Projectizing the Governance Approach to Civil Service Reform

An Institutional Environment Assessment for Preparing a Sectoral Adjustment Loan in the Gambia

Rogerio F. Pinto
with assistance from Angelous J. Mrope

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Foreword

Capacity Building has been singled out as the missing link in Sub-Saharan Africa's development—hence its importance in the Region’s work agenda. It is also now widely accepted that, for development capacity to accrue, governance impediments to an efficient civil service must be removed or significantly mitigated. The Governance Approach to Civil Service Reform developed by the Capacity Building and Implementation Division of the Technical Department (AFTCB) is the cornerstone of the Region’s efforts to design lending operations that will improve the developmental capacity of civil service institutions in Sub-Saharan Africa.

The Department’s Technical Paper No. 225, "A Governance Approach to Civil Service Reform in Sub-Saharan Africa," laid the ground for this new approach by formulating a conceptual framework for tackling what is seen by many as an inherently intractable problem. This Discussion Paper—a companion to the Technical Paper—takes the concept to its practical application and records the experience of the first pilot operation being prepared with the proposed approach: The Gambia SECAL on Economic Management. The paper is being disseminated as a discussion paper because it reflects an evolving experience. Other such experiences will also be documented with emphasis on lessons learned.

This Discussion Paper methodically operationalizes the conceptual principles contained in the Technical Paper by laying out the variables on which data is collected to assess the environment in which civil services perform, thus providing the context for reform. The Institutional Environment Assessment (IEA) methodology described in the paper represents a valuable tool for the comprehensive diagnostic required by operations with broad civil service reform components. In the case of sector operations, a modified diagnostic tool is being developed: the Institutional Assessment (IA), which focuses only on the sector ministry and associated government agencies. IAs are being tested in Zambia and Ghana. In a handful of countries where a full IEA is not warranted, Institutional Environment Overviews (IEO) are being undertaken (Cape Verde, Botswana, and Malawi). Results of all these experiences will also be recorded and disseminated by the Africa Technical Department.

While these tools constitute valuable additions to the "tool kits" of Task Managers throughout the Region, our Country Department clients within the Bank can also count on the expertise being developed in the Department to jointly undertake IEAs or IAs in support of appropriate operations. As in the case of The Gambia, where a successful partnership with the Sahelian Department allowed this important pilot project to be undertaken, we are confident that similar partnerships will be developed with other Country Departments. This paper is recommended to all those, within and outside the Bank, who are concerned with building capacity in civil service systems.

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Director
Technical Department
Africa Region

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### Abbreviations

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A &amp; A</td>
<td>Accounting and Auditing</td>
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<td>AFTCB</td>
<td>Capacity Building and Implementation Division of the Africa Technical Department</td>
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<td>AFTEN</td>
<td>Africa Technical Department, Environment Division</td>
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<td>AF5CO</td>
<td>Africa Country Operations Division of the Sahelian Department</td>
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<td>ARP</td>
<td>Administrative Reform Program</td>
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<td>CD</td>
<td>Country Departments</td>
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<td>CS</td>
<td>Civil Service</td>
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<td>CSR</td>
<td>Civil Service Reform</td>
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<td>EDI</td>
<td>Economic Development Institute, World Bank</td>
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<td>EMCBP</td>
<td>Economic Management Capacity Building Program</td>
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<td>ERP</td>
<td>Economic Reform Program</td>
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<td>ESW</td>
<td>Economic and Sectoral Work (World Bank)</td>
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<td>FEPS</td>
<td>Final Executive Project Summary</td>
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<td>HLC</td>
<td>High-Level Committee</td>
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<td>IA</td>
<td>Institutional Assessment</td>
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<td>ID</td>
<td>Institutional Development</td>
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<td>IEA</td>
<td>Institutional Environment Assessment</td>
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<td>IEPS</td>
<td>Initial Executive Project Summary</td>
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<td>IM</td>
<td>Initiating Memorandum</td>
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<td>MFEA</td>
<td>Ministry of Finance and Economic Affairs</td>
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<td>NGOs</td>
<td>Non-governmental Organizations</td>
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<td>ODA</td>
<td>Overseas Development Administration (United Kingdom)</td>
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<td>OPR</td>
<td>Operations Policy Department</td>
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<td>PAC</td>
<td>Public Accounts Committee</td>
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<td>PMD</td>
<td>Personnel Management Office</td>
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<td>PPF</td>
<td>Project Preparation Facility</td>
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<td>PS</td>
<td>Permanent Secretary</td>
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<td>PSC</td>
<td>Public Service Commission</td>
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<td>RIPA</td>
<td>Royal Institute of Public Administration</td>
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<td>SAL</td>
<td>Structural Adjustment Loan</td>
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<td>SECAL</td>
<td>Sectoral Adjustment Lending</td>
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<td>SL</td>
<td>Structured Learning</td>
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<td>SSA</td>
<td>Sub-Saharan Africa</td>
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<td>TM</td>
<td>Task Manager</td>
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<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Programme</td>
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<td>WB</td>
<td>The World Bank</td>
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The Governance Approach and its Operationalization

This paper discusses the first experience with the operationalization of the Governance Approach to Civil Service Reform in The Gambia. It describes how to undertake the upstream diagnostic work required by the governance approach to civil service reform; how this work was done in The Gambia; and what process as well as substantive lessons were learned from the outcomes of this pilot effort.

A central hypothesis of the governance approach to civil service reform is that Sub-Saharan public bureaucracies are by and large "patrimonialized" by ruling elites, which use them as control tools to ensure their own permanence in power at the expense of serving the public interest. The remedial approach calls for:

- Greater insight into the effect of patrimonialism on public bureaucracies; and
- More operational knowledge about the bureaucracies' response to an environment that confers on them little or no legitimacy and places them at odds with the society they are to serve.

Reaching a thorough understanding of the institutional environment and the contextual idiosyncrasies of each country (upstream diagnostic work) prior to the design of civil service reform strategies and the choice of the appropriate lending operation is an important feature of the operationalization phase of the governance approach. A diagnostic assessment of the context and environment for civil service reform—an Institutional Environment Assessment (IEA)—is therefore proposed as the point of departure. The IEA should clarify issues relating to:

(i) The role of the state;
(ii) The governance environment; and
(iii) Existing dysfunctions in and standards for civil service performance.

It should provide the basis for designing projects intended to achieve the required adjustments in the civil service. The IEA itself can be as thorough as required by the ESW (as in the case of The Gambia herein described), or it can be shortened into an Institutional Environment Overview (IEO) if circumstances so require. The diagnostic assessment required by the governance approach is based on the information generated by the inquiry into these variables and the explanatory power of the relationships established between environmental information and the functioning of the civil service.
Institutional Environment Assessments (IEA)

The upstream diagnostic work called for by the governance approach draws on the conceptual framework described here. This framework encompasses:

(i) Tiered (vertical) analysis of information on the proposed variables; and
(ii) Analysis of the dynamic interaction between governance and institutional variables on the one hand and the civil service on the other (horizontal).

In addition, it is now widely accepted in the World Bank’s Africa Region that no lending operation with institutional development (ID) content should start without a thorough upstream diagnostic exercise in the form of in-depth economic and sectoral work on institutional development (ESW ID), such as that conducted in The Gambia, Malawi, and Zambia. Together with the need for systematically understanding the context for civil service reform, these factors all argue for an Institutional Environment Assessment (IEA).

An Institutional Environment Assessment is an upstream diagnostic exercise with the following characteristics. It is:

(i) Undertaken primarily in the context of World Bank (and/or donor partner) project preparation or as part of economic and sectoral work on institutional development (ESW ID);

(ii) Government-driven and donor-assisted;

(iii) Sequenced either top-down or bottom-up;

(iv) Diagnostic of both the institutional and the governance dimensions of the civil service environment, focusing on three levels of analysis: structural, administrative, and technical;

(v) Group-based, allowing ample participation, ownership, and sustainability of outcome;

(vi) Geared to building consensus around the institutional profile drawn or problems identified, and corrective actions; and

(vii) Directed to review and reformulate on-going strategies or reform programs as well as prospective design and projectization, regardless of funding source (action planning oriented).

IEAs and Structured Learning of Participatory Processes

While IEAs build on commitment at the highest level, they are designed to ensure ownership by all concerned. Accordingly, the IEA provides a participatory process involving both senior and mid-level government officials for project preparation. It creates opportunities for full understanding and shaping of project objectives. The logical starting point for a participatory process bound for ownership is the engagement of mid-level actors
in diagnostic activities—a central objective of the IEA Workshop. This allows mid-level and rank-and-file actors to be mobilized for the collection and analysis of information that pertains to the environment to be targeted by a project. The IEA ensures that participants are brought in at the ground level of project preparation to genuinely contribute to the shaping of the project.

Pilot projects following the IEA approach under the regional CSR Program are being monitored by the technique of Structured Learning (SL)—a monitoring technique (similar to action research) that is being applied in the World Bank under the supervision of the Central Vice Presidency for Environmentally Sustainable Development. The SL technique is designed to monitor innovative operations by formulating and testing certain hypotheses about the relationships between certain new features in project preparation and quality of design and the sustainability of implementation. SL monitoring will enable a continuous evaluation of institutional learning and documentation of the effect of IEAs on the quality of both process (project preparation and implementation) and content (project design).

The driving hypothesis to be tested in pilot exercises is:

Projects prepared through wide participatory processes have a greater chance of success, in terms of intended impact, than projects prepared by traditional methods.

This central hypothesis is supported by the following ancillary hypotheses. Projects prepared through broad participatory processes will:

(i) Facilitate the flow of information upward to project planners, resulting in better project design;

(ii) Facilitate the flow of information downward to managers and subordinates, resulting in greater knowledge and awareness about project goals throughout the organization; and

(iii) Foster a high degree of ownership at all levels among those responsible for implementing them, resulting in better performance throughout the organization during implementation.

The Gambia Context and the IEA Design

World Bank discussions with the Government of The Gambia in mid-1993 concerning the identification of this operation centered on the need to revisit the on-going Administrative Reform Program to seek ways to effectively reform the civil service. Given that the Administrative Reform Program (ARP) was at that time eight years old, the Government decided that, instead of simply evaluating the ARP through expert assistance, a fresh diagnostic exercise should be undertaken including the governance dimension. Governance issues came into the picture because they were recognized to be inextricably related to poor performance in both resource allocation and mobilization. The lack of transparency in Government decision-making, loose tax enforcement, inadequate accountability for public expenditures, and weaknesses in legislative oversight were all perceived by both the World Bank and the Government to be compromising good economic management.
As a comprehensive diagnostic tool, the IEA seemed particularly appropriate for linking symptomatic problems of economic management to impediments at the level of system-wide administrative functions and governance factors. The Government agreed that an IEA would be a useful diagnostic exercise to launch the preparation of the envisaged SECAL focusing on economic management. The IEA was also considered useful because it would fold into the Workshop preparation phase the essential information coming out of the on-going work by the Government. By linking governance to tax policy and administration, the IEA could also expand problem analysis pertaining to resource mobilization, thus giving the reform effort a new impetus.

The Gambia was selected as the first pilot case for the application of an IEA because it met all of the selection criteria except that relating to political transition. Furthermore, the IEA was designed in direct response to the need to prepare a programmed SECAL operation focusing primarily on resource mobilization and resource allocation. Civil service reform was to be included as a means of ensuring improvements in the performance of those key economic management functions—as well as to revitalize the on-going civil service reform under the ARP. Given these objectives, which emerged from the World Bank policy dialogue as well as from the Bank’s on-going economic and sectoral work (ESW), the IEA approach required was clearly of the "bottom-up" variety.

As set out in the IEA conceptual framework, the first IEA Workshop (IEA Stage I) would build on the outcomes of the IEA preparatory phase (Desk Review, Field Review, and Governance Survey). Its primary purposes would be to: synthesize, prioritize, and analyze the information developed; review current and past reform strategies and experiences; and go as far as possible in building consensus on the major change activities to be projectized. In essence, the role of the Workshop would be to carry the IEA from the diagnostic analysis undertaken by the Desk and Field reviews to a proposed strategy for change/reform—thus providing the basis for the SECAL to be projectized. Change activities would be formulated under certain assumptions, which might involve preconditions for the successful implementation of the change action plan. Such preconditions might well constitute the basis for the proposed conditionality of the SECAL.

The IEA Workshop framework and process was intended to take the participants through symptomatic problem identification, problem analysis, impediment identification, and strategy review, and it would culminate with the formulation of corrective actions under certain preconditions. Through this process, an indigenous and informed strategy would evolve in a way that would help ensure not only the validity of the assumptions made, but also ownership and effective implementation. Following the Workshop, the participating syndicate groups (discussed subsequently) would remain active; they would draft the required follow-up documentation and prepare the groundwork for World Bank pre-appraisal and appraisal missions.

**The IEA Experience: Lessons Learned**

Although there are several lessons to be learned from the IEA exercise, it has been judged by both the World Bank and the Government to have been by and large successful. The IEA Workshop achieved the goal of providing a forum for participation with both upward and downward communication—enhancing awareness of environmental
impediments to civil service performance. It also created a climate conducive to frank confrontation of the central problems affecting the functioning of the civil service as well as their root causes. While the Workshop fell short of identifying specific activities to support a SECAL, it was very successful in building consensus on the priority problem areas relating to economic management and civil service reform to be addressed by the SECAL or other donor assistance. More important, the IEA exercise created a network of key players who actively participated in the diagnostics as well as in the prioritization of reform action. Both the substantive accomplishments of the Workshop and the networking among its participants are expected to persist throughout project preparation and implementation. Evidence of this is already emerging: Government technical staff charged with preparing SECAL proposals have been interacting with those who participated in the Workshop syndicate groups to ensure that the Workshop's outcomes are adequately reflected in the SECAL proposals.

The Process Survey conducted at the end of the Workshop as part of the structured learning exercise revealed that a large number of participants agree that reforming The Gambia's core economic management capacity is of great importance and needs urgent attention. A significant number of participants also stated that reforming economic management will require widespread fundamental restructuring of the civil service system. The survey likewise revealed that approximately 90 percent of the participants were committed to reform; this is an indication of their predisposition to accept the diagnosis as well as commit themselves to the goals of the proposed SECAL. Over a quarter of those surveyed claimed that they were ready to make sacrifices to ensure the achievement of reform results.

The Governance Survey went well in terms of eliciting the collaboration of most respondents. The survey achieved its goal of creating an unprecedented forum for the Gambians to assess the environment within which their civil service operates. It also allowed for broad participation and served to increase awareness of environmental impediments to sound economic management in particular, and good civil service in general. The governance issues emerging from the survey were featured prominently and openly discussed at the Workshop. Participants seized the opportunity to vent their views and frustrations about the ways in which the civil service operates. Discussions were extremely candid. The Workshop elicited both defensiveness and constructive suggestions for addressing the problems identified. The low profile assumed by the large number of donor-sponsored consultants in attendance allowed the Gambians to take charge of discussions and deliberations.

It is worth noting the frankness displayed by most of the respondents in "reading" the patrimonial environment in which the civil service operates. Finally, the survey results confirmed some of the conclusions drawn by the Bank's Desk Review. The responses obtained from respondents enabled the IEA to discern the particular characteristics of the "friendly" patrimonial environment in The Gambia that would qualify it as "benign patrimonialism." This conclusion provides two lessons for World Bank operations:

(i) The performance of the civil service is seriously constrained by structural and environmental obstacles. Hence, it is not enough for political leaders to declare commitment to reform while the character of the public administration system and its governance culture limit the propensity of the civil service to manage the economy effectively.
(ii) The prevalence of patrimonialism is a considerable challenge to technical assistance (TA). It limits TA impact on the ground and compromises opportunities for building local capacity. Unless a serious reform process removes patrimonial impediments and evolves environmental and institutional mechanisms of good governance, patrimonial traits—characterized by distortions such as tax evasion—will continue to pervade economic management functions.

Survey conclusions thus suggest a governance environment that would benefit from an operation that would deepen the achievements realized under SALs I and II and at the same time help create an enabling environment for the civil service to manage economic reform. Put most simply, fixing the economy requires fixing the governance environment so as to remove the patrimonial obstacles. This in turn requires that civil servants be rewarded for their efforts by adequate pay and incentives rather than by patronage.

The IEA and Project Design

It is anticipated that the five syndicate groups that analyzed symptomatic problems, system-wide administrative functions and problems, and governance structures and culture will be reconvened in the course of project preparation to further refine and expand the seven modules formulated by the Drafting Committee. This refinement should be done on the basis of the results of the analytical exercise conducted by the syndicate groups at the Workshop, which were not fully integrated into the seven modules prepared by the Drafting Committee. It is also expected that this work will be undertaken in collaboration with the standing working groups under EMCBP.

Despite the emphasis of the IEA design on economic management functions and their symptomatic problems, the Workshop discussions clearly favored issues having to do with system-wide administrative functions and governance. For SECAL preparation, the lesson learned is that economic management was clearly perceived as dependent on the quality of governance practices as well as on the effectiveness of system-wide administrative functions.

World Bank procedure requires that project pre-appraisal start only after an Initial Executive Project Summary (IEPS) or an Initiating Memorandum (IM) has been prepared and cleared by the Bank. These documents, in turn, should reflect the objectives of the operation, the issues driving it, and an outline of the proposed project. These constitute powerful determining factors in project preparation, despite the participatory process that follows. In this pilot case, it is expected that the IM, which triggered the pre-appraisal mission, will be applied with considerable flexibility, allowing for substantial modification in response to the findings of the IEA.

The aggregate results of the Governance Survey and of the analysis of economic management and civil service problems conducted during the Workshop suggest that The Gambia public administration is ready for a World Bank hybrid-type Public Administration Adjustment Operation, as prescribed in the Governance Approach to Civil Service Reform in Sub-Saharan Africa. This preliminary conclusion, to be confirmed once the Government of
The Gambia proceeds with project preparation, would suggest a lending operation that includes:

(i) A sector adjustment component, supporting policy change geared to the removal of both technical and environmental distortions affecting the management of core economic management functions identified; and

(ii) Targeted correction of public administration draw-backs which, according to the Workshop participants, particularly compromise the Government's ability to manage the economy.

IEA Sustainability

The follow-up mission conducted two months after the IEA Workshop learned that the IEA had catalyzed a host of initiatives that are poised for further study and implementation—provided that adequate technical and financial resources are made available. The mission also concluded that the Government was ready to act on these initiatives outside the scope of the SECAL and therefore is helping to mobilize resources from donors other than the World Bank.

While an IEA is primarily intended to be a means of preparing sustainable World Bank projects, its benefits to the borrower go beyond securing a loan or credit. In the case so far documented in The Gambia, the IEA has triggered initiatives that are likely to run their course irrespective of the approval of a SECAL. In this limited sense, the IEA has already demonstrated its value. Its fruition into a fully developed SECAL—hopefully one that will follow the configuration of the engendered hybrid Administration Adjustment Operation—will be the ultimate test of complete success. The World Bank’s traditional project preparation mode will need to give way to more flexible and adaptable practices that truly live up to both the good intentions articulated in the Wapenhans initiative on the improvement of portfolio management and the Africa Region’s emphasis on the further empowerment of borrowers during project preparation. It is hoped that this report on the Gambia’s experience with an IEA will make a difference in facilitating this transition to more effective and participatory project preparation practices.
I. INTRODUCTION

The Governance and Civil Service Reform (CSR) Program is a regional program of the Africa Technical Department that explores innovative ways to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of the civil service in the countries of Sub-Saharan Africa. Jointly with country departments in the region, the Technical Department helps prepare targeted operations informed by an understanding of the critical impediments to a well-functioning government administration and oriented to building public administration capacity. The CSR Program consists of two stages: the first is a conceptual and region-wide vetting stage that leads to the launching of the concept of a "governance approach" to civil service reform; and the second involves the operationalization of this concept through the preparation of certain lending operations.\(^1\)

The paper, *A Governance Approach to Civil Service Reform in Sub-Saharan Africa* articulates the conceptual framework for understanding the root causes of the civil service predicament in the region (see Box 1). The paper advances a set of strategic options to undertake civil service reform and to identify a lending operation suitable to particular institutional environments. The operationalization of the CSR Program rests on the application of the conceptual framework as well as on the proposed reform strategy to projects with substantial civil service reform components.

This paper discusses the first experience with the initial operationalization stage of the concept in The Gambia. It describes how to undertake the upstream\(^2\) diagnostic work required by the governance approach to civil service reform; how this work was done in The Gambia; and what process and substantive lessons were learned from the outcomes of this pilot effort.

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1. "Governance" here stands for the practical exercise of power and authority by governments in the management of their affairs in general and of economic development in particular.

2. "Upstream" refers to preparatory diagnostic and design activities occurring prior to project implementation, while "downstream" refers to implementation.
BOX 1: A GOVERNANCE APPROACH TO CIVIL SERVICE REFORM IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA

This paper argues the case for a governance approach to civil service reform in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA). It reviews past World Bank support to civil service reform, highlighting the limitations of the focus on short-term cost-containment, stabilization measures that emphasize reduction and control of civil service staff strength and the burden of the wage bill on the budget. It stresses the very small budgetary savings recorded in almost every case and the virtual neglect of the issues of efficiency and effectiveness. These rather disappointing results are traced to the patrimonial character of the state, whose features in the civil service context are: recruitment based on subjective and ascriptive criteria; public employment managed as a welfare system; pay levels that are unrelated to productivity; loyalty of officials to the person of the ruler rather than to the state; and formalism of administrative rules and procedures. The governance approach advocated would begin with an assessment of the institutional environment (with emphasis on the key governance elements of accountability, rule of law, openness and transparency) to determine the patrimonial profile of the country: high, low, in-between. This will be followed by the adoption of a strategy for reform that could be a comprehensive approach, an enclave approach or a hybrid approach, depending on whether the country patrimonial profile is high, low or average, respectively. The comprehensive reform would be supported by an administrative adjustment SECAL; the enclave by a technical assistance project; and the hybrid by a hybrid operation with one component focused on sectoral adjustment (governance and institutional issues) and the other on technical assistance, both to support the sectoral adjustment issues and to strengthen technical/managerial capacity to manage core government functions and deliver key public services.

II. THE GOVERNANCE APPROACH TO CIVIL SERVICE REFORM

The Need for a Governance Approach

The disarray and ineffectiveness of their civil services undermines the ability of Sub-Saharan African countries to carry out basic governmental functions, thus threatening the development efforts of governments. Capacity to make and implement policy is reduced, revenues go uncollected, and much-needed public services are provided poorly or not at all. The engendered crisis of governmental administration is particularly serious at a time when structural adjustment programs require governmental institutions to plan and manage fundamental transformations in these countries’ economies.

A central hypothesis of the governance approach to civil service reform is that Sub-Saharan public bureaucracies are by and large "patrimonialized" by ruling elites, which use them as control tools to ensure their own permanence in power at the expense of serving the public interest. The approach calls for:

(i) Greater insight into the effect of patrimonialism on public bureaucracies; and

(ii) More operational knowledge about the bureaucracies' response to an environment that confers on them little or no legitimacy and places them at odds with the society they are to serve.

These bureaucracies are perceived by the public as a colonial legacy—and thus as less than legitimate. They do not reflect the values and desires of the majority and are the cause of great popular discontent.

For social discontent with public bureaucracies to trigger reform, the tension between patrimonial insiders and the public at large must be at a level to generate momentum for reform. Furthermore, some governance mechanisms must be in place to allow for the voicing of discontent. This momentum is best achieved in periods of governmental transition, when incoming governments are more apt to be propelled by a reformist platform calling for radical change in the way public business is conducted. From a governance standpoint, effective public administration reform thus also becomes a matter of "political opportunity." In the absence of such an opportunity, leverage must be sought elsewhere. The classical alternative is donor leverage, which in the past has had mostly negative results as a driving force for civil service reform.

With respect to leadership and operational drive for reform, the governance approach acknowledges that civil servants are unlikely to reform themselves on their own. This being so, there is a need to "reform the reformers first." The paradox of "reforming the reformers"

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1 Patrimonialism, as discussed in the Technical Paper (DIA 1993) is a system of leadership characterized by the inability or unwillingness of rulers or ruling elites to distinguish between personal and public patrimony (property). The power and authority of office is used as a form of "currency," and loyalty of subordinates is exchanged for parcels of power or for privileges from office. A formula definition of Patrimonialism offered by the Technical Paper is: Patrimonialism = monopoly of power + discretion - accountability - transparency.
is that, while reformers cannot reform themselves, reform cannot be achieved without their active support. Moreover, turning around the public administrations of Sub-Saharan Africa will require reconnecting the civil service with civil society. This "reconnection" is likely to unleash social forces capable of propelling reform—hence the very fundamental challenge that meaningful civil service reform can only occur jointly with governance reform.

