Madagascar: Building Decentralization Capacity through Rapid Results Initiatives

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Abstract

Rapid results initiatives are an important part of WBI’s toolkit of leadership activities, all of which are customized to focus on the most pressing needs of a particular government. In Madagascar, a country-led needs analysis identified, as a key priority, the design of a strategy to achieve rapid development results. RRI has proven its ability to generate – beyond the achievement of ambitious stretch targets – significant intangible collateral benefits of local ownership, participation, transparency, accountability, and improved access to knowledge and information. Although the aggregate impact of the RRI program in terms of macro-level measures of output, local tax collection, etc., has so far not been quantitatively significant, the systems put in place and behavior change brought about by RRI will facilitate many aspects of future development.
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Background and objectives

Context
Madagascar, while rich in minerals and enjoying a unique island culture, has suffered decades of economic decline and is one of the poorest countries in Africa. Recent reforms have led to some growth, but the poor have not shared in those gains. In late 2002, after an extended political transition, the new President of Madagascar, Marc Rovolomanana, requested assistance from the World Bank to design and implement a learning event for ministers and senior officials of the new Government to support them in realizing outcomes that would benefit all of Madagascar’s citizens. Since the initial Government Learning Retreat in June 2003, a succession of other learning events and initiatives has aimed at building the capacity of government, private sector, and civil society stakeholders at the national and sub-national levels to achieve more effective development results.

These initiatives, which followed the introduction of a new decentralization policy in 2004, introduced innovative mechanisms for improving governance and supporting regional development and local service delivery. The World Bank Institute (WBI), working with other partners, contributed to the design and implementation of these initiatives, including a Rapid Results Initiative (RRI) to develop leadership capacity in newly created administrative regions. The first phase of the RRI was initiated in February 2005 and ended in June 2006. The second phase was initiated in July 2005 and ended in December 2005. The third phase started in March 2006.

The RRI approach is a participatory process in which a “rapid results team” is accountable for delivering anticipated targets in a short period of time – typically 150 days, with intermediate results in 50 and 100 days. Most RRI teams include at least one team leader and a group of stakeholders (between 8 to 12 persons) representing the interests of the public, private, and civil society actors of a given sector (rice, litchi, tourism, health, textile, fiscal, etc). The short timeframe, combined with political will and proper incentives for local leaders, is key to the success of the RRI approach, since it requires that the teams quickly find original, and often cross-cutting, solutions in order to achieve their targets.

This case study was written by Govindan Nair, World Bank Lead Economist, Eric Champagne, Public Sector Specialist Consultant and Cia Sjetnan, Capacity Development Specialist at the World Bank Institute. This note also received inputs and support from Benjamina Randrianarivelo, the national consultant on Rapid Results in Madagascar.
Rapid results initiatives are an important part of WBI’s toolkit of leadership activities, all of which are customized to focus on the most pressing needs of a particular government. In Madagascar, a country-led needs analysis identified, as a key priority, the design of a strategy to achieve rapid development results.

**Goal and objectives**
This report assesses the effectiveness of Madagascar’s RRI approach in (i) creating mutual trust and respect among leaders and change-agents at all levels; (ii) clarifying the respective roles, responsibilities, and accountabilities of these leaders; and more broadly, (iii) fostering a team approach to implementing the new Government’s development agenda.

The RRI was initiated through the series of learning retreats in early 2005; four pilot regions\(^1\) were targeted in phase one, and 12 additional regions were targeted in phase two. The RRI is currently in its third phase, during which it will be implemented in 21 regions of the country (out of 22.) Each region typically identifies a set of specific results to be achieved in 150 days in one or more sectors, which so far have included agriculture, mining, livestock farming, health, textiles, and tourism.

To assess the performance of the first two phases, a Malagasy consultant firm was contracted by the *Programme de Reforme pour l’Efficacite de l’Administration* (PREA), a World Bank financed project\(^2\), to look at tangible results in 12 provinces after 150 days.\(^3\) While this May 2006 assessment reported on concrete findings, it did little to explore the soft side effects of the RRI approach; key factors that facilitate and sustain organizational and institutional change, such as the ability to identify priority actions, mobilize various actors, and clarify roles and responsibilities. The present report aims to complement the earlier study by exploring such “soft side” effects.

This report analyzes RRI both retrospectively and prospectively, so as to (i) complement the quantitative assessment of RRI targets with a qualitative assessment of key success factors; and (ii) outline possible issues for the sustainability and future scale-up of RRI issues in the country.

