For Official Use Only CLR Review Independent Evaluation Group 1. CAS Data Country: Burundi CAS Year: FY13 CAS Period: FY13 – FY16 CLR Period: FY13 – FY16 Date of this review: June 26, 2019 2. Ratings CLR Rating IEG Rating Development Outcome: Moderately Unsatisfactory Moderately Unsatisfactory WBG Performance: Fair Fair 3. Executive Summary i. This review of the World Bank Group’s (WBG) Completion and Learning Review (CLR) covers the period of the Country Assistance Strategy (CAS), FY13-16, and updated in the Performance and Learning Review (PLR) dated February 25, 2015. ii. Burundi is a low-income country with a Gross National Income (GNI) per capita of $290 in 2017. It is a small, land-locked, and densely populated country, heavily dependent on natural resources—mainly coffee and tea—and foreign aid. Drivers of growth are extremely volatile, notably reflecting wide fluctuations in agricultural production. Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth averaged 1.2 percent during the CAS period (2013-16) - well below the average GDP growth during the previous four years (3.9 percent), while average GDP per capita growth was negative (1.8 percent) due in part to high average population growth (3.0 percent), a political crisis in 2015 triggered by the President’s decision to run for a third term that year 1, and unfavorable weather conditions in 2016. 2 The poverty rate was 65 percent in 2014 (69 percent rural and 28 percent urban) and had declined little as population growth outpaces economic growth. The country’s Human Development Index remained virtually unchanged between 2012 and 2015, ranking 184th among 188 countries. Inequality (the GINI Index) was relatively low (38.6) in 2013, reflecting the country’s widespread poverty. Policy effectiveness has been undermined by high levels of corruption. iii. The World Bank Group’s (WBG) CAS had three pillars (or focus areas): (i) improving competitiveness, (ii) improving resilience by consolidating social stability, and (iii) strengthening governance. The CAS was broadly aligned with the Government’s Second National Poverty Reduction Strategy (PRSP II), 2012-2015, which seeks to improve governance, growth and job creation, social services, and environmental/spatial management. Specifically, the CAS focus areas and objectives supported PRSP II objectives on quality of economic infrastructure, promotion of the 1 An attempted coup d'état on May 13, 2015, failed to depose the sitting President and triggered the political crisis. Political opposition was met with repression from the Government, leading to a new cycle of political violence. By December 2015, over 230,000 people had fled the country, primarily into settlements in neighboring countries (Systematic Country Diagnostic, 2018, p. x). 2 Burundi has been a fragile and conflict-affected state since 1971. From 1971 to 2015, Burundi faced 11 years of climate shocks that reduced agricultural output and another 11 years of political conflicts that contracted dramatically the nonagricultural sector (Systematic Country Diagnostic, 2018, p. viii). CLR Reviewed by: Peer Reviewed by: CLR Review Manager/Coordinator Mauricio Carrizosa Juan Jose Fernandez Jeff Chelsky IEGEC Consultant Ansola Manager, IEGEC IEGEC Consultant Takatoshi Kamezawa Lourdes Pagaran Sr. Evaluation Office, IEGEC CLRR Coordinator, IEGEC CLR Review For Official Use Only Independent Evaluation Group 2 private sector and job creation, strengthening the social safety net, capacity building and improved performance in the healthcare system, and fiscal management. iv. At the beginning of the CAS period, IDA total commitments were $407.1 million, with 15 Investment Project Financing (IPF) operations, including three Additional Financing and two regional operations. During the CAS period, total new commitments were $426.3 million, or 37.8 percent lower than the planned volume of $685.0 million. The new financing portfolio consisted of 10 new operations in the form of three Development Policy Financing (DPF) operations and seven IPF operations including one Additional Financing (AF) and one regional operation. The new financing portfolio reflected a shift in focus from the inherited portfolio which include higher allocation for energy, economic reform and agriculture; less for transport and none for other sectors (such as water and private sector development). IDA leveraged its financing with new trust fund (TF) support for three operations amounting to $43.2 million, the largest of which was in the health sector ($34.8 million). v. IEG rates the CAS development outcome as Moderately Unsatisfactory. Of the five CPS objectives, three were Partially Achieved and two were Mostly Achieved. On Focus Area I, there was good progress on reducing infrastructure related bottlenecks through increased road network rehabilitation and improved affordability of internet services; albeit partial progress in improving the electricity regulatory framework. There was little progress on improving the business climate and increasing private investment. The Doing Business Indicators changed little between 2013 and 2017 and private investment declined as percentage of GDP between 2012 and 2016. On Focus Area II, there was progress on increasing employment from the public works program and developing social protection systems; however, there were mixed results on improving access to and quality of health services. On Focus Area III, commune budget information improved, while mining revenue transparency and government capacity on expenditure management did not advance. vi. IEG rates WBG performance as Fair. The CAS addressed well-identified development challenges and benefited from alignment with the government’s PRSP II and consultation with multiple stakeholders. The CAS was selective and consistent with the twin corporate goals. WBG’s use of instruments was generally appropriate to address investment and policy needs. There was generally good collaboration between IDA and IFC in the energy sector. WBG forged partnerships with other development partners through the Partnership Coordination Group and at the project level, although division of labor among the many donors may have been limited. However, the CAS had significant design weaknesses. First, the results framework had broad objectives accompanied by indicators with limited or narrow scope to measure the achievement of the stated objectives. Second, the CAS and the PLR underestimated political risks and provided insufficient attention to activities that could mitigate adverse impacts of political events on development. Third, although actual ASA activities addressed important development issues, some were not closely aligned with CAS objectives. Finally, complex design in some projects were not well aligned with available capacity. vii. Despite Bank efforts to adapt to changing conditions, implementation deteriorated sharply following the 2015 political crisis. The deterioration also reflected Bank performance issues. According to the CLR, there was insufficient attention to portfolio management, which contributed to deteriorating portfolio performance, although the Bank cancelled a number of planned operations after the 2015 political crisis unfolded. During the review period, Bank’s performance at exit performed less well than the average for Africa and the Bank-wide and had significant to high risks of sustainability. Active portfolio performance showed mixed results with increased percentage of projects at risk yet slightly better in terms of commitments at risk. IFC’s Advisory Service (AS) projects on improving Burundi’s investment climate were unsuccessful. INT received seven complaints, of which one in the agricultural sector resulted in an investigation, but the allegations could not be substantiated. viii. The CLR highlighted three lessons. First, political economy analysis can produce useful insights and inputs into operational work, and the sustainability of reforms under budget support. CLR Review For Official Use Only Independent Evaluation Group 3 Second, less complex design, more realistic objectives, stakeholder consensus, and a long-term approach to implementation could result in better outcomes. Third, continued Bank engagement during a political crisis could enhance Government trust in the Bank and the Bank’s capacity to conduct dialogue on critical development issues. ix. IEG adds the following lessons: • In a fragile and conflict affected country, risk management will benefit from a realistic assessment of the main risks and fairly robust mitigation measures/plans to deal with the risks. In Burundi, the WBG identified the risk of conflict and political violence (CPS and PLR stage) but failed to articulate appropriate scenarios and risk mitigation measures. Going forward, WBG may consider developing base and high case scenarios that link its assistance to possible developments in these areas, emphasizing less complex operations and sufficient attention to portfolio management. This could be done in collaboration with development partners that can help create a more conducive political economy conditions and mitigate risks of conflict and violence. • Regional operations can be particularly effective in a small, landlocked country. Burundi’s program included regional projects on communications and health as well as an ASA on regional transport. The projects helped improve access to internet and health services, and the ASA activity has helped inform the East African Community on corridor development plans, of special relevance to Burundi’s landlocked condition. The WBG may consider further enhancing regional activities to seize upon the synergies and economies of scale that such activities entail, while at the same time recognizing the challenges of capacity and coordination. • Strengthening the linkages between intended objectives and outcomes and associated result indicators will help focus interventions on the critical outcomes that matter. In the Burundi program, several indicators did not reflect objectives well, or were not supported by interventions. To strengthen achievements in fragile countries, IDA may consider using the appropriate theory of change to articulate tighter links between the CPS objectives to outcome indicators and WBG interventions. 