Operationalizing the Approach

An initial group of six countries was selected in consultation with the World Bank's Africa region country departments to serve as "pilots" for the application of the approach. The four criteria used for inclusion as a pilot operation were:

(i) Prominence of civil service reform in the respective country program, evidenced by the presence of a civil service reform operation or a major ESW on civil service reform (CSR) or institutional development (ID);

(ii) Country interest and cooperation in participating and supporting the pilot activities;

(iii) Relevance of civil service reform, especially in the context of governmental transition—making incoming governments with revisionist platforms particularly appropriate; and

(iv) Funding considerations on the part of the World Bank or partner donors.

The following countries were selected on the basis of these criteria: The Gambia, Zambia, Mali, Zimbabwe, Mozambique, and Angola. Targets of opportunity or changing circumstances in the selected countries have caused the programming of the pilot activities to shift and countries to be changed.⁴

Operationalization of the governance approach to civil service reform factors in the ancillary goals stressed in the "Next Steps" initiative following the Wappenhans Task Force on portfolio management⁵ by building ownership and consensus around reform objectives during project preparation and beyond. Operationalizing the governance approach to civil service reform therefore means "mainstreaming" it into World Bank practice by folding it into the Bank's initial intervention with borrowers in the context of project identification and preparation and/or economic and sectoral work (ESW). The present report covers preparation activities up to and including project pre-appraisal.

Reaching a thorough understanding of the institutional environment and the contextual idiosyncrasies of each country (upstream diagnostic work) prior to the design of civil service reform strategies and the choice of the appropriate lending operation is an important feature of the operationalization phase of the governance approach. A diagnostic assessment of the

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⁴ The following countries are also being considered for pilot operations: Eritrea, Malawi, Cape Verde, Ghana, Uganda, Mauritania, Kenya, and Botswana(10,7),(991,988)

context and environment for civil service reform—an Institutional Environment Assessment (IEA)—is therefore proposed as the point of departure. The IEA should clarify issues relating to:

(i) The role of the state;  
(ii) The governance environment; and  
(iii) Existing dysfunctions in and standards for civil service performance.

It should provide the basis for designing projects intended to achieve the required adjustments in the civil service. The IEA itself can be as thorough as required by the ESW (as in the case of The Gambia herein described), or it can be shortened into an "overview" if circumstances so require, as discussed later in this report (pp 17-18).

The Conceptual Framework

The rationale for the proposed upstream diagnosis is based on a systems approach. This approach places the civil service or public bureaucracy at the center of the system as characterized in Diagram 1. The civil service has the primary responsibility for performing the core economic management functions of government and for providing service delivery to society. These are also major concerns of the World Bank as a development institution. The civil service is seen as part of a larger environmental whole, and its performance is determined not only by its internal workings, but also by its external environment. In this context, the goal of civil service reform is to change the system as a whole—and especially the interactions between the civil service and its environment. This suggests that civil service reform should go beyond public management to concern itself with the role of the civil service as a primary instrument of the state at the service of civil society.

For the purposes of this approach, "environment" is defined as the sum total of factors found outside the immediate confines of the civil service that have a significant bearing on it. It includes policy considerations, cultural values, and donor assistance, among other factors. For the purposes of institutional diagnostic work, we are particularly interested in the governance and institutional dimensions of the environment as defined by a set of variables. Designating certain variables a priori makes it possible to disaggregate complex problems or phenomena into their component parts. This analysis, in turn, should help to clarify the causes and effects of the relationships between the civil service and its environment.

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*Public bureaucracy* is here used synonymously with "civil service" (*latus sensus*) and represents the administrative/organizational arm of the state, expected to operate by certain guiding principles, norms, and standards of professionalism, neutrality, and within constitutional boundaries. A public bureaucracy responds to directives from other state institutions under a set of managerial principles and practices carried out by a specially designated corps of civil servants. It may also interact with the public at large or organized interest or civic groups to better interpret their needs and aspirations. Public bureaucracies are, therefore, instruments of governance mediating political and economic interests, mobilizing and directing resources in the service of the State at large. This mobilization is seen as being more effective when managerially driven.
Diagram I: The Public Administration System

GOVERNANCE ENVIRONMENT (Values)

Legitimacy
Rule of Law
Public Service
Role of the State

INSTITUTIONAL ENVIRONMENT (Levels)

Political/Structural (Organization of The State)
Administrative Systems (Public Bureaucracy)
Public Personnel System
Financial System

Technical (Service Delivery and Core Economic Functions)

INSTITUTIONAL ENVIRONMENT

Civil Society

THE STATE

PUBLIC BUREAUCRACY

SERVICE DELIVERY
CORE ECONOMIC FUNCTION
Given the importance of the environment in determining the capacity level of the civil service, it is essential that the diagnostic exercise shed light on the interactions among sets of variables (governance and institutional) and the civil service. This "interface" is best understood if examined by levels. For example, if one wants to know about the institutional health of a given state agency, e.g., the legislature, one needs to determine how legitimate the legislature is by assessing its accountability, access to and participation in it by the public, and the transparency of its deliberations—in addition to looking at the rules, roles, norms and structures of the local national assembly. Likewise, the prevalence of the rule of law will suggest how norms and rules are made and enforced within the civil service. Macroeconomic or sectoral policies and regulatory frameworks, determined by the prevailing role of the state, will also have a bearing on the performance of sector or core economic functions.

The proposed framework vertically segments the environment into the following three analytical levels, from the top down:

- **Political-structural level** (organization of the state);
- **Administrative systems level** (public bureaucracy); and
- **Technical level** (service delivery and core economic functions).

Each level is seen in both institutional and governance dimensions, each of which includes its own set of distinct variables. It is generally accepted that the higher levels have a determining effect over the lower ones. For example, the system-wide administrative features of a given civil service are by and large determined by the nature of the political structures and institutions—the context of influences and expectations surrounding and involving the state in which the civil service is embedded. Similarly, the service-delivery technical capabilities of a given sector are a function of the quality of system-wide administrative functions. The proposed variables for each environment dimension are grouped by levels of analysis under their respective clusters, as shown in the three boxes that follow.

The **Political-Structural Level** (Box 2) of inquiry is appropriate for assessing state institutions, e.g., the legislature or the judiciary. The nature of the environment has a direct impact on the institutions of the state and at the same time deeply affects the functioning and performance of the civil service. The influence of the environment is determined by the intensity and role of other environmental factors that may be present or absent:

1. A free press;
2. An independent judiciary;
3. Opposition parties;
4. Free and fair elections;
5. An active legislature, adequately supported with technical staff;
6. Laws and regulations that promote transparency in government financial operations and decision-making;
7. A functioning system of courts;
8. Sufficient intra-governmental checks and balances; and
9. An active and involved "civil society" made up of local communities, non-governmental institutions (NGOs), professional and labor associations, academic and legal circles, and other groups that are sufficiently organized for
various forms of popular participation and "voice." The potency of the preceding factors—combined with the prevailing institutional traits of the state—determines the degree of overall legitimacy, which has a significant bearing on the overall rules of the game.

**BOX 2: POLITICAL-STRUCTURAL LEVEL**

At the Political-Structural Level, the following variables are targeted for inquiry:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Institutional Dimension</th>
<th>Governance Dimension</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Organization of the State</strong></td>
<td><strong>Legitimacy</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>norms/values</td>
<td>ascribed role of the state</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>organizational structures</td>
<td>accountability</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>roles</td>
<td>access</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>rules</td>
<td>participation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>transparency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>representation</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Administrative Systems Level (Box 3) focuses on the environment of the public bureaucracy, affecting the system-wide (cross-ministry) support systems that integrate public administration coherently and with common standards. The nature of these environmental factors also deeply affects the performance level of civil servants. The potency of these factors will have a significant bearing on the nature of bureaucratic systems—especially on the attitudes and behaviors of public bureaucrats in their performance of duties connected with system-wide support functions (personnel and financial) and their provision of public services or inputs into the management of core economic functions.

The Technical Level (Box 4) focuses on sectoral agencies responsible for the delivery of specific services in which sectoral technical aspects dominate and on the performance of core economic functions. These functions in turn are determined by prevailing values and expectations of society with regard to economic policy and sectoral public service. Variables at this level relate to the issue of the role of the state in promoting growth with equity, and they are studied from the perspective of the political economy of economic management and service delivery. Their impact is felt not only on macroeconomic and sectoral policy making, but also on organizations and organizational networks directly responsible for the delivery of specific policies, projects, or services—both macro (e.g., fiscal or monetary) and sectoral (e.g., agriculture, education, or health).

The diagnostic assessment required by the governance approach is based on the information generated by the inquiry into these variables and the explanatory power of the relationships established between environmental information and the functioning of the civil service.
**BOX 3: ADMINISTRATIVE SYSTEMS LEVEL**

At the *Administrative Systems Level*, the following variables are targeted for inquiry:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Institutional Dimension</th>
<th>Governance Dimension</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Public Personnel System</strong></td>
<td><strong>Rule of Law</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>employment</td>
<td>universal rules</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>compensation</td>
<td>equal application</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>career</td>
<td>enforcement and redress</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>training &amp; development</td>
<td>rule-making &amp; amendment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>work conditions</td>
<td>balance of power/authority</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>civil service statutes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>code of ethics</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Financial System</th>
<th>Public Service</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>budgets</td>
<td>leadership</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>accounting/audit</td>
<td>efficiency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>procurement</td>
<td>effectiveness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>general services</td>
<td>professionalism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>internal regulatory framework</td>
<td>service quality</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**BOX 4: TECHNICAL LEVEL**

At the *Technical Level*, the following variables are targeted for inquiry:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Institutional Dimension</th>
<th>Governance Dimension</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sectors</strong></td>
<td><strong>Role of the State</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>economic development strategies</td>
<td>macroeconomic policies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>sector agency norms</td>
<td>regulatory framework</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>sector agency structures</td>
<td>sector policies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>technical skills and capacity</td>
<td>burden of costs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>management skills and capacity</td>
<td>beneficiaries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>economic management systems</td>
<td>resource mobilization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>programs/projects</td>
<td>resource allocation</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
III. ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENTS AND PROJECT PREPARATION

Institutional Environment Assessment (IEA)

The upstream diagnostic work called for by the governance approach draws on the conceptual framework described in the document. This framework encompasses:

(i) Tiered (vertical) analysis of information on the proposed variables; and
(ii) Analysis of the dynamic interaction between governance and institutional variables on the one hand and the civil service on the other (horizontal).

In addition, it is now widely accepted in the World Bank's Africa Region that no lending operation with institutional development (ID) content should start without a thorough upstream diagnostic exercise in the form of in-depth economic and sectoral work on institutional development (ESW ID), such as that conducted in The Gambia, Malawi, and Zambia. Together with the need for systematically understanding the context for civil service reform, these factors all argue for an Institutional Environment Assessment (IEA).

By analyzing the interaction between environmental variables (institutional and governance) and the civil service in a segmented manner, one achieves a better grasp of existing capacity—and especially of the impediments to the realization of this capacity. These impediments may be internal or external to institutions. Internal impediments usually relate to organizational structures and processes and are removable through classical organizational restructuring or systems improvements. In contrast, external impediments rooted in the governance environment, while more self-evident, are particularly difficult to remove and require radical reforms. For example, if the assessment of the governance environment shows that the regime presiding over government fits the patrimonial pattern suggested in the previously mentioned technical paper, the proposed design for civil service reform must reflect an emphasis on correcting the civil service distortions caused by salient patrimonialism. The recommended operation in such a case would be one supporting a comprehensive reform strategy in which "environmental" adjustments would be paramount.

An Institutional Environment Assessment is an upstream diagnostic exercise with the following characteristics. It is:

(i) Undertaken primarily in the context of World Bank (and/or donor partner) project preparation or as part of economic and sectoral work on institutional development (ESW ID);

(ii) Government-driven and donor-assisted;

(iii) Sequenced either top-down or bottom-up;

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(iv) Diagnostic of both the institutional and the governance dimensions of the civil service environment, focusing on three levels of analysis: structural, administrative, and technical;

(v) Group-based, allowing ample participation, ownership, and sustainability of outcome;

(vi) Geared to building consensus around the institutional profile drawn or problems identified, and corrective actions; and

(vii) Directed to review and reformulate on-going strategies or reform programs as well as prospective design and projectization, regardless of funding source (action planning oriented).

IEAs will vary according to the particular circumstances of the client government or the type of project/program envisaged. When the prospect is a comprehensive civil service reform program, to be assisted by a World Bank free-standing technical assistance (TA) operation, or by any other donor, a top-down sequence for the IEA is appropriate. In this case, the objective is to consensually draw out the environmental profile of the civil service by focusing on both dimensions—governance and institutional—so as to enable conclusions regarding both impediments to and overall capacity of the civil service. When a particular aspect of economic management or sector service delivery is at the center of the reform effort, a bottom-up sequence for the IEA is appropriate. In both approaches, the diagnosis required covers the institutional and the governance dimensions of the civil service environment. Both approaches are also geared to strategy review, formulation, and project design regardless of the source of funding. Although pilot countries were selected from among those in which the World Bank is planning an operation that it will fund, an IEA can be undertaken when the client government itself wishes to take stock of its own environment for internal purposes—as a review or evaluation of civil service reform strategy. In such cases, the process will be more genuinely "owned" locally, as in the case of Ghana’s Capacity Building and Reform action planning or the planned IEA in Zambia.

In countries where the governance environment does not give reason for concern, and where, accordingly, public management is deemed satisfactory, an Institutional Environment Overview (IEO) may be warranted. An IEO is appropriate, in preparation for World Bank operations with some ID content, where an IEA is neither warranted nor possible. An IEO simply matches the key elements of governance discussed in the preceding conceptual framework and the salient institutional features of the country concerned.

Data collected and analyzed at the outset of an IEA need to be related to the country’s own civil service reform experience or on-going strategy. This strategy is then assessed for its congruence with the consensual institutional profile drawn and the problems and impediments identified. The congruence analysis required should make explicit the current assumptions about:

(i) The role of the state (controlling or responsive to society):

(ii) The structure of incentives and rewards to civil servants (to comply with the authority of the ruling elite or ruler, or to serve the public); and
(iii) The focus on introducing modern technologies, as opposed to adapting to local capacities and building on local resources.

This review and analysis should provide the basis for reassessment of the country’s own ongoing strategy and program, followed by the design of a suitable operation.

An IEA requires consultation and close coordination with the government interlocutors driving it and generally involves the following three stages:

Stage I comprises data collection and analysis of the proposed variables for the three levels of analysis (top-down) or problem-area focus (bottom-up), so as to reach consensus around the institutional profile and/or the symptomatic problems and their root causes. The specific input activities of the IEA are:

(i) a Desk Review conducted at the World Bank;
(ii) a Field Review by government officials on issues under the three levels of analysis; and
(iii) an in-country Governance Survey focusing on the variables identified under the governance environment (see Boxes 2, 3, 4).

Stage I concludes with a first Institutional Environment Assessment Workshop, which serves to summarize and prioritize the data collected and to review on-going reform strategies. It is unlikely that this first workshop can go much beyond reviewing reform strategies.

Stage II follows up on the first IEA Workshop to reach agreement on a strategy and proposed change activities that can be internalized by the Government and subsequently projectized jointly with the Bank. The specific input activity consists of retaining the syndicate groups brought together during the Field Review and first Workshop for complementary work on strategy and project design in preparation for pre-appraisal and/or appraisal. This stage overlaps with project preparation work and may require several follow-up missions and/or workshops.

Stage III consists of the preparation of a project, jointly with one or more donors, on the basis of products and outcomes of Stages I and II (projectization). The input activity for this stage consists of the active participation in the appraisal mission of the representatives of the syndicate groups as key interlocutors with the World Bank as the lead donor. Arrangements are also made during this stage to help assure that these same officials stay involved throughout implementation activities.

IEAs and the Project Cycle

The phased method of an IEA generates products, activities, and outcomes. Products are the building blocks in the formulation of an appropriate reform strategy supporting the design of a project. Activities represent the sequenced inputs required to complete a product. Outcomes are impacts of immediate value to the participating country, as they contribute to the review or formulation of contextually relevant reform strategies.

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1 The two IEA workshops may be collapsed into one, as was the case in The Gambia exercise.
The quality of a product coming out of an IEA is measured in terms of the intended outcome. Therefore *IEAs are sequenced so as to ensure that activities and products of a given stage achieve the desired outcome; the subsequent stage only proceeds if the preceding outcome is achieved*. For example, Stage II on strategy and project design will be allowed to start only after the institutional profile or prioritized problem areas have been agreed upon and internalized by the Government in Stage I of an IEA. Similarly, Stage III on full projectization can be initiated only after the strategy adopted and the project design delineated during Stage II have been internalized.

If an IEA is being conducted in the context of preparing a World Bank operation—as will be true in most cases—it becomes necessary to factor the World Bank project cycle into the sequencing of the exercise. Diagrams II and III *describe how the participatory process of the IEA links activities, products, and expected outcomes to the World Bank project cycle*. Diagram II refers to the case of a *top-down sequencing*—which starts at Stage I, by focusing data collection and reform experiences primarily on the highest level of the institutional environment (structural) and links it to the lower levels (administrative systems and technical-sectoral systems) to build a consensual institutional profile of state institutions and their functioning. Stage I runs concurrently with:

(i) The World Bank policy dialogue with the country in question; and
(ii) Project identification/preparation activities.

Stage II focuses on the formulation of strategies (comprehensive, enclave, or hybrid—see Box 1 for brief description) and projectized components that run concurrently with project pre-appraisal. Stage III concentrates on joint project preparation for a World Bank Public Administration Adjustment operation on the basis of the outcome of previous stages. This stage runs concurrently with project appraisal and involves agreement on the specific type of operation to support the chosen reform strategy: comprehensive, enclave, or hybrid.

Diagram III refers to a *bottom-up sequencing*, which starts at Stage I, by summarizing problems affecting the targeted sector or set of issues and reviewing on-going reform strategies. This stage runs concurrently with:

(i) Drawing conclusions from the country policy dialogue leading to project identification; and
(ii) The first project preparation mission.

Stage II focuses on strategy and project design on the basis of the products and outcomes of Stage I that have been internalized by the Government. This stage runs concurrently with project pre-appraisal and preparations for appraisal. Stage III concentrates on the actual preparation of a suitable project in the light of the outcomes of the previous stages and coincides with the appraisal mission. The bottom-up sequencing is more effective in the sense that it secures more participation from on-the-ground players, who relate better to tangible symptoms or issues raised in economic and sectoral work (ESW) or in the policy dialogue with the World Bank.²

² Conditions permitting, the IEA should be followed by, or done concurrently with, an institutional assessment of an agency or ministry. This allows the results of the broader IEA to relate to the specific institutional and environmental circumstances of the most affected government agencies or ministries.
Diagram II: Top-Down IEA

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ACTIVITIES</th>
<th>PRODUCTS</th>
<th>OUTCOMES</th>
<th>WB PROJECT CYCLE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Desk/Field Reviews</td>
<td>PARALLEL INPUTS TO INSTITUTIONAL PROFILE</td>
<td>PROFILE CONTRASTED BY PARTICIPANTS</td>
<td>COUNTRY POLICY DIALOGUE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Governance Survey</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Workshop</td>
<td>CONSSENSUAL INSTITUTIONAL PROFILE AND REVIEWED</td>
<td>INSTITUTIONAL PROFILE ACCEPTED AND CONGRUENCE</td>
<td>PROJECT IDENTIFICATION MISSION</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>REFORM EXPERIENCES</td>
<td>ANALYSIS INTERNALIZED BY PARTICIPANTS</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Group Work for Project Formulation</td>
<td>COMPREHENSIVE ENCLAVE OR HYBRID STRATEGY</td>
<td>INTERNALIZATION AND ADOPTION OF STRATEGY</td>
<td>PROJECT PREPARATION MISSION</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>DESIGN</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joint Appraisal</td>
<td>PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION ADJUSTMENT OPERATION</td>
<td>PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION ADJUSTMENT OPERATION</td>
<td>PRE-APPRaisal MISSION</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SUMMARY CONCLUSION/EVALUATION REPORT</td>
<td>IDENTIFIED/PREPARED IN PILOT COUNTRY</td>
<td>APPRAISAL MISSION</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WB Monitoring and Reporting</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>NEGOTIATIONS BOARD IMPLEMENTATION</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Diagram shows the stages of the project cycle:

- Stage I: Dialogue
  - Parallel inputs to institutional profile
  - Profile contrasted by participants

- Stage II: Institutional profile and reviewed reform experiences
  - Consensual institutional profile and reviewed reform experiences
  - Institutional profile accepted and congruence analysis internalized by participants

- Stage III: Comprehensive internalization for project enrollment and hybrid strategy design
  - Internalization and adoption of strategy
  - Comprehensive internalization

- Project phases:
  - Pre-appraisal mission
  - Appraisal mission
  - Negotiations board implementation
Diagram III: Bottom-Up IEA

**ACTIVITIES**

- Desk/Field
  - Reviews
  - Governance
  - Survey

- Workshop

- Group Work
  - for Project Formulation

- Joint Appraisal

- WB Monitoring and Reporting

**PRODUCTS**

- **STAGE I**
  - SUMMARIES OF PROBLEMS/IMPEDIMENTS/ENVIRONMENT
  - PRIORITIZED ISSUES AND REVIEW REFORM EXPERIENCES

- **STAGE II**
  - PROPOSED CHANGE ACTIVITIES STRATEGY AND PROJECT DESIGN

- **STAGE III**
  - PROJECT/LENDING OPERATION

**OUTCOMES**

- PROBLEM AREAS IDENTIFIED
  - INTERNALIZATION AND OWNERSHIP OF REQUIRED CHANGE ACTIONS
  - INTERNALIZATION AND ADOPTION STRATEGY
  - OPERATION PREPARED

**WB PROJECT CYCLE**

- COUNTRY POLICY DIALOGUE
- PROJECT IDENTIFICATION MISSION
- PROJECT PREPARATION MISSION
- PRE-APPRaisal MISSION
- APPRAISAL MISSION
- NEGOTIATIONS BOARD IMPLEMENTATION

SUMMARY CONCLUSION/EVALUATION REPORT

REPORTING
Participatory Project Preparation and Ownership

The importance of country commitment and ownership of projects has been stressed as critical to improving the quality of the World Bank's portfolio. Commitment and ownership are both germane concepts, but there are significant differences between them that need to be recognized as one applies them. In the context of project preparation and implementation, commitment on the part of the borrower leadership is achieved through high-level consultation and exchanges between management level staff of the World Bank and senior government officials. In some instances it may even go beyond the "technocratic" levels of government to include members of the political leadership in a broad sense. In any event, commitment usually takes the form of declarations or enunciations of intent and may also be reflected in policy acts or governmental statements. While commitment entails willingness to contribute to achieving outcomes by holding others accountable for its outcome, it does not necessarily ensure ownership of, or responsibility for, the project.

Where there is ownership, the "owners" will feel responsible and will care about outcomes. If the outcome of the project is successful, "owners" will gain; if it is not successful, "owners" will lose. This is not the case with those who are merely committed. While commitment is simply declared, ownership is achieved through intensive interaction between "owners" and the project. All too often, the Bank incorrectly assumes that where there is commitment at the highest level, ownership by the rank-and-file will follow. If one accepts that ownership is a higher order of involvement than commitment, and that it needs to be achieved rather than simply declared, the need for participation in project preparation becomes more evident.

Thus, commitment to a project is associated with the intent of the leadership, while ownership is associated with the hands-on involvement (participation) of the rank-and-file, who will have a more direct effect on implementation activities. Participation is therefore the means of ensuring ownership of a project. It brings the preparation process closer to those players in and outside government who will determine the outcome of implementation. It is widely recognized that, where there is ownership, successful implementation is more likely. The special importance of commitment, in contrast, is that it allows the preparation process to get under way, leading to project approval; it does not, however, ensure project implementation. In other words, there can be commitment without responsible ownership, but not responsible ownership without commitment.

