BACKGROUND PAPER

GOVERNANCE and THE LAW

Accounting for Cross-Country Income Differences: Ten Years Later

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Accounting for Cross-Country Income Differences: Ten Years Later

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1 Introduction

My 2005 survey of development accounting is often cited as motivation for studies attempting to explain cross-country differences in the efficiency with which capital and labor are used [Caselli (2005)]. That study focused on a cross-section of countries observed in the mid-1990s, so the conclusions from that effort are beginning to be a bit dated. In addition, significant revisions of the data underlying the 2005 paper have been published. Last but not least, in the intervening years I have become aware of ways in which the original methodology can be usefully improved and extended. Hence the present update and upgrade of the original paper.\footnote{Besides the survey of development accounting, the 2005 paper also contained calculations aimed at assessing the role of sectoral efficiency differences in overall efficiency differences; and a study of non-neutral technology differences. An “update and upgrade” of the latter is offered in Caselli (2016).} This paper focuses on data (mostly) from 2005 and improves on the original methodology in several dimensions.

Development accounting compares differences in income per worker between developing and developed countries to counter-factual differences attributable to observable compo-
ponents of physical and human capital. Such calculations can serve a useful preliminary diagnostic role before engaging in deeper and more detailed explorations of the fundamental determinants of differences in income per worker. If differences in physical and human capital – or capital gaps – are sufficient to explain most of the difference in incomes, then researchers and policy makers need to focus on factors holding back investment (in machines and in humans). Instead, if differences in capital are insufficient to account for most of the variation in income, one must conclude that developing countries are also hampered by relatively low efficiency at using their inputs - efficiency gaps. The research and policy agenda would then have to focus on technology, allocative efficiency, competition, and other determinants of the efficient use of capital.

I measure physical capital as an aggregate of reproducible and “natural” capital. Reproducible capital includes equipment and structures, while natural capital primarily includes subsoil resources, arable land, and timber. The inclusion of natural capital in the physical capital stock, as applied to development accounting, is an innovation of the present paper. The importance of tracking the contribution of natural capital to production is illustrated by Caselli and Feyrer (2007).

My preferred measure of human capital is based on a “Mincerian” framework, where the key inputs are schooling (years of education), health (as proxied by the adult survival rate), and cognitive skills (as proxied by test score results). However because of limitations in the coverage of the test results, I also present results where human capital is only measured from years of schooling and health. It turns out that, at least in my preferred calibration, the addition or omission of cognitive skills (as measured by test scores) does not greatly affect the quantitative results.

Given measures of physical capital gaps, as well gaps in the components of human capital, development-accounting uses a calibration to map these gaps into counter-factual income gaps, or the income gaps that would be observed based on differences in human and capital endowments only. Because these counterfactual incomes are bundles of physical and human capital, I refer to the ratio of a country’s counterfactual incomes to the US counterfactual income as relative capital.

I present results from two alternative calibrations, a “baseline” calibration and an “aggressive” calibration. The baseline calibration makes use of the existing body of mi-
croeconomic estimates of the Mincerian framework in the way that most closely fits the theoretical framework of development accounting. As it turns out, this leads to coefficients for the mapping from the components of human capital to the index of human capital that are substantially lower than in much existing work in development accounting - leading to relatively smaller estimated capital gaps and, correspondingly, larger efficiency gaps. The aggressive calibration thus uses more conventional figures as a robustness check.

Under both the benchmark and the aggressive calibration I find very large efficiency gaps. In the benchmark calibration, countries in the bottom decile of the world income distribution use their inputs only about 10% as efficiently as the US; countries in the second decile are less than 20% as efficient; at the third it’s only little above 20%, and so on. The efficiency of countries in the 9th decile of the income distribution is roughly 90% of the US level. The aggressive calibration implies higher relative efficiency, but the gaps are still huge. For example at the 3rd decile of the income distribution efficiency is 30% of the US level (against 20% in the benchmark calibration).