**Methodology**
Based on a review of the May 2006 performance assessment, reports generated by the RRI teams, and on field visits to two of the regions in which the program is operating, the material here emerged from an interview protocol that included the following questions:

- How do Malagasy stakeholders perceive the results achieved during the first two phases of the RRI program (between February and June 2005)?
- What were the perceived critical factors in success or failure?

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\(^1\) The first RRI pilot regions were Boeny, Menabe, Bongolava, and Vakinankaratra.

\(^2\) This program is partly financed through the World Bank Governance and Institutional Development Program. Others resources comes from partners such as the African Development Bank.

- Where was the locus of initiative and implementation in RRI activities?
- What might be key issues for sustainability and scaling up?

Attention was given to the fact that the interviews (i) often required, especially at the district level, interpretation between Malagasy and French; and (ii) were largely aimed at audiences concerned with concrete economic results (crop yield, level of sales) rather than with abstract issues such as RRI methodology and impact. Questions were therefore framed in an open-ended way and referred to the specific economic or business results which concerned the target audience. The discussion below relates their answers to the broader questions of the long-term viability of RRI.

Fieldwork was conducted by a team of four people\(^4\) from June 12 to June 17, 2006. Interviews with national and local informants were conducted in the national capital, Antananarivo, and in the two regional administrative centers (chefs lieu) targeted by the study – Mahajanga in Boeny, and Tulear in Atsimo-Andrefana. The two case study regions were selected because the performance assessment suggested somewhat divergent results in the in the two regions – the targets were achieved in Boeny and partially achieved in Atsimo-Andrefana.

Interviews were complemented by analysis of evaluation reports, RRI strategic plans, RRI newsletters, Regional Development Plans, newspaper reports, and other documents identified during the field visits.

Key national and local informants included:
- Members of the National Steering Committee
- National RRI coaches
- Members of RRI teams
- Regional chiefs
- Regional development directors
- Mayors and assistant mayors
- Local entrepreneur organizations
- Representatives of farmers groups
- Regional RRI coaches
- Local RRI project teams.

It was not the intention of the mission to attempt an in-depth field analysis of the RRI program, especially given the wide geographic dispersion of the various RRI activities across

\(^{4}\) The team included Govind Nair, World Bank Senior Economist; Eric Champagne, Public Sector Specialist; Cia Sjetnan, Capacity Development Specialist, the World Bank Institute; and Benjamina Randrianarivelo, RRI national consultant in Madagascar.
Madagascar. The field visits were rather used principally to cross-check conclusions that could be drawn from the available documentation.

It appears that national political commitment and local-level stakeholder demands, as well as newly developed incentives for local officials, have been the keys to success in RRIs, and that these also represent expanded capacity for future results delivery.

The case studies

Boeny

Located in the Northwest part of the island, the Boeny region is composed of six districts, with Mahajanga as the administrative center. It has a surface area of 29,830 kms and a population of around 570,000. A fertile rice-growing area, the region is considered the second rice bowl of Madagascar.

Boeny was among the first four pilot regions in phase 1 of the RRI. At the time the initiative was being designed, the region identified rice production, which had deteriorated over recent years, as a priority for the RRI. (Rice is the national staple food - if a Malgache does not eat it three times a day “il est malheureux” - unhappy and deprived.) From an initial yield of 2.5 tons/hectare, the program set a target of 3.5 tons/hectare, representing an increase in productivity of 50,000 tons over 150 days, on a total cultivated area of 15,000 hectares.

Intensifying rice cultivation over this short period required collaboration among a number of stakeholders, including regional authorities, local governments, farmers’ associations and other rice producers, financial institutions, and civil society. To create a collaborative environment, the RRI team – supported by a regional coach – mobilized stakeholders, facilitated knowledge transfer, and helped to ensure continuous communication with authorities in the national capital. In terms of quantitative achievements, two pumping stations were repaired in the farming zones and additional acreage was cultivated. Farmers received 1,320 tons of fertilizer and small farm equipment, which made it possible for them to double the number of harvests (from one to two) during the year. In addition, several kilometers of tracks and roads in paddy fields were rehabilitated; and farmers were given technical training on improved seeds and commercialization techniques.

