Document of The World Bank Report No: ICR00003803 IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION AND RESULTS REPORT (IDA-46120) ON A CREDIT IN THE AMOUNT OF SDR 40.3 MILLION (US$60 MILLION EQUIVALENT) TO THE REPUBLIC OF CAMEROON FOR A AGRICULTURAL COMPETITIVENESS PROJECT June 15, 2017 Agriculture Global Practice Africa Region CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS (Exchange Rate Effective March 17, 2016) Currency Unit = XAF 1.00 = 0.0017US$ US$ 1.00 = XAF 581 FISCAL YEAR January 1 – December 31 ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS AFD Agence Française de Développement (French Development Agency) ARMP Procurement Regulatory Agency CAS Country Assistance Strategy CAVCA Cameroon Agricultural Value Chains Analysis CNOPCAM Conseil National des OP du Cameroun (OP National Council) CPAR Country Procurement Assessment Review DA Disbursement Account DDA Direction du Développement de 1 'Agriculture (Agriculture Development Department) DPIA Direction de la Production et des Industries Animales (Department of Animal Production and Industries) DRR Direction des Routes Rurales (Rural Roads Department) DEPC Direction des Etudes, des Programmes et de la Coopération-MINADER (Department of Research, Programs and Cooperation) DESC Direction des Etudes, du Suivi et de la Coopération-MINEPIA (Department of Studies, Monitoring and Cooperation) DESV Direction des Etudes et des Services Vétérinaires-MINEPIA (Department of Veterinary Studies and Services) DGR Direction du Génie Rural-MINADER (Rural Engineering Department) DOPA Direction des Organisations Professionnelles Agricoles (Department of Agricultural Organizations) EC European Commission EMP Environment Management Plan EP Economic Partnerships ESMF Environment and Social Management Framework ESW Economic and Sector Work (Cameroon Agriculture Value Chain Analysis) EU European Union FCFA Franc de la Communauté Financière d'Afrique (CFA Franc) FM Financial Management FMS Financial Management Specialist GDP Gross Domestic Product GPN General Procurement Notice GST Groupe de Suivi Technique (Technical Monitoring Team) IBRD International Bank for Reconstruction and Development ICB International Competitive Bidding IDA International Development Association IFAD International Fund for Agricultural Development IFC International Finance Corporation IFR Interim Financial Reports IPPF Indigenous People Planning Framework ii IPSAS International Public Sector Accounting Standards IRAD Institut de Recherche Agricole pour le Développement (Agricultural Development Research Institute) ISN Interim Strategy Note M&E Monitoring and Evaluation MGF Matching Grant Facility MINADER Ministère de 1'Agriculture et du Développement Rural (Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development) MINEP Ministère de I ‘Environnement et de la Protection de la Nature (Ministry of Environment and Protection of Nature) MINEPIA Ministère de I'Elevage, la Pêche et les Industries Animales (Ministry of Livestock, Fisheries, and Animal Production) MINFI Ministère des Finances (Ministry of Finance) MINTP Ministère des Travaux Publics (Ministry of Public Works) MIS Project Management Information System NCB National Competitive Bidding NGO Non Governmental Organization OAL Opérateurs d 'Appui Local (Local Support Operators) OED Operation Evaluation Department OP Operational Policy PACA Projet d 'Appui à la Compétitivité Agricole (Agricultural Competitiveness Project) PCU Project Coordination Unit PIM Project Implementation Manual PLANOPAC Plateforme Nationale des Organisations de Producteurs Agricoles du Cameroun (Cameroon National Platform of Agricultural POs) PMP Pest Management Plan PNDP National Participatory Development Program PNVRA National Agricultural Extension and Research Project PO Producer Organization POA Annual Operating Plan PRSP Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper PSAE Programme Sectoriel Agriculture-Elevage (Agricultural and Livestock Sector Program) RCU Regional Coordination Unit RFP Resettlement Policy Framework RRR Rural Road Rehabilitation RSC Regional Selecting Committee SBD Standard Bidding Documents SEMRY Société d'Expansion et Modernisation de la Riziculture de Yagoua (Society for the Expansion and Modernization of Rice Cultivation in Yagoua) SOE Statement of Expenditures UNVDA Upper Noun Valley Development Authority VAT Value Added Tax Senior Global Practice Director: Juergen Voegele Practice Manager: Dina Umali-Deininger Project Team Leader: Myriam Chaudron ICR Team Leader: Jeehye Kim iii CAMEROON AGRICULTURAL COMPETITIVENESS PROJECT CONTENTS Data Sheet A. Basic Information B. Key Dates C. Ratings Summary D. Sector and Theme Codes E. Bank Staff F. Results Framework Analysis G. Ratings of Project Performance in ISRs H. Restructuring I. Disbursement Graph 1. Project Context, Development Objectives and Design ............................................... 1 2. Key Factors Affecting Implementation and Outcomes .............................................. 3 3. Assessment of Outcomes .......................................................................................... 10 4. Assessment of Risk to Development Outcome......................................................... 23 5. Assessment of Bank and Borrower Performance ..................................................... 24 6. Lessons Learned ....................................................................................................... 26 7. Comments on Issues Raised by Borrower/Implementing Agencies/Partners .......... 27 Annex 1. Project Costs and Financing .......................................................................... 28 Annex 2. Outputs by Component ................................................................................. 29 Annex 3. Economic and Financial Analysis ................................................................. 45 Annex 4. Bank Lending and Implementation Support/Supervision Processes ............ 53 Annex 5. Beneficiary Survey Results ........................................................................... 55 Annex 6. Stakeholder Workshop Report and Results................................................... 60 Annex 7. Summary of Borrower's ICR and Comments on Draft ICR ........................ 61 Annex 8. Comments of Cofinanciers and Other Partners/Stakeholders ....................... 65 Annex 9. List of Supporting Documents ...................................................................... 66 MAP iv A. Basic Information CM-Agricultural Country: Cameroon Project Name: Competitiveness Project Project ID: P112635 L/C/TF Number(s): IDA-46120 ICR Date: 05/08/2017 ICR Type: Core ICR REPUBLIC OF Lending Instrument: SIL Borrower: CAMEROON Original Total XDR 40.30M Disbursed Amount: XDR 39.86M Commitment: Revised Amount: XDR 39.86M Environmental Category: Implementing Agencies: Ministry of Economy, Planning and Regional Development (MINEPAT) Cofinanciers and Other External Partners: B. Key Dates Revised / Actual Process Date Process Original Date Date(s) Concept Review: 11/13/2008 Effectiveness: 02/12/2010 01/29/2010 10/01/2013 07/10/2015 Appraisal: 04/22/2009 Restructuring(s): 03/29/2016 06/29/2016 12/23/2016 Approval: 06/18/2009 Mid-term Review: 11/12/2012 12/03/2012 Closing: 11/30/2015 12/31/2016 C. Ratings Summary C.1 Performance Rating by ICR Outcomes: Moderately Satisfactory Risk to Development Outcome: Substantial Bank Performance: Moderately Satisfactory Borrower Performance: Moderately Satisfactory C.2 Detailed Ratings of Bank and Borrower Performance (by ICR) Bank Ratings Borrower Ratings Moderately Moderately Quality at Entry: Government: Unsatisfactory Unsatisfactory Implementing Quality of Supervision: Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory Agency/Agencies: Overall Bank Overall Borrower Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory Performance: Performance: v C.3 Quality at Entry and Implementation Performance Indicators Implementation QAG Assessments (if Indicators Rating Performance any) Potential Problem Project Quality at Entry Yes None at any time (Yes/No): (QEA): Problem Project at any Quality of Supervision Yes None time (Yes/No): (QSA): DO rating before Moderately Closing/Inactive status: Satisfactory D. Sector and Theme Codes Original Actual Major Sector/Sector Agriculture, Fishing and Forestry Other Agriculture, Fishing and Forestry 8 8 Irrigation and Drainage 15 15 Public Administration Public administration - Agriculture, fishing and forestry 17 17 Transportation Rural and Inter-Urban Roads 23 23 Industry, Trade and Services Agricultural markets, commercialization and agri- 37 37 business Major Theme/Theme/Sub Theme Finance Finance for Development 18 18 Agriculture Finance 18 18 Urban and Rural Development Rural Development 44 44 Rural Infrastructure and service delivery 44 44 Rural Markets 39 39 E. Bank Staff Positions At ICR At Approval Vice President: Makhtar Diop Obiageli Katryn Ezekwesili Country Director: Elisabeth Huybens Mary A. Barton-Dock Practice Dina Umali-Deininger Karen Mcconnell Brooks Manager/Manager: vi Myriam Mireille Veronique Project Team Leader: Renato Nardello Chaudron ICR Team Leader: Jeehye Kim ICR Primary Author: Jeehye Kim ICR co-Author: Leny van Oyen F. Results Framework Analysis Project Development Objectives (from Project Appraisal Document) Increase the competitiveness of beneficiary producer organizations working on target value chains. Revised Project Development Objectives (as approved by original approving authority) (a) PDO Indicator(s) Original Target Actual Value Formally Values (from Achieved at Indicator Baseline Value Revised approval Completion or Target Values documents) Target Years Increase in the value of sales from Producer Organizations (POs) supported by the Indicator 1 : Project Value 0 20 69.28 quantitative or Qualitative) Date achieved 06/30/2009 12/30/2016 10/19/2016 Comments Target achieved (346%). Results are based on M&E data of sub-projects and figures (incl. % from 2014 impact study revised in 2015. achievement) Reduction of post-harvest losses from supported POs with access to the new Indicator 2 : transport infrastructures Value 0 20 30 quantitative or Qualitative) Date achieved 06/30/2009 12/30/2016 10/19/2016 Comments Target achieved (150%). Reduction in post-harvest losses along the 50 km of rural (incl. % roads that were constructed by 2016 was 30% compared to a target of 20%. achievement) Increase in average rice yields in the rehabilitated irrigated areas Indicator 3 : Value 5.2 6.1 6.9 quantitative or Qualitative) Date achieved 06/30/2009 12/30/2016 10/19/2016 vii Target achieved (113%). Increases in rice yields are not due to irrigation Comments rehabilitation, but rather due to institutional support to irrigation authorities and (incl. % support to the rice grower POs. achievement) Increase in crop yields for two other targeted crop value chains (Maize and Plantain) Indicator 4 : Value 2.5 6.5 3.0 7.5 3.10 16.7 quantitative or Qualitative) Date achieved 06/30/2009 12/30/2016 10/19/2016 Comments Target achieved (Maize:103% and Plantain: 223%). The palm oil value chain was (incl. % dropped during the MTR as there were no applications for sub-projects. achievement) (b) Intermediate Outcome Indicator(s) Original Target Actual Value Formally Values (from Achieved at Indicator Baseline Value Revised approval Completion or Target Values documents) Target Years Reduction in transportation time to closest market Indicator 1 : Value 0 20 20 (quantitative or Qualitative) Date achieved 06/30/2009 12/30/2016 10/19/2016 Comments Information drawn from the impact evaluation report of 2015. (incl. % achievement) Roads rehabilitated, Rural Indicator 2 : Value 0 500 250 (quantitative or Qualitative) Date achieved 06/30/2009 12/31/2016 12/31/2016 Target partially achieved. The rural roads component suffered from long delays and Comments 50% out of 500 km were rehabilitated. Due to lack of necessary engineering studies, (incl. % cost estimates were grossly underestimated. achievement) Sub-projects profitable (positive gross profit) 1 year after completion Indicator 3 : Value 0 80 94.7 (quantitative or Qualitative) Date achieved 06/30/2009 12/30/2016 10/19/2016 Comments (incl. % Target achieved (118%). Data from M&E system of PACA. achievement) Unqualified technical and safeguard audits Indicator 4 : viii Value 0 70 91.5 (quantitative or Qualitative) Date achieved 06/30/2009 12/30/2016 10/19/2016 Comments Target achieved (131%). Nearly all sub-projects (91.5% versus a target of 70%) were (incl. % subject to an environmental audit and passed screening test. achievement) POs engaged in economic partnerships (number) Indicator 5 : Value 0 1,000 1,555 (quantitative or Qualitative) Date achieved 06/30/2009 12/30/2016 10/19/2016 Target achieved (155%). 100% of POs had contracts with input suppliers, 22 % Comments with marketing bodies, and 32 % with agricultural credit institutions. Contracts with (incl. % suppliers were much more common than contracts with buyers. achievement) Sub-projects approved (number) Indicator 6 : Value 0 1,000 1,138 (quantitative or Qualitative) Date achieved 06/30/2009 12/30/2016 10/19/2016 Comments Target achieved (113%). According to Dec. 2014 annual report of PACA, out of (incl. % 1,250 sub-projects presented, 1,138 were approved. achievement) POs in targeted areas satisfied with support services received from apex Indicator 7 : organizations Value 0 80 39.40 (quantitative or Qualitative) Date achieved 06/30/2009 12/30/2016 10/19/2016 Target not achieved (49.3%). The low satisfaction rate of POs with support received Comments from apex institutions is due to the weakness of the apex institutions. These (incl. % institutions received capacity building support from PACA, but their capacity achievement) for outreach to POs is still limited. POs receiving support services through APEX organizations (number) Indicator 8 : Value 0 500 267 (quantitative or Qualitative) Date achieved 06/30/2009 12/30/2016 10/19/2016 Comments Target not achieved (53%). Outreach capacity of apex organizations, while improved (incl. % under the project, is still limited. achievement) POs managed effectively (hold regular meetings, record their decisions, open and Indicator 9 : manage a bank account and have regularly elected officials)(Percentage, Custom) Value 0 80 89.76 ix (quantitative or Qualitative) Date achieved 06/30/2009 12/30/2016 10/19/2016 Target achieved (112%). The management capacity was strengthened by the project, Comments with its technical advice through Local Service Providers, decentralized staff from (incl. % MINADER and MINEPIA, and its procedures for the management of sub- achievement) projects by POs. Incremental volume of annual certified seeds produced (tons) (Number, Custom) Indicator 10 : Value 0 500 1,500 (quantitative or Qualitative) Date achieved 06/30/2009 12/30/2016 10/19/2016 Target achieved (300%). PACA, in collaboration with the Seed Certification Comments Department of MINADER, has contributed to the additional production of 1,500t of (incl. % certified seeds, three times the original target achievement) Sub-projects presented (number, Custom) Indicator 11 : Value 0 2,000 1,250 (quantitative or Qualitative) Date achieved 06/30/2009 12/30/2016 10/19/2016 Target achieved partially (63%). Although this target was partially achieved, this Comments does not represent under-performance of PACA. Resources allocated to sub-projects (incl. % were exhausted as of 2014. Therefore, the number of sub-project applications achievement) remained at 1250. POs adopting business plans (Percentage, Custom) Indicator 12 : Value 0 70 100 (quantitative or Qualitative) Date achieved 06/30/2009 12/30/2016 10/19/2016 Target achieved (143%). The target of 70% of POs adopting business was surpassed Comments since all of them that have contracts with PACA have a business plan. The quality of (incl. % these business plans depended to a large extent on the capacity of Local Support achievement) Operators (OALs) G. Ratings of Project Performance in ISRs Actual Date ISR No. DO IP Disbursements Archived (USD millions) 1 11/18/2009 Satisfactory Satisfactory 0.00 2 06/24/2010 Moderately Satisfactory Satisfactory 4.34 3 12/18/2010 Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Unsatisfactory 5.19 4 03/10/2011 Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 5.61 x 5 07/31/2011 Moderately Satisfactory Satisfactory 7.02 6 02/05/2012 Satisfactory Satisfactory 9.75 7 07/23/2012 Satisfactory Satisfactory 14.80 8 02/28/2013 Moderately Satisfactory Satisfactory 19.60 9 05/23/2013 Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 26.92 10 12/03/2013 Satisfactory Satisfactory 33.01 11 02/23/2014 Satisfactory Satisfactory 36.27 12 09/22/2014 Satisfactory Satisfactory 46.62 13 03/15/2015 Satisfactory Satisfactory 51.85 14 09/23/2015 Satisfactory Satisfactory 55.42 15 04/10/2016 Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 59.33 16 11/01/2016 Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 60.35 H. Restructuring (if any) ISR Ratings at Amount Board Restructuring Restructuring Disbursed at Reason for Restructuring & Approved Date(s) Restructuring Key Changes Made PDO Change DO IP in USD millions To scale down the rehabilitation of rice irrigated perimeters and reallocate funds to institutional support for the 10/01/2013 N MS MS 31.77 irrigation authorities. Results framework was modified accordingly. o Extension of closing date from end November, 2015 to end 07/10/2015 N S S 54.61 March 2016 Closing date change (to end June, 03/29/2016 S S 58.50 2016) and Reallocation Closing date change (to end Dec 06/29/2016 S MS 60.25 2016) and Reallocation Partial cancellation of undisbursed balance of SDR 440,755 (regarding 12/23/2016 MS MS 59.68 C1) xi I. Disbursement Profile xii 1. Project Context, Development Objectives and Design 1.1 Context at appraisal Policy context: The second pillar of the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (2003) highlighted the importance of economic diversification with a strong focus on agricultural development as the key income generating activity and the main source for future economic growth and poverty alleviation in rural areas. The subsequent National Rural Sector Development Strategy (2007) placed particular emphasis on the driving role of producer associations and the involvement of private investors in agriculture. In 2009 (the year of project approval) the Government launched its Growth and Employment Strategy for the period 2010-2020 which covered several objectives pertaining to agriculture, among which were growth of the sector, increase in rural revenues, rural employment, and increase in the share of agricultural products in exports. With a view to achieving these objectives, the above-mentioned 2007 Rural Sector Development Strategy was revised in 2012, focusing on, inter alia, institutional development, the modernization of rural infrastructure, and productivity enhancement of agricultural value chains. Based on the above strategies, the National Agricultural Investment Plan (2014-2020) was launched in June 2015, aimed at harmonizing and strengthening interventions pertaining to the rural sector, with emphasis on investment. Sector context: Agriculture has been and still remains a key element for sustaining growth, reducing poverty and achieving food security in Cameroon. Growth in agriculture was expected to also play a pivotal role in reducing the country’s dependency on volatile oil revenues, which accounted for more than 50 % of the total value of exports. At appraisal, it was revealed that the agriculture sector covered 18.9% of GDP in 2008 (which rose to around 23% in 2014), and was largely driven by family farmers that represented more than 80% of the country’s agricultural production system and employed almost 60% of the economically active population. Of all rural households 90% were to some extent engaged in agriculture and approximately one third of them earned their living from export crops. The household survey in Cameroon at appraisal (ECAM III, 2007) revealed that over 55 % of rural households were poor, as compared to only about 12 % of urban households. More recent data indicate that in the period 2001-2014 poverty incidence in rural areas increased, particularly in the northern parts of the country. Rationale for Bank involvement: The project was in line with the Bank’s commitment to scaling up investment in African agriculture. More specifically, the project was a logical follow-up to the Agricultural Value Chain Analysis (ESW) prepared in FY08. This ESW recommended enhancing the technical, managerial and logistic capacity of producer organizations (POs), increasing access to agricultural inputs and high-yielding material, and improving the network of feeder roads and wholesale markets. The project also built on previous Bank projects, in particular the National Agricultural Extension and Research Project (closed in 2004) and was to work in synergy with other initiatives including WB/IFC support to enhance competitiveness and promote private investment in the economy including in agri-business. Diversification from the oil sector and support to agriculture featured prominently in the Country Assistance Strategy (CAS, FY10-FY13) that included among its strategic pillars support to agriculture and the promotion of high potential value chains (including agribusiness). Also the objectives and focus areas of the current Country Partnership Framework (CPF, FY17-FY21) include direct and indirect support to rural development and poverty reduction, comprising inter alia emphasis on increasing productivity and improving access to markets. 