4. Strategic Focus Relevance of the WBG Strategy: 1. Congruence with Country Context and Country Program. The CAS objectives were congruent with the government’s 2012 PRSP II. Its objectives were specifically aligned with a limited number of PRSPII areas covering infrastructure, the business climate, health services, safety nets, and transparency. For example, the CAS objective to reduce infrastructure bottlenecks addressed Burundi’s infrastructures gaps, resulting in high transport costs given the country’s landlocked economy. The CAS objectives also addressed other significant development constraints, including Burundi’s lagging business climate, the dire conditions of its health services, the need to develop social protection systems and policies, and the lack of budget transparency. Nevertheless, the CAS could have improved congruence with country conditions, with a stronger focus on activities with institution building and sustainability, which remain major development issues for Burundi. 2. Relevance of Design. Proposed interventions could be expected to contribute towards the achievement of most objectives and contribute to selected goals under the government’s PRSP II. A major assumption for the achievability of objectives was the maintenance of peace in Burundi, a fragile and conflict affected country. The CAS envisaged that its objectives would be supported through the pre-existing portfolio of Investment Project Financing (IPF), combined with new lending, in IPF and DPF. The DPF program would account for about a third of the financing program and cover reforms on the business climate, safety nets, and governance. Financing would be complemented with trust-fund financing and ASA, the latter also financed partly by trust funds. Planned IPF addressed sectoral issues, notably on energy, agriculture, and health. IFC’s contribution to achieving CLR Review For Official Use Only Independent Evaluation Group 4 program results was expected in Focus Area I (competitiveness). Planned ASA supported the CAS areas (e.g., Economic and Sector Work (ESW) and Technical Assistance (TA) on safety nets) and included also integrative tasks (e.g., poverty and environmental assessments). Planned coordination with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) sought to help maintain macro stability and, with the African Development Bank (AfDB) and the European Union, to devise a plan for public sector accounting reform and budget preparation and execution. The widespread use of Project Implementation Units (PIUs), while justified given limited implementation capacity, may have also limited the reach of projects as capacity building tools. As the CLR notes, project design was often too complex given the country’s limited institutional capacity. Selectivity 3. The CAS was selective in terms of focus areas, objectives and indicators, and number of projects. Selected outcomes broadly covered areas where the Bank has comparative advantage (e.g., infrastructure and social protection) and adequate diagnostics, while recognizing that IDA’s capacity to deliver under the previous CAS was less than strong. The CAS also applied selectivity in terms of having a limited number of new projects, by increasing the average project size under the new CAS compared to the previous CAS (from $22.1 million to $48.9 million). At the end of CAS period, the number of IDA financed operations in the portfolio was reduced, following the cancellation of planned operations after the 2015 political crisis. The number of active trust funds declined from 13 under the previous CAS to 9 for the CAS under review, reflecting the exit of donor contributions after 2015. Division of labor with other donors was limited, with several donors overlapping in many areas. Alignment 4. The CAS objectives were broadly aligned with the 2013 corporate twin goals of poverty reduction and shared prosperity goals. The CAS did not target poverty and shared prosperity directly. However, the focus areas and proposed interventions could reinforce each other to contribute to the twin goals. The CAS maintained focus on a key area to directly reduce poverty (safety nets for resilience) as well as on growth enhancing policies (business climate and infrastructure for competitiveness). Together, progress on these areas could help both to reduce the percentage of population below the poverty line and raise incomes for the poorest 40 percent of the population (shared prosperity). At the PLR, the WBG strategy envisaged enhance efforts on both resilience and competitiveness. 5. Development Outcome Overview of Achievement by Objective: 5. This assessment follows the IEG-WBG Shared Approach on Country Engagement and considers the degree to which CAS objectives (designated as outcomes in the PLR results matrix) were achieved. Focus Area I: Improving Competitiveness 6. Focus Area I had two objectives: (i) reduce infrastructure-related bottlenecks to growth, and (ii) improve business climate and increase private investment. 7. Objective 1: Reduce Infrastructure-Related Bottlenecks to Growth. IDA supported this objective through the FY04 Burundi Road Sector Development project and its FY11 additional financing, the FY12 Energy Efficiency Project, the FY10 Public Works and Urban Management project, the FY13 Resumo Falls Hydroelectric Project, the FY14 Jiji and Mulembwe Hydropower Project, and the FY08 Regional Communications Infrastructure Project (RCIP). ASA included the FY15 Regional Transport Study: Building a Reform Consensus for Integrated Corridor Development in the East African Community. IFC provided support through the Energy Regulation Advisory, completed in FY15. This objective had three indicators: CLR Review For Official Use Only Independent Evaluation Group 5 • Roads network rehabilitated and maintained: 81.5 additional km of non-rural roads were rehabilitated by December 2015, compared to the target of 105 km. These numbers include rehabilitation of paved roads and paving or urban roads. [Mostly Achieved]. • Electricity regulatory framework improved: application decrees of Electricity and PPP Laws approved by December 2015. According to the ISR for the FY14 project and the CLR, the drafting of the new Electricity Law, and associated decrees and ordinances; and the Public- Private Partnerships (PPP) and model contracts for hydro projects were completed in April 2015 with IFC support. However, IEG could not verify the CLR’s statement that the application decrees of Electricity and Public-Private Partnership (PPP) Laws were approved during the PLR period. [Partially Achieved]. • Affordability of ICT services improved: reduced retail price of monthly Internet services (per Mbps) from $1,600 in June 2012 to $600 in 2016.The ICR for the RCIP project indicates that retail price for internet access dropped to $300 per month for 256kb connection in 2014. [Achieved]. 8. Additional information from the Logistics Performance Index (Quality of trade and transport- related infrastructure) indicates a net improvement of the index from 1.7/5 in 2012 to 2.0/5 in 2016, despite some deterioration after 2014.While there was progress on the drafting of regulations and the PPP and model contracts, there is no indication that these were approved. Access to internet services has now become more affordable with the dropping of retail prices for internet access. The ICRR for the RCIP project concludes that the Bank’s intervention made a significant contribution in reducing ICT prices in Burundi. On balance, IEG rates Objective 1 as Mostly Achieved. 9. Objective 2: Improve Business Climate and Increase Private Investment. This objective was supported through the FY10 Finance and Private Sector Development Project, the FY10 Agro- Pastoral Productivity and Markets Development Project, the FY12 Public Works and Urban Management project, and the FY13, FY14, and FY15 Economic Reform Support Grants (ERSGs). ASA included the FY13 Trade Integration Study. IFC provided support through advisory services to the Central Bank of Burundi and through its Conflict Affected States in Africa (CASA) and Business Edge programs. This objective had two indicators: • Strengthened financial infrastructure: time for high-value transactions settled in the automatic transfer system reduced from 3 days (2014) to 15 minutes (2016). The target was not achieved in 2016 (at the end of CPS period). However, by June 2017, 98 percent of high value payments were settled within 15 minutes. [Achieved]. • Market access (percentage) for targeted commodities increased: as of April 2016, 63 percent production in targeted value chains were marketed by participating producers (compared to the target of 26 percent). [Achieved]. 10. The indicators above do not sufficiently measure the stated objective of improved business climate and private investment. Burundi’s rank in the Doing Business Indicator (DBI) Surveys changed little, from 159 in DBI 2013 to 157 in DBI 2017. Private investment declined from 15 percent of GDP in 2012 to 9 percent 2016. On balance, IEG rates Objective 2 as Partially Achieved. 