The World Bank Jakarta Office Information, Attitude and Obstacles: Challenges to using complaints as a tool for improving Village Law implementation in Indonesia April 2017 Table of Contents Executive Summary .......................................................................................... 3 1 Introduction .................................................................................................. 5 1.1 Background ...................................................................................................... 5 1.2 Approach and structure of the paper............................................................... 6 2 Complaints resolution pathways ............................................................... 8 2.1 Summary .......................................................................................................... 8 2.2 District Level ..................................................................................................... 9 2.3 Provincial Level .............................................................................................. 13 2.4 National Level ................................................................................................. 14 3 Common complaints: types and numbers .............................................. 16 3.1 What are the main types of problems with village governance?.................... 16 3.2 Numbers of complaints about village governance ........................................ 19 4 The information barrier: citizen awareness of village financial management .............................................................................................. 22 4.1 Access to information ..................................................................................... 22 4.2 Monitoring....................................................................................................... 26 5 Attitudes and obstacles: to complain or not, and how? ....................... 30 5.1 Attitude ........................................................................................................... 30 5.2 Obstacles ....................................................................................................... 32 5.3 How do people complain if they decide to take action? ................................ 34 6 Conclusions and recommendations ....................................................... 38 6.1 Should a CHS be established? ...................................................................... 38 6.2 Possible alternative investments and their merits .......................................... 40 6.3 Factors to consider in the design of a CHS ................................................... 42 7 References ................................................................................................. 44 2 Executive Summary This paper addresses two basic questions: (a) Whether a CHS should be established to deal with grievances arising in relation to village governance,1 and; (b) If so, what factors should be taken into account in its design? In doing so, the paper assumes that, in the context of the Village Law, investment in a complaints handling system (CHS) would serve three main objectives: (i) Increased citizen empowerment by providing an alternative avenue for exercising control over elected representatives; (ii) Greater village government responsiveness as a result of officials facing a higher likelihood of sanction for poor performance or corruption; and (iii) Improved aggregation of data to enable the monitoring of trends and the early identification of emerging systemic problems. The paper further assumes that the degree of priority that should be afforded to investing in a CHS depends upon the extent to which, given the prevailing conditions: (iv) Citizens are likely to use the system, and government is likely to both respond to complaints and make effective use of system-generated data; and (v) Whether alternative investments might be more effective and/or efficient in achieving objectives (i) – (iii). The paper finds that at present, although there are good reasons to believe there is significant corruption and mismanagement at the village level, citizens rarely complain for three main reasons, namely: • Information (lack of information about the village budget and spending); • Attitude (a degree of tolerance for corrupt conduct and apathy born of previous unsuccessful attempts at complaining); and • Obstacles (lack of responsiveness from institutions charged with receiving complaints, fear of repercussions and cost/time). Of these three factors, a lack of information appears to be the dominant explanation for the low level of complaints, followed by obstacles. Access to village budgets and related documents is so highly restricted that in the majority of cases citizens simply are not (and cannot be) aware of how their village funds are being spent at a level that would enable them to identify all but the most extreme corruption or mismanagement. When citizens are aware of problems, the biggest obstacle 1 For the purposes of this paper, a CHS is taken to mean a national system broadly similar to what existed under PNPM, with necessary adjustments to take into account the different institutional framework that applies under the Village Law. 3 to complaining appears to be the perceived (and in many cases actual) low likelihood of getting a response, followed by fear of repercussions. Over time, the feeling that complaining is futile can engender attitudes of acceptance and apathy. The paper therefore concludes that, in the short term, the relative priority of investing in a CHS is reduced by the fact that it would not directly address the primary reason for citizens’ inability to complain, and alternative complaints resolution pathways (albeit imperfect) do exist. The relative priority of investing in a CHS is further reduced by the fact that under the prevailing conditions, alternative means of achieving the objectives of a CHS may prove more effective and/or efficient than investing in a CHS itself. At this point, increased citizen empowerment is arguably better served by improving access to village financial information and ensuring that communities have the ability and incentive to effectively monitor village expenditure. This does not guarantee citizens will complain about problems they uncover (or that they will be capable of uncovering all problems), but is a fundamental pre-condition to them doing so. The challenge is technically relatively simple but politically formidable. Village government responsiveness may also be improved if officials know that citizens are aware of how their money is being spent (to a higher level of detail than is currently the case). That said, the effect may be muted if not accompanied by the credible threat of being reported to a higher authority that is likely to take action. Under current conditions, it is uncertain whether the existence of a CHS would significantly increase the credibility of the threat or the nature of the response, as district governments would almost certainly retain primary responsibility for handling complaints in the first instance. Aggregation of data on the types of problems that are occurring could be achieved through a combination of media monitoring, opinion polling and surveys. Media monitoring has advantages in terms of administrative simplicity, and also that where district governments might be keen to downplay negative news from their jurisdictions, media in most cases have an interest in reporting it. The main drawback of media monitoring is media are more likely to report on high profile corruption cases rather than more mundane but no less important administrative problems, thereby skewing the data in that direction. One means of addressing this problem is by complementing media monitoring with targeted opinion polling and surveys. An added benefit of such an approach is that through actively seeking information, the data generated about smaller / less important but widespread problems is likely to be more complete than what might be obtained through relying on a passive CHS. If investment in a CHS is nevertheless preferred, the key focus should be on districts – both in terms of how they handle complaints, and how complaints about them are handled. The key points here are to: • Prioritise working with existing systems rather than creating something new; • Clarify responsibilities for complaints handling between district offices and subdistrict governments; • Ensure system design accommodates in-person complaints, including promoting active approaches to complaints solicitation and the role of facilitators in providing citizens with information on how to complain. 4 1 Introduction 1.1 Background This paper stems from consultations with the Government of Indonesia in mid-2016 on strengthening accountability for the use of village development funds, and what role a complaints handling system might play in support of that objective. During the course of those consultations, it was noted that whereas PNPM had relied on a centralized complaints handling system, no equivalent system currently exists to deal with complaints arising under the Village Law. The question that arose was therefore twofold: (a) Whether a complaints handling system should be established to deal with grievances arising in relation to village governance; and (b) If so, what factors should be taken into account in its design? To assist in formulating advice for the Government, fieldwork was carried out in two phases across four provinces – Central Java, East Java, West Sulawesi and East Nusa Tenggara. Figure 1: Location of Study Provinces Phase 1 comprised a limited assessment of district and sub-district capacity to manage and resolve complaints relating to village governance. Undertaken in June 2016, study locations were Central Java (Wonogiri and Banyumas districts) and West Sulawesi (Polewali Mandar and Majene districts). Key respondents included representatives of Community Empowerment Agencies (Badan Pemberdayaan Masayarakat Desa or BPMD); Village Governance Units of Regional Secretariats (Bagian Pemerintahan Desa or Pemdes); Inspectorates; district prosecutors; sub-district governments and village facilitators. Phase 2 focussed on community knowledge of and attitudes towards village governance and complaints resolution pathways. Undertaken between December 2016 – February 2017, study locations were East Java (Malang district) and East Nusa Tenggara (Kupang district), A total of seven villages were visited for an average of 2 – 3 days each. In Malang district, all three villages were located in Sumbermanjing Wetan sub-district, approximately 1.5 hours drive to the southeast of the district capital Kepanjen. In Kupang district, two villages were located in West Kupang subdistrict, approximately 2 hours drive to the west of the district capital, while a further two villages were located in East Kupang subdistrict, between 15 – 30 minutes drive from the district capital. Key respondents included village heads and members of the village government; members of the Village Council (BPD); hamlet and neighbourhood heads; community health volunteers (kader posyandu); and ordinary community members. 5 1.2 Approach and structure of the paper The paper assumes that, in the context of the Village Law, investment in a national integrated complaints handling system (CHS) would serve three main objectives: (i) Increased citizen empowerment by providing an alternative avenue for exercising control over elected representatives; (ii) Greater village government responsiveness as a result of officials facing a higher likelihood of sanction for poor performance or corruption; and (iii) Improved aggregation of data to enable the monitoring of trends and the early identification of emerging systemic problems. The paper further assumes that the degree of priority that should be afforded to investing in a CHS depends upon the extent to which, given the prevailing conditions: (iv) Citizens are likely to use the system, and government is likely to both respond to complaints and make effective use of system-generated data; and (v) Whether alternative investments might be more effective and/or efficient in achieving objectives (i) – (iii). The structure of the paper follows the basic analytical framework of ‘information, attitude and obstacles’ (Figure 2) as possible explanations for why citizens may not complain about objectively unsatisfactory governance practices at the village level. This structure has been adopted in light of existing data that indicates the number of complaints about village governance is significantly lower than what might ordinarily be expected given the likely level of mismanagement and corruption at the village level. Figure 2: Possible reasons for not complaining INFORMATION Unaware of the problem (and so don’t complain) ATTITUDE Aware of the problem but do not perceive it to be wrong (and so don’t complain) OBSTACLES Aware of the problem and perceive it to be wrong but (i) are unable to complain or (ii) choose not to 6 However, the paper begins by first setting out the current complaints handling context. Section 2 outlines existing pathways for resolving complaints about village governance, primarily at the district level. Section 3 provides existing data on the types and levels of complaints made about village governance and canvasses possible reasons why the level of complaints is lower than what might ordinarily be expected. The remainder of the paper then explores the range of different factors that should be taken into account in (i) determining the relative priority of investing in a CHS, and (ii) designing a CHS to maximise its accessibility and utility. Section 4 highlights current challenges in relation to access to information about village spending and how it can be monitored. Section 5 provides insight into the reasons why citizens do or don’t complain, looking at both attitudes and obstacles. It also examines citizen preferences in relation to the method of complaining. Section 6 closes with conclusions and recommendations. Overall, the paper views a CHS as a tool in service of the overall objective of promoting village development by helping villages to make effective use of the resources at their disposal, rather than an end in itself. Approached this way, the question of whether the objectives of a CHS are achieved through a single system or combination of systems will depend on the individual context. In some cases, particularly where there are no existing systems to build upon, it may make sense to develop a single, comprehensive CHS. In others, it may be that there are alternative (and possibly more effective) ways of achieving each objective rather than through a single CHS. This paper concludes that in the current context of the Village Law, and at least in the short term, the latter is the preferable approach. 