Policies for Building Post-Conflict Peace

Betty Bigombe, Paul Collier and Nicholas Sambanis

World Bank

March 20th 2000

Paper for presentation at the ad hoc expert group meeting on The Economics of Civil Conflicts in Africa, April 7-8, 2000, Addis Ababa, organized by the UN Economic Commission for Africa.

The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely those of the author. They do not necessarily represent the views of the World Bank, its Executive Directors, or the countries they represent.
1. Introduction

Civil wars always end, but they usually restart. Globally, with the first ten years of the end of a conflict, 31% of them have resumed. African conflicts are even more prone to restart than the global average: half of African peace restorations last less than a decade. Thus, while for those African countries currently at war the task of reaching peace may seem enormous, the harder task is probably not to reach peace but to sustain it. This paper explores appropriate policies for sustainable peace both for the international community and for a post-conflict government. Section 2 provides an overview of the problem. We discuss the risk factors which determine whether a conflict restarts, and show how they can be measured. By establishing which are the highest risk factors in a particular situation, it is possible to prioritize policy interventions aimed at risk-reduction. Taking each risk in turn, we then consider how action by the international community and a post-conflict government might be able to reduce these risks. We base the analysis on a new conflict prediction model by Collier and Hoeffler (2000).

In the next two sections we focus in turn on action by the international community and action by a post-conflict government. In Section 3 we focus upon peace-building actions by the international community, identifying the circumstances in which United Nations intervention is most valuable. We then apply the analysis to Africa, showing the scope for UN intervention in African post-conflict situations. For this we use a new model by Doyle and Sambanis (2000). In Section 4 we turn to the policy choices of a post-conflict government. We focus on two core tasks: defusing a volatile military situation, and making government more inclusive. We discuss how the military situation can be improved through disarmament, demobilization, reintegration; and how government can be made more inclusive through decentralization and the co-option of traditional authorities decision making.

In Section 5 we pull together the evidence. Each African post-conflict situation is different, but that does not mean it is unpredictable. The composition of the risk factors facing a country at a particular time can be estimated, and from this, the most serious risks can be identified and prioritized. Both the international community and a post-conflict government have a range of policies which can reduce each of these risk factors. Some policies which look to have a lot of potential have not yet been tried. For example, opportunities for rebel looting of natural resource exports appear to be a major driver of conflict renewal. Similarly, diasporas in USA appear to be financing rebel movements, and this massively increases the risk of conflict renewal. The international community could build controls on both of these phenomena, analogous to its recent controls on bribery of developing country governments by western corporations. Post-conflict governments could make their use of natural resource revenues more transparent, reducing support for rebel predation, and attempt to co-opt their diasporas into the peace process. We show that in many African circumstances international peacekeeping interventions can be effective in increasing the chances of sustainable peace. However, interventions should be broadened from the observer role which has been most common in Africa to date. We show that multi-dimensional UN peacekeeping operations, in combination with peace treaties and aid inflows are much more effective that traditional
peace-keeping interventions. Turning to the actions of post-conflict governments, we show the circumstances in which post-conflict governments can best use disarmament and demobilization. We discuss how decentralization and the involvement of traditional authorities can make governance more inclusive, reducing the incentive for minorities to resort to conflict.

Our analysis suggests that the high rate of peace collapse in Africa is not inevitable. To date, policies both on the part of the international community and post-conflict governments have been highly inefficient. With better policies, the risk of peace collapse can be radically reduced.

2. Identifying the Risk Factors and Prioritizing Effective Policies

Appropriate policy for peace in post-conflict situations is likely to be highly context-specific, in part because conflict is highly idiosyncratic. The Collier-Hoeffler (CH) model of conflict (Collier and Hoeffler, 2000), on which this Section is based, explains only around 30% of the variation in conflict experience. Here we address only these generic features of post-conflict situations.

**Inherited Risk Factors**

The risk of conflict is likely to be high in post-conflict societies partly, because unless the country was very unlucky, it presumably had risk factors which made it atypically prone to conflict. These risk factors are likely to have persisted and indeed, the conflict is likely to have caused some of them to deteriorate. Further, the conflict will have changed the consequences of a given set of pre-conflict risk factors: some risk factors have different effects post-conflict than pre-conflict.

The CH model of conflict identifies three policy-related pre-conflict risks. It also identifies some more structural risk factors, such as population size and the geographic concentration of the population which we will not discuss further because they are not readily amenable to policy.

The most powerful of the three policy-dependent risk factors is the extent of natural resource rents: unless these rents are very large, greater dependence upon them strongly increases the risk of conflict. The peak danger level is when natural resource exports constitute around 25-30% of GDP. Natural resource rents attract both quasi-criminal rebel activity, in which the rebel organization is directly predatory on the rents, and political rebellion, in which a political leader mobilizes the population of a resource-rich region to secede, analogous to tax exodus by the rich (see Collier, 2000).

The second risk factor is a lack of alternative economic opportunities. These opportunities, implicitly for young men, are proxied by the level of per capita income, male secondary school enrolment, per capita GDP growth, and population growth. The two former both, in effect, measure the level of poverty among potential recruits: the
more severe is poverty, the greater are the risks of conflict. Per capita GDP growth and population growth both measure the change in economic opportunities, and so might be thought of as proxies for the tightness of the labor market, or for the ability of new laborforce entrants to find productive employment. CH find that a one percentage point increase in the rate of population growth is around four times more potent in increasing risk than a one percentage point reduction in the growth of per capita GDP. Population growth may be proxying changes in access to land. Possibly the contraction in opportunities brought about by reduced access to land is more important than more generalised reductions in economic opportunities caused by slow economic growth.

The final risk factor is if the society is characterized by ethnic dominance. Ethnic dominance is defined in CH as occurring when the largest ethno-linguistic group has between 45% and 80% of the population. Both the lower bound of 45% and the upper bound of 80% are empirically determined but are consistent with the predictions of analytic models of political economy. The lower bound of 45% is likely to be sufficient to give the ethnic group a stable winning coalition even in a democracy and is indeed close to the 50% lower bound which would be predicted by simple voting models. The upper bound of 80% is consistent with the prediction that subject to constituting a winning coalition, the smaller is the group the more likely it is to exploit minorities, even if this is at the expense of the general good. Approximately 40% of post-conflict societies are characterized by ethnic dominance so defined. CH estimate that ethnic dominance approximately doubles the risk of conflict.

Since these three characteristics each increase the risk of conflict, most post-conflict countries tend to have had some or all of them prior to conflict: post-conflict societies were on average already atypically prone to conflict prior to that conflict. However, while a post-conflict country will usually have started from unfavorable risk characteristics, they may have been further accentuated by the conflict.

Dependence on natural resource rents may increase have increased. Collier (1999) suggests that the structure of the economy is powerfully changed by conflict, with some activities being much more conflict-vulnerable than others. It is therefore possible that despite the conflict being predatory on natural resource rents, the economy actually becomes relatively more dependent upon natural resource exports rather than less dependent.