According to the independent evaluation, the objectives of the RRI in Boeny were largely met. The baseline average yield of 2.5 tons/hectare rose to 4 tons/hectares during the 150-day period. While the overall yield target of 3.5 tons/hectare appears to have been surpassed, there
was considerable variation among individual growers, some of whom achieved only half the targeted increase. Possible reasons include differences in the use and/or success of enhanced rice production techniques and in the soil conditions of farms.

Regardless of yield variations, the soft side benefits of the RRI were significant. The interventions not only mobilized human and physical resources in the region, but also created synergies among stakeholders, improved cooperation and the flow of information, and fostered a positive mindset that led to changes in traditional work habits and laid the foundation for even greater productivity increases in the future.

Notwithstanding this striking performance, however, several problems with the RRI process were observed:

- There was a timing mismatch between some interventions and the crop cultivation cycle;
- Some elected local officials did not appear committed to or involved in the program;
- The small farm equipment (motorized cultivators) provided under the RRI was not adapted to the type of soil in the area;
- Some materials and crop inputs were not delivered on time, and the pumping stations did not become functional until late in the harvest season.

These problems indicate that the drive to achieve quick results, while it may be beneficial in terms of social mobilization, may cause some local realities to be overlooked – and this could, in turn, risk creating suspicion toward any new approaches. The stakeholders were able to identify the risks and the mistakes and it was obvious that they learned from that experience and will adjust their strategies during the next phases.

On the whole, farmers and communities involved in the RRI agreed that the initiative improved their lives. For example, surpluses were invested in farm equipment, fertilizer, and even in new communication devices, such as cellular phones.

Our interviews with district mayors and farmers organizations yielded the following observations about the benefits of the program:

- While the RRI methodology helped to mobilize stakeholders toward quantum yield and output improvements, the methodology does not, by itself, address significant structural and technical issues involved in rice production.
- The results in the target areas were positive enough to generate interest in the RRI approach in other zones and sectors. In phase 2, for example, Boeny used the RRI approach to speed development of the tourism industry.
- The regional coach played an important intermediation role by fostering more intensive and fluid communications between farmers and regional and national authorities.
**Atsimo-Andrefana**

Located in the Southwest part of the country, Atsimo-Andrefana (also known as *Région sud ouest*) has 9 districts, of which Tulear (also known as Toliara) is the administrative center. Its surface is 66,687 km$^2$ and its population is a little above one million. The region has more than 400 km of coastline and the second largest coral reef in the world, after Australia’s Great Barrier Reef. It also has two important wildlife preserves – Zombitse Vohibasia and Tsimanapetsotse. The region is one of 12 that were added in RRI phase 2. Atsimo-Andrefana’s experience with RRI was a mix of success and unmet expectations, as illustrated by the outcomes in three sectors – textiles, tourism, and health.

**Textiles/Cotton.** The region’s first RRI pilot was in the cotton industry in the north, where conditions are good for cotton cultivation. The goals of the pilot were to significantly increase cotton production and farmers’ incomes over a period of 150 days. The initial targets were ambitious: 12,000 hectares of additional plantings; an increase of 14,400 tons of cotton produced; and 8,000 new farm workers (mainly planters) in the cotton industry. Most of the new area under cultivation was converted from another type of crop (rice, peas, etc.). During the first 50 days, the RRI process was strong – public and private investment were mobilized, more than 9,000 new potential planters were identified and sensitized, irrigation infrastructure (dams and channels) was repaired, and more than 200 farmers groups were created with the goal of achieving the RRI targets.

At the end of the 150 day period, however, the initiative had not fulfilled its promise. Only 2,676 new hectares of cotton fields had been developed and 1,874 new jobs were created. The evaluation identified several reasons for this:

- Important infrastructure works (including a dam) were delayed, which disrupted execution of the project to a considerable degree;
- The infrastructure delays disrupted the cotton cultivation cycle;
- Financial resources to finance the farm works could not be released in time due to insufficient guarantees;
- The World Bank’s rural program in Madagascar was not able to meet its full commitments to supply agricultural inputs and farm equipment for the new plantations;
- World cotton prices declined in 2004-2005 due to record levels of cotton production. Though the risks had been known before the start of the RRI, the initiative went forward based on a conservative estimate of cost factors (labor, material, seed, equipment, etc.). These estimates proved inaccurate; prices barely covered the costs of production, and Hasyma, the recently privatized French-owned cotton company, offered only a very low price for the entire cotton crop.