7 2 Complaints resolution pathways The absence of a single, formal complaints handling system does not mean no mechanisms exist for resolving complaints about village governance. This section outlines existing complaints resolution pathways at the district, provincial and national levels, with which any prospective complaints handling system may be integrated or at least complement. Key points u Districts play the primary role in resolving complaints about village governance. Viewed in their entirety, they can generally be said to have basic systems in place to deal with village level corruption, BUT ONLY when it is reported to them and when they themselves are not involved in the corrupt activity in some way. u At the agency level, institutionalised complaints handling mechanisms are the exception rather than the rule, with the majority allocating no specific resources to complaints handling. u Provinces have limited jurisdiction to handle complaints about village governance, or about the conduct of district level agencies. u A number of national level systems exist that can receive complaint about village governance (particularly corruption), but, like provinces, are limited in their ability to respond without district level cooperation. 2.1 Summary Complaints about village governance are most frequently made direct to the Bupati, possibly after a prior attempt at resolution by the Camat has proved unsuccessful. Handling of the complaint is then delegated to BPMD / Pemdes and/or the Inspectorate depending on its nature. BPMD / Pemdes can in most cases also receive complaints direct from the public but this is less common. Cases involving alleged criminal behavior may be reported directly to the police or prosecutors by citizens or may be referred after an initial investigation by other government agencies (usually with the approval of the Bupati). While complaints to provincial level authorities are theoretically possible, they are rare. These, and other, pathways for resolving complaints are shown in Figure 3 (below). 8 Province Figure 3: Pathways for resolving complaints about village governance BPMD Governor Ombudsman Province Police / Prosecutor Bupati DPRD Only on Bupati’s instruction Inspectorate * Direct complaint to Inspectorate not available all locations BPMD / TA Sekda District Subdistrict PD / PLD Government Subdistrict Village Most frequent avenue of complaint Other potential avenues of complaint Assistance / flow of information Source: World Bank fieldwork 2016-2017 2.2 District Level District governments, viewed in their entirety, can generally be said to have basic systems in place to deal with village level corruption when it is reported to them and when they themselves are not involved in the corrupt activity in some way. ‘System’ here is used to describe a general process for handling complaints, regardless of whether it is formal or informal in nature. Division of authority between agencies in relation to complaints handling appears on the surface to be relatively clear, with the exception of the relationship between the subdistrict government and district level SKPD (primarily BPMD and/or Pemdes). BPMD / Pemdes tend to assume that subdistrict governments will handle complaints, but often without them ever having actually issued guidance to subdistricts on this topic. For their part, some (although not all) subdistrict governments felt that they have not been given sufficient information about Village Law implementation and lack authority to play a role in oversight and complaints handling. 9 At the agency (Dinas) level, institutionalized complaints handling mechanisms are the exception rather than the rule. The absence of such mechanisms does not mean agencies are not capable of handling complaints effectively on an ad hoc basis as they arise, but without examining specific examples it is difficult to assess how well they perform this function. Inspectorates fall into a slightly different category, being specifically tasked with carrying out audits and investigations (see Box 1 below). A summary of key information about complaints handling mechanisms by agency and district is provided in Figure 4 (below). Figure 4: Summary of CHS infrastructure by district and agency Central Java West Sulawesi Agency Wonogiri Banyumas Polewali Mandar Majene BPMD (District) Formal / informal Informal Informal Informal Informal CHS Specific resources No No No No allocated Complaints received Solicited Yes, number 1 between January None received complaints in 2015 unknown (1 village - June 2016, 6 in between January - relating to head removed in 2015 June 2016 empowerment and 2015) poverty reduction but not village governance Sekda – Bagian Pemerintahan Desa Formal / informal Formal Informal Unknown, but None – complaints CHS BPMD has full should go direct to responsibility for Bupati or BPMD Village Law Specific resources Yes (Rp 30 million No Unknown No allocated per year for 10 cases) Complaints received 4 in 2015, 3 Yes (number and Unknown None relating to misuse type unknown) of village funds Sekda – Bagian Hubungan Masyarakat (results of internet search only) Formal / informal Online CHS Online CHS Unknown – not Unknown – not CHS online online Specific resources Unknown Unknown Unknown Unknown allocated Complaints received Yes (general Yes (general Unknown Unknown complaints) complaints) 10 Central Java West Sulawesi Agency Wonogiri Banyumas Polewali Mandar Majene Inspectorate Formal / informal Formal Formal Does not receive Formal CHS complaints directly Specific resources Yes Yes Yes Yes allocated Complaints received 10 in 2015, none None between Complaints must Unknown relating to village January - June be directed to governance 2016, estimated 2 - Bupati 3 complaints in 2015 Camat Formal / informal Informal Informal Informal Informal CHS Specific resources No No No No allocated Complaints received Yes (number and Yes (number and None between Unknown type unknown) type unknown) February - June 2016 Box 1: Complaints Handling by the Inspectorate in Banyumas • In principle, the Inspectorate in Banyumas accepts complaints from anyone about anything. Their noticeboard includes a sign inviting complaints about public services in Banyumas and listing the mobile telephone number of the Bupati. They also have a fixed line telephone and fax number and email address listed for complaints to be sent to the Inspectorate. • Although complaints are usually submitted direct to the Bupati and referred to the Inspectorate, if a member of the public submits a complaint direct to the Inspectorate, the complaint will be referred to the Bupati for authorization to investigate. However, the Inspectorate may do some initial screening first to determine the legitimacy of the complaint. • In undertaking this screening, the Inspectorate may do their own field investigation, or they may first ask the Camat to investigate on their behalf. If the complaint can be resolved by the Camat, this would be reported to the Bupati. If not, the Inspectorate would seek approval from the Bupati to conduct its own formal investigation. • At the conclusion of the investigation, the Inspectorate may require a set of corrective actions from the subject of the investigation, but would only inform the Bupati if there is evidence of a potential criminal offence. It would then be up to the Bupati as to whether to refer the matter to police or prosecutors. 11 District Prosecutors’ Offices are generally open to cooperation with Box 2: Prosecuting Corruption in government agencies in relation to Polewali Mandar outreach but, appropriately, are keen to guard their independence in • Polewali Mandar is located approximately 200km or 5 hours drive relation to the processing of cases. from Mamuju, the capital of West Sulawesi. The Anti-Corruption Court, in Although the core task of prosecutors which all corruption cases must be is to prosecute cases that have first heard, is located in Mamuju. This been investigated by the police, they creates logistical challenges for also have authority to investigate prosecutors in Polewali Mandar and certain crimes themselves, of which influences the exercise of prosecutorial corruption is one.2 This means that discretion in relation to corruption community members wishing to report cases. suspected corruption may report directly to prosecutors instead of the police (although that avenue also • To prosecute a case in the Anti- remains open). All offices reported Corruption Court usually requires a they would generally not proceed with minimum of 10 hearings. Prosecutors a case if, at the preliminary report that it costs them approximately investigation stage (penyeledikan) the Rp 3 – 5 million every time they attend a alleged perpetrator returned any hearing, which results in a minimum misused funds. Dropping a case at the cost of Rp 30 – 50 million to prosecute a further investigation stage (penyidikan) case, not including the court’s costs. is more difficult, because of the higher These costs, and the time lost in transit, standard of proof required for an make it difficult for prosecutors to investigation to advance to that stage. achieve their corruption case targets In Polewali Mandar and Majene, and negatively impacts upon the exercise of discretion in this way was handling of other cases. explicitly linked to the resources involved in prosecuting a case (see • As a result, they will generally prioritize Box 2), although other factors may also informal resolution of village corruption influence the decision. cases, although in recent years there has only been one. Unofficial policy is The current terms of reference for that they won’t prosecute cases with a facilitators (both at the district and value of less than Rp 50 million. subdistrict levels) does not explicitly outline a role for them in complaints handling. This has shaped a common understanding amongst all respondents (including facilitators themselves) that complaints handling is not something in which facilitators should currently engage. However, views were expressed both for and against a greater role for facilitators in relation to complaints handling, and there are a number of factors that influence how appropriate or successful this might be. These are summarized in Figure 5 (below). 2 Art 30(1)(d) Law No.16/2004 regarding the Prosecution Service and the elucidation thereof. 12 Figure 5: Arguments for / against facilitator involvement in complaint handling Facilitators are (in theory) the people in most frequent interaction with community members. This can allow them to build relationships of trust that can facilitate the sharing of information, particularly in areas where there is a cultural aversion to making formal complaints. BPMD in Wonogiri, for example, was of the opinion that facilitators who become aware of information about possible corruption or other problems relating to village governance should have an obligation to report it to government. Involvement in complaints handling (even if merely reporting complaints) could result in facilitators damaging the very relationships with village governments that facilitators rely on in order to do their jobs effectively. Given that the power balance between facilitators and village governments has now shifted in favour of village governments (because facilitators no longer approve use of development funds), facilitators must rely on their value to villages to retain access. If facilitators were perceived to take sides in a dispute (particularly against the village government), this could result in them being effectively shut out of a village. A middle ground suggested by the Camat in Balanipa (Polewali Mandar) was that if a facilitator receives a complaint from a community member, he or she should report it to the BPD. The BPD would then be responsible for any further action whether internal or external to the village. 2.3 Provincial Level Due to the way authority is divided between provincial and district governments under Indonesia’s system of decentralization, primary authority for the implementation of the Village Law rests with districts rather than provinces. This means that while provincial BPMD are responsible for the engagement of village facilitators, they have no direct authority to resolve complaints about the use of village development funds. This remains the responsibility of districts. If a provincial BPMD did receive a complaint about village governance, they could send a letter to the Bupati of the relevant district, who would then forward it to District BPMD and/or the Inspectorate, depending on the nature of the complaint (the letter may also be copied to those agencies by the province). Of the two provincial BPMD visited, one (Central Java) reported having a complaints handling system of some kind, while the other (West Sulawesi) did not. Provincial representative offices of the Ombudsman (a national institution) have jurisdiction to receive complaints about public services, including those delivered by villages. However, severe capacity constraints mean that it presents a more theoretical rather than practical complaints resolution pathway. To lodge a complaint with the Ombudsman, an attempt must first be made to resolve the problem directly with the service provider. The Central Java office interpreted this as meaning that a complaint about village governance must first be lodged with the Bupati or Inspectorate at the district level, whereas offices in West Sulawesi and East Nusa Tenggara would accept a complaint if it had first been made to the village government in question (although some flexibility reportedly exists if there is a good reason why a complaint cannot be made directly to the village government). Although the majority of complaints received by the Ombudsman are resolved without the Ombudsman issuing a formal recommendation, if the Ombudsman does issue a formal recommendation then the 13 subject of the investigation is required by law to comply with it. That said, if the subject fails to do so, the Ombudsman has no coercive powers to compel compliance. The Ombudsman has a central MIS system (called SIMPEL) that can be accessed by all provincial offices. When accessed by the West Sulawesi office in June 2016, a search with the term ‘village’ (desa) generated 68 results for the entire time the system has been in existence. At that point in 2016, five cases have been reported nationwide involving villages while eight were reported in 2015. 