Economic opportunities are liable to have contracted as a result of conflict. Recall that empirically, the lack of economic opportunity as a significant risk factor is a complex combination of four components. The first of these, per capita income, will obviously be reduced by conflict. Collier (1999) finds that on average incomes fall by around 2.2% p.a. during conflict. The enrolment of young men in secondary schooling is also likely to have been reduced by conflict as non-military public expenditure is reduced. The third component of economic opportunities, the growth rate of per capita income, is more complex. Post-conflict economic growth can be both much faster and much slower than prior to conflict. Collier (1999) shows that long conflicts tend to produce a post-conflict recovery effect, whereas short conflicts tend to lead to continued decline. The
difference in growth during the first five years of post-conflict between a society emerging from a 15 year conflict and one emerging from a one year conflict is on average eight percentage points on the per capita growth rate. This differential growth effect raises the risk of renewed conflict by around 60%. Hence, other things equal, economic recovery is considerably easier after long conflicts. However, a long conflict with have depressed the level of income: for example, a 15 year conflict will typically have reduced income by around 25% as compared with a one-year conflict. This lower level of income will cause a partially offsetting increase in the risk of conflict. The final component of economic opportunities, population growth, is likely to have been reduced by conflict as mortality and emigration rates rise. However, post-conflict there could be a large return of population will increase competition for economic opportunities.

The third risk factor, ethnic dominance, might also have changed as a result of conflict, since ethnic minorities might have emigrated or become refugees. In the worst case this may transform the ethnic composition of the society from fragmentation to dominance. For example, the conflict in Yugoslavia gradually transformed the political map from one in which no group constituted as much as 45% of the population in the federation, into a series of independent countries each of which was characterized by ethnic dominance. However, if emigration intensifies an existing situation of ethnic dominance, it may conceivably reduce the underlying problem. Recall that as the dominant ethnic group increases its population share its incentive to exploit the minority diminishes.

Prioritization as between these three possible areas for intervention should differ between countries, depending upon which of the risk factors is particularly high by the end of the conflict. This will be a combination of inheritance from the pre-conflict era and changes brought about during the conflict.

However, these are not the only influences on post-conflict prioritization. Post-conflict economies do not necessarily respond to risk factors in the same way as pre-conflict economies, so that even were the risk factors identical before and after the conflict, the priorities for risk reduction will need to change. To determine how conflict alters the relative and absolute importance of the three types of risk factor, we add three interaction terms in turn to the integrated greed-grievance CH model of conflict. The integrated CH model has two variants, depending upon whether the level of economic activity is proxied by per capita income, or by the enrolment rate of young men. Here we adopt the latter, although the results are not affected by this choice. The terms interact the risk factor with the post-conflict experience. We test two ways of specifying this interaction. The first is the simple one of interacting the risk factor with a dummy which takes the value of unity if the society is post-conflict. The more sophisticated specification allows the effect of post-conflict to be dependent upon the length of time which has evolved since the conflict, dividing the risk factor by the number of post-conflict months. Thus, the longer the duration of peace the smaller is the potential influence of the risk factor. We find that this latter specification is always statistically superior and focus on these results in Table 1.
Two of the risk factors are shown to have significantly different effects in post-conflict societies than in pre-conflict societies. A given level of natural resource dependence is found to be significantly more dangerous in post-conflict societies. However, the effect is not large: one year into peace, natural resource exports are around one fifth more dangerous than in pre-conflict societies. Similarly, a given rate of growth of economic opportunities (per capita income growth minus population growth), is significantly more effective in reducing risk in post-conflict societies. Again, the effect is not large. The other risk factors do not have significantly different effects in post-conflict societies than in pre-conflict societies. Thus, given that a post-conflict society has a particular composition of pre-conflict risk factors, it should attach somewhat more attention to the effect of natural resource rents and the growth of economic opportunities than implied by the pre-conflict risk analysis.

Table 1: How Risk Factors differ in Post-Conflict Societies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Risk factor</th>
<th>coefficient</th>
<th>t-statistic</th>
<th>coefficient</th>
<th>t-statistic</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Resource exports:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resource exports</td>
<td>31.98</td>
<td>3.72</td>
<td>31.29</td>
<td>3.68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resource exports$^2$</td>
<td>-63.86</td>
<td>-3.23</td>
<td>-62.33</td>
<td>-3.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Lack of Opportunities:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male secondary enrolment</td>
<td>-0.033</td>
<td>-2.98</td>
<td>-0.033</td>
<td>-2.97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Growth</td>
<td>-0.061</td>
<td>-1.76</td>
<td>-0.68</td>
<td>-1.98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Exogenous Grievance:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic dominance</td>
<td>0.82</td>
<td>2.17</td>
<td>-0.81</td>
<td>2.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Endogenous grievance:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peacetime (months)</td>
<td>-0.003</td>
<td>-2.45</td>
<td>-0.003</td>
<td>-2.58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Post-conflict interaction:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resource exports/peacetime</td>
<td>-0.14</td>
<td>-1.88</td>
<td>0.52</td>
<td>1.59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Growth/peacetime</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.52</td>
<td>1.59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Technology:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Geographic concentration</td>
<td>-4.06</td>
<td>-3.36</td>
<td>-4.01</td>
<td>-3.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population (ln)</td>
<td>0.93</td>
<td>4.58</td>
<td>0.92</td>
<td>4.53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethno-Religious fractionalization</td>
<td>-0.00036</td>
<td>-3.38</td>
<td>-0.00036</td>
<td>-3.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-16.43</td>
<td>-4.80</td>
<td>-16.19</td>
<td>-4.76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log likelihood</td>
<td>-111.44</td>
<td>-112.21</td>
<td>0.31</td>
<td>0.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pseudo r$^2$</td>
<td>0.31</td>
<td>0.30</td>
<td>0.31</td>
<td>0.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>688</td>
<td>688</td>
<td>688</td>
<td>688</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Notes:

For a full definition of variables and data sources see CH (2000)
Resource exports = primary commodity exports/GDP
Growth = per capita economic growth in the five years prior to conflict, minus four times the rate of population growth

To summarise, for each society it is possible to estimate the structure of the generic post-conflict risks. These combine the pre-conflict inheritance, changes to that inheritance brought about by the conflict, and changes in the effect of different risk factors which make post-conflict reactions to the same characteristics somewhat different from those pre-conflict. The structure of these risk factors in a specific society provides some guidance to policy prioritization: which risks should be targeted, to the extent that it is feasible to change them.

**Reducing the Inherited Risk Factors**

We now consider the policy options in reducing the three risk factors in post-conflict societies.