While IEAs build on commitment at the highest level, they are designed to ensure ownership by all concerned. Accordingly, the IEA provides a participatory process involving both senior and mid-level government officials for project preparation. It creates opportunities for full understanding and shaping of project objectives. The logical starting

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11 An illustration of this is provided by a recent report of an appraisal mission to an African country. The Task Manager reported: "There was strong evidence of continued Government commitment to the project. This commitment was reaffirmed by the highest level of Government by both the Secretary to the President and to Cabinet and the Minister of Finance.... The ownership dimension to the role of the task force emerged clearly in the modifications it made to the project Matrix of Issues and Activities agreed upon in July."
point for a participatory process bound for ownership is the engagement of mid-level actors in diagnostic activities—a central objective of the IEA Workshop. This allows mid-level and rank-and-file actors to be mobilized for the collection and analysis of information that pertains to the environment to be targeted by a project. The IEA ensures that participants are brought in at the ground level of project preparation to genuinely contribute to the shaping of the project.\textsuperscript{12}

For civil service reform and economic management purposes, the IEA approach takes into account the need for both the participatory process and the substantive information essential for projectization. Yet, while participation is very beneficial for ownership and improved project implementation, it also bears a cost: it increases expectations and may increase project complexity and costs. Certainly there is a need to keep participating players involved in project preparation, but it must be recognized that, despite the offsetting gains, participation entails a longer and costlier process. Participation also precludes dealing only with the leadership that provides the initial commitment to the project. These factors may lead to loss of control over the project by senior government leaders, with whom the World Bank interacts. If the Bank follows the participatory method inherent in an IEA, it will be required to revisit its internal processes regulating the project cycle so as to allow full internalization of the costs and benefits of project preparation ownership by borrowers. This might, for example, entail more flexibility in the preparation and reviews of project documentation such as Initiating Memoranda (IM), Initial Executive Project Summary (IEPSs), Final Executive Project Summary (FEPSs), and Staff Appraisal Reports (SAR).

Pilot projects following the IEA approach under the regional CSR Program are being monitored by the technique of "structured learning" (SL).\textsuperscript{13} This monitoring will enable a continuous evaluation of institutional learning and documentation of the effect of IEAs on the quality of both process (project preparation and implementation) and content (project design). The driving positive hypothesis to be tested in pilot exercises is:

Projects prepared through wide participatory processes have a greater chance of success, in terms of intended impact, than projects prepared by traditional methods.

This central hypothesis is supported by the following positive ancillary hypotheses. Projects prepared through broad participatory processes will:

(i) Facilitate the flow of information upwards to project planners, resulting in better project design;

\textsuperscript{12} The approach to participation adopted by the IEA has some features of the "empowerment strategy" proposed by Paula Donnelly-Roark, AFTCB, as it is based on a group learning process that allows the group, over time, to undertake diagnosis, corrective actions, and reassessment to ascertain the achieved changes. Africa Technical Department, Environmental Division (AFTEN), consultant report, August 1992.

\textsuperscript{13} "Structured Learning" is a technique (similar to action research) that is being applied in the World Bank under the supervision of the Central Vice Presidency for Environmentally Sustainable Development to monitor innovative operations by formulating and testing certain hypotheses about the relationships between certain new features in project preparation and quality of design and the sustainability of implementation. For a full explanation of the methodology, see Arturo Israel. 1993. "Program of Structured Learning". Unpublished Note. Transport, Water and Urban Development Department. Washington, D.C.: World Bank.
(ii) Facilitate the flow of information downwards to managers and subordinates, resulting in greater knowledge and awareness about project goals throughout the organization; and

(iii) Foster a high degree of ownership at all levels among those responsible for implementing them, resulting in better performance throughout the organization during implementation.

As for the possible negative consequences of participatory approaches, it is hypothesized that:

(i) During its initial phase, a broad participatory planning process will take longer and be more costly to prepare;

(ii) Because it creates expectations among multiple constituencies that their particular concerns will be addressed, a broad participatory process will result in more complicated and costly project design;

(iii) Because it empowers a broad group of stakeholders, whose agenda may differ from that of the Government or the World Bank, a broad participatory process that strays from the intended project impact may lead to a project inconsistent with the Bank’s Country Program, its policy dialogue with the borrower, or its on-going economic and sectoral work (ESW); and

(iv) Once a participatory process has been initiated, attempts to modify or disregard the results of that process, or to by-pass the participants, will severely reduce the level of ownership and adversely affect the project’s implementation.

Specific variables relating to these hypotheses have been identified, and data on them will be collected at different intervals during the IEA process. For example, the first IEA Workshop provides an opportunity for data to be gathered on:

(i) Extent of participation;
(ii) Flow of information;
(iii) Sense of ownership;
(iv) Expectations regarding project outcomes; and
(v) Perceptions of commitment.

By testing the structured learning (SL) hypotheses throughout all of the stages of an IEA, as well as during project implementation, it will be possible to evaluate the impact of the participatory approach on the quality and sustainability of the project. Structured learning is primarily a process-monitoring mechanism; it will not provide information regarding the substance of the project. It should be of great value for demonstrating the implications—both

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14 Independent Variable: (1) participatory process; Intervening Variables: (2) improved information flow: upward; (3) improved information flow: downward; (4) greater ownership; (5) increased expectations among multiple constituencies; Dependent Variables: (6) project success; (7) quality of project design; (8) greater knowledge and awareness of project among managers and workers; (9) improved implementation; (10) length of planning process; (11) cost of planning process; (12) complexity of project design; (13) project cost; and (14) approval rate.
positive and negative—of introducing a participatory method into the preparation of projects with substantial institutional development components. Annex E contains examples of questions to be included in a SL survey conducted at an IEA Workshop to collect data on the proposed hypotheses, and Annex F contains a summary of the findings emerging from the SL survey conducted.\textsuperscript{15}

\textsuperscript{15} This annex is an abridged version of a report by Robert Beschel analyzing the results of the SL survey.
IV. CONDUCTING AN IEA FOR SECAL PREPARATION IN THE GAMBIA

The Gambia Context

Focusing on Economic Management

Through its Economic Reform Program (ERP) launched in 1985, the Government of The Gambia adopted a set of policies intended to reverse the country’s financial and economic deterioration. During the ensuing eight years, results have been significant in terms of stabilizing and liberalizing the economy, reversing economic decline, and restoring macroeconomic stability. Moreover, the Government has succeeded in reducing the role of the state in the economy. Yet, reform efforts have fallen short of achieving capacity to design, analyze, and implement macroeconomic policies. The reform process now clearly needs to go deeper to improve public administration—especially in the area of public resource management. The Government’s inability to bring revenues to a level consistent with the potential tax base and to allocate resources in a manner allowing the provision of efficient social and infrastructural services is directly linked to weak institutional capacity. The World Bank’s Structural Adjustment Loans (SALs) I and II have contributed to some improvement in overall government capacity; the Personnel Management Office (PMO) was established as the focal point for improvements in civil service management; and the Administrative Reform Program (see subsequent text) was launched. But much still remains to be done.

The opening of the economy to market forces has not been sufficient to create an environment conducive to a satisfactory level of supply response by the private sector. In this context, and from the ongoing policy dialogue with the Government, it has become clear that the forthcoming adjustment operations need to focus on policy changes designed to further strengthen economic management, especially with respect to resource mobilization and allocation. It has also been recognized by all that this can only be accomplished by building substantial Government capacity through civil service reform. The World Bank Sectoral Adjustment Loan (SECAL) operation that is emerging from this context would seek to combine balance-of-payments support with capacity-building efforts in economic management.

Studies done at the request of the Government of The Gambia by the Internal Audit Unit of the U.K. Customs and Excise Department and the Harvard Institute for International Development revealed significant laxity in the application of rules and regulations regarding import taxes, the granting of waivers, and the enforcement of the income tax code. Failure to pay customs duties as well as corporate and individual income taxes was recognized by the Government to be a major barrier to improved public resource management. The removal of this blockage was seen by all concerned as a matter of the highest priority.

World Bank discussions with the Government in mid-1993 concerning the identification of this operation centered on the need to revisit the ongoing Administrative Reform Program (see more detailed discussion on pp 25-26) to seek ways to effectively reform the civil service. Given that the Administrative Reform Program (ARP) was at that time eight years old, the Government decided that, instead of simply evaluating the ARP through expert assistance, a fresh diagnostic exercise should be undertaken including the governance dimension. Governance issues came into the picture because they were recognized to be inextricably related to poor performance in both resource allocation and
mobilization. The lack of transparency in Government decision-making, loose tax enforcement, inadequate accountability for public expenditures, and weaknesses in legislative oversight were all perceived by both the World Bank and the Government to be compromising good economic management.

As a comprehensive diagnostic tool, the IEA seemed particularly appropriate for linking symptomatic problems of economic management to impediments at the level of system-wide administrative functions and governance factors. The Government agreed that an IEA would be a useful diagnostic exercise to launch the preparation of the envisaged SECAL focusing on economic management. The IEA was also considered useful because it would fold into the Workshop preparation phase the essential information coming out of the on-going work by the Government under a PPF (Project Preparation Facility) on public resource allocation, i.e., public expenditure and public investment programming supported by modernized budgeting practices. By linking governance to tax policy and administration, the IEA could also expand problem analysis pertaining to resource mobilization, giving the reform effort a new impetus.

By building on collaboration with the U. N. Development Programme (UNDP) and the U.K. Overseas Development Administration (ODA), the IEA was also able to make a substantial contribution to donor coordination in the area of economic management and civil service reform. UNDP's Economic Management Capacity Building Programme (EMCBP) became a partner in the planning and execution of the IEA and a crucial element in facilitating the continuity required to link the IEA to the SECAL preparation. ODA's continuing interest in supporting civil service reform in The Gambia is now closely coordinated with the World Bank's initiative under its Africa Region CSR Program.

The Government's Civil Service and Administrative Reform Programs

Civil service reform in The Gambia had its inception in 1985 as part of the Economic Reform Program (ERP). The primary focus of the civil service reform was on reducing the size of the work force and on correcting wage erosion, which had caused salaries to decline by 50 percent between 1980 and 1986. The initial objective of the reform program was to "achieve a leaner, affordable civil service, better paid and more productive." The reform approach taken involved retrenchments, budgetary restrictions, outplacement programs, a new pay and grading system, and a staff appraisal scheme. It also called for the creation of a central agency in charge of civil service management: the Personnel Management Office (PMO).

While the civil service reform program achieved its initial objectives of retrenching, revising the pay and grading system, and installing a staff-inspection program and certain schemes of service, it did not succeed in linking performance-appraisal systems to compensation. Moreover, the initial down-sizing eroded over the years due to budget constraints, which kept the wage bill under control while not imposing hiring restrictions. As a result, real average salaries in the civil service eroded significantly, becoming a major disincentive to performance.

Subsequently, in 1987, the comprehensive Administrative Reform Program (ARP)—subsuming the earlier civil service reform program—was launched with assistance from U.K. ODA. The thrust of the ARP was to progressively withdraw the Government from productive activities and to shift its emphasis to macroeconomic management and the
provision of basic infrastructure and social services. An ancillary objective was to promote an environment conducive to the proper functioning of market forces.

The Public Service Act of 1991 expanded the PMO's authority over civil service management and established two senior committees to support the ARP—the Advisory Committee for Personnel Management and the Steering Committee for Manpower Development. Despite this institutional strengthening, by 1993, the ARP and the civil service reform program were clearly weakening due to the lack of active leadership and generally low staff morale. Weak support from the sectoral ministries for the different components of the civil service reform program, as well as fragmented reform initiatives by these ministries, had also considerably undermined the centralized reform program. Although the PMO has been able to continue to perform routine management functions, its progress with the core reform program has been limited to staff inspections and computerization of personnel data. At present, the ARP lacks strategy and direction and needs to be revitalized. The IEA was viewed by the Bank and the Government as a means of assisting the revitalization of the ARP in the context of the specific SECAL objectives. The Government also recognized that revitalizing the ARP should be done through a participatory diagnostic exercise that would update and energize it by enlisting the participation of the sectoral ministries.

The IEA Process: Customizing for The Gambia

The IEA Design

The Gambia was selected as the first pilot case for the application of an IEA because it met all of the selection criteria (see page 11) except that relating to political transition. Furthermore, the IEA was designed in direct response to the need to prepare a programmed SECAL operation focusing primarily on resource mobilization and resource allocation. Civil service reform was to be included as a means of ensuring improvements in the performance of those key economic management functions—as well as to revitalize the on-going civil service reform under the ARP. Given these objectives, which emerged from the World Bank policy dialogue as well as from the Bank's on-going economic and sectoral work (ESW), the IEA approach required was clearly of the "bottom-up" variety. The timing for the IEA allowed it to be launched shortly after the completion of a major ESW report focusing on institutional development and covering The Gambia's experience with civil service reform and public expenditure programming as part of two SAL operations. This ESW report also covered lessons of experience with institutional development in the country's sectoral ministries and the Central Bank.

The focus of IEA data gathering was on the technical level and primarily concerned the key economic management functions of resource mobilization and resource allocation. The bottom-up approach adopted therefore centered on the problems relating to these two areas, which were highlighted in the reports of several consulting experts and perceived to be pertinent by relevant Government officials. Accordingly, the IEA started with preparatory work undertaken by working groups expected to participate in the first IEA Workshop. The same groups were expected to follow through with the implementation of its conclusions, including the preparation (and subsequently also the implementation) of the

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SECAL funded by the World Bank. The composition of the working groups was critical to ensuring the successful design and ownership of the SECAL project to follow.

The Desk Review was conducted by Bank staff and consisted of a thorough review of consultant reports and ESW drafts on the areas targeted for the SECAL as well as governance-related issues. Following the tiered (vertical) analysis proposed by *A Governance Approach to CSR in Sub-Saharan Africa* (Dia 1993), the format for the Desk Review required information on:

A. *Symptomatic problems* of economic management;
B. *System-wide administrative functions and problems*; and
C. *Political institutions and structures* as well as *governance culture*.

A technical aide-memoire was also prepared characterizing the political institutions and governance structures of The Gambia—reflecting the concepts and terminology of the governance environment, as proposed in the conceptual framework set out in the study by Dia (1993). This aide-memoire was prepared on the basis of general information on governance about The Gambia available to the Bank. It listed a series of hypothetical flaws in the governance system and was prepared solely to generate discussion.

Three carefully selected groups in The Gambia, assisted by a U.K. ODA consultant, would conduct the Field Review following the A, B, and C categories set out for the Desk Review. The three work groups would consist of senior officials representing their organizations. (The officials selected should have the following grade ranks: Groups A and B, grades 10 and 11; and Group C, grades 11 and 12). Each work group would appoint a chairperson, a secretary, and resource persons from donor agencies. The work groups would not be privy to the results of the Desk Review—so as not to bias their problem identification. The products of the Desk and Field reviews, together with the results of the Governance Survey (discussed in detail from page 35 onwards) would constitute the materials informing the first IEA Workshop. As a participatory diagnostic process, the Workshop would allow for group validation of and consensus on the outcomes of the Desk and Field reviews and the Governance Survey. This process, applying the tiered analysis concept described in Diagram IV would provide for continuity between the data gathering and the Workshop.

*The Workshop Design*

As set out in the IEA conceptual framework discussed earlier in this paper, the first IEA Workshop (IEA Stage I) would build on the outcomes of the IEA preparatory phase (Desk Review, Field Review, and Governance Survey). Its primary purposes would be to: synthesize, prioritize, and analyze the information developed; review current and past reform strategies and experiences; and go as far as possible in building consensus on the major change activities to be projectized. In essence, the role of the Workshop would be to carry the IEA from the diagnostic analysis undertaken by the Desk and Field reviews to a proposed strategy for change/reform—thus providing the basis for the SECAL to be projectized. Change activities would be formulated under certain assumptions, which might involve preconditions for the successful implementation of the change action plan. Such preconditions might well constitute the basis for the proposed conditionality of the SECAL.

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17 Grade 12 is the highest and applies to Permanent Secretaries.
**Diagram IV: Tiered Diagnostic Process**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>SYMPTOMS (Technical)</th>
<th>SYSTEMS (Administrative)</th>
<th>STRUCTURES (Political)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>DESK REVIEW/FIELD REVIEW</strong></td>
<td>-A- Summary/symptomatic problem areas by outsiders and insiders</td>
<td>-B- Summary/conclusions by outsiders and insiders on system-wide admin. problem areas</td>
<td>-C- Summary/description of political institutions/structures and generic governance culture under Legitimacy, Rule of Law</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>GOVERNANCE SURVEY</strong></td>
<td>-D- Survey governance issues relating to Role of State impacting on Symptoms</td>
<td>-E- Survey governance issues relating to Public Service impacting system-wide functions</td>
<td>-F- Survey governance issues relating to Political Institutions, Legitimacy and Rule of Law, Gauging patrimonialism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>WORKSHOP</strong></td>
<td>Presentation and validation of summaries and results of survey Proceed as per Matrix II</td>
<td>Presentation and validation of summaries and results of survey Proceed as per Matrix II</td>
<td>Presentation and validation of summaries and results of survey Proceed as per Matrix II</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The Workshop framework and process would take the participants through symptomatic problem identification, problem analysis, impediment identification, and strategy review, and would culminate with the formulation of corrective actions under certain preconditions. Through this process, an indigenous and informed strategy would evolve in a way that would help ensure not only the validity of the assumptions made, but also ownership and effective implementation. Following the Workshop, the participating syndicate groups (discussed subsequently) would remain active; they would draft the required follow-up documentation and prepare the groundwork for World Bank pre-appraisal and appraisal missions. (The organization of the Workshop is summarized in Diagram V).

The IEA Workshop, designed to last for four full working days, would require the participation of senior government officials, who would be expected to do most of the work, with assistance from a few World Bank resource people and consultants. Senior civil servants in attendance would already have participated in the three IEA Field Review diagnostic work groups (A, B, and C) dealing, respectively, with:

(i) Symptomatic problems;
(ii) System-wide administrative functions and problems; and
(iii) Governance structures and the institutional-environment factors affecting them.

To give it visibility and legitimacy as an important activity of the Government, the Workshop would be opened by a prominent political figure.

During the preparatory phase of the IEA in The Gambia, a Workshop Steering Committee was set up consisting of the Permanent Secretary of the Personnel Management Office (Chairman), a general rapporteur, one representative from each of the Field Review work groups, the chief secretary of the Workshop, two consulting facilitators, and a representative from the World Bank. It was decided that each session of the Workshop would be chaired by a senior government official, assisted by the chief consulting facilitator. At the Workshop, the numerous resource persons from the participating donor agencies would play a supporting role, intervening only when the need arose or when they were requested to provide an opinion. It was emphasized that these resource persons should minimize their roles as "experts" and certainly avoid taking charge of the discussions. Workshop activities would include plenary sessions and working sessions of syndicate groups. At the request of the Chairman of the Steering Committee, it was decided that the Workshop would conclude with an Action Plan, the drafting of which would be entrusted to the general rapporteur, who would work with inputs provided by the rapporteurs of the syndicate groups. In addition, provisions were made for World Bank staff (from EDI), together with a faculty member of the Management Development Institute (MDI), to conduct a process assessment of the Workshop. This assessment would involve data collection for testing the hypotheses contained in the Structured Learning (SL) monitoring exercise discussed previously (pp. 24-26).

During Day 1, the three Field Review work groups (A, B, and C) and World Bank staff would present to the Workshop the results and synthesis of the diagnostic data gathered by the Desk and Field reviews. Participants would be asked to assess the accuracy and
### Diagram V:
**IEA Workshop - From Symptoms to Change Strategy**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DAY ONE</th>
<th>DAY TWO</th>
<th>DAY THREE</th>
<th>DAY FOUR</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>SYMPTOMS (A)</strong></td>
<td>SYMPTOMS (A) Synthesis</td>
<td>SYSTEMS (B) Synthesis</td>
<td>STRUCTURES (C) Synthesis</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Summary by</td>
<td>Ad-hoc group discussions of prioritized</td>
<td>Ad-hoc group discussions of prioritized</td>
<td>Ad-hoc group discussions of prioritized</td>
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<tr>
<td>insiders</td>
<td>issues led by members of Symptoms</td>
<td>issues led by members of Systems</td>
<td>issues led by members of Structures</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Summary by</td>
<td>Group A</td>
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*Group Presentations*
completeness of the diagnosis. Presentations would be made by each of the three work groups:

- Work Group A on symptomatic problems (service delivery and core economic functions);
- Work Group B on system-wide administrative functions and problems (government-wide services such as personnel and financial systems); and
- Work Group C on governance structures and governance culture (questions of governance relating to rule of law, legitimacy, public service, and role of the state).

The three work groups' summaries would be followed by presentations of the Desk Review by the World Bank, and of the results of the Governance Survey (reported in a sequence relating to symptoms, systems, and structures). The summaries from the three sources of diagnosis (Desk Review, Field Review, and the Governance Survey) would then be synthesized and prioritized by the Workshop participants in syndicate groups and vetted by the Workshop plenary.

During Day 2, five syndicate groups would be formed. Each group would be led by a member of Field Review Work Group A on symptomatic problems and would be assigned one or two of the prioritized problem areas for analysis and discussion. For each problem area, the responsible syndicate group would identify the corresponding internal or external impediments, required change actions or further study, current reform strategies, proposed activities, and preconditions for success. Each group would prepare a presentation of the results of its discussions for the plenary at the end of the day. (The worksheet used for this exercise is provided as Annex A, followed by an example used as an illustration to guide participants in Annex B.) The five syndicate groups would remain constant, giving each group the opportunity to analyze system-wide administrative and governance problems, so as to provide continuity and a better grasp of the linkages among different levels.

On Day 3, participants would concentrate on the data developed by Group B on system-wide administrative functions and problems. As on the previous day, the same syndicate groups—this time led by members of Field Review Work Group B—would be assigned one or two of the prioritized problem areas for analysis and discussion. These problem areas would also be discussed as outlined in the problem analysis work sheet and presented at the plenary session.

On Day 4, participants would concentrate on the governance structures and culture data developed by Group C, i.e., the external environment or context within which the civil service operates. Syndicate groups led by members of Field Review Work Group C on governance structures would be established and assigned one or two prioritized problem areas for analysis and discussion. The same set of guidelines for problem analysis would be used during the syndicate group discussions and plenary presentations. By this time, participants would be expected to understand and illustrate with local examples the interconnectedness among symptoms, systems, and structures—achieving the goal of the tiered
analysis. (Diagram VI characterizes the two tracks of analysis designed for the Workshop and intended to bring out both:

(i) Specific inputs for the SECAL—in terms of the deepening of policy reforms launched under SALs I and II to strengthen economic management; and
(ii) Broader institutional reforms required for the effectiveness of civil service reform in support of economic management.

The cumulative analysis by the syndicate groups would feed into the Action Plan and subsequently into the SECAL design.

The Workshop Steering Committee would meet at the end of every working day to evaluate and adjust the program. At the end of the Workshop, a one-day session restricted to the Steering Committee would be held for the purposes of:

(i) Substantive synthesis of the Workshop results;
(ii) Action planning;
(iii) Evaluation and drawing of lessons from the IEA in general and the Workshop in particular;
(iv) Linking of the IEA results with the SECAL pre-appraisal mission scheduled to start at the end of the Workshop; and
(v) Determining how participants in the Workshop would interact with the pre-appraisal mission.

**The Governance Survey Design**

The governance topic in The Gambia was broached to the Government at high-level discussions that took place in 1992 between senior World Bank staff and political leaders in Government. Those discussions, as well as other contacts held between Bank staff and senior civil servants, confirmed the Government’s willingness to obtain assistance from the Bank and to develop methodologies to deal with governance issues and apply these in the context of the IEA. Despite apprehension on the part of the Bank staff as well as its partners in U.K. ODA, the Governance Survey was allowed to proceed after its scope, purpose, and the instrument itself had been reviewed with senior Government officials. Agreement was reached with the Government that respondents to the survey would include all participants in the Workshop, as well as a sample of opinion leaders in the community. The Government also proposed that, given the sensitivity of the topic, the preparatory work on governance should be done by very senior government officials (Group C).

In its treatment of the governance issue, the earlier-mentioned Technical Paper (see Box 1) hypothesized eight traits of a patrimonial institutional environment (see also Box 5):

(i) Kinship ties;
(ii) State-society nexus;
(iii) Monopoly of power;
(iv) Scope of government;
(v) Resource management;
(vi) Rule of law (including regulatory framework);
(vii) Transparency and openness; and
(viii) Accountability.