In assessing this evidence, it is essential to bear in mind that efficiency gaps contribute to income disparity both directly – as they mean that poorer countries get less out of their capital – and indirectly – since much of the capital gap itself is likely due to diminished incentives to invest in equipment, structure, schooling, and health caused by low efficiency. The consequences of closing the efficiency gap would correspondingly be far reaching.

2 Conceptual Framework

The analytical tool at the core of development accounting is the aggregate production function. The aggregate production function maps aggregate input quantities into output. The main inputs considered are physical capital and human capital. The empirical literature so far has failed to uncover compelling evidence that aggregate input quantities deliver large external economies, so it is usually deemed safe to assume constant returns to scale.\(^2\) Given this assumption, one can express the production function in intensive form, i.e. by

\(^2\)See, e.g. Iranzo and Peri (2009) for a recent review and some new evidence on the quantitative significance of schooling externalities.
specifying all input and output quantities in per worker terms. In order to construct counterfactual incomes a functional form is needed. Existing evidence suggests that the share of capital in income does not vary systematically with the level of development, or with factor endowments [Gollin (2002)]. Hence, most practitioners of development accounting opt for a Cobb-Douglas specification. In sum, the production function for country \( i \) is

\[
y_i = A_i k_i^\alpha h_i^{1-\alpha},
\]

where \( y \) is output per worker, \( k \) is physical capital per worker, \( h \) is human capital per worker (quality-adjusted labor), and \( A \) captures unmeasured/unobservable factors that contribute to differences in output per worker.

The term \( A \) is subject to much speculation and controversy. Practitioners refer to it as total factor productivity, technology, a measure of our ignorance, etc. Here I will refer to it as “efficiency”. Countries with a larger \( A \) are countries that, for whatever reasons, are more efficient users of their physical and human capital.

The goal of development accounting is to assess the relative importance of efficiency differences and physical and human capital differences in producing the differences in income per worker we observe in the data. To this end, one constructs counterfactual incomes, or capital bundles,

\[
\tilde{y}_i = k_i^\alpha h_i^{1-\alpha},
\]

which are based exclusively on the observable inputs. Differences in these capital bundles are then compared to income differences. If counter-factual and actual income differences are similar, then observable factors are able to account for the bulk of the variation in income. If they are quite different, then differences in efficiency are important. Establishing how significant efficiency differences are has important repercussions both for research and for policy.

In order to construct the counterfactual \( \tilde{y}_i \)'s we need to construct measures of \( k_i \) and \( h_i \), as well as to calibrate the capital-share parameter \( \alpha \). Standard practice sets the latter to 0.33, and we stick to this practice throughout the main body of the paper. In the appendix I present robustness checks using a larger capital share, i.e. 0.40. This higher share implies somewhat larger capital gaps and somewhat smaller efficiency gaps, though
the main message of the paper is unchanged.\footnote{There may well be significant heterogeneity among countries in the value of $\alpha$. However, it is not known how to perform development-accounting with country-specific capital shares. This is because measures of the capital stock are indices, so that a requirement for the exercise to make sense is that the results should be invariants to the units in which $k$ is measured. Now $(k_i/k_j)^\alpha$ is unit-invariant, but $(k_i^{a_i}/k_j^{a_j})$ is not.}

The rest of this section focuses on the measurement of physical and human capital.

Existing development-accounting calculations measure $k$ exclusively on the basis of \textit{reproducible} capital (equipment and structures). But in most developing countries, where agricultural and mining activities still represent large shares of GDP, natural capital (land, timber, ores, etc.) is also very important. Caselli and Feyrer (2007) show that omitting natural capital can lead to very significant understatements of total capital in developing countries relative to developed ones. Hence, this study will measure $k$ as the sum of the value of all reproducible and natural capital.

