1. Project Data:

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2. Project Objectives and Components:

a. Objectives:

The Project Development Objective (from the Project Appraisal Document, PAD, page 6) is "to contribute to the implementation of the Education Sector Program by improving access to better quality primary education."

The Legal Agreement's statement of the objective is slightly more specific but essentially the same: "The objective of the Project is to contribute to the implementation of Phase 2 of the Recipient's Ten Year Program for the Development of Education for the Implementation of its Education Law No. 98-12 of June 1, 1998, referred to in the Recipients' Prime Minister Letter of Education Policy for 2002-2012 (the "Program"), by improving access to better quality education."

b. Were the project objectives/key associated outcome targets revised during implementation?

No

c. Components:

The project had three components (PAD, page 7):

(a) **Increased access and equity in primary education** (appraised at US$ 5.65 million, actual costs US$5.99 million)

This component was to support:
- the construction and equipment of 400 classrooms and latrines mainly in rural areas;
- the organization of information campaigns to increase awareness of the benefits of girls’ education, in liaison with a promotion of Proximity Sensitizing, which showed satisfactory results during the first phase of the program; and
- the provision of awards to promising female students at the regional level.

(b) Improved quality in primary education  (appraised at US$ 1.58 million, actual costs US$ 0.98 million)

This component had three sub-components:

- the publication and distribution of about 412,260 textbooks and 546,000 other reading materials (booklets);
- the development and implementation of a pre-service and in-service teacher and inspector training program to update teachers' and inspectors' competencies; and
- the implementation of a pilot consisting of the provision of micro-grants to School Management Committees for the financing of learning tool kits that would help improve quality.

(c) Strengthening the management capacity of the central and local levels  (appraised at: US$ 0.77 million, actual costs US$ 0.91 million)

This component had two sub-components:

- strengthening the capacity of the School Management Committees. This sub-component aimed to train members of School Management Committees in diagnosing and planning for improved girls' participation in education and in managing funds for the purchase of school materials. These activities were designed to improve community participation and ownership of education.

- strengthening the capacity of the Ministry of National Education (MEN) in critical areas in line with the Education Sector Plan training program. Activities under this sub-component included: (i) training of local agencies in Results Based Management; (ii) training of a core team of trainers on strategic planning; and (iii) training of a team to undertake annual Public Expenditure Reviews.

d. Comments on Project Cost, Financing, Borrower Contribution, and Dates:

Project Cost: The total cost of project activities was projected to be US$ 8 million. Only US$ 7.64 million was disbursed. The difference was due to the fact that some booklets for students were not purchased and also to currency fluctuations.

Project funds were reallocated in November 2011 to allow for a six-month extension of the closing date, to enable completion of some construction and equipment activities that had been held up by slow procurements. These reallocations took place because of higher than initially estimated costs in civil works, including fluctuations in the US-FCFA exchange rate, tax issues (see below), and increases in the cost of materials for classroom construction and furniture.

Financing: The project was financed by a catalytic grant from the Fast Track Initiative (now known as the Global Partnership for Education) and covered only a small amount of the overall education program budget, the financing for which came from multiple donors and the government working in parallel on Education Program activities. The Catalytic Fund financing amounted to only 4% of the overall budget for the broader Education Sector Program for the project period. Overall, Catalytic Fund financing covered 12% of the classroom construction budget, 4% of the girls' education activities, 2% of the teacher pre-service training and 22% of the teacher in-service training activities, and 4% of the total cost of the institutional development activities in the broader Program.

Borrower Contribution: No specific financial contribution was made by the Borrower for activities under this project. The Government was contributing substantially to the overall Education Sector Program.

Dates: The Project was implemented during a time of political instability that started prior to effectiveness and continued into the implementation period. This resulted in internal divisions and negative reactions from donors, including the suspension of aid. In addition to delaying effectiveness, the instability led to a coup in February 2010. The Bank then decided to suspend operations. Effectiveness was eventually declared on March 15, 2010.

This project had a short time frame of two years. The project was restructured in November 2011 to extend the closing date by six months. This was to allow for completion of classroom construction and the acquisition of furniture and books for classrooms. Procurement was behind schedule, as the project had a delayed start of six months due to the political situation that resulted in changes in staffing at the Ministry of National Education. These staffing changes led to decreased procurement capacity and consequent delays in implementation.
3. Relevance of Objectives & Design:

a. Relevance of Objectives:

Relevance of Objectives is rated High.