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Operationalization of the proposed hypotheses regarding patrimonialism requires an assessment of these traits in a given country that enables conclusions to be reached about the pervasiveness and depth of patrimonialism. Accordingly, twenty-nine hypotheses on the civil service environment were developed (see Annex C) on the basis of:

(i) Variables on the governance and institutional dimensions of the environment were provided by the conceptual framework for the governance approach (Boxes 2, 3, 4);

(ii) Information contained in several reports on The Gambia; and

(iii) The patrimonial traits.

The hypotheses were grouped by the same levels used to conduct the environmental analysis of the IEA: symptomatic problems (D), system-wide administrative functions (E), and the functioning of political institutions and structures (F) (Diagram IV). These hypotheses, in turn, were used to design a Survey Instrument that could fulfill a twofold purpose:

(i) Serve as a "self-diagnostic mirror" to civil service respondents; and
(ii) Generate information for governance profile analysis (Annex D).

The questions contained in the Survey Instrument corresponded to the variables pertaining to the governance environment and were grouped under the governance values of legitimacy, rule of law, public service, and the role of the state. In keeping with the Governance Survey’s structure (D, E, and F), its results were intended to shed light on each level of problem identification and analysis done by the Desk and Field reviews (A, B, and C—Diagram IV), so as to bring the governance dimensions into the Workshop discussions at the appropriate level. The Workshop was then designed to build on the products coming out of the Desk and Field reviews and the survey.

At the Technical Level of analysis (economic management functions), four hypotheses were developed to test variables on resources mobilization, two on resource allocation, three on the budget preparation/execution process, and three on institutional organization.

Hypotheses on resource mobilization focused on four variables:

(i) The tax administration system;
(ii) The attitude of the tax enforcement staff;
(iii) Supervision and monitoring; and
(iv) The tax code and prosecution of tax delinquents.

Hypotheses on resource allocation focused on two variables:

(i) The link between policy guidelines and resource allocation; and
(ii) Performance and productivity of previous public investments.
BOX 5: PATRIMONIALISM, RATING INDICATORS

1. **Kinship Ties:**
   Dedication, identity, and accountability centered around ethnic and kinship ties. Ethnic bases and clientelism as substitutes to moral and political legitimacy.

2. **State-Society Nexus:**
   Ascendancy of the state over civil society. Few independent interest groups (consumer organizations, professional associations, independent research organizations, NGOs, etc.) ready and able to contribute to the policy debate. People not informed about government activities.

3. **Monopoly of Power:**
   Single-party system, with absolute power over the government, legislature, and judiciary. Weak rubber-stamping parliament, which cannot hold government accountable and lacks much of the critical information essential to the exercise of legislative oversight. Opposition is a weak minority.

4. **Scope of Government:**
   Strong and bloated central government. Hegemonic habits dominate the state/central government, and paternalistic, tutelary habits and patronage imbue the civil service.

5. **Resource Management:**
   Financial: Regressive customs and tax policies. Deep ambivalence about accountability for national resource allocation characterized by patronage, graft, and outright corruption.

   Personnel: Recruitment constitutes the most privileged and secure way of building power, wealth, and access to social services. Hence, civil service becomes the most attractive and desirable form of employment and provides the most promising channel for social and political mobility. Career development and remuneration reflect more ascriptive criteria than performance and productivity.

6. **Rule of Law:**
   Lawmakers and enforcers see themselves as above the law—as characterized by arbitrary rights and exemptions, political abrogation, and vetoing of court decisions. The court system is more or less part of the bureaucracy—generally under the ministry or department of justice.

7. **Transparency and Openness:**
   Mass media underdeveloped. Information not accessible or of low quality. Government presents budget in such a form and with such technicality as to minimize opportunities for public control either through legislation or mass media. Difficult for legislature to independently access information in order to make meaningful choices between alternative fiscal and budgetary policies. Legislature is dependent on the bureaucracy for information.

8. **Accountability:**
   Weak, random/sporadic or absent. Government has limited legitimacy and/or mandate.
Hypotheses on the budget preparation/execution process focused on three variables:

(i) The budgeting system and cost-effective managerial tools;
(ii) Realistic allocation within ceilings; and
(iii) Overall fiscal management.

Hypotheses on institutional organization focused on three variables:

(i) Institutional cooperation in resource mobilization;
(ii) Institutional coordination in resource allocation; and
(iii) Institutional leadership for budget preparation, execution, and appraisal.

At the Administrative Systems Level of analysis (system-wide administrative functions and problems), two main hypotheses were developed to test variables on the public bureaucracy, and four on public service.

On the public bureaucracy, two main variables were broken down into several sub-variables. The effectiveness of the personnel system had six: public employment; public compensation; career system; training and development; work conditions; and civil service statutes (including code of ethics). The effectiveness of the financial system had five: accounting; auditing; procurement; general services; and financial regulations.

On the public service, the hypotheses focused on four variables: leadership; civil service effectiveness/efficiency; professionalism; and service quality.

At the Structural Level of analysis (political structures and institutions), six hypotheses were developed on legitimacy; and five on the rule of law.

On legitimacy, the hypotheses focusing on the sub-variables of the selection process and post-election performance of elected leaders were not tested, since their questions were removed from the instrument following consultations with the Government. The variables that remained were: accountability; accessibility of the civil society to the institutions of the state; popular participation in political, government, and economic affairs; transparency and openness—with particular attention to availability of information on government activity; and effective representation.

On the rule of law, the hypotheses focused on five variables: universality of the scope of the law; equal application of the law; effectiveness of enforcement and redress; the process of rule making and amendment; and checks and balances between the branches of government. Additions to the instrument that were not among the hypotheses were the size and scope of government and a question as to why the respondents had joined the civil service.

Through seventy-two questions interspersed throughout the instrument (consisting of ninety questions), the survey was also designed to elicit information to gauge the level of patrimonialism in The Gambia’s political culture. The instrument employed the Frequency/Response Model, with 1 to 4 assigned to yield numerical values to respondents’ answers about facts, events, perceptions, values, and practices. The most affirmative rating was 1, and the most negative was 4. During the analysis of the survey results, the response scale was converted into a "patrimonial scale"—with 4 standing for highly patrimonial, 1 for
non-patrimonial, 2 for patrimonial, 3 for traces of patrimonialism. (In certain instances, the scale was reversed as the first option represented the non-patrimonial, given the phrasing of the question).

Agreement was also reached between the Bank and the Government that, while there would be no confidentiality of responses to the survey, anonymity would be preserved, and the results of the survey would only be used as feedback to the Workshop and to analyze the governance profile. Accordingly:

(i) The results of the survey were to be presented to the Workshop along with information from the Desk and Field reviews;
(ii) A summary of recommendations made by the respondents regarding actions to be taken in the governance area was to be circulated at the Workshop; and
(iii) A composite of responses to the survey was to be compiled (reflecting percentages and mean values that would be analyzed to draw conclusions regarding the presence of patrimonial factors and their impediments to the civil service).

The Governance Survey would provide individual participants a vehicle to express their views about key governance issues. The instrument supporting the survey would enable their views on the components of the IEA to be systematically reviewed and would introduce concepts and terminology making it possible for governance issues to be discussed in a systematic and constructive manner. Anonymity and government encouragement to respondents were expected to contribute to a climate of candor and openness on the part of the respondents during both the Survey and the Workshop.18

The Workshop Experience

The Government of The Gambia was first approached about the governance approach to civil service reform by a World Bank mission in the context of preliminary discussions for a SECAL identification in mid-1993. It was agreed at that point that the wavering Administrative Reform Program (ARP)—a product of SAL I—should be evaluated and reformulated in the light of the Government’s increased focus on economic management. It was the Government’s intention to undertake this task through consultants who would independently evaluate the ARP. During the same mission, however, an AFTCB representative made a presentation on the Africa Region CSR Program and suggested that a bottom-up IEA exercise might be undertaken instead of conducting an independent expert evaluation of the ARP. The proposal was widely accepted by members of the ARP Standing Committee, and the IEA planning process got under way with remarkable collaboration between the World Bank and its interlocutor in the Government, the Permanent Secretary for Personnel Management in the President’s Office. The Secretary General/Head of the Civil Service was also very supportive and instrumental in allowing the IEA to get under way. On the Bank’s side, task management for the IEA was held by AFTCB, the managing division for the Africa Region CSR Program. Given that the IEA was geared to supporting SECAL

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18 Given the size and composition of the sample of respondents, this Survey feedback should not be construed as a means to draw statistically valid conclusions about the nature of The Gambia’s governance environment. It should instead be viewed as a valid portrayal of senior civil servants’ perceptions of their governance environment.

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preparation, however, close collaboration with Africa Country Operations Division of the Sahelian Department (AF5CO) was both necessary and quite successfully achieved. This collaboration had in fact started prior to the launching of the IEA, as AFTCB had collaborated in the related economic and sectoral work (ESW) under way in the form of the earlier-mentioned Institutional Development report prepared on The Gambia (page 29 and footnote 16).

The U.K. Overseas Development Administration (ODA) has since the mid-1980s assisted The Gambia in the area of civil service reform and improvement. When the World Bank approached ODA early in 1993 to collaborate with it in the context of its Africa Region CSR Program by supporting the first pilot IEA exercises, ODA was ready to help. In agreement with the Government, a consulting contractor, the Royal Institute of Public Administration (RIPA) International, was selected, and a good working rapport was established with this partner group. RIPA International contributed one team leader who assisted throughout the Workshop; a consultant who worked with the work groups during the Field review; and a specialist in governance matters who helped design and conduct the Governance Survey. With funding from a PPF for the SECAL, the Government contracted a consultant to serve as the chief facilitator for the Workshop. The AFTCB Task Manager for the IEA coordinated closely with the RIPA International team. In two joint working sessions, the concept and framework for the IEA were discussed and agreed. Activities were jointly planned and collaboratively executed in close cooperation with the Government’s chief facilitator.

With the help of the RIPA International team member in the field, the Government made all the logistical arrangements to enable the Workshop to run smoothly (despite the much larger than expected attendance). With the help of the chief facilitator it had contracted under the PPF, the Government took charge of the Workshop, which was opened by The Gambia’s Vice President. Plenary sessions were chaired by the Secretary General and other senior officials. The interest and involvement of participants was such that an additional day of work was required, and attendance was consistently high during the entire event. Although the chief facilitator had been assigned the task of monitoring and control of the process, in the event, the directive roles played by the Chairpersons considerably constrained the chief facilitator’s role. Despite attempts by the facilitator to advise the Chairpersons on corrective action during the proceedings, there were points at which control of the Workshop process was lost, and discussions strayed. In retrospect, it might have been better to arrange for the Chairpersons to be selected and thoroughly briefed by the facilitator well in advance.

The diverse professional composition and the large size of each work group, with representation from several ministries, made the task of the Field Review rather difficult. For example, representatives from the sectoral ministries (e.g., health, education) had difficulty identifying symptomatic economic problems. Furthermore, work groups tended to focus on impediments rather than on problem areas, thus getting ahead of the tasks that were planned for the Workshop. Due to this emphasis of the work groups on impediments rather than on problems, the Workshop syndicate groups had difficulty in differentiating between internal causes of symptomatic problems and external impediments, which in many instances were rooted in deficiencies at a higher level, i.e., system-wide administrative functions. In retrospect, it might have been better to specialize the groups by ministries or sectors and to ensure that the tiered method of analysis would be upheld. Likewise, the
syndicate groups at the Workshop might have been reminded of the analytical framework and the method of analysis proposed. This might have been facilitated by forming smaller groups.

The tasks assigned to the syndicate groups proved to be more than these groups could accomplish in the time allotted. The Workshop did, however, develop important assessment information from the materials provided by the Desk and Field reviews and the Governance Survey. This information took the form of sets of five problem analyses for each of the three segments of the Workshop framework: symptomatic core economic problems; system-wide public administration functions and problems; and structural governance problems. The fifteen problems to be analyzed were prioritized by participants (Annex G) and then merged by the Action Plan Drafting Committee into seven key areas to be considered for SECAL attention (Annex H). It was also decided by the Workshop that the seven modules would be further refined and expanded by the Drafting Committee to bring them closer to the required projectization to be taken up by the SECAL pre-appraisal and appraisal missions. Problem areas were identified irrespective of donor interests or the fact that the exercise took place in the context of preparing a World Bank operation. It was understood that while the SECAL might not pick up all or even most of the identified components, it would provide an organizing framework to guide reform efforts by the Government and concerned donors.

As mentioned earlier, it was the intent of the Workshop leadership (PMO) to conclude the four-day effort with an Action Plan—a provision not included in the original Workshop design. The head of the PMO wanted the Action Plan to be prepared with broad participation and to pull together the conclusions of the Workshop in a way that would propel participants into action. At the end of the Workshop, however, there was hesitation on the part of the leadership about eliciting the elements for such a plan from participants in plenary. This hesitation was in part due to the leadership’s perception that the assembled group lacked the technical expertise to specify an Action Plan that would lead to discussions with the World Bank—a task better suited (in the leadership’s view) to existing technical groups within the Government. Some of the Workshop participants clearly resented the proposal to shift the responsibility for drafting an Action Plan to existing technical committees in the Government. The compromise reached was to refer the task to a modified Drafting Committee that would meet following the Workshop; this Committee was seen by most members of the Workshop Steering Committee as better equipped to interact with the standing Government groups. The Workshop concluded with the ranking of the fifteen problem areas and the formulation of the seven potential components for SECAL consideration—as had been proposed by the Drafting Committee.

The Workshop fell short of carrying problem analysis all the way to identifying specific activities that would provide the basis for projectizing the SECAL or other donor assistance. It became clear, as the ad hoc groups started to work, that it was unrealistic to expect the Workshop to fully deliver on this design requirement. Discussion remained mainly at the level of overall change action required to remove the impediments identified. The syndicate groups were rather large, and time constraints did not allow for in-depth consideration of activities that would configure specific project components. Furthermore, most participants were uninformed as to the content of the ongoing policy dialogue between the World Bank and the Government. This might have been remedied by some advance training of group participants in methods of problem analysis and institutional diagnosis, as well as by prior briefing on the policy dialogue with the World Bank. Such advance training might also have included an introduction to the conceptual
framework undergirding the IEA and driving the Workshop, i.e., the tiered diagnostic analysis going from symptomatic problems, to system-wide administrative functions, to governance structures. Clarification of the framework, along with local illustrations, was attempted during the Workshop plenary through a presentation utilizing the illustration in Annex B, as well as a presentation on the parallel tracks of analysis, using Diagram VI. It is noteworthy that few participants were aware of the macroeconomic policy issues under discussion with the World Bank. This was reflected in the low level of importance attached to the analysis track relating to specific reforms to deepen the on-going reforms in economic management.

Following the Workshop, the Bank staff, the chief facilitator, and the RIPA International team met with the PMO Permanent Secretary and certain members of the Drafting Committee to further develop several of the identified problem areas to take them closer to projectized components to be submitted for SECAL pre-appraisal review. In contrast to the role they had played at the Workshop, resource persons took a pro-active role during this session and tried to fill the technical gaps that had become apparent during discussion. The same exercise was to be undertaken with the remaining problem areas with the help of the Government’s consultant (chief facilitator) and made available to the pre-appraisal mission, further linking the IEA and project preparation. It was agreed, moreover, that this same group should meet periodically, and that the World Bank would call on it for future project appraisal work. The sustainable integration of this and other ad hoc groups into the stages and process of project preparation and implementation is to be monitored for evidence of the benefits of participation under the structured learning (SL) exercise.

Participation intended to strengthen ownership of a reform program is neither swift nor orderly. It is tumultuous and requires several iterations. The first IEA Workshop alone was not expected to ensure broad ownership of the reform process or of the SECAL project. It did, however, constitute a very good start in that direction, and the process initiated should be sustained with help from the World Bank and other donors concerned with improving economic management and advancing civil service reform in The Gambia. Assisting with sustainability will require keeping the syndicate groups engendered by the Workshop alive and involved in SECAL preparation. In this connection, it is crucial that SECAL preparation not be perceived as taking place on a restricted basis with the leadership of the MFEA, as this would discredit the participatory process launched.

Although there are several lessons to be learned from the IEA exercise, it has been judged by both the World Bank and the Government to have been by and large successful. The IEA Workshop achieved the goal of providing a forum for participation with both upward and downward communication—enhancing awareness of environmental impediments to civil service performance. The Workshop format created a climate conducive to a frank confrontation of the central problems affecting the functioning of the civil service as well as their root causes. While the Workshop fell short of identifying specific activities to support a SECAL, it was very successful in building consensus on the priority problem areas relating to economic management and civil service reform to be addressed by the SECAL or other donor assistance. More important, the IEA exercise created a network of key players who actively participated in the diagnostics as well as in the prioritization of reform action. Both the substantive accomplishments of the Workshop and the networking among its participants are expected to persist throughout project preparation and implementation. Evidence of this (discussed later in this paper) is already emerging. Government technical staff charged with preparing SECAL proposals have been interacting
Diagram VI: Cumulative Analysis—From Symptoms to Project Design

SECAL PROJECT DESIGN
AND OTHER GOVERNMENT REFORM INITIATIVES (EMCBP)

SECAL Deepening of Economic Management Reforms

SECAL Provides Continuity to SAL, CSR, Institutional Reforms

ACTIONS PLAN

Problem Analysis by Syndicate Groups

Problem Analysis by Syndicate Groups

Problem Analysis by Syndicate Groups

Symptomatic Problems Economic Management

Specific Governance Problems i.e. Transparency

Generic Governance Problems i.e. Interface between Executive & Legislature

Specific System-wide Administrative Problems i.e. Centralization

Generic System-wide Administrative Problems i.e. Incentives
with those who participated in the Workshop syndicate groups to ensure that the Workshop’s outcomes are adequately reflected in the SECAL proposals.

The process survey conducted at the end of the Workshop as part of the Structured Learning (SL) exercise revealed that a large number of participants agree that reforming The Gambia’s core economic management capacity is of great importance and needs urgent attention. A significant number of participants also stated that reforming economic management will require widespread fundamental restructuring of the civil service system. The survey likewise revealed that approximately 90 percent of the participants were committed to reform; this is an indication of their predisposition to accept the diagnosis as well as commit themselves to the goals of the proposed SECAL. Over a quarter of those surveyed claimed that they were ready to make sacrifices to ensure the achievement of reform results. Those participants willing to make an effort to achieve reform results were willing to do so even at the risk of alienating their superiors, who, according to the Survey, are not perceived to be genuinely committed to reform. (See Annex F for a summary of the findings of the survey conducted during the IEA Workshop.)

With respect to the process sequence to be pursued toward project preparation (described on page 19), the governance approach of the CSR Program requires that the product of Stage I of the IEA be internalized by the Government before proceeding to Stage II, which coincides with project preparation. In the case of The Gambia, despite considerable evidence of broad-based ownership of the diagnostic exercise by participants, further evidence of Government internalization is required. Government delivery on the follow-up steps for project preparation, and the extent to which these measures were actually taken by mobilizing the network developed at the IEA Workshop, would constitute such further evidence. Chapter VI discusses the Government’s initial response to the IEA in terms of SECAL preparatory activities.

**Governance Outcomes: A Patrimonial Profile**

**The Survey Experience**

The briefing with Government authorities prior to conducting the Governance Survey and the activities of the Field Review work groups (A, B, and C) considerably facilitated interaction between the survey staff and respondents. The survey instrument, originally designed to be self-administered, became, in some instances, a guiding checklist for structured interviews. This was the case when interviewing respondents outside the civil service as well as ministers—when respondents had time constraints, or when they preferred to have a structured interview. The wide coverage of the survey instrument required some conceptual explanations by the interviewer; this invariably prompted reactions by the respondents in addition to their direct replies to questions put to them. This dialogue made the interviews last over two hours—clearly a costly investment. Given the professional diversity of the respondents, interviewers needed to allow them to relate the governance questions to their particular interests. In addition, prior familiarization with the governance context in The Gambia proved invaluable to interviewers in establishing credibility and trust with their respondents. Furthermore, interviewers were often called upon to explain the meaning of governance and public management terminology, which served an important training objective. The trust developed between interviewers and respondents resulted in a very significant pay-off in terms of both the quantity and the quality of information.
The Governance Survey went well in terms of eliciting the collaboration of most respondents. The survey achieved its goal of creating an unprecedented forum for the Gambians to assess the environment within which their civil service operates. It also allowed for broad participation and served to increase awareness of environmental impediments to sound economic management in particular, and good civil service in general. The governance issues emerging from the survey were featured prominently and openly discussed at the Workshop. Participants seized the opportunity to vent their views and frustrations about the ways in which the civil service operates. Discussions were extremely candid. The Workshop elicited both defensiveness and constructive suggestions for addressing the problems identified. The low profile assumed by the large number of donor-sponsored consultants in attendance allowed the Gambians to take charge of discussions and deliberations.

Information developed from the Governance Survey covers a broad range of issues:

(i) Tax collection;
(ii) Allocation of resources according to policy;
(iii) Auditing of government accounts;
(iv) Public expenditure mismanagement;
(v) Accountability and transparency of Government actions;
(vi) Consultation with affected public;
(vii) Information to Parliament;
(viii) Compliance with regulations and laws;
(ix) Kinship ties and government decisions;
(x) Access by rural population to Government; and
(xi) Judicial infrastructure.

This wealth of governance information rendered discussions at the Workshop very insightful as to the real impediments to economic management and civil service performance. The extent to which the technical aide-memoire on governance prepared by the Desk Review assisted in shaping Work Group C’s inputs into the Workshop and the ensuing discussions has not been determined. The defensiveness shown by certain senior level officials at the Workshop—when sensitive governance flaws came up during discussions—speaks to the perceived relevance of the issues uncovered by the survey. The most dramatic issues raised concerned the roles of the Accountant General and of the Auditor General’s Offices as well as that of the Tax Commissioner.
Survey Findings: Governance Profile Analysis

Analysis of the respondents' answers leads to the conclusion that patrimonialism has an adverse effect on the performance of the civil service in The Gambia. Apart from confirming the central argument of *A Governance Approach to Civil Service Reform in Sub-Saharan Africa* (December 93) about the overriding effect of patrimonialism on the civil service performance, the survey validated the need for a governance approach to effective civil service reform. The Survey Instrument was made up of ninety statements and questions, of which eighteen were aimed at providing technical insights about good governance and seventy-two were designed to gauge the patrimonial profile of the civil service. Applying the patrimonial profile scale (described on page 39) on the seventy-two statements yielded the following profile summary:

(i) 14 percent of all responses scored "highly patrimonial";
(ii) 60 percent scored "patrimonial";
(iii) 20 percent scored "traces of patrimonialism"; and
(iv) 3 percent of the responses were on the borderline between "traces of patrimonialism" and "patrimonialism"; 3 percent were on the borderline between "traces of patrimonialism" and "non-patrimonial."

The sum of the "highly patrimonial" and "patrimonial" responses yields 74 percent—a high patrimonial rating. This analysis and the percentages given below are based on twenty-five responding civil servants. Some of the officials did not answer all questions. Non-officials (mainly participants from NGOs and private business) gave very similar responses but generally were more extreme, expressing stronger agreement or disagreement.

Issues that elicited "highly patrimonial" responses were:

(i) Lack of accountability in resource management (including resource mobilization, allocation, and financial management);
(ii) The size and scope of Government;
(iii) Personal interests overriding institutional efficiency;
(iv) Lack of transparency and openness—especially in the flow and availability of information to the people and the media;
(v) The condition of women in development as well as social services; and
(vi) Lack of effective representation.

Apparently, there are some of the most critical issues at all three levels of IEA analysis (symptomatic problems of economic management, system-wide administrative functions and problems, and governance institutions and structures).

At the level of symptomatic problems, the survey covered governance issues of resource mobilization, resource allocation, and institutional organization. Regarding resource mobilization, it is clear from the survey that it is affected by self-serving distortions.
percent of the respondents affirmed that revenue collection was below resource potential because of improprieties in tax administration. These included:

(i) Failure on the part of the Government to prosecute tax delinquents (agreed by 82 percent of the respondents);
(ii) Connivance between the tax staff and the business community;
(iii) Discretion in using the tax code for personal gain;
(iv) Unfair play to customers; and
(v) System-wide supervision failure. A high 96 percent of the respondents agreed—with 72 percent strongly agreeing—that revenue collection would improve if accountability were enhanced.

As discussions at the Workshop showed, political patronage to some well-connected businessmen has paralyzed the collection of Government revenue as well as the prosecution of tax delinquents.