2.4 National Level In addition to the Ombudsman, four key complaints resolution pathways exist at the national level – CHS run by each of the Ministry of Villages and the Ministry of Home Affairs, the online complaints portal LAPOR! and the Anti-Corruption Commission (KPK). The Ministry of Villages operates a call center and sms gateway for complaints and requests for information, although their effectiveness is unclear. The Ministry has reportedly been hamstrung by an inability to follow up on complaints at the district level, because of an inability to issue instructions to local governments to take action on cases referred to them. In addition, while they have also been using the facilitator network to gather complaints data in some locations, in the locations visited as part of this study district and subdistrict level facilitators knew nothing about their role in this (if any). The Ministry of Home Affairs operates an online complaints portal called SAPA (Sarana Pengaduan dan Aspirasi), although it rarely if ever receives complaints about village governance. Based in the Ministry’s Public Affairs unit, SAPA staff report receiving between 250 – 300 complaints per month. Approximately 75% of complaints in SAPA relate to civil registration issues. Citizens could in theory use SAPA to report complaints about village governance, but SAPA staff were not aware of any specific examples. If a complaint about village governance were to be received, it would be referred to Ditjen Bina Pemdes for action. They would then write a letter to the relevant district government asking it to investigate, and the district government would have to write back to them informing the actions taken. Public Affairs would be notified of the result and they would provide feedback to the complainant. LAPOR! receives an impressive number of complaints about public services, but its usefulness for channelling complaints about village governance is currently limited by the small number of district governments that have signed up to the system (although the number is growing). LAPOR! began operation in the Presidential Staff Office, but is now run in coordination with the Ombudsman and the Ministry of Administrative and Bureaucratic Reform. It effectively acts as a clearinghouse, receiving complaints through a single portal and referring them to the agency responsible for providing a response. As at November 2015, LAPOR! was receiving an average of 535 complaints per day, with 65 percent of complaints in the system resolved, 15 percent in progress and 20 percent pending a response.3 3 GovInsider, ‘Inside LAPOR, Indonesia’s Complaints Unit’, 5 November 2015, available at https://govinsider.asia/innovation/inside-lapor-indonesias-complaints-unit/ (accessed 25 April 2017). 14 The major obstacle to LAPOR! acting as a conduit for complaints about village governance is that participation is voluntary, and government agencies need to sign up to receive complaints from the system. Although almost all national level ministries and institutions have done so, as at April 2017 only 76 districts and 34 municipalities had signed up, meaning that approximately 80 percent remain outside the system.4 Even if they do sign up, the vast majority of complaints about village governance or local government will still be resolved by districts themselves - the main advantage of LAPOR! would be the ability to monitor progress of complaints submitted through that system, albeit without any ability to verify responses. KPK can receive reports of corruption involving village funds (dana desa), but its jurisdiction is only triggered by potential state losses of Rp 1 billion or greater, or corruption involving state officials or law enforcement officers. Accordingly, its role in handling complaints about village governance is relatively limited. Village heads and BPMD officials, for example, are not state officials for the purposes of KPK jurisdiction (the only district level state officials being District Heads, Vice District Heads and members of local parliaments or DPRD). Neither is the value of the majority of cases of alleged corruption of village funds likely to exceed Rp 1 billion. Nevertheless, KPK’s public profile and reputation mean that it still receives a not insignificant number of complaints: as at January 2017, KPK had received 362 complaints concerning the use of village funds, of which 87 were being further investigated.5 4 Jaringan Pemberitaan Pemerintah (JPP) [Government News Network], ‘Pastikan Terintegrasi ke LAPOR!-SP4N, Pemda se-Indonesia Ikut Bimtek’ [To ensure integration into LAPOR!-SP4N, all Indonesian local governments to attend training], JPP, 7 April 2017, available at http://jpp.go.id/nasional/pemerintahan/304758-pastikan-terintegrasi-ke-lapor-sp4n-pemda-se-indonesia- ikut-bimtek (accessed 25 April 2017). 5 Suara.com, ‘KPK Tindaklanjuti 87 Laporan Dugaan Korupsi Dana Desa’ [KPK Investigates 87 Reports of Suspected Corruption of Village Funds], 28 January 2017, available at http://www.suara.com/news/2017/01/28/190800/kpk-tindaklanjuti-87-laporan-dugaan-korupsi-dana-desa (accessed 25 April 2017) 15 3 Common complaints: types and numbers Even in the absence of a national complaints handling system, partial data still exists on the types and levels of complaints commonly made about village governance. Data on the type of complaints most commonly made about village governance can help to identify the issues on which complaints handling policy should focus. A significant difference between the actual and expected level of complaints about village governance may indicate that citizens have difficulty either identifying or articulating problems. This section presents data of both kinds and suggests that there is substantial under-reporting of problems relating to the mismanagement and corruption of village funds. It canvasses possible explanations for this, which are examined in more detail in following sections. Key points u Complaints relating to implementation of the Village Law fall into two broad categories – those concerning the behaviour of village governments and those concerning the behaviour of district and subdistrict governments. u The majority of complaints about village governments relate to village financial management. Previous research suggests it is reasonable to assume that in most villages, a certain level of corruption will exist. However, the number of complaints about village governments is much lower than what might be expected given the assumed level of corruption. u Very few, if any, complaints are made about district and subdistrict governments because of the inherent conflict of interest in them investigating their own behaviour. Likely malfeasance includes interference in village procurement processes and charging for services that should be provided free of charge. u Possible reasons for the low number of complaints are: (i) INFORMATION: Citizens are unaware of the problem and so don’t complain; (ii) ATTITUDE: Citizens are aware of the problem but do not perceive it to be wrong (and so don’t complain); and (iii) OBSTACLES: Citizens are aware of the problem and perceive it to be wrong but are either unable to complain or choose not to. 3.1 What are the main types of problems with village governance? Potential complaints about village governance fall into two broad categories – those concerning the behaviour of village governments and those concerning the behaviour of district and sub-district governments (Figure 6). 16 Figure 6: Common examples of misuse of funds / authority under the Village Law Village District / Sub-district Government Governments Marking up the cost of Charging for services that materials / pocketing the should be provided free of difference between standard and market prices charge Directing villages to buy Inflating amounts of from certain suppliers at materials and/or labour inflated prices for financial reward Extracting financial Allocating funds for fictitious contributions from villages projects for unclear purposes and on unclear bases Source: World Bank fieldwork and media monitoring 2016-2017 The most common complaints about the behaviour of village governments relate to the corruption or mismanagement of village funds. Table 1 (below) shows the percentage of districts receiving complaints about various issues in 2014. (Note that this is the year prior to the first year of Village Law implementation, when the resources under village management were significantly less than they are now). Alleged misuse of funds was reported in 61 percent of districts, while 24 percent of districts received complaints about alleged corruption or embezzlement. Box 3 (also below) illustrates how such a complaint may unfold. Table 1: Most commonly articulated complaints about village governance (2014) Misuse of funds 61 Village boundaries 31 Violence / misuse of authority by village officials 25 Corruption and embezzlement 24 Village head elections 6 General village governance 4 0 20 40 60 80 Percentage of districts receiving complaint (n = 157) Source: World Bank (2016) 17 Box 3: Alleged Corruption by the Village Head in Desa Mekar Sari, Polewali Mandar • In October 2015, residents of Desa Mekar Sari demonstrated and burnt tyres in front of the village office, demanding that the village head stand down or be removed in relation to allegations of corruption. Thereafter they sent a letter to the Bupati setting out their complaint, which was forwarded to BPMD for further action. Prior to the demonstration, residents had apparently reported the case to the Camat but he had been unable to resolve the problem. • BPMD investigated and found that the village head had made an allocation in the APBDes for repairs to a road that didn’t exist. He had already purchased the materials needed for the ‘repairs’ but had not used any of them. He promised BPMD that he would use the materials for a legitimate purpose, but nothing happened for months. He then vanished. • BPMD asked the Inspectorate (via the Bupati) to undertake an investigation. The investigation found that the village head had improperly procured materials for a project he couldn’t execute, and also could not properly account for all of them. Losses were assessed at approximately Rp 120 million. As a result, the Inspectorate recommended that the Bupati replace the village head, and that any funds returned by the village head be witnessed by the Camat and BPMD to ensure they really had been returned. The Bupati acted on the advice, dismissed the village head, and appointed the village secretary to act in his place. • At some point subsequent to this, the village head was reported to the Prosecutor’s Office by an unknown person. He has reportedly been summonsed twice by prosecutors but failed to present himself. Corruption by district governments is harder to uncover, but the following examples are illustrative: Alleged corruption in relation to procurement and charging for services: In a district in Central Java, Pemdes is allegedly misusing its authority in relation to procurement and charging for services. Villages have reportedly been ‘strongly encouraged’ to purchase uniforms from a supplier nominated by Pemdes at highly inflated prices (Rp 150,000 for a shirt that would normally cost Rp 50,000 or less). Most village heads allegedly complied on the basis that not to do so would lead to Pemdes deliberately creating problems for them in relation to the approval of village planning and budgeting documents (and ultimately lead to them spending significant amounts of time and money on back and forth travel between their village and the district capital). Pemdes is also alleged to have requested villages to budget for Village Law information sessions in which Pemdes staff acted as paid resource persons and provided only generic information. Alleged corruption in relation to procurement and training: In a district in West Sulawesi, all village heads had reportedly paid Rp 9 million from their ADD in order to attend a 3-day training course in Bandung arranged by BPMD. Funds were paid to and managed by BPMD. One of the district level facilitators had followed up the issue with BPMD, who claimed only to have recommended that village heads attend the training course. Village heads themselves, however, reported being effectively forced by BPMD to do so. Alleged corruption in relation to unbudgeted and unaccounted for payments: In a district in Central Java, respondents cited a case in which a sub-district government required financial contributions from villages, ostensibly to fund a celebration of a public holiday. There was no allocation in village budgets for this expense, and no receipt was provided for funds contributed. 18 Complaints about higher levels of government need to be distinguished from complaints about village governments themselves, for two reasons. First, while the overall impact of this type of corruption may be significant, its impact on any particular village is often relatively small, thereby leading to collective action problems. Second, complaints handling mechanisms operated by agencies who themselves are the subject of a complaint are unlikely to be (or perceived to be) effective at dealing with those complaints, and citizens are likely to have difficulty in accessing an independent arbiter with the ability to exert influence over those agencies. 