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5 Before 2004, Hasyma was a state-own company. Since September 2004, the French Company Dagris has owned 90 percent of Hasyma, with the State retaining 10 percent of the shares.
The combination of these exogenous factors left the cotton planters disappointed, perplexed, and cynical toward the RRI approach. The next season, most farmers moved back to other types of crops. They did, however, benefit from the increased production capacity created by the RRI, including irrigation infrastructure (dams and channels) in the target areas.

**Tourism.** The outcomes were different in the tourism industry, which had been identified as a key growth pole for the region. The RRI pilot sought to create a new Regional Tourist Area (truck stop) managed by villagers belonging to a commune on National Road 7 (RN7). Targets included the creation of 400 new jobs; increased household revenues; increased tax revenues for the commune; the creation of an organization for local businesses; and creation of a 2.5 hectare area for vendor stalls, complete with basic facilities such as water and electricity.

The results of this tourism RRI were more significant than they were in the cotton sector. The land for the Regional Tourist Area has been identified and offered by the commune. The small operators (gargotiers) have been organized under a new association called the AGRA. Electricity service has been inaugurated and two water access points have been built. When the mission visited the site, the vendor stalls had not yet been built and the level of expected job creation and additional fiscal resources for the commune had not been fully achieved. Nevertheless, job creation was on the rise and local tax revenues had already started to increase.

Notwithstanding these favorable results, the project experienced some problems:

- Some gargotiers were not interested in moving their activities to formally designated spaces;
- The choice of this project over some higher-profile tourist projects was criticized by important tour operators.

**Health.** The health sector RRI was also very successful. In the context of RRI phase 3, Atsimo-Andrefana decided to apply the RRI method to HIV/AIDS and family planning. This initiative, which started in March 2006, aimed to increase the number of voluntary HIV tests by 750, for a total of 1050 tests during the period, as compared to 300 tests for the previous comparable period. During the first 100 days of the operation, 907 tests were carried out, due largely to multi-sectoral coordination among all actors (Direction générale du planning familial, Direction générale de la santé, la coordination de la prevention et des text du VIH) and better communication channels with the population – both of which led to a more integrated approach that enabled infected persons to find physical, pharmaceutical, and psychological support at a single service point.

Atsimo-Andrefana was also able to draw on lessons from earlier RRI initiatives. Following an analysis of what went wrong in the cotton industry and what went right in other sectors, the region elaborated a set of guidelines for the design of new RRI projects under phase 3. Since the development of guidelines is an important lead indicator of a learning process, this initiative was highly significant. The guideline was a regional innovation named REGARDS Sud-
Ouest⁶. It is a handbook, which provides a framework for adapting new RRI business plans to a specific regional context and local culture. This framework will be used for the design and implementation of ten new regional RRIIs in the areas of (i) local tax revenues; (ii) public safety; (iii) mining; (iv) agriculture; (v) livestock; (vi) fishing; (vii) tourism; (viii) education; (ix) health; and (x) environment. The model will also soon be extended to the communes as a method to support effective decentralization in the region.

Retrospective analysis

Findings from the field visits and stakeholder interviews confirmed that the following factors are important for the success, scalability, and sustainability of rapid results initiatives:

1. **The RRI program framework and process is viewed positively by local stakeholders.** Interview results and other evidence overwhelmingly point to local stakeholders’ satisfaction with the results orientation and time-bound targets of rapid results initiatives, and with the availability of regional coaches for facilitation and transmitting messages about bottlenecks to national-level officials.

2. **Political commitment and incentives are the fundamental drivers of stakeholder engagement.** Stakeholders unanimously agreed that while the RRI methodology is a useful and important tool, it does not fundamentally drive the local initiatives. Our observations are that the dynamics of national political commitment and local-level stakeholder demands, as well as newly developed incentives for local officials, play a preponderant role in explaining the success of RRI activities to date. These dynamics are closely tied to the new decentralization policy initiated in late 2004. Key elements of these dynamics are: (i) the President’s commitment to achieving his electoral slogan of “rapid development” – which fits with the RRI nomenclature and methodology; (ii) the newly established process of competitive recruitment of regional officials (Regional Chief, Director of Regional Development), many of whom are from the private sector, not the civil service, by offering attractive remuneration and strong performance incentives; (iii) the growing demands of local stakeholders for results after the extended period of political transition; (iv) the competitive recruitment of national and regional coaches, most of whom come from non-administrative backgrounds; and (v) the process of RRI monitoring and reporting, including the role of the national-level Steering Committee in tackling policy and administrative bottlenecks. Stakeholders perceive these factors as contributing to an effective and credible process for achieving near-term results in the areas of decentralized service delivery and local economic development.