Human capital per worker can vary across countries as a result of differences in knowledge, skills, health, etc. The literature has identified three variables that vary across countries which may capture significant differences in these dimensions: years of schooling [e.g., Klenow and Rodriguez-Clare (1997), Hall and Jones (1999)], health [Weil (2007)], and cognitive skills [e.g. Hanushek and Woessmann (2012a)]. In order to bring these together, we postulate the following model for human capital:

$$h_i = \exp(\beta_s s_i + \beta_r r_i + \beta_t t_i).$$

(3)

In this equation, $s_i$ measures average years of schooling in the working-age population, $r_i$ is a measure of health in the population, and $t_i$ is a measure of cognitive skills. The coefficients $\beta_s$, $\beta_r$, and $\beta_t$ map differences in the corresponding variables into differences in human capital.\footnote{Some caveats as to the validity of of the functional form assumption in (3) are in order. There is considerable micro and macro evidence against the assumption that workers with different years of schooling are perfect substitutes [e.g. Caselli and Coleman (2006)]. In this paper I abstract from the issue of imperfect substitutability. Caselli and Ciccone (2013) argue that consideration of imperfect substitution is unlikely to reduce the estimated importance of efficiency gaps.}
ters $\beta_s$, $\beta_r$, and $\beta_t$. In particular, combining (1), (3), and an assumption that wages are proportional to the marginal productivity of labor, we obtain the “Mincerian” formulation

$$\log(w_{ij}) = \alpha_i + \beta_s s_{ij} + \beta_r r_{ij} + \beta_t t_{ij};$$

(4)

where $w_{ij}$ ($s_{ij}$, etc.) is the wage (years of schooling, etc.) of worker $j$ in country $i$, and $\alpha_i$ is a country-specific term.$^5$ This suggests that using within-country variation in wages, schooling, health, and cognitive skills one might in principle identify the coefficients $\beta$. In practice, there are severe limitations in following this strategy, that we discuss after introducing the data.

3 Data

I work with a sample of 128 countries for which I have data for $y$, $k$, $s$, and $r$, all observed in 2005. These data are an extract from a dataset I developed in Caselli (2016), which contains details of construction and definitions. I treat the USA as the benchmark country. Since all of the variables enter the calculations either as ratios or as differences to US values, this effectively means that there are 127 data points. When including test score estimates, the number of data points will drop to 54.

Per-worker income $y_i$ is variable $rgdpwok$ from version 7.1 of the Penn World Tables (PWT71). Figure 1 depicts the distribution of income per worker relative to the USA, or $y_i/y_{US}$. Countries are grouped by decile, and the bars represent the decile mean. The colossal income gaps shown in the figure are well known, of course. In the bottom decile income is two orders of magnitudes lower than in the US. At the median, it’s still one order of magnitude. Standards of living remotely comparable to the US only begin to appear in the 9th decile.

World Bank (2012) presents cross-sectional estimates of the total capital stock, $k$, as

$^5$Note that this approach to the measurement of human capital is robust to a broad range of deviations from perfect competition. In particular, the wage does not need to equal the marginal productivity of labour, but just be proportional to it. Many models of monopsony in labor markets and monopolistic competition have this property.
Figure 1: World Income Distribution

well as its components, for various years. The total capital stock includes reproducible capital, but also land, timber, mineral deposits, and other items that are not included in standard national-account-based data sets. The basic strategy of the World Bank team that constructed these data begins with estimates of the rental flows accruing from different types of natural capital, which are then capitalized using fixed discount rates. I construct the total capital measure by adding the variables \textit{producedplusurban} and \textit{natcap}.

Measuring the total capital stock as the sum of natural and reproducible capital amounts to an assumption of perfect substitutability between the two capital types. To evaluate this assumption, it is useful to conceive of GDP as the sum of the added values of the primary sector (essentially agriculture and mining), where natural capital is heavily used, and of the secondary and tertiary sectors (essentially manufacturing and services), where natural capital plays virtually no role. Then, perfect substitutability is most defensible if the primary sector uses little or no reproducible capital, or if the primary sector is a relatively small share of the economy. Admittedly, the former assumption is not particularly credible, while the latter clearly does not apply to many commodity-exporting
Figure 2: Endowments of Physical Capital

countries. Intuitively, though, this should result in an overestimate of the capital gap in commodity-exporting countries, and consequently an underestimate of the efficiency gap. If the primary sector is large, and reproducible capital plays a significant role in the primary sector, reproducible capital and natural capital should boost each other’s productivity, resulting in a larger capital bundle than in the case they are perfect substitutes. In other words, by assuming perfect substitutability we are underestimating the total contribution of commodity exporters than in the richer, benchmark country.