3.2 Numbers of complaints about village governance 3.2.1 Existing data Previous research on the incidence of corruption in PNPM suggests that it is reasonable to assume that in most villages, a certain level of corruption will exist. Olken’s (2007) study of 608 villages using PNPM funds to build roads found that although the threat of audit reduced the amount of expenditures that could not be accounted for compared to control villages, 20 percent of expenditures remained unaccounted for even in villages facing a 100 percent probability of audit. However, data from a range of sources Table 2: Number of complaints about village reveals a very low number of complaints governance received by districts in 2014 about the use of village development funds given the assumed level of corruption at the village level. Don't 101+ know 2% Recent fieldwork in four districts in Central Java and West Sulawesi revealed 51 - 100 the number of complaints about village 4% 9% governance reported to district level 21 - 50 agencies ranged between 0 – 3 per year. 6% These findings are consistent with the None results of a 2016 World Bank survey 11 - 20 35% 10% which showed that a third of districts reported receiving no complaints about 1 - 10 village governance in 2014, followed by a 34% further third that reported receiving between 1 – 10 complaints (see Table 2). However, a degree of caution is required in interpreting these results, considering (n=241) only 20 percent of districts reported having an MIS in which to actually record Source: World Bank (2016) complaints data (World Bank, 2016). Comparison between 2016 complaints data from the Ministry of Villages and complaints data from later years of PNPM also indicates that the level of complaints about village governance is lower than what might reasonably be expected. In the first ten months of 2013, for example, after PNPM had achieved close to national coverage, 5,405 complaints were submitted to the PNPM complaints handling system, of which 2,833 were ultimately found to be relevant (BAPPENAS 2013). In contrast, in 2016, only 683 complaints about village governance were submitted to the Ministry of Villages (see Table 3). Of those, only 41 of those complaints relate to misuse of funds and 2 to misuse of assets– the remainder relate to alleged administrative violations or problems. 19 Table 3: PNPM Complaints 2013 and However, as with the survey results, a Village Law Complaints 2016 degree of caution is required in comparing these figures because of differences in what they represent. 6000 First, in total, PNPM reached only 65 – 70 percent of the number of villages now 5000 receiving Village Law funds, and not all villages received PNPM funds every year.6 If Number of complaints Complaints 4000 2572 received but every village had received PNPM funds every found not year, the number of complaints would likely relevant be higher. Second, the Ministry of Villages 3000 complaints data is sourced from only 20 provinces through a system that is largely ad hoc and unlikely to be accessible by all 2000 villages in those 20 provinces. Some complaints are also likely to have gone 2833 directly to district governments and not to the 1000 Ministry of Villages. Moreover, the Village Law has only been through two complete 683 implementation cycles, and many instances 0 PNPM 2013 Village Law of village corruption during this period may 2016* not yet have come to light or been reported to a higher authority. Again, as with PNPM Source: Bappenas (2013) and Ministry of Villages complaints, the combined effect of these two factors is that the actual number of complaints is likely to be higher. However, given that both sets of data most likely under- represent the true number of complaints, comparison between them is still useful for illustrating the problem in general if not precise terms. 3.2.2 Possible reasons why citizens do not or cannot complain INFORMATION: The most basic explanation for the low level of complaints about village governance and the use of village development funds is simply that citizens are unaware of problems. This may result from either restricted access to information or citizens not being sufficiently engaged in village affairs to seek it out. As following sections will show, it is reasonable to assume that a lack of awareness of corruption at least partly explains the disparity between assumed levels of corruption and the number of complaints about it. ATTITUDE: Another explanation is apparent citizen satisfaction with what is an objectively unsatisfactory state of affairs Such explanations have, for example, been linked to a lack of citizen demand for improved services in relation to education (Lewis 2010) and sanitation (Winters, Karim & Martawardaya 2014). Anecdotal evidence also suggests that at least in some locations and to some extent, permissive attitudes may exist in relation to the misuse of village development funds by village officials (fieldwork for this report, Kompak 2016). 6 In 2013, PNPM had reached a cumulative total of 49,000 villages (PSF 2015), as opposed to the 74,754 villages receiving village development funds in 2016. Moreover, under PNPM, not every village within a sub-district was successful in their application for PNPM funds each year, meaning the number of villages receiving PNPM funds in any given year was significantly below 49,000. 20 OBSTACLES: Alternatively, citizens may have a grievance, but be either unable or unwilling to articulate it. Inability to articulate a grievance may be linked to either geographic, financial or information barriers, or some combination of the three. For example, a 2012 governance review of PNPM found that many community members did not have knowledge of where to complain about misuse of program funds (World Bank 2012). Similarly, an earlier study of corruption cases within KDP (the predecessor to PNPM) showed that while citizens were prepared to use the state justice system as a last resort, the extent to which they could access it was largely dependent on whether they (or KDP facilitators) had links to local legal aid organizations, government agencies or project management structures that could provide access to information and technical support (World Bank 2004). Unwillingness to articulate a grievance may be linked to factors including fear of retribution, collective action problems, or perverse incentive structures (World Bank 2012). For example, under PNPM, the risk of their village losing project funding were corruption to be exposed led many citizens to remain silent, as did preferences for maintaining social harmony over seeking redress for wrongs (World Bank 2012). Alternatively, low expectations of government’s motivation and ability to effectively respond to the complaint may lead citizens to conclude that there is simply little point in articulating a complaint. However, reluctance to complain is by no means absolute. For example, the number of complaints submitted to the Ombudsman has risen from 1,054 in 2010 to 6,859 in 2015 (Ombudsman RI 2015). Rosser and Joshi (2013) cite a number of instances in which parents have had modest success in holding officials and school principals to account in relation to the imposition of illegal school fees. Fieldwork for this study in Central Java, East Java, West Sulawesi and East Nusa Tenggara also demonstrated that, in certain circumstances, citizens are prepared to report suspected village level corruption to either district governments or law enforcement authorities. However, as is outlined in more detail below, the number of those complaints is significantly lower than what might be expected. 21 4 The information barrier: citizen awareness of village financial management If citizens are unaware of corruption or mismanagement of funds in their village, they are unlikely to complain about it. This section highlights key points in relation to access to information about village spending and how it can be monitored. Overall, it shows that access to information about village financial management is so restricted that a lack of citizen awareness as to how their village funds are being used is likely to be a significant factor underlying the low number of complaints about village governance. Key points u Ordinary citizens and even some village officials rarely have access to the village budget (APBDes) – it was not on public display in any of the villages visited and generally only read out to a limited audience at village meetings. Access to detailed activity budgets (RAB) is even more restricted. u The desire for information about the APBDes is high. However, asking for information goes against ingrained social norms, and the general consensus is that only certain people (high village officials such as members of the BPD) have the right to ask. u Monitoring of village expenditure can be thought of as a two-step process – the first ensuring a budgeted item was provided, and the second confirming it complies with specifications and represents value for money. u Currently, limited access to the APBDes makes even ensuring a budgeted item was provided a significant challenge. Without access to the RAB, confirming an item complies with specifications and represents value for money is almost impossible without additional technical and/or market knowledge. u Overall, while providing better access to the ABPDes and associated RAB would not of itself guarantee a higher level of complaints about village governance, its absence is almost certainly a major contributor to the current low number of complaints about it. 4.1 Access to information The two most important pieces of information for citizens to access are the village budget (Anggaran Pendapatan dan Belanja Desa or APBDes) and associated detailed activity budgets (Rincian Anggaran Biaya or RAB). The APBDes details all village spending but at a headline level only – for example, the lump sum figure allocated to build a village road or plant a community orchard (as shown in Figure 7 below). The RAB for each activity then provides a more detailed line-by-line expenditure plan for each item required to complete the activity. 22 Figure 7: Example APBDes and RAB APBDes RAB: Community Rp No Activity (million) Orchard 1 Building a 350.0 Unit Rp No Item Vol. Cost (million) village road 2 Incentive for 3.6 1 Barbed 400 70,000 28.0 Guru PAUD wire 3 Planting of 280.0 2 Fence 4,000 2,000 8.0 community posts orchard 3 Wages 800 5,000 4.0 4 Assistance for 150.0 4 Fertiliser 22,500 1,500 33.7 fishermen 5 Computer 11.0 5 Banana 300 15,000 4.5 course for seedlings village officials …. …. Ordinary citizens rarely have access to the APBDes – it was not on public display in any of the villages visited. Access to the RAB is even more restricted. Of the seven villages visited, only one (in East Kupang subdistrict) had any budgetary information displayed. This consisted of lump sum costs for four village construction activities funded out of the 2016 village budget. Although not all villages were asked why they did not display their budget, of those that were, the general response was to acknowledge in theory that it was a good idea, but that they just ‘hadn’t had a chance yet’ or had been ‘too busy’. In at least one village, even village officials responsible for implementing activities did not have access to the budget Uang masuk uang keluar itu bukan urusan ketong [kami]. Ketong bekerja documents for the activities they saja. Kami tenaga kerja saja, dikasih were implementing. upah saja. Dong [mereka] yang kelola. Two members of the Activity Whether the money comes in or the money Implementation Team (Tim goes out, that’s not our business. We just Pelaksana Kegiatan or TPK) in work. We’re just labourers, we just receive a village in East Kupang a wage. They [the village government] subdistrict (each a hamlet head) manage [everything]. independently confirmed that Fisherman, Kupang District they had experienced this problem. Only the head of the TPK (the Head of Development Affairs or Kepala Urusan Pembangunan of the village government) had access to the budget documents. Accordingly, they were reduced to effectively being field supervisors – a situation they were not entirely happy with. 23 This is not to say that citizens have no information about the village budget – in most villages it is reportedly Ada yang kasih tahu [tentang ABPDes] read out at the village meeting tapi kita kurang paham, kadang-kadang through which it is approved. kurang ingat juga However, this does not mean We did get told something [about the that all citizens can access village budget], but we didn’t really budget information, because understand, and sometimes we don’t remember either attendance at village planning meetings is itself limited. Those in Housewife, Kupang District attendance tend to be those with some kind of formal position in the village (for example, hamlet or neighbourhood heads) or those with high social status. That said, these types of people are also more likely to be able to actually take action in response to information that they obtain than those with lesser positions in the village hierarchy. Oral transmission of detailed budget information also has drawbacks. While some respondents were able to quote amounts allocated for particular activities that they recalled hearing at the planning meeting, they had no means of independently verifying what they had heard, and there are clearly limits to the amount of detailed budgetary information that can be retained on the basis of memory. Nevertheless, this is sufficient for some: as one respondent in Sumbermanjing Wetan subdistrict put it, ‘if the budget has been read out, that’s enough for me – I wouldn’t go looking for a written copy at the subdistrict’. Likewise, a significant proportion of respondents have at least partial knowledge of particular development activities being implemented in their village (or at least hamlet) through either direct involvement or observation or through word of mouth. Respondents outside of the village government could usually (although not always) nominate some way in which the village budget had been used, although their knowledge was far from comprehensive. For example, an ordinary citizen in the most remote hamlet of a village in West Kupang subdistrict had heard about the village budget being used to fund the lease of land for a community orchard, and knew the rough amount it had been leased for, despite never having been to a village planning meeting. Possibly the reason he knew this was that the value of the lease was relatively high, and the lessor was the village head, and as such it had become a topic of discussion in the village. But, overall, community knowledge of how the village budget is used appears to be low. This stands in contrast to the genuine community desire to APBDes dikasih ke kadus enak…ditempel di be able to access village kantor desa lebih enak lagi budget information in It would be good if the village budget was written form. provided to hamlet heads…it would be even better if it was displayed at the village office While being somewhat Hamlet head, Kupang District difficult to capture in words, most respondents, when asked if they would be interested in seeing the village budget, gave what seemed to be a strikingly genuine answer of ‘yes’. 