Regarding resource allocation, 60 percent of the respondents disagreed that it was determined by policy priorities, and 50 percent did not perceive any actual link between policy priorities and resource allocation. One of the sources perceived to have distorted the link between policy priorities and resource allocation was power play among groups within the bureaucracy (agreed by 72 percent). It was also agreed by 84 percent of the respondents (with 60 percent agreeing strongly) that resource allocation geared toward private gain, the diversion of resources, and improper management behavior were indications of an unaccountable managerial framework. This in turn led to low levels of expenditure even in key sectors (agreed by 96 percent, with 64 percent agreeing strongly); and low productivity in public investment. Unaccountable management might have prompted the donors to get more involved in determining public investment—with the potential possibility of favoring their own views and motives with respect to the country's goals. Moreover, lack of managerial accountability would tend to exacerbate the downward economic spiral, as a dwindling resource base leads to thinner spreading around of resources across competing demands, arbitrary changes of the budget, delayed payment to suppliers, over-centralization of the accounting system, and outright fraud.

Responding on institutional organization in resource management, 72 percent disagreed with the statement that "there was adequate cooperation between ministries, departments, agencies, and civil groups in conducting consultations aimed at optimal resource allocation." Also, 76 percent responded negatively to the statement that "when allocating resources, the government takes into account the opinion of the civil society, including, sub-national (local) authorities, traditional institutions, non-governmental organizations, the media, and private enterprise." Yet only 44 percent of the respondents disagreed with the statement that "the parliamentary debates on the budget are genuine and allow the public interest to be reflected." Furthermore, 83 percent disagreed (54 percent strongly) with the statement that "the parliamentary committee on public accounts (PAC) is effective in ensuring timely consolidation of expenditure data." Finally, 96 percent agreed that personal interests override institutional effectiveness, even though civil servants are aware that this is harmful to the overall economic welfare of The Gambia.
At the level of system-wide administrative functions and problems, in addition to expressing generally negative views about the governance environment, respondents most frequently singled out remuneration, staff management, accountability, staff morale, and leadership when they were asked to identify the main reasons for poor civil service performance and the areas in which they found the public service to be weakest. Seventy-one percent responded that senior civil servants thought more about efforts to supplement their eroded wages than about their official tasks. While remuneration is obviously a technical problem, it has governance implications in The Gambia because, even though all civil servants are under-paid, some have privileges that may compensate for their low pay. In related statements, 68 percent of those surveyed responded that social connections rather than training and professional qualifications determined staff advancement; 70 percent responded negatively about fairness in awarding promotions and scholarships; and 78 percent agreed that it was hard to get things done in the civil service without the "right connections." When asked why—despite their awareness of all these distortions—they had decided to join and remain in the civil service, the majority responded that the civil service was the only viable employer and trainer.

Of the respondents, 91 percent agreed (50 percent strongly) that senior- and middle-level leadership in the public service was weak and tended to emphasize administrative detail rather than policy. Responding to a statement on delegation within ministries and departments, most of those questioned commented that personalization of official duties prevented delegation to the extent that important ministerial operations would hardly proceed when the minister was away from the office. The practice of identifying government activity with an individual may perhaps explain the over-centralization of accounting and auditing functions in the persons of the Accountant General and the Auditor General, respectively. Furthermore, 95 percent of the respondents agreed that "the lack of human resource capacity—even in government institutions charged with managing public funds, such as the Accountant General's Office and the Auditor General's Office, underlines the seriousness of the governance distortions in the accountability of public resource management." Since 79 percent strongly agreed that the size of the civil service in The Gambia is too large, it would seem that human and financial resources deployment in The Gambia reflects patrimonial ascriptive criteria rather than performance and productivity.

At the level of governance structures and culture, survey responses indicated that, despite The Gambia's democratic tradition, the institutional environment cannot provide adequate checks and balances against abuse of official authority and power. It is interesting to note that 96 percent of the respondents indicated that they believe strongly that the people of The Gambia have the right to know and criticize the Government because they put it in power. In addition, 83 percent strongly agreed that the people need to be better informed about how they can make their wishes known to their members of parliament. In their additional comments obtained during the survey and in the Workshop discussions, it was pointed out that the effective participation of most Members of Parliament in parliamentary debates was hampered by their low proficiency in English—the only working language in Parliament. In reaction to a question on the culture of secrecy, 83 percent of the respondents strongly agreed that more information about government activity should be made available to the public, while 88 percent strongly agreed that the press should have the right to report on all court cases and parliamentary debates.
Interviews outside the civil service, especially those conducted in rural Gambia, indicated that the high illiteracy rate that pervades the Gambian electorate fetters information flow to the people and from the people. In this setting, it is interesting that 80 percent of the civil service respondents nevertheless agreed (52 percent strongly) that the state is relatively unresponsive to the civil society, and that "more pressure is needed from Members of Parliament and voters to make the civil service more effective." This objective remains remote in juxtaposition with the additional comments made by opinion leaders outside the civil service indicating that the Parliament has been marginalized into a rubber-stamping institution. It is clear that the civil service is pressed between a relatively illiterate, apathetic civil society and an insufficiently enabling structural environment of the state. Under such conditions, the civil service can hardly perform core economic management and service delivery functions in an accountable and socially effective manner.

**Patrimonialism and the Civil Service**

Distortions in tax administration, budgeting, and budget execution demonstrate the extent to which patrimonial traits underlie core economic functions in The Gambia. It should be noted that, although revenue collection is below resource potential, mostly because of corruption, the problem has greatly intensified ever since political patronage frustrated attempts to prosecute leading delinquents. In interviews outside the civil service, opinion leaders observed that tax evasion has spread to the wider civil society, which, besides being aware of abuses by few, has increasingly found less value-for-money in terms of the services rendered by the Government. While political patronage hinders the effective collection of revenue, the ineffectiveness of the state disheartens the people from contributing to their country's and their own development. This partly explains the Government's dependence on two sources of public revenue: the re-export trade and donor financing.

Patrimonial traits also lead to problems of financial management that have specific negative implications for the auditing function as a critical part of financial and economic information about Government activities. In The Gambia, the Auditor General's Office is supposed to derive its authority from the Constitution and to perform the function of monitoring Government compliance with financial regulations. The legal provision mandates it to be independent and to report directly to Parliament. Yet survey responses and Workshop discussions showed that, in practice, the Auditor General's Office does not have its own budget and depends on the Accountant General's Office for funds, staff needs, and public expenditure data. Clearly, such an institutional arrangement—whereby the Auditor General depends for financial resources on those to be audited—undermines the Office's authority; and in fact, the Auditor General's Office is several years in arrears. Furthermore, the accounting and auditing (A&A) professionals are by regulation under the Accountant General for their placement and career development. Thus, the probability is high that A&A

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19 One potential area of conditionality for the SECAL is to require the Government to allow the Tax Commissioner to deal with tax code violations administratively or by referring serious cases to the Public Prosecutor's Office. Anti-corruption operations might also be undertaken, starting with big offenders—as has been done in Hong Kong, Singapore, and Malaysia, which have dealt successfully with corruption.
staff are impelled to orient their allegiance toward the Accountant General rather than the heads of the departments and ministries to which they are posted.

The situation described here only reinforces the over-centralization of the accounting system and exacerbates the lack of financial accountability. Support for decentralization, affirmed by 88 percent of the survey respondents, was reflected in the heated debate during the Workshop that resulted in (among other outcomes) the recommendation to amend the Finance and Audit Act.\(^{20}\) Inability to consolidate expenditure data in time and delays in audit reports facilitate fraud; while over-centralization of the accounting system makes it cumbersome for funds to be made available and for payments to be made on time. This leads to delays in program/project implementation as well as to both internal corruption (among the accounting and auditing staff and other civil servants in payments of staff allowances) and external (in payments to service providers and in procurement).

As is shown in the Survey results, personnel management is distorted by the relative preeminence of personal interests over institutional goals. In the interviews, several respondents mentioned that in a considerable number of cases, staff placement is politically inspired. One respondent called this form of patrimonial distortion "square pegs in round holes." In legal terms, the Public Service Commission (PSC) was supposed to be independent and wholly in charge of induction and promotion on merit. Both survey responses and Workshop discussion indicated, however, that the Commission in practice reports to the Secretary General/Head of the Civil Service, who in turn reports to the President. In another complex organizational arrangement, the Personnel Management Office (PMO) is procedurally barred from instituting disciplinary procedures on civil servants and has to refer the cases to the Commission. Since the Commission's decisions are not final and independent, well-connected civil servants go unpunished. As with tax delinquents, patronage directed at one civil servant sends wrong signals to the entire civil service.

It is worth noting the frankness displayed by most of the respondents in "reading" the patrimonial environment in which the civil service operates. Finally, the survey results confirmed some of the conclusions drawn by the Bank's Desk Review. The responses obtained from respondents enabled the IEA to discern the particular characteristics of the "friendly" patrimonial environment in The Gambia that would qualify it as "benign patrimonialism." This conclusion provides two lessons for World Bank operations:

(i) The performance of the civil service is seriously constrained by structural and environmental obstacles. Hence, it is not enough for political leaders to declare commitment to reform while the character of the public administration system and its governance culture limit the propensity of the civil service to manage the economy effectively.

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\(^{20}\) The Finance and Audit Act was inherited from the British Colonial Administration. It was designed to enhance centralized financial control by the governor, and it was suitable for small civil services (about 200-strong in colonial administrations). In recent years, countries that inherited similar legislation—for example Kenya and Tanzania—have changed the law into an Exchequer and Audit Act. Consequently, the Accountant General retains a "pay-master" or treasury function, while the Permanent Secretaries become chief accounting officers in their respective ministries, and the Auditor General's Office becomes autonomous and reports to the legislature.
(ii) The prevalence of patrimonialism is a strenuous challenge to technical assistance (TA). It limits TA impact on the ground and compromises opportunities for building local capacity. Unless a serious reform process removes patrimonial impediments and evolves environmental and institutional mechanisms of good governance, patrimonial traits—characterized by distortions such as tax evasion—will continue to pervade economic management functions.

Survey conclusions thus suggest a governance environment that would benefit from an operation that deepened the achievements realized under SALs I and II and at the same time helped create an enabling environment for the civil service to manage economic reform. Put simply, fixing the economy requires fixing the governance environment so as to remove the patrimonial obstacles. This in turn requires that civil servants be rewarded for their efforts by adequate pay and incentives rather than by patronage.
V. FROM THE IEA TO PROJECT DESIGN: LESSONS LEARNED

The IEA Network

An important goal of participatory project preparation on the basis of an IEA is that participants in project design continue to be involved in project preparation and remain involved in project implementation so as to ensure sustainability. At present, the Gamb'a SECAL is under preparation; therefore, outcomes as to the continuity of the participant network developed by the IEA can only be assessed in terms of its involvement with project preparation. The follow-up mission discussed in Chapter VI of this report ascertained the continuity of the network. In view of the existence of several standing work groups under the structure of the UNDP's Economic Management Capacity Building Project (EMCBP), some overlap between these groups and the IEA network is to be expected.

The network created by the Workshop rests on five syndicate groups that were established to analyze and discuss the large amount of information brought to the Workshop from the Desk and Field reviews and the Governance Survey. Members of these groups were selected at random, mostly from the membership of Field Review Work Groups A, B, and C, with a few members having chosen their groups. The Chairmanship of each syndicate group rotated according to the topic of discussion, i.e., when symptomatic problems were being analyzed, each syndicate group had as its Chairman a member of Work Group A. Each syndicate group had two resource persons from among the donors represented. A rapporteur was selected to make presentations in the plenary and to liaise with the chief rapporteur. The membership of the syndicate groups was held constant throughout the Workshop, so as to consolidate group dynamics and provide cumulative continuity of analysis at all levels.

Immediately following the Workshop, the modified Drafting Committee met several times to expand and refine the seven modules outlined during the Workshop as the basis for possible SECAL components. These meetings were held jointly with the two standing Working Groups created by EMCBP—one on Public Investment and another on Public Expenditure Programming—to focus on the two modules dealing with economic management. The remaining five modules, dealing with civil service reform, were refined by members of the Drafting Committee jointly with EMCBP's standing Working Group on Human Resource Development (Annex I). The refined modules resulting from the two joint exercises will be integrated through the Committee on Strategic Planning before being presented to the Government's High Level Committee for final approval. This dovetailing between the participatory network coming out of the IEA Workshop and existing working groups in the Government suggests the likelihood of continuity of the group interaction launched at the Workshop. All of these working groups (the Government ones as well as the ones coming out of the Workshop) are supported by the technical secretariat of UNDP's EMCBP.

It is anticipated that the five syndicate groups that analyzed symptomatic problems, system-wide administrative functions and problems, and governance structures and culture will be reconvened in the course of project preparation to further refine and expand the seven modules formulated by the Drafting Committee. This refinement should be done on the basis
of the results of the analytical exercise conducted by the syndicate groups at the Workshop, which were not fully integrated into the seven modules prepared by the Drafting Committee. It is also expected that this work will be undertaken in joint collaboration with the standing working groups under EMCBP.

Refining IEA Outputs for Pre-Appraisal/Appraisal

At the Workshop, within very tight time constraints, the syndicate groups were able to analyze problem areas by following the proposed methodology. The fact that all of the syndicate groups applied a common analytical approach facilitated moving from problem diagnosis toward actionable measures for change, even if the formulation of specific measures proved elusive. The fifteen problem areas processed by the syndicate groups were:

A. Symptomatic Problems

Syndicate Group 1: Revenue collection below potential.
Syndicate Group 2: Resources allocated to organizational units rather than to programs based on policies, priorities, or benefits and costs.
Syndicate Group 3: Centralization of budget execution for control purposes only.
Syndicate Group 4: Improvement and modernization efforts focused internally rather than on the interface between the civil service and private sector as a client.
Syndicate Group 5: Resource dependence and external influence over economic policy.

B. System-wide Administrative Functions

Syndicate Group 1: Over-centralization of the accounting function.
Syndicate Group 2: Lack of training and staff development.
Syndicate Group 3: Poor conditions of service.
Syndicate Group 4: Inadequate management of information system.
Syndicate Group 5: Lack of autonomy of Auditor General.

C. Governance Structures and Culture

Syndicate Group 1: Objectives and scope of government.
Syndicate Group 2: How to get better service delivery and value for money from the civil service.
Syndicate Group 3: Encroachment on the constitutional powers of PSC.
Syndicate Group 4: Civil service rules and regulations and ministerial operations.
Syndicate Group 5: Communication channels between the government and the people.

The prioritization of these fifteen problem areas was undertaken in the plenary and was not intended to be a reflection of the analytical work done by the five syndicate groups, although that work may have had an effect on the prioritization (Annex G). Seven modules for
SEACAL consideration were extracted from the work of the syndicate groups by eliminating duplication and merging related topics (Annex H).

Prioritized problem areas were merged on the basis of affinity. The resulting seven modules do not reflect the prioritization of problem areas. For example, Module I is the product of merging problem areas 2, 3, and 4 under category A, which were ranked by the Workshop as 5th, 9th, and 13th. This module relates essentially to budgeting dysfunctions—a critical resource allocation issue identified by the Desk Review. Module II relates to insufficient revenue generation—a critical resource-mobilization problem also identified by the Desk Review. The remaining modules are a combination of system-wide administrative functions and governance issues.

Module III centers on civil service regulations and their orderly issuance—a problem not identified in the Desk Review. Module IV centers on the scope of government and functional distribution among levels of government—an issue raised in the Desk Review. Module V is intended to correct over-centralization of accounting and dependency of the auditing function; the issues in this module were not identified in the Desk Review. Module VI addresses conditions of service and the role of the Public Service Commission. The issues supporting this module were also not identified in the Desk Review. Module VII focuses on training and staff development; the training issue was amply discussed in the Desk Review done by the World Bank.

Despite the emphasis of the IEA design on economic management functions and their symptomatic problems, the Workshop discussions clearly favored issues having to do with system-wide administrative functions and governance. It is not clear whether participants saw the latter as more important issues or whether the purely technical aspects of resource allocation and mobilization were not adequately represented in the IEA activities—given the scarcity of skills in these areas. For SECAL preparation, the lesson learned is that economic management was clearly perceived as dependent on the quality of governance practices as well as on the effectiveness of system-wide administrative functions.

SECAL project preparation under way at the time of writing will benefit from a variety of products coming out of the Workshop:

(i) The analytical work of the five syndicate groups;
(ii) The seven module outlines (Annex H);
(iii) Supplementary problem analyses and module refinement by members of the syndicate groups in coordination with standing working groups (EMCBP) (Annex I);
(iv) Guidelines provided by the pre-appraisal mission based on policy dialogue and World Bank project models (Annex J); and
(v) The set of proposed elements for a civil service reform program under the SECAL provided by the Workshop facilitator.
In addition, Government staff may also access technical reports on resource allocation and resource mobilization by resident advisors and the earlier-mentioned ESW report, "The Gambia Institutional Development Assessment" (see page 29 and footnote 16), prepared as part of World Bank economic and sectoral work (ESW). The manner in which the SECAL project preparation team in the Government are utilizing all of these products to proceed with the preparation of the project is discussed later in this report (page 60); all six products should, however, prove useful for carrying out this task.

Given the on-going policy dialogue and customary interaction between the Government and the World Bank, project preparation is firmly under the control of the Permanent Secretary of the MFEA, supported by the Strategic Planning Committee, which has the EMCBP as its secretariat. Preparatory work on resource allocation is seen to be advanced—mostly due to technical reports prepared with substantial inputs from resident advisors. These reports include specific objectives for budgeting reform, required activities, and expected results, as well as institutional arrangements and responsibilities. Since these technical proposals were undertaken with considerable inputs from expatriate advisors, their internalization by Government is problematic. It is equally difficult to assess the extent to which these proposed systems can be implemented—given the need to correct the problems at the level of system-wide administrative functions identified at the Workshop. It is expected that, through close interaction between the Government’s Strategic Planning Committee and the syndicate groups constituted at the IEA Workshop, an element of realism will be injected into these technical proposals. Preparatory work on resource mobilization is seen as less advanced than that on resource allocation, since government technical staff had—at the time of this writing—not followed up on the recommendations of the Harvard Institute for International Development.

The Configuration of the SECAL

World Bank procedure requires that project pre-appraisal start only after an Initial Executive Project Summary (IEPS) or an Initiating Memorandum (IM) has been prepared and cleared by the Bank. These documents, in turn, should reflect the objectives of the operation, the issues driving it, and an outline of the proposed project. These constitute powerful determining factors in project preparation, despite the participatory process that follows. In this pilot case, it is expected that the IM, which triggered the pre-appraisal mission, will be applied with considerable flexibility, allowing for substantial modification in response to the findings of the IEA.

The aggregate results of the Governance Survey and of the analysis of economic management and civil service problems conducted during the Workshop suggest that The Gambia public administration is ready for a World Bank hybrid-type Public Administration Adjustment Operation, as prescribed in the Governance Approach to Civil Service Reform in Sub-Saharan Africa.21 This preliminary conclusion, to be confirmed once The Gambian

Government proceeds with project preparation, would suggest a lending operation that includes:

(i) A sector adjustment component, supporting policy change geared to the removal of both technical and environmental distortions affecting the management of core economic management functions identified; and

(ii) Targeted correction of public administration draw-backs which, according to the Workshop participants, particularly compromise the Government’s ability to manage the economy.

A hybrid-type administrative adjustment operation usually starts with the identification of a few critical core government functions that are under-performing to the point of becoming an impediment to development. It then goes on to examine system-wide administrative deficiencies as well as governance impediments that account for the breakdown in core economic management functions. These operations are not intended to address comprehensive civil service reforms; they are designed to remove specific impediments to economic management or specific public service provision and/or delivery. They are "hybrid" in the sense that they include both a sector-adjustment and a technical-assistance component. The sector-adjustment component supports policy changes targeted to remove interrelated governance and civil service reform impediments, such as the dependence of the Auditor General’s Office and the excessive over-centralization and power of the Accountant General’s Office in The Gambia. Such impediments are associated with patrimonialism of considerable intensity. These policy changes are likely to have an effect on the role of the state and the performance of state institutions, as well as to cause changes in key system-wide administrative functions.

The IEA for The Gambia revealed that improved economic management requires decentralization of the public accounting function and enhanced accountability of the chief accounting officers in the ministries. This decentralization—with appropriate shifts in authority over public expenditures (from the Accountant General to the permanent secretaries in ministries)—would enhance the overall financial accountability of the line ministries. It would also enable more accountability of the Executive Branch to Parliament through the autonomous functioning of the Auditor General’s Office. In addition, the envisaged hybrid-type operation includes provisions to technically strengthen those units of Government that support such functions as budgeting, tax policy, and administration. The technical assistance component of a hybrid operation may be used to jump-start the technical strengthening referred to here—or, more important, to support the commercialization or decentralization of Government functions amenable to being commercialized or decentralized. In the case of The Gambia, although the IEA identified the need for further studies to identify such functions, tax administration was singled out as one possible candidate for autonomous management. Some discussion took place during the IEA Workshop to set up in The Gambia a system similar to Ghana’s Tax Board.

The governance profile of The Gambia that emerged from the IEA Workshop suggests that the civil service is the prime conduit for patrimonial practices that have a direct bearing on resource allocation and resource mobilization. Instead of being outright autocratic in the use of bureaucratic power, the ruling elite uses the civil service persuasively rather than
forcefully to its ends—hence the *benign patrimonialism* characterization discussed earlier in this report. It is equally clear from the IEA that improving economic management, especially in the resource mobilization area, will necessitate significant changes in governance practices. For example, the prosecution of tax evaders must not be politically hampered. Therefore, administrative changes in the way in which tax delinquency is dealt with administratively or through litigation will have to be clearly spelled out. This means that improvement of economic management and civil service reform must be addressed jointly. Accordingly, civil service reform should not be a free-standing component of this SECAL alongside the resource mobilization and allocation components, as reflected in the original IEPS. It should instead consist of a select group of changes in the functioning of the Civil Service, driven by the specific requirements of improved economic management. A separate project may be identified from the outcome of the IEA for a comprehensive Civil Service Reform Program to be pursued by the World Bank or another donor at a later stage.
VI. PROGRESS REPORT ON SECAL PREPARATION

Two months after the IEA workshop, in February 1994, a follow-up mission to The Gambia was carried out to assess progress with the SECAL preparation and to ascertain the sustainability of the IEA process. The mission was particularly interested in verifying the extent to which the network engendered by the IEA was preserved and supporting the SECAL preparation work. Also of concern to the mission was the utility of the IEA products for SECAL preparation (listed on page 54).

IEA Sustainability

At the time of the mission, the syndicate groups established at the IEA Workshop were continuing to meet, although in a modified configuration. As already mentioned, directly after the Workshop, the entire Drafting Committee—expanded to include additional members who had participated in the Workshop syndicate groups—met to follow up on the IEA. Because of its size and its members' diverse expectations and perspectives on the SECAL, the expanded group was split into two drafting groups: Group A on Economic Management and Group B on Civil Service Reform. This split was unfortunate, as it accentuated the cleavages between the two aspects of the SECAL.

Group A reflected the composition of the Public Expenditure Program and Public Investment Program (PEP/PIP) Working Groups of EMCBP; and Group B essentially duplicated the membership of the Human Resources Development Working Group of EMCBP, though with some additional members. The two groups had been meeting regularly in connection with the preparation of the civil service reform component of the SECAL document. Assistance from USAID consultants and from the advisor on budgeting provided under the SECAL Project Preparation Facility (PPF) was made available to Group A. Substantial technical assistance and secretariat inputs from UNDP expatriate consultants associated with EMCBP were made available to Group B. Group B, which chose to draw quite heavily on consultant help, had been more productive in its preparatory activities. Group A, which opted to work independently—despite the substantial technical work produced by the expatriate consultant funded under the PPF—had not progressed very far with its draft.

It was quite apparent to the mission that splitting the Drafting Committee along topical and institutional lines had generated some tension between the Personnel Management Office (PMO) and the Ministry of Financial and Economic Affairs (MFEA). This tension—associated with a polarization of interests between the PMO and the MFEA with respect to the SECAL—had compartmentalized the SECAL, undesirably insulating the economic management issues from those of civil service reform. It was also clear to the mission that many group members' expectations that the SECAL would either directly or indirectly bring about considerable improvement in the conditions of service in public administration accounted for much of their interest in the project. Other expectations of the SECAL are also nudging the preparatory work toward a rather complex
project—substantiating the hypothesis about the effect of multiple expectations from participatory projects derived from the Structured Learning exercise (page 24).