Figure 2 shows total (reproducible plus natural) capital per worker relative to the US, $k_i/k_{US}$, by relative-income decile. I.e., countries continue to be ranked by their relative income, as in Figure 1, and not by their relative capital. The same format will be used in all subsequent figures. The figure shows that physical-capital gaps are broadly comparable to income gaps: average relative physical capital in the various income deciles tends to be of a similar order of magnitude as average relative income.

For average years of schooling in the working-age population (which is defined as between 15 and 99 years of age) I rely on Barro and Lee (2013). Note from equation (3)
that for the purposes of constructing relative human capital $h_i/h_{US}$ what is relevant is the difference in years of schooling $s_i - s_{US}$. The same will be true for $r$ and $t$. Accordingly, in Figure 3 I plot schooling-year differences with the USA in 2005.

Schooling gaps with the USA are very substantial. In countries in the bottom income decile the average worker has 9.2 fewer years of schooling. In the fifth decile, it is still 5.7 (though interestingly the 4th decile does a bit better, with 4.7). Remarkably, the schooling gap with the USA remains quite substantial even at the top, with each of the top three deciles showing a gap between 2.6 and 2.9 years.

As a proxy for the health status of the population, $r$, Weil (2007) proposes using the adult survival rate. The adult survival rate is a statistic computed from age-specific mortality rates at a point in time. It can be interpreted as the probability of reaching the age of 60, conditional on having reached the age of 15, at current rates of age-specific mortality. Since most mortality before age 60 is due to illness, the adult survival rate is a reasonably good proxy for the overall health status of the population at a given point in time. Relative to more direct measures of health, the advantage of the adult survival rate is
that it is available for a large cross-section of countries. I construct the adult survival rate from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators. Specifically, this is the weighted average of male and female survival rates, weighted by the male and female share in the population.

Figure 4: Health by Income Decile

In Figure 4 I plot adult survival rate differences with the USA. We observe the usual broadly-monotonic pattern, with countries in the bottom income deciles suffering from much lower survival rates: 16-year-olds in the 1st decile are almost 30 percentage points less likely to reach the age of 60 than US 16 years old. However, differences in health appear to contract fairly rapidly as we move up the income distribution: they are less than 5 percentage points in the 5th and 7th decile, and they actually turn against the US in the top three deciles.

Following work by Gundlach, Rudman, and Woessman (2002), Woessman (2003), Jones and Schneider (2010) and Hanushek and Woessmann (particularly 2012a), we also wish to account for differences in cognitive skills not already accounted for by years of schooling and health. The ideal measure would be a test of average cognitive ability in the working
population. Hanushek and Zhang (2009) report estimates of one such test (the International Adult Literacy Survey (IALS)) for a dozen countries, but this is clearly too small a sample to be useful here.

As a fallback, I rely on internationally comparable test scores taken by school-age children. I will use scores from a science test administered in 2009 to 15 year olds by PISA (Program for International Student Assessment). There are in principle several other internationally-comparable tests (by subject matter, year of testing, and organization testing) that could be used in alternative to or in combination with the 2009 PISA science test. However there would be virtually no gain in country coverage by using or combining with other years (the PISA tests of 2009 are the ones with the greatest participation). Focusing only on one test bypasses potentially thorny issues of aggregation across years, subjects, and methods of administration. Cross-country correlations in test results are very high anyway, and very stable over time. Data on PISA test score results are from the World Bank’s Education Statistics.

Needless to say measuring \( t \) by the above-described test scores is clearly very unsatisfactory, as in most cases the tests reflect the cognitive skills of individuals who have not joined the labor force as of 2005, much less those of the average worker. Implicitly, we are interpreting test-score gaps in current children as proxies for test scores gaps in current workers. If the US and the other countries in the sample have experienced different trends in cognitive skills of children over the last few decades this assumption is problematic.