1.2 Original Project Development Objectives (PDO) and Key Indicators The Project Development Objective was to increase the competitiveness of eligible producer organizations working on target value chains. It was expected that the project would lead to increased value of marketed production through increased productivity, quality, and marketing. Key outcome indicators were: (i) increase in the value of selected marketed/traded products in target areas (percent); (ii) reduction in the quantity of post-harvest losses from the supported producer organizations with access to the new transport infrastructures (percent); (iii) increase in average rice yields in the 1 rehabilitated irrigated areas (ton/ha); and (iv) increase in yields of other targeted value chains (%). At the intermediate level, performance indicators were defined for each component and subcomponent. 1.3 Revised PDO/key indicators and reasons/justification The PDO was not revised. However, after the redefinition by the Mid-Term Review (MTR, 2012) of sub-component 1.2 (irrigated perimeters) and as explained in 1.6 below, two intermediate results indicators were removed from the results framework, i.e., ‘increase in rice production in rehabilitated perimeters’ and ‘irrigation area rehabilitated.’ Moreover, the MTR removed the indicator related to productivity increase of palm oil trees, due to limited sub-projects in this sub-sector. This was related to (a) the size of investment needed for, in particular, palm oil processing (beyond the funding ceiling for sub-projects) and (b) the time needed to generate tangible results in case of expansion of plantations. 1.4 Main Target Beneficiaries The project intended to target small-holders and their organizations as direct beneficiaries (some 20,000 rice producers and another 20,000 other producers engaged in economic partnership projects (investment sub-projects)). Moreover, the project would have indirect beneficiaries, such as the population living in high potential production areas benefitting from project activities and road rehabilitation, other actors along the value chains (such as traders, transporters, processors). 1.5 Original Components Component 1: Rehabilitation of key rural infrastructure (US$21.5 million IDA). This component had two sub-components: Sub-component I.1: Rehabilitation of rural roads (US$12.8 million IDA), covering about 500 km of rural roads with the main purpose of connecting high-potential production areas to markets; Sub-component 1.2: Rehabilitation of irrigated perimeters (US$8.7 million IDA), covering about 11,500 hectares of existing irrigated schemes (paddy rice production) of which 10,500 hectares in the Far North Region, and about 1,000 hectares in the North-West Region. Component 2: Economic Partnerships (US$22.7 million IDA). This component was to support Producer Organizations (POs) in targeted value chains and regions in establishing and implementing investment sub-projects based on Economic Partnerships (EPs) aimed at addressing production, and marketing and/or processing bottlenecks. Component 2 comprised two sub-components: Sub-component 2.1: Support to the establishment of Economic Partnerships (US$2.1 million IDA). This sub-component was to support the development of linkages and coordination between different stakeholders and help them analyze and propose solutions to specific bottlenecks to the development of competitive value chains; Sub-component 2.2: Co-financing of PO investment projects (US$20.6 million IDA). This sub- component was to co-finance (on a matching-grant basis) POs’ investments regarding production, collection, marketing, processing, and/or other services along the target value chains (rice, maize, plantain, palm oil, pork, and poultry). Co-financing from the Project was expected to reach 70 % of the total cost of the subproject and a maximum of FCFA30 million (about $60,000 equivalent). Component 3: Institutional support and capacity development (USS5.0 million IDA). This component was to develop the capacity of actors at different levels under three sub-components: Sub-component 3.1: Developing the capacity of apex producer organizations (US$2.5 million IDA), in order to improve their functions in terms of advocacy, organization, negotiation, management, strategy formulation, policy dialogue, operations, and support services to member POs; Sub-component 3.2: Strengthening core functions of public services (US$2.1 million IDA): The services targeted were those instrumental to support smallholders’ productivity and access to the markets; and 2 Sub-component 3.3: Support to the establishment of legal and regulatory framework (US$0.1 million IDA): The framework was expected to be conducive to the sustainable development of agricultural value chains. Component 4: Project coordination, Monitoring and Evaluation (US$7.4 million IDA). This component supported the establishment, equipment and operations of the project coordination teams at national and regional levels, responsible for project implementation, procurement, financial management and overall Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E). 1.6 Revised Components The reformulation of sub-component 1.2: The irrigation rehabilitation aspect of Component 1 was transferred to an emergency operation (the Cameroon Flood Emergency Project), and the focus shifted to institution building for the irrigation authority, introduction of land preparation equipment, as well as use of agricultural inputs by POs, and strengthening of their organization. This was the subject of the first restructuring. Under sub-component 3.2 (in particular its veterinary services dimension), unforeseen targeted assistance was provided by the project during its last six months of implementation to assist the Government in its response to the outbreak of avian influenza in May 2016 which had affected poultry production in Cameroon, particularly in the western part of the country. This was the subject of the (fourth) restructuring (extension and reallocation), together with the extension of the implementation period for the rural roads rehabilitation. The persistent implementation delays in the rural road rehabilitation sub-component (1.1) resulted in the cancellation of an undisbursed balance in December 2016 (equivalent to $605,016.70) as per the last (fifth) restructuring. 1.7 Other significant changes The project was initially expected to be completed by 30 November 2015 but was extended twice, its actual completion being 31 December 2016. The project was restructured five times (level 2), primarily to permit the completion of sub-component 1.1, the adjustment of component 1.2 and also covered some funds reallocation among (sub-) components. The first restructuring took place after the MTR (2013), encompassing the reformulation of sub-component 1.2 and, accordingly, of its indicators (cf. Section 1.6). The second restructuring covered an extension in the closing date (from end November 2015 to end March 2016), Also the third and fourth restructurings encompassed project extensions (to end June 2016 and thereafter end December 2016) as well as funds reallocation to cover support to address the avian influenza outbreak. The last restructuring covered the cancellation of an undisbursed balance at the end of the project. For details of the restructurings, reference is made to the table included in Annex 2. 2. Key Factors Affecting Implementation and Outcomes 2.1 Project Preparation, Design and Quality at Entry Background Analysis The design of the project was based on the findings and recommendations of the Agricultural Value Chain Analysis conducted in 2008. This study explored the development constraints and potential for the competitiveness of six agricultural value chains. The study identified products and farming systems for which Cameroon could become competitive. The study recommended the following public sector interventions for providing support to the development of these value chains: (i) technical assistance to producer organizations (POs) to coordinate their demand and purchase of inputs and planting material; 3 (ii) expansion of the rural transport system by investing in the rural roads network; and (iii) provision of organizational and managerial training for farmers. The project adopted these recommendations. Lessons drawn from past and on-going Bank and other donor operations were sufficiently reflected in the project concept namely: measures to ensure sustainability based on cost sharing and participation; the need to complement investments with capacity building; and the value and importance of establishing clearly defined rules of the game. Design This project, in its design, made a clear departure from the approach followed in traditional agricultural development projects in Cameroon in which focus was put entirely on the production side of agriculture. The project extended this approach by including substantial focus on the promotion of value chains and market-based development. Taking a step further, the project attempted to address gaps in infrastructure (i.e. rural roads and irrigation parameters in component 1) and institutions (component 3) to provide an enabling environment for producer organizations (component 2), who constitute the main beneficiaries of this project. Considerable attention was given to developing the core component (component 2) of the operation, namely the co-financing of PO investment projects. Detailed fiduciary and technical procedures regarding co-financing of sub-projects, including control mechanisms and remedies for subproject implementation; clear eligibility criteria for projects and for beneficiaries, processing cycle and timing, as well as complaint-handling mechanisms for sub-projects were developed. Similar attention was paid to how POs and other stakeholders should be trained prior to subproject implementation. Templates for subproject agreements incorporating good governance and transparency clauses were designed. Aspects of project design related to institutional and implementation arrangements were well developed. This included arrangements for oversight and coordination of effort at every level – covering the establishment of a steering committee for project oversight and the establishment of a project coordination team with regional coordination units, focal points from decentralized sectoral ministries, and regional selection committees. While some aspects of the project were well designed in some detail prior to project effectiveness, both sub-components of the rural infrastructure component (Component 1) lacked important aspects of program design prior to project effectiveness. Sub-Components 1.1 (rehabilitation of rural roads (500 km)) and Sub-Component 1.2 (rehabilitation of irrigated perimeters (11,500 hectares of existing irrigation schemes)) which together represented one third of project costs (roughly $20 million out of the total $60 million) were inadequately prepared. Plans for preliminary studies that were needed for both Sub-Components were not included in the implementation plan prior to effectiveness. Nor were assessments of the institutional capacity of the two irrigation development authorities carried out. As a consequence of these failings in preparation, cost estimates were underestimated and timelines were unrealistic, which meant that the implementing agencies struggled to respond to the challenges that arose. In addition, concerning the rehabilitation of existing irrigated schemes, the concept of “rehabilitation” was not well defined. This led to ambiguity in the overall objectives. Such analysis would have allowed for more precision in the design of the Project to address these critical issues. Assessment of risks A few risks identified at preparation turned out to be extremely relevant and would later on lead to delays and difficulties in project execution. The project involved several technical ministries (Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock, Public Works, and Social Affairs) and required close coordination between these entities. Although the risk of poor sectoral coordination was identified, suggested mitigation measures to create a multi-sectoral steering committee and define a clear decision-making process were at best perfunctory and not adequately followed through in the project implementation. As a result, inter- ministerial coordination and collaboration was far less effective than was needed for successful implementation of the project. 4 While acknowledging substantial risks associated with complex procurement guidelines and the weak capacity of PCU and Producer Organizations to comply, the project lacked a clear strategy for building capacity and affording adequate attention to monitor the process. 2.2 Implementation The project was implemented according to its design. However, implementation and outcomes were impacted by the following key factors: (i) Slow project start-up (2010-2011). Implementation of Component 1 (Rehabilitation of Rural Infrastructure (mostly rural roads and irrigation systems)) suffered significant delays at the start of the Project for several reasons, including: incomplete preparation and insufficient technical feasibility studies; weak capacity of implementing agencies; and procurement delays related to both of these factors. Component 2 (Economic Partnerships) was slow to take off as well, as POs were initially reluctant to buy into the project’s concept of matching grants. This reluctance was rooted in skepticism and discomfort with the project process. In particular: (i) POs had to submit project proposals and contribute up to 30 % of investment costs up front (10 % in the form of cash to be deposited in a local bank account and 20 % in kind); and (ii) PACA payments were tied to the financing plan and only disbursed in tranches. Because of this, the formulation and submission of PO investment project proposals was initially slow. Correspondingly, disbursements lagged and by December 2011, had reached only SDR 6.29 million (16%) of the IDA credit. To compensate for the slow start and accelerate sub-project implementation, the project team took active measures including: frequent supervision missions to interact with the POs and stakeholders; speedy recruitment of strong local service providers (OALs) to closely support the POs; and forums on access to finance. (ii) The Rural Road Sub-Component (1.1). The rural roads component was hampered by perennial procurement delays caused by a mixture of issues: - Inadequte preparation of the project. The amount originally planned for the rehabilitation of 500 km of rural roads was underestimated at appraisal due to the lack of detailed feasibility studies at the time, which led to an underestimation of unit costs. Due also to the increase in the price of goods and services associated with road work in 2014 (ISR 13), the amount allocated for rural roads was only able to cover the cost of rehabilitation of 250 km of rural roads. - Appointment of key staff. The Bank project team did not involve a qualified road engineer as a core team member during the project implementation. Throughout its implementation, the Bank team relied on informal support of an in-house road expert, whose support was given to the team largely based on positive personal relationships between particular individuals rather than because of any managerial or institutional support. Given the size of the interventions in component 1.1 and the technical complexity thereof, not involving a road engineer in the Bank’s supervision team affected the quality of implementation support and removed the possibility of a more conscious and responsible implementation support to the project. - Lack of ownership by the implementing agency. The Ministry of Public Works (MINTP) and its Rural Roads Department (DRR) did not show full ownership of this sub-component, paid insufficient attention to its implementation, and was unable to prevent the long delays (notwithstanding the linkage with the WB/AfDB Unit in this Ministry). Inadequate contract management due to capacity constraints at the MINTP was the main reason for the delays experienced, as the relatively small contracts for rural roads rehabilitation were not treated as a priority and were subject to the standard procurement procedures (that are recognized to be lengthy in Cameroon). 5 - Limited contractor pool. The contractor pool was limited given the relatively small size of the contracts. As a result, some of the contractors were stated to have weak financial capacity and could not mobilize their equipment and personnel on time to the geographically spread areas targeted by the project. (iii) Natural disasters. The implementation of Sub-component 1.2 on Irrigated Perimeters (already delayed by insufficient preparation, as noted above) was further restricted by floods during 2012, which revealed that irrigation rehabilitation without first securing two major dams was not feasible. Consequently, the Bank prepared the Cameroon Flood Emergency Project to address this situation. The irrigation rehabilitation aspects originally included in PACA were transferred to this new project and the content of the remaining sub-component was redefined. PACA’s PCU played an important role in preparing for this new project. (iv) Avian Flu. The outbreak of avian flu in May 2016 led to a restructuring and the extension of the project until end December 2016. PACA supported an emergency response, covering in particular: awareness building of different stakeholders; disinfection materials; logistical support to detect and monitor outbreaks (such as cars, computers, and communication tools); an impact study1; laboratory equipment; and consumables, enabling detection in support of the network in charge of the epidemic surveillance. (v) Mid-term Review. The Mid-term Review (MTR) in December 2012 was well prepared and decisive in adjusting project components and their scope to the realities on the ground. a) Rural Roads (Sub-Component 1.1). In light of the serious delays experienced in the implementation of this Sub-component, the team analyzed in detail the implementation status as well as the implementation arrangements for this Sub-Component 1.1. A series of meetings were held between the Bank team, PCU and MINTP to examine why this component did not move and whether there was enough time to achieve the initial objectives of 500 km of rural roads rehabilitated by the end of the Project. As a result of these meetings, a precise time-bound action plan was agreed. The MTR considered eliminating the rural roads component but in the end decided not to do so since MINTP gave assurances that henceforth this component would be implemented in a timely fashion. b) Irrigation Perimeters (Sub-Component 1.2) Detailed technical studies on the cost and timeline of the planned Rehabilitation of Rice Irrigation Perimeters were concluded at the MTR. Based on the outcomes of the detailed studies, Rehabilitation of Rice Irrigated Perimeters (RRIP) was found not feasible by the Project's resources and timeline because final costs were estimated far higher (at US$58 million) and the work would take five years (which meant the work to be completed not before 2018). The Bank team and the Government jointly decided to scale down the rehabilitation of rice irrigated perimeters (hydraulic aspects) and reallocate funds to the institutional support of the two irrigation development authorities (Societe d’Expansion et de Modernisation de la Riziculture de Yagoua – SEMRY, and the Upper Nun Valley Development Authority – UNVDA). This was a complete overhaul of this sub-component as the emphasis shifted from hardware to software. The restructuring entailed an adjustment of the Results Framework by removing two intermediate results indicators: “Increase in rice production in rehabilitated perimeters” and “Irrigation area rehabilitated” related to sub-component 1 (Rehabilitating Key Rural Infrastructure). 