11. Focus Area I is rated as Moderately Unsatisfactory. There was good progress on reducing infrastructure related bottlenecks through increased road network rehabilitation and maintenance, and improved affordability to internet services; albeit partial progress in improving the electricity regulatory framework. However, there was little progress on improving the business climate and increasing private investment. The Doing Business Indicators changed little between 2013 and 2017 and private investment declined as percentage of GDP. Focus Area II: Increasing resilience by consolidating social stability 12. Focus Area II had two objectives: (i) improve access to and quality of health services, and (ii) expand safety nets to reduce volatility of livelihoods. CLR Review For Official Use Only Independent Evaluation Group 6 13. Objective 3: Improve Access to and Quality of Health Services. This objective was supported through the FY09 Health Sector Development Support project and its FY12 and FY13 additional financing operations, FY14 Great Lakes Emergency Sexual and Gender Based Violence and Women’s Project and the FY12 East Africa Public Health Laboratory Networking. ASA included the FY14 Health Care Financing Study. This objective had two indicators. • Births attended by skilled personnel: percentage of births attended by skilled personnel from 78.4% (2012) to 80% (2015). The Demographic Health Survey (2016-2017) reports that the share of births assisted by skilled personnel increased to 85.1 percent (2016). Additional information from the ISR for the FY14 project reports that the share of births assisted by skilled personnel had increased to 88 percent (2017). [Achieved]. • Utilization of contraceptives by couples of reproductive age increased: from 19.8 percent (2012) to 40 percent (2015). According to the Demographic Health Survey (2016-2017), the contraceptive prevalence rate was estimated at 23 percent in 2017. [Partially Achieved]. 14. The CLR notes that the overall health situation deteriorated, in part due to withdrawal of development partner funding and unavailability of drugs. In addition, the World Development Indicators report a reduction in average per capita health expenditures (from $76 during 2009-12 to $61 during 2012-15). Despite the reduction in health spending, infant mortality continued to decline from 56 (per 1000 live births) in 2012 to 48 in 2016 and life expectancy improved further, from 58 to 59 years. However, these indicators are influenced by other factors and population growth remains high at 3.0 percent. On balance, IEG rates Objective 3 as Partially Achieved. 15. Objective 4: Expand Safety Nets to Reduce Volatility of Livelihoods. This objective is supported through the FY12 Public Works and Urban Management project, the FY10 Agropastoral Productivity and Market Development Project, and FY16 Social Safety Nets project. ASA included the FY14 Burundi Social Safety Nets Assessment (ESW) and TA support to Social Protection System Evolution. This objective had two indicators. • Improve job creation and local service delivery: from 2.94 million person-days (August 2012) to 4.92 million person-days (December 2014), of which at least 15% for women. The ICRR for the FY12 project reports that 7 million (person days) of short-term employment had been created in the capital city, Bujumbura, through labor intensive works as of June 2015 (of which 23% women). However, there is no indicator provided to measure improved local service delivery [Mostly Achieved]. • Establish framework for the effective delivery of social protection systems: adoption of the National Social Protection Strategy (2015). The National Social Protection Strategy was adopted in 2015. [Achieved]. 16. On balance, IEG rates Objective 4 as Mostly Achieved. 17. IEG rates Focus Area II as Moderately Unsatisfactory. There was good progress in creating short-term employment through labor intensive works in the capital city and adopting a social protection strategy; however, there is no information on improved local service delivery. Moreover, while there was progress in increasing the percentage of births attended by skilled personnel, there was limited progress in the utilization of contraceptives. Focus Area III (Foundation): Strengthening Governance 18. Objective 5: Enhance Transparency and Accountability in Public Expenditure. This objective was supported through the FY13, FY14, and FY15 Economic Reform Support Grants (ERSGs VI to VIII), the FY15 Strengthening Institutional Capacity for Government Effectiveness Project. ASA included TA for Burundi’s pre-application phase to the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) and ESW on Public Expenditures and Fiscal Decentralization. This objective had three indicators: CLR Review For Official Use Only Independent Evaluation Group 7 • Promote citizen engagement and monitoring: The share of communes where budget information tables were available had increased from 26.5 percent to 100 percent as of February 2015, compared the target of 50 percent in December 2015. [Achieved]. • Strengthen Government capacity to effectively manage public spending: The CLR reports that 98 beneficiaries have been trained according to the Système Intégré de Gestion des Finances Publiques (SIGEFI) evaluation training report. IEG could not verify this information. Additional information from Burundi’s CPIA rating for “Quality of Budgetary and Financial Management” suggests improvements from 3.0/6.0 in 2012 to 3.5/6.0 in 2013/14, but which later declined to 2.5/6.0 in 2016/17, following the 2015 political crisis. This suggests that public spending management capacity deteriorated. [Not Achieved]. • Promote transparency and accountability in the management of revenues from extractive industries: The target was for GoB to become an EITI candidate with revised mineral fiscal measures benchmarked to international best practice and assessed by an external third party by December 2015. Following the 2015 political crisis, the government did not take further action to become an EITI candidate country. [Not Achieved]. 19. IEG’s review of ERSGs ICR indicates that many of the enhancements to PFM and budget transparency were reversed following the political crisis of 2015. On balance, IEG rates Objective 5 as Partially Achieved. 20. Focus Area III is rated as Moderately Unsatisfactory. There was good progress on promoting citizen engagement and monitoring through commune budget information. However, initial achievements at strengthening government capacity to better manage public spending in priority sectors and other expenditure management dimensions were reversed following the 2015 crisis. Finally, initial efforts for the GoB to become an EITI candidate were not further pursued following the 2015 political crisis. Overall Assessment and Rating 21. IEG rates the CAS development outcome as Moderately Unsatisfactory. On Focus Area I, there was good progress on reducing infrastructure related bottlenecks through increased road network rehabilitation and improved affordability of internet services; albeit partial progress in improving the electricity regulatory framework. There was little progress on improving the business climate and increasing private investment. The Doing Business Indicators changed little between 2013 and 2017 and private investment declined as percentage of GDP between 2012 and 2016. On Focus Area II, there was progress on increasing employment from the public works program and developing social protection systems; however, there were mixed results on improving access to and quality of health services. On Focus Area III, commune budget information improved, while mining revenue transparency and government capacity on expenditure management did not advance. Objectives CLR Rating IEG Rating Focus Area I: Improving Competitiveness Moderately Unsatisfactory Moderately Unsatisfactory Objective 1: Reduce Infrastructure-Related Partially Achieved Mostly Achieved Bottlenecks to Growth. Objective 2: Improve Business Climate and Partially Achieved Partially Achieved Increase Private Investment. Focus Area II: Increasing resilience by Satisfactory Moderately Unsatisfactory consolidating social stability Objective 3: Improve Access to and Quality of Partially Achieved Partially Achieved Health Services. Objective 4: Expand Safety Nets to Reduce Achieved Mostly Achieved Volatility of Livelihoods. Focus Area III: Strengthening Governance Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Unsatisfactory Objective 5: Enhance Transparency and Accountability in Public Expenditure. Partially Achieved Partially Achieved CLR Review For Official Use Only Independent Evaluation Group 8 6. WBG Performance Lending and Investments 22. At the beginning of the CAS period, IDA total commitments were $407.1 million, with 15 Investment Project Financing (IPF) operations, including three Additional Financing and two regional operations. During the CAS period, total new commitments were $426.3 million, or 37.8 percent lower than the planned volume of $685.0 million. The new financing portfolio consisted of 10 new operations in the form of three Development Policy Financing (DPF) operations and seven IPF operations including one Additional Financing (AF) and one regional operation. The new lending portfolio reflected a shift in focus from the inherited portfolio. Compared to the pre-existing portfolio, the new financing portfolio allocated 50 percent to energy where only 4 percent were allocated before; a higher share for economic reform DPF (from 6 to 18 percent); and agriculture (from 11 to 13 percent); less for transport (from 22 to 6 percent); and none for other sectors in the pre-existing portfolio, including water, community development, urban development, or private sector development. IDA leveraged its assistance with new trust fund (TF) support for three operations amounting to $43.2 million, the largest of which was in the health sector ($34.8 million). Pre-existing TF operations were in energy and economic reform, as well as on capacity building for expenditure management. 