The 2009 PISA science tests are reported on a scale from 0 to 1000, and they are normalized so that the average score among OECD countries (i.e. among all pupils taking the test in this set of countries) is (approximately) 500 and the standard deviation is (approximately) 100.\(^7\) Figure 5 shows test score differences \( t_i - t_{US} \) for the countries which

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\(^6\)Repeating all my calculations using the PISA math scores yielded results that were virtually indistinguishable from those using the science test.

\(^7\)I say approximately in parenthesis because the normalization was applied to the 2006 wave of the test. The 2009 test was graded to be comparable to the 2006 one. Hence, it is likely that the 2009 mean (standard deviation) will have drifted somewhat away from 500 (100) - though probably not by much. The PISA math and reading tests were normalized in 2000 and 2003, respectively, so their mean and standard deviation are more likely to have drifted away from the initial benchmark. This is one reason why I use
took part in the test. The poorest country in the sample to report a test score is the country at the 24th percentile of the relative income distribution, so I cannot plot cognitive-skill differences from the bottom two deciles.\footnote{Recall that I have complete data on income, physical capital, years of schooling, and survival rates for my sample of 128 countries, but only 58 countries with test scores. This also implies that the decile averages in Figure 5 are typically based on a subset of the countries that populate the decile.}

Differences in PISA scores are very significant. In the third and fourth decile the gap between the average student and the average US student exceeds the standard deviation among OECD students. In the fifth and sixth deciles the gap is still similar to the OECD standard deviation. On the other hand countries in the top two income deciles outperform the US.
4 Calibration

The last, and most difficult, step in producing counter-factual income gaps between US and Latin America is to calibrate the coefficients $\beta_s$, $\beta_r$, and $\beta_t$. As discussed, equation (4) indicates that, using within country data on $w$, $s$, $r$, and $t$, one could in principle identify these coefficients by running an extended Mincerian regression for log-wages. In implementing this plan, we are confronted with (at least) two important problems.

The first problem is that one of the explanatory variables, the adult survival rate $r$, by definition does not vary within countries. Estimating $\beta_r$ directly is therefore a logical impossibility. To solve this problem Weil (2007) notices that, in the time series (for a sample of ten countries for which the necessary data is available), there is a fairly tight relationship between the adult survival rate and average height. In other words, he postulates $c_i = \alpha_c + \gamma_c r_i$, where $c_i$ is average height and the coefficient $\gamma_c$ is estimated from the above-mentioned time series relation (he obtains a coefficient of 19.2 in his preferred specification). Since height does vary within countries as well as between countries, this opens the way to identifying $\beta_r$ by means of the Mincerian regression

$$\log(w_{ij}) = \alpha_i + \beta_s s_{ij} + \beta_c c_{ij} + \beta_t t_{ij},$$

where $\beta_r = \beta_c \gamma_c$.\(^9\)

The second problem is that measures of $t$ are not consistent at the macro and at the micro level. In particular, while we do have micro data sets reporting both results from tests of cognitive skills and wages, the test in question is simply a different test from the tests we have available at the level of the cross-section of countries. Call the alternative test available at the micro level $d$. Once again the solution is to assume a linear relationship $d_i = \gamma_d t_i$. The difference with the case of height-survival rate is that, as far as I know, there is no way to check the empirical plausibility of this assumption. Given the assumed linear relationship, one can back out $\gamma_d$ as the ratio of the within country standard deviation of

\(^9\)Needless to say if we had cross-country data on average height there would be no need to use the survival rate at all.
$d_{ij}$ and $t_{ij}$. With $\gamma_d$ at hand, one can back out $\beta_t$ from the modified Mincerian regression

$$\log(w_{ij}) = \alpha_i + \beta_s s_{ij} + \beta_c c_{ij} + \beta_d d_{ij}, \quad (5)$$

using $\beta_t = \beta_d \gamma_d$.

In choosing values for $\beta_s$, $\beta_c$, and $\beta_d$ from the literature it is highly desirable to focus on microeconomic estimates of equation (5) that include all three right-hand variables. This is because $s$, $c$, and $d$ are well-known to be highly positively correlated. Hence, any OLS estimate of one of the coefficients from a regression that omits one or two of the other two variables will be biased upward.