The objectives chosen for the project were relevant and drawn from the country's Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) of 2007, which includes improvement in access for the poor to quality social services as one its four main pillars. In addition, the May 2008 Country Assistance Strategy (CAS) identifies the need for creating equitable access to quality social services as one of seven pillars (p. 9). Niger was ranked in 2008 as 174th out of 179 on the United Nations Development Programme Human Development Index, with 61% of the population living in extreme poverty, and this project focused on impoverished rural areas. GDP was low, affected by the impact of environmental disasters on a largely rural agricultural economic base.

The project was based on previously identified issues facing the education sector that were included in Phase II of the Government Education Sector Plan 2003-2013. This Plan was endorsed by the donors in December 2008 with respect to Fast Track Initiative (FTI, now renamed Global Partnership for Education) engagement and financing. Key issues addressed by that Plan included those targeted by the project: the lack of schools, teachers, equipment, and learning materials in rural areas. Fifty percent of primary school structures are temporary in nature. Constructed of straw remaining after harvesting, many rural buildings were often dismantled and used for fodder by the end of the school year, leading to loss of learning time.

Demand-side issues relating to the actual and opportunity costs for rural parents of sending their children to school were addressed through school grants and the purchase of textbooks. The poor quality of education is attributed to a combination of factors, including those mentioned above, as well as limited and poor quality teacher training, which was also included in the project. Activities to support School Management Committees addressed the need to decentralize to improve local ownership as well as deconcentrate responsibilities for education system management.

b. Relevance of Design:

Relevance of Design is rated Modest.

The project time frame was a short two-year period. The activities identified relate directly to the Government program and to the project's objective. The three components cover access, quality, and institutional issues. However, the project included perhaps too many activities for such a small amount of funding and short time frame. In some cases, inputs to particular sub-sectoral issues were very small, perhaps reflecting the need to bolster policy decisions and reflect standard education project design which usually includes more than just infrastructure. A stronger focus on one or two activities might have been easier to manage and had greater impact in the limited time frame.

4. Achievement of Objectives (Efficacy):

Improve Access to Primary Education: Substantial

Outputs

- Construction of 264 rural classrooms (target 345). The Government had not realized during project planning that it was possible to include taxes in the calculation of project costs. When this became an issue due to budget constraints, construction activities were reduced and fewer single -classroom schools than had been anticipated were built. This construction is still underway, and information on how many communities need to provide doors and windows to complete school buildings constructed under the project is not available.
- By the end of the project the whole country had benefited from campaigns to improve girls' enrollment, with a special emphasis being placed on the nine areas with lowest girls' enrollment.
- A system of prizes for best-performing girls was piloted in 139 communities, with 417 girls receiving prizes.
- Local levels of government and the community were empowered to take control over school construction as part of decentralizing responsibility for management of the education system. A stakeholder workshop held at project completion noted the benefits of newly constructed classrooms and teacher training but also noted variable success of involvement of the School Management Committees in construction.

Outcomes
The project had modest and appropriate outcome targets for access. At the national level, the primary school gross enrollment rate increased from 62% in 2007/8 to 76% in 2011, far exceeding the target of 70%. Primary school gross enrollment in rural areas increased from 58.9% in 2007/8 to 70% in 2011, exceeding the target of 67%. The latter certainly was impacted by project activities that were targeted to rural areas.

Nationally, girls' share in primary school enrollment increased from 42.7% in 2007/2008 to 44.2% in 2011, in essence meeting the target of 45%. In the four targeted regions of Dosso, Doutchi, Tessaua, and Madoua, gross girls' enrollment was 83.9%, 82.9%, 92.1% and 77.6% in 2009/10 and 87.1%, 84.4%, 93.7% and 86.4% in 2010/2011, respectively. Given poor data quality, some of these increases should be considered marginal over the two year period, not significantly different than changes at the national level. There is no information in the ICR on the socio-economic levels of students in these areas, although it is assumed they would have been in the poorest quintiles given that the project targeted poorer rural regions.

The long-term effect of the pilot for prizes for girls is being monitored by the Ministry of Education to determine the success of the program, but no outcome data are yet available.

