The application will be transmitted to the coordinator.
61. The coordinator will disburse the funds under the insurance window promptly following receipt of a Request-for-Funds application: (i) that meets all activation criteria; (ii) that includes the related risk assessment endorsed by WHO; and (iii) when funds from the insurance pay-ins have been received in the FIF. All affected countries will be eligible to submit an application for funds in a proportion pro-rated according to number of cases (at the time activation criteria are met) in the country and country population.

62. If a Request-for-Funds application is received for outbreaks for which the activation criteria is not met, the coordinator will consult with the expert roster. The experts will examine the submitted evidence, WHO risk assessment, externally available evidence and such other sources as necessary, and communicate their advice on the severity of the unfolding outbreak to the coordinator. The coordinator will present the application together with the advice of the experts to the steering body, which will take a decision on the payout from the cash window within 24 hours. Agreed procedures for payouts will be set out in the Operations Manual.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Box 1: Hypothetical PEF Response to the Ebola Outbreak in West Africa, 2014</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>23 March 2014:</strong> Guinea notifies WHO of a rapidly evolving outbreak of Ebola Virus Disease (EVD), and reports a total of 49 cases including 29 deaths.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>7 July 2014:</strong> Guinea reports a total of 412 cases and 305 deaths from Ebola; Sierra Leone reports 252 cases and 101 deaths; and Liberia reports 115 cases and 75 deaths. The activation threshold of the PEF is reached: number of deaths is over 250 and growth rate in cases is over 90%. WBG/PEF Coordinator sends an Event Notice to the Calculation Agent to verify if the thresholds for criteria activation have been reached.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>10 July 2014:</strong> AIR declares that the threshold has been reached. IBRD advances payment of US$60m to the PEF. IBRD also sends a notification of a reduction of principal amount to the bondholders.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>11 July 2014:</strong> The coordinator consults with the steering body and obtains authorization to draw an additional US$40 million from the cash window. Based on payout details in the Operations Manual, the coordinator divides US$100m among Guinea, Sierra Leone and Liberia.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>7 August 2014:</strong> WHO declares Public Health Emergency of International Concern for Ebola.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>10 August 2014:</strong> The number of confirmed deaths in the three affected countries reaches 750, which triggers the second payment of US$60 million from insurance. Following similar procedures as above, the coordinator requests the steering body for an additional US$40m from the cash window and disburses US$100m to Guinea, Sierra Leone and Liberia.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>29 September 2014:</strong> The number of confirmed deaths reaches 2,500, which triggers the third payment of US$80 million. The coordinator disburses US$80m to the three affected countries and responding agencies.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Overall, the PEF paid out a total of US$280 million, distributed across the three affected countries and responding agencies as follows: Guinea (US$43m), Sierra Leone (US$37m), Liberia (US$31m), WHO (US$56m), WFP (US$56m) and UNICEF (US$56m). These resources financed ongoing emergency response (essential supplies, staff training, protective equipment, essential drugs, etc.), human resources scale up (hazard pay, deployment of international doctors, etc.), and provision of food and basic supplies.
63. The distribution of funds from the PEF across Responding Agencies is designed to optimize effectiveness of response. This includes assessment of national capacities as well as comparative advantages of accredited responding agencies. Box 1 presents a simulated scenario of how the PEF might have worked had it been functional in 2014 when West Africa experienced the Ebola virus outbreak.

4.4 Monitoring and Evaluation of the PEF

64. The PEF steering body will approve a Monitoring and Evaluation Framework for the PEF. The coordinator and advisory committee may recommend, and the steering body may decide on, adjustments to improve PEF performance in both non-emergency and emergency situations.

V. Risks and Risk Mitigation

5.1 Strategic Risk

65. The risk that PEF funds will not be sufficient to address all the needs of a given outbreak is real. Any reputational issues arising from this will be addressed through positioning the PEF clearly from the start as one part of the solution to strengthen pandemic response. Indeed, the PEF has been designed to be complementary to other existing and new mechanisms.

66. WBG will play multiple roles in the PEF. To address any perceived conflict of interest, a key requirement will be clear separation of roles and responsibilities, and ensuring that separate management chains are in place for roles it plays with respect to bond and insurance transactions (WB Treasury), as Trustee (DFi), coordinator (HNP) and as steering body member (HNP). On the steering body, the possibility of conflict will be mitigated by the fact that the WBG would have a non-voting seat, along with other significant non-voting members such as WHO. The coordinator function will be well defined in the PEF framework document and operations manual, and coordinator actions and recommendations will be subject to review or confirmation by the steering body (or otherwise follow a clear set of criteria, procedures and guidelines set out in the PEF operations manual).