Recall that natural resource dependence is both the most important driver of conflict and that its effects are even stronger in post-conflict societies. The relationship is quadratic, so that in principle, some post-conflict societies may reduce risks by increasing their resource dependence. However, most post-conflict societies have levels of natural resource exports under the level of peak danger, so that there best policy is to reduce dependence. In the medium term it is possible to reduce natural resource dependence by diversifying the economy. To the extent that there is a trade-off between diversification and growth, a post-conflict society has some rationale for favoring diversification. However, since reduced growth will directly increase risk even on the criterion of reducing the risk of conflict, the choice is not clear a priori but must be calculated depending upon the extent of the growth-diversification trade-off. In the short term, natural resource dependence cannot be changed. Hence, in the early post-conflict years the task of reducing risks from natural resource rents is to reduce the incentive for natural resource predation by rebels, given the continued importance of the natural resources. One approach is to concede substantial control of natural resource rents to rebels without requiring them to fight for it. This is effectively the solution recently found in Sierra Leone. However, one difficulty with this approach is that if rebellion is profitable for one rebel leader, it is likely to be profitable for another, so that buying off the current leader may not be sufficient for sustainable peace. An alternative approach is to reduce the attractions for rebellion by raising its costs and lowering its expected pay-off. One way of raising the costs of rebellion is by reducing the willingness of the population to support those who seek to be predatory on natural resources. Presumably, one reason why natural resource rents increase conflict is because many people are dissatisfied with the way they are being utilized. Government policy might aim to increase the transparency with which natural resource rents are distributed, trying to ensure that there are sufficient evident beneficiaries to make rebel attempts at predation unpopular.
In addition to government action to reduce the incentives for natural resource predation, there is scope for action by the international community. One way of reducing the pay-off to rebel capture of natural resources is the international community to reduce the access of rebels to the international markets in natural resources. Most commodity marketing channels have some point at which the number of transacting agents is quite small, and where the need to verify quality provides an opportunity to establish origin. For example, diamond cutting is an expert undertaking with relatively few skilled workers, and at this stage it is possible to establish the origin of the diamond. Several civil wars are evidently related to rebel access to the diamond market. The effort which the OECD societies currently put into denying access of illicit drugs producers to their markets is massive by comparison with their efforts to deny access to rebel groups predatory on other natural resources. Yet the consequences for the risks of conflict in developing countries are probably similar.

A lack of economic opportunities is important in increasing the risk of conflict through each of the four proxy measures: the level of per capita income, male secondary school enrolment, per capita economic growth, and population growth. Further, two of these, per capita economic growth and population growth, are jointly even more important in post-conflict societies. The level of per capita income is a slow-changing variable, whereas secondary school enrolment and economic growth can change considerably over a few years. We do not yet know whether secondary school enrolment is important because it raises income-earning opportunities, or because of its 'jail effect', whereby young men in secondary school are less likely to be recruited for rebellions. The former route would imply that the risk-reducing effect would be lagged, whereas the latter would be coincident. On present econometric evidence, substantial secondary school expansion may be an effective early post-conflict policy. Raising economic growth is an obvious priority for reasons other than risk reduction. The scope for both governments and the international community to raise growth in post-conflict societies is not the subject of this paper (see Collier, 1999). However, it is encouraging that if achieved, growth indeed contributes to risk reduction. As noted above, population may grow rapidly post-conflict if there are returning refugees. There are evidently powerful arguments for the early return of refugees, which probably override any considerations of the effects on economic opportunities for the already resident population.

If the society is characterized by ethnic dominance then the political solution cannot be unrestricted democracy. Dominant ethnic groups have a rational self-interest in exploiting minorities. Minorities therefore need either constitutional group rights to minority protection, or constitutional individual rights to equal treatment. Presuming that the post-conflict government reflects the power of the ethnic majority, its only interest in granting either of these rights is that they significantly reduce the risk of further conflict. As noted above, if the government can convincingly solve the problem of ethnic dominance by constitutional rights the underlying risk of conflict will be approximately halved, which is surely a substantial effect. Partly, the government may simply need to be convinced, and to convince its supporters, that constitutional chance has the potential to be so effective. However, especially in post-conflict societies, minorities may have little trust in
constitutions and so even when convinced, the ethnic majority may lack the power to commit itself in a credible manner.

The international community has a role in reducing the risks generated by ethnic dominance in two potential circumstances. First, it may be needed to coerce or persuade the government to provide constitutional protection to its minorities. This might be achieved through donor conditionality, requiring constitutional minority rights in return for aid or peace-keeping. Secondly, even if the government is fully persuaded of the need for constitutional rights for minorities, such rights may lack credibility with minorities. The international community may then have a role as a guarantor of these rights. Recall that other than in circumstances of ethnic dominance, ethnic and religious diversity is not a risk factor. Collier (2000) argues that ethnic politics in the context of ethnic fragmentation, with no group being dominant, is unlikely to generate political outcomes markedly different from non-ethnic democratic politics.

**Risks Caused by Conflict**

In the CH model, although natural resources, a lack of economic opportunities, and ethnic dominance are the causes of initial conflict, once conflict has arisen it generates grievances which themselves increase the risk of subsequent conflict. In turn, the extent to which conflict augments the risk of further conflict depends upon two factors: time and diasporas.

The CH model unsurprisingly finds that time heals. Quite how fast it heals is difficult to determine with any precision in the model, especially in the extreme range of the model, namely the first few months of post-conflict experience, because in this range the results are highly sensitive to minor changes in functional form. Outside the extreme range the results are probably more trustworthy: for example, after ten years of peace the risks of conflict are about half of those after five years of peace at the mean of the characteristics of post-conflict countries. Hence, it makes sense, on these figures, for donors to invest in the early years of peace. If during the first ten years peace can be maintained, for example by military peacekeeping forces in the early years and by aid-augmented economic growth in subsequent years, then the society may attain a level of risk sufficiently low for peace to be self-sustaining.

Perhaps the most striking finding of the CH model is the importance of US-resident (and by implication OECD-resident) diasporas of conflict countries. They find that after five years of peace, a society with the largest observed diaspora relative to its resident population has a six-fold greater risk of renewed conflict during the next five years than a society with the smallest observed diaspora: 36% versus 6%. Further, they show that this effect cannot be explained by the size of the diaspora proxying the intensity of conflict. They decompose the size of the diaspora of post-conflict societies into a conflict-induced component and an exogenous component. They find that the exogenous component has a large and significant effect in increasing the risk of conflict and indeed, that the effects of the two components of the diaspora are not significantly different. As with the more general risk of renewed conflict, time heals. CH do not investigate whether time heals
less rapidly for diasporas than for the resident population. Some case study evidence suggests that diasporas harbor grievance for much longer than resident populations. Even without such an effect, diasporas appear to be major additional risk factors in post-conflict societies. In the CH model, the reason why diasporas are predicted to affect the risk of conflict is financial. Diasporas are much wealthier than resident populations in the countries which they have left, and so are much better able to finance conflict. Further, being themselves small minorities in their host societies, they have a strong incentive to organize for collective action, for example, to preserve their cultural heritage for their children. The same organizations which preserve culture can be used to overcome the free-rider problem which besets fund-raising for rebellion in the post-conflict country itself. Further, diasporas do not themselves suffer any of the costs of conflict, and so have a greater incentive to purchase vengeance than the resident population. Rebellions need finance, especially at the start-up stage, where they may need to achieve a certain scale before they can become self-financing from natural resource predation (Collier, 2000a). Hence, both empirically and analytically, post-conflict countries with large diasporas are likely to have substantially higher risks of renewed conflict.