1 Etude sur l’impact socio-économique de l’infection à virus influenza aviaire hautement pathogène et des mesures de riposte mises en place par le Gouvernement sur la filière avicole locale 6 c) Timely reallocation of project proceeds during MTR. Both the project team and Bank supervision team decided to increase by SDR 2,115,000 the budget allocated to Category 4 “Sub-grants under Category 2.2 to complete the financing of sub-projects that had already been identified, and by SDR 1,500,000 the budget allocated to Category 6 “Goods, Operating Costs, Training and Services for Part D of the Project” (Project Management) to strengthen data collection, monitoring and evaluation, internal audit, financial management, training, operational equipment, as well as to increase support to producers on the ground. With this timely reallocation of funds, pre-identified sub-projects received full project support. Moreover, with more resource, the PCU of PACA was able to support implementation of the newly approved Cameroon Flood Emergency Project (P143940) until the latter’s coordination unit was established, as well as preparation and early implementation of the Cameroon Agriculture Investment and Market Development Project (P143417). The PCU of PACA provided technical support for both of these projects until their own PCUs were functional. 2.3 Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) Design, Implementation and Utilization Design of indicators The results framework includes the baseline and target values for the indicators described in the PAD. These were based on a detailed baseline study (2009) covering data on 360 POs and 15 apex organizations. The indicators defined for the development outcome measure the degree in which the project results translate into increase in yields, in value of marketed products as well as in reduction in post-harvest losses. Regarding the (14) intermediate level results indicators, they are specific and measurable, allowing for tracking progress under each of the subcomponents. Regarding the indicator on sub-project profitability (positive gross profit one year after completion), this was realistic to the extent 70% of the sub-project was a grant. As yields and value depend on many factors, several of which were outside the control of the project (weather conditions and price fluctuations), progress (or lack thereof) may or may not be fully attributable to project interventions. Most indicators are quantitative (referring to tons/ha, km, number of POs, number of sub-projects etc.). The values of the livestock indicators were formulated and included in the results framework at the time of the MTR. The framework includes only one indicator pertaining to the capacity of core public services to POs under Component 3 (the certification of seeds). The importance of some indicators for achieving the planned results was overstated (the case of Component 1), as the PDO targets were achieved notwithstanding under-achievement under Component 1. In hindsight, indicators of the ways in which gender issues were addressed in the implementation of the project might have been given greater prominence. For example, the core Bank indicator ‘number of direct project beneficiaries of which female (%)’ was only adopted in 2014, it was not included in the results framework at the time of PACA’s design. Even so, M&E implementation did contain the collection of some gender-disaggregated data and monitoring of gender aspects of the project was not completely absent. The system: Performance monitoring covered different levels and actors: (i) the National Steering Committee (twice a year) comprising representatives of the key Ministries involved, of the private sector and of related sector projects; (ii) a Technical Monitoring Team covering representatives of the same stakeholders (quarterly meetings with the PCU); (iii) semi-annual joint supervision missions (Bank, Government and apex POs) and (iv) day-to-day monitoring by the PCU that included an M&E specialist. The M&E team in the PCU depended on the Regional Coordination Units (RCUs), Focal Points, Local Support Operators (OALs) as well as the POs for data collection. 7 M&E Implementation Average yields for target value chains were calculated based on performance averages of all POs/sub- projects by value chain and by region. The “data chain” was as follows: o PACA training of POs and other stakeholders at regional level on data collection; o POs completing the standard data sheet containing information on, e.g., costs, crop/ animal performance (such as, in the case of the poultry sector: increase in bird weight; number of eggs/bird, mortality rate/production cycle); o OALs collecting (including verifying) the data and calculating indicator values for the POs covered; o The regional coordination units (RCUs) calculating regional averages of indicator values on the basis of data received from the OALs; o The central coordination entity (PCU) calculating annual national averages of indicator values on the basis of data received from the RCUs. There was a verification mechanism consisting of checking the data at the level of samples of POs to ensure data validity. In case of deviations, explanations were required. The data collected on the POs as per the above approach was complemented by the following: o two impact studies (2012 and 2015); o two PO satisfaction surveys (2012 and 20132); o two environmental and social audits (2014 and 2015); o the Borrower’s completion report (June 2016) which constitutes a self-evaluation of PACA. Software was purchased to facilitate the M&E function (TECPRO, TOM MARCHES), but problems adapting the software to the project needs and also non-harmonized use across regions resulted in abandonment of these tools and the compilation of data in Excel sheets (both at level of RCU and PCU). Only TOM PRO (accounting software) was used. The Ministry of Public Works (MINTP) initially intended to use GIS to monitor the status of the road network (including rural roads). The system was to show roads to be rehabilitated/roads rehabilitated, and was to be implemented by the MINTP (and not by PACA), but was not implemented due to lack of capacity and commitment. The M&E efforts focused in particular on component 2.2. This was a major task, considering the large number of sub-projects. As regards the measurement of economic partnerships (component 2.1), this focused on numbers (1129) and value (FCFA 18 billion). The cooperation with MFIs (with which PACA established MoUs) was important for POs having funding gaps to implement their sub-projects and was reported to encompass FCFA 500.5 million in terms of (co-) financing. Other than information on the number of kilometers of rural roads rehabilitated under component 1, there is no information on the proportionate degree of complexity of the road works (heavy or light rehabilitation, as specified in the PAD). With regard to component 3, reporting was mainly input based with the exception of the quantity of certified seeds produced. Utilization The annual consolidated project reports adequately reflected the data collected on the evolution of the key performance indicators. These data were used in the Implementation Status and Results (ISR) reports as well as by the consecutive supervision missions. Throughout the project, the ISRs rated the M&E of PACA as satisfactory. 2 No additional surveys as all of the subprojects were completed as of 2014. 8 There was communication to beneficiaries and to the public on project achievements through local media to encourage other producers to engage in the modernization of their infrastructure/production methods. Lessons learned with respect to the first generation of POs (such as under-estimation of costs in the preparation of sub-projects) resulted in review and adjustments of reference costing for new sub-projects. At the closure of the RCUs (2015), the sub-project records were transferred to the regional Delegations of the counterpart Ministries to support utilization of these data in their programs. The PACA PCU took an active part in the preparation of the follow-on Bank funded projects namely, the Agriculture Investment and Market Development Project (PIDMA) and Livestock Development Project (PRODEL). Lessons learned from PACA, such as its focus on POs and the experience with its local service delivery model (OAL), were taken into consideration in the design of the two successor projects. 2.4 Safeguard and Fiduciary Compliance The project was classified as ‘Category B’. While infrastructure activities have been limited to rehabilitation of existing structures, sub-projects were expected to have potential risks of site-specific adverse environmental and social impacts. Therefore, the following safeguards were triggered: OP 4.01 Environmental Assessment, OP 4.09 Pest Management, OP 4.10 Indigenous People, OP 4.12 Involuntary Resettlement, and OP 7.50 Projects on International Waterways. In compliance with Bank requirements, an Environment and Social Management Framework (ESMF), a Pest Management Plan (PMP), an Indigenous People Planning Framework (IPPF), and a Resettlement Policy Framework (RPF) were prepared by the Borrower before the project start. Environment. The project achieved 100% compliance with environmental and social safeguards requirements. An environmental and social impact assessment was conducted and was found to be satisfactory. Targets for unqualified safeguard audits were achieved. Through contract with the local service providers, all 831 sub-projects implemented under the Project were screened for environmental and social impacts before implementation. Environmental audits of the two irrigation development authorities were carried out. As a result of the findings of these audits, social and environmental management plans were developed for the areas of intervention for each entity. Among the risks foreseen at appraisal was the possibility of water and soil pollution occurring due to land clearing and fruit processing for palm oil production. This risk did not materialize as there were no oil palm sub-projects and the oil palm value chain was dropped during the MTR. The findings of the evaluation of the PACA socio-environmental performance carried out in 2014 by an independent consultant resulted in the Project’s environmental and social management being rated moderately satisfactory. Social. Concerning social safeguards, OP 4.12 (involuntary resettlement) was ultimately not materialized as there was no incidence of displacement. Investment sub-projects by POs were executed on land already belonging to members of the POs and did not result in displacement. As regards indigenous communities (OP 4.10) only very few benefited from the project. A social action plan was prepared by the Ministry of Social Affairs (MINAS), and a specialist from MINAS was transferred to the PCU to oversee its implementation. However, implementation of the plan was significantly delayed due to inter-ministerial non-collaboration. In the end, there was inadequate budget and time left to implement the social action plan as elaborated. It is possible that more progress might have been made toward implementation of the plan had it contained at the time of appraisal more detailed and costed underpinning for the specific actions. Financial Management, Audits and Disbursements. The financial management unit within the PCU appears to have functioned well, fulfilling its obligations in a satisfactory manner. The staff of the unit was well trained and professional and adequate for the tasks. Initial difficulties and delays linked to the decentralized nature of the project, whereby supporting financial documents had to be transmitted from hundreds of PO sub-projects to the capital, were overcome with time. A total of 28 financial statements were produced during the life of the project. These were released on a regular basis and within the established time limits. All financial statements for PACA were audited and all but two were certified without qualifications. Two audits were qualified - one in 2010, and another in 2011. In both cases, the 9 reason for qualification was the existence of unjustified expenditures. In each case, the Borrower was able to resolve the issues raised in the audit by supplying acceptable documents in time for the next audit. Over the life of the project, supervision missions rated financial management as satisfactory (S), or more often as moderately satisfactory (MS). Actual financial contributions to the project were somewhat lower than appraisal estimates (particularly for Government and Beneficiary contributions) as table 1 below shows: Table 1. Financial Contributions to the Project (In US$ million (calculated at 1 US$=550 FCFA)) IDA Government Beneficiaries’ Total Contribution Contribution contribution Planned Disbursed Planned Disbursed Planned Disbursed Planned Disbursed 60.0 57.6 12.5 6.6 9.5 5.1 82.0 69.3 Procurement. Procurement was a problematic aspect of project implementation and resulted in considerable delays. For Sub-Component 1.1 (rural roads) and Sub-Component 1.2 (irrigated perimeters), procurement problems stemmed from the preparation stage. Plans for both Sub- Components were insufficiently defined at the outset, and no preliminary or final engineering studies were available. The need to carry out these studies delayed implementation after effectiveness. For the rural roads component, once plans were ready for bidding, the selection of bidders and bid awards also took much longer than expected. Furthermore, in some cases, selected bidders were unable to perform their obligations and the bidding process had to start afresh. For the procurement of goods and services for Sub-Component 2.2, Co-financing of PO investment project difficulties arose from the fact that POs and OALs were not familiar with World Bank procurement procedures. However, over time and with adequate information and training, these difficulties were overcome. 2.5 Post-completion Operation/Next Phase The investment projects of POs that were co-financed will continue. According to M&E data and field inspection results gathered by the PCU, most investment projects are growing in technical strength, economic turnover and profits. Also, many of the technical assistance relationships between OALs and POs that were nurtured under the project are expected to continue beyond the investment phase. Furthermore, farmers have learned the benefits of organizing in informal and formal groups, including cooperatives, and the Government is providing support through legislative actions and various incentives to further support the emergence of cooperative movements. Two World Bank agricultural projects, namely the Agriculture Investment and Market Development Project (PIDMA) approved in August 2014, and a Livestock Development Project (PRODEL), 3which is currently under preparation, built on the experiences of PACA. Many of the POs supported under PACA will be potential beneficiaries under these two projects as they are evolving into cooperatives that will be able to participate in the targeted value chains of these two operations. 3. Assessment of Outcomes 3.1 Relevance of Objectives, Design and Implementation Rating: Substantial 3 PRODEL was formulated by the Government through Application No. 0123 / L / MINEPAT / DGCOOP / DNS / M of 09/01/2015 on the financing of Phase II of the PACA, specific to the livestock sector, to enable Cameroon to capitalize on the achievements and to continue the modernization of the priority livestock sectors. 10 Relevance of objectives. The objectives of PACA remain highly relevant. They are well aligned with the country’s plan for agricultural investment (PNIA4) and are also consistent with the Bank’s Country Partnership Framework FY 17-FY21. Modernization of agricultural production through competitive value chains as well as transformation of traditional family farming into agricultural enterprises remain priority objectives for the Government as well as for the World Bank. Relevance of Design. The design of PACA is directly relevant to the above. It made investments geared toward establishing competitive value chains through building the capacity of producers’ organizations and investing in rural infrastructure (irrigation and rural roads). This is reflected in the components which included various types of investments and support required to address multi-sectoral constraints to achieving the objective of enhanced competitiveness of producers in the targeted value chains. The arrangement of components also corresponds directly to the strategic elements that form the logic of the project’s results framework. The results framework is well-structured and logically built around a critical set of intermediate results that support the achievement of the development objective. However, the causal link between the rehabilitated road and associated outcomes (i.e. reduction in transportation time and reduction in quantity of post-harvest losses) may have been somewhat overstated. That is, despite the relatively poor performance of the rural road subcomponent as measured by under-achievement with respect to the relevant intermediate outcome (intermediate indicator 1), the final outcome (reduced post- harvest loss) has nonetheless reached the set target. This may indicate that several factors (discussed in section 3.2) played important roles in achieving the overall objectives Relevance of Implementation. The approach taken by the project in implementing the project activities was fully relevant. In particular, the empowerment of producer organizations to work with private Local Support Operators (OALs) remains relevant. Proactivity in restructuring the project when it was evident that project proceeds (and ceilings for grants) to sub-projects needed to be increased to benefit identified POs. However, implementation of the infrastructure component was overly ambitious given inadequate attention afforded to rehabilitation of roads (component 1.1). In addition, the project did not respond adequately to rehabilitation cost increases (due to price increases for goods and services) and missed the opportunity to formally revise target kilometers of rural roads at mid-term (from 500km to 250km), or seek additional financing during the last two restructurings. 3.2 Achievement of Project Development Objectives Rating: Substantial The project substantially achieved its development objective as measured by the set of key development outcome indicators presented in the Data Sheet. 