5.2 Operational Risk

67. Moral Hazard: There is a perception that the coverage provided by the PEF to countries could be seen as reducing incentives for countries to invest in pandemic preparedness. On the contrary, discussions around the PEF have already raised significant awareness on the importance of preparedness among both development partners and country governments. Furthermore, the PEF’s design embeds preparedness in a strategic, long-term approach by including design features that will channel a higher proportion of funds to country governments that can demonstrate their planning and capacity to use the funds effectively and efficiently.

10 The development of metrics, such as the recently-developed JEE tool, to comprehensively evaluate country preparedness and response capacity, will facilitate a more objective assessment of the country’s ability to effectively implement its own response vis-a-vis its need to be supported by international responding agencies.
68. **Design Risks:** The PEF relies on a transparent, data-driven, model to assess the potential of an outbreak, but cannot predict the future. The PEF model measures the potential risk that a particular outbreak represents against a set of key criteria and based on available data. The model, and as a consequence the PEF, may underestimat e that risk, resulting in a situation the design intended to cover but where insurance is not triggered. One response to this risk will be the availability of funds from the cash window to provide more flexibility. Over time, the PEF’s ability to assess risk accurately will improve as data design and availability improve. This aspect of the PEF will be communicated clearly from the start. The PEF must be viewed as a complement, not an alternative, to traditional risk analysis that relies on quantitative as well as qualitative information and currently guides public health decisions.

69. **Using rules-based processes for pay-in and payout will help the PEF fulfill its objective of a timely response.** The processes set in place to activate PEF funding seek to balance the objectives of speed with flexibility. Pay-in from the private sector under the catastrophe bonds and insurance contracts is based on transparent, parametric contractual activation criteria. In situations where there is no ambiguity regarding the type, severity, growth and spread of the outbreak, and in which the pay-in is activated by unequivocally measured parametric criteria and received in the FIF, the payouts will be made with minimum deliberation and will follow ex-ante established procedures. In all other cases, payouts will be made from the cash window following due consideration by the steering body based on expert advice and evidence, and will be tailored to the outbreak situation. Time limits will be set to ensure that the deliberation process does not delay payouts.

5.3 **Financial Risk**

70. **Financial risks arising from participation in the PEF can be adequately mitigated; No WBG funds are invested in the initiative.** That said, the team has examined and developed mitigation measures to address: (i) counterparty credit risk in respect of insurance coverage payouts, (ii) donor credit risk in respect of insurance premium or interest payments; and (iii) possible disputes that delay payments or lead to legal actions.

71. **Counterparty credit risk with respect to insurance coverage payouts to the PEF.** As discussed above, there are two general types of instruments that may be used in the PEF. There is no counterparty credit risk associated with the catastrophe bond option (donor risk with respect to coupon payments is discussed below). Investors will pay the full principal amount (equivalent to the maximum insurance payout) up front when purchasing the bond, and IBRD Treasury will control the use of the proceeds during the life of the bond. If the activation criteria are triggered, IBRD Treasury will transfer the relevant amount to the PEF. Thus, payouts to the PEF will always be available under the bond option. If IBRD uses other mechanisms to provide coverage, including insurance or other equivalent transactions, there is some residual risk of a counterparty default: If acting strictly as an arranger, IBRD would not be guaranteeing payment on insurance coverage. Therefore, IBRD would not advance or transfer any sums to the PEF until payments were received from the relevant third party coverage providers. Accordingly, any counterparty defaults under insurance or equivalent contracts would mean that payments on the relevant coverage would not be available to the PEF. As Treasury Manager for the PEF, IBRD would attempt to limit any such
risks. IBRD would mitigate counterparty credit risk by selecting only reputable and creditworthy insurance companies or other counterparties and by requiring adequate collateral. The selection of counterparties and the relevant risk mitigation provisions to be used will be agreed between CROMC and Treasury. IBRD may also act as an intermediary in the insurance market, meaning that IBRD would pay the PEF in the event that the activation criteria are triggered, even if IBRD did not receive payment from its insurance company counterparty due to insolvency or other reasons. IBRD has successfully acted as intermediary in several other disaster risk insurance operations. As intermediary, IBRD would apply the same criteria described above to mitigate its counterparty credit risk - e.g., by selecting only reputable and creditworthy insurance companies or other counterparties and by requiring adequate collateral.\(^\text{11}\)