The evident implication is that both governments in post-conflict countries and the international community should develop strategies for reducing the damage done by diasporas in post-conflict societies. Such strategies might focus upon co-optation, persuasion, and penalties. Diasporas can perhaps be co-opted by being brought into the peace process at the stage of negotiation. This may make it harder to reach a settlement, but may make the settlement more durable once it is reached. Once a settlement has been reached, post-conflict governments may need to mount targeted public relations campaigns in the USA and other countries with large diaspora communities to persuade their diasporas of the benefits of peace and of the acceptability of the peace settlement. Finally, there are important lessons for the international community. Diasporas are sometimes influential in their host societies, and so each OECD government may be individually reluctant to take action which will arouse diaspora opposition. However, collectively, OECD governments could surely be far more effective than they are currently in discouraging the diasporas which they host from financing conflict. Just as OECD governments have recently collectively criminalized bribery by OECD companies in developing countries, so they could collectively criminalize the finance of rebel movements by diaspora organizations. The free-rider problem suggests that much of the diaspora funding for rebellion must flow through diaspora organizations, rather than being simply the outcome of uncoordinated contributions. Since it is much easier to control the behavior of such organizations than to control individual action, it should be possible effectively to enforce new OECD legislation. As with the other risk factors, the importance of diaspora management will vary enormously between societies. However, in those societies with large diasporas, the successful management of the behavior of the diaspora may contribute more to peace than any other policy intervention.
3. The Scope for UN Peacebuilding

Peacebuilding is a concept that derives directly from the UN Secretary-General's 1992 *Agenda for Peace*. Peacebuilding "is the fourth phase in the United Nations strategy for conflict resolution. It becomes necessary when *preventive diplomacy* fails to resolve conflict and after *peacemaking* and *peacekeeping* have established the framework for a negotiated settlement and monitored an agreed cease-fire.¹ Peacebuilding activities then 'identify and support structures which intend to strengthen and solidify peace.' They range from demobilization of soldiers and the reintegration of soldiers and refugees, demining, emergency relief, food aid, economic rehabilitation, to the repair of roads and infrastructure (Doyle and Sambanis 2000b, 3)."

The potential for peacebuilding success is determined by the strategic environment within which actors take their decisions. There are three core determinants of that environment: the level of hostility created by the previous war; the level of local capacities for development; and the level of international assistance. In Section 2 we showed that the first two of these are important determinants of post-conflict peace. Conflict creates grievance, or hostility, which considerably increases the risk of conflict recurrence. Domestic capacities such as low income, natural resource dependence and the dominance by a single ethnic group, also increase the risks. This Section adds the third dimension of international assistance, using the Doyle-Sambanis model (DS), (Doyle and Sambanis, 2000a,b). The three dimensions essentially circumscribe the available space for peace: the shallower the hostility, the deeper the local capacities, and the higher the level of international assistance, the greater the space for peace.²

¹ See Michael W. Doyle and Nicholas Sambanis, 2000b, "Building Peace: Concepts and Strategies After Civil War," working paper, World Bank (December 27). The authors (p. 3) provide the following definitions: "(traditional) *peacekeeping* is an interim strategy aimed at generating the necessary conditions to prevent the recurrence of violence. It has the consent of the parties (normally authorized under Chapter VI of the UN Charter). It includes the deployment of troops and civilians and a mix of strategies to prevent violence ranging from the establishment and policing of a buffer zone; demobilization and disarmament of military forces, to establishing communication between the parties and facilitating negotiation. More multidimensional strategies for capacities-expansion can also be part of peacekeeping operations, but they are usually defined as parts of a strategy for (multidimensional) *peacebuilding*, that usually includes economic reconstruction and may even lead to institutional transformation (e.g. reform of the police, army, and judicial system, elections, civil society re-building). *Peacemaking* is a strategy usually preceding peacekeeping, but also pursued in tandem with peacekeeping; it aims at reconciliation and encourages the negotiation and settlement of the political conflict underlying the violence. *Peace enforcement* is the forcible restoration of peace and order, without the consent of the parties in conflict, authorized by the Security Council under Chapter VII of the Charter." See Boutros Boutros-Ghali, 1992, *An Agenda for Peace* (New York: United Nations).

² These three dimensions shape a "peacebuilding triangle." For a fuller discussion of this concept and for a detailed analysis of the elements of each dimension of the peacebuilding triangle, see Michael W. Doyle, and Nicholas Sambanis, 2000a, "International Peacebuilding: A Theoretical and Quantitative Analysis," Working Paper (February); and Michael W. Doyle, and Nicholas Sambanis, 2000b, "Building Peace: Concepts and Strategies After Civil War," working paper, World Bank (February).
Table 2 shows how the post-conflict countries of Sub-Saharan Africa compare with other post-conflict countries in the first two dimensions: war-generated hostility, and the level of local capacities. We proxy the hostility generated by war by the number of deaths and displacements caused by the war and by its duration. We proxy local capacities by per capita income and the extent to which the political system is democratic.

**Table 2: Civil War and Socio-Political Summary Statistics**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Proxies for hostility:</th>
<th>Non-African Civil Wars</th>
<th>African Civil Wars</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Deaths</td>
<td>84 188,000</td>
<td>39 206,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Displacements</td>
<td>84 547,000</td>
<td>40 621,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Duration (months)</td>
<td>84 77</td>
<td>40 85</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Proxies for domestic capacity:</th>
<th>Non-African Civil Wars</th>
<th>African Civil Wars</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Per capita income ($)</td>
<td>83 2,092</td>
<td>40 880</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democracy (10=max)</td>
<td>82 6.8</td>
<td>38 4.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The observations in Table 2 refer to war events since 1945. As can be seen, African conflicts have been characterized by higher deaths and displacements and have lasted longer. It is thus reasonable to infer that they have left an unusually deep legacy of hostility. Similarly, income is lower in the African post-conflict countries and they are further from fully democratic political institutions, so they can be inferred to have shallower domestic capabilities. This combination of atypically deep hostility and atypically shallow domestic capacities limits the scope for peacebuilding.

We now investigate the scope for the third dimension of peacebuilding, international assistance, to offset Africa's disadvantages in the other two dimensions. The scale of international assistance in post-conflict countries can vary both in respect of financial aid and institutional support. The United Nations is the main provider of such support, so we will look more closely at its role in peacebuilding effort in Africa and elsewhere.

How would one expect an organization like the United Nations -- charged with the mandate to preserve international peace and security -- to respond to this grim picture? First, let us look at the facts. How has the UN responded to civil wars around the globe? Table 3 lists the number and type of UN peace operations used in African and non-African civil wars. Evidently, Africa has had the lion's share of UN peace operations.

---

3 Source: Doyle and Sambanis (2000a) and World Bank (2000). Death measures include both military and civilian deaths that resulted from the war. Displacements include refugees and internally displaced people (0 indicates not available information on significant displacements). Duration is measured in months. Income is measured in PPP-adjusted real per capita terms. Democracy is measured as the five-year pre-war average difference between the democracy and autocracy scores for each country at war based on Gurr's Polity98 data-base. A score of 0 indicates an extreme autocracy. A score of 20 indicates a democracy.
Table 3: UN Peace Operations in African and Non-African Civil Wars

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of operation</th>
<th>Non-African Countries</th>
<th>African Countries</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Frequency</td>
<td>Percent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Operation</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mediation/Good Offices</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observer Mission</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peacekeeping/building</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enforcement</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total (# civil wars)</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

especially since the end of the Cold War. In fact, thirteen out of thirty-two substantive UN peace operations since the end of the Cold War have been deployed in Africa.