3.2.1 Project Outcome Indicator 1. Increase in the value of selected marketed/traded products in targeted areas: Substantially Achieved PACA financed and implemented 831 sub-projects5 supporting production, collection, and marketing along the targeted value chains. By project closure, the value of marketed production from beneficiary 4 Plan National d’Investissement Agricole: Approved in 2014, the National Agricultural Investment Plan is structured into four thematic areas, detailed in 20 actions and 92 activities according to the terminology defined by the New State Financial Regime. The thematic areas 1 and 2 of the NIP are: (i) development of production chains and improvement of food and nutritional security; (ii) modernization of rural production infrastructure and improved access to finance. 5 For breakdowns by value chains, refer to the table in Annex 2. 11 POs had increased by 69% (target was 20% increase). This increase was achieved largely through: a) increased production and productivity and b) increased marketed volumes and enhanced access to market by Producer Organizations (POs). In particular, matching grants and economic partnerships in the implementation of sub-projects allowed the vast majority of POs (85%, according to project M&E data) to greatly expand on-farm production capacity (e.g. expansion of farm holdings), productivity (quality inputs and technology) and marketability. Two key areas of achievements are directly linked to the achievement of the development outcome indicator 1:  Increased production and productivity (discussed in detail in 3.2.3 and 3.2.4)  Better technical packages promoted by the two rice irrigation authorities (i.e. application of recommended fertilizers as well as adherence to the timetable for crop management) positively affected the overall production as well as the productivity of rice production by related POs (for yield data, see 3.2.3).  Development of norms and quality standards for maize (see 3.2.4), meat and poultry supply chains had positive impacts on the adoption of higher quality production packages/processes by the POs. For all targeted value chains, recorded average productivity increases met and/or surpassed the set targets (see data section).  According to the PO survey data, an overwhelming majority of POs surveyed (86% of the total) said they had increased their production activities following the receipt of financing from PACA grants. This increase was accompanied by an increase in the size of the holding (76.2%), and the acquisition of additional facilities for storage, processing and marketing (23.8%).  Increased marketability (including marketed volume) and enhanced market opportunities  The project supported establishment of Economic Partnerships (EPs) among POs, input suppliers and buyers around the purchase of inputs (1129 EPs) and the sales of agriculture and livestock products (426 EPs). These commercial partnerships put in place a transparent marketing and purchase system in which POs benefited from grouped (and organized) input purchase and output sales, resulting in cost and time savings and profit optimization through improved economies of scale.  The average quantities of the selected commodities that were marketed and/or traded in the targeted regions were larger in 2013 and 2014, compared to 2009. (see Table 2 below) Table 2. PACA regional average of marketed quantity of target commodities QUANTITIES OF TARGET COMMODITIES IN (TONS) 2009 2013 2014 RICE 63.8 159.02 185.13 MAIZE 1.48 1.74 1.89 BANANA PLANTAIN 4.21 4.62 5.43 POULTRY 13.73 17.79 18.8 (FOR MEAT) PORK 2.78 3.36 3.36 Source: Impact Assessment Study of PACA 2013 and 2015  Correspondingly, larger shares of overall production of the selected commodities produced by members of the PACA POs were oriented towards the market: more than 87% of livestock production was marketed in 2013 and 2014, and more than 75% of crop production in the same period (PO survey data). The share of rice production that was marketed, for example, grew rapidly to 97% in 2012 from 44% in 2009. 12  The increase in marketed value is attributable to the PACA interventions. In this regard, it is noticeable that the beneficiary POs compare favorably to the non-beneficiary POs in their increasing trend in market value (see Table 3 below). According to the survey data collected during the 2015 impact assessment, the gap in favor of beneficiary POs increased by 104.68% over the project period for the rice sector, 145.68% in the maize sector, and 1039.25% in the plantain sector Table 3. Changes in the value of production marketed by POs surveyed between 2009 and 2014 Value Chain TYPE of PO 2009 2014 Difference RICE Beneficiary PO 8 930 000 8 577 818 -3.94% Non Beneficiary PO 672 000 328 000 -51.19% Difference 1229% 2515% 104.68% MAIZE Beneficiary PO 69 560 905 136 627 824 96.41% Non Beneficiary PO 13 206 000 11 897 150 -9.91% Difference 427% 1048% 145.68% PLANTAIN Beneficiary PO 17 506 577 46 416 271 165.14% Non Beneficiary PO 4 620 000 1 416 100 -69.35% Difference 279% 3178% 1039.26% Source: Impact Study of PACA 2015 (Survey of POs) 3.2.2 Project Outcome Indicator 2. Reduction in the quantity of post-harvest losses from the Producer Organizations supported with access to the new transport infrastructures: Achieved The impact assessment study found that post-harvest losses incurred by POs with access to rehabilitated roads were reduced by 30% relative to the 2009 baseline. This was significantly better than the 20% target reduction. This overall reduction of 30% included: - For rice, post-harvest losses were reduced by 94% in 2014 against a 20% reduction forecast at the end of the project; - For maize, this reduction is 82% against a forecast of 20%; - For plantain, the loss rate is 0.2% in 2014, with no possibility of comparison with the reference situation, which was not published in the project document; and - The mortality rate reduction was around 4% to 7% in egg laying farms, less than 5% in broiler farms, and about 5% in pig meat farms. (See Annex 5 for more information on impact studies). However, the rehabilitation of roads may not have been the primary causal factor in post-harvest loss reduction. The direct beneficiaries’ (POs with access to rehabilitated roads6) perceptions on the value of rehabilitated roads did not place a great deal of importance on roads as a source of post-harvest loss reduction. When surveyed, a majority (82.6%) of these POs were unable to comment on the usefulness of the rehabilitated roads in terms of post-harvest loss reduction. One of the key reasons for this response is that farm holdings for many of these beneficiaries are still far from the nearest market (median of 6 to 7 km). For these POs, post-harvest loss happens primarily on-farm (weight loss due to spoilage and other on-farm factors), rather than during transport. In addition, although one of the criteria for selection 6 The POs with access to the rehabilitated roads. Due to implementation delays and underachieved target kilometers of roads, these POs represent fewer than 6 % of the total beneficiary POs of PACA 13 of roads included potential synergy with component 2 (p42 of PAD), actual selection was mostly based on the production basins of the target value chains rather than on the location of the sub-projects. While rehabilitated roads may have contributed to reduction of post-harvest losses through reduced transportation time to nearest market (which is the project’s intermediary outcome indicator, fully achieved), there is no data to demonstrate this causality conclusively. However, other project-related investments and activities did contribute substantially to post-harvest loss reduction for the POs. Project supported activities and benefits contributing to reducing post-harvest weight loss due to spoilage: - Better commodity preservation techniques promoted by PACA, including processing (drying) and storage facilities, formed a major part of the PACA supported sub-projects. As a result, the storage of products in houses has decreased, while it has increased in storages (see table 4). Related to this, an analysis was carried out in relation to the timeframes of storage of the products by crop value chains before and since the support of the PACA. The results are presented in Table 4.1.; - 426 EPs concerning the sales of agriculture and livestock products generated benefits of reducing post-harvest losses by easing product flow, saving time in marketing, and encouraging the preservation of product quality for more remunerative and stable prices. - Reduced mortality rate in the livestock sectors owing to the construction of state of the art buildings, as part of PO sub-projects, to raise pork and poultry. Similarly, subproject investments related to better quality animal feed, use of higher yield breeds, animal health and bio-security measures and construction of solid/liquid waste reservoirs; Table 4: Place of Storage of Produce by commodity before and after the PACA (in %) Conservation Rice Maize Plantain Practice Before After Before After Before After PACA PACA PACA PACA PACA PACA House (%) 88.9 3.7 87.0 35.6 53.3 0 Storage (%) 0.0 96.3 9.1 46.6 13.3 58.3 Container (%) 0.0 0 2.6 2.7 0 0 Others (%) 3.7 0 1.3 15.1 33.3 41.7 Table 4.1: Periods of storage of products by value chains before and after financing Value Chain Days in storage before PACA Days in storage after PACA Rice 112 167.0 Maize 143.2 170.5 Plantain 1.9 4.2 Project supported establishment of market linkages contributing to reducing commercial loss - Better marketing arrangements established through economic partnerships: 1,555 - The POs, through economic partnerships, signed delivery agreements for marketing their production - Gradual control of marketing channels by POs selling produce collectively. The project supported organizational capacity strengthening of 40 sectoral apex POs, which resulted in their transformation into cooperatives (19 cooperatives) and the creation of other 35 cooperatives (particularly in the maize, poultry and plantain banana sub-sectors) Among the POs who signed delivery agreements for marketing their production, reduction of post- harvest loss was perceived as one of the important benefits generated by the marketing arrangements, preceded by ease of product flow, time saved to market, and competitive price. 14 3.2.3 Project Outcome Indicator 3: Increase in average rice yields in the maintained irrigated areas (tons/ ha): Achieved Farmers in the project areas achieved an average yield of 6.9 t/ha for rice – substantially exceeding the target of 6.1 t/ha from the baseline of 5.2t/ha. These results were obtained over 3,483.7 ha of irrigated fields (representing support for 71 approved sub-projects under the Project). The planned productivity target was reached and even exceeded as early as 2013, despite the incidence of floods in September 20127 which negatively affected rice farmers in the targeted region (Maga and Yagoua). Increases in rice yields are not due to irrigation rehabilitation, but rather due to: (i) institutional support to the two irrigation authorities, (ii) the strengthening of rice grower POs, and (iii) the introduction and widespread use of appropriate land preparation equipment and agricultural inputs. These measures were agreed upon during the MTR (cf 2.2 on MTR). The Project provided direct financing and support to the rice producers in two irrigation authorities’ production zones (SEMRY and UNVDA) through support for the establishment of economic partnerships and co-financing for producer organizations sub-projects. It also provided training and equipment support to SEMRY and UNVDA for the maintenance of irrigation perimeters (e.g. soil preparation and maintenance of canals).8 The project support to both the rice POs and two irrigation authorities appears to have created a virtuous cycle around the environment of rice production. The technical training (on irrigation and maintenance) and acquisition of equipment strengthened the capacity of SEMRY and UNVDA to provide quality support to their respective POs. Rice POs acquired and applied fertilizers at the right time and at recommended doses through the matching grant scheme. Irrigation authorities’ closer support to POs translated into higher adherence (up to 100%)9 by the POs to the timetable for field operations. All the beneficiary POs, on their part, maintained balances in their account to pay the royalties to the irrigation authority on the required date. The 2015 impact study found that about 72% of the POs in the rice production regions considered the support provided by PACA to sub-project recipients to have been useful (among which one third found it very useful); among the 32 beneficiary POs surveyed, average rice production increased by 787% between 2009 and 2014. 3.2.4 Project Outcome Indicator 4: Increase in the crop yields for the two other (Maize and Plantain) targeted crop value chains (tons/ha): Achieved The project supported a total of 333 sub-projects for maize and 147 for plantain. The final targets of the crop yields have been achieved at 103 % for maize (target: 3 tons per ha, result: 3.1 tons per ha) and 223 % for plantain (target: 7.5 tons per ha, result: 16.7 tons per ha). For POs producing plantain, PACA support was especially effective in addressing constraints faced by producers in accessing improved inputs and in building production capacity. PACA, in cooperation with the Centre Africain de Recherche sur Bananier et Plantain (CARBAP), promoted access to seedlings 7 Flooding in the Far North (2012) affected the existing infrastructure (water reservoirs and dikes) and emergency rehabilitation operations were transferred to another Bank project (Emergency Floods Operation, P143940). 8 At the MTR, the original focus on the rehabilitation of the irrigated perimeters was shifted to institutional support to SEMRY and UNVDA. 9 Although 100% seems improbably high, this reflects the achievement in the intermediate outcome indicator 12, POs adopting business plans. 15 (some 580,000) and provided training for 93 POs on plant multiplication techniques10. The technical capacity and productivity of beneficiary POs improved significantly through these interventions, leading to an increase in the area under cultivation and an increase in production. Faced with CARBAP's inability to deliver sufficient quantities of seedlings, almost all POs that received training under the project started multiplying the planting materials themselves in order to achieve the planting objectives of their sub-projects. For maize PO sub-projects, several factors favored the achievement of target performance including, inter alia, the following: Maize POs benefited from a wealth of extension information and advisory support which strengthened POs’ technical capacity to produce. PACA supported the development of over 5,000 specific technical papers on the sustainable and integrated production of maize, as well as development of norms and quality standards for maize. Given clear technical information, follow up support from OALs and respective RCUs were considered effective and systematic. Maize POs have consistently been surveyed to be one of the most satisfied groups as regards support provided by PACA. Participants' capacity in terms of the technical aspects of production, including use and dose of seeds and fertilizer, and economic aspects of farming practices (e.g. establishment of an operating account) also have improved significantly. Successful and profitable economic partnerships with livestock POs motivated more and better production. At project-supported forums, maize POs entered into multiple economic partnership agreements with livestock POs (poultry and pig farming) to establish market linkages for maize produce as raw material for animal feeds. As the number of feed mills increased due to the high number of POs in livestock, market outlets for maize POs increased in number. This further motivated POs to realize higher yields. The 2015 impact assessment of the economic and financial profitability of the maize sub- projects demonstrated that maize was one of the most profitable commodities supported under the Project. 3.2.5. Intermediate indicators: Among 12 intermediate outcome indicators, most were either fully achieved (8) or partially achieved (2), with only two intermediate outcomes not achieved (indicator 7 and 8). The 8 fully achieved target intermediate outcomes were delivered largely by Component 2: Economic Partnerships and Component 3: Institutional Support and Capacity Development. The intermediate outcome that was partially achieved was the rehabilitation of the rural roads and the number of subprojects presented. Meanwhile, indicators that belonged to component 3.1 (apex organizations) failed to deliver its planned outputs. The weak performance of apex institutions was compensated by OALs, project staff, and staff of MINADER and MINEPIA. The creditable performance in achieving specific intermediate outcomes and the four PDO indicators demonstrate substantial overall efficacy of the project in achieving its development objective. Specific accomplishments vis-à-vis these performance indicators on Intermediate Outcomes are provided in Annex 2. 3.3 Efficiency Rating: Modest Economic and Financial Analysis at appraisal versus closure 10 The PACA, in collaboration with IRAD and MINADER (DRCQ), trained POs in specific technical fields. For plantain, emphasis was placed on the production of banana-plantain stems (PIFT). POs are now equipped to carry out this activity on their own. 16 Ex-ante analysis The Economic and Financial Analysis (EFA) carried out at appraisal estimated project results based on information on the infrastructure projects (component 1) and indicative production models regarding sub-projects under component 2. The EFA highlighted direct financial benefits for participating smallholders and their POs and expected financial benefits for other stakeholders along the targeted value chains. The project was estimated to generate economic benefits, yielding an economic internal rate of return (ERR) of 26 % and a Net Present Value (NPV) of US$52 million (at a 12 % discount rate) – when taking into consideration all costs. When considering only the costs of components 1 and 2 (covering US$ 44.2 or 74% of the IDA budget), the ERR and NPV were estimated to be even higher, respectively 31% and US$ 61 million. The sensitivity analysis indicated resilience to important changes in costs or reduction in benefits in that the project would have only modestly lower ERR in case of increase in costs (22% if costs increased by 20%; 30% if benefits increased by 30%, 21% of benefits reduced by 20% and 18% if benefits lagged by 2 years). Fiscal impact was estimated as neutral in the short term and positive in the medium to long term as a result of, inter alia, increase in production, income, and employment. The cost of maintaining the rehabilitated rural roads was estimated to constitute only a small percentage of the annual budget of the Road Fund (cf. Annex 9, PAD). The ex-ante EFA was a partial analysis, as it did not include all crops/sub-sectors targeted in the project: it focused on rice, poultry and pig farming yet did not cover maize, plantain, nor oil palm (even if the latter was de-emphasized during implementation). More importantly, it is to be recognized that the findings of this initial EFA proved to be overly positive, as assumptions made at the time were not realized in implementation. Namely, the cost of the road component was in fact underestimated in project design. Also, an important precondition for the expected effects of road rehabilitation on production losses and transport costs was overlooked in project design: such benefits could only occur when the road segments selected for rehabilitation were in the proximity of/of direct relevance for the POs ultimately supported through PACA. As regards rice production, the cost of the rehabilitation of the existing perimeters was seriously underestimated in project design (resulting in the revision of sub- component 1.2, also triggered by changes in priorities after flooding in one of the regions covered). Therefore, the EFA assumptions underlying the improvements in rice production (increase in hectares and in yields) were ultimately not in place. Finally, as regards animal production, animal mortality rates were assumed to be reduced as a result of factors such as improved breeds, the introduction of vaccinations, improved animal feed and improved buildings. Potential ‘shocks’ associated with the occurrence of diseases are commonly accepted as an important risk in any type of animal production, however, these were not included among the project risks. Yet PACA was affected by swine fever and avian influenza and this was not factored in the ex-ante analysis. Whereas it is recognized that the avian influenza outbreaks could not have been foreseen prior to project implementation, the country had already experienced cases in the Extreme North in 2006. With respect to swine fever, this disease is known to be endemic in the country. Based on the above assessment of the initial EFA, its findings in terms of ERR and NPV are deemed to have been overly optimistic. Ex-post analysis Ex-post analysis of the project EFA shows that the project interventions were modestly cost-effective. The difference in the ex-ante and ex-post EFA analysis is due to several factors:  Due to a change in Bank guidelines as regards discount rates between the time of appraisal (12%) and closure (6%), the ex-ante and ex-post analyses applied a different rate.  