**Improve Access to Better Quality Primary Education: Modest**

**Outputs**

- The project financed the delivery of 412,260 textbooks and 31,000 teacher guides that reached schools by the time the ICR was written. These materials contributed to increasing the textbook-to-student ratio from 0 to 1:3 for students in Grades 3 and 4 and to 1:2 for Grades 5 and 6. However, other booklets and teaching materials were not purchased as anticipated due to delays in contracting.
- A pilot program in one inspectorate, Konni, covering about 40,000 students, tested the delivery of learning materials at lower cost to parents through the use of School Management Committees.
- Quality issues were also addressed through a teacher training program that aimed to ensure that teaching materials and teaching practices were harmonized, student teachers received improved support during their training, and teachers in practice schools used the specific teaching approach of "learning by competencies." The project trained 98.4% of the target of 3,150 teachers.
- 96.5% of School Committee members were trained in micro-planning to assist them in identifying issues relating to girls' enrollment and in managing the school materials pilot activity. This capacity-building included single-classroom rural schools. The number of functioning school management committees increased from 10,162 in 2008 to 14,000 at the end of 2011.
- Some activities to strengthen the capacity of the Ministry of Education on various aspects of managing the system were not carried out. These were to have addressed the training of deconcentrated education system entities on results-based management, the training of a core team of trainers on strategic planning, and the training of a core team to undertake Public Expenditure Reviews on an annual basis. Parallel co-financing from other donors did train three staff people, and one Public Expenditure review was carried out contributing to improved analytic capacity at the Ministry and some policy changes.

**Outcomes**

- The national primary completion rate increased from 45.8% in 2007/2008 to 51.2% by 2010/11, exceeding the target of 50%, and the national average pass rate increased from 83.6% in 2007/8 to 89.5% in 2011, exceeding the target of 86.6%. However, the ICR does not specify whether the standards for passing and completion remained consistent throughout the project period.
- The program to involve school communities in the purchase of materials and the completion of school buildings is in place and functioning. Learning materials arrived in a timely fashion at the beginning of the school year, with transparent flow of funds through a system of local rather than central purchasing.
  According to the ICR, communities were apparently satisfied with the system, although it has not yet been possible to measure the impact of these activities and other learning material purchases on student learning, due to the short time frame of the project.
- The teacher training resulted in reported ownership of new approaches to teacher training, better support of practical training, changes in classroom practice, and improved exchanges between the existing and new teacher cadres (ICR, page 55). It is not clear how these outcomes were measured. This three-day training provided is only a start in improving the quality of teaching, and it was not possible to draw any conclusions as to longer term impact on student learning by project closure.

**5. Efficiency:**

Efficiency is rated Substantial.
The Project Appraisal Document (page 21) notes only that economic and financial analyses conducted for other ongoing operations remained valid at the time of appraisal. These analyses are based on the assumption that expenditures on basic education have a direct benefit on the health and productivity of agricultural workers. Evidence supporting this assumption has been proven for Niger, but sources are not cited in the ICR document.

**Component One**: The number of classrooms to be built under the project was reduced by 63 due to the need to finance taxes from existing project funds. Classroom costs were 11% higher than projected for this reason. Costs were also high because of remote locations for construction and security issues in the regions. These trends can be seen in other projects over the same period. The ICR (page 41) notes that the cost per square meter for the semi-finished classrooms built under this project was only slightly higher than those built under a similar UNICEF program. Under the financing plan, communities were to finance 10% of project costs, including doors and windows. It is not clear whether these classrooms have been finished and are in use. It is anticipated that the use of permanent structures will bring a cost savings to communities that previously had to replace temporary structures. However, this would not apply for classrooms in schools in new locations where the community had previously had no outlay for repairs.

An independent audit carried out from 2009-2012 considered the project construction component as equally or more successful than the construction that took place in parallel under the pooled funding. The project took recommendations from this audit into account when implementing construction activities.

**Component Two**: Actual prices for purchased textbooks and teacher guides were 40% and 29% lower than had been anticipated. These costs were reduced by the decision to author the materials in-country but contract out editorial and publication costs. Producing the content in-country avoided copyright fees for publishing company content. It is not clear how this method of producing content affected the quality of the work in the short time frame of the project, as book authorship is usually a long-term effort. If the quality had been different than normally achieved with external content procurement, this might not be efficient over the longer term.