To fully appreciate the peacebuilding potential that is generated by the particular combination of hostility, local capacity and the scale of international intervention in Africa, we must turn to a more detailed empirical analysis.

**Lessons from Peacebuilding Experience Since 1945**

Countries emerging from a state of war typically have modest goals for the short run. Peacebuilding immediately after civil war should aim at restoring state sovereignty, ending all large-scale violence, and initiating a gradual process of democratization. In the rest of this section, we will consider the achievement of these goals as constituting peacebuilding success. We will explore the correlates of such success in Africa by applying the DS model. The model is consistent with the CH model used in Section 2 in finding that the chance of sustained peace increases with the level of economic development, and decreases with dependence upon natural resource exports. However, the DS model adds a range of international interventions.

---


6 These lessons are identified and discussed in Michael W. Doyle and Nicholas Sambanis, 2000a, "International Peacebuilding: A Theoretical and Quantitative Analysis," working paper, Princeton University and World Bank (February).

7 We will not replicate the theory or statistical analysis here, except for some simulations of particular relevance to Africa. Interested readers should look at the original paper for details regarding estimation methods, assumptions made, and sources for the data and other relevant material.
In some circumstances a peacekeeping and peacebuilding operation can make a big contribution. These circumstances are when the levels of hostility and local capacities are between the extremes. When hostility is low and domestic capacities are high, only limited international intervention is needed: the country can achieve a sustainable peace with some financial aid and a modest peace operation. Conversely, when hostility is extremely high and domestic capacities are very low, international intervention is likely to be ineffective: even with a peace treaty and multinational intervention, the risk of conflict renewal is very high. Since hostility builds up with deaths and displacements, this suggests that intervention should come before it has reached extreme levels.

We now use the DS model to estimate how the international community could increase the probability of peacebuilding success in Africa. Table 4 presents the change in the probability of peacebuilding success that result from international intervention.8

The most common form of UN intervention in Africa has been an observer mission. These operations, however, do not have the capacity to create the institutional framework necessary for peace. The DS model predicts that if the UN’s model of involvement in Africa changed from employing observer missions to multidimensional peace operations, this would increase the probability of peace-building success by nearly 13%. A similar change from traditional to multidimensional peacekeeping would increase the probability of peace-building success by nearly 8%. Treaties are also helpful, as they signal the parties’ ability to negotiate. The DS model estimates that a treaty raises the probability that a peace will be sustained by 12%. Treaties also facilitate the disbursement of international assistance (peacekeepers, humanitarian aid, loan and development programs), and the DS model suggests that such financial assistance also increases the chance of a peace being sustained further investigation. Economic assistance (aid, current transfers, development projects) is very beneficial, though political and institutional assistance are paramount after civil war. Force may be necessary in some circumstances, to control radical elements that aim to spoil the peace, but civilian missions in multidimensional operations are the most important ingredient of peace-building success.

An important policy question for Africa is whether African regional organizations can provide the expertise, technical and material support, impartiality, and long-term involvement needed for a successful peace operation. The UN lacks the resources necessary to respond fully to every crisis and must therefore choose its battleground. These resource constraints, as well as political disagreement in the Security Council, have in recent years led the UN to rely more on Chapter VIII operations -- i.e. operations endorsed by the UN, but implemented by regional organizations.

8 This is a logistic model of peacebuilding success, using cross-sectional data. All variables are significant with one-tailed tests. Economic variables were measured at pre-war levels. Hence, low pre-levels of local capacities imply a greater opportunity for economic grievance that could fuel future wars. The local capacity measures are therefore analogous to the economic causes of civil war discussed in Collier (1999) and Collier and Hoefler (1999).
Table 4: Changes in the Probability of Peacebuilding Success
Changes in X-variables noted in the first column
All other variables held constant at their sample medians

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>First Difference of Change in Variable</th>
<th>Mean Estimate of Change in the Probability of Peacebuilding Success</th>
<th>Standard Deviation of Estimated Probability</th>
<th>95% Confidence Interval of Estimate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UN Peace Operation From Observer Mission To Multidimensional PKO</td>
<td>0.1284 0.0911 0.0145541 0.3634466</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN Peace Operation From Traditional PKO To Multidimensional PKO</td>
<td>0.0794 0.056 0.0086108 0.2209958</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Treaty From no treaty to treaty</td>
<td>0.1209 0.098 0.0128948 0.3872549</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Net Transfers Per Capita ($) From 25th to 75th percentile</td>
<td>0.0018 0.0015 0.0002649 0.0056421</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Can African regional organizations effectively promote peacebuilding? Organizations such as NATO in Europe and ECOWAS or the OAU have been used to advance the interests of the international community. The establishment within the OAU of a specific conflict management mechanism has increased its capacity to initiate and manage diplomatic interventions and conflict mediation efforts. Sub-regional organizations such as ECOWAS and SADC have now included security cooperation within their mandates and engage in joint military training and peacekeeping exercises. Nevertheless, it is not entirely clear that regional organizations are better poised in curbing the threat of international or intra-national war. Regional organizations are often too close to parties engaged in regional conflicts, thereby losing their ability to act impartially. Their resources technical expertise are usually more limited than those of the United Nations (with the possible exception of NATO) and their mandates do not allow them to become involved in all aspects of a given conflict.\(^9\) In view of the UN's constraints and the US reluctance to become proactively involved in settling African conflicts since the Somalia operation of 1992, there seems to be a significant void in the leadership of peace operations in Africa that African regional organizations will have to fill. Given their organizational and resource constraints -- which supersede those of the United Nations -- it is necessary to forge a partnership between the UN and African regional organizations with a view to developing better peacebuilding operations.

4. Policies for Post-Conflict African Governments

A post conflict government faces the challenge of consolidating the previously warring factions into a single state. Building a new government, it has to accommodate the interest of the warring parties, and create a new national non-partisan military force. And yet when a country is emerging from civil war it suffers from deeper societal divisions, the institutions are new and more fragile, insecurity is almost always at its worst because there are always plenty of weapons in private hands, and greater temptations towards abuse of power by the authority in charge. Domestic adversaries who wish to settle their war inevitably face two structural requirements that leave them especially vulnerable to exploitation. If they agree to settle off the battlefield then they must at some point agree to demobilize, disengage, and disarm their separate militaries, and they must then surrender whatever remaining power they have to a single administration, not necessarily their own. Most warring factions are usually nervous about this arrangement. They believe that once groups send their fighting forces home disarmed they can become easy target to attack, and that once they surrender their assets to a single administration the opposing group can set up a one party state: the “winner takes all” kind of situation may prevail.

Hence, the core challenge is of building credibly inclusive institutions of governance, while defusing a volatile military situation. In Section 2 we showed that an important generic risk of conflict resumption is when a country is characterized by ethnic dominance: one ethnic group controlling power and using it to disadvantage other groups. In this Section we consider two policies which a post-conflict African government can deploy to make government more inclusive and reassuring: decentralization and the co-option of traditional authorities. In Section 3 we showed that the international community could reduce the risk of renewed conflict by military intervention, but that it is generally much more effective if international interventions evolve beyond a military role. Now we consider the counterpart military focus of the post-conflict government in managing disarmament and demobilization.