23. During the CAS period, Burundi’s portfolio at exit performed less well that than the average for Africa and Bank-wide. Of the 11 projects validated by IEG, 45 percent were rated Moderately Satisfactory or better, below the averages for Africa (65 percent) and the Bank (71 percent). In terms of commitments, Burundi also performed less well, with 39 percent rated MS or better compared to the averages for Africa (73 percent) and Bank-wide (84 percent). Burundi’s closed portfolio had significant to high risk to development outcome (RDO) ratings, compared to the averages for Africa (35 percent and 30 percent in value and number of operations, respectively) and Bank-wide (53 percent and 43 percent, respectively) with moderate to low risk RDO ratings. The overall RDO rating for Burundi’s portfolio at exit suggests that development outcomes achieved under the completed operations have significant to higher risks of not being sustained in the future. 24. Burundi’s active IDA portfolio performance as measured by percentage of projects at risk showed mixed results. Burundi performance compared well with Africa and Bank-wide averages in terms of number of projects (21 percent), but was mixed in terms of commitments (25 percent). The comparable figures for Africa were 26 percent and 33 percent respectively, and for the Bank (24 percent and 22 percent respectively. The percentage of projects at risk (in terms of number) increased from 14 percent in 2014 to 29 percent in 2015, reflecting the deterioration of the political and social environment. The average disbursement ratio during the CAS period was higher for Burundi (25 percent) than for Africa (22 percent) or the Bank (21 percent). However, the disbursement ratio declined from 44 percent in 2014 to 18 percent in 2015, reflecting the 2015 political crisis. The CLR notes that the Bank did not promptly address recurring challenges linked to capacity and M&E through project restructurings and raised questions regarding the Bank’s ability to address implementation problems. The performance of Burundi’s active portfolio compared with the relatively weak performance at exit may suggest lack of proactivity in addressing problem projects and lack of candor and realism in ratings and possible downgrades of Burundi project ratings at exit. 25. During the CAS period, IFC had a total net commitment of $5.0 million for its core business of long-term loans and equity investments. During the CAS period, IFC had an average outstanding exposure of $4.9 million short-term trade finance guarantees under its Global Trade Finance Program (GTFP). IEG did not validate any Expanded Project Supervision Report (XPSR) of IFC investment projects by producing EvNotes. In FY14, MIGA underwrote one political risk guarantee for the dray port project with the total gross exposure of $8.5 million. Advisory Services and Analytics products (ASA) 26. During the CAS period, 22 ASA were completed, comprising 15 Economic Sector Work (ESW) and 7 Technical Assistance (TA). ASA covered important development topics for Burundi. A number of ASA were well-aligned with CPS objectives, These included public expenditure review and policy CLR Review For Official Use Only Independent Evaluation Group 9 notes that focused on the fiscal space needed to improve public expenditure in priority sectors; a health financing study that highlighted the institutional barriers (e.g., fragmentation) in the sector and the actions needed to create the fiscal space for financing of health services; and TA support (e.g., training) to develop the social protection system. Some topics were more closely aligned with specific CAS objectives than other topics. For example, the ASA on the social protection system was well- aligned with Objective 4. In contrast, the ASA on trade was less tightly aligned with the CAS objective on private investment. A significant gap was the absence of a Country Economic Memorandum (CEM) to update growth analyses (and the 2011 CEM), as well as an assessment of political economy risks. The planned ASA that did not materialize covered ICT, transportation, energy, and jobs, all closely relevant to CAS objectives. The nine unplanned ASA covered relevant development topics, although some (e.g., on debt management) were not closely aligned with CAS objectives. The CLR indicates that some ASA became irrelevant, including, for example, policy notes that lost traction as a result of the political crisis. Completed ASA were well disseminated as reflected in reports readily available to the public in the Bank’s Open Knowledge Repository. The TA on social protection was particularly visible, covering social protection policy and operational aspects. The record of its training activities, together with achievements under Objective 4 (to expand safety nets), suggest that it may have been an influential ASA. 27. During the CAS review period, IFC had one pre-FY13 AS project with $ 2.4 million of IFC funds. The project aimed at improving the investment climate of the country. IEG validated two Project Completion Reports (PCRs) of AS projects completed by IFC during the review period and assigned Unsuccessful ratings for both projects for their Development Effectiveness. Both AS projects sought to expand financing to SMEs including female entrepreneurs, but both were well short of meeting outcome targets and failed to realize its intended development objectives. Results Framework 28. The CAS results framework reflected reasonably well the link between the government’s strategy, the CAS objectives and indicators and the supporting WBG interventions. Generally, indicators were measurable, with baselines, targets and their associated dates. Nevertheless, the results matrix had three shortcomings. First, several CPS objectives were broadly formulated while the associated outcome indicators were limited in scope and do not sufficiently measure the stated objectives. For example, Objective 2 outcome indicators (automated settlement of transactions and market access for targeted commodities) hardly reflect the objective (business climate and private investment). Second, some of the CPS objectives are not well supported by WBG interventions (such as Objective 2), or interventions are not well captured in the results framework including several emergency operations (Emergency Demobilization and Reintegration and Emergency Electricity Infrastructure) and regional operations (Great Lakes). Third, some result indicators are process oriented (e.g., regulatory framework) and thus fail to measure the objective they cover (i.e., reduced infrastructure bottlenecks). The PLR made revisions to some indicators and targets and explained most changes adequately. While these reflect adjustments to the WBG program under the PLR (e.g., on energy), the indicators were narrow or limited (e.g., with no adequate measurement of reduction in energy bottlenecks). Partnerships and Development Partner Coordination 29. The CAS benefited from consultation with other development partners. The Bank expected that other development partners would take the lead in funding and supporting programs in many sectors and did not indicate its leadership in any. Partner coordination in Burundi is led by the Government through a Partner Coordination Group. This group operates sector working groups, a strategic forum, and a policy forum led respectively by sector ministries, the Minister of Planning and Finance, and the vice presidents. Such coordination may have resulted only in a limited division of labor, as there is overlap of several donors in many development areas. Nevertheless, the Bank coordinated with other partners at the project level. On the Economic Reform Support Grants, for example, the Bank coordinated with the IMF. On the Health System Support Project, the Bank coordinated with other partners to avoid duplications of efforts (e.g., on financing of drug supplies). Trust Funds complemented IDA support, notably on health. CLR Review For Official Use Only Independent Evaluation Group 10 Safeguards and Fiduciary Issues 30. Nine operations were closed and validated by IEG during the CPS, of which seven triggered at least one Safeguards policy in the water, energy, transport and social development practices. The project ICRs and ICRRS generally report compliance with the triggered policy instruments, with successful resolutions on all the project-related issues which include implementation delays and weak capacity on the ground; although no information on mitigation activities nor on project effects or impacts on the populations is provided. No inspection Panel case was filed during the CPS implementation period. 