3. **A new public-private organization model to deliver results.** The RRI structure is based on a mix of public and private actors. At the top of the hierarchy is the National Steering Committee, made up of officials from the Presidency, the Prime Minister’s Office, and key

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⁶ REGARDS is an acronym for REnforcement de la Gouvernance régionale et Approche à Résultats rapides pour le Développement de la région Sud Ouest – in English, Strengthening Regional Governance and Rapid Results Approaches for South-West Development.
ministries. The national coach, a private consultant recruited under a competitive process, coordinated the activities of the regional coaches. He is also a key channel of communication, as he passes on to the Steering Committee all relevant information that can be used for decision-making. At the regional level, a Regional Chief or Regional Development Director acts as the strategic leader, responsible for identifying the regional priorities in the targeted sectors and for coordinating the RRI teams. These new interrelationships represent a durable expansion of capacity.

4. **Creation of a parallel structure carries some risks.** When developing parallel structures (e.g., the national and regional coaching system), there is always a risk that development could be negatively affected. This risk must be carefully managed; and in particular, RRI coaches must be considered temporary agents of change whose functions will eventually be taken over by existing team members or the administration. Risks of parallel structures can also be mitigated through strong coordination among all the stakeholders, including donors. Most importantly, government structures should not be marginalized, and donors can help ensure that this does not happen by taking part in RRI elaboration and execution. The RRI parallel structure should also have a clear exit strategy. In Madagascar, each regional coach working with a team is asked to gradually step back from the process once the change and learning efforts show visible success. More research is needed to determine whether the initiatives remain sustainable after the RRI cycle is completed and the contract with the regional coach is terminated.

5. **The National Steering Committee is key to the success of the initiative.** Owing to its high-level membership, including the Prime Minister’s Chief of Staff, the Director of Good Governance at the Presidency, and the RRI Coordinator, the Committee can quickly resolve bottlenecks in central-level decision-making. By periodically reviewing the RRI results, the Steering Committee can also address any urgent issues that cannot be resolved at the local or regional level.

6. **The RRI program facilitates cross-sectoral and multi-stakeholder coordination.** Achieving ambitious time-bound RRI targets depends on addressing the cross-sectoral nature of the problems encountered, which in turn requires surmounting the high costs of coordination across government, civil society, and private actors. Madagascar’s quantum leap in rice production, for example, required inter-ministerial, regional and local coordination to put in place new radio transmitters, rehabilitate water pumps, deliver seed and fertilizers, unlock donor financing, and mobilize farmer groups. The nationally validated RRI framework has made such multi-stakeholder and cross-sectoral mobilization and coordination easier to achieve. This, too, represents expanded capacity for future results delivery.

7. **Use of the internet and mobile telecommunications is critical to information exchange, reporting, and decisionmaking within the RRI process.** New communication technologies can facilitate communication across the national, regional, and local levels. In Madagascar, regional coaches report spending an average of at least two hours a day using e-mail and/or mobile telephony to fulfill their key role as information brokers.
8. **Newly created channels for information flow and knowledge exchange can link different regional stakeholder groups at different program levels.** National and regional RRI coaches, together with the Steering Committee, have developed new channels for provision of just-in-time information and knowledge based on specific requirements identified by stakeholders in the field. In many cases, the new channels of information are giving local stakeholders first-time access to current information on national laws and regulations, government policy, and other relevant issues. This soft side capacity gain could have significant future pay-offs.

9. **RRI has shifted from top-down prescription to bottom-up initiative.** Although the rice crisis of early 2005 spurred a top-down mandate which shaped the first phase of RRI, the second phase was defined largely by locally identified initiatives. The RRI framework, and particularly its accountability mechanism – under which Regional Chiefs report directly to the Presidency – has also created the political space (and requirement) for newly appointed Chiefs to prove themselves. Now, in phase 3, RRI appears to be organically evolving as a process of localized responses to stakeholder needs. The third phase is beginning to see innovative proposals for application of the methodology, as is happening with the REGARD program in Atsimo-Andrefana.