72. **Donor credit risk with respect to the insurance premium payment to insurance companies or interest payments to bond investors.** Donor contributions received in the FIF will be used to pay insurance premiums and interest on bonds. Accordingly, non-payment by a donor could result in a cash shortfall that would prevent IBRD from paying insurance premiums or coupons to investors. In the basic form of these transactions, IBRD would receive full payment upfront to cover all contractual insurance premiums (based on the desired term of the contract) or CAT bond funding premium (portion of the coupon paid to investors for the CAT risk) for the life of the bond. Alternatively IBRD could enter into an arrangement with donors whereby payments were made over time, provided that the additional risks and costs borne by IBRD were fully mitigated and/or compensated. Key risk mitigation measures are as follows: IBRD will only issue a bond or sign an insurance contract when it has cash contributions or legally binding commitments from development partners that are sufficient to cover all relevant interest, premium, and other payments over the life of the relevant bond or insurance contract. In addition, IBRD will require sufficient cash on hand to cover the first year of bond coupons or insurance premiums. Nevertheless, this practice could entail accepting a certain degree of credit risk – for example, if IBRD issues a three-year bond, IBRD would be obligated to make interest payments over the full lifetime of the bond, potentially relying in part on such future payment commitments.

73. **To manage this risk, Management has developed in the past a set of parameters which will provide the Bank with sufficient protection, consistent with its other risk management tools available against this form of credit exposure\(^\text{12}\).** The parameters developed include the following key aspects: (a) only exposure to highly-rated sovereign donors would be permitted taking into account methodologies the Bank currently uses in management of similar risk; (b) donors within this category would be required to sign legally-binding and enforceable contracts to make payments upon the Bank’s request, each of which will be supported, where appropriate, by external counsel legal opinions to the effect that such obligation to pay by the donor is indeed legal, valid, binding and enforceable; (c) the Bank as Trustee would call for the donor’s share of funds well in advance of when the sums are actually required to meet payment obligations under


\(^{12}\) Other examples where donors have provided such commitments include in relation to the International Finance Facility for Immunisation and the Advance Market Commitment for Pneumococcal Vaccines and the Pilot Auction Facility for Methane and Climate Change Mitigation. There has not been a default by any donors as a result of such arrangements under those programs.
the bonds or insurance contracts, as applicable; and (d) a commitment fee on outstanding payments owed to the Bank would be charged, as determined and amended from time to time by Senior Management depending on how other risk management tools available against this form of credit exposure are amended. Management proposes that the above parameters be used for the PEF, as necessary, to manage donor credit risk.

74. **As necessary, management could also explore the use of other risk mitigation features.** Such risk mitigation features include the use an early redemption provision on bonds under which the bonds would be redeemed early and the principal amount be returned to investors if development partner payments were not sufficient to cover future interest payments. In such a case, the parameters set out in paragraph 73 will not be applicable.

75. **Furthermore, IBRD should not be liable towards the insurers and bond holders in case of disputes related to coverage payouts.** The PEF’s insurance window will rely on clear parametric activation criteria designed with publicly available data. Unlike indemnity insurance, parametric instruments work from an analytic model to calculate the payout of the insurance policy. Once activation criteria are met, parametric insurance can be settled in days, compared to the time it takes for traditional indemnity insurance payments to be disbursed. The legal documentation will make it clear that the determinations of the WHO are final and binding on all parties, similar to other calculation and determination agent provisions in commercial contracts. While one cannot rule out nuisance suits by litigious parties, the risk of successful suits can be reasonably mitigated by clear legal documentation. Furthermore, as noted above, IBRD will enter into insurance contracts with reputable counterparties who are familiar with parametric triggers, which should also mitigate disputes and litigation risk.

5.4 Partnership and Stakeholder Risk

76. **The success of the PEF depends upon a collaborative relationship between the Bank and WHO, which relies on member States for data.** For this reason, the WBG has worked closely with WHO to design the PEF in a manner that speaks to the two organizations’ respective strengths. While the Bank provides a financial platform to the PEF, the WHO is in charge of collecting information from member States, which are responsible for surveillance. The PEF structure relies on WHO data provided from member States, notably making outbreak information public. The risk is mitigated by the obligations set out in the International Health Regulations and the coverage (three years). If a partnership element were to deteriorate, the coverage could be discontinued or not extended.