31. During the review period, INT received seven complaints. One was in the agricultural sector which resulted in an investigation, but the allegations could not be substantiated. The other complaints were in the Energy, Transport and IT, Private Sector Development (2), and Social Protection and Labor Sectors, as well as IFC. Ownership and Flexibility 32. The alignment of the CAS objectives with the government’s PRSP II suggests strong government commitment to implement the CAS program. Furthermore, the CAS was informed by the findings of a Client Survey (2012), and by consultations held with the Government, civil society, the private sector, and other development partners. However, Government commitment declined following the 2015 political crisis. The CLR notes, for example, that due to the 2015 crisis, nothing further was done to become an EITI candidate country (an outcome under Objective 5). The Bank responded flexibly to changes in commitment. At the PLR, which was completed two months before the 2015 political crisis, the WBG envisaged a larger program, underpinned by a better CPIA and resulting in larger IDA allocation, and mobilization of broader international support. Soon after the PLR, however, the 2015 political crisis derailed commitment and the Bank reversed the plans for scaling up support, with the cancellation of several operations. Nevertheless, the Bank remained engaged, and in 2016, as the crisis subsided, operational activities picked up pace again. WBG Internal Cooperation 33. IDA/IFC collaboration included both division of labor and complementary efforts. IFC provided investment and advisory services to four commercial banks and funded a study on the 2015 crisis. IFC also advised the Central Bank of Burundi on developing a credit reporting system, a collateral registry, and a leasing program; all relevant to WBG efforts on the investment climate. IFC cooperated with IDA on the energy sector. In this regard, IDA approved two hydro projects (under Objective 1), while IFC advised on the electricity regulatory framework, developed model concessions for power purchase agreements (PPAs), and potential energy PPPs. Risk Identification and Mitigation 34. The CAS and PLR identified three major risk factors that could affect the program’s implementation: a deteriorating global economy, conflict and political violence (particularly ahead of the 2015 presidential election), and inadequate resources to implement the strategy. The WBG strategies also outlined risks from high transport costs, fuel-price volatility and food insecurity, economic governance slippages, weak technical capacity, climate impacts, and population density. Mitigation strategies included alignment with widely supported PRSP priorities, sustained engagement with counterparts, civil society and the private sector, and coordination with development partners. The CLR argues that the PLR, which was fairly optimistic, overlooked the increased political risks suggested by the erosion of the 2000 Arusha Peace agreements. Conflict and violence risks materialized soon after the PLR, following the 2015 political crisis, and resulted in reduced resources from international donors, from $515 million in 2014 to $366 million in 2015. The WBG responded by cancelling several operations, including a planned budget support operation, and protecting the existing portfolio, albeit unsuccessfully. In addition, weather risks materialized with the 2016 unfavorable weather conditions that dampened agricultural production and energy supplies. CLR Review For Official Use Only Independent Evaluation Group 11 Overall Assessment and Rating 35. IEG rates WBG performance as Fair. The CAS addressed well-identified development challenges and benefited from alignment with the government’s PRSP II and consultation with multiple stakeholders. The CAS was selective and consistent with the twin corporate goals. WBG’s use of instruments was generally appropriate to address investment and policy needs. There was generally good collaboration between IDA and IFC in the energy sector. WBG forged partnerships with other development partners through the Partnership Coordination Group and at the project level, although division of labor among the many donors may have been limited. However, the CAS had two significant design weaknesses. First, the results framework had broad objectives accompanied by result indicators with limited or narrow scope to measure the achievement of the stated objectives. Second, the CAS and the PLR underestimated political risks and afforded insufficient attention to activities that could mitigate adverse impacts of political events on development. Third, although actual ASA activities addressed important development issues, some were not closely aligned with CAS objectives. Third, complex design in some projects were not well aligned with available capacity. 36. Despite Bank efforts to adapt to changing conditions, implementation deteriorated sharply following the 2015 political crisis. The deterioration also reflected Bank performance issues. According to the CLR suggests, there was insufficient attention to portfolio management, which contributed to deteriorating portfolio performance, although the Bank cancelled a number of planned operations after the 2015 political crisis unfolded. During the review period, Bank’s performance at exit performed less well than the average for Africa and the Bank-wide and had significant to high risks of sustainability. Active portfolio performance showed mixed results with increased percentage of projects at risk yet slightly better in terms of commitments at risk. IFC’s Advisory Service (AS) projects, on improving Burundi’s investment climate, were unsuccessful. INT received seven complaints, of which one in the Agricultural Sector resulted in an investigation, but the allegations could not be substantiated. 7. Assessment of CLR Completion Report 37. The CLR provides an informative and reflective assessment of the CAS development outcomes and WBG performance. The CLR provided evidence on the extent to which outcomes were achieved as well as on WBG’s contribution to those outcomes. Importantly, in some areas (business climate and governance), the CLR assessment discusses how the outcomes contributed to CAS objectives and provides additional evidence to supplement CAS indicators. However, the CLR’s separate assessment of the CAS and PLR outcomes was inconsistent with the shared WBG/IEG approach that calls for evaluating outcome against “the CPF results framework as updated in the most recent CPF Performance and Learning Review (PLR)”. The separate coverage of CAS and PLR results sometimes clouds the discussion, as PLR targets are intended to reflect achievements during the full CAS period. The CLR provided little detail on implementation challenges and how the WBG responded to those challenges (e.g., on EITI). 8. Findings and Lessons 38. The CLR highlighted three lessons. First, political economy analysis can produce useful insight and inputs into operational work, and the sustainability of reforms under budget support. Second, less complex design, more realistic goals, stakeholder consensus, and a long-term approach to implementation could result in better outcomes. Third, continued Bank engagement during a political crisis could enhance Government trust in the Bank and the Bank’s capacity to conduct dialogue on critical development issues. 39. IEG adds the following lessons: • In a fragile and conflict affected country, risk management will benefit from a realistic assessment of the main risks and fairly robust mitigation measures/plans to deal with the risks. In Burundi, the WBG identified the risk of conflict and political violence (CPS and PLR stage) but failed to articulate appropriate scenarios and risk mitigation measures. Going forward, WBG may consider developing base and high case scenarios that link its CLR Review For Official Use Only Independent Evaluation Group 12 assistance to possible developments in these areas, emphasizing less complex operations and sufficient attention to project management. This could be done in collaboration with development partners that can help create a more conducive political economy conditions and mitigate risks of conflict and violence. • Regional operations can be particularly effective in a small, landlocked country. Burundi’s program included regional projects on communications and health as well as an ASA on regional transport. The projects helped improve access to internet and health services, and the ASA activity has helped inform the East African Community on corridor development plans, of special relevance to Burundi’s landlocked condition. The WBG may consider further enhancing regional activities to seize upon the synergies and economies of scale that such activities entail, while at the same time recognizing the challenges of capacity and coordination. • Strengthening the linkages between intended objectives and outcomes and associated result indicators will help focus interventions on the critical outcomes that matter. In the Burundi program, several indicators did not reflect objectives well, or were not supported by interventions. To strengthen achievements in fragile countries, IDA may consider using the appropriate theory of change to articulate tighter links between CPS objectives, outcome indicators and WBG interventions. Annexes CLR Review 13 Independent Evaluation Group Annex Table 1: Summary of Achievements of CAS Objectives – Burundi Annex Table 2: Planned and Actual Lending for Burundi, FY13-FY16 Annex Table 3: Advisory Services and Analytics Work for Burundi, FY13-FY16 Annex Table 4: Burundi Grants and Trust Funds Active in FY13-FY16 Annex Table 5: IEG Project Ratings for Burundi, FY13-FY16 Annex Table 6: IEG Project Ratings for Burundi and Comparators, FY13-FY16 Annex Table 7: Portfolio Status for Burundi and Comparators, FY13-FY16 Annex Table 8: Disbursement Ratio for Burundi, FY13-FY16 Annex Table 9: Net Disbursements and Charges for Burundi, FY13-FY16 Annex Table 10: Total Net Disbursements of Official Development Assistance for Burundi Annex Table 11: Economic and Social Indicators for Burundi Annex Table 12: List of IFC Investments in Burundi Annex Table 13: List of IFC Advisory Services in Burundi Annex Table 14: IFC net commitment activity in Burundi, FY13 - FY16 Annex Table 15: List of MIGA Projects Active in Burundi, FY13-FY16 Annexes CLR Review 15 Independent Evaluation Group Annex Table 1: Summary of Achievements of CAS Objectives – Burundi CAS FY13-FY16: Focus Area I: Actual Results IEG Comments Improving Competitiveness 1. CAS Objective: Reduced Infrastructure-related bottlenecks to growth Outcome 1 Roads network The Burundi Road Sector Development At PLR stage, the target rehabilitated and maintained project (P064876, FY04) and its additional was increased from the financing (P123119, FY11) and the Public original target: 44km by Indicator: Non-rural roads Works and Urban Management project December 2014. rehabilitated (km): (P112998, FY10) supported this Outcome. Baseline: 27 km in August 2012 IEG ICRR: MU for project P064876 reports Target: 105 km by December that rehabilitation works were carried out on 2015 