A search of the literature yielded one and only one study reporting all three coefficients from equation (5). Vogl (2014) uses the two waves (2002 and 2005) of the nationally-representative Mexican Family Life Survey to estimate (5) on a subsample of men aged 25-65. In his study, $w$ is measured as hourly earnings, $s$ as years of schooling, $c$ is in centimeters, and $d$ is the respondent’s score on a cognitive-skill test administered at the time of the survey. The cognitive skill measure is scaled so its standard deviation in the Mexican population is 1.

The coefficients reported by Vogl are as follows (see his Table 4, column 7). The return to schooling $\beta_s$ is 0.072, which can be plugged directly in equation (3). The “return to height” $\beta_c$ is 0.013. Hence, the coefficient associated with the adult survival rate in (3) is $0.013 \times 19.2 = 0.25$, where I have used Weil’s mapping between height and the adult survival rate. Finally, the reported return to cognitive skills $\beta_d$ is 0.011. Since the standard deviation of $d$ is one by construction, and the standard deviation of the 2009 Science PISA test in Mexico is 77, the implied coefficient on the PISA test for the purposes of constructing

\[10\] See, e.g., the literature review in Vogl (2014).

\[11\] An alternative would be to use IV estimates of the $\beta$s, but instruments for the variables on the right hand side of equation 5 are often somewhat controversial - especially for height and cognitive skills.

\[12\] The test is the short-form Raven’s Progressive Matrices Test.

\[13\] Needless to say there are aspects of Vogl’s treatment that imply the regressions he runs are not a perfect fit for the conceptual framework of the paper. It may have been preferable for our purposes to include both men and women. He also controls for ethnicity, age, and age squared, which do not feature in my framework. Finally, he notes that the Raven’s core is a coarse measure of cognitive skills, giving raise to concerns with attenuation bias (more on this below).
The coefficients in my baseline calibration are considerably lower than those used in other development-accounting exercises. For schooling, applications usually gravitate towards the “modal” Mincerian coefficient of 0.10. For the adult survival rate, Weil (2007) uses 0.65, on the basis of considerably higher estimates of the returns to height than those reported by Vogl. For the return to cognitive skills, Hanushek and Woessmann (2012a) advocate 0.002, which is more than one order of magnitude larger than the value I derive from the Vogl’s estimates.\textsuperscript{14}

The fact that the parameters calibrated on Vogl’s estimates are smaller than those commonly used is consistent with the discussion above. In particular, the alternative estimates are often based on regressions that omit one or two of the variables in (5), and are therefore upward biased. Another consideration is that there is considerable cross-country heterogeneity in the estimates, and that researchers often focus on estimates from the USA, which are often larger.\textsuperscript{15,16}

On the other hand, Vogl’s regressions are admittedly estimated via OLS, and there is a real concern with attenuation bias from measurement error. In order to gauge the sensitivity of my results to possibly excessively low values of the calibration parameters due to attenuation bias, I will also present results based on an “aggressive” calibration, which uses a Mincerian return of 0.10, Weil’s 0.65 value for the mapping of the adult survival rate to human capital, and Hanushek and Woessman’s 0.002 coefficient on the PISA test.\textsuperscript{17}

\textsuperscript{14}This is based on Hanushek and Zhang (2009), who use the International Adult Literacy Survey (IALS) to estimate the return to cognitive skills in a set of 13 countries. The value of 0.002 is the one for the USA.

\textsuperscript{15}For example, in Hanushek and Zhang (2009), the estimated market return to cognitive skills varies (from minimum to maximum) by a factor of 10! The estimate from the USA, which is used in Hanushek and Woessman (2012a) is the maximum of this distribution.

\textsuperscript{16}This is actually an issue with the capital share $\alpha$ as well. However, the issue there is less severe as observed capital shares do not vary systematically with $y$, so it should be possible to ascribe the observed variation to measurement error. In other words the patterns of variation in $\alpha$ do not necessarily rise the issue of model mispecification.