With the assistance of professional services funded by USAID, the MFEA conducted its own institutional assessment in the form of a Strategic Planning Seminar using the approach of Management Services International (a consulting firm under contract with USAID). The Seminar built on some of the materials of the IEA and had a strong impact on the technical staff of the MFEA. As this was being perceived by the PMO as a "competing" initiative running in parallel, it was agreed with the Government that this MFEA initiative should be "mainstreamed" into the IEA process. This development suggests that, despite the common impetus during the IEA exercise to jointly design a project, once members recede into their own institutions, the usual institutional cleavages tend to take over.

According to several Gambian officials, the IEA exercise either triggered or accelerated several measures related to governance and civil service reform. The measures launched, which required high-level Government clearance, included:

(i) Establishment of a *genuinely autonomous* Auditor General with appropriate staff;
(ii) Creation of an autonomous Revenue Board;
(iii) Establishment of a Complaints Committee with the functions of an Ombudsman;
(iv) Revision of the Court System to make it more efficient and accessible to citizens;
(v) "Hiving off" (through commercialization or privatization) such Government functions as those performed by the Post Office, Radio Gambia, and the Government Printing Office;
(vi) Establishment of an autonomous scheme of service for the teaching corps of the Ministry of Education;
(vii) Conversion of the janitor, messenger, and driver services currently under the Government into privately operated enterprises; and
(viii) Adoption of a Code of Ethics for civil servants as a measure to discourage corrupt practices.

Most of these initiatives have been subject to Presidential/Cabinet decisions or continuing discussion in the Cabinet, as reflected by Cabinet deliberations. The mission obtained documentation on such decisions/discussions.

Discussions at the IEA Workshop had focused mostly on governance and civil service issues, somewhat crowding out economic management issues, despite the Workshop's initial focus on economic management. The heated governance debate left no negative residue. It is clear that several of the governance initiatives listed here were linked to the IEA exercise. However, the IEA Workshop's conclusion that the Accountant General had undue powers was, at the time of the follow-up mission, disputed by some officials in the MFEA. Discussions with the mission indicated that, while the Accountant General's office is de facto centralizing, this is so by default. In effect, Permanent Secretaries in the ministries do have broad discretion on financial matters, but they have failed to exercise it. It was further acknowledged that the Accountant General's Office does have considerable influence in
arbitrating among conflicting interests during budgetary execution. This arbitrariness of the Office should be corrected through improvements of the budgetary system.

The follow-up mission left with the impression that the IEA had catalyzed a host of initiatives that are poised for further study and implementation, provided adequate technical and financial resources are made available. The mission also concluded that Government was ready to act on these initiatives outside the scope of the SECAL and therefore had mobilized resources from donors other than the World Bank.

Given the state of readiness on the part of the World Bank to advance preparation of the SECAL, the mission found it advisable to assist in efforts to find resources for the Government to implement such initiatives while the momentum is strong.

Preparations for Appraisal

As a result of the drifting apart of Groups A and B, the SECAL documentation being prepared consisted of two independent reports with considerably different orientations and clearly lacking a shared strategy. This documentation would not facilitate the preparation of the hybrid-type SECAL operation as prompted by the results of the IEA. This outcome suggests that the drafting stage of SECAL preparation was not reflecting the tone and focus of group work under the IEA—a matter of some concern, warranting corrective action. The mission concluded from these findings that a follow-up Workshop shortly before appraisal is warranted—further substantiating the SL hypothesis that participatory project preparation is a costly proposition.

Standard World Bank practice requires that borrowers prepare documentation for the joint appraisal of a project with the Bank. Because of this requirement—and the need for the document to reflect the views and needs of the different Government agencies authoring the document—the results of the work of the two groups drafting the SECAL preparatory documents in The Gambia are not likely to be fully representative of the prior consensual approach to project formulation. The challenge ahead in the case of The Gambia is to carry the quality and momentum of the IEA into the SECAL drafting stage and then into appraisal.

In an attempt to meet the challenge mentioned here, the follow-up mission recommended that an effort be made to combine the documents, merging all "institutional" proposals under the Civil Service Reform component and keeping only the technical proposals on resource mobilization and allocation separate. It was further recommended that the Civil Service Reform component concentrate on those proposals seeking to contribute to the removal of impediments to economic management. It was also suggested that a broader Civil Service Reform program, to re-energize certain parts of the Administrative Reform Program (ARP), could be presented separately for financing by other donors. The mission concluded an agreement with the Government on how to proceed to prepare acceptable documentation to prepare the ground for the SECAL appraisal.
Next Steps

Given that the IEA in The Gambia seems to have engendered several initiatives addressing the most salient governance issues, the follow-up mission discussed several possible courses of action building on the momentum generated by the IEA.

At the outset of the IEA, it was stressed that while the SECAL (page 42 and Diagram VI) would be the vehicle to fund an administration adjustment operation, certain issues would emerge from the exercise that could be addressed under funding arrangements with other donors. Certain problem areas discussed at the IEA Workshop should be covered by the SECAL: overhauling of the Accountant General's Office and the accounting system; strengthening the PMO; autonomy of the Auditor General's Office; and the setting up of the National Revenue Board. However, to build on the momentum generated by the IEA and the Government's predisposition to act on several of these fronts, timely appraisal of the SECAL is crucial to reaping the benefits of this substantial investment in project preparation.

To sustain the project preparation momentum—in the absence of a timely World Bank appraisal response—the mission assisted the Government in identifying initial funding that could later be folded into the SECAL financial package. Accordingly:

(i) The initiative to set up an autonomous Auditor General's Office could be jointly supported by ODA and direct assistance by the World Bank under the regional initiative on Audit and Accounting of the Africa Technical Department.

(ii) The setting up of an autonomous post office could be assisted by an Institutional Development Fund (IDF) grant.

(iii) The upgrading of the court system could be supplemented by an Institutional Development Fund (IDF) grant in coordination with USAID.

(iv) The strengthening of the PMO's strategic planning capability—as the leading government unit supporting the SECAL—could be undertaken under the current PPF.

The remaining initiatives could be addressed directly under the SECAL.

While an IEA is primarily intended to be a means of preparing sustainable World Bank projects, its benefits to the borrower go beyond securing a loan or credit. In the case so far documented in the Gambia, the IEA has triggered initiatives that are likely to run their course irrespective of the approval of a SECAL. In this limited sense, the IEA has already demonstrated its value. Its fruition into a fully developed SECAL—hopefully one that will follow the configuration of the engendered hybrid Administration Adjustment Operation—will be the ultimate test of success. As mentioned earlier, it is now up to the World Bank's traditional style of project preparation to give way to more flexible and adaptable practices that truly live up to both the good intentions articulated in the Wapenhans initiative on the improvement of portfolio management and the Africa Region's emphasis on further empowerment of borrowers during project preparation. It is hoped that this report on The Gambia's experience with an IEA will make a difference in facilitating this transition to more effective and participatory project preparation practices.
ANNEX A. FRAMEWORK FOR SYNDICATE (AD HOC) GROUP DISCUSSIONS AND PRESENTATIONS
(Symptom ... > systems ... > structure)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>KEY PRIORITY ISSUES RELATING TO:</th>
<th>INTERNAL/EXTERNAL IMPEDIMENT</th>
<th>REQUIRED CHANGE ACTION: OR FURTHER STUDIES</th>
<th>CURRENT REFORM ACTIVITIES</th>
<th>PROPOSED ACTIVITIES</th>
<th>PRE-CONDITIONS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(A) CORE ECONOMIC FUNCTIONS (SYMPTOMS)</td>
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<tr>
<td>(B) GOVT WIDE SYSTEMS (SYSTEMS)</td>
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<td>(C) GOVERNANCE (STRUCTURES)</td>
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ANNEX B. AN EXAMPLE USING THE COMMON ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK

AN EXAMPLE:

Problem: Tax Revenues below potential

IMPEDIMENTS:

Ext. (a) Public does not see value for tax
       (b) Tax base limited

Int. (a) Tax Collection ineffective
       (b) No institutional/individual incentives to effective collection (vulnerability to corruption
       (c) Tax code with loopholes
       (d) Loose enforcement

CHANGE ACTION: STUDY

(a) Better understanding of public’s perception/activities to benefits/value
(b) Better understanding of real limits of tax base
(c) Rationalize/streamline tax administration
(d) Create institutional (budget) and individual (compensation) incentives for higher of tax collection
(e) Shift from reactive to proactive collection/enforcement mode

STRATEGIES

Current: Intensive/extensive use of indirect taxation

Alternative: (a) Shift to direct taxes
             (b) Adopt incentives to collect effectively

PROPOSED ACTIVITIES

(a) Review (study) tax code
(b) Undertake survey of tax payer activities
(c) Undertake management review of tax administration

PRECONDITIONS

(a) Act of Parliament to revise tax code
(b) Political will to pursue tax issue
ANNEX C. INSTITUTIONAL ENVIRONMENT ASSESSMENT (IEA)
HYPOTHESES ON PROBLEM AREAS
IN THE GAMBIA

A. ECONOMIC FUNCTIONS

I. RESOURCE MOBILIZATION

1. Resource mobilization is a function of the tax collection system. A well designed and administered system is necessary for efficient generation of Government revenue.

   - the tax system: income, sales, import/export, and tax on services. Is it a burden or are there any incentives for tax payers?
   - exemption: when, who and why exemption?
   - the infrastructure: equipment, office space, stationery, paper-work etc. Is it adequate?
   - the administration: procedures, records, public relations, information.

2. Resource mobilization is a function of the group and individual behavior of the tax administration staff. The more honest they are, the higher the revenues collected.

   - communication: superior-subordinate relations. Is there any cooperation?
   - rent-seeking: corruption, absenteeism, negligent behavior towards customers. Is it because of low civil service pay?
   - career development and training: Is there any future for tax employees?

3. Resource mobilization is a function of effective supervision. Close supervision and monitoring by senior public servants will check dishonest workers.

   - accountability: inspection, disciplinary procedures against culprits, superiors responsibility. Are superiors held accountable?
   - transparency: Is there any secrecy that prevents effective inspection effort?

4. Resource mobilization is a function of the tax code. An effective regulatory framework is necessary for dealing effectively against delinquents; and hence, deterring tax evasion.

   - sanctions: prosecution of tax delinquents. Is it based on executive discretionary powers or universal application of rules? (i.e. who sends the cases to court?).
   - judicial process: Is the court system able to sentence tax offenders and enforce that punishment?
II. RESOURCE ALLOCATION

1. Resource allocation is a function of policy guidelines. The more clearly policy priorities are drawn, the better the allocation process.
   - policy: analysis, formulation, implementation, monitoring and review. Is the government capable?
   - priorities: How are they identified and linked to the resource base?

2. Resource allocation is a function of the performance and productivity of previous public investments. The higher the productivity the higher the return on investment, and hence, the bigger the resource envelope.
   - project execution: time frame, cost efficiency, management, procurement, disbursement, and accounting.
   - sustainability: level of returns, maintenance, and management.
   - link between previous and new investment; development and recurrent expenditure.

III. BUDGET PREPARATION/EXECUTION PROCESS

1. The budget process is a function of the budgeting system. The more it evolves out of, and is linked to programs and projects, the more effective it is.
   - line budgeting: incremental adjustments, maintaining staffing patterns, accountability and control.
   - PBS: linking priorities to programs, public management, and linking development and recurrent expenditures.
   - administrative infrastructure: equipment, skills, office space, and stationery.

2. The budget process is a function of spending within available resources. A balanced budget is necessary for realistic allocation.
   - envelope ceilings: inflated allocation requests, indiscriminate cutting during execution, supplemental appropriation and arbitrary shift of resources among departments or ministries.
   - certainty: of securing appropriated funds, of conducting performance monitoring, of timely programmatic statements by ministries, and positive consultations with the MOF.

3. The budget process is a function of fiscal management by the government. A sound fiscal policy (and monetary policy) is prerequisite for effective preparation and execution of the budget.
   - fiscal controls: restraint/delay in payments to suppliers and providers of services, and delays in consolidating expenditure data by the Accountant General.
monetary policy: foreign exchange regime, money supply, inflation etc.
- supervision: of staff preparing budget, and of the accounting, auditing, implementation and review functions.

IV. INSTITUTIONAL ORGANIZATION

1. Core economic management is a function of institutional organization in resource mobilization. The more well organized the institutional framework, the better the resource mobilization and core economic management.
   - structural links: rules, roles, links, values, and structures; and the way they coordinate in mobilizing resources.
   - core functions: the scope of government, the participation of sub-national, non-governmental, and private structures.

2. Core economic management is a function of institutional organization in resource allocation. Coordinated institutional priorities and performance is necessary to achieve the congruence between development plans and expenditure patterns.
   - structural links: ministries, departments, and agencies.
   - structural links: the Parliament, sub-national/local authorities, non-governmental organizations, and private users.

How do these different institutions input policy making and resource allocation?

3. Core economic management is a function of institutional organization in budget preparation and execution process. The higher the skill, expertise, institutional program orientation, and coordination in implementation monitoring, the more effective the budgeting process.
   - professionalism: skill, skill mix, formulation of programs responding to priorities, and adequate MOF/ministries organization and planning.
   - effectiveness/efficiency: optimal allocation, minimization of cost and waste, review of output performance, accounting and auditing, timely payments etc.
   - leadership: adequate communication between MOF and line ministries, exemplary work ethics, and parliamentary inspection of government accounts.
   - service quality: program performance reviews, maintenance, sustainability and user participation.

B. SYSTEM-WIDE ADMINISTRATIVE FUNCTIONS

I. PUBLIC BUREAUCRACY

1. The performance of the public bureaucracy is a function of the effectiveness of the public personnel system: Organizational objectives, such as, programs and projects, become more enhanced as the personnel system excels in linking them to staff recruitment.
• public employment: functions, structures, size and skill of staff, number of projects and programs, performance and productivity. What determines/guides public employment?
• public compensation: wages and non-wage benefits. What impact has remuneration on motivation, performance and productivity?
• Career system: promotion, schedule of duties, and responsibility. What determines the grading of staff?
• Training and development: pre-employment training, on-job training, skill enhancement, research and dissemination. What guides the training policy?
• Work conditions: office space, stationary, buildings and staff services. Is there any policy on care for infrastructure as well as staff welfare?
• Civil Service Statutes: regulations, procedures and directives. How are rules applied to ensure good performance as well as staff discipline?

2. The performance of the public bureaucracy is a function of the effectiveness of the financial systems: The cost of governance has to be met by revenue accruing from taxes; and the better public funds are managed, the greater the cost efficiency.

• Budget: resource mobilization, allocation, and budget execution. How effective are the tax administration, the budgeting process and the review of expenditure?
• Accounting/Audit: financial management, the treasury function, the auditing and inspection of public accounts. What rules and roles guarantee professional prudence in accounting and auditing?
• Procurement: tender administration, inspection and certification. How transparent is government procurement?
• General services: programs, projects and utilities. How are line ministries structured to deliver the assigned services?
• Internal regulatory framework: authorization, pre-auditing, inspection, and accountability. How are internal ministry, department and agency mechanisms designed to ensure proper accounting and auditing?

II. Public Service

3. The productivity of the public service is a function of leadership: Senior and middle level role model is the key to high staff productivity.

• Responsibility: communication, explanation consultation, information, and supervision. How effective are leaders?
• Behavior: obedience, concern, listening, participation, and firmness. Are leaders exemplary in their attitudes?

4. The productivity of the public service is a function of effectiveness/efficiency: Meager resources available have to be maximized.

• Bureaucratic tendencies: red-tape, excessive regulations, and the degree of delegation in decision making. How much time is lost before something is done?
• Initiative: creativity, and innovation. How rigid is the system of rules?
5. The productivity of the public service is a function of professionalism: The more scientific and technological knowledge is applied, the less the waste.

- Codes and ethics: enforcement and accountability. By what mechanisms are professional qualities factored into work processes?
- Professional bodies: boards and associations. What institutions are charged with enforcement?

6. The productivity of the public service is a function of service quality: Ministries, departments and agencies are sub-structures of the whole; and the more each of the substructures deliver, the higher the overall productivity of the government.

- Functional-technical Level: core economic functions, sectoral strategies, and policies. What guides production of service and delivery?
- Growth with Equity: Distribution, burden of costs and beneficiaries. Who benefits, and at whose cost?

C. STRUCTURAL ENVIRONMENT

I. LEGITIMACY

1. Legitimate governance is a function of the ascribed role of the state: That is, (a) the selection process through which leaders become leaders, and which emanates from the people; and (b) their post-election performance in fulfilling the promises that determined their selection. The more the state agents are assigned to respond promptly, the less dysfunctional the governance environment.

- officialdom: promptness, serving, responding, delivering, reacting, and obeying. Do civil servants as well as elected political representatives think of themselves as leaders or rulers?
- ascribing: provision of authority, mandate to act, and empowerment. Who ascribes roles to state agents?
- rewards and sanctions: merit and impartiality. What determines, and who decides whom to reward or to sanction?

2. Legitimate governance is a function of the extent to which institutions as well as individual public servants account for their acts and omissions: The wider the scope of official accountability, the more the government is characterized as legitimate.

- responsibility: professional competence, operational confidence, initiatives, innovation, errors, mistakes, and offenses. How are official responsibilities defined?
- accountability: financial/economic, professional, and political. By what system is accountability demanded?
3. Legitimate governance is a function of accessibility of the civic society to the institutions of state as well as individual civil servants: The more attention is paid punctually to the public, the less the government is alienated.

- access: bureaucratic red-tape, prohibitions, and loss of time. Is accessibility a right or a privilege?
- alienation: the state-society nexus. Society controlling the state; state controlling society.

4. Legitimate governance is a function of the magnitude of popular participation in political/government affairs: The more the political processes are open to civic input, the more the acknowledgement.

- civic society: rights, liberties, duties, institutions, and organization. How vibrant is the civic society?
- support: self-help, involvement and enthusiasm. Are local communities involved in their areas?

5. Legitimate governance is a function of the level of transparency and openness in government activity: The less the secrecy, the more public officials would make responsible decisions. (Transparent/open government environment reduces secrecy and abuse of official authority).

- transparency/openness: information, eligibility to access government activity such as procurement, right to criticize government, and frankness. To what extent is government activity "laid bare" for everybody to participate?

6. Legitimate governance is a function of effective representation: Elected representatives are expected to present and articulate the demands of the electorate. (An effective representation increases the political mandate of the government).

- representation: free and fair elections, competitive elections, voter interests, and candidates' competence. How effective is the representation?
- maturity of voters: mobilization/organization, political participation, lobby groups, and traditional institutions. How politically organized is the civic society?

II. RULE OF LAW

1. Governance by rule of law is a function of universal rules: The less rules are exclusive, the less they will discriminate, and hence, everybody abides by the law.

- universality: legislative process (including draftsmanship), magnitude of executive fiat in the legal instruments, and "legalism". What values characterize the obligations that people have regarding the law?
- law and order: law without order; and order without law.
2. Governance by the rule of law is a function of the equal application of law: For rule of law to be effective there should be less discretionary powers that engender arbitrariness.

- arbitrariiness: discretion, "nolle prosequi", preventive detention, executive pardon, and emergency powers. Do some citizens manage to be above the law?

3. Governance by rule of law is a function of enforcement and redress processes: Justice has to be seen to be done.

- litigation: rules of natural justice, accessibility and predictability of the judicial process.
- the bar profession: lawyers and judges. Qualifications and work ethics.
- sanctity of judicial decisions: enforcement, redress against executive actions, and recovering damages from civil legal entities.

4. Governance by rule of law is a function of the process of rule making and amendment: The more the inclusiveness and flexibility, the more the universality.

- parent acts: initiation of bills, debating bills, and decrees. Who makes the law?
- subsidiary legislation: secondary laws, rules, procedures, and regulations. Are subsidiary instruments "in vires"?
- flexibility: rule "bending" and amendments.

5. Governance by rule of law is a function of checks-and-balances: Power and authority needs to be institutionally balanced in order to check against the abuse of official positions.

- authority (right to compel): constitutional provisions and executive schedules. What is the source of official authority?
- power (ability to influence): resource base, mandate, and leverage. What is the source of official power?
- power versus authority: power without authority; authority without power. Authority which is not exercised; power which is not exercised.
Note: This instrument is designed for survey-feedback, with the exclusive objective of presenting the results back to the respondents as a group; and not a normal statistical survey as in representative sample analysis models.

Introduction

The questionnaire is designed to confirm facts/events, gauge perceptions and values, and establish certain practices.

**FACT/EVENT:** Measured by FREQUENCY.
Scale: Always[1], Usually[2], Sometimes[3], and Never[4].

**PERCEPTION:** Measured by RESPONSE/CERTAINTY.
Scale: True[1], Mostly True[2], Mostly Untrue[3], and Not True[4].

**VALUE:** Measured by RESPONSE/INTENSITY.
Scale: Strongly Agree[1], Agree with Reservations[2], Disagree with Reservations[3], and Strongly Disagree[4].

**CAUSES OR PRACTICE:** Measured by FREQUENCY.
Scale: Always[1], Usually[2], Sometimes[3], and Never[4].

It is anticipated that the responses will stimulate discussions about the institutional environment and the way it affects the performance of the Civil Service.
Please circle one.

A. CORE ECONOMIC FUNCTIONS

RESOURCE MOBILIZATION

1. "The system of tax collection is plagued by distortions; as a result, the poor pay relatively more."

   True      Mostly      Mostly      Not
   True      Untrue      True

2. "Revenue would increase if the accountability of government tax collection institutions and individual staff were enhanced."

   Strongly Agree with Disagree with Strongly
   Agree Reservations Reservations Disagree

3. "Revenue collectors are guided by the tax code and its regulations, rather than individual discretion, in enforcing the tax code."

   Strongly Agree with Disagree with Strongly
   Agree Reservations Reservations Disagree

4. "Tax collectors tend to use their official positions for personal gain."

   Always      Usually      Sometimes Never

5. "Poor revenue collection will persist however collectors are equipped unless corruptive connivance between tax employees and the business community is checked."

   Always      Usually      Sometimes Never

6. "The supervisory performance of senior public servants in the tax collecting institutions is not satisfactory."

   True      Mostly      Mostly      Not
   True      Untrue      True
7. "Tax enforcement staff are fair to customers."

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>True</th>
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<tr>
<td>True</td>
<td>Untrue</td>
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8. "The perception of insecurity by government authorities leads to a culture of secrecy in government functions such as, lack of records on tax delinquents."

<table>
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<th>True</th>
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<th>Mostly</th>
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<tr>
<td>True</td>
<td>Untrue</td>
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9. "The government fails to prosecute and enforce sentences against tax delinquents."

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<tr>
<td>True</td>
<td>Untrue</td>
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10. "Tax exemption privileges are effectively applied and thus, fair and useful."

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<tr>
<td>True</td>
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RESOURCE ALLOCATION

11. "Policy priorities determine resource allocation."

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<th>Always</th>
<th>Usually</th>
<th>Sometimes</th>
<th>Never</th>
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12. "In The Gambia, one can clearly perceive the link between policy priorities and resource allocation."

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>True</th>
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<tr>
<td>True</td>
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13. "Even in the key sectors, the levels of operations and maintenance expenditure are inadequate."

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<tr>
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<th>Mostly</th>
<th>Not</th>
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<tr>
<td>True</td>
<td>Untrue</td>
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14. "Resource allocation is influenced more by power relations between groups in the bureaucracy than the economic priority of the programs or projects that are funded."

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strongly Agree</th>
<th>Agree with Reservations</th>
<th>Disagree with Reservations</th>
<th>Strongly Disagree</th>
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</table>

15. "Public investment is characterized by low productivity, thus depriving the public in general and the productive sectors of the much needed infrastructure."

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>True</th>
<th>Mostly True</th>
<th>Mostly Unlikely</th>
<th>Not True</th>
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16. "Improper management behavior, such as diversion of resources, graft, and use of public property for private gain, indicates unaccountable managerial framework."

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strongly Agree</th>
<th>Agree with Reservations</th>
<th>Disagree with Reservations</th>
<th>Strongly Disagree</th>
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</table>

17. "Public investment is overwhelmingly determined by donor interests because of the government's dependence on external resources."

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Always</th>
<th>Usually</th>
<th>Sometimes</th>
<th>Never</th>
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BUDGET PREPARATION/EXECUTION PROCESS

18. "Government budgets are well designed with the public interest in mind and for delivering genuine development objectives."

<table>
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<th>Always</th>
<th>Usually</th>
<th>Sometimes</th>
<th>Never</th>
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19. "Line budgeting characterized by incremental adjustments on previous budgets; priority in maintaining staff patterns; and emphasis on accountability and control, is good for the Gambia."