24 But asking for information goes against ingrained social norms, and the general consensus is that only certain people have a ‘right’ to ask UPK members in Kupang Timur subdistrict spoke (unapprovingly) of planning documents being the property of ‘the Yang pemerintah punya village’ in the sense of the village [APBDes], kita tidak bisa tanya- government (milik desa), rather than tanya ke situ. Malu tanya the community at large (milik We can’t ask about things that are umum). As a shopkeeper in East the preserve of government [i.e. the Kupang subdistrict put it, if an village budget]. I’d be embarrassed ordinary citizen asked about the to ask financial arrangements for a program, Housewife, Kupang District that would be considered an ‘intervention’. A number of respondents were Ibaratnya tamu bertanya kepada tuan of the opinion that you need to rumah berapa jumlah kopi dan gula yang digunakan dalam secangkir kopi have a position in the village to ask for information (for [Asking for the village budget] would be like example, a hamlet head) but a guest asking his host how much coffee even then there is no and sugar she’d used in a mug of coffee guarantee you’ll be granted Neighbourhood head, Kupang District access. For example, one hamlet head in West Kupang subdistrict said that although ordinary citizens couldn’t ask the village government directly for access to the village budget, they could channel their request through him. However, he then admitted that even he, as hamlet head, couldn’t as the village government for access to the budget, so that wouldn’t do much good either. In East Kupang subdistrict, a respondent Bapa desa janji akan fotokopi imagined the likely response of the Laporan Pertanggung Jawaban village head if he asked about the 2015 tapi nggak jadi-jadi financial details of a current project to install bores in the village: ‘Aren’t you The village head promised that he’d happy? Now you’ve got water, but photocopy the 2015 Accountability you’re still asking questions!’ The Report but we’re still waiting implication being, of course, that he Hamlet head, Kupang District should shut up and be grateful for what he’d received. And the practices and attitudes of higher levels of government are not supportive of greater access to budget information at the village level, even if in theory they recognise its importance. A subdistrict government officer in West Kupang district was asked whether a citizen could request their village budget from the subdistrict if they couldn’t obtain it from the village government. She replied that even though the subdistrict had a copy of the village budget, they couldn’t provide it to the citizen because it’s not their document to give – the budget is the property of the village government and only they have authority to disclose it. All the village is required to do is ensure the budget is read out at the village meeting. A provincial BPMD officer in Java was of the opinion that public participation in planning and budgeting is important to promote accountability, but there are limits – villages ‘don’t 25 need to be so transparent that they’re naked’. But a district level BPMD head perhaps summed the situation up best. After acknowledging that there needed to be more effort in promoting transparency in village financial management, he eventually gave an exasperated laugh and admitted that he couldn’t access the budget of the government office next door, and if access to district government budgets was so restricted they couldn’t really demand more from villages. Box 4: Who benefits from a lack of transparency at the village level? • According to a BPD member in Kupang district, the district government (BPMD) actually benefits from low levels of transparency and accountability at the village level, because if the village government siphons off a significant amount of village funds they will later have trouble drafting their annual accountability report. This then gives BPMD an opportunity to ask the village how much money is remaining, and take a cut of that in return for helping to draft and ultimately approve the accountability report. • After the BPD member started distributing the village budget to community members, he alleges he was called to BPMD and given the message (indirectly) that what he was doing was not a good idea and that he should stop. Finally, despite the almost universal failure to make budget information accessible, several instances were noted of village officials trying to talk down community expectations at to what could be achieved with Rp 1 billion. If there is one piece of information that is well known amongst community members, it is that villages now receive Rp 1 billion in funding each year. Yang masyarakat tahu, desa At the village planning meeting observed in menerima Rp 1M. Lalu mereka Malang district, various village officials went bingung kenapa jembatan tidak bisa diperbaiki out of their way to stress that the community should not expect the entire Rp All the community knows is that 1 billion to be available for spending on the village receives Rp 1 billion. village development, because a portion Then they wonder why they can’t was allocated to village government get a bridge fixed salaries and other deductions. A hamlet BPD member, Malang District head in Kupang district also remarked that community members sometimes complained ‘is this all we get for Rp 1 billion’? On the one hand, their point is legitimate, in the sense that it is technically correct. On the other hand, however, for as long as village governments fail to allow community access to budgets to see for themselves how spending is allocated, it is difficult to conclude there is often not an ulterior motive behind the attempt to manage expectations. 4.2 Monitoring Main di harga barang beda urusan, tapi paling tidak ada barang Monitoring can be thought of as a two- Playing with the price of an item is a step process – the first ensuring that a different matter, but at least we have budgeted item was provided, and the that item second confirming that it complies with BPD head, Kupang District specifications and represents value for money. 26 As the quote above indicates, citizens themselves often think in these terms, but frequently stop at Step 1, considering it an achievement in itself (which it may well be). As Figure 8 (below) shows, access to the APBDes is necessary for Step 1, but Step 2 requires access to the RAB and/or the technical or market knowledge required to assess whether something complies with specifications and represents value for money. Step 2 is not impossible without access to the RAB, but is made much more difficult. Figure 8: A two-step monitoring process and required sources of information Step 1 Was a budgeted Information item provided? required If yes Does it comply with Information Step 2 specifications and required represent value for money? As noted in Section 4.1 (above), with access to the written village budget highly restricted, the only people in Bapak desa kelola semua. Ketong a position to undertake ‘Step 1’ [kami] dusun nggak pernah tahu uang itu ke mana monitoring are the select few who have attended a village planning The village head manages everything. meeting, or those who have been We in the hamlet never know where the money goes briefed on its content. Hamlet head, Kupang District However, Step 1 monitoring only provides potential protection against the most egregious forms of corruption and financial mismanagement, assuming that once exposed it will be either resolved at the village level or reported to a higher authority. ‘Step 2’ monitoring (compliance with specifications and value for money) appears to be even less frequently undertaken, although at least one positive example was found. Community attitudes to monitoring serve as a reminder for the seemingly obvious point that even within individual villages, significant differences can exist. In a village in East Kupang sub-district, one respondent felt that ‘as long as there is some sort of physical construction from the village budget, we’ll just trust that the finances are OK. Only if there is no construction whatsoever would we question it – that would involve lying or corruption.’ However, another respondent in that village (a hamlet head) related the story in Box 5 (below) where hamlet members successfully monitored the length of road that was built with village funds, even if they did not have corresponding success in actually resolving the problem that they uncovered. 27 Box 5: Shortchanged in East Kupang subdistrict • Bu Paulina is a young woman in her early twenties who is the head of Dusun 1 (Hamlet 2). After having been directed to the hamlet head’s house, it’s easy to mistake her for the hamlet head’s daughter. Upon graduating from SMA, she almost immediately married and had a child, and was also simultaneously elected head of Dusun 2, which is home to 105 households. • Bu Paulina relates the story of a stone and gravel road built in Dusun 1 in 2016 with funding from the 2016 village budget. She and other community members attended the village planning meeting and knew that the budget for the road was Rp 100 million, and it should have been 1270m long and used 600 loads of stone and gravel. Citizens of Dusun 1 were employed to work on the road, but the Activity Implementation Team (TPK) managing the project were all from Dusun 3. • When the road was constructed, it turned out to be 200m short, measuring only 1070m. Citizens of Dusun 1 also noted that only 410 loads of stone and gravel had been supplied. Being disappointed with this, they asked Bu Paulina to complain to the village head, which she did, but his response was simply ‘let them ask’. At the most recent village meeting he was asked again, but he remained silent and didn’t even acknowledge the question. The community feels very disappointed that a leader couldn’t at least respond to a question from his own community members. • Bu Paulina and her community didn’t report the problem to the BPD because the BPD were going to be at the village meeting where they planned to ask the village head about it directly. In theory, she thinks they could report the problem to the subdistrict, but would have to go in a group because if they went individually no one would take any notice. The ideal number of people would be however many you can cram into a pickup truck – at Rp 250,000 for the return trip, it’s not something you’d be doing unless it’s important. But they are patient and would prefer to resolve the matter amicably with the village head – they plan to give him at least two years before thinking about reporting to the subdistrict. However, even when citizens can’t access village budgets and planning documents, observations from daily life and a small amount of knowledge still allows basic conclusions to be drawn. Monitoring can be as simple as Kok Rp 1M setahun hanya begini aja? comparing the known or estimated size of the village Is this all we have to show for Rp 1 billion budget with observable per year? development activities, or the Hamlet head, Kupang District known or estimated salary of an official with his or her apparent wealth. However, at best such comparisons can Tunjangan kepala desa hanya Rp 2 only serve to alert citizens to seek juta per bulan, kok bisa dia kaya? further information about how village The village head’s salary is only Rp 2 funds are being managed, or how million per month, how could he be so the official has accumulated their rich? wealth. Information generated by the comparison itself is generally not BPD head, Kupang District directly actionable. 