Defusing the military situation: disarmament and demobilization, reintegration

Although demobilization and reintegration is crucial in a country emerging from violent conflict, there are risks involved in the demobilization process. Several conditions have to be met in order to make it work.

Demobilization takes priority in the peace process because security must be enhanced; the rule of law promoted; development stimulated; refugees repatriated. In sum, demobilization is crucial in the reconciliation process. Peace operations aimed at the settlement of internal conflicts usually include programs for the demobilization of warring factions, reintegration of ex-combatants, amalgamation of opposing armies, and collection of war materials. When based on peace agreements, demobilization and disarmament and reintegration are among the very first steps in post conflict

10 Barbara F Walter: Designing Transitions from Violent Civil War.
reconstruction, and it is usually an important element in the design of peace accord. At the same time, demobilization is a relatively sensitive issue because militarization is viewed by parties that have been at war as a factor of empowerment in entering into negotiation as an insurance policy in case the political dialogue breaks down. Combined with inherent lack of trust between the negotiating parties following years of mutual deception and bitter conflict, the prospect of demobilization is very likely to result in stalemate in the negotiating process if it is perceived as to indicate relative disempowerment. It is a litmus test for reconciliation. People who fought on either side want to be rewarded non rewarded fighters may pose as both political and security risk even decades later, as in the case of the Freedom fighters in Zimbabwe, Mozambique, and Guinea Bissau. But it is also over simplifying to say that they just want to be rewarded, but it also gives them a sense of justice if they are rewarded – they feel they are treated fairly.

Besides the need for a secure environment as a first step for other reconstruction work to start, and so the flow of arms must be managed; there are also economic and fiscal reasons. Demobilization might yield a significant net reduction in military expenditures. The fiscal gains are more uncertain, depending on the nature of the reintegration program. To prevent reoccurrence of violent conflict, help restart development projects, it is important to give them alternative means of earning a living. The political system also needs to be expanded so that all groups may articulate their interests within the system.

Each case of demobilization involves a distinct political and socioeconomic context. Decisions are based on specific military, political, and socioeconomic circumstances or events. Most demobilization policy decisions in Africa have been the result of one or more of the following factors (BICC, 1996):

- A peace accord between fighting parties
- Defeat of one of the fighting parties
- Perceived improvement in the security situation
- Shortage of adequate funding
- Perceived economic and development impact of conversion
- Changing military technologies and/or strategies

Demobilization which have taken place in Africa have different contexts and approaches. For example: South Africa, and in Ethiopia the defeat of the Derg army, 1991, led to its total and immediate demobilization, and was replaced by a much smaller army, the Ethiopian Popular Revolutionary Democratic Front; in Mozambique, the two fighting parties, the national government and Renamo reached an agreement to stop fighting, demobilize and create a small national army; and Uganda demobilized long several years after civil war had ended, (but had absorbed the various fighting forces in the national army). Uganda had three objectives:

- Budgetary was intended to reduce military expenditures so that those resources could be allocated to productive and social priority sectors
• Social was to resettle ex-soldiers and their families in places of their own choices, and reintegrate them peacefully, productively and sustainable civilian life

• And military was to retain a leaner, better trained and a motivated army.

Post conflict demobilization and efforts to support reintegration are usually part of a broader process of reconciliation, nation building and the strengthening of civil society. Demobilization conducted after signing peace accord like the case of Mozambique is usually done under time pressure. Once the decision has been taken practical plans have to be made and financing secured. It also takes place along side other rehabilitation programs. In the case of Uganda, because it took place after peace had been realized, the implementation was conducted in a phased approach.

*Who gets demobilized?* Attention is usually cast on major guerilla groups and government troops, and often times we forget “irregular groups” or splinter groups, who may not be signatory to the peace accord. It is very important that they receive the same recognition as any other group if sustainable peace is to break out. This group can easily be lured out if the demobilization package is attractive. The sticky issue is often the payment of pensions to to demobilized soldiers in circumstances where there have been no outright victory. Will the fighters of the opposition group, such as Renamo in Mozambique, also be eligible for pension? How about child soldiers – will they also be eligible for pension. This is both political as well as macroeconomic issue, as payment of pension may become a significant budget burden. At the same time it is a measurement whether the demobilization process was fair to all.

Reintegration component is where the challenge is in the demobilization process because they (and their families) have to build up a new livelihood – often after many years in the military. Their skill level is usually low because most of them are school drop outs and have minimum level of literacy. This is because they are recruited or forcefully conscripted into the armed forces or militia when quite young. Because of low skill they face problems in societies where it is difficult to start a small enterprises or find employment. In addition combatants released are usually the ones with the worst perspective for reintegration, not only because of little skill or lack of but it can also be health related. Some of them are already have known better living using their weapons for illegal gains, instead of attempting to learn and apply new professions, they feel they cannot fit in.

Psychological adjustment is one other problem that a lot of them develop after demobilization. It is usually difficult for ex-combatants to adjust their attitude and expectations. Military personnel are trained in top-down methods of management, which often contradict the appropriate approaches for successful management and entrepreneurship in the civilian sector. They have lost personal connections within the society which is essential for starting business. They are then forced to go through a personal process of adjustment, after losing a predictable environment with a certain status, whether positive or negative. They are forced to rethink their ambitions and
capabilities, and consider a non violent role in the society. In addition quite a number of them suffer from psycho-social problems due to post traumatic stress disorder.

The key to a successful demobilization is disarmament. However, disarmament must include all important parties and be designed with due regard to the local balance of power and influence among the contending factions, and only then it will have an impact. Even then there are problems arising from the way most demobilization are implemented. These include:

- The tight schedule associated with demobilization which is linked to higher –level objectives within the overall peace process establishes artificial deadlines and does not allow for sufficiently nurturing of the program.

- In an environment that frequently already involves a breakdown in honoring the commitment to demobilization like delay in the release of their packages many demobilized ex-combatants take a life of crime using weapons either bought or what could have not been surrendered at the time of disarmament. Uganda is a good example of this. In the first few months after demobilization, most ex-combatants returned to their communities and lived peacefully. Usually, those districts which received the most ex-combatants did not experience any increase in crime compared with other districts. The one exception to this was among the small minority of ex-combatants who had reported, prior to their demobilization, that they had no access to land. These people were massively more likely to resort to crime upon their demobilization (Collier, 1994). This problem would have required either that those soldiers who were landless should not have been demobilized, or an expensive policy of purchasing land for them. However, subsequent to the demobilization, the government delayed in honoring its commitment to provide a re-integration package of money and material inputs to ex-combatants. As a result, many ex-combatants turned to criminal activities — and have become a big source of insecurity. Because they are disgruntled they have created a fertile ground for armed opposition recruitment. They are also known to be a source of manpower for mercenary recruitment. The use of ex-soldiers as mercenaries in official and private armies is increasing.

- A life of crime using weapons acquired during the conflict is almost inevitably more lucrative than an alternative employment that combatants can find which are very limited in countries where governments are the only big employer, and unemployment of even skilled people is limited.