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<th>True</th>
<th>Mostly True</th>
<th>Mostly Untrue</th>
<th>Not True</th>
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</table>

20. "Arbitrary changes of budget --through for example, inflated requests, shift of funds between departments and ministries, and indiscriminate cuts-- do more harm than good"

<table>
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<tr>
<th>True</th>
<th>Mostly True</th>
<th>Mostly Untrue</th>
<th>Not True</th>
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</thead>
</table>

74
21. "Uncertainty and cumbersome procedures in paying suppliers and providers of services leads to bribery."

Always  Usually  Sometimes  Never

22. "Because of weaknesses and delays in the accounting system, dishonest staff engage in fraud."

Always  Usually  Sometimes  Never

INSTITUTIONAL ORGANIZATION

23. "The organizational structures of the Government are not yet guided by values such as rule of law, accountability, and transparency (that most Gambians cherish in their rich democratic tradition)."

Strongly Agree with  Disagree with  Strongly Agree Reservations Reservations Disagree

24. "Government structures without well coordinated links, roles, and rules, cannot support institutional capacity to perform core economic functions effectively."

True  Mostly  Mostly  Not

True  Mostly Untrue  True

25. "The central government is not close enough to the action to perform core economic functions effectively, hence, decentralization and divestiture are necessary."

True  Mostly  Mostly  Not

True  Mostly Untrue  True

26. "Decentralization will widen the doors of popular participation and peoples’ support of the government’s resource mobilization initiatives."

Strongly Agree with  Disagree with  Strongly Agree Reservations Reservations Disagree

27. "There is adequate cooperation between ministries, departments, agencies, civil and groups in conducting consultations aimed at optimal resource allocation."

Always  Usually  Sometimes  Never
28. "The Parliamentary debates on the budget are genuine and allow the public interest to be reflected."

| True | Mostly True | Mostly Untrue | Not True |

29. "The Parliamentary Committee on Public Accounts is effective in ensuring timely consolidation of expenditure data."

| Strongly Agree with Reservations | Strongly Disagree |
| Agree Reservations | Disagree |

30. "When allocating resources, the government takes into account the opinion of the civil society, including, sub-national authorities, traditional institutions, non-governmental organizations, the media and private enterprise."

| Always | Usually | Sometimes | Never |

31. "Senior officials provide adequate leadership to the financial institutions of government --for example, effective inter-ministerial coordination; exemplary work ethics; and performance monitoring."

| True | Mostly True | Mostly Untrue | Not True |

32. "The quality of public services, such as health and education, offered to the public is satisfactory."

| True | Somewhat True | Unlikely True | Not True |

33. "Some civil servants deliberately place personal interests above institutional efficiency although they understand that it is harmful to the overall economic welfare of The Gambia."

| Strongly Agree with Reservations | Strongly Disagree |
| Agree Reservations | Disagree |

34. Civil Servants place personal interests above the public interest unknowingly and out of economic necessity since the government does not reward them properly."

| True | Somewhat True | Unlikely True | Not True |
B. SYSTEM-WIDE ADMINISTRATIVE FUNCTIONS

PUBLIC BUREAUCRACY

I. Public Personnel System

35. List what you consider to be the main reasons for any poor performance by civil servants in The Gambia.

(i) ..................................................................................................................
(ii) ................................................................................................................
(iii) .............................................................................................................

36. List the areas in which you consider the public service in The Gambia to be weakest.

(i) ..................................................................................................................
................................................................................................................
................................................................................................................
................................................................................................................

37. "There is over-employment in the civil service because employment is a reward to supporters and relatives of political leaders and senior officials."

True Mostly Mostly Not
True Untrue True

38. "Gambians seek government employment because of the security-social safety net it provides rather than as a genuine and productive career."

Always Usually Sometimes Never

39. "It is not the wage that matters to the civil servant, but inflated allowances, travel expenses, and gifts."

True Mostly Mostly Not
True Untrue True

40. "Senior civil servants think more about efforts to supplement their eroded wages than their official tasks."

True Mostly Mostly Not
True Untrue True
41. "Professional training and development are not aggressively pursued, because it is the social connections, rather than professional qualification, that determine personal advancement."

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strongly Agree with</th>
<th>Reservations</th>
<th>Strongly Disagree</th>
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II. Financial Systems

42. "The treasury is regarded as a mythical entity that is always capable of spinning out money for public expenditure, rather than an institution struggling to mobilize resources from taxes levied on The Gambians."

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>True</th>
<th>Mostly True</th>
<th>Mostly Untrue</th>
<th>Not True</th>
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</table>

43. "The roles of Accounting Officers (in the ministries, departments and agencies) and the Accountant General's Office are not clearly defined."

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<tr>
<th>True</th>
<th>Mostly True</th>
<th>Mostly Untrue</th>
<th>Not True</th>
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</table>

44. "The lack of human resource capacity even in government institutions charged with managing public funds, such as the Accountant General's Office and the Auditor General's Office, underlines the seriousness of the governance distortions in the accountability of public resource management."

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strongly Agree with</th>
<th>Reservations</th>
<th>Strongly Disagree</th>
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PUBLIC SERVICE

I. Leadership

45. "Our leadership at senior and middle levels is weak, and tends to emphasize administrative detail rather than policy."

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strongly Agree with</th>
<th>Reservations</th>
<th>Strongly Disagree</th>
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46. How often do you discuss your work and responsibilities with your supervisor?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Always</th>
<th>Usually</th>
<th>Sometimes</th>
<th>Never</th>
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</table>
47. How often do you discuss your work and responsibilities with your workmates?

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<tr>
<th>Always</th>
<th>Usually</th>
<th>Sometimes</th>
<th>Never</th>
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</table>

48. "Public servants have no motivation to exploit and demonstrate their leadership potential because of low incentives."

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>True</th>
<th>Mostly</th>
<th>Mostly</th>
<th>Not</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>True</td>
<td>Untrue</td>
<td>True</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

49. "Promotions, salaries and scholarships are awarded fairly throughout the civil service."

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Always</th>
<th>Usually</th>
<th>Sometimes</th>
<th>Never</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

50. "Your superior gives you adequate information to enable you carry out your tasks."

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Always</th>
<th>Usually</th>
<th>Sometimes</th>
<th>Never</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

II. Effectiveness/Efficiency

51. What would you do if your superior asked you to ignore regulations in order to achieve organizational goals? [MARK IN RANK ORDER: [1] most likely, [2], [3], and [4] least likely].

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Carry out Obediently</th>
<th>Comply after Discussion</th>
<th>Boss must take Responsibility</th>
<th>Decline</th>
<th>Outright</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

52. Have you ever been asked by your superior to ignore regulations in order to realize personal gain?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Always</th>
<th>Usually</th>
<th>Sometimes</th>
<th>Never</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

53. "The Gambian civil servant is proud of being a public service employee."

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>True</th>
<th>Mostly</th>
<th>Mostly</th>
<th>Not</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>True</td>
<td>Untrue</td>
<td>True</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

54. "Rules and regulations should be followed in order to get things done effectively."

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Always</th>
<th>Usually</th>
<th>Sometimes</th>
<th>Never</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
55. "The general public is aware of the regulations, orders, and procedures in the civil service, that are intended for their benefit."

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>True</th>
<th>Mostly True</th>
<th>Mostly Untrue</th>
<th>Not True</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>True</td>
<td>Mostly True</td>
<td>Mostly Untrue</td>
<td>Not True</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

56. "There could be greater effectiveness/efficiency if more authority was delegated to the middle and lower levels of the establishment."

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strongly Agree</th>
<th>Agree with Reservations</th>
<th>Disagree with Reservations</th>
<th>Strongly Disagree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Strongly Agree</td>
<td>Agree with Reservations</td>
<td>Disagree with Reservations</td>
<td>Strongly Disagree</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

57. "Subordinates are generally made aware of what their senior officers are planning for their departments, agencies or ministries."

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Always</th>
<th>Usually</th>
<th>Sometimes</th>
<th>Never</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Always</td>
<td>Usually</td>
<td>Sometimes</td>
<td>Never</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

III. Professionalism

58. Assume you have access to a variety of information sources. Which of the following tend to be most helpful in shaping administrative issues and decisions? [MARK IN RANK ORDER: [1] - most likely, [2], [3], and [4] - least likely]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Professional Rules and Material</th>
<th>Rules and Material</th>
<th>Professional Codes and Ethics</th>
<th>Friends/Relatives</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Professional Rules and Material</td>
<td>Rules and Material</td>
<td>Professional Codes and Ethics</td>
<td>Friends/Relatives</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

59. "Government agencies are more strict in enforcing professional codes and ethics to public employees than private associations such as, the Association of Accountants; or the Bar Association."

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>True</th>
<th>Mostly True</th>
<th>Mostly Untrue</th>
<th>Not True</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>True</td>
<td>Mostly True</td>
<td>Mostly Untrue</td>
<td>Not True</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

60. "One is under obligation to be loyal to those who have helped him/her in one way or another (for example, to those who recruited her/him into the civil service)."

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Always</th>
<th>Usually</th>
<th>Sometimes</th>
<th>Never</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Always</td>
<td>Usually</td>
<td>Sometimes</td>
<td>Never</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
61. "It is hard to get things done in the civil service without the right connections".

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strongly Agree</th>
<th>Agree with Reservations</th>
<th>Disagree with Reservations</th>
<th>Strongly Disagree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

62. "Civil servants find it difficult not to favor friends and relatives, because it is part of the social tradition."

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strongly Agree</th>
<th>Agree with Reservations</th>
<th>Disagree with Reservations</th>
<th>Strongly Disagree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

IV. Service Quality

63. "Civil Servants are frustrated by complaints from the public about the services they offer."

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>True</th>
<th>Mostly</th>
<th>Mostly</th>
<th>Not</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>True</td>
<td>Untrue</td>
<td>True</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

64. "Civil Servants take time to explain to the public the difficulties they face in seeking to provide better service."

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Always</th>
<th>Usually</th>
<th>Sometimes</th>
<th>Never</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

65. Why did you enter the Civil Service?
C. THE STRUCTURAL ENVIRONMENT

LEGITIMACY

I. Accountability

66. "Senior civil servants are responsible for their professional competence and are held accountable for their official acts."

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>True</th>
<th>Mostly</th>
<th>Mostly</th>
<th>Not</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>True</td>
<td>Untrue</td>
<td>True</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

II. Accessibility

67. "Government officials have more important matters than appointments with the people."

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strongly Agree</th>
<th>with</th>
<th>Disagree with</th>
<th>Strongly Disagree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>Reservations</td>
<td>Reservations</td>
<td>Disagree</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

68. "There should be more information given to the public about government activity."

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Always</th>
<th>Usually</th>
<th>Sometimes</th>
<th>Never</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

III. Participation

69. "The people's eagerness to participate and have any say in development is deliberately ignored by the government."

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>True</th>
<th>Mostly</th>
<th>Mostly</th>
<th>Not</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>True</td>
<td>Untrue</td>
<td>True</td>
<td></td>
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</table>

70. "Authority is delegated to local governments and communities."

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Always</th>
<th>Usually</th>
<th>Sometimes</th>
<th>Never</th>
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</table>

71. "Women, especially those in the rural areas, benefit from preferential consideration in development activities and service delivery."

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Always</th>
<th>Usually</th>
<th>Sometimes</th>
<th>Never</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
IV. Transparency and Openness

72. "Transparency and openness are necessary in order to maintain government legitimacy."

Always Usually Sometimes Never

73. "The people have the right to know and criticize the government because they put it in power."

Always Usually Sometimes Never

V. Effective Representation

74. "More pressure is needed from Members of Parliament and voters to make the civil service more effective."

Strongly Agree with Disagree with Strongly Agree Reservations Reservations Disagree

75. "The people need to be better informed about how they may make their wishes known to their Members of Parliament."

Strongly Agree with Disagree with Strongly Agree Reservations Reservations Disagree

RULE OF LAW

I. Universal Rules

76. "Laws enacted by the elected legislature are driven by special elite interests, rather than the needs of the public."

Strongly Agree with Disagree with Strongly Agree Reservations Reservations Disagree
II. Equal Application of Law

77. "A leader has an inherent right to interpret the law with flexibility if it is necessary to protect his/her status."

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strongly Agree</th>
<th>Agree with Reservations</th>
<th>Disagree with Reservations</th>
<th>Strongly Disagree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

78. "Discretionary application, such as intervention through orders to discontinue prosecution and pardon well-connected offenders, makes the law unpredictable."

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>True</th>
<th>Mostly True</th>
<th>Mostly Untrue</th>
<th>Not True</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

79. "There is excessive pressure to abandon disciplinary proceedings or reinstate properly dismissed public service staff."

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Always</th>
<th>Usually</th>
<th>Sometimes</th>
<th>Never</th>
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</table>

III. Enforcement and Redress

80. "All judicial decisions are properly enforced by the government."

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Always</th>
<th>Usually</th>
<th>Sometimes</th>
<th>Never</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

81. "Accused persons are assumed innocent until proved guilty beyond reasonable doubt by the court of law."

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>True</th>
<th>Mostly True</th>
<th>Mostly Untrue</th>
<th>Not True</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

82. "Citizens in The Gambia enjoy the constitutional right of equality before the law."

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Always</th>
<th>Usually</th>
<th>Sometimes</th>
<th>Never</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
IV. Process of Rule Making and Amendment

83. "Exhaustive Parliamentary debate on bills ensures good laws (even if the bills are not, in the first place, well drafted)."

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strongly Agree</th>
<th>Agree with Reservations</th>
<th>Disagree with Reservations</th>
<th>Strongly Disagree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

84. "Senior civil servants deliberately make subsidiary instruments, such as secondary laws; rules; procedures and regulations, excessively cumbersome in order to enhance executive control."

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>True</th>
<th>Mostly True</th>
<th>Mostly Untrue</th>
<th>Not True</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

85. "Amending counter-productive laws is difficult unless it is done for powerful special interests."

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Always</th>
<th>Usually</th>
<th>Sometimes</th>
<th>Never</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

V. Checks and Balances

86. "The Civil Service has too much power and the Parliament too little."

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>True</th>
<th>Mostly True</th>
<th>Mostly Untrue</th>
<th>Not True</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

87. "The leverage of rewards and sanctions flows from the control of public resources--rather than from the constitution."

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>True</th>
<th>Somewhat True</th>
<th>Unlikely</th>
<th>Not True</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

88. "Elected leaders should have power to change the constitution."

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strongly Agree</th>
<th>Agree with Reservations</th>
<th>Disagree with Reservations</th>
<th>Strongly Disagree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
89. "The press should have the right to report all court cases and parliamentary debates."

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strongly Agree</th>
<th>Agree with Reservations</th>
<th>Disagree with Reservations</th>
<th>Strongly Disagree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

VI. Scope of Government

90. "The choice of optimal-desirable size of government is arbitrary unless The Gambia defines the development objectives of its government; and determines the systems and resources with which to perform effectively.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>True</th>
<th>Mostly True</th>
<th>Mostly Untrue</th>
<th>Not True</th>
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</table>
ANNEX E. STRUCTURED LEARNING OF PARTICIPATORY PROCESSES IN PROJECT PREPARATION: HYPOTHESES AND SURVEY QUESTIONS

Central Hypothesis

H-1. Projects prepared through wide participatory processes have a greater chance of success and are likely to generate higher returns than projects prepared by traditional methods.

Relevant Survey Questions on Participation:
17. Was the process truly participatory?
18. Have your views received a free and fair hearing during the workshop?
26. Were all of the major Gambian stakeholders consulted?
36. Strengths of the participatory process;
37. Weaknesses of the participatory process;
38. Recommendations to make the process more efficient, effective or participatory.

Relevant Survey Questions on Probability of Success:
10. Estimate the chances of reform succeeding.

Intervening Hypotheses

A Participatory Process Will Have the Following Beneficial Effects:

I-1. Projects prepared through wide participatory processes will facilitate the flow of information upwards to project planners, resulting in better project design.

Relevant Survey Questions on Information:
27. Improved flow of factual information from mid-level managers to senior government officials;
28. Improved awareness of senior government officials to issues, problems and concerns of middle management;
30. Improved information flow among various government ministries;
31. Helpful in generating feedback on areas in which your ministry’s performance could be improved.

I-2. Projects prepared through wide participatory processes will facilitate the flow of information downwards to managers and subordinates,
resulting in greater knowledge and awareness about the project’s goals throughout the organization.

Relevant Survey Questions on Information:
29. Improved flow of information from senior government officials to mid-level managers;
30. Improved information flow among various government ministries;
31. Helpful in generating feedback on areas in which your ministry’s performance could be improved.

I-3. Projects prepared through wide participatory processes foster a higher degree of ownership at all levels among those responsible for implementing them, resulting in better performance during implementation throughout the organization.

Relevant Survey Questions on Ownership and Commitment:
1. Importance of reform (general);
2. Urgency of reform (general);
3. Extent of reform necessary (general);
4. Source of reform initiative;
5. Importance of reform (your ministry);
6. Urgency of reform (your ministry);
7. Degree to which you are personally committed to reform;
8. Degree to which your colleagues are committed to reform;
9. Degree to which your immediate superior is committed to reform;
10. Measures you would undertake to promote reform;
11. Measures your colleagues would undertake to promote reform;
12. Willingness to take risks to promote reform;
13. Willingness for colleagues to take risks to promote reform;
24. List of impediments accurately reflect your views;
25. List of recommendations accurately reflect your views;
33. Did the workshop increase your personal commitment to reform?
34. What priority to senior government officials attach to the need for reform?
35. How committed are senior government officials to reform?
A Participatory Process Will Have the Following Negative Effects:

1-4. During its initial phases, a wide participatory planning process will take longer and be more costly to prepare.

*Relevant Survey Question:*

39. Will the additional benefits of a participatory planning process outweigh the cost in additional time and effort?

1-5. Because it creates expectations among multiple constituencies that their particular concerns will be addressed, a wide participatory process will result in more complicated and costly project designs.

*Relevant Survey Questions on Expectations:*

24. List of impediments accurately reflect your views;
25. List of recommendations accurately reflect your views.

1-6. Because it empowers a broad group of stakeholders whose agenda may differ from that of the government or World Bank, a wide participatory process may result in a lower likelihood that the resulting project will be approved.

[Not Relevant for Workshop]

1-7. Once a participatory project process is initiated, attempts to modify or disregard the results of the process or to by-pass the participants will severely reduce the level of ownership and adversely affect the project's implementation.

[Not Relevant for Workshop]

Introduction

1. This paper provides comments from the structured learning perspective on the utility of a participatory planning process for conducting an Institutional Environment Assessment in The Gambia. The paper discusses the results of a participatory survey conducted at the workshop which culminated the IEA process in The Gambia (November 4-10, 1993 in Banjul).

2. The workshop was the first in a series of structured learning exercises, in which the World Bank would seek to systematically gather and assess data regarding the effectiveness of a participatory approach vis-à-vis more traditional approaches to institutional development. This objective required carefully specifying the set of issues to be addressed, which were formulated as hypotheses to be tested and validated. It also involved collecting and analyzing data to assess the validity of these hypotheses.

Testing of Hypotheses

3. Those who support the use of participatory processes in planning and implementing projects frequently make their case on both normative and instrumental grounds. Normatively, they argue that people have a right to be consulted about initiatives that are likely to have a major impact upon their lives, and those who plan such projects are under a moral obligation to solicit input from all of the relevant stakeholders. Instrumentally, they argue that these projects are likely to be more successful in achieving their objectives, for a variety of reasons that will be outlined subsequently.

4. The central hypothesis is that projects prepared through a participatory process will have a greater probability of success and a higher rate of return. Important as the moral argument may be, this analysis will focus exclusively upon the instrumental rationale for utilizing wide participatory processes. If the central hypothesis is not true, it will be difficult to argue on normative grounds alone that the World Bank should use these processes in its sectoral adjustment work.

5. The intervening hypotheses spell out the assumptions that would lead us to believe that the central hypothesis is accurate. On the positive side, a participatory process improves the flow of information at several phases in the project’s design and implementation. In the initial phases, information flows upward to senior decision-makers and results in better project design. (Hopefully, monitoring and feedback from the lower levels will continue to flow to senior government officials both during and after the project’s implementation.) Once a particular course of action has been agreed upon, a participatory process also helps facilitate the flow of information downward by increasing the number of channels available for senior management to communicate its objectives and priorities. Greater knowledge of a project’s
goals and objectives may not be a sufficient condition for ownership at the lower levels of an organization, but it is certainly a necessary condition.

6. Another potential benefit is that projects prepared through a broad participatory process will hopefully generate a greater sense of "ownership" on the part of the recipient than those prepared by traditional methods. This hypothesis is based upon the assumption that people will feel that they have a stake in an initiative that they helped to design, and that they will therefore work harder to ensure its successful implementation. The project should therefore enjoy a higher probability of success than it would otherwise experience. A recent World Bank Discussion Paper surveyed nearly 100 adjustment programs in 42 countries and concluded that there is a "significant degree of positive correlation between program success and borrower ownership."1

7. A participatory process is also likely to have several disadvantages. During the initial phases, it is likely to take longer and be more costly to prepare. Because it generates expectations of change among those who participate, it is likely to result in more complicated and costly projects that seek to address the needs of multiple constituencies. Since a broad participatory process is less easily controlled by both the Bank and government officials, there is an increased risk that the result will fail to meet the design criteria of one or more of these actors; thus it is plausible to assume that projects prepared in this fashion will have a lower rate of approval. Finally, there is the risk that one or more of the parties that initiated the participatory planning process will seek to ignore or circumvent the results if they are not satisfied. If this happens, it is likely that the project's implementation will be much more difficult and uncertain.

8. In evaluating the recent workshop in The Gambia, we elected to focus on four variables:
   (i) The participatory nature of the process;
   (ii) The upward flow of information;
   (iii) Improved project design; and
   (iv) Ownership.

Participants were surveyed to determine their attitudes and responses on these issues, and the results were tabulated and analyzed. The results are discussed subsequently.

How Participatory was the Process?

9. There are two important dimensions to the question of participation: the breadth or scope of the process and the depth or degree to which stakeholders are involved in it. The first dimension can be measured by comparing the number of people involved in a participatory planning process against the total number of individuals who have a stake in this initiative. The second is more difficult to judge and requires a combination of quantitative and qualitative measures to assess the extent to which participants are able to interject their views into the process and the degree to which they feel that the outcome reflects their preferences and concerns.

10. Although conceptually straightforward, attempts to measure the scope of the process may quickly encounter significant empirical problems. It may be impossible to identify and involve all of the individual stakeholders in a sectoral adjustment program, for example, for they could number in the tens or even hundreds of thousands. It may therefore be necessary to utilize carefully chosen representatives of various stakeholder groups as a substitute. In the Executive Branch, the list includes senior elected officials (the President, Vice President and Ministers); senior civil servants (Permanent Secretaries, Deputy Permanent Secretaries and Directors); mid-level staff and field directors; and rank and file employees. As the participants at the workshop indicated, it also includes members of the Public Service Commission and the National Investment Board. In the Legislative Branch, the list would include members of Parliament. It would also include members of the judiciary, whose support is essential for the prosecution of fraud and tax evasion.

11. The analysis of participation also made use of survey data to assess the extent to which the Gambians perceived the process to be open and participatory. Participants were asked whether there was a free and equal exchange of views between Gambians and members of the international donor community. The survey results on this question were mixed, with 36 percent and 27 percent answering "definitely" or "mostly" (respectively), and 27 percent and 9 percent answering "somewhat" and "not at all." Participants were also requested to state if their views during the workshop and its related activities received a free and fair hearing. Their response to this question was much more positive; almost 46 percent answered "definitely," 52 percent answered "mostly," and only 3 percent answered "not at all."

12. This data leads to a guardedly optimistic assessment regarding both the breadth and the depth of the participatory process. On the plus side, out of sixteen potential stakeholding groups, at least some input was received from eleven of them (69 percent). The numbers are even more favorable when one considers that six of the eight key stakeholding groups were able to interject their views into the process. Furthermore, when one examines the degree of participation, clear majorities maintain that there had been a free and equal exchange of views and that their views had generally received a fair hearing. These factors lead to the conclusion that those who participated in the conference--Permanent Secretaries and other senior staff, mid-level staff, and representatives of the World Bank and other donor organizations--generally felt that they had been able to provide useful input into the deliberations and that the result was more or less in accord with their views.