28 At a higher level of sophistication, if citizens can ascertain the budgeted amount for a particular output, even without the RAB they may be able to make basic judgements as to whether that output represents value for money. For example, one village in East Kupang subdistrict had budgeted to build a single room 4 x 5m posyandu for Rp 100 million. Opinions were sought from various respondents as to whether the cost was reasonable considering the output delivered, and responses varied significantly. At one end of the spectrum, the head of the Puskesmas in West Kupang subdistrict estimated the cost of building a posyandu at Rp 20 million, and was shocked when told a village had budgeted Rp 100 million for this purpose. However, she did not appear to have any firm basis for her estimate. In contrast, community members in the village initially estimated the cost of a posyandu at Rp 50 million, assuming a semi- permanent structure measuring 6m x 7m with 3 rooms and a bathroom, but not fully enclosed. For a fully enclosed structure of this size, they estimated Rp 100 million – the same as the budgeted cost, but with slightly larger dimensions. By both of the above estimates, Box 6: Why didn’t we get what they got? the posyandu was moderately to extremely over-priced. A further • A village in Malang district recently received reference point is the 2016 financial assistance to buy goods for poor district government standard community members (later discovered to be building cost per square metre of Rp 2.5 million per eligible person). However, Rp 4 million, which includes paint all eligible community members received and floor coverings but does not were two scrawny chickens that didn’t grow, include water or electricity worth perhaps Rp 500,000. They compared connections. Based on this with what people in neighbouring dimensions of 4 x 5 metres, this villages had received (e.g. goats) and felt also tends to indicate that the they’d been hard done by. As a result, a posyandu was moderately over- group of respected community members priced (Rp 100 million instead of reported the problem to their local DPRD Rp 80 million), especially member, who was eventually able to considering that the government negotiate a resolution with the village head. standard is likely somewhat generous. Even simply making a comparison with what the neighbours have received can be enough to prompt thought and, in the example provided in Box 6 (above), a complaint. And even if communities did have access to detailed activity budgets, they may be able to effectively monitor unit prices, but would likely experience difficulty monitoring quantities. Olken (2009) uses data from his 2007 PNPM study to show that communities are good at monitoring labour inputs and unit costs, but not so good at monitoring quantities. Unsurprisingly, inflating quantities of materials was the main method through which the vast majority of corruption in PNPM was found to take place. There is also a risk that even if the village budget was displayed at the village office or elsewhere, community members would simply fail to read it. Kami ibu-ibu hanya perhatikan yang di dalam rumah Us housewives only pay attention to things within our household Community member, Kupang District 29 5 Attitudes and obstacles: to complain or not, and how? Where citizens are aware of mismanagement of village funds, or are otherwise dissatisfied with an aspect of village governance, actually complaining about it remains the exception rather than the rule. This section provides insight into the reasons why citizens do or don’t complain, looking at both attitudes and obstacles. It then examines citizen preferences in relation to the method of complaining. Key points u Acceptance of corruption (attitude) likely contributes to the low level of complaints about village governance. Although citizens seem to be capable of identifying theoretical examples of corrupt conduct and consider it to be wrong, in practice they often appear to exercise a greater degree of tolerance. u Access to information aside, the biggest obstacle to complaints appears to be the perceived likelihood of getting a response to a complaint – this can be influenced by either conflicts of interest or simply the capacity or motivation of an institution to respond. Over time, the feeling that complaining is futile can lead to an attitude of acceptance and apathy. u When citizens do complain, there is distinct preference for informality and in- person complaints, if possible direct to a person capable of responding. However, complaining via third parties is also popular where a direct complaint may be too confrontational, or the third party can add ‘weight’ to the complaint by virtue of their position. u Psychologically, complaining to the district is viewed as a big step. Complaining to a provincial level institution about a village governance issue (or for that matter a problem related to health or education) was not considered an option by any respondents. u To overcome both the reluctance to complain and some of the obstacles that exist, an active approach to soliciting complaints may be required. 5.1 Attitude At a theoretical level, community members were able to identify corrupt conduct as wrong when presented with a range of examples. These ranged from when the corruption had seemingly little effect (goods still delivered according to specifications, just at a slightly inflated price) to where goods were either not delivered in accordance with specifications or not delivered at all. 30 In real life, there is likely a greater level of tolerance for corrupt conduct, albeit in some cases grudging. Pasti dia [kepala desa] makan, tapi tidak terlalu banyak… As the quote opposite shows, one BPD Of course he [the village head] is on head in Kupang district, while not the take, but within reason… condoning corruption, nevertheless indicated that a small amount was BPD Head, Kupang District probably the best that could be hoped for. Attitudes to corruption may also vary depending on who benefits, as the case in Box 7 (below) illustrates. Box 7: If corruption proves irresistible, best to share the proceeds… • In June 2016 a village head in Wonogiri was charged in relation to the corruption of approximately Rp 416 million from the 2013, 2014 and 2015 APBDes. According to subdistrict government staff, they had been aware of the alleged corruption for some time and had repeatedly told the village head not to ‘push things too far’ but he had persisted. Eventually an unknown person reported the case to the district prosecutor’s office. • Ironically, the previous village head had also been highly corrupt and in terms of village development had been significantly worse than the village head who was reported to prosecutors. However, the previous village head had reportedly shared the proceeds of corruption with villagers, whereas the current village head had not. So the common understanding was that it was not the corruption per se that angered villagers, but the fact that they had not received a share of the benefits. • Moreover, a number of interviewees expressed a view that people in Wonogiri would generally be quite tolerant of misbehaviour until reaching a breaking point. However, once that point was reached, they would seek to punish the person quite harshly (for example by reporting to law enforcement authorities rather than to government agencies). An alternative is that while the corruption itself is viewed as wrong, what is misappropriated is not always viewed as ‘belonging’ to community members, and therefore not something they have a right to complain about. This explanation was advanced by a SMERU researcher who had at that point spent Kalau ada bantuan kita terima, several months working intensively in kalau tidak ada, ya sudah two villages in Wonogiri district. In part If there’s [village government] it matched with attitudes displayed by assistance we’ll accept it, if not, well community members in Malang and I guess that’s just how it is… Kupang districts (see, for example, the quote at left). However, at least at a Shopkeeper, Kupang District theoretical level, when community members were asked to whom dana desa belonged, common answers ranged from ‘ dana desa is owned by the government for [the benefit of] the community’ to ‘the community has a collective right to dana desa’. 31 5.2 Obstacles At the most basic level, knowledge of where to complain may be an obstacle for some, although generally speaking should not prove insurmountable. A substantial number of respondents, when pressed, could nominate either the BPD, sub-district government or Masyarakat hanya ngomong mau lapor, Bupati as potential complaints tapi tidak tahu harus lapor ke mana pathways (or, in the case of health and education services, People say they’ll report something, but don’t actually know where they should the service provider report to themselves, the village head, or the district office). Knowledge of Hamlet head, Kupang District provincial or national level complaints handling pathways, however, was almost non-existent, as was knowledge of online or sms complaints handling mechanisms of the local government. The bigger issue for most is the perceived likelihood of getting a response. In some cases, this is linked to the perceived independence of the body receiving the complaint. The first point for complaints about the village governance, the BPD, is often viewed as being insufficiently independent from the village Seringkali BPD sama Kades satu head to be able to exercise an effective oversight role. A respondent in Malang Often the BPD is as one with the district related how in his village, the village head village head had already influenced the Community member, Kupang composition of the BPD before he himself District was elected. Village facilitators in Malang district estimated that in their experience, 60 percent of BPDs were aligned with the village head, 20 percent were critical of the village head, and a further 20 percent were inactive. At the next level up, the Aturan karet semua ini – Banwas datang independence of district level periksa dia juga bisa masuk angin agencies is also subject to question for some These are all ‘rubber regulations’ – if an respondents. For example, a auditor comes to investigate he might also community member in ‘catch a cold’ [i.e. be bribed by the subject of the investigation] Kupang district expressed his lack of trust in the district Community member, Kupang District Inspectorate’s ability to investigate malfeasance by the village government (see quote at left). Similarly, in Wonogiri district, the reporting of a village head suspected of corruption directly to prosecutors rather than first to the district government was explained on the basis that the village head was perceived as being close to BPMD and community members suspected it would therefore act to protect him. In other cases, the perceived likelihood of getting a response is simply linked to the capacity or motivation of an institution to respond. 32 For example, a number of respondents in Kupang district mentioned delays in the delivery of subsidised fertiliser as a priority issue of concern. Respondents in one village Ketong [kami] di desa tunggu sa explained that two years ago, their [saja]. Kadang-kadang dapat fertiliser did not arrive until after they cukup [pupuk], kadang-kadang tidak dapat cukup, begitu. had harvested their crops. They had complained at a subdistrict meeting of We in the village just wait. village heads, but had been told to Sometimes we get enough [fertiliser], ‘just wait’, which they did. They also sometimes we don’t get enough, raised the matter at an electorate that’s how it is. meeting with their local DPRD member, Hamlet head, Kupang District but he admitted that he had also given up trying to resolve the problem because it was just too difficult – he couldn’t compete with the ‘fertiliser mafia’. In another village, a hamlet head had complained about the problem to a relative who worked at the local Agriculture Office, but the answer had been the same – ‘just wait’. Members of a village government in Malang district couldn’t think of anything they would report or ask for directly to the district government. They felt it would be pointless because they would just be asked to go back and channel their report or request through the subdistrict. If they had a problem with the subdistrict, they could report it to the Bupati if he happened to visit the village, but that’s problematic because as their village didn’t support the Bupati in the last election, he’s never visited. Over time, the feeling that complaining is futile can morph into an attitude that whatever happens, it’s better to just accept the situation and not even see it as a problem. For example, a respondent in Malang district felt there was a difference in the quality of education between the city and the village, which he quantified on the basis of city schools setting homework while village schools did not. However, in his view, there is no demand for better education amongst parents – they just accept it. Fear of repercussions can be another reason behind the general reluctance to complain. For example, several mothers in Malang district indicated they were dissatisfied with extended teacher absences and would like to complain, but don’t because they are worried the teachers will retaliate against their children. When informed of the district government’s online complaints system that openly displays the identity of the complainant, they laughed and said they wouldn’t use it if anonymity wasn’t guaranteed. Similarly, a village facilitator in East Kupang subdistrict who was previously a PNPM facilitator explained that a community member had once complained to her about the quality of a village road that was built with PNPM funds. She encouraged the person to raise it at a village meeting, which she later attended. Although the complainant attended the meeting and was encouraged to speak up, they were too scared to say anything and just sat there quietly. Finally, the cost and time of complaining can also weigh on the mind of a prospective complainant. Particularly in more sparsely populated areas of the country, the distance between a village and the district capital can be significant. Village government officials in West Kupang subdistrict said the round trip to the district capital was 2+ hours each way and cost Rp200,000. West Kupang is not the closest sub-district to the district capital, but neither is it the furthest and the quality of the road is good. For those further away via poor quality roads, a trip to the district capital can be a significant undertaking. This has the effect of raising the bar for when making a complaint may be worthwhile. 