\textsuperscript{17}As described above the Hanushek and Zhang estimate for the US comes from a test $d$ different from $t$. 
Figure 6: Two measures of human capital (benchmark calibration)

As the test-score results are only available for less than half of the countries in the sample, it is worth checking if including them in the construction of the human-capital measure makes a material quantitative difference. Figure 6 compares human capital estimates with and without test scores, for the countries for which test scores are available, using my benchmark calibration. Specifically, for each decile the first bar shows average relative human capital computed as $\exp(\beta_s s_i + \beta_r r_i + \beta_t t_i)$, while the second bar shows $\exp(\beta_s s_i + \beta_r r_i)$. Qualitatively, accounting for cognitive skills reduces relative human capital for countries with poorer test scores, and increases it for countries that score higher than the USA. This is, of course, by construction. The important point, however, is that

In order to go from their coefficient $\beta_d$ to the coefficient of interest $\beta_i$ we need to multiply the former by the ratio of the standard deviation of $d_{US,i}$ to the standard deviation of $t_{US,i}$. Since Hanushek and Zhang standardize the variable $d$, we just have to multiply by the inverse of the standard deviation of $t_{US,i}$. But in the test we are using this is just 0.98, so the correction would be immaterial.
the differences between accounting and not-accounting for cognitive skills is minuscule. This is of course a consequence of the very small coefficient on cognitive skills from Vogl’s estimates.

In light of the very small difference between relative human capital measures that account and do not account for cognitive skills, it does not seem worthwhile to give up on more than half of the sample to include cognitive skills in the measure of human capital - at least when using the benchmark calibration. From now on, therefore, my benchmark calculations will drop the test-score correction. Figure 7 shows relative human capital on the full sample.

Figure 7: Human Capital in the Full Sample

Relative human capital is still broadly increasing in income. However, human-capital gaps do not appear as large as physical-capital gaps. The countries in the bottom income decile have half as much as the human capital of the USA. The distribution of relative human-capital is also remarkably compressed, ranging from just shy of 50% to just over 80%. Of course the fact that human-capital gaps are comparatively small does not imply that human capital contributes little to income gaps, as the elasticity of income to human
capital is twice as large as its elasticity to physical capital.

Figure 8: Aggressive Calibration

8 compares human capital estimates with and without test scores, using the aggressive calibration. The differences are quite significant this time. In the 3rd income decile relative human capital is 10 percentage points lower when accounting for cognitive skills; in the 4th decile, almost 20 percentage points. It is clear that when using the aggressive calibration we cannot ignore test scores. Accordingly, when reporting results from the aggressive calibration I will focus only on the subsample of countries which participated in the PISA science test. Not surprisingly, using the aggressive calibration results in significantly lower relative human capital, since the impact of differentials in schooling, health, and cognitive skills is magnified.

5 Results

My baseline results are presented in Figure 9, which shows average counter-factual income (labeled “total capital”) and efficiency relative to the USA by income decile. Counter-
factual income is computed as in (2). Relative efficiency is, as usual, the residual.\textsuperscript{18} The "total capital" bar is an inverse measure of the overall capital gap with the USA. The “relative efficiency” bar is an inverse measure of the efficiency gap with the USA.

The figure points to a roughly 50-50 contribution of capital gaps and efficiency gaps to the overall income gap. There is a slight reversal in relative importance between the bottom-half of the income distribution, where efficiency gaps are somewhat more significant, and the top, where capital gaps become somewhat more important. But the differences are small on both sides of the median, and the basic conclusion is that efficiency and capital shortfalls are equally important in determining relative incomes. Quantitatively, the key observation is that poorer countries are exceptionally inefficient users of their inputs: relative efficiency is less than 10\% in the bottom decile, less than 20\% in the 2nd decile; just over 20\% in the 3rd; about 30\% in the fourth, etc.