40km of paved roads as of January 2015 and IEG ICRR: MS for project P112998 reports that 71.5km of urban roads were paved as of June 2015 – as 27km of non- rural roads were rehabilitated as of February 2012 (see August 2012 ISR: S), 41.5km of non-rural roads were rehabilitated between August 2012 and 2015. Between these two projects, 81.5 km of road networks were rehabilitated, as of December 2015. Mostly Achieved Major Outcome 2: Electricity regulatory The August 2016 ISR: MU of the Jiji and At PLR stage, this Outcome framework improved Mulembwe Hydropower Project (P133610, indicator was modified Measures FY14) reports that the drafting of the new from the original Indicator: Application decrees of electricity Law which was passed in April outcome/indicator: Electricity and PPP Laws approved 2015; the decrees and ordinances for the Electricity supply improved by December 2015 law to be implemented; and the Public- - Generation capacity of Private Partnerships (PPP) and model hydro-power contracts for hydro projects were completed plants (Jiji and in April 2015 (see information from the Mulwembe) constructed National Assembly), thanks to support from Baseline: 0 in June 2012 the IFC Energy Regulation Advisory PPP Target: 25MW by June financed under the Sustainable Energy for 2016 All Initiative. There is no indication that the drafted decrees were approved. Partially Achieved Outcome 3: Affordability of ICT The Regional Communications At PLR stage, the target services improved Infrastructure Project (P094103, FY08) date was extended from supported this Outcome. IICR: S reports December 2013 to 2016. Indicator: Reduce retail price of that retail monthly price for internet access monthly internet services (per for 256kb connection fell from USD 2,500 to 1 Mbit/s is equivalent to Mbit/s) USD 300 (see IEG comment) as of March 125 kb/s (see unit Baseline: $1,600 in June 2012 2014. converter page). Target: $600 in 2016 Achieved * Management ICR: S indicates that retail prices of mobile broadband were CLR Review Annexes Independent Evaluation Group 16 CAS FY13-FY16: Focus Area I: Actual Results IEG Comments Improving Competitiveness cheaper at project completion (around USD 3.20 for a monthly bundle of 500 Mbps). 2. CAS Objective: Improved business climate and increased private investment Outcome 1: Financial The Finance and Private Sector At PLR stage, the indicator infrastructure strengthened Development Project (P107851, FY10) for Outcome 1 was supported this Outcome. IEG ICRR: MS changed from the original Indicator: Time for high value reports that all interbank transactions are indicator: transactions settled in the settled in automated transmission systems Time for check clearance automatic transfer system reduced. and that the share of high value payments in Bujumbura reduced Baseline: 3 days in 2014 settled within 15 minutes increased from 0% Baseline: 5 days in June Target: 15 minutes in 2016 (2011) to 98% at the end of 2017. 2012 Achieved Target: 3 days by February 2014 Outcome 2: Market access for The Agro-Pastoral Productivity and Markets and the following outcome/ targeted commodities increased Development Project (P107343, FY10) indicator were taken out: supported this Outcome. The October 2016 Promote development of Indicator: Percent of production of ISR: S reports a 62.99% production of the mining sector commodity in targeted value commodity in targeted value chains Indicator: Revised Mining chains marketed by participating marketed by participating producers as of Code submitted to producers April 2016. Parliament by June 2014 Baseline:10 in June 2012 Achieved Target: 25 by April 2016 CAS FY13-FY16: Focus Area II: Increasing resilience by Actual Results IEG Comments consolidating social stability 3. CAS Objective: Improved access to and quality of health services Outcome 1: Births attended by The Health Sector Development Support Outcome 1 was added at skilled personnel project (P101160, FY09) and additional PLR stage and replaced financing (P126742, FY12 and P131919, the previous Outcome Indicator: Percentage of births FY13) supported this Outcome. “Children under age 5 attended by skilled personnel According to the November 2016 ISR: S, treated for moderate or Baseline: 78.4% in 2012 the share of births assisted by skilled severe malnutrition Target: 80% in 2015 personal has not increased between Indicator: Number December 2014 and October 2016 and children under 5 receiving remained at 78.4%. The Great Lakes treatment for malnutrition Major Emergency Sexual and Gender Based Baseline: 90,350 in 2012 Outcome Violence and Women’s Health project Target: 92,200 in 2015 » Measures (P147489) ISR: MU reports the percentage of births attended by skilled personnel at 88 The IEG ICRR: MS percent as of June 2017. The Demographic reports that this share Health Survey (2016-2017) reports that the increased to 85.1% as of share of births assisted by skilled personnel 2017 according to data increased to 85.1 percent (2016). from the 2016-2017 Achieved. Demographic and Health Survey (DHS). World Development Indicators are not available before 2017 and previous DSH was CLR Review Annexes Independent Evaluation Group 17 CAS FY13-FY16: Focus Area II: Increasing resilience by Actual Results IEG Comments consolidating social stability prepared in 2010 (see WB page). Outcome 2: Increased utilization The November 2015 ISR: S of project At PLR stage, the target of contraceptives by couples of P101160 reports a prevalence rate of was increased from the reproductive age 31.70% of December 2014. original target: 22% in Partially Achieved 2015. Indicator: Contraceptive prevalence rate The IEG ICRR: MS reports Baseline: 19.8% in 2012 a contraceptive prevalence Target: 40% in 2015 of 37.40% as of 2017 although, citing the ICR, it flags issues regarding the validity and reliability of the data. According to the 2016-2017 DHS, contraceptive prevalence rate was estimated at 23% in 2017. 4. CAS Objective: Expanded safety nets to reduce volatility of livelihoods Outcome 1: Improve job creation The Public Works and Urban Management The Economic Reform and local service delivery project (P112998, FY10) supported this Support Grants VI-VIII Outcome. The February 2015 ISR: S (FY13, FY14 and FY15) Indicator: Generate short-term reports 6.7 million person days of short- also supported this employment through labor- term employment created as of September Objective. IEG ICRR: MU intensive public works 2014 (of which 25% women). IEG ICRR: indicates that a set task Baseline: 2.94 million person/days MS reports about 7 million short-term force completed a social of work by August 2012 employment person days, of which 23% safety net assessment, a Target: 4.92 million person/days were women, in the capital city Bujumbura household expenditure of work in December 2014 (while there was no employment data for survey and a national of which at least 15% for women the two other target cities) as of June 2015. poverty map and that all The indicator does not capture the local provinces created social service delivery dimension articulated in the protection committees. outcome. Mostly Achieved Outcome 2: Establish the As indicated in the Project Appraisal Through project P143134 framework for the effective Document (PAD) of the Social Safety Nets (FY14), the World Bank delivery of social protection project (P151835, FY16), the National and UNICEF supported systems Social Protection Strategy – NSPP (see the preparation of an document) ) was adopted in 2015 thanks to Assessment of Social Indicator: Adoption of the National support from the World Bank and UNICEF Safety Nets in Burundi Social Protection Strategy by end (see IEG comment). (September 2014) as a 2015 Achieved contribution to the NSPP operationalization. CLR Review Annexes Independent Evaluation Group 18 CAS FY13-FY18: Cross-cutting: Actual Results IEG Comments Strengthening Governance 5. CAS Objective: Enhanced transparency and accountability in public expenditure Outcome 1: Promote citizen The Economic Reform Support Grants VI- engagement and monitoring VIII (P127080 approved in FY13, P144612 approved in FY14 and P150941approved in Indicator: Share of communes FY15) supported this Objective. IEG ICRR: where budget information is made MU reports that the share of communes publicly available where budget information tables were Baseline: 26.5% by March 2012 available increased from 26.5% to 100% as Target: 50% by December 2015 of February 2015. Achieved Outcome 2: Strengthen The Strengthening Institutional Capacity for This Outcome was added Government capacity to Government Effectiveness Project at PLR stage and the effectively manage public (P149176, FY15) supported this Outcome. following original outcome Spending The January 2018 ISR: MS reported that no was taken out at PLR: data was available for training, as of Promote dialogue with Indicator: number of beneficiaries December 2016. The CLR reports that 98 civil society GoB to trained in the new IFMIS beneficiaries have been trained, according establish a joint Anti- Baseline: 0 to the Système Intégré de Gestion des Corruption Forum with Target: 200 by 2016 (of which Finances Publiques (SIGEFI) evaluation CSOs by 30% are female) training report, which could not be found or December 2014 accessed by IEG. Major Outcome The CPIA rating for “Quality of Budgetary Measures and Financial Management” improved from 3.0/6.0 in 2012 to 3.5/6.0 in 2013/14, but then declined to 2.5/6.0 in 2016/17, following the 2015 crisis. This suggests that public spending management capacity deteriorated. Not Achieved Outcome 3: Promote The World Bank has supported the At PLR stage, this transparency and accountability preparation of a pre-feasibility study for the Outcome’s indicator was in the management of revenues pre-application phase of Burundi (see changed from the original from extractive