33 5.3 How do people complain if they decide to take action? There is often a distinct preference for informality and in-person complaints, if possible direct to a person capable of responding. In Malang district, the Education Office accepts complaints by letter, email, sms or in person. However, the majority of the small number of complaints received are conveyed in person, sometimes accompanied by a letter. Consistent with this practice, a community member in Malang district explained that if (in theory) he wanted to complain about service at a Puskesmas, he would go in person to the district Health Office rather than sending a letter because that would be the ‘nice’ way to go about it. In Kupang district, the head of the Education Office said that while they do have an sms complaints system, over 70% of complaints go direct to his private number or to the Bupati. He doesn’t know how people get his number, but attributes them contacting him directly to a belief that they will get a quicker response than going through a complaints handling system. Also in Kupang district, the head of a Puskesmas explained that the most common complaints she receives are about midwives absent from their posts or that stocks of medicine have run out. Complaints about the latter are often made through midwives to be conveyed to the Puskesmas, while complaints about the former are generally conveyed to the head of the Puskesmas directly, in person. However, there also are times at which a direct complaint may be too confrontational, or where a complaint via a third party may add ‘weight’ to the complaint by virtue of the third party’s position. Several examples were noted of where the BPD felt they could not directly oppose the village head, and so other respected community members Di sini kita tidak main tabrak langsung were tasked with lodging a Here we don’t take a head-on approach complaint with at least some degree of backing from the Community member, Kupang District BPD. Similarly, a group of community members in Malang district, community members unsatisfied with the performance of the village midwife chose to complain via the village government rather than direct to the Puskesmas. This was partly because the village government was viewed as having a stronger bargaining position than individual citizens, but also because complaining via neutral third party was less confrontational and more socially acceptable. It is also relatively common for complaints to be made direct to the Bupati, or at least be copied to the Bupati, even though it is known the Bupati will not investigate the complaint directly. This is rooted in the belief that line agencies (primarily BPMD and the Inspectorate) will be more responsive to an instruction of the Bupati than the request of an individual citizen. For those with the right connections, complaining via DPRD members is another way to add weight to a complaint. A village head in Malang district observed that the important thing is to report to a member you have a personal relationship with, regardless of what electorate they’re from or what commission they’re on. They’ll then introduce you to the member on the relevant 34 committee, who will then contact the relevant government office on your behalf. Without a personal introduction it’s more difficult to get the member to do this for you. The government office will then telephone you, rather than you telephoning them. As he put it, the DPRD member is often the best bet because the Bupati usually doesn’t want to know about ‘small’ problems like that, but a DPRD member is much more likely to get a response from a government agency than a village head. Box 8 (below) provides an example of how this can work in practice. Box 8: A technical or political approach to complaints handling? • Box 6 related the story of the village in Malang district where eligible community members received assistance in the form of two scrawny chickens worth no more than Rp 500,000. After comparing this with the goats worth Rp 2.5 million received by eligible community members in neighbouring villages, they discovered the village head had likely skimmed off some of the funds for his own benefit. • In thinking about what to do, community members didn’t report to the police because (a) they had previously reported small cases to the police and the police hadn’t done anything, and (b) they thought the village head was personally close to the local police and subdistrict government. They didn’t report to the Inspectorate or BPMD because they didn’t think they’d do anything either. • Instead, a group of respected community members travelled to the district capital to report the problem to their local DPRD member, who agreed to come to the village and bring some local media with him. When the DPRD member came to the village, he reportedly had a civil conversation with the village head who eventually agreed to return the money and buy community members what they should have received. The case was also publicised in a number of print and electronic media, which increased the pressure on the village head. • In their view, the key factor was that the local DPRD member was a political opponent of the village head and so was happy to help out. Had he been a political ally, their approach would likely have been unsuccessful, so they would have tried to go to another DPRD member who was not aligned with the village head. Another way of adding ‘weight’ to a complaint is to complain in a group. Respondents in both Malang and Kupang districts noted that the likelihood of getting a response to their complaint was increased through force of numbers. For example, a community member in Malang district was pessimistic about the prospects of lodging a complaint at a Puskesmas on his own (see quote Nggak akan ditanggapi, kecuali below). Similarly, a hamlet head berbondong-bondong ke sana berunjuk in Kupang district believed that rasa the only effective way to They won’t pay any attention, except if we complain to the subdistrict go as a group and demonstrate government would be to rent a Community member, Malang District pick-up truck and take as many people with you as could be crammed into the truck. When complaining to the district government, the same theory applies. A village head in Malang district explained that if he had a complaint about a Camat, he could report to the Bupati, but the Bupati would be unlikely to take any notice unless there was a group of 35 village heads complaining together. He estimated at least 11 of the 15 village heads in his subdistrict would be required to get the Bupati’s attention. Psychologically, complaining to the district is viewed as a big step. Complaining to a provincial level institution about a village governance issue (or for that matter a problem related to health or education) was not considered an option by any respondents. In a sense, this is quite logical, given that provincial government agencies do not usually have jurisdiction to respond directly to a complaint. Also, the distance of a village from a provincial capital can be many hundreds of kilometres. However, these were generally not the explanations given for why respondents would not consider complaining to the provincial government, although they are to some extent related. A village head in East Kupang subdistrict said he would not make a complaint to the provincial capital, less than an hour away by road, because he didn’t know any of the officials there. In Malang district, a group of BPD members said they would never complain about the district government to the provincial government ‘because it would be embarrassing’. Also in East Kupang subdistrict, a group of village officials said complaining to the province had simply never crossed their mind. Sometimes citizens need an extra nudge to elicit a complaint – in other words, an active rather than passive approach to complaints handling may be required. The general reluctance of community members to complain was cited frequently by respondents in Central and East Java and to a lesser extent in West Sulawesi and East Nusa Tenggara. For example, members of a Karang Taruna youth group in Sumbermanjing Wetan subdistrict said that even at the village planning meeting, people need to be invited (or instructed) by the BPD to provide input – otherwise they will tend to sit quietly even though they have something to contribute. Complaints boxes, the stereotypical passive complaints receiving mechanism, are widely regarded as a joke. Accordingly, the most common response when a respondent was asked whether their institution had such a box was literally a laugh. However, only in Wonogiri district was an example found of a district office that had taken a more active approach to soliciting complaints. In Wonogiri, BPMD staff were adamant that a passive complaints handling system would be ineffective, and so instead set about soliciting complaints during the course of their regular activities. This is described in Box 9 (below). 36 Box 9: An Active Approach to Soliciting Complaints by BPMD Wonogiri • In 2015, Central Java’s provincial level BPMD reportedly asked each district to establish a Community Complaints Unit (Unit Pengaduan Masyarakat or UPM) to elicit complaints about poverty reduction and community empowerment programs. However, districts were given flexibility in how to go about doing this. • BPMD Wonogiri felt that because of a general reluctance of citizens to complain, it would likely be a fruitless endeavor to set up a formal system and simply wait for citizens to submit complaints. Instead, they decided to actively solicit complaints from citizens in the course of their regular activities (in this case, community meetings held in every subdistrict to verify data for a housing rehabilitation program). The number of complaints generated was significant (801). • They saw two benefits to this approach. First, if they held events solely for the purpose of soliciting complaints, that would be considered ‘strange’ and may make citizens reluctant to participate. Second, there were no budgetary implications because these meetings were already funded. • The drawback (which they seemed unconcerned by) is that only village heads and the head of each village’s Community Empowerment Organization (Lembaga Pemberdayaan Masyarakat or LPM) participated in the meetings, restricting the range of voices heard. While this may be less of a problem in relation to complaints about programs managed by supra-village actors, without modification it would clearly be ineffective for generating complaints about the management of village development activities by village governments. • The complaints data generated was provided to the provincial BPMD, to the district Poverty Alleviation Coordination Team (TKPKD) and to the government offices responsible for particular programs or services that were the subject of complaint. The data is not used by BPMD itself to resolve individual complaints, but they see value in the way it enables them to monitor trends and identify areas where large numbers of problems are occurring. They also feel the data gives them the confidence to raise problems with other agencies that they would otherwise be more reluctant to do. 37 6 Conclusions and recommendations Key points u The paper set out to address two basic questions: (a) Whether a CHS should be established to deal with grievances arising in relation to village governance, and; (b) If so, what factors should be taken into account in its design? u Overall, it concludes that, in the short term, establishing a CHS is a lower order priority because there are currently very few complaints to either resolve or track. Given the reasons for this, establishing a CHS is, of itself, unlikely to result in a significantly higher number of complaints being articulated. u Instead, immediate priority should be given to the technically simple but politically formidable challenge of increasing access to the village budget. If there remains a desire to focus on pursuing the objectives of a CHS, at this stage discrete interventions aimed at improving individual functions are likely to be more effective than an approach that tries to achieve everything through a single system. u If establishment of a nationally integrated CHS is nevertheless preferred, there is a strong case for working with existing systems rather than creating something new. The focus should be on both the ability of districts to handle complaints, and on providing accessible alternative channels for resolving complaints about them. System design should consider promoting active approaches to complaints solicitation and the role of facilitators in providing citizens with information on how to complain. 6.1 Should a CHS be established? The paper concludes that investing in a national integrated CHS is currently a lower relative priority because, given the prevailing conditions: (i) The majority of citizens are unlikely to use the system, and there is no guarantee that government would be any more responsive to complaints than they currently are, or make more effective use of system-generated data; and (ii) Alternative investments might be more effective and/or efficient in achieving the overarching objectives of: - Increased citizen empowerment by providing an alternative avenue for exercising control over elected representatives; - Greater village government responsiveness as a result of officials facing a higher likelihood of sanction for poor performance or corruption; and - Improved aggregation and analysis of data to enable the monitoring of trends and the early identification of emerging systemic problems. 38 Also relevant to consider is the status quo, whereby the absence of a national integrated CHS does not mean that no systems currently exist for resolving complaints about village governance. Districts are the level of government primarily responsible for this task. At the whole of government level, they can be said to have basic systems to deal with complaints about village governance, even though individual offices and agencies (Dinas) usually lack formalised procedures or dedicated resources for complaints handling. Exactly how well those systems function is difficult to say, but examples show that they can respond to complaints with at least some degree of effectiveness when they want to or are effectively pressured to do so. What is much clearer is that citizens very rarely use these systems, despite the fact that in many cases they should have something to complain about. As is argued below, this is not something that establishing a nationally integrated CHS would necessarily change. 