Higher actual costs associated with road construction and other project inputs.  Updating the set of value chains include in the EFA to better reflect those supported by the project 17  Differences in predicted vs. actual yields obtained, particularly in the livestock value chains that were afflicted by disease outbreaks. Based on a sample of 108 sub-projects spread over the rice, maize, poultry and pork farming sub-sectors, the ex-post analysis covered the project period 2011-2016, including projections up to 2020 (the details of which are presented in the table below as well as in Annex 3). The following findings are highlighted:  There is a major variation between the NPV of (i) crops and (ii) livestock production value chains covered by PACA. This is best shown by comparing global NPV with and NPV without the livestock value chains: o Global NPV including livestock: -104 million FCFA o Global NPV excluding livestock: +288 million FCFA  The maize, plantain and rice value chains each had positive NPV of respectively 17,7 million F CFA, 127 million FCFA and 143 million FCFA.  NPV was however negative for both the pig farming and poultry value chains. This is attributed to the occurrence of animal diseases that resulted in the loss of animals and reduction in production benefits (all outside the control of the project)11. To illustrate, swine fever incidence in 2015 affected the entire sector and was said to explain the negative result (- 41 million FCFA) in the period 2011-2016 of the sub-projects included in the analysis. Even if the results for poultry sub-projects were positive in that same period, performance could have been better, as there were several avian influenza outbreaks during PACA. Overall, the EFA estimates losses in PACA sub-projects as a result of swine fever at -2 239 830 (‘000 FCFA), based on estimated loss of one third of production in 2015 and 2016) and regarding avian influenza even more, namely – 2 453 966 (‘000 FCFA), based on an estimated 50% loss of production in 2016.  It is to be noted that these estimates are a combination of actual losses and decisions of farmers to reduce the size of / postpone the start of new production cycles as a result of the disease outbreaks. In other words, a context characterized by disease risks – that also affects markets and input supplies - makes farmers make the (logical) decision to reduce production below capacity. The EFA compared the results of PACA with the situation prior to PACA. Whereas yields and surface cultivated had increased as a result of project interventions, more detailed analysis was stated to be hampered by lack of data on the situation prior to PACA. Table 5. Summary of indicators before and after PACA Sub- Indicators Prior to PACA With PACA sectors Yield 1.5t/ha 2.94t/ha Proportion of losses 6.8% ERR 7.5% Maize NPV (6%)12 17,7 million F CFA Surface covered 15 692 ha Gross margin 36.2 million F CFA 11 Before any incidences of animal diseases, the project had shown improved productivity in animal value chains according to data from ISR Seq No. 10, Dec 2013. Average annual pig live weight: baseline: 23 kg/m2, result: 60 kg/m2 (121.72 percent); (ii) average annual poultry live weight: baseline: 21.63 kg/m2, result: 55.63 kg/m2 (257.18 percent); and (iii) average annual egg production: baseline: 198 eggs per hen, result: 279 eggs per hen (141 percent). 12 In line with WB guidelines at the time of the EFA/2017. 18 Average production cost 25 million F CFA Average revenue 26.9 million F CFA Yield 16,37 ha Proportion of losses 9.4% ERR 18.7% NPV (6%) 127 million FCFA Plantain Surface covered 337 ha Gross margin 70.7 million FCFA Average production cost 24.1 million FCFA Average revenue 18.2 million FCFA Yield 3.83/ha/cycle 6.04t/ha/cycle Proportion of losses ERR 0% NPV (6%) 143 million FCFA Surface covered 908 ha 2 173 ha Gross margin 79.9 million FCFA Rice Average production cost 34.3 million FCFA Average revenue 42.3 million FCFA Yield/pigs (meat) 49.29 KGPV/m2 44.33 KGPV/m2 13 Yield/pigs (reproduction) 12 piglets/pig/year 14-16 piglets/pig/year Mortality rate/piglets 15-20% 10-12% ERR -- *14 Pig NPV (6%) -316 million FCFA farming Gross margin -41.9 million FCFA Average production cost 19.4 million FCFA Average revenue 17.3 million FCFA Yield/poultry (meat) 21.6 KGPV/m2 59 KGPV/m2 Yield/poultry (eggs) 198 eggs/chicken/yr 276 eggs/chicken/yr ERR -- * NPV (6%) -76 million FCFA Poultry Gross margin 155.3 million FCFA Average production cost 46.7 million FCFA Average revenue 50.9 million FCFA ERR 3.7% NPV (6%) 26 million FCFA -104 million FCFA Total NPV (6%) without livestock +288 million FCFA value chains Proportion/losses -20% Source: EFA, 2017, Table 13 (based on PAD and calculations of consultant that conducted the EFA) and corrections provided by the same consultant as per email of 23 May 2017) The analysis included several assumptions, including the continuation of monitoring/supervision missions in the period 2016-2020 to assess the evolution of the performance of the sub-projects. It is noted that the yield indicators reflected in the end-of-project EFA vary from those reflected in the last annual of report of PACA: all are slightly lower in the EFA. This may be related to the fact that the EFA is based on analysis of sub-total of 108 sub-projects. 13 Average annual pig live weigh was 60 kg/m2 for the period before incidence of swine fever 14 * ERR of pig farming and poultry was negative at 6% 19 In general, the EFA showed a cost-benefit ratio of 2.7% for the period 2011-2020 as regards the support under Component 1 (rural infrastructure); as regards Component 2 the average cost-benefit is below 1 (0.95) yet estimated to be positive as of 2017; for Component 3 this average ratio is below 1 (0.40), yet estimated to be positive primarily as of 2017; finally, regarding Component 4 the ratio was 1.23 and thus positive; The EFA concluded that the project  was profitable when applying a discount rate between 3-6%;  generated an estimated 2 893 226 665 FCFA (USD 494,7492.27) in terms of value addition;  created jobs (estimated by PACA at around 240,000 jobs created, with a value of earnings estimated at 9 532 437 046 FCFA or USD 16,300,713.39);  benefitted a sizeable number of women (varying per value chain, such as 48%/rice; 39%/ maize; 69%/plantain; 71%/oil palm; 24%/pig farming; 40%/poultry - i.e., figures regarding buyers in the value chains in 2014); their role in the management of POs and service provision (OALs) was less prominent;  benefitted from Micro Financial Institutions (MFIs) engaging in financial services for 188 POs (648 435 475 FCFCA or USD 1,108,841.40). It is important to refer at this point also to the observed benefits of the response to the 2016 avian influenza outbreak (that included support of PACA in the period June-December 2016 under Component 3, as it was engaged together with other donors in the emergency response). This support allowed for (i) containing the negative impact of the outbreak through providing disinfection material and logistical support to detect and monitor outbreaks; and (ii) preparing the authorities for responding more rapidly and more effectively to future outbreaks by equipping the national network in charge of emergency surveillance (RESCAM). No quantitative data are available to calculate the economic impact of this support such as in terms of avoided loss of animals as a result of this emergency response15. Still, even if not quantified, the (positive) benefits of this support are to be listed among PACA’s effects. Other efficiency issues pertaining to the use of resources The following are aspects of design and implementation that have contributed to (strong points) and reduced (weak points) efficiency: Strong points (mainly concerning component 2)  ambition and engagement of the different stakeholders (including also the beneficiaries), considering the number of sub-projects implemented, with wide regional and sectoral coverage  decentralization of decision making and of monitoring of sub-projects (at the level of the regions)  rigor in screening of POs to ensure they covered real operations (farmers/investors) and not project driven entities 15 IEG’s report on the Bank’s experience with Avian Influenza 2006 -13 also notes that assessment of economic impact of the avian influenza emergency support program is extremely difficult given: a) inherent uncertainties in the estimating probability of outbreaks of various severity; and b) difficulty in quantifying the efficacy of project interventions without meaningful counterfactuals. 20  adjustments made when needed based on lessons learned from the implementation of the first generation of sub-projects (rise of ceiling/tranche payments to accommodate demand; adjustment of initial cost estimates) Weak points  lack of engineering studies at appraisal stage (rural infrastructure), resulting in underestimation of costs (components 1.1 and 1.2) and delay in actual rehabilitation works (component 1.1)  lengthy procurement procedures affecting the ability to reach targets within the given time frame (component 1)  delays in the availability of counterpart funding It is to be highlighted that interventions under Component 2 were at the core of PACA, covering 44% of total funding (allocations) and 47% of total disbursements. This component: o had a high implementation rate (94%); o generated tangible results and impact as described in this report; o obtained a positive overall perception of its beneficiaries; and o showed best financial results for POs focused on crops, with POs engaged in animal production suffering from disease outbreaks (that were outside the control of the project) – the effects of which are expected to be reduced over time, considering support provided to strengthen the emergency response to such outbreaks. For this reason, it is considered justified and justifiable to rate overall efficiency as modest. 3.4 Justification of Overall Outcome Rating Rating: Moderately Satisfactory (MS) The project design was consistent with the avowed development objective and priorities of the Government of Cameroon as well as the CPF of the Bank for Cameroon for the agriculture sector. The project was successful in achieving the four PDO outcome indicators and bringing about the objective of increasing competitiveness of the target POs. The project was not as efficient as originally foreseen in the use of its resources due in part to gross underestimation of costs and perennial delays in procurement. The implementation efficiency was also stymied due to a series of disease outbreaks in the livestock sector. Nevertheless, it is acknowledged that the project was able to deliver most of its target intermediate outcomes that, if sustained, will contribute to improving the competitiveness of the target POs. Combining substantial relevance, substantial achievement of PDO and modest efficiency, the overall outcome rating is rated moderately satisfactory. 3.5 Overarching Themes, Other Outcomes and Impacts. The project has had a demonstration effect that goes beyond the project area, which is difficult to quantify. The sub-projects financed by PACA are showing the farming community at large that more modern production methods can be profitable and that farming is a business that needs a business plan and needs to be well connected to input and output markets. For the Government of Cameroon, PACA has demonstrated the need for a supportive agricultural policy environment that addresses such key issues as access to land and credit, improved plant and animal genetic material, and policies regarding seed legislation and food safety standards. The use of professional Local Support Operators (OALs) as 21 private technical advisors to POs has demonstrated its usefulness, even if not always without problems. Finally, PACA has played an important role in the process and movement towards POs that are specialized and better organized and where many of them are expected to continue their way towards full-fledged cooperatives. (a) Poverty Impacts, Gender Aspects, and Social Development PACA has had a positive impact on poverty reduction and improvements in living conditions. In an impact study of the project in 2015, 86%, 80% and 84% of respondents declared respectively that their capacity to: (i) look after the medical needs of members; (ii) pay for school fees of children; and (iii) improve the family nutrition had improved. Regarding gender aspects, the same study showed that 41.5% of members of POs were women and that women in leadership positions in the POs represented 39%. However, women were discriminated against in the access to land but were the ones that dominated commerce with agricultural products, especially for plantain. A review of POs working with PACA showed that they have become more dynamic and democratic. Regular meetings are being held, leaders are being elected, and books are being kept that allow financial transparency. All of this is leading to good governance at the local level and the build-up of social capital. Trust among POs is laying the foundation for the development of a viable cooperative movement. (b) Institutional Change/Strengthening Irrigation Authorities: SEMRY and UNVDA At the MTR, the original focus on the rehabilitation of the irrigated perimeters was shifted to institutional support for SEMRY and UNVDA. Throughout the implementation, the capacity of the two irrigation authorities experienced a notable evolution in their technical, operational and professional support to rice POs and the project. The two institutions demonstrated a strong ownership and capacity in collaborating with PACA to conduct robust environmental and social audits. The rice POs indicated a high level of satisfaction with services received by SEMRY and UNVDA, which was demonstrated by timely payment of royalties and other fees. The project, through institutional support and subproject grants, helped achieve meaningful institutional change (both in the two authorities and in rice POs) that could contribute to longer term development of the rice sector in Cameroon. Producer Organizations For producer organizations, the project facilitated the improvement of the way in which they were run, institutionalizing inclusive and consultative decision-making processes that are both business and market oriented. Through the engagement with the OALs and economic partnerships with various stakeholders, POs built and displayed competencies to negotiate, demand and organize services, and identify and resolve issues around agriculture as business. 3.6 Summary of Findings of Beneficiary Survey and/or Stakeholder Workshops To the extent PO satisfaction with the services of apex POs is among the intermediate results indicators, the consecutive ISRs (WB) reported on this dimension. The ratings in this regard were satisfactory up to 2016. Values were recorded as of 2014 and reached almost 45% in 2014/15 (against the 80% target). However, they decreased to 39% in 2016, which was one of the factors resulting in a downgrading of overall rating from satisfactory to moderately satisfactory. In hindsight, it would have been appropriate to revise this indicator (probably already at the time of the MTR), to the extent (i) it only covered PO satisfaction regarding apex PO services, without considering their satisfaction with PACA services at large nor services of public entities engaged in support to agriculture, and (ii) the gaps in the service capacity of the apex POs were already perceived at that point in time. Based on the different studies (baseline in 2009; PO satisfaction surveys in 2012 and 2013, impact studies in 2012 and 2015), overall, beneficiaries were appreciative of the tangible support provided by PACA in general: the project interventions made a difference in their production, revenue and in the 22 way they were organized. Also, a number of challenges were reported, particularly pertaining to procedures, the rhythm of allocation of tranches (funding), and mixed observations on the OALs as core service deliverers. As per these studies the degree of satisfaction with the services provided by apex POs remained rather low, related to the capacity gaps of these entities. For details on findings of these studies, reference is made to Annex 5. These converge with the observations shared by representatives of some 25 POs with the ICR team during stakeholders’ meetings in Yaoundé and in Bafoussam (also included in Annex 5), 4. Assessment of Risk to Development Outcome Rating: Substantial The sustainability of the sub-project efforts at the level of individual POs is likely. PACA facilitated inter alia investments in state of the art farming infrastructure that has a lifetime of at least 20 years, access to improved inputs, improved storage and fostered business linkages. Moreover, the support strengthened the way in which these POs are run (professionalization of their management). The assistance was based on a cost-sharing principle and had strict eligibility criteria. To the extent the POs are the owners of the sub-projects in which they have invested themselves and of which they started to reap the benefits, the sustainability of the efforts at the level of individual POs is likely. This being said, several factors could affect the degree in which the business of the POs continues to grow. Internal factors include the eventual relaxation of rigor in PO management as PACA no longer monitors the POs and the rise of possible conflicts among PO members about the distribution of growing benefits. External factors relate to the ability of the POs to secure reliable markets for their (increased) production (weak contractual arrangements), eventual fluctuations (reduction) in sales prices as a result of increased supply as well as limited processing capacity. Regarding the crops, the main risks affecting production are weather (drought) related, particularly in the northern parts of the country. Avian flu crisis. Particular attention is drawn to the avian flu crisis, which has affected the entire poultry sector in Cameroon in terms of demand for end products, supply of day old chicks, as well as demand for animal feed – apart from farms having been directly affected by the disease: loss/destruction of their animal stock, other costs related to farm disinfection and forgone income as farm buildings need to remain vacant for a period before restarting production (with no compensation scheme). Whereas the figures on the poultry value chain as per the last annual report of PACA (2015) were encouraging, the situation has seriously reversed as of May 2016 (avian flu outbreak). It means that PACA’s POs in this sector operate at much lower capacity, including new buildings financed in the context of sub-projects remaining for the time being unused or under-utilized. Notwithstanding an emergency plan for avian flu16 and support provided through PACA to respond to the 2016 crisis and prevent its spread, new cases have occurred in 2017. The same risks apply to pig farming given recurrent outbreaks of swine fever - albeit its negative impact seems less severe in that farmers market their animals prior to the season in which the disease tends to occur most. Low sustainability of the support delivery mechanisms in PACA. There are also risks as regards the sustainability of the support delivery mechanisms of PACA: the multi-sectoral apex POs have limited capacity to deliver effective services to their members and the “inter-profession” organizations will need strengthening. Moreover, the support delivery through the OALs was not institutionally embedded, and its results were mitigated and ended with the closure of PACA. Access to credit is expected to be addressed by the interest of MFIs in agriculture and many POs already having a credit history with MFIs (the issue being the cost of credit and its affordability by POs, depending on the market prices for crops/livestock). 