Overall the project was subject to some implementation delays due to a slow start that made the use of funds less efficient. It is to be noted that service delivery in remote rural areas is usually more expensive than in urban areas due to transportation, staffing, and environmental difficulties, and therefore higher costs would be expected. The project did try to minimize some costs by passing 10% of construction costs to local communities.

The project was too short to evaluate how any of its activities impacted on the overall efficiency of the education system.

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### Economic Rate of Return (ERR)/Financial Rate of Return (FRR) at appraisal and the re-estimated value at evaluation:

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* Refers to percent of total project cost for which ERR/FRR was calculated.

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#### 6. Outcome:

The Relevance of Objectives is rated **High** and Relevance of Design is rated **Substantial**. The issues addressed by the project were drawn from and supported the overall aims of the broader government education program. The project's results chain was plausible and logical, with planned activities that should have helped lead to the achievement of its development objectives.

The access objective is rated **Substantial**, Not all the construction was completed, and girls’ enrollment improved in targeted areas. The project supported community engagement in school construction and the acquisition of some learning materials, leading to greater engagement in the education process.

The quality objective is rated **Modest** against the objective, as there was no means of determining whether the training and textbooks procured by the project were effectively put to use, or of testing learning outcomes within the project period.
Efficiency is rated **Substantial**, Project costs were kept down, which given the country geography is an achievement. Little evidence is given for the broader implications of the inputs for education sector efficiency but the project was not designed to address these.

**a. Outcome Rating**: Moderately Satisfactory

### 7. Rationale for Risk to Development Outcome Rating:

The project was implemented in a period of political uncertainty and change, and many of these challenges remain both for the country and for the surrounding region. At the present time the internal situation is stable, with a new democratically elected government in place. However, the potential for further political instability remains significant and poses a threat to overall progress in the country. Government commitment to basic education remains high, although fiscal constraints may also affect the sustainability of project activities.

Within the education sector, community engagement in basic education is substantial. However, the decentralization process has just started and will take some time before it is fully functional. This may pose challenges to decentralized activities such as the school grants. However most activities supported by this project are continuing under new funding and the overall program objectives remain relevant. Hence the risks to the development outcomes largely the political and fiscal vulnerability of the country context rather than a lack of willingness to improve education.

**a. Risk to Development Outcome Rating**: Significant

### 8. Assessment of Bank Performance:

**a. Quality at entry:**

Project preparation was disrupted by instability. Rebel activity in some parts of the country and a military response from the Government, together with the impact of the Libyan crisis and the subsequent movement of warring factions to the north of Niger, posed security threats. These threats led to the displacement of communities and affected the planning for project activities.

The project was prepared when the Fast Track Initiative guidelines were still under development. It was designed as a supportive grant to the broader Education Sector Program and the 2005 Niger Country Status Report, utilizing the Framework for that project adapted for a smaller number of components. These sources, as well as a 2006 school construction evaluation, led to an emphasis on providing local primary school infrastructure in ways that supported the education of girls and community involvement in education. The project design team drew on a large number of lessons learned from projects in other countries and in Niger, including: (a) the need to mainstream project implementation activities within existing government entities; (b) the need to support both infrastructure and quality improvements in education in order to ensure retention and graduation; (c) the knowledge that community involvement is vital to ensure management and accountability at the local level; and (d) the idea that quality improvements in education require trained leadership and skilled teachers.

The project design for supervision of classroom construction was constrained by supervision costs. It assumed that transportation and logistical support for supervision of classroom construction would be provided through a sharing arrangement using vehicles and technical support from a previous project. The classroom construction activities were dispersed across a wide geographical area, making these logistics crucial to adequate supervision. Due to the unstable political situation and personnel changes, however, equipment and support from earlier projects were not available for this project as anticipated, leading to supervision delays. This scenario could have been anticipated and either the location of classrooms altered, or the provision of logistical support included in the planned project activities.

Project design also significantly did not include taxes in the total project cost, an option that would have been available to the country as the Government was in a period of crisis when revenues had decreased significantly. When this flaw was discovered, funds from the Fast Track Initiative could not cover this amount, nor could the World Bank increase IDA funding as this was not a co-financed operation. When construction contracts had to include taxes, the costs were much higher than estimated, resulting in a reduction of about 30% in the number of classrooms constructed in order to remain within the funding envelope.
There was no Quality at Entry Review held for this project, which might have pointed out some of these issues.