- Security problems surface because a large number of weapons remain or fall in the hands of ex-combatants. Disarming soldiers and guerilla fighters are difficult, since they may own more than one weapon. So, if they turn in one, another might be hidden elsewhere. Some of these weapons end up in black market. Nobody knows the numbers of weapons in circulation, and they are easy to smuggle across border causing insecurity in neighboring countries as well.
Certain conditions are necessary to make demobilization work:

- Strong political commitment by all the faction leaders without which the exercise cannot succeed. Lack of commitment was responsible for the renewed violent conflict in Angola, (both in 1992 and 1994); and it contributed to renewed fighting in Sierra Leone in 1997
- In order to optimize the impact of demobilization, it requires cessation of hostilities, and political will of all parties if it is to succeed and contribute to security.
- There must be clear guidelines for disarmament and demobilization, and their activities must be carried out with the agreement of the parties
- Demobilization requires a clear and credible central authority, with committed resources for the process, and in case there is an agreement between two parties there should be an independent outside entity to ensure impartiality in the process.
- The process should not be rushed so as to give ex-combatants transition period to adjust.
- Communities play a fundamental role in the reintegration. Communities have to accept them when they change their roles from being perpetrators of war to being part of a solution to the problem. There is always the sensitive issue of victims who may perceive demobilization and reintegration as rewarding their foes. Victims have to be have to be resettled too so as to avoid unfair treatment on the part of the victim. To victims it is justice, and self esteem – that is why in some countries at the community level, cultural/traditional methods of conflict resolution is being resorted to, in order to avoid revenge.
- And finally, credibility to honor commitments to demobilized soldiers is key to stability and reduction of crime. Resources must be made in a timely manner. Delays can create distrust and give rise to speculations about any potential lack of commitment to finding a peaceful solution. Ensuring the credibility of demobilization and reintegration program should have top priority among the international community.

**Making governance more inclusive: decentralization**

The policy of Decentralization has been adopted by many African countries which are emerging from conflict. Some of the countries which have implemented decentralization are Uganda, Rwanda, Mozambique, and Eritrea.

To appreciate why decentralization is increasingly becoming attractive to countries emerging from conflict we need to understand the history and causes of conflicts. Violent conflict has various roots causes: over control of land, over exercise of power, it may essentially be political, aimed at excluding a group/organization from control of state machinery, it may be economic – dispute over control/access to resources; it may be
social when the politics of exclusion is being practiced – marginalization of a group based on either religious, ethnic, or tribal differences. A number of scholars have long realized that centralized state systems in Africa have failed to offer the people good governance. Barkan and Chege suggest four reasons for the failure:

- Central State agencies do not have sufficient information about the specific needs and conditions present in the thousands of local communities which comprise rural society.

- Central state agencies do not have sufficient capacity in terms of financial resources or personnel to plan and implement appropriate policies at the local level.

- The prospects for rural development are highest where local people participate in determining the course of development initiatives, and where they believe they have a stake in the outcomes.

- Few African states have created an appropriate local “institutional infrastructure” to facilitate citizen participation in development planning, on the contrary most have undermined such institutions where they exist.

To illustrate the success, as well as difficulties in implementing decentralization policy we will use Uganda’s experience, Uganda opted to decentralize power to answer one of Uganda’s chronic problems – the political problems which were basically rooted in centralization of power and ethnic pluralism. Thus when Museveni came to power, decentralization was prescribed as the essential part of a broad process of bringing good governance to Uganda’s war torn society. It was regarded as a policy instrument aimed at improving local democracy, accountability, efficiency, intra- and inter-district equity, effectiveness and sustainability in the provision of social services countrywide. The policy aimed at transferring powers, resources and competence to local levels and in the process strengthen the management and technical capacities of local government. The decentralization of in-built democratic features included:

- The building of a democratic government that would be responsive to the needs of the people;

- Introduction of local choice, and the development of a sense of local ownership;

- Improvement of relations between local and central authorities;

- Strengthening of linkages between development programs; and

- Taking decision making closer to the populations affected by the reforms.


In adopting the decentralization policy the Ugandan President once said, “Uganda government had to decentralize in order to transfer powers, functions, resources, and
competence to local governments in a bid, inter alia, to introduce popular democracy and to foster local government through the improvement of planning and implementation capacities of local institutions. We therefore set out to devolve powers and functions. In addition to political decentralization, we committed ourselves to the transfer of financial and human resources through the process of financial and personal decentralization with a view to making local governments acquire a government character. Decentralization in the Ugandan context was expected to:

- enhance democratic behavior through the election of council members. The elected councils at the local level were seen as forums for building peaceful mechanisms of conflict resolution and centers for consensus building and social reconciliation in the districts where they were established. In this way the policy was expected to help in the emergence of the politics of tolerance, development and consensus, leading to social reconciliation in a country that had suffered high levels of conflict and violence for over twenty years.

- Reduce and would eventually eliminate, the excessive control of local areas by central government bureaucrats.

- the subjection of local officials to the wishes and interest of the electorate would give the people more influence not only over what policies were formed but also over how they were implemented.

- The policy would eliminate the central government’s ability to interfere in local affairs; it would no longer be able for instance, to dissolve local councils without reference to or opposition to the people who elected those councils.

It must be noted that certain key areas including defense, security, planning, immigration, and foreign affairs have been kept under central control.

Several studies have been conducted in Uganda to evaluate the impact of decentralization policy. All the studies agree on the following issues:

1. For the first time since independence the people of Uganda feel they have been given a chance to participate in decision making on matters that affect their lives and their lives directly. They have a chance to elect those who govern them within the decentralized system.

2. The Councils have become forums for the people to air their views, articulate their grievances, suggest remedies to local problems, refine methods of conflict resolution at the local level, and devise ways of dealing with the central government and with neighboring local authorities. In this way decentralization has enhanced harmony between the local authorities in Uganda.

---

11 The Effect of decentralization reform on Uganda, by Makerere Institute of Social Research (MISR) for DANIDA
UNDP Uganda’s Human Development Report, 1996
United nations Department for Development Support and Management Services (UNDDSMS) 1996.
3. The devolving of powers to local authorities has encouraged local economic development since its management is no longer dependant on central government planning, funding, and patronage, but on local revenue, effort and initiative. This has in turn “improved the socioeconomic status of the people”. According to Local Government because of increased economic activity in the rural areas, local authorities now boast of increased revenue collection from which some of them have improved their physical infrastructure by constructing roads, schools, health clinics etc.\textsuperscript{12}

4. Decentralization has enhanced the capacity of the district councils to plan for their areas, to hire and arrange for the training of their qualified staff, to allocate resources according to local perception of need, and to privatize costly functions, for example the maintenance of market places, collection of dues, and supervision of ferries across lakes and rivers. It has also improved the ability of local authorities to prioritize, and focus on execute according to priority, and to maximize the use of scarce resources.

5. It has improved transparency and accountability. Regular budgeting and accounting, together with the checks and balances built into the local council system, have in turn reduced though not eliminated local corruption. The introduction of local accounting committees at the district level, the insistence that individual departments submit quarterly financial reports to the Finance Committee, and the increased participation of local citizens in the administrative affairs of the districts have greatly improved the management of finances. Further, the system of regularized local tendering introduced under decentralization is believed to have reduced corruption in the process of awarding tender.