16 The importance of which was recognized as early as 2012 23 As regards the rural infrastructure work undertaken, the 250 km of rehabilitated roads are expected to be maintained as part of the national road maintenance scheme and the irrigation authorities are equipped to carry out the maintenance works and expand the surface covered. As the POs operating in these irrigated perimeters have been strengthened and have increased revenues, they are expected to continue their reported improvement in payment for services rendered by the irrigation authorities. 5. Assessment of Bank and Borrower Performance 5.1 Bank Performance (a) Bank Performance in Ensuring Quality at Entry Rating: Moderately Unsatisfactory Strong project design. The project was underpinned by sound technical, economic and financial analysis. The mix of components and sub-components was comprehensive and should have addressed the key constraints to agricultural development that stood in the way of increased competitiveness. Strong M&E design. Almost all the outcome indicators were well designed to fully capture project outcomes. Rushed preparation. The project was prepared quickly, in less than 8 months from the Concept Review to Board approval. Considering that average processing time from concept to approval in Cameroon is 17 months, this was a case of rushed preparation, which in part explains sub-optimal preparation and lack of in-depth studies (and preliminary survey) on various aspects of the design, notably road rehabilitation, irrigation perimeters, and the local presence of service providers for POs, among other things. Skills deficiency. The Bank team failed to build a strong technical team, especially in skills required to assess the preparedness of component 1.1., i.e., road engineers. Readiness to implement component 1.1 was, as a result, overstated. Over-estimation of institutional capacity and availability, especially of apex POs and local service providers (OALs), who should have first been pre-identified and tested. (b) Quality of Supervision Rating: Moderately Satisfactory Supervision mission was periodic and adequate. Supervision missions were carried out at regular intervals. Altogether, there were some 16-implementation status and results reports, 11 field supervision missions and four TTLs. From the end of 2010 when a new TTL was posted in country, until mid- 2014 there was proactivity and continuity in task management. During this period, the team organized meetings every two weeks with staff of the PCU and other stakeholders to advise on project implementation issues and to ensure that PCU staff would carry out necessary field visits to the RCU and visit sub-project sites of POs. MTR. The preparation of the MTR was well done and allowed for key corrections, especially regarding the irrigation rehabilitation sub-component, and reallocation of resources among disbursement categories. Innovative pilot, leveraging TF. A number of innovative activities were carried out by the supervision team, leveraging resources from a trust fund. These innovations related to the organization of local fora for the mobilization of credit from micro-finance institutions (MFIs), and to implementation of two pilot 24 projects with trust fund support: fully washed coffee and cassava processing in collaboration with international agricultural research institutions. Environment and social Safeguard. Adherence to the environmental safeguard was monitored consistently and intensively. In contrast, social safeguard issues (especially as regards the indigenous people plan) did not receive the professional attention it had deserved. Ineffective supervision for road component. The Bank supervision team failed to provide sufficient technical support due mainly to lack of technical knowledge and expertise in the team. During implementation, the team depended on the informal support of one road engineer in the country office whose work program did not formally involve PACA. The Bank was not candid in admitting this deficiency of skills and did not examine the team composition critically. (c) Justification of rating for Overall Borrower Performance Rating: Moderately Satisfactory Based on the above argumentation, and given that the outcome is rated moderately satisfactory, the overall Bank Performance is rated as moderately satisfactory. 5.2 Borrower Performance (a) Government Performance Rating: Moderately unsatisfactory The Government fulfilled its obligations at the start of project implementation (including the establishment of the RCUs, RSCs, and Field Focal Points) and both the Project Steering Committee and Technical Monitoring Team functioned satisfactorily (respectively 7 and 9 meetings held during the life time of PACA). However, there were delays in the availability of counterpart funding, which was reported to have led to postponement of steering committee meetings as well as of field missions for members of the Technical Monitoring Team. Also, the volume of counterpart funding was significantly lower than planned (52.8%), as shown in the table below that summarizes the dates of allocation and corresponding amounts. Table 6. Counterpart Funding Dates of allotment Subtotal/FCFA $ Equivalent (Exchange rate 15 April 2017) 2010 (May and September) 300 000 000 485,367 2011 (February, March, August) 350 000 000 566,262 2012 (August and October) 300 000 000 485,367 2013 (February) 100 000 000 161,789 2014 (April, October and Dec.) 609 844 000 986,661 2015 (May and November) 590 156 000 954,808 Total - direct contribution 2 250 000 000 3 640 255 Total - indirect contribution 1 826 250 378 2,954,674 (VAT etc.) Grand Total 4 076 250 378 6,594,929 Planned contribution as per PAD 12,500,000 Percentage 52.8% 25 The project’s core Ministries (MINADER and MINEPIA) performed their roles as planned, although opportunities for support to policy level interventions under Component 3 were underutilized. As regards the other Ministries involved in PACA: The Ministry of Public Works in charge of the rural road rehabilitation sub-component was unable to speed up implementation (already delayed by engineering studies not conducted at the time of appraisal, which was exacerbated by the lengthy procurement process). Concerning support to indigenous people (IP), the agreement with the Ministry of Social Affairs was only signed in October 2013, limiting time for implementation of the planned activities to only two years towards the end of the project (2014-2015). (b) Implementing Agencies’ Performance Rating: Moderately satisfactory After a learning period at the start of the project, the different implementing agents played their role as expected: central Project Coordination Unit, Regional Coordination Unit and Regional Selection Committee, and Focal Points. The PCU was expanded as certain specialists were omitted in the project design (environment; communication) and additional staff regarding M&E was to support the monitoring of more than 800 sub-projects – a task that was underestimated. There was some PCU staff turnover (environment and communication expertise) and in the RCUs (with change in core staff in two RCUs based on misconduct – on which a report was submitted to the Bank). As there were multiple actors engaged in the micro-projects, their division of labor, while defined in the operations manual, was not always clear in actual operations (sometimes actors had several hats, triggered by the lack of private service deliverers/OALs in the vicinity of the POs). Regarding Component 1.2, the two irrigation authorities played their expected role; after restructuring and refocusing of the interventions, they received not only equipment but also “soft” support aimed at their strengthening. (c) Justification of rating for Overall Borrower Performance Rating: Moderately Satisfactory Based on the discussion, and given that outcome is rated moderately satisfactory, the overall Borrower Performance is rated as moderately satisfactory. 6. Lessons Learned  Assessment of the availability and sustainability of service providers and key stakeholders. Prior to launching a decentralized support delivery model in agriculture, it is important to assess: the availability of the appropriate service providers (case of OALs); and the likelihood of sustainability of the approach. Based on these assessment, the project should select the key stakeholders based on their mandate and capacity (case of focusing on multi-sector versus sector based apex Producer Organizations).  Success factors of institutional capacity building. The factors which are identified as being important to the success of institutional capacity building activities are: interventions adapted to the level of development and absorption capacity of the institutions involved (e.g. irrigation authorities’ vs apex organizations’ in PACA); demand-driven interventions; and focus on building long-term relationship between the institutions and their constituencies (e.g. relationship between Rice POs and Irrigation authorities).  A clear definition of respective roles and responsibilities of the different parties and their inter-linkages. PACA involved a multitude of players (among which were National/Regional Coordination Units, teams of experts, OALs and Focal Points) adding to the project’s 26 complexity. In this context, an unambiguous division of labor would have eliminated the possibility of mismatching skills with tasks.  Inter-ministerial collaboration should involve: strong leadership and commitment at the highest level of all participating ministries; clearly spelled out role of the lead ministry; and a strategic plan that incorporates and aligns collaborative activities to the interests of the ministries.  Needs based planning of rural road rehabilitation. It is important to: (i) concentrate on the roads that are priorities in a limited geographic area; (ii) carefully assess the type of rehabilitation needed (depending on the state of the road and commensurate with its actual/expected use to connect producers to inputs and markets); (iii) ensure that engineering studies are ready at the start of projects that include road rehabilitation works and presence of local contractors; (iv) formally involve a road engineer in the Bank’s supervision team; and (v) define modalities for medium and long-term maintenance. 7. Comments on Issues Raised by Borrower/Implementing Agencies/Partners (a) Borrower/implementing agencies No issues were raised by the Borrower (b) Cofinanciers Not applicable (c) Other partners and stakeholders (e.g. NGOs/private sector/civil society) Not applicable 27 Annex 1. Project Costs and Financing (a) Project Cost by Component (in USD Million equivalent) Appraisal Actual/Latest Percentage of Components Estimate (USD Estimate (USD Appraisal millions) millions) Component 1: Rural Infrastructure 30.00 17.7 59.0 Component 2: Economic Partnership 32.70 31.7 96.9 Component 3: Capacity Building 5.70 3.2 56.1 Component 4: Coordination, M&E 9.20 15.9 172.8 Total Baseline Cost 77.60 68.50 88.3 PPF 1.00 0.7 0.3 Contingencies/Unallocated 3.40 0 0.00 Total Project Costs 82.00 69.2 84.4 Front-end fee PPF - - - Front-end fee IBRD - - - (b) Financing Appraisal Actual/Latest Type of Estimate Estimate Percentage of Source of Funds Cofinancing (USD (USD Appraisal millions) millions) Borrower 12.5 6.6 52.8 International Development Association 60.0 57.6 96.0 (IDA) Local Farmer Organizations 9.5 5.1 53.7 28 Annex 2. Outputs by Component 2.1 Main milestones (process) The following table presents the chronology of PACA’s main milestones (process) from design to completion: Approval of Concept Paper 13 November 2008 Preparatory missions September 2008 December 2008, February-March 2009 Board Approval 18 June 2009 Signature of Financing Agreement 16 September 2009 Effective start of project 29 January 2010 Expected completion 30 November 2015 Actual completion 31 December 2016 Bank Supervisions missions 2010 : October 2011 : January-February and December 2012 : December (Mid Term Review) TTL based in country office 2015 : October National Steering Committee Total of 7 meetings (last one in June 2014 according to minutes received) National Technical Monitoring Team Total of 9 meetings (last one in December 2014 according to minutes received) Project Restructuring Total of 5 at level 2 : 2013 : October 2015 : October 2016 : March, June and Dec Impact assessment 2012 and 2015 Environmental and social analysis of 2014 and 2015 sub-projects Economic and Financial Analysis January 2017 Project Completion Report cum June 2016 Evaluation by Borrower 2.2 Summary of main achievements Drawing on a range of complementary reports, in particular annual progress reports prepared by the Project Coordination Unit, the Borrower Completion Report, Bank’s Implementation Status and Results Reports as well as impact studies (cf. Annex 9, List of Supporting Documents), the main achievements under each of the components/sub-components are summarized as follows: 29 Component 1: Rehabilitation of key rural infrastructure  initially planned (as per PAD): US$30 million (36.6% of total/IDA+GvT+POs)  revised after restructuring: US$ 25.2 million (33.6% of total)  actual: US$ 17.5 million (26.3% of total disbursed; implementation rate: 69.5%) Sub-Component 1.1 Rehabilitation of rural roads  initially planned: US$19 million (23.2% of total/IDA+GvT+POs)  revised after restructuring: US$14.9 million (19.9% of total)  actual: US$9.5 million (14.3% of total disbursed; implementation rate: 63.9%) Planned output Achievements 500 km of rural roads in project  Cooperation agreement was signed between MINADER/MINEPIA and MINTP on 1 October 2010; the works target areas rehabilitated (of which were supervised by MINTP through its Rural Roads Division and its Cellule AfDB-WB; MINTP had its own 100-150 km heavy rehabilitation special account to implement Sub-Component 1.1 and a Focal Point of MINTP was based within the PCU of and 350-400 km light PACA; rehabilitation) responding to local  After priority setting and selection of the specific roads to be covered under PACA, a series of subsequent call priorities for tenders were needed, i.e., for (a) engineering studies, (b) environmental impact studies, (c) road *supervised by the Ministry of rehabilitation and (d) supervision and control ; Public Works (MINTP)  Of the 500 km of rural envisaged to be rehabilitated (spread over the regions covered by PACA), works on the *with borrower commitment for first 50 km started end 2012 and were completed in 2013 – soon after the MTR (two local subcontractors); long-term maintenance, and another 200 km were rehabilitated in the period 2015-2016 (involving 6 subcontractors including one in charge *GIS-based monitoring of of supervision and control); maintenance status.  Another 250 km of road rehabilitation was planned but later found to be not feasible due to lack of resources and time left of the project. Observations  There were major delays in this sub-component as time was needed to conduct engineering studies (not done by the time of appraisal); moreover, the lengthy national procurement process resulted in delays in both the studies and the implementation of rehabilitation works; other factors generating delays were the time needed to obtain Bank’s non- objection and weak financial capacity of sub-contractors to pre-finance works. Furthermore, based on the studies undertaken, the budget for this sub-component (design) proved to be underestimated;  Resultantly, the supervision missions (including MTR) and national steering committee meetings devoted considerable time to address the problems faced in the implementation of this sub-component that was maintained, monitored based on a detailed action plan yet continued to face delays, and its completion (last 200 km) required two project extensions; 31  Reporting does not include information on the proportion of heavy versus light rehabilitation works carried out as regards the total of 250 km covered (although such distinction was made in project design);  There is no indication of analysis of rehabilitation needs/costs based on actual/expected use of the rural roads to be rehabilitated (light/heavy transport), which would allow for more precise definition of km that could be rehabilitated within a given budget;  A priori the maintenance of the rehabilitated roads is covered by the Borrower (as per the PAD); nonetheless, MINTP mentioned the need for a finishing layer to enhance the medium/longer-term durability of the roads rehabilitated under PACA (referring to the need for an additional loan to this end);  There is no indication of PACA having used GIS-based monitoring under component 1.1;  The rural roads component had the purpose of connecting high-potential areas to markets. The 2015 impact study reports 20% reduction in transport time to nearest market by the POs targeted by this component. Sub-component 1.2 Rehabilitation of irrigated perimeters (IP)  initially planned (as per PAD): US$11 million (13.4% of total/IDA+GvT+POs)  revised after restructuring: US$ 10.2 million (13.7% of total)  actual: US$7.9 million (12.0% of total disbursed; implementation rate: 77.6%) Planned output Achievements About 11,500 hectares of existing  In the absence of detailed engineering studies by the time of project appraisal, these studies were conducted irrigation schemes rehabilitated by during implementation (which generated delays); according to the findings of the study pertaining to SEMRY the irrigation development (available at the time of MTR), the cost estimate of rehabilitation of the planned 10,500 ha would add up to authorities to support paddy rice US58 million (almost the size of the entire project) rather than the estimated US$ 8.7 million as per the PAD; production, of which 10,500 ha in  Moreover, flooding in the Far North (2012) affected the existing infrastructure (water reservoirs and dikes) and the Far North (Société d’Expansion emergency rehabilitation operations were transferred to another Bank project (Emergency Floods Operation, et de Modernisation de la P143940); under PACA a study was financed pertaining to the rehabilitation of dikes affected by the flooding; Riziculture de Yagoua/SEMRY - accordingly, the MTR decided to refocus the planned actions under this sub-component on maintenance Maga and Yagoua) and about 1,000 with adjustment of the target from 11,500 ha/rehabilitation works to 6,500 ha/maintenance works; ha in the Nord-West (Upper Noun  The refocusing also covered: (i) purchase of equipment for SEMRY and UNVDA for IP maintenance (such as Development Authority/UNVDA); soil preparation and maintenance of irrigation canals), and (for UNVDA) of a generator, (ii) an institutional moreover: and strategic audit of both authorities with a view to developing a vision for the revival of rice production/their capacity of rice POs built and role therein (audit covering mission and responsibilities, management, organization, staffing, budget, investment by these PO supported equipment);  According to the 2015 impact study about 72% of the POs in the rice production regions