industries: GoB report). IEG ICRR: MU for the Economic indicator: “GoB to publish is an EITI Reform Support Grants VI-VIII report that a financially sustainable the operations supported the preparation of work plan for Indicator: GoB is an EITI candidate a new mining code to stimulate adherence implementing the EITI with revised mineral fiscal to the EITI. criteria by January measures benchmarked to Although, in 2015, the country had 2015 ». international best practice and committed to implement the EITI (see EITI assessed by an external third party document), no EITI country status is Target: by December 2015 available for Burundi. According to the CLR, following the 2015 political crisis no further action was by the government to become an EITI candidate country. Not Achieved CLR Review Annexes Independent Evaluation Group 19 Annex Table 2: Planned and Actual Lending for Burundi, FY13-FY16 Approved Proposed Proposed Proposed Approval Closing IDA Project ID Project name Amount Amount FY FY FY Amount ($M) ($M) ($M) CAS PLR Project Planned Under CPS/PLR P127080 BI-ERSG VI 2013 2013 2014 25 25 P131919 BI-Health Sector Dev 2nd AF (FY13) 2013 2013 2017 45.0 25.0 P075941 NELSAP Rusumo Falls MP SIL (FY14) 2013 2014 2020 40.0 113.3 P144612 BI-ERSG VII 2014 2014 2015 25.0 26.0 Cancelled Economic Management Support follow-on 2014 10.0 Public Works and Urban Management Cancelled Project 2014 15.0 Additional Financing P133610 BI-Jiji and Mulembwe Hydropower 2015 2014 2020 60.0 100.0 P150941 BI Eight Economic Reform Support Grant 2015 2015 2016 25.0 25.0 P161447* Agro-Pastoral Prod. and Markets Dev. 2016 2017 2020 15.0 Cancelled ERSG IX 2016 25.0 Cancelled Regional Transport 2016 20.0 P150929 BI-Infrastructure Resilience Emergency 2015 2015 2019 25.0 25.0 P149176 BI-Strengthening Institutional Capacity 2015 2015 2021 22.0 22.0 East Africa Public Health Laboratory P153665 2015 2016 2020 4 10.0 Networking Project (new) P151869 BI-Coffee Sector Competitiveness Project 2015 2016 2023 55.0 55.0 Development Policy Operation Series Cancelled 2015 85 (Economic Reforms Support) P151835* BI-Social Safety Nets (Merankabandi) 2016 2017 2022 30.0 P156012* Health System Support Project (KIRA) 2016 2017 2021 15.0 Regional Great Lakes Integrated P161781* 2016 2017 2022 25 Agriculture Development Program (new) Cancelled Regional Trade Facilitation (new) 2016 4 Cancelled Ruzizi 3 Hydropower Project (new) 2016 15 Urban Cities Competitiveness Project Cancelled 2016 20 (new) Cancelled Regional Multi-Modal Transport Project 2017 80 Total 305 380 426.3 Approved Proposed Proposed Proposed Approval Closing IDA Project ID Project name Amount Amount FY FY FY Amount ($M) ($M) ($M) CAS PLR Project Unplanned Under CPS/PLR Total CLR Review Annexes Independent Evaluation Group 20 Approved Proposed Proposed Proposed Approval Closing IDA Project ID Project name Amount Amount FY FY FY Amount ($M) ($M) ($M) CAS PLR On-going Projects During the CPS/PLR Period P078627 BI-Econ Mgmt Supt SIL (FY04) 2004 2013 26 P064876 BI-Road Sec Dev SIM (FY04) 2004 2015 51.4 Regional Adaptable Program Loan for the P094103 Regional Communications Infrastructure 2007 2017 20.1 Program BI- Community and Social Development P095211 2007 2013 40 Project P097974 BI-Multisectoral Water & Electricity Inf 2008 2013 50 P101160 BI-Health Project (FY09) 2009 2017 25 P112998 BI-Public Works and Urban Management 2009 2015 45 P113506 BI: Emerg Demob and Transitional Reint. 2009 2014 15 P107343 Bi-Ag. Past. Product. & Market Devel. 2010 2020 43 P107851 BI-Finance & Private Sector Development 2010 2018 19 P122217 BI-Emergency Elect. Infrast. Project 2011 2014 15.4 P123119 BI-Road Sec Dev Add'l Financing 2011 2011 2015 19 P125209 BI: Financial & PS Dev Add Financing 2011 2018 8 BI:AF Public Works and Urban P127262 2012 2015 15 Management Great Lakes Emergency Sexual and P147489 Gender Based Violence and Women’s 2014 2020 15.15 Health Project Total 407.1 Source: Burundi CPS, WB Business Intelligence Table 2a.4, 2a.7, and 2b.1 as of 7/9/2018. * The following projects (P161447, P151835, P156012, P161781) were proposed during the CAS/PLR (FY13-FY16) but were only officially approved in FY17. These projects were not included in the total for the approved IDA lending amount. CLR Review Annexes Independent Evaluation Group 21 Annex Table 3: Advisory Services and Analytics Work for Burundi, FY13-FY16 Project Economic and Sector Fiscal Report Type Global Practice ID Work Year P120598 Trade Work FY13 Sector or Thematic Study/Note Trade & Competitiveness Macroeconomics, Trade and P124432 BI:Public Expenditure Notes FY13 Public Expenditure Review (PER) Investment BI--Update of the Ed Status P127852 FY13 Sector or Thematic Study/Note Education Report DeMPA Assessment - Debt management Performance Macroeconomics, Trade and P131082 FY13 Burundi Assessment(DeMPA) Investment P126944 BI PER FY13 FY14 Public Expenditure Review (PER) Governance P143086 Burundi Economic Update FY14 Sector or Thematic Study/Note Trade & Competitiveness Burundi Social Safety Nets P143134 FY14 Sector or Thematic Study/Note Social Protection & Labor Assessment Burundi-Skills Development P143579 FY14 Sector or Thematic Study/Note Education for Growth BI-Use of Country System P144043 FY15 Sector or Thematic Study/Note Governance study Accounting and Auditing P144359 ROSC FY15 Governance Assessment (ROSC) Burundi Fiscal Institutional and Governance P145324 FY15 Governance Decentralization Review (IGR) Burundi Vulnerability P147034 FY15 Poverty Assessment (PA) Poverty and Equity Assessment BI:Urbanization and Social, Urban, Rural and P150440 FY15 Sector or Thematic Study/Note Economic Development Resilience Global Practice P152373 BI-Poverty Assessment FY16 Poverty Assessment (PA) Poverty and Equity Skills for urban P155895 FY16 Sector or Thematic Study/Note Education development Project Fiscal Technical Assistance Output Type Global Practice ID Year Debt Reform Plan Macroeconomics, Trade and P132275 FY13 Technical Assistance BURUNDI Investment Health Care Financing P145882 FY14 Technical Assistance Health, Nutrition & Population Study P148767 Burundi EITI Support FY15 Technical Assistance Energy & Extractives Burundi Rapid Assessment Social, Urban, Rural and P150316 FY15 Technical Assistance - Flood Risk Resilience Global Practice Burundi Support to P153047 FY15 Technical Assistance Governance Oversight Functions P145997 Burundi ASM and EITI FY16 Technical Assistance Energy & Extractives P155894 Skills for the coffee sector FY16 Technical Assistance Education Source: WB Business Intelligence 06/26/2018. CLR Review Annexes Independent Evaluation Group 22 Annex Table 4: Burundi Grants and Trust Funds Active in FY13-FY16 Project Approval Closing Approved Project name TF ID ID FY FY Amount ($M) Emergency Demobilization and Transitional P145095 TF 14654 2014 2014 4.3 Reintegration Project AF P101160 Health Sector Development Support TF 13043 2013 2017 20.0 P101160 Health Sector Development Support TF 12526 2013 2015 14.8 P127258 Sustainable Coffee Landscape Project TF 14427 2013 2019 4.2 P127258 Sustainable Coffee Landscape Project TF 11799 2012 2013 0.0 P117225 Burundi - Energy Efficiency Project TF 12460 2012 2016 1.8 P119324 Burundi Fifth Economic Reform Support Grant TF 12076 2012 2013 8.8 Capacity building for the use of sectoral Medium P120163 TF 97438 2011 2014 0.4 Term Expenditure Frameworks Emergency Demobilization and Transitional P113506 TF 96439 2010 2014 12.5 Reintegration Project Total 66.8 Source: WB Client Connection as of 06/26/18. ** IEG validates RETF that are 5M and above. Annex Table 5: IEG Project Ratings for Burundi, FY13-FY16 Total Exit IEG Risk to Project ID Project name Evaluated IEG Outcome FY DO ($M) BI-Econ Mgmt Supt SIL MODERATELY 2013 P078627 26.9 SIGNIFICANT (FY04) UNSATISFACTORY BI-Community and Social MODERATELY 2013 P095211 41.2 HIGH Dvpt SIL (FY06) UNSATISFACTORY BI-Multisectoral Water & 2013 P097974 46.7 MODERATELY SATISFACTORY HIGH Electricity Inf MODERATELY 2013 P127080 BI-ERSG VI* 75.0 HIGH UNSATISFACTORY BI: Emerg Demob and 2014 P113506 10.5 SATISFACTORY SIGNIFICANT Transitional Reint. BI-Emergency Elect. 2014 P122217 15.3 MODERATELY SATISFACTORY SIGNIFICANT Infrast. Project BI-Road Sec Dev SIM MODERATELY 2015 P064876 70.2 HIGH (FY04) UNSATISFACTORY BI-Public Works and Urban 2015 P112998 60.9 MODERATELY SATISFACTORY SIGNIFICANT Management P117225* 2016 BI-Energy Efficiency Project 1.8 MODERATELY SATISFACTORY SIGNIFICANT * Total 348.5 Source: WB Business Intelligence Key IEG Ratings as of 06/26/18. * includes ERSG VI-VIII ** GEF grant. CLR Review Annexes Independent Evaluation Group 23 Annex Table 6: IEG Project Ratings for Burundi and Comparators, FY13-FY16 Total Total RDO % RDO % Outcome Outcome Region Evaluated Evaluated Moderate or Lower Moderate or Lower % Sat ($M) % Sat (No) ($M) (No) Sat ($) Sat (No) Burundi* 348.5 11 39 45 0 0 Africa 16,081.9 313 73 65 35 30 World 90,561.6 1,043 84 71 53 43 Source: WB Business Intelligence and IEG staff calculations as of 06/26/18. *includes ERSG VI-VIII Annex Table 7: Portfolio Status for Burundi and Comparators, FY13-FY16 Fiscal Year 2013 2014 2015 2016 Ave FY13-FY16 Burundi # Proj 7 7 7 7 7 # Proj At Risk 1 1 2 2 2 % Proj At Risk 14 14 29 29 21 Net Comm Amt ($M) 275.5 376.1 292.0 320.6 316.1 Comm At Risk ($M) 27.0 27.0 127.0 125.0 76.5 % Commit at Risk 10 7 43 39 25 Africa # Proj 403 438 458 474 443 # Proj At Risk 106 115 111 124 114 % Proj At Risk 26 26 24 26 26 Net Comm Amt ($M) 40,799.0 46,621.7 51,993.5 56,089.8 48,876.0 Comm At Risk ($M) 13,938.0 16,171.5 15,372.2 18,235.0 15,929.2 % Commit at Risk 34 35 30 33 33 World # Proj 1,337 1,386 1,402 1,398 1,381 # Proj At Risk 339 329 339 336 336 % Proj At Risk 25 24 24 24 24 Net Comm Amt ($M) 169,430.6 183,153.9 191,907.8 207,350.0 187,960.6 Comm At Risk ($M) 39,638.0 39,748.6 44,430.7 42,715.1 41,633.1 % Commit at Risk 23 22 23 21 22 Source: WB Business