6. It has empowered formerly marginalized groups to participate in the political process in their areas. These groups include women, youths, disabled, and, in some districts descendants of immigrants.

Generally, decentralization is believed to have accelerated social development in a number of areas, such as poverty alleviation, and social service delivery as well as improving general security of local areas. For a country which has suffered civil war, social chaos, and various forms of violence, decentralization appears to be working, and the studies so far conducted confirm that observation.

**What then are the prospects for success in the devolution?**

For now decentralization appears to be a success story in Uganda. The legislative expression of decentralization in Uganda is contained in Local Government (Resistance Councils) Statute of 1993. A.T. Regan and Soren Valladsen reaffirm this that the statute confers real and significant powers to local government. Regan goes far to say that it ‘offers far more resources and powers to lower levels of government than normal in either developing or developed countries.’ But to succeed, local governments will have to attract qualified and loyal staff, develop independent revenues, and be able to shield themselves from the centralizing tendency of the central government. Uganda’s

\textsuperscript{12} It is important to note that that statement does not apply to all the districts. Revenue collection is still very weak in some districts especially district where insecurity still prevails.
decentralization has yet to be tested. Capacity at the local level is often very low. A large proportion of the elected councilors who are entrusted with the responsibility of planning and other activities are uneducated. Thus the ability of such men and women to deliver good services are questionable. Corruption is emerging as a major problem, with no mechanism to control or monitor expenditure in place. Nepotism is another disturbing factor, hiring of personnel to some extent is based on who you know or political support and not necessarily on merit. These behavior will sooner or later breed dissatisfaction.

Secondly, the National Resistance Movement's monolithic organizational behavior means that the leadership controls decision making process to a large extent, and this filters down to the local level, where politicians are afraid to make decisions which differ from the official NRM policies, that makes it questionable whether the devolution of power is really working. The main reason for central control is usually political. Genuine devolution entails the ruler's loss of patronage, and the likelihood that political opponents will build local bases from which to challenge national leaders. Insecure ruling elite are usually reluctant to cede staff, powers, and independent fiscal resources to local governments or communities. This being the case, most experiments in decentralization and local participation is likely to abort because national authorities overtly reconsolidate central control. In the Uganda context, although there appears to be participation at the local level, power is highly concentrated at the top.

The Uganda decentralization program was designed to ensure that functions, powers, and responsibilities are devolved from the central government to local government units. The decentralization applies to all levels of local government from higher to lower government units to ensure people's participation and democratic control in decision making. Whether a country is in transition may be a matter of value judgment as well as empirical validation. We should note that the struggle for power during transition can be mild or intense. Uganda gives us a good example of decentralization after decades of protracted wars, and was already considered a collapsed state. Despite problems that have been cited, for the time being decentralization appears to be working.

**Making governance more inclusive: involving traditional authorities**

Another dimension important for successful political stabilization is the re-definition of the relationship between traditional authorities and the public administration. The marginalization of traditional authorities was one of the factors fueling the internal dynamics of the war in Mozambique (Christian Geffray, *La Cause des Armes au Mocambique*). The decentralization legislation adopted by the Mozambican Parliament in 1994 shortly before the elections contained a formal recognition of traditional authorities at the district level. So did the new Land Law adopted in 1997 which stipulated that traditional authorities would have to be consulted before land use rights could be allocated.

The relationship between a modern administrative and political structure and systems of traditional authorities is often complex and conflictual, as it is not easy to delineate exactly the competences between the two, and new ways have to be found for legal
solutions to the differing logics. For example, according to the new Mozambican Land Law, land use rights have to be authorized and registered with the administration. But land can also be registered collectively under the name of a community. Once the land is registered in the name of a community, traditional criteria for allocating it to individuals becomes the prerogative of the local traditional structures.

In Uganda, traditional authorities demanded for the restoration of their tribal kingdoms. They considered the return of the kings not only as righting a wrong, but also as a gesture for reconciliation. In 1993, the heir to the Kingdom of Buganda was allowed to return and be installed as king. Since then other tribes have also reinstalled their kings/tribal paramount chiefs. The kings are very instrumental in reviving cultural values.

The dimension of recognizing formally the role of traditional authorities has also played a significant role in South Africa. There would have certainly been a civil war if the ANC had insisted on a purely modern governance system. The conflict has already been violent in KwaZulu-Natal under the existing circumstances and it would have most likely spun out of control and spread to other provinces had the ANC not made significant compromises in recognizing traditional authorities despite its socialist rhetoric while in exile.

At the same time, the structure of traditional authorities is also dynamic and forced to change over time. Some of the traditional leaders and families were instrumentalized by colonialism or by one of the political forces after independence, and their legitimacy may not be recognized anymore by the community. Also young people do not always recognize the authority of their elder leaders anymore. But despite those tensions, traditional authorities have to be part of any inclusive post-conflict governance structure.
5. Conclusion

Civil war is obviously a terrible experience. Tragically, most societies which experience a civil war and restore peace, collapse into further conflict. African post-conflict peace is even more fragile than the global average. Hence, it is not enough to seek peace settlements in currently warring societies, the objective must be sustainability. Post-conflict societies usually have high risks of renewed conflict during the first decade after conflict has ended. There is, however, much that can be done by both post-conflict governments and the international community to reduce these risks.

It is possible for each society to identify the structure of risks and so to establish the priorities for risk-reduction. The structure of risks can be expected to differ massively between post-conflict societies, so that policy must be country-specific. Further, the structure of risks change during the post-conflict peace. We can distinguish between three groups of risk. The management of ethnic dominance, and the level of per capita income become relatively more important over time because they do not decline in absolute importance: time does not heal these effects. At the opposite end of the spectrum the absolute effects of post-conflict diaspora grievance, and post-conflict resident grievance, both fade reasonably rapidly. In between, the absolute effects of natural resource rents and the growth of economic opportunities decline somewhat, but less rapidly than the two induced grievance effects. This suggests that as the post-conflict peace is sustained, the policy agenda should shift from managing induced grievances to the underlying problems of ethnic dominance and poverty.

We have tried to show how policy interventions by post-conflict governments and the international community could reduce the risk of conflict repetition. No one policy is the key, but cumulatively, better policy offers considerable scope for making conflict repetition an exceptional event instead of the normal pattern which it has been to date.

At the international level we have shown that UN peacekeeping interventions can be effective, but that they would be much more effective if instead of being confined to an observer role, they were multi-dimensional, combining military with political and developmental roles. We have suggested that there is scope for international community pressure to control rebel access to commodity markets, and to control the ability of diasporas to finance rebel groups.

At the level of a post-conflict African government, we have proposed greater transparency in the use of natural resource revenues; expansion of secondary educational enrolment; effective demobilization programs; and more inclusive governance through decentralization and the involvement of traditional authorities.
References


NEED REFS FOR:

BARKAN AND CHEGE

PETTER LANGSETH

BICC 1996

GEFFRAY

DOYLE AND SAMBANIS 2000 A,B