considered the support provided by PACA under this sub-component useful (among which one third found it very useful); 32  Environmental and social audits were conducted of SEMRY and UNVDA in 2013;  Support to rice POs under Component 2.2 (sub-projects) was reported to have resulted in improved payment for services to SEMRY; this support included the strengthening of the POs working with SEMRY with a view of enhancing their capacity and role in the management and maintenance of the irrigated perimeters; Observations  As in the case of sub-component 1.1, the interventions under sub-component 1.2 suffered from under- estimation of costs at the moment of project design, as well as delays in studies related to the length of procurement procedures; moreover, no analysis was carried out during the project design phase to determine the factors that explained the low paddy yields and what the best intervention strategies and their phasing should be;  Reporting does not include information on the actual utilization of the equipment purchased for SEMRY and UNVDA, such as proportion of the IP under production or length of canals maintained since the arrival of the equipment;  There is no indication of the actual utilization of the institutional audit conducted (in terms of eventual changes introduced in the modus operandi of the two authorities based on the findings of these studies). Component 2: Economic Partnerships  initially planned (as per PAD): US$32.7 million (39.9% of total/IDA+GvT+POs)  revised after restructuring: US$33.2 (44.4% of total)  actual: US$31.3 million (47.0% of total disbursed; implementation rate: 94.1%) Sub-component 2.1: Support to the establishment of Economic Partnerships  initially planned (as per PAD): US$2.4 million (2.9% of total/IDA+GvT+POs)  revised after restructuring: US$1.7 (2.3% of total)  actual: US$1.4 million (2.2% of total disbursed; implementation rate: 82.6%) Planned output Achievements Economic Partnerships (EP)  Information and communication: the project organized 155 meetings across the different regions to diffuse established covering linkages and information on PACA, its procedures as well as sub-sector specific events, such as on building standards coordination between different (livestock infrastructure); these meetings covered a total of 9447 persons (5816 male, 2165 female and 1466 stakeholders in the selected value youth) and generated the receipt of 6904 requests (fiches/sub-projects); this was complemented by information chains. diffused through media (radio, TV, newspapers) to announce PACA as well as (later on) to report on its According to the PAD this sub- achievements component was to cover:  Institutional support to POs: the project supported the organizational strengthening of 40 sectoral apex POs, *value chain analyses, market their transformation into cooperatives (the case of 19 sectoral POs) and the creation of 35 cooperatives studies, action plans (particularly in the maize, poultry and plantain banana sub-sectors); 33 *information and communication  Consultations among stakeholders: a total of 59 input supplier-buyer-seller fora were organized around the campaigns POs across all regions (albeit with concentration in West and North-West) covering a total of 1151 participants; *regular consultations among value Project reporting refers to 1129 EPs pertaining to the purchase of inputs and 426 EPs concerning the sales of chain actors at national and regional agriculture and livestock products, with cumulative value reported to be around 18 billion FCFA; level  Technical workshops/study tours: a series of technical workshops was organized on a wide range of themes, *institutional and technical audits such as on the multiplication of seedlings, diversification of production, bio security rules; study tours allowed of POs for visits to POs with a view to exchanging experiences; *support to the establishment of  Good practice guidelines: for all sub-sectors covered by PACA technical data sheets were prepared pertaining contract-farming arrangements to construction of farm building and equipment, production, hygiene and bio-security (livestock); *support to the preparation of  Studies: standards were developed for maize and poultry meat and an analysis was conducted of the quality of proposals and feasibility studies. inputs/animal feed;  Access to rural finance: a national forum on this theme was organized in 2011 and a total of 38% (188) of the POs that implemented sub-projects (sub-component 2.2) engaged in borrowing from micro-finance institutions covering a total amount of almost 650 million FCFA; preparatory work was conducted for a partnership with a hire-purchase scheme. Observations  The involvement of the cross-sectoral apex POs (CNOP-CAM and PLANOPAC) in the organizational strengthening of sectoral POs was reported to be less than expected (cf. the discussion of sub-component 3.1);  According to the 2015 impact study, few partnership agreements signed between PACA and the MFIs were implemented and POs were mainly ordinary clients of MFIs. There is no indication to what extent the POs engaged in loans at the level of MFIs prior to PACA;  The Operations Manual distinguishes between three types of EP agreements: related to (i) inputs/production/sales, (ii) financing and (iii) technical assistance. Whereas the intermediary results indicator refers to the number of POs engaged in EP (1555 compared to the end target of 1000), the coverage by type of EP and their impact is hard to assess. Some (or perhaps most) EP cover standard business processes in terms of buying inputs and selling products for which the term EP is overly glossy;  There is no indication of value chain analyses/action plans and/or market studies conducted under this sub- component during the life the project. Sub-component 2.2: Co-financing of PO investment projects  initially planned (as per PAD): US$30.3 million (37.0% of total/IDA+GvT+POs)  revised after restructuring: US$31.5 (42.0% of total)  actual: US$29.8 million (44.8% of total disbursed; implementation rate: 94.7%) Planned output Achievements 34 Producer Organizations (PO)  This sub-component was at the core of PACA and co-financed (on a matching-grant basis) POs’ investments implemented investment sub- along selected value chains (rice; maize; plantain; oil palm; pig farming; and poultry) in seven (out of ten) projects (SP) co-financed on a regions of the country; matching-grant basis concerning  Applications for sub-projects (SP) were initially low, as POs were not familiar with PACA’s operating production, collection, marketing, procedures and were hesitant in providing their required counterpart funds (in cash and kind). By February processing and/or other services 2011 only 52 SP were under implementation, the number of applications rose steadily and by January 2014 along the value chain – up to 70% there were 1138 approved SPs, covering an achievement of 114% against the target of 1000 SPs. By then of cost-sharing by sub-project, with PACA approved more SPs than it could finance. However, a number of approved SPs were not pursued for maximum of FCFA 30 million different reasons (such as incomplete project; difficulty in mobilizing PO share among members). The (approx US$60,000) per sub- following core statistics summarize the results by stage: projects *screened by Regional Overview of SP/ PACA Coordination Units and selected by Regional Selection Committees Requests received 6904 comprising representatives of the SP prepared 1250 sectoral ministries and the apex PO and SP approved 1138 *support of local service providers SP agreements signed 1000 called Local Support Operators (OALs) to prepare sub-projects and SP implemented 831 assist in their implementation SP cancelled 169 (17% of all SP signed, of which 144 prior to start and 25 after the first tranche). In terms of value chains: most projects cancelled were in maize, pig farming, plantain) SP by value chain Value Chain Maize Plantain Rice Oil palm Poultry Pork Total (meat/eggs (reproducti ) on/meat) No. of SPs 365 183 74 8 336 284 1250 prepared No. of SPs 333 147 71 7 310 270 1138 approved (29.3%) (12.9%) (6.2%) (0.6%) (27.4%) (23.7%) 35 No. of SPs 224 82 64 2 254 205 831 Implemented and Completed SP by region Value East Centre Extreme Littoral North- West Total Chain North West No. of SPs 152 195 190 227 165 209 1138 approved % 13.4 17.1 16.7 19.9 14.5 18.4 100 Costs and financing of 831 implemented SPs Million FCFA US$ Percent (conversion 9 April 2017 @ 619, 378 XAF/$) Total 19 654 382 038 31 732 473 100 Project contribution 13 129 112 272 21 197 268 66.8 POs contribution 6 525 269 766 10 535 205 33.2 Average cost implemented 23 651 551 38 186 SP  As regards SPs for crop production, PACA financed the use of certified seeds, improved seedlings, fertilizers and small agricultural equipment, as well as the construction of drying and storage facilities. The SPs in the livestock sector covered primarily the construction of state of the art buildings to raise pork and poultry, investments related to animal feed, use of higher yield breeds, animal health and bio-security measures and solid/liquid waste reservoirs;  The indicators for agriculture and livestock (see below) show increases in yields well above set targets in the case of most value chains. The poultry meat targets were not achieved because of problems with the timely 36 supply of 1-day chicken, which led to the underutilization of installed production capacity. These indicators of intermediary outcomes are further discussed under Section 3 (Outcomes). Key metrics of the performance of PACA’s sub-projects Crop/Livestock Baseline Expected Yields by end Yields by Yields by Overall Activity as per PAD of project end 2012 end 2015 achievement (MTR) **** (2015) in % against expected yields Maize 2.5 T/ha 3.0 T/ha 2.8 T/ha 3.1 T/ha 103% Plantain 6.5 T/ha 7.5 T/ha n.a. 16.7 T/ha 223% Rice 5.2 T/ha 6,1 T/ha 5.7 T/ha 6.9 T/ha 113% Palm Oil 1.5 T/ha 2,1 T/ha n.a. number of n.a. changed/MTR 2012 to processing 5 oil processing plants plants: n.a established via hire- purchase scheme Pork*** 49,29kg PV/m2 35 kg NB: 60,23 65,27 186% (24 weeks) * PV/M2 ** baseline Poultry Meat 21,63 kg 100 ** values for 45,25 69,0 69% PV/m2 pork and (45 days) * poultry Poultry Eggs 198/hen/year * 280** meat 205 283 101% diverge from MTR baseline values *baseline as per MTR ** not set at time of PAD nor at time of MTR; baseline taken from final report *** average number of piglets is not included in the results framework. However, the 2015 impact study gives the following information to this end: baseline 13; value in 2014: 15 37 ****as per final report/2015 – data converge with 2015 impact study apart from the case of poultry meat (that is according to the impact study 55.07 and not 69.0)  Other indications of performance reported in the final report (2015) relate to increase in surface cultivated and report on revenues generated. Moreover, PACA estimates in its 2015 annual report that the project generated employment, the distribution of which is summarized below: Type of employment Total Male Female Labor f.t 9515 8225 1290 Labor p.t 233118 208283 24835 OAL/formulation 139 118 21 OAL/implementation 181 167 14 Experts (sub-project 61 57 4 analysis) Consultants/technical 13 10 3 advice/PACA Grand total 242821 216728 26093 % 89.3 10.7 Observations  The experience with respect to OALs as service deliverers proved to be mitigated (cf. discussion under Section 3, Efficiency);  Most sub-projects relate to the improvement of production (as the target beneficiaries were organizations of agricultural producers); further development of the value chain will require strengthening of business linkages with processors (including the upgrading of the latter);  The oil palm value chain was de-emphasized after the MTR; whereas a target concerning processing plants was established, there is no indication in reporting to what extent processing plants were established;  As there are no baseline data on some of the results reflected in the final report (PACA, 2015 and Borrower’s completion report) as they were not integral part of the results framework (such as surface cultivated, production losses, revenue and employment), it is not possible to assess changes during project implementation. For example, other than the expertise recruited during the implementation of PACA, employment figures 38 presented are likely to cover only partially additional employment generated (as the POs were operating prior to the start of PACA);  The reporting on POs omits efforts undertaken in the first years of project implementation related to coffee and cassava (against the 10% of sub-projects targeted in other than the priority sectors). These concerned pilot/demonstration projects initiated by WB HQ under a Bank-Executed Trust Fund/TF (the All ACP Agricultural Commodities Program, AAACP) covering the testing of technology to produce (i) fully washed coffee and, for cassava, the production of starch and chips for animal feed. According to early reporting by PACA these pilot initiatives covered 5000 producers and 7 POs. The implementation strategy was different from the support to POs under PACA, as the feasibility studies were conducted by international firms and funded by the TF. Only the funding of the equipment came from PACA resources (the precise amount of which could not be traced in the reports). Whereas the results of at least the coffee related sub-projects were stated to be encouraging, there is no indication of WB monitoring beyond the initial years, nor of effective upscaling in order for these efforts to go beyond the pilot experience. Component 3: Institutional support and capacity development  initially planned (as per PAD): US$5.7 million (7.0% of total/IDA+GvT+POs)  revised after restructuring: US$3.5 (4.7% of total)  actual: US$2.6 million (3.9% of total disbursed; implementation rate: 73.5%) Sub-component 3.1: Developing the capacity of apex producer organizations (no financial details by sub-component available) Planned output Achievements Apex PO’s strengthened in terms of  Two apex POs, namely Concertation Nationale des Organisations Paysannes du Cameroun (CNOPCAM) and strategy, operations (organization, Plateforme Nationale des Organisations Professionnelles Agro-sylvo-pastorales du Cameroun (PLANOPAC) management), policy dialogue received support to strengthen their organisation and service delivery capacity. CNOPCAM benefitted from (advocacy, negotiation) and support support in terms of seminars to enhance their visibility, its management and organisation both at the level of services to members, covering also its HQ and in selected regions. Support to PLANOPAC covered an institutional diagnostic resulting in the support to multi-stakeholder preparation of its operations manual; financial management training, training on procurement; provision of associations (“interprofession”) at office equipment and vehicle; support to organisation of 7 General Assemblies; national, regional and departmental  IPAVIC (Interprofession Avicole du Cameroun) received support in the form of an organisational and strategic level audit, start of system to collect, analyse and diffuse information on the poultry sector, organisation of Regional Assemblies in two regions and of a National Assembly; 39  CAFPEN (Coopérative des Acteurs de la Filière Porcine de l’Extrême Nord) was supported in the organisation of its General Assembly and also received office equipment. Observations  Whereas in the design phase of PACA emphasis was put on sectoral associations of producers (that are a priori closest to their members/clients), the multi-sectoral ones (CNOPCAM and PLANOPAC) ended up receiving a more prominent role (and more support) in PACA;  The “division of labor” between the two organizations (created in a top down mode) was found to be unclear;  Although these multi-sectoral organizations were to strengthen the structure and organization of the POs, they were not yet sufficiently established themselves to carry out their mandate;  As per the feedback of the OPs on the service capacity and outreach of these multi-sectoral apex bodies (2015 impact study), the services of latter are not (yet) well developed;  Notwithstanding the resources earmarked under PACA to strengthen CNOPCAM and PLANOPAC, there were found to be gaps in their absorption capacity (staffing situation improved only towards the end of PACA). Sub-component 3.2: Strengthening core functions of public services (no financial details by sub-component available) Planned output Achievements Core functions of sectoral public In particular the following are highlighted: services to enhance smallholders’ Regarding the counterpart Ministries (MINADER; MINEPIA): productivity and access to markets  Preparation of good practice guidelines (including regarding bio security); strengthened in terms of seeds Regarding research: certification/control, formulation  Support to Institut de Recherche Agricole pour le Développement (IRAD): training, study tours, operational and analysis of sectoral policies, support ; food safety standards, veterinary Regarding inputs: services, monitoring of sectoral  Cooperation with the Centre Africain de Recherche sur Bananier et Plantain (CARBAP) resulted in access to resources seedlings (some 580,000) and, given demand, training of 93 POs on plant multiplication techniques;  In the field of quality control and certification of seeds, the services at national and regional level of the Direction de la Réglementation et du Contrôle de Qualité (DRCQ MINADER) were strengthened: training; logistics, support to inspections and certifications in selected regions;  The Comité d’Orientation et de Gestion Participative (COGEP) of Kounden received operational support to the rehabilitation and running of its pig farm (focused on production and distribution of some 2100 improved breeds); Regarding the organization of POs: 40  Enhancement of the country’s alignment to OHADA legislation by supporting the evolution from Groupements d’Intérêt Economique (GIC) to cooperatives (encompassing 15 cooperatives in the East and 8 in the Extreme North) Regarding animal health:  Cooperation with the Laboratoire National Vétérinaire (LaNaVet), covering in particular small equipment and consumables for the laboratory, two vaccination campaigns (village poultry);  Following the outbreak of avian flu (May 2016) - one of the factors that led to a restructuring and the extension of the project until end December 2016- PACA supported an emergency response, covering in particular: awareness building of different stakeholders; disinfection materials; logistical support to detect and monitor outbreaks (such as cars, computers, communication tools); laboratory equipment and consumables enabling detection in support of the network in charge of RESCAM – Réseau d’Epiemiosurveillance); a study of the socio-economic impact of the crisis and of the conditions for its recovery; and training; Regarding food safety standards:  Development of norms and quality standards for maize, meat and poultry supply chains to serve as a benchmark in Cameroon; Observations  Notwithstanding the achievements, it is observed that they have been scattered across different organizations, with limited indication how improved institutional capacity has benefitted the value chain actors in real terms;  As regards the avian flu crisis, it is noted that the support provided under PACA constituted one among different sources of support (involving also other development partners). Sub-component 3.3: Support to the establishment of legal and regulatory framework (no financial details by sub-component available Planned output Achievements Sectoral legal and regulatory  There is no indication of new acts/legislation enacted during the implementation of PACA framework conducive to the Observations sustainable development of the  There is no reporting on this sub-component, in line with its state of achievement. targeted agricultural value chains (fertilizers act, seed legislation, regulation of veterinary profession, agricultural tax code, duties on agricultural