Intelligence as of 06/26/18. Note: Only IBRD and IDA Agreement Type are included. Excludes regional projects and additional financing. CLR Review Annexes Independent Evaluation Group 24 Annex Table 8: Disbursement Ratio for Burundi, FY13-FY16 Fiscal Year 2013 2014 2015 2016 Overall Result Burundi Disbursement Ratio (%) 39 44 18 7 25 Inv Disb in FY ($M) 54.7 51.7 26.5 12.1 145.0 Inv Tot Undisb Begin FY ($M) 141.8 116.4 150.3 170.1 578.6 Africa Disbursement Ratio (%) 22 23 24 20 22 Inv Disb in FY ($M) 5,652.1 6,143.9 6,473.2 5,572.5 23,841.8 Inv Tot Undisb Begin FY ($M) 25,175.9 26,540.4 26,463.6 28,377.1 106,557.0 World Disbursement Ratio (%) 21 21 22 19 21 Inv Disb in FY ($M) 20,510.7 20,757.7 21,853.7 21,152.9 84,275.0 Inv Tot Undisb Begin FY ($M) 99,588.3 99,854.3 100,344.9 108,600.3 408,387.7 Source: WB Business Intelligence as of 06/26/18. Annex Table 9: Net Disbursements and Charges for Burundi, FY13-FY16 ($, millions) Disb. Repay Net Period Net Amt. Charges Fees Amt. Amt. Transfers FY13 86.2 1.6 84.6 0.0 1.3 83.3 FY14 87.8 1.8 86.0 0.0 1.3 84.7 FY15 59.7 3.2 56.5 0.0 1.2 55.3 FY16 23.3 3.2 20.1 0.0 1.2 18.9 Report Total 257.0 9.8 247.1 0.0 4.9 242.2 Source: WB Business Intelligence as of 06/26/2018. CLR Review Annexes Independent Evaluation Group 25 Annex Table 10: Total Net Disbursements of Official Development Assistance for Burundi ($ millions) Development Partners 2013 2014 2015 2016 Australia 2.1 1.0 0.6 0.2 Austria 0.2 0.1 0.0 0.0 Belgium 65.2 61.8 48.7 52.0 Canada 3.3 5.1 4.2 4.2 Czech Republic 0.0 .. .. .. Denmark 0.0 0.5 .. 0.0 Finland 0.5 0.9 0.8 0.6 France 15.5 11.3 6.8 5.6 Germany 24.8 25.9 17.4 46.1 Greece .. 0.0 0.0 .. Hungary .. .. 0.0 0.0 Ireland 1.2 1.2 1.6 1.8 Italy 1.5 0.5 1.4 1.0 Japan 30.7 9.0 2.6 3.6 Korea 0.1 0.6 0.9 0.6 Luxembourg 1.0 1.0 0.9 0.6 Netherlands 32.7 27.6 27.0 33.9 Norway 13.8 7.2 5.5 5.2 Poland 0.2 0.2 0.0 .. Portugal .. .. .. 0.0 Slovak Republic .. 0.0 .. .. Slovenia 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 Spain 0.2 0.2 0.4 1.0 Sweden 1.8 1.3 0.1 2.3 Switzerland 11.2 10.4 6.9 7.2 United Kingdom 6.5 10.1 0.3 4.3 United States 36.0 40.3 42.0 388.6 DAC Countries, Total 248.6 216.0 167.9 558.6 Israel 0.0 0.0 0.0 .. Romania 0.0 0.0 0.0 .. Russia .. .. .. .. Thailand 0.0 0.0 .. .. Turkey 0.5 0.7 0.0 0.4 United Arab Emirates -0.1 0.0 0.0 -0.1 Non-DAC Countries, Total 0.4 0.7 0.1 0.3 EU Institutions 75.2 95.2 48.6 58.2 International Monetary Fund, Total 5.0 -0.9 -10.5 -18.0 IMF (Concessional Trust Funds) 5.0 -0.9 -10.5 -18.0 Regional Development Banks, Total 33.3 35.6 38.9 14.5 African Development Bank, Total 33.3 35.6 38.9 14.4 CLR Review Annexes Independent Evaluation Group 26 Development Partners 2013 2014 2015 2016 African Development Bank [AfDB] .. .. 0.1 .. African Development Fund [AfDF] 33.3 35.6 38.8 14.4 Islamic Development Bank [IsDB] .. .. .. 0.1 United Nations, Total 40.3 43.7 46.0 51.4 Food and Agriculture Organisation [FAO] 0.5 .. .. .. International Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA] 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.2 IFAD 9.5 13.3 6.9 12.3 International Labour Organisation [ILO] 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.1 UNAIDS 0.6 0.5 0.6 0.5 UNDP 6.6 8.8 7.3 8.4 UNFPA 2.1 2.9 2.2 1.6 UNHCR 0.2 .. 10.1 6.1 UNICEF 8.8 10.0 11.9 11.1 UN Peacebuilding Fund [UNPBF] 5.3 2.0 2.1 4.9 UNTA .. .. .. .. WFP 5.1 4.9 3.0 5.1 World Health Organisation [WHO] 1.3 1.0 1.8 1.2 World Bank Group, Total 101.9 59.8 45.1 30.7 World Bank, Total 101.9 59.8 45.1 30.7 International Development Association [IDA] 101.9 59.8 45.1 30.7 Other Multilateral, Total 54.1 65.3 30.4 46.5 Multilateral Agencies, Total 309.8 298.7 198.6 183.3 Development Partners, Total 558.82 515.41 366.55 742.14 Source: OECD Stat database as of 06/26/18 Annex Table 11: Economic and Social Indicators for Burundi Burundi Africa World Series Name 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 Average 2013-2016 Growth and Inflation GDP growth (annual %) 4.6 4.7 -3.9 -0.6 0.5 1.2 3.5 2.7 GDP per capita growth (annual %) 1.5 1.6 -6.8 -3.6 -2.6 -1.8 0.7 1.5 GNI per capita, PPP (current international $) 820.0 840.0 800.0 780.0 770.0 810.0 3,517.7 15,439.0 GNI per capita, Atlas method (current $) 280.0 290.0 280.0 280.0 290.0 282.5 1,654.6 10,670.9 Inflation, consumer prices (annual %) 8.0 4.4 5.6 5.5 .. 5.9 4.6 2.1 Composition of GDP (%) Agriculture, value added (% of GDP) 36 36 37 36 .. 36 16 4 Industry, value added (% of GDP) 16 17 15 15 .. 16 24 26 Services, etc., value added (% of GDP) .. .. .. .. .. .. 53 64 Gross fixed capital formation (% of GDP) 29 28 17 17 .. 23 20 23 Gross domestic savings (% of GDP) 2 2 -7 -9 .. -3 17 25 External Accounts CLR Review Annexes Independent Evaluation Group 27 Burundi Africa World Series Name 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 Average 2013-2016 Exports of goods and services (% of GDP) 7 8 6 6 .. 7 27 30 Imports of goods and services (% of GDP) 34 34 30 32 .. 32 30 29 Current account balance (% of GDP) -10 -13 -12 -12 .. -12 .. .. External debt stocks (% of GNI) 25 22 20 20 .. 22 .. .. Total debt service (% of GNI) 1 1 1 2 .. 1 2 .. Total reserves in months of imports 4.3 4.0 1.9 1.5 .. 2.9 5.2 13.4 Fiscal Accounts* General government revenue (% of GDP) 31 28 22 15 14 24 19 .. General government total expenditure (% of 33 32 27 21 22 28 23 .. GDP) General government net lending/borrowing -2 -4 -5 -6 -8 -4 -4 .. (% of GDP) General government gross debt (% of GDP) 36 36 45 47 57 41 36 .. Health Life expectancy at birth, total (years) 56.3 56.7 57.1 57.5 .. 56.9 59.7 71.8 Immunization, DPT (% of children ages 12- 96 95 94 94 91 95 71 85 23 months) People using at least basic sanitation 50 50 50 .. .. 50 28 67 services (% of pop) People using at least basic drinking water 56 56 56 .. .. 56 57 88 services (% of pop) Mortality rate, infant (per 1,000 live births) 50.5 48.0 45.9 44.1 42.5 47.1 55.8 31.8 Education School enrollment, preprimary (% gross) 9 11 14 14 .. 12 32 48 School enrollment, primary (% gross) 140 138 134 131 .. 136 98 104 School enrollment, secondary (% gross) 34 40 45 48 .. 42 43 76 Population Population, total (Millions) 9.6 9.9 10.2 10.5 10.9 10.1 992.7 7,314.5 Population growth (annual %) 3.0 3.0 3.1 3.1 3.2 3.0 2.7 1.2 Urban population (% of total) 11 12 12 12 13 12 38 54 Poverty Poverty headcount ratio at $1.90 a day (2011 72 .. .. .. .. 72 42 11 PPP) (% of pop) Poverty headcount ratio at national poverty .. 65 .. .. .. 65 .. .. lines (% of pop) Rural poverty headcount ratio at national .. 69 .. .. .. 69 .. .. poverty lines (% of rural pop) Urban poverty headcount ratio at national .. 28 .. .. .. 28 .. .. poverty lines (% of urban pop) GINI index (World Bank estimate) 38.6 .. .. .. .. 38.6 .. .. Source: WB World Development Indicators as of 09/26/18. *International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook Database, April 2018 CLR Review Annexes Independent Evaluation Group 28 Annex Table 12: List of IFC Investments in Burundi ($, millions) Investments Committed in FY13-FY16 Project Cmt Project Net Net Net Primary Sector Name Project Size ID FY Status Loan Equity Comm 36240 2015 Closed Finance & Insurance 5.0 - - - Sub-Total 5.0 - - - Investments Committed pre-FY13 but active during FY13-16 ($, millions) Project CMT Project Net Net Net Primary Sector Name Project Size ID FY Status Loan Equity Comm Accommodation & Tourism 5.5 5.5 5.5 30862 2012 Active Services 31109 2012 Active Construction and Real Estate 7.5 3.5 - 3.5 30346 2011 Active Finance & Insurance 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 27700 2009 Active Finance & Insurance 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 25891 2007 Active Finance & Insurance 1.0 4.6 - 4.6 Sub-Total 15.5 15.1 1.5 15.1 TOTAL 20.5 15.1 1.5 15.1 Source: IFC-MIS Extract as of 5/31/18 Annex Table 13: List of IFC Advisory Services in Burundi ($, millions) Advisory Services Approved in FY13-16 Impl Impl Primary Project Project Total Project Name Start End Business ID Status Funds, $ FY FY Line 601521 KCB Burundi FIG AS 2016 2019 TERMINATED FIG 0.6 Burundi Investment Climate Reform 0.5 600281 2015 2017 ACTIVE EFI Program 2 Burundi Industry Competitiveness Support 1.3 600774 2015 2019 ACTIVE EFI Program 601010 Burundi Kagunuzi Hydropower PPP 2015 2015 ACTIVE CAS - CREATED IN 0.4 600042 ALF II (Burundi) 2014 2018 A2F ERROR 600311 Burundi Secured Transactions Registry 2014 2019 ACTIVE EFI 0.4 599049 Burundi Credit Reference Bureau - Phase 1 2013 2019 ACTIVE EFI 0.6 576488 AMSMETA BoA BCB 2012 2016 CLOSED FIG 1.1 Sub-Total 4.9 Advisory Services Approved pre-FY13 but active during FY13-16 Impl Impl Primary Project Project Total Project Name Start End Business ID Status Funds, $ FY FY Line Burundi Investment Climate Reform 574687 2011 2014 CLOSED TAC 2.4 Program Sub-Total 2.4 TOTAL 7.3 Source: IFC AS Portal Data as of 7/15/18 CLR Review Annexes Independent Evaluation Group 29 Annex Table 14: IFC net commitment activity in Burundi, FY13 - FY16 ($, millions) 2013 2014 2015 2016 Total Long-term Investment Commitment Financial Markets - - 2.5 (1.3) 1.3 Telecom, Media, and Technology (25.0) - - - Total IFC Long Term Investment (25.0) - 2.5 (1.3) (23.8) Commitment Short-term Finance/Trade Finance - 0.1 0.6 0.8 1.0 2.4 Average Outstanding Balance Source: IFC MIS as of 8/29/18 Note: IFC began reporting average outstanding short-term commitments (not total commitments) in FY15 and no longer aggregates short-term commitments with long-term commitments. IEG uses net commitment number for IFC's long-term investment. For trade finance guarantees under GTFP, average commitment numbers have been used. Annex Table 15: List of MIGA Projects Active in Burundi, FY13-FY16 ($, millions) Max Project Contract Enterprise FY Sector Investor Gross Status Issuance Cotecna Inspection, S.A., Burundi 2014 Active Services Switzerland 8.5 Liaison Office Total 8.5 Source: MIGA 8/29/18