6.1.1 Are citizens likely to use the system or governments likely to respond? The reasons why citizens rarely make use of existing complaints resolution pathways can be summarised as relating to information, attitude or obstacles. While all play a role, highly restricted access to information about the use of the village budget appears to be primarily responsible for the low number of complaints about village governance. Establishing an integrated national CHS would be unlikely to have a significant impact on this issue. The lack of access to village budgets and planning documents at the village level is striking. Although coming from direct observation in only seven villages in two districts, respondents in six districts with first hand knowledge of the village environment (BPMD officials, subdistrict heads, village facilitators and local NGOs) confirmed this to be the case more generally. This is not to say that communities have no information about the use of village development funds, but that the information they do have is often partial and unverifiable. This makes it very difficult for them to know how their village budget is being managed. And without actionable knowledge of any problems, the issues of attitudes to corruption or obstacles to complaining do not arise. Where citizens do have knowledge of corruption or mismanagement, attitudes to corruption and, to a greater extent, obstacles to complaining, both contribute to the low number of complaints about it. While establishing an integrated national CHS could potentially contribute to addressing both issues, the likelihood of that potential being realised is arguably low. One of the most significant obstacles to complaining is the perceived lack of responsiveness of the local government offices and agencies currently tasked with receiving complaints. However, this lack of responsiveness appears to be driven more by political, bureaucratic or personal factors than a lack of technical capacity (although that too can be a factor). Given an integrated national CHS would still have to rely upon district governments to handle complaints in the first instance, the technical design of such a system would likely be secondary in importance to devising strategies to increase the motivation of districts to use it. Examples abound of district-level complaints handling systems that are established but then fall into disuse, presumably at least in part because very few complaints are received. 39 A better approach would be to first focus on improving citizens’ ability to articulate complaints about village governance, then improve the systems to deal with them. Given the relatively low number of complaints that most individual local government offices currently receive in a given year, many would likely consider their current arrangements sufficient to meet demand and therefore not take the issue seriously. Attempting to strengthen systems where those responsible for them do not see a need to do so is unlikely to be a recipe for success. There is of course a ‘chicken and egg’ element to the problem – citizens are reluctant to complain in the absence of a responsive CHS, and in the absence of citizen complaints, there is little impetus to build a more responsive CHS. In a world of limitless resources, both sides of the equation would ideally be addressed simultaneously. However, if one must be prioritised over the other, investing in the ability of citizens to identify and articulate complaints should, in time, put pressure on government to improve their complaints handling systems. Working in the reverse order is unlikely to have the same impact. The one exception to the above concerns complaints by village officials about the behaviour of district governments themselves. Again, however, establishing a national integrated CHS for this purpose is only one possible response. While district governments may have basic systems in place to deal with village level corruption (that is, complaints about others), there is understandable scepticism about their ability to deal with complaints about themselves. This problem is not, of course, unique to the Village Law context. Where district level complaints handling systems prove ineffective, citizens need recourse to a higher authority outside the local political milieu. At present, options include local prosecution offices (although their independence from local politics is not guaranteed) and provincial offices of the Ombudsman (who have extremely limited resources). National level options such as LAPOR! and KPK also exist, but come with their own limitations. A national integrated CHS could provide another pathway for submitting complaints about district and subdistrict governments, but would face the same jurisdictional and responsiveness challenges as existing systems. An alternative approach could be to take a more political rather than technical approach to the problem, for example by encouraging local civil society organisations to monitor poor government practices and help villages to organise against them and seek strength in numbers. (However, this may be something more suitable for donor funding, as there are likely limits to the extent to which the central government is willing and able to fund such an approach). 6.2 Possible alternative investments and their merits 6.2.1 Increased citizen empowerment Increased citizen empowerment arguably starts with greater access to information. Improving access to village financial information and ensuring that communities have the ability and incentive to effectively monitor village expenditure does not guarantee citizens will complain about problems they uncover (or that they will be capable of uncovering all problems), but is a fundamental pre-condition to them doing so. Even with access to the APBDes and RAB, there are limits to what communities will be able to effectively monitor. As Olken’s work has shown, audit will also remain an important and possibly more effective tool for monitoring certain types of expenditure. That said, at a minimum, access to the ABPDes enables communities to at least undertake ‘Step 1’ monitoring – i.e. ensuring that budgeted items have been provided. Although ‘Step 2’ monitoring – compliance with specifications and value for money – is much easier with 40 access to the RAB, basic market and/or technical knowledge can still make it possible to draw general conclusions about whether an item represents value for money when only the total cost is known. Improving access to village budgets is primarily a political rather than a technical problem. At its most basic level, this would involve ensuring that budgets are posted at the village office and at sites around the village where citizens congregate (e.g. mosques, churches or markets). In addition, budgets could be made available at the subdistrict or district level, although this would significantly reduce the number of people who would access them. Requiring only some photocopies and thumb tacks, the technical challenge to overcoming this problem is almost non-existent, but the political challenge is formidable. Alternatively, digital access to village budgets could be considered in some areas, which would combine the benefits of easy access for those in villages with mobile internet coverage, with not leaving village officials solely responsible for providing financial information to citizens (which they are clearly reluctant to do). Each BPMD already has a compilation of all village budgets – they would simply need to be scanned and uploaded to a website. The next step would then be to ensure that information is presented in a form that is easily comprehensible by the average citizen. Although access for all may be the ideal, the immediate objective should be to at least slightly enlarge the circle of people with access to the village budget. Realistically, a significant proportion of village citizens will never have the interest or motivation to pay serious attention to village spending – as in most communities, large or small, that task will effectively be delegated to community leaders, formal or informal. Many of these people are likely to be capable of reading a village budget and associated activity budgets in their original form. The challenge will be ensuring that that circle of people is wide enough that it is not practical for all of them to be co-opted by the village government. 6.2.2 Increased village government responsiveness In theory, village governments will also be more responsive if officials know that citizens are aware of how their money is being spent to a higher level of detail than is currently the case. However, the effect may be muted if not accompanied by the credible threat of being reported to a higher authority that is likely to take action. Unfortunately, it is far from certain that under current conditions the existence of a CHS would significantly increase the credibility of the threat or the nature of the response, as district governments would most likely retain primary responsibility for handling complaints in the first instance. 6.2.3 Improved aggregation and analysis of complaints data Aggregating data on complaints is another area where the central or provincial governments could play a role, although not necessarily through the establishment of a CHS at these levels. If central or provincial governments are involved in complaints handling, it would be primarily as a clearinghouse for complaints that are then referred back to the districts for resolution. Neither the central nor provincial governments have sufficient representation at the district level to be able to perform this function themselves, even if that were desirable. They could however collect and aggregate data on complaints referred back to districts, which could then be analysed to discern emerging trends and formulate policy responses. 41 Aggregation of data on the types of problems that are occurring could be achieved through a combination of media monitoring, opinion polling and surveys. Media monitoring has advantages in terms of administrative simplicity, and also that where district governments might be keen to downplay negative news from their jurisdictions, media in most cases have an interest in reporting it. The main drawback of media monitoring is media are more likely to report on high profile corruption cases rather than more mundane but no less important administrative problems, thereby skewing the data in that direction. One means of addressing this problem is by complementing media monitoring with targeted opinion polling and surveys. An added benefit of such an approach is that through actively seeking information, the data generated about smaller / less important but widespread problems is likely to be more complete than what might be obtained through relying on a passive CHS. Only the most determined or motivated citizens or village officials are likely submit a complaint about such issues through a passive CHS, potentially understating their impact. 6.3 Factors to consider in the design of a CHS If a preference or opportunity nevertheless exists to take action in relation to complaints handling systems, there is a strong case for working with existing systems rather than creating something new. In doing so, it is important to distinguish between systems for the channelling of complaints (for example, a system such as LAPOR!) and systems for their actual resolution (that is, the procedures used by district governments and the resources allocated for this task). Relying on a system such as LAPOR! to channel complaints has significant efficiencies and economies of scale because it reduces the need for individual districts (or ministries) to build their own complaints channelling systems. But it is important to remember that LAPOR! would not change the way districts currently handle complaints – a separate approach to this problem is needed. Focus on the role of district and subdistrict governments - even the district capital can feel distant at the village level, let alone the province or the national capital. This brings particular challenges because the problems are only partly technical. While SOPs could be developed for those districts that do not have them, the potential benefit of such procedures is not clear without an assessment of what impact, if any, their absence currently has on the quality of complaint handling. A higher priority might be to focus on resolving confusion over the division of authority for complaints handling between district offices and subdistricts – while this is clear in some districts, it is not in others and can impede the ability of those closest to a problem to do something about it. While technology has obvious benefits, many at the village level still feel more comfortable with an in-person approach to complaining – system design should accommodate this. Active approaches to complaints solicitation and the role of facilitators should also be considered in this context. Technology-based systems at the district level may be effective in some locations, but in the areas visited during this study, a number of examples were found of where they had been established but were either poorly designed or socialised (or both), and accordingly had fallen into disuse. Although the issue of involving facilitators in complaints handling is somewhat delicate, at a minimum they should be equipped with information on complaining that they can provide to citizens who express complaints to them, even if they are not actively involved in their resolution. 42 Finally, thought should be given to improving channels for handling complaints about district governments themselves. The target audience for this is more easily identifiable and capable of specific targeting – village officials who deal directly with district governments. Although the Ombudsman currently fulfils this role in theory, there may be ways in which it can coordinate with higher levels of government in dealing with complaints specifically related to implementation of the Village Law. 43 7 References Directorate for the Evaluation of Sectoral Development Performance, Bappenas (2013) PNPM Mandiri Evaluation, Bappenas, Jakarta. 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