77. **The PEF’s design, structure, analytics and modeling rely on extensive consultations with development partners,** most fundamentally a working group comprising WBG, WHO and three private sector firms: AIR Worldwide, Munich Re and Swiss Re. In view of the importance of using all grant resources with particular care and focus on value-added, the World Bank has taken specific precautions to establish appropriate incentives and aligned interest where possible, as described below, and none of the three private sector firms will sit on the steering body of the PEF.
78. AIR Worldwide, an analytics and modeling firm, was engaged by the World Bank through a competitive procurement process. The analytic structure and modeling is the bedrock of a risk transfer transaction: AIR Worldwide is the world’s largest modeling firm as measured by issued volume in insurance-linked securities and has the necessary confidence of market participants. Of the three firms that bid in response to the Request for Proposals, AIR Worldwide had the most mature model, the best execution capabilities and the most competitive price. AIR’s incentives to create a successful transaction are aligned with those of the World Bank, and its remuneration is independent from the premium of the insurance (flat fee for development plus a success fee tied to the size of the transaction).

79. Swiss Re and Munich Re assisted in developing and structuring the PEF transaction model, a new project for both the WBG and the insurance industry. Of the six insurance companies contacted by WBG about this role, Swiss Re and Munich Re demonstrated unique expertise in developing new transactions in the Catastrophe Bond market, and possessed requisite knowledge and interest in investing resources in a potential new market.

80. For PEF Catastrophe Bond issuance, Swiss Re’s and Munich Re’s interests are aligned with those of the WBG. As structurers, the firms are paid a flat fee for the development work leading to the finalization of the securities market transaction. In the case of a Cat Bond, WBG is not committed to make any cat bond offering, and it retains the right, and expects, to involve other parties in any Cat Bond offering. In a Cat Bond transaction, fees will be paid on a success basis and relative to the notional amount of the bond. The level of premiums on Cat Bonds will have no impact on the remuneration of Swiss Re or Munich Re.

81. For PEF (re)insurance, Swiss Re and Munich Re will compete with other insurance companies. The tranche structure allows for a portion of pandemic risk to be transferred to the reinsurance companies, potentially enabling the PEF to provide more notional coverage, and reduce pricing. The risk transfer to re-insurance will be done on a price discovery basis by soliciting interest and pricing on a competitive basis, with multiple insurers able to bid on the whole or portions of the risk. Munich Re and Swiss Re will provide coverage only if they provide the same or a better price than other (re)insurance companies.

VI. Conclusion and Recommendation

82. The PEF has been designed to achieve the specific health purpose of providing timely funding to support response efforts for events with clear pandemic potential. To obtain substantial financing at the right time, it will rely on private insurance and capital markets, made possible through payment by development partners of associated risk premiums. It is hoped that this innovative approach will contribute to the development of a global market for pandemic risk transfer. It will generate related benefits around the design, availability and transparency of data that will help all development partners be better prepared for the unpredictable and severe risks posed by pandemic crisis. The initiative carries a number of risks which Management believes have been identified and can be mitigated or managed. Recognizing the critical value and lower cost of prevention as compared to emergency response, the PEF will work in parallel with – and help to incentivize – development partner efforts to build and improve preparedness.
83. Subject to Board approval of the establishment of the FIF, the goal is to launch the PEF at the Ise-Shima Summit (May 26-27, 2016); making the PEF operational requires a number of different work streams, described above and in progress. These include:

- Establishing the governance and operating arrangements, including negotiating a framework document setting out the governance and operating arrangements of the PEF, and signing the financial procedures agreements (FPAs) with the first group of responding agencies;
- Issuing the catastrophe bonds and entering into the insurance contracts that are the core of the PEF: In order to do so, cash will be required to cover first year premium payments and costs, along with firm commitments for financial support in amounts sufficient to cover premiums for the coverage period. Contribution agreements will need to be signed with development partners to provide a total amount of US$200-300 million over the initial three-year period to cover premium contributions (approximately US$165-195 million) and the cash window (US$50-100 million). Sufficient resources would need to be in hand to cover the premium for the first year (US$55-65 million); premiums for subsequent years would fall due in 2017 and 2018.
- With the required amounts and commitments, placing the insurance products on the markets. After this, the insurance coverage can be made effective within one to two months.

84. It is recommended that the Executive Directors approve the establishment and administration of the PEF. Specifically, Management recommends approval of the following: (a) establishment of the PEF as a Financial Intermediary Fund, (b) Bank support to the PEF as Trustee, coordinator, and Responding Agency; and (c) Bank’s Treasury support to the PEF such that IBRD is authorized to issue bonds or enter into insurance arrangements to provide pandemic risk coverage, provided that the Trustee has cash contributions or legally binding commitments from development partners that are sufficient to cover all relevant coupon, premium, and other costs over the life of such coverage, as set out in paragraphs 72, 73, 74.