\textsuperscript{18}Namely, relative efficiency is \((\hat{y}_i/\hat{y}_{US}) / (\tilde{y}_i/\tilde{y}_{US})\).
Figure 10: Robustness to Aggressive Calibration

Figure 10 is analogous to Figure 9, but uses the aggressive calibration instead. Recall that when using the aggressive calibration, we have to include the cognitive-test scores and, as a consequence, we lose many observations. As expected, using larger parameters in the mapping from schooling years, health, and test scores leads to a considerable decline in relative capital. As a result, the relative contribution of capital gaps is now larger than the contribution of efficiency gaps for all income deciles. Nevertheless, huge efficiency gaps persist even under the aggressive calibration. The average efficiency of the 3rd decile is 30%; in the 4th decile is less than 40%.

In order to fully appreciate the importance of these efficiency gaps it is crucial to note that, under almost any imaginable set of circumstances, physical (specifically, reproducible) and human capital accumulation respond to a country’s level of efficiency. The higher \( A \) the higher the marginal productivity of capital, leading to enhanced incentives to invest in equipment and structure, schooling, etc. While quantifying this effect is difficult, most theoretical frameworks would lead one to expect it to be large. Hence, it is legitimate to
conjecture that a significant fraction of the capital gap may be due to the efficiency gap.\footnote{In principle, one might also argue for a reverse direction of causation, with larger physical and human-capital stocks leading to higher efficiency. In particular, this would be true if the model was misspecified, and there were large externalities. But as already mentioned the empirical literature has not to date uncovered significant evidence of externalities in physical and human capital.}

6 Implications and Conclusions

There is huge inequality in income per worker between the countries of the World: countries in the bottom decile are about 100 times less productive than the USA, and substantial differences persist all of the way up to the higher percentiles. A development-accounting calculation reveals that both capital gaps and efficiency gaps contribute roughly equally to this overall productivity gap. Hence, poor countries are poorer both because they exert less effort in accumulating productive factors, and because they use these factors much less efficiently. Reducing these efficiency gaps would reduce overall productivity gaps both directly and indirectly, since much of the capital gap is likely due to the efficiency gap itself: closing the efficiency gap would stimulate investment at rates potentially capable of closing the capital gap as well.

These conclusions are contingent on the quality of the underlying macroeconomic data. There is growing concern about the quality and reliability of the PPP national-account figures in the Penn World Tables and similar data sets [e.g. Johnson et al. (2013)]. Similar concerns apply, no doubt, to our proxies for human capital as well (as already discussed particularly in the context of cognitive skills). It is true that such concerns are most often voiced in the context of implied comparisons of changes, especially over short time spans: cross-country comparisons of levels reveal such gigantic differences (as seen above) that they seem unlikely to be entirely dominated by noise. Still, exclusive reliance on these macro data is highly inadvisable.

Fortunately, it is also increasingly unnecessary. The increasing availability of firm level data sets, particularly when matched with employee-level information (e.g. about schooling), provides an opportunity to supplement the macro picture with microeconomic
productivity estimates comparable across countries.

The benefit of producing such micro productivity estimates is by no means limited to permitting to check the robustness of conclusions concerning average capital and efficiency gaps - though this benefit alone is sufficient to make such exercises worthwhile. An additional benefit is to uncover information on the within country distribution of physical capital, human capital, and efficiency. A relatively concentrated distribution would suggest that efficiency gaps are mostly due to aggregate, macroeconomic factors that affect all firms fairly equally (e.g. impediment to technology diffusion from other countries). A very dispersed distribution, with some firms close to the world technology frontier, would be more consistent with allocative frictions that prevent capital and labor to flow to the more efficient/talented managers.

More generally, firm-level data is likely to prove essential in the quest for the determinants of the large efficiency gaps revealed by the development-accounting calculation. After all, (in-)efficiency is – by definition – a firm-level phenomenon. Most of the most plausible possible explanations for the efficiency gap are microeconomic in nature – whether it is about firms unable to adapt technologies developed in more technologically-advanced countries, failures in the market for managers and/or capital, frictions in the matching process for workers, etc. It seems implausible that evidence for or against these mechanisms can be found in the macro data. Yet understanding the sources of poor countries' efficiency gaps is unquestionably the most urgent task for those who want to design policies aimed at closing the income gaps.
References