Upward Flow of Information

13. One of the central benefits of a participatory process is that it improves the flow of information upward to senior management and enables them to tap into the knowledge and experience of their subordinates, who are often closer to an organization's "customers" and have a better feel for their priorities. These staffs are also often in a better position to identify dysfunctional organizational policies and procedures. In The Gambia, the combination of surveys, working groups, desk research and conference discussions yielded a vast wealth of information regarding problems and impediments in the functioning of the government's core economic processes. Over 200 observations were collected before and during the first two days of the workshop. Although there were multiple redundancies and similarities, by the end of the workshop over fifteen priority areas (with many points and sub-points underneath them) were identified.

14. The quality of these observations varied. Many were prescient, interesting, and of immediate relevance to the drafting of the SECAL. Others were more idiosyncratic and
reflected conditions within a particular ministry or ministries. Still others reflected "felt needs," such as the overwhelming agreement among the participants that poor staff working conditions was the most pressing issue that the government should address.

15. Survey results indicate that the participants were, on average, strongly inclined to believe that the process had played a useful role both in improving the flow of factual information to senior government officials and in improving their awareness regarding the problems and concerns confronted by middle management. Over 54 percent stated that the workshop had "definitely" improved the flow of factual information, and another 22 percent stated that it had "probably" improved the information flow. On the question of raising senior management's awareness regarding the issues, problems and concerns confronting middle managers, the answers were slightly more favorable: 58 percent and 27 percent stated that awareness had "definitely" or "probably" improved. (Approximately 21 percent stated that the participatory process had only "somewhat" improved the flow of data, and 12 percent gave the same answer to the question of raising management's awareness. No one answered "not at all" to either question.)

16. In a similar fashion, the participants also felt that the participatory process improved the downward flow of information from senior government officials to mid-level managers. Approximately 70 percent of the sample stated that the information flow had "definitely" or "probably" improved, whereas only 24 percent stated that it had "somewhat" improved and no one answered "not at all". Similar majorities held that the participatory process had improved the flow of information between ministries.

17. The numbers are less impressive when one attempts to assess the immediate usefulness of information generated by the participatory process to government officials with specific line responsibility. In answering the question, "Did you find the workshop sessions helpful in generating feedback regarding areas in which your ministry's performance could be improved?", only 28 percent of the respondents answered "definitely". Approximately 42 percent answered "mostly," 21 percent responded "somewhat," and 9 percent did not answer the question. Yet many participants were able to identify a range of concrete measures that their ministry should implement as a result of this workshop. Topping the list were measures to enhance internal and external communication and to improve the dissemination of information, improving the rationalization and allocation of responsibilities among and within various ministries, and devoting more attention to training and staff development. Improving the budgeting process was also high on the list of priorities, although this is more of a systemic question and it is uncertain how much progress individual ministries can make on the topic by themselves.

18. The most serious problem associated with the flow of information at the workshop is not that the flow itself is inadequate or the type of information generated is irrelevant, but that senior managers will not be convinced or coerced into taking the results seriously. Some senior managers displayed remarkable defensiveness and intransigence in confronting the

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2 The question of whether the process made senior management more aware of the problems and concerns confronting middle management is one of the few issues in which the views of senior government officials diverged significantly from those of middle management. Approximately 67 percent of senior managers stated that the process had "definitely" improved their awareness; 22 percent "probably" and 12 percent "somewhat". The comparable figures for middle management were 43 percent, 43 percent and 14 percent, respectively. Middle management was evidently more sceptical about the upward flow of information than senior management.
criticism of their colleagues. In the concluding survey, the participants identified "defensive attitudes on the part of some participants" as the most serious weaknesses of the workshop.

Improved Project Design

19. One of the most important indicators that a participatory process is worthwhile is the contribution that it makes to improved project design. Unfortunately, most of the design work on the sectoral adjustment credit has yet to take place, so it is premature to judge the process’s effectiveness in relation to this objective.

20. A few impressionistic and anecdotal observations would suggest that the job of translating feedback into project design will not be an easy one. The workshop sessions were quite effective in getting people to talk about problems and impediments. They were also useful in outlining a range of possible solutions. They were less effective in prioritizing problem areas. One attempt to do so, a survey of fifteen problem areas given on the last day, generated tremendous resistance from the participants. Part of this resistance may have been due to misunderstandings about the nature of the exercise, but part of it was due to an unwillingness to accept and buy into the conclusions of the group on the part of some participants.

21. Furthermore, the question of next steps was left up in the air. Since the group was unable to determine and agree upon a clear plan of action, responsibility for follow up was left with a couple of ad-hoc committees that were established on the last day. This raised the specter of senior government officials seeking to impose their own agenda upon the proposed work program and not taking the results of the workshop seriously.

22. Legitimate questions were also raised (mostly by World Bank staff) as to whether some of the working groups had the necessary technical expertise to fully comprehend some of the measures that should be included in the SECAL, such as the shift from line item budgeting to program budgeting. It also became clear during the course of the workshop that, if the Bank is indeed serious about aggressively pursuing participatory decision-making processes, then its internal procedures for appraisal and approval will need to be modified.

Ownership

23. Although the question of "ownership" is important for all potential stake-holders in a major sectoral adjustment initiative, it is particularly critical for those who will have direct responsibility for implementing the program. There is a strong consensus in the literature on organizational change and restructuring that it is absolutely essential that senior management be viewed as strongly supporting a major reform initiative if it is to succeed. If this is not the case, then lower level managers and rank and file employees will not take the reform effort seriously.

24. A survey of participants on the final day of the workshop yielded some very telling results with regard to ownership. The good news is that the environment appears to be favorable for a major sectoral adjustment initiative. A solid core of senior civil servants and mid-level managers agree that reforming The Gambia’s core economic management capability is of fundamental, overriding importance. Furthermore, they believe that the changes need to be implemented quickly and on a massive scale. Ninety-four percent believe that such reform
should take place either "urgently" or "soon," and only 6 percent believe that their country
can get by with marginal adjustments to the existing system. The specific results:

- Over 85 percent of workshop participants maintain that reforming The Gambia’s
capacity to manage its core economic processes is of fundamental overriding
importance to Gambia’s development; the remaining 15 percent state that it is
important to Gambia’s development.

- Roughly 49 percent of the group feel that reform is urgent and should take place
within the next six months; another 46 percent feel that reform should take place
soon (within the next one-two years); and the remaining 6 percent hold that
reform should take place "at some point".

- Almost 40 percent stated that reforming The Gambia’s capacity to manage its
core economic processes will require widespread, fundamental restructuring of
the existing system; 55 percent stated that it would require significant reforms in
the existing system; and only 6 percent said that it would require marginal
adjustments to the existing system.

25. Another promising sign is the large number of government officials (approximately 85
percent) who describe themselves as strongly and personally committed to the need for
reform. The remaining 16 percent describe themselves as "sympathetic" to the need for
reform, and no one describes himself or herself as being "indifferent or uncertain" or
"skeptical" about the need for reform. The participants also appeared to be willing to
champion reform even at considerable personal cost. Almost a third of the group (30 percent)
claimed that they would be willing to work unpaid overtime on nights and weekends if
necessary if it would promote reform; another 36 percent were willing to work paid overtime,
and 30 percent were willing to pursue reform efforts during normal business hours. Over a
third of the group (36 percent) was willing to work to reform the system even at the risk of
alienating their superiors; 39 percent were willing to work up to the point where it would risk
alienating their superiors, and 24 percent were willing to make a modest contribution to the
process of reform, as requested.\(^3\)

26. The survey also indicates that the participants view their co-workers’ commitment to
reform as less pronounced than their own. Only a third claim that their colleagues at their
ministry or department are strongly and personally committed to reform, whereas 84 percent
describe themselves as such. Only 12 percent believe that their colleagues would be willing
to work unpaid overtime (versus 30 percent of the participants). Only 3 percent believe that
their colleagues would be willing to champion reform at the risk of alienating their superiors,
versus 36 percent of the participants.

27. In what is perhaps the most disturbing finding, the survey identifies significant
problems regarding the seriousness with which senior management endorses the reform
process. Only slightly more than a quarter of the participants feel that senior government
officials are strongly and personally committed to reform. Under half the group feels that

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\(^3\) There was a significant divergence between permanent and deputy permanent secretaries and mid-
level managers on this question. Approximately 56 percent of the senior group was willing to push
for reform at the risk of alienating their superiors, but only 14 percent of the mid-level managers
were willing to accept this risk.
they are "sympathetic" to reform, while about a quarter feels that they are either indifferent or uncertain about the reform process (18 percent) or skeptical about the need for it (6 percent). Roughly the same percentages exist in responses to the question regarding the priority that the most senior government officials attach to the reform process. In a related finding, only 6 percent described the probability of reform succeeding as "very strong;" 64 percent said it was "good;" and almost a third (30 percent) thought the chances were only 50:50.

28. One could interpret these findings in a "half full-half empty" fashion. On the positive side, 73 percent of the group believes that senior government officials are "strongly committed" or "sympathetic" to reform, and almost 70 percent believes that the chances of reform are "very strong" or "good." Yet one is inclined to view these results in a much less favorable light. The fact that only slightly more than a quarter believe that senior management is strongly and personally committed to reform, in spite of the presence of the Vice President and Secretary General at the workshop and their ringing endorsement of the process, is clearly cause for concern. Furthermore, very few people feel that the reforms stand a high probability of success. These results indicate considerable lack of confidence that senior political leaders have the political will to follow through with a major restructuring effort. Over 40 percent of the participants identified "the question of political will at the most senior levels" as one of the greatest obstacles to reforming the management of The Gambia's core economic functions, and this problem finished second behind "bureaucratic inertia and resistance to change" as the most serious challenge to reform. These findings are particularly disturbing in light of the fact that unless senior management is committed to a major restructuring effort--and is widely perceived to be committed by junior management and the rank and file employees--it is bound to fail.

29. As to whether the workshop itself helped to enhance ownership, over half of the participants claim to be definitely more committed to the process of reform than they were prior to the workshop. Over 27 percent feel somewhat more committed, 3 percent were indifferent, and 9 percent felt that the workshop had no effect upon their commitment to reform. Almost 79 percent of the group believes that the impetus for the participatory approach was either an initiative of the Gambian government or inspired and developed in close collaboration between the Government, the World Bank, RIPA and ODA. No one held that the process was foisted upon the government by the donor community in spite of its disagreement and/or reluctance to endorse some aspects of the program.

30. Over 80 percent of the group feels that the resulting list of impediments "definitely" or "mostly" reflects their views, and 75 percent answered in a similar fashion regarding the recommendations for reforming The Gambia's core economic processes. These findings are consistent with the observation that roughly four out of five participants were satisfied with the process.

Participants' Reflections upon the Workshop

31. The participants were asked to provide feedback regarding the effectiveness of the workshop and its related activities in collecting and analyzing their input. Of the three activities that took place prior to the workshop, the working groups clearly received the highest marks for their role in gathering information and feeding it back to the group. Almost 68 percent of the participants stated that these groups were "definitely" an effective means for gathering information and another 27 percent stated that they were "mostly" an effective means. The governance survey was a distant second, with 33 percent stating it was "definitely" effective; 42 percent stating it was "mostly" effective; 15 percent stating that it
was "somewhat" effective; and 3 percent stating that it was "not at all" effective. The World Bank desk review received even poorer marks, with 30 percent answering "definitely"; 36 percent "mostly"; 27 percent "somewhat"; and 6 percent "not at all". The suspicion is that these lower marks had less to with the quality of the desk review than with perceptions on the part of the participants that it was "not invented here."

32. On average, the smaller working groups received quite high marks from the participants as being useful in identifying and elaborating the general issues to be addressed in reforming The Gambia's core economic functions. Almost 67 percent said these sessions were "definitely" useful, and another 24 percent stated that they were "mostly" useful. The plenary sessions received lower marks, but were still regarded favorably. (The numbers for the plenary sessions were 52 percent and 39 percent, respectively.)

33. Participants were given a blank sheet of paper and asked to identify the major strengths and weaknesses of the Workshop. The most commonly cited strength was that it provided a forum to discuss The Gambia's problems in a frank, open and comprehensive fashion. Other advantages were that it allowed for a mutually enriching exchange of understanding, increased the flow of information across ministries, and promoted the development of group cohesion and ownership.

34. On the downside, many participants cited defensive attitudes on the part of some participants as a major weakness of the workshop. Others complained about limited speaking time, or that some of the participants may have been reluctant to speak openly. A few argued that the process was too time consuming, or that the recommendations generated by the process were not specific enough to be of use by the ministries.

35. In terms of recommendations, two participants cited more open and public sessions as a way to improve the process to make it more participatory. A number of other suggestions were advanced, ranging from increased frequency of dialogue on these issues to greater follow-up and more involvement from junior staff to more guided deliberations. Although these observations may be useful, they were not widely shared. None of them were advanced by more than one person.

36. Participants were, on average, pleased with the workshop and its associated activities. Although the process was imperfect, most of the participants supported the result and believed it to be generally--although not completely--in line with their beliefs. In one of the more encouraging indicators, only 12 percent of the group was uncertain that the additional benefits that will accrue from a participatory process will outweigh the additional time and effort invested in the project design phase, whereas 54 percent believe that the benefits will "definitely" outweigh the costs and another 27 percent believe that they will "probably" outweigh the costs. To state this result another way, having participated in the process to date, approximately four out of five of the participants believe it to be worth the cost.
### ANNEX G. ESTABLISHING PRIORITY AREAS FOR FOCUS

Rank the following in the order of priority (ascending order). The number 1 signifies the most important and 15 the least important. There can be no ties and each area must be assigned a priority.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank/Ave/Std</th>
<th>Priority Area</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1/3.6/2.4</td>
<td>X. POOR CONDITIONS OF SERVICE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2/4.9/3.3</td>
<td>I. REVENUE COLLECTION BELOW POTENTIAL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3/5.4/3.3</td>
<td>XIII. LACK OF TRAINING AND STAFF DEVELOPMENT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4/6.1/4.4</td>
<td>II. OBJECTIVES AND SCOPE OF GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS AND CIVIL SERVICE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5/6.3/3.9</td>
<td>VIII. RESOURCES ARE ALLOCATED TO ORGANIZATIONAL UNITS NOT PROGRAMMES BASED ON POLICY PRIORITIES, BENEFITS AND COSTS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6/6.8/4.2</td>
<td>XII. HOW TO GET BETTER SERVICE DELIVERY AND VALUE FOR MONEY FROM THE CIVIL SERVICE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7/8.3/3.7</td>
<td>XIV. MANAGEMENT OF INFORMATION SYSTEM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8/8.6/3.6</td>
<td>XV. COMMUNICATION CHANNELS BETWEEN GOVERNMENT AND THE PEOPLE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9/8.7/3.4</td>
<td>III. CENTRALIZATION OF BUDGET EXECUTION ONLY FOR CONTROL PURPOSES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10/9.4/3.9</td>
<td>V. RESOURCE DEPENDENCE AND EXTERNAL INFLUENCE OVER MACROECONOMIC POLICY MAKING</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11/9.5/3.7</td>
<td>VII. CIVIL SERVICE RULES AND REGULATIONS AND MINISTERIAL OPERATIONS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12/9.8/3.6</td>
<td>VI. OVERCENTRALIZATION OF ACCOUNTING FUNCTION</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13/10.1/3.7</td>
<td>XI. INTERNAL FOCUS AND EFFORTS RATHER THAN SERVICE TO PUBLIC AND PRIVATE SECTORS</td>
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<tr>
<td>14/10.3/4.0</td>
<td>IV. AUTONOMY OF AUDITOR GENERAL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15/12.2/3.2</td>
<td>IX. ENCROACHMENT OF CONSTITUTIONAL POWERS OF P.S.C.</td>
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ANNEX H. PRIORITY PROBLEM AREAS AND POSSIBLE SECAL COMPONENTS

I. Problem Area (EM)

Centralized budget control; Focus on allocation of resources to organizational units, line items, not on programmes. Targeting beneficiaries or reflecting policy.

Source: Merging of A 2,3,4  Workshop Ranking: 5,9,13

Component Outline: Pilot project introducing programme budget; integrate current/development budgets; budget accounting; introduce/training programme design/management.

II. Problem Area (EM)

Revenue below potential and resource dependence.

Source: A 1,5  Workshop Ranking: 2,10

Component Outline: Tax payer education; improve tax registries, revise tax costs and administration authority to collect; provide incentives to increased collection under the Scheme of Service.

III. Problem Area (CSR-GOV)

Issuance of Civil Service Regulations; dissemination and orientation; public information of government activities.

Source: C4,5  Workshop Ranking: 11,8

Component Outline: Develop and install system of issuances; orientation training on key regulations; public information campaigns; reinstate/improve gazette study/privatizing of the Printing Department; review functions of Radio Gambia; set up Access mechanisms i.e., Ombudsman. Procurement, regulatory framework.

IV. Problem Area (CSR-GOV)

Broad scope of government and inadequate functional distribution among levels of government; no value for money in service delivery.

Source: C1,2  Workshop Ranking: 4,6

Component Outline: Functional review/identification of potential areas for commercialization; update study on size-cost of civil service; study functional allocation between levels of Government.
V. Problem Area (CSR, EM, GOV)

Overcentralization of accounting function and professionalization; autonomy of Auditor General and accountability to Parliament.

Source: B1,5 Workshop Ranking: 12,14

Component Outline: Professionalization of accountants and review scheme of service; review of rules on Internal Audit; implement Makanda report - Technical Support to Public Accounts Committee of Parliament.

VI. Problem Area (CSR)

Conditions of service; functioning of PCS; linking pay to performance.

Source: B3, C3 Workshop Ranking: 1,15

Component Outline: Review Public Service Act and Role of PSC; design and pilot test system of pay linked to performance; assess physical facilities and propose plan for renovations of critical areas; conduct a salary review.

VII. Problem Area (CSR)

Lack of training and staff development.

Source: B,2 Workshop Ranking: 3

Component Outline: Design a comprehensive training policy; formulate a training programme linked to the policy, strengthen MDI; conduct training needs assessment of core economic agencies; review post and career structure of core economic agencies.

Note: These priority problem areas were derived from a synthesis and regrouping of the key priority issues identified by each of Working Groups A, B and C, and the ranking of the fifteen items shown in Appendix I.

EM = Economic Management
CSR = Civil Service Reform
GOV = Governance
PSC = Public Service Commission
MDI = Management Development Institute

A, B and C refer to Workshop Working Groups, and Workshop Ranking refer to the results shown in Appendix I.
ANNEX I. PRE-APPRaisal REFORM COMPONENTS AND ACTIVITIES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Problem Areas/Needs</th>
<th>Suggested Activities</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(b) Limited dissemination and internalization of regulations resulting in lack of awareness and inviting abuse</td>
<td>3. Examining the need for having other regulatory and operational instruments.</td>
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<tr>
<td>(c) Limited publications capability within PMO</td>
<td>1. Improve capacity to produce, manage, circulate, and keep up-to-date regulations and other instruments.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>2. Include in the training and staff development component, appropriate induction, orientation, and refresher programs on dissemination and applications of regulations.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>3. Examine mechanisms for strengthening and enforcement of regulations, including strengthening the capacity of PSC (e.g., staff appraisal systems, decentralization, delegation).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. <em>Communication policy guidelines within the Civil Service</em></td>
<td>1. Develop a publication capability within PMO to deal with issues of civil service issuance, dissemination, orientation, upgrading, and updating.</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1. Develop communication policy guidelines in consultation with Ministries.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>2. Communicate policy guidelines throughout the service.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>3. Guidelines should differentiate types of information and how they should be handled within government.</td>
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</table>
1. Develop a public information policy which promotes transparency through consultative mechanisms.

2. Examine ways to better utilize both official and private media (e.g., press releases, conferences, ministerial statements).

3. Examine the need for the establishment of an Ombudsman office.

4. Update the size and cost study (1991) and use it as a starting point for defining the strategic role of the civil service as a basis for restructuring, streamlining, hiving off, merging, etc., different parts of the civil service.

2. Remove teachers and related groups from the civil service. Create an Education Board.

3. Make preparatory and institutional arrangements, including legal provisions to divest from the civil service: audit, survey, printing, parts of public works, statistics, revenue collection, post office, registration, municipal affairs, health, and others as may be identified by a full and detailed study.

4. Respond to the challenges resulting from the restructuring, streamlining, commercialization and privatization such
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Problem Areas/Needs</th>
<th>Suggested Activities</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>as the need for government to maintain an effective and proactive regulatory regime in areas such as finance (e.g., banking, insurance), consumer protection, telecommunications including radio, cable, etc, as well as the need to strengthen the Office of the President as a central coordinating body of the now smaller line ministries and the newly created executing agencies.</td>
<td>5. Review, study and undertake retrenchment at the top including merging ministries.</td>
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</table>
| 5. **Value for Money**  
Government needs to get value for money spent on civil service | 1. Use commercial standards for assessing performance of civil service operations.  
2. Ensure accurate costing of civil service goods and services produce/provided.  
3. Eliminate services which cost too much, general little or no revenue or have no significant impact on the core functions of government or on the work or lives of the general public.  
4. Stop paying people by cash - use the banking system. |
| 6. **Conditions of Service**  
Poor conditions of service which erode performance and government’s ability to hire and retain the best | 1. Build conditions of service improvements into the on-going CSR.  
2. Separate Executive Management (PS+) from the rest of the service and open up grade 12 for PSDs and professionals.  
3. Build a compensation package which balances performance with equity, cost of living and affordability.  
4. Redevelop and put in place a saleable performance appraisal system within the framework of clearly defined job responsibilities. |
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Problem Areas/Needs</th>
<th>Suggested Activities</th>
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<tr>
<td>5. Complete arrangements for the revised Pension Scheme, Health Insurance Scheme and the Injuries Compensation Scheme.</td>
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<tr>
<td>6. Revise allowances e.g., Provisional, House Rent.</td>
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<td>7. Incentive systems to be introduced based on performance contracts and performance appraisal.</td>
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7. **The PSC/PMO**

There are problems of the mandates, roles, functions, linkages, etc between these organizations

1. Undertake a comprehensive study of the role, functions and interfaces between PMO and PSC and make recommendations in light of the new strategic role and structuring of the civil service.

2. Make the PSC transparent with clear rules and procedures for reaching its decisions.

3. There is a feeling that both PSC and PMO are doing too much in certain areas. This should be investigated and a more rational allocation of responsibilities should be established.

8. **Lack of training and staff development**

1. Expand the training needs analysis done by MDI for EMCBP (Nov. 1993) to cover other civil service core functions - excluding those which are likely to be hived off.

2. The training which needs assessment should follow the establishment of ministerial mission statements, strategies, plans and programs. Several ministries have already developed mission strategies and plans but no programs. They should be assisted to have fully developed programs.

3. There is a need to focus training on MOA.
4. The needs analysis, design implementation and monitoring must be done participatively with as many civil servants as possible. Draw on and expand the EMCBP Methodology.

5. Training is needed in the following areas:
   - Accounting, including Management Accounting
   - Finance, including international finance (e.g., for debt management)
   - Computing - basic literacy, word processing, computation, communication, technical applications, etc.
   - White collar crime investigators especially with business and computer background.

   MDI to take on lead role in all sectors but may have to contract out certain functions.

9. The perceived lack of autonomy of the Auditor General

1. Much of the work done by the Auditor General’s Office will be hived off and commercialized.

2. The Auditor-General should be answerable to Parliament and his budget should be controlled by Parliament.

Note: These components and their respective activities are the results of two postworkshop meetings at MDI on Friday, November 12, 1993 and in the Secretary General’s Office on Tuesday, November 16, 1993. From Government side, those present included Mr. Njai, PS, PMO; Mrs. Annie Bensouda, Solicitor General and Legal Secretary, Ministry of Justice, Mrs. Juka Jabang, Director General, MDI, Yusupha Dibna, DPS Administration, Ministry of Local Government and Lands (formerly PMO); and M. Tourny, Planning Analysis Unit (PAU), Office of the President. P. Collins, R. Pinto and H. Marshall were also present at the MDI meeting. The Secretary General, Alhaji Abdou Janha worked with the group for Tuesday meeting. M. Kiggundu attended both meetings.
ANNEX J. WHAT IS NEEDED FOR EACH SECAL COMPONENT BEFORE APPRAISAL

1. Objectives.

2. Specific Activities.

3. Expected Results/Impact of the Activities.

4. Institutional Arrangements and Responsibilities.

5. Phasing of activities and timetable for implementation.

6. Financial Plan detailing the cost of each component and cost breakdown between foreign and local.

7. Memo items: Regulatory, legal, training information implications and other donors financing of activities under component.

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