**Quality-at-Entry Rating:** Moderately Unsatisfactory

### b. Quality of supervision:

The Bank team worked closely with the Government, being based in Niamey. It provided sound responses to a number of crises related to both political and implementation issues. Five supervision missions were carried out over the life of the project with sound technical staff. These were coordinated with Education Sector Program implementation and monitoring to ensure cohesion between donors, government, communities, and nongovernmental organizations. The Bank supervision provided intensive support to the local project team on issues such as procurement where implementation capacity was lacking.

According to the ICR (page vi), the project was rated Moderately Satisfactory through the middle of 2010, although there were no disbursements at that time and project activities were stalled because of political disruption. These ratings seem to be taken from the broader Education Sector Program implementation status reports and were not specific to this Catalytic Grant.

**Quality of Supervision Rating:** Moderately Satisfactory

**Overall Bank Performance Rating:** Moderately Satisfactory

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9. **Assessment of Borrower Performance:**

### a. Government Performance:

Political turbulence leading to staff changes impacted the ability of the Government to maximize project inputs. Some of the planned activities proved to be difficult to implementing during a time of instability and change, such as the sharing of resources at the decentralized level. Fiscal constraints prevented the addition of resources where needed. The need for staff training in appropriate project management led the Government to employ technical assistance.

However, the Government did continue to demonstrate strong commitment to sector policies and the policy and institutional changes recommended under the project, and it held extensive beneficiary and stakeholder consultations during preparation and at the conclusion of the project.

**Government Performance Rating** Moderately Satisfactory

### b. Implementing Agency Performance:

The project was implemented by the national Ministry of Education and regional directorates of education. It was a follow-up project using implementation and institutional arrangements that were already in place. Some activities were delayed through no fault of the implementing agencies. For example, bidding and draft contract documents for textbooks and construction had been completed during project preparation. However, the political upheaval resulted in delays of six to nine months in this process, resulting in the first construction contracts being awarded only in August 2011, about nine months prior to project completion.

The staffing difficulties previously noted led to delays in procurement and in financial management (see Section 11b), and arrangements for transportation for staff supervising construction were impeded by the lack of transport to remote classroom sites. However, despite these challenges, activities were mostly concluded successfully.

**Implementing Agency Performance Rating** Moderately Satisfactory

**Overall Borrower Performance Rating** Moderately Satisfactory
10. M&E Design, Implementation, & Utilization:

a. M&E Design:

The Monitoring and Evaluation design was based on the system in use for the overall Government Education Sector Program. This system included three main elements:
- Agreed project-specific indicators, both at Project Development Objective and Intermediate Outcome Indicator levels;
- A Technical Committee for Sector Budget Support Management and Monitoring; and
- Annual Joint Donor and Government reviews.

The PDO indicators were taken from the broader Education Sector Program. Given the very limited time frame of this project and the number of variables affecting outcomes, it would never have been possible to determine the impact of activities on the overall education program, particularly since some of the outputs were only achieved towards the end of the project. This reflects the use of a standard IDA lending instrument for a very short catalytic grant linked to the country Education Sector Plan. The design is intended to be coherent with the overall Education Sector Program rather than a stand-alone project.

b. M&E Implementation:

Responsibility for Monitoring and Evaluation was shared between three departments of the Ministry of National Education, with Regional Directors providing information from lower levels of the education system: the Department of Statistics and Information, the Department of Human Resource Management, and the Department of Planning and Studies.

Data collection methods seem to have been reliable and were monitored by donors, the Government, and the Bank as well as by NGOs. Progress reports were prepared twice a year by the implementing departments and planned to coincide with project supervision missions and annual joint sector reviews led by the Government in June and July of each year. These reviews examined the financial and technical performance of the overall Education Sector Program and the project at the same time. Donor partners contributed to studies on project implementation (the Japanese International Cooperation Agency provided some financing for a study on the pilot school level grants).

c. M&E Utilization:

The time frame of the project was too short to allow for the utilization of data to improve the project performance or outcomes from all activities. Project data collection did, however, allow for assessing the broad outcomes of the Education Sector Program, which gave a contextual background to this project. Output indicators were regularly measured to assess progress on project implementation. Monitoring observations led to changes in the program to increase the utilization of latrines constructed by the project, and resources for the grant subcomponent were increased when it was seen to be successful.