10. **Regional activities have been stakeholder led, not donor driven.** Unlike small-scale donor-financed projects, some of which resemble activities carried out under the RRI framework, none of the RRI activities has started as a donor project. This has freed these initiatives from having to meet cumbersome qualifying procedures for donor funds. The success of many RRI projects has, however, attracted interest from several donor-supported projects. This is a healthy development, as there is a growing match between the need for improved disbursement rates on many donor projects, on one hand, and access to finance, which remains a constraint for sustaining progress in various RRI projects.

11. **Local stakeholders, not foreign consultants, are now providing the impetus for application and implementation of the RRI approach.** Though the RRI approach was originally introduced with the support of donors and international consultants, it was quickly adopted by local coaches and local RRI teams, which have adapted it to local realities, values, and practices. The role of local consultants and local communities has been critical in ensuring that RRI initiatives are scaleable and sustainable. It will be important to maintain this critical bottom-up, community-driven and locally owned approach to RRI and avoid any temptation to grasp the reins too tightly.

### Prospective analysis and preliminary conclusions

While successful community-level initiatives elsewhere in the world have achieved superior performance in various sectors, Madagascar’s RRI initiatives can offer valuable lessons for other countries:

1. **Success should be defined by historic rates of performance and baseline measures in the country, not by international performance norms.** The key achievement of RRI
projects has been to raise the performance improvement rates in various economic and social activities. The absolute levels of many of these measures, however, suggest much more room for improvement. If these initiatives are to begin to show a significant aggregate impact rather than remain a collection of isolated pockets of short-term success, then sustained attention must be paid to removing critical bottlenecks to achieving good practice in different performance areas. This will require the right institutions at the right time and place, as some problems can only be acted upon locally, and others only at a national level. Long-term impact will also require strengthening the feedback mechanisms between Cabinet-level learning (where RRI initiatives typically begin) and local-level learning.

2. **Local leadership and incentives are critical for sustainability.** It is difficult to imagine the RRIIs in Madagascar having been successful in the absence of incentives provided to officials at decentralized levels to provide leadership and support. The recruitment of Regional Chiefs from largely private sector and non-administrative backgrounds, combined with close contacts and follow-up at the level of the Presidency, marked a clear break from lethargy among local administrations, and this change was noticed by local stakeholders. Similar incentives will be necessary across at least one more political cycle to ensure the sustainability of the RRI approach.

3. **Local coaching is also key for sustainability.** Local RRI coaches were recruited through a competitive process, and so far are being paid out of PREA project funds. These local coaches have been instrumental in three areas: (i) transferring RRI knowledge and approaches to team leaders and team members; (ii) bolstering and maintaining momentum throughout the full RRI period (150 days), by assisting with managing the RRI organization and ensuring that all the team members attend regular meetings; and (iii) facilitating knowledge flow and knowledge management. Local coaches are in communication with the central level seven days a week, which ensures that high-level officials almost instantly know about problems or deadlocks.

There is, however, concern about what will happen with other RRI projects that do not have coaches supported by the PREA. Interviewees have identified two possible solutions: (i) training certified coaches in the country, who could then be hired by development projects financed by the Government or donors; or (ii) identifying and training a member of each team as an “internal” coach; and in fact, plans already exist to develop internal coaches in the third phase of RRI. A promising strategy would be to develop a professional coaching practice in the country and critical mass of both external and internal coaches.

4. **Cross-regional learning mechanisms are critical.** The system of regional RRI coordinators provides both informal and formal mechanisms for disseminating lessons from RRIIs in different regions, including newsletters and briefing notes produced on a regular basis by the national RRI office. This constant flow of information stimulates competition and learning across regions. Such a learning framework needs to be maintained and reinforced.
5. **The success of the RRI in Madagascar is inherent in the method itself.** The most powerful argument for RRI is its own success. The tangible results provide a strong incentive to behavior change.

6. **RRI alone cannot substitute for even broader initiatives** aimed at helping early micro-level successes evolve into sustainable and scaleable programs for better governance, accelerated growth, and improved service delivery.

7. **As RRI emerges as a highly visible mechanism for multi-stakeholder, cross-sectoral, and multi-level coordination,** sustainability and scaleability will emerge as key issues for the program.

8. **RRI generates expanded capacity as a collateral benefit.** RRI has proven its ability to generate – beyond the achievement of ambitious stretch targets – significant intangible collateral benefits of local ownership, participation, transparency, accountability, and improved access to knowledge and information. Although the aggregate impact of the RRI program in terms of macro-level measures of output, local tax collection, etc., has so far not been quantitatively significant, the systems put in place and behavior change brought about by RRI will facilitate many aspects of future development.