M&E Quality Rating: Modest

11. Other Issues

a. Safeguards:

The project generated an Environmental Category B rating. This related to the possible negative environmental and social impact from the construction of classrooms in rural areas. OP 4.01 (Environmental Assessment) and OP 4.2 (Involuntary Resettlement) were triggered due to these potential hazards. It was not known at appraisal where specific project sites would be, so the safeguards framework was designed to take into account a range of possible impacts. A stakeholder workshop on safeguard issues was held during preparation and the comments incorporated into mitigation plans. The project proposed to train Regional Environmental Focal Points to oversee the implementation of environmental and social safeguard policies. It was also envisaged that School Management Committees and Parents Associations would have oversight on recommended measures.
Capacity building for stakeholders in environmental issues was built into the project. An environmental analysis was prepared for the previous project which covered all three phases of the Education Sector Program. These were disclosed in country and at the Bank as required and were to be updated and re-disclosed for this project.

There were no significant deviations from Bank safeguard policies reported in Implementation Status Reports (ISRs).

b. Fiduciary Compliance:

A public expenditure management and financial accountability Review (PEMFAR) was carried out for Niger in 2003, identifying some areas of concern. At appraisal a financial management assessment was carried out. It identified that the previous Basic Education Project (BEP) had been appropriately managed by a competent team. Some deficiencies, however, such as an out-of-date Financial Management Manual and accounting software, needed to be addressed. A financial management action plan was put in place and the fiduciary control risk estimated as modest on appraisal. Project funds were not blended with other government funding but transferred to a designated account.

The Government implementation team changed over the course of the project in terms of staffing. New team members needed time to learn the needed procedures. Two audit reports for FY2010 and FY2011 were carried out and were qualified. Final audit reports were awaited by June 30, 2013. Interim Financial Reports were carried out and submitted in appropriate time frames and were acceptable. However, there were no major governance issues, which was an improvement on the implementation of the previous project. ISRs rated the project as satisfactory on fiduciary policies and procedures, although these might have been a cause for concern at some points during implementation.

Procurement procedures over the course of the project and initial difficulties with bidding documentation improved with advice and assistance from the Bank, but did lead to procurement delays with respect to contracts for booklets and auto-teaching materials.

c. Unintended Impacts (positive or negative):

Work on familiarizing families with the use of sanitary facilities and their maintenance was included in the project, although not originally financed. Implementation of this activity revealed that the construction of sanitary facilities alone was insufficient. A more complete package of inputs, including the provision of clean water, may be included in future projects.

d. Other:

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NOTES:
- When insufficient information is provided by the Bank for IEG to arrive at a clear rating, IEG will downgrade the relevant ratings as warranted beginning July 1, 2006.
- The "Reason for Disagreement/Comments" column could cross-reference other sections of the ICR.
Review, as appropriate.

13. Lessons:

The lessons learned section of the ICR (page 32) covers a number of issues relating to community participation and girls’ education that have been well known for some time, such as: (a) the need to limit an implementation area when access and costs are high; (b) interventions to improve the attendance of girls require a package that addresses social constraints as well as basic infrastructure; (c) communities need extensive training and coaching to be able to implement self-managed projects; and (d) communication between the Government and communities needs to be good for such systems to work fully.

Two further lessons are offered by IEG:

- It is rarely safe to depend on materials and equipment left by a previous project for implementation of a newer project, as equipment can be faulty and the demands of those using the equipment usually take precedence over any new requirements.

- Where the Bank acts as an implementing agency for an outside body, there needs to be clarity on project design requirements so that the project is implementable within Bank regulations for financing and evaluation.

14. Assessment Recommended?  ○ Yes  ● No

15. Comments on Quality of ICR:

The ICR is clearly written and candid as to project shortcomings. It includes a good review of the country status and education sector issues, citing relevant documents. It also includes relevant information from beneficiary assessments held at the end of the project and makes good use of comments by donors and the Government. Its conclusions are based on evidence where it is available, although more data would have helped strengthen some of its arguments on the success of girls’ enrollment activities and the community school construction component.

Quality of ICR Rating: Satisfactory