inputs) Component 4: Project coordination, Monitoring and Evaluation  initially planned (as per PAD): US$9.2 million (11.2% of total/IDA+GvT+POs) 41  revised after restructuring: US$12.1 (16.2% of total)  actual: US$14.5 million (21.8% of total disbursed; implementation rate: 119.8%) Planned output Achievements Project coordination team in place,  PCU and RCUs established as per planning; equipped and operational at both  Baseline conducted and M&E system in place (for discussion of M&E system, cf. Section 2.3); national and regional levels, in  Annual budget and annual reports prepared; charge of implementation,  In case of two RCUs change of core staff in 2015 (corruption case dealt with by Borrower; report sent to Bank); procurement, financial  Trainings conducted on procedures; management and overall M&E  Supervision /Bank: 5 missions, including MTR; system (including baseline and  Periodic meetings of Steering Committee (7 meetings) and National Technical Monitoring Team (9 meetings); impact studies, linkage to  Impact studies carried out (2012; 2015); Geographic Information System/GIS - for reporting on sub-  Seminars held in view of project closure (second half, 2015); component 1) and covering also the  Final report/evaluation prepared by Borrower (June 2016); operational costs of the national  Support by PCU to the preparation of follow-up projects (Agriculture: PIDMA; Livestock: PRODEL). Project Steering Committee) Observations  No tight link between Bank supervision missions and National Steering Committee meetings;  Delays in Steering Committees linked in reporting to delays in counterpart funding being available;  As of 2015 there appeared more focus by both Bank and Borrower/PCU on the preparation of the next round of WB projects (PIDMA/PRODEL) than on adequately closing PACA. 2.3 Summary table of project restructurings 42 Restructuring 1 (R 1) R2 R3 R4 R5 % 20.09.2013 8.10.2015 21.03.2016 27.06.2016 23.12.2016 (as per R.5) Current at PAD revised at approval revised revised revised revised revised (approval) C1.1Rehabi- 6 900 000 6 459 245 16% litation of 8 600 000 8 600 000 21% 21% 8 600 000 8 600 000 rural roads C1.2 Institutional support of 5 800 000 5 800 000 14% 14% 5 800 000 5 800 000 5 800 000 5 800 000 15% SEMRY and UNVDA C2.1 Support to 1 400 000 997 000 3% 2% 997 000 997 000 997 000 997 000 3% economic partnerships C2.2 Co- 16 175 000 financing of 13 800 000 15 915 000 34% 39% 15 915 000 15 915 000 16 175 000 41% Sub-projects C3 Support to Institutional 3 400 000 1 788 000 8% 4% 1 788 000 1 388 000 2 108 000 2 108 000 5% & Capacity Building C4 7 620 000 7 620 000 19% Coordina- 5 000 000 6 500 000 12% 15% 6 500 000 6 900 000 tion, M&E PPF 700 000 700 000 2% 2% 700 000 700 000 700 000 700 000 1% Unallocated 1 600 000 0 4% 0% 0 0 0 0 0% Grand 40 300 000 40 300 000 100% 100% 40 300 000 40 300 000 40 300 000 39 859 245 100% Total 43 Purpose of o Extension o Cancellation o See o Extension restructu- o Extension of of closing of text o Reallocation within C 1.2 (from rehabilitation of rice of closing ring closing date date to undisbursed below irrigated perimeters to institutional support to rice date to from end end Dec balance of authorities) end June November 2016 SDR o Reallocation from C 2.1 and C3 to C 2.2 and C4 2016 2015 to end o Reallocati 440,755 o Reallocat March 2016 on from (regarding ion from C1.1 to C1) C3 to C4 C2.2, C3 (avian flu outbreak) and C4 As regards the final budget proportions in comparison to PAD, attention is drawn to: decrease in C1; increase in C2.2; decrease in C3; and increase in C4 44 Annex 3. Economic and Financial Analysis (including assumptions in the analysis) This annex complements the discussion on the EFAs carried out at appraisal and at project closure (cf. Section 3.3, Efficiency). It thus covers the results of the EFA conducted at project appraisal and the end-of-project EFA of PACA conducted (EFA, final report, January 2017, complemented by exchanges with the consultant who conducted this EFA). As mentioned in Section 3.3, Bank guidelines changed as regards discount rates (12% at appraisal versus 6% at closure). This is to be kept in mind, as affecting the comparability of the two EFAs. EFA at appraisal The financial analysis at project appraisal showed net profitability of support in the targeted value chains, with emphasis of the financial analysis on rice (Component 1.2), poultry and pig farming (Component 2.2). Comparing “with project” and “without project”, the model showed yield increase as regards the rice crop as a result of rehabilitation and, correspondingly, increase in the income of farmers. As regards the rice crop, the findings of the analysis were as follows: Results of rice crop models Area Without With project Incremental project Gross margin Gross margin Family labour Gross margin % (‘000 (‘000 (‘000 (‘000 FCFA/ha FCFA/ha FCFA/ha FCFA/ha Rice SEMRY 299 349 2587 50 17 (rainy season) – rehabilitated plots Rice SEMRY 470 495 3665 25 5 (dry season) – rehabilitated plots 45 Rice SEMRY - 349 2587 349 - (rainy season) – new plots Rice SEMRY - 495 3665 495 - (dry season) – new plots Rice UNVDA - 316 2038 316 - (dry season) – new plots Source: Table 2, PAD, p. 78 Given varying investment costs depending on the type and size of livestock activities, return on investment varied, as shown in below. Results of livestock models Type of Unit Pig Pig Piglet Ameliorated Rural Rural Peri-urban Peri-urban sub-project fattenin fattenin productio village poultry poultry poultry egg g g (50 n poultry (500 (3000 (4000 production (10 pigs) chickens/ chickens/yr chickens/ (1000 hens) pigs) yr) ) yr) Investment ‘000 2649 7753 6640 178 898 3291 6128 9039 costs FCF A Internal % 13 31 45 64 161 339 267 7 Rate of return Profitabilit % 21 20 24 48 12 13 16 5 y (margin/ sales) NPV ‘000 43 2948 8903 368 2157 14266 26173 -1696 FCF A Source: Table 3, PAD, p. 79 46 The findings showed that the estimated Internal Rates of Return varied from 7 to 339 percent and profitability from 5 to 48 percent. It is to be noted that the analysis did not include the other crops targeted in the project. Moreover, for the sub-sectors covered in the analysis, it was highlighted that the findings were to be taken with caution, as based on assumptions that needed to be verified by the actual demand of producers.17 The analysis was based on assumptions pertaining to increase in availability of water, in use of fertilizers and of improved seeds (as regards rice). Concerning livestock, the model assumed factors such as improved breeds, buildings and animal feed. The benefits mainly derived from increase in value added as regards rice production (57% of all benefits in the model), cash-flows from sub-projects (29%), benefits from roads rehabilitation (14%). As regards the latter this was expected to be related to reduction in transport losses of production (estimated at minus 50%) as well as reduction in transport costs (minus 10%) as well as increased life of trucks and reduction of truck maintenance costs. Attention is drawn to the fact that the share of estimated benefits of Component 1 in this ex ante EFA is rather modest (14%) compared to overall expected benefits and considering costs. The ex-ante EFA resulted in an estimated project yield (ERR) of 26% and NPV of US$52 million (at a 12% discount rate) and the sensitivity analysis indicated good resilience to important changes in costs or reduction in benefits (e.g., maintaining an ERR of 20% in case of a 30% reduction of benefits). As already explained in Section 3.3 (Efficiency), the findings of the initial EFA are considered overly positive as based on assumptions that proved to be different in implementation (such as the cost of road rehabilitation) and as omitting risks in terms of the occurrence of diseases affecting animal production (a common risk in animal production). EFA at project closure The end-of-project EFA: o Determined the commercial viability of the project through its internal rate of return, net present value (NPV), production costs, revenues and gross margins, including gross annual margins of the project’s beneficiaries; o Covered a cost/benefit analysis as per the 4 project components; o Assessed the contribution of the project to the national added value; o Determined the contribution of MFIs to the project; o Assessed the social effects of the project as well the project’s contribution to the organization of producers (PO transforma tion into cooperatives). 17 Source : PAD, paragraphe 13, p. 80. 47 This EFA adopted the following methodology: sampling of POs, collection of information on the sample supplemented by data collection at the level of the Regional Coordination Units of the project. The study thus compiled information pertaining to 108 POs, covering a cross section of PACA’s target subsectors, regions covered and PO sub-projects for which a final report was available. On this basis a database was created and cleaned, followed by analysis of data collected over the period 2011-2015, as well as projections for the period 2016-2020. Analysis of the data covering the sample of 108 POs showed that PACA invested close to FCFA 1.8 billion between 2011 and 2016, whereas the POs contributed about FCFA 785.1 million for the implementation of subprojects (with overall average production costs estimated at FCFA 144.3 million, all sectors combined). These investments yielded an average total income of roughly FCFA 161.8 million, which corresponds to a global profit margin of FCFA 300.4 million. As highlighted in Section 3.3, there proved to be a major variation between the NPV of (i) crops and (ii) livestock production value chains covered by PACA. Comparison of global NPV with and NPV without the livestock value chains clearly shows this difference: o Global NPV including livestock: -104 million FCFA; o Global NPV excluding livestock: +288 million FCFA. In particular the losses incurred as a result of animal diseases that are outside the control of the project (swine fever and avian influenza) explain the negative performance of sub-projects involving animal production. In this regard, the EFA estimated losses in PACA pig farming sub-projects as a result of swine fever at -2 239 830 (in ‘000 FCFA), based on estimated loss of one third of production in 2015 and 2016). Losses in PACA poultry sub- projects as a result of avian influenza were even higher, estimated at – 2 453 966 (in ‘000 FCFA), based on an estimated 50% loss of production in 2016. Therefore, the global NPV is to be interpreted with caution and ‘totalling’ makes less sense, given divergence between in particular the performance of crop sub-projects and animal production sub-projects. Whereas the financial evaluation showed a negative NPV, estimated at FCFA -104.036 million at the rate of 6% , detailed financial analysis by subsector showed that the plantain, maize and rice subsectors had positive NPVs in the order of respectively FCFA 127.343 million, FCFC 17.676 million and FCFA 143.001 million, with negative values for pig farming and poultry (see table below). Similarly, the overall ERR is 3.7%, yet, there are major disparities across subsectors: whereas the plantain subsector had a rate of return of 18.7%, the maize and rice subsectors showed rates of return of respectively 7.4% and 0% and the ERR for the animal production sub-sectors was negative . NPV by sector and global Sub-sector NPV Maize 17676003,4 48 Plantain 127343319,6 Pig farming -316018875,9 Rice 143001927,2 Poultry -76038445,1 Global -104036070,8 Analysis of the evolution of the project indicators indicated that subsector yields improved as a result of awareness raising and training on improved production techniques, storage, animal health practices, as well as infrastructure rehabilitation. However, the absence of data on the situation in the targeted subsectors prior to the implementation of the PACA made it not possible to conduct an in-depth “with and without analysis” of PACA (which explains the missing data in the overview table included in Section 3.3). The cost-benefit analysis yielded more interesting results. By considering various easily quantifiable direct and indirect economic and social benefits, the project was found to be economically profitable. This profitability is observable from 2017 onwards for most of the project components with an average benefit / cost ratio greater than 1 in the period considered (ratio of 1.05 in the period 2011 and 2020), as shown in the table below. Component NPV (6%) in million FCFA ERR Component 1 112 653 361 183 1% Component 2 - 4 511 169 418 N/D Component 3 589 480 582 1% Component 4 - 196 722 063 1% Total 7,14693R+09 1% When taking into consideration sensitivity to discount rates, EFA calculations show that o for maize there is financial viability between 6 et 9% discount rate; o for plantain, this is between 18 and 21%; o regarding pig farming and poultry, they are not financially viable in the period covered (attributed to losses incurred as a result of the outbreaks of animal diseases); o for rice there is financial viability between 0 and 3% discount rate. As shown in the table below, sensitivity analysis allows for further precision and indicates PACA’s financial viability at a discount rate between 3 and 6%. 49 Sensitivity to discount rate variations Discount rate 3% 6% 9% 12% 15% 18% 21% 24% 27% 33% - - - - - - - Maize 61443146,9 17676003,4 16523934,4 43512432,3 -65011361,1 82292118,5 96302576,3 107755913 117193427 131583398 - - - Plantain 181524201 127343320 85082288,8 51849112,5 25518334,7 4511763,49 12353821,5 25973641,5 -37030869 53441831,5 Pig - - - - - - - - - farming 347588118 316018876 291251813 271617845 -255897340 243189802 232823770 224293823 217216082 206307753 Rice 183033287 143001927 111384084 86144973,1 65792545,1 49221152,8 35603232,1 24313412,6 14874782,8 165821,748 - - - - - - - - - Poultry 38786551,3 76038445,2 106104974 130631194 -150838304 167643060 181741054 193665447 203828870 220093679 - - - - - - - - Global 39625966,3 104036071 217414348 307767386 -380436125 439392064 487617990 527375412 560394465 611260840 The role played by MFIs in project implementation was highlighted, as they contributed about FCFA 500.5 million to the (co)financing of the sub- projects. This contribution (which is related to their economic partnerships with the POs) enabled the POs to mobilize their counterpart funding for the realization of their subprojects. The project has also contributed to the national added value of an estimated amount of more than FCFA 2.8 billion. Other benefits to the project included job creation (that PACA reported to be around 242 000 – including project experts that are however to be counted as inputs rather than benefits) and the participation of women (around 45% of PO members/beneficiaries) and indigenous people. What is missing in the EFA (as there were no quantitative data) are the effects of the contribution of PACA to the 2016 avian influenza outbreak (that included support in the period June-December 2016 under Component 3, together with other donors). These efforts had positive effects, as the outbreak was contained through awareness building and other preventive measures and the emergency response also prepared the authorities for reacting more rapidly and more effectively to future outbreaks. Whereas no quantitative data are available to calculate the positive benefits of this support such as in terms of avoided loss of animals, it is to be recognized that these efforts had (positive) effects. The final EFA recommended 50 (i) Completion of final reports of sub-projects As at 31 December 2015 only 270 sub-projects had completion reports. Of these 270 a total of 108 was analyzed; the data of the remaining ones had gaps as regards their operating accounts, in particular with respect to revenues. The recommendation made in relation to this point is that for future projects particular emphasis should be placed on the preparation and monitoring of the operating accounts of the POs. This could cover, for example, including in the sub-project agreement with POs the obligation to provide such data and strengthening the project’s M & E system in order to capture the required information at the level of farms and plantations. (ii) Targeting of interventions Based on review of the project reports, it was observed that most support of PACA was at the level of production (upstream), with limited support related to storage, processing, marketing, etc. (downstream). This gap in support to the targeted sub-sectors could partially explain mitigated performance. It is thus recommended for future projects to include more downstream interventions in support to POs. In that sense the project supported only part of the selected value chains rather than the entire chain. There is also considered scope for reinforcing inter-linkages (services) among POs as well as strengthening the capacities of MFIs to provide adapted services to POs including expansion of their portfolio of services targeted at POs. In conclusion, the ICR team wishes to highlight the following as regards the EFAs: 1. The findings of the pre-project EFA and the final EFA vary considerably and used different discount rates: estimated NPV of about 31.397 million FCFA (at 12% discount rate) in 2009 versus negative NPV of FCFA -104.036 million (at the rate of 6%) in 2017. The change in discount rates is the result of changes in Bank guidelines to this end; 2. As core data on the situation before PACA were incomplete, the final EFA does not include a comprehensive comparison of the key ratios by value chain before and after PACA; 3. Due to limited availability of subproject completion reports, the findings of the final EFA are based on the sample of 108 subprojects (rice; maize; plantain; poultry; pig farming) - encompassing 13% of the implemented subprojects; whereas the NPV and ERR estimates give insight in the cost-effectiveness of the project, they need to be treated with caution, given the limited sample size; 4. There were major differences between the performance of crop sub-projects versus those involving animal production (the latter suffering from “shocks” as a result of swine fever and avian influenza) - beyond the control of the project; 5. There were benefits as a result of efforts to respond to the avian influenza outbreak (avoiding/minimizing the loss of animals), even though these benefits were not counted. Considering the above constraints, it is difficult to determine in precise terms whether the project represented the expected least-cost solution to attain the benefits achieved. As regards component 1, the precise benefits of the 250 km of rehabilitated roads have not been measured against the higher than 51 estimated costs (PAD versus actual implementation). Regarding component 2, the yields (agriculture and livestock) recorded as per the indicators show increases, which translated into increase in revenues and in employment. To the extent the investments were durable (modern farming infrastructure/equipment), these benefits are expected to persist (notwithstanding challenges due to swine fever and avian influenza outbreaks – to which the emergency response capacity has however been improved). Finally, it is difficult to assess the cost-effectiveness of the benefits under component 3. The above explains the decision of the ICR team to give the project as regards its efficiency the following rating: modest. 52 Annex 4. Bank Lending and Implementation Support/Supervision Processes (a) Task Team members Responsibility/ Names Title Unit Specialty Lending Financial Nestor Coffi Country Manager AFMBI Management Jeanne d'Arc Edima Program Assistant AFCC1 Team Support Germaine M. Ethy Senior Executive Assistant GED07 Team Support Stephane Forman Senior Livestock Specialist GFA02 Livestock Specialist Anna Victoria Gyllerup Operations Adviser AFRDE Operations Francois G. Le Gall Adviser GFA01 Agric. Specialist Lucienne M. M'Baipor Senior Social Development Spec GSU01 Safeguards Emeran Serge M. Menang Senior Environmental Specialist GEN07 Safeguards Evouna Kouami Hounsinou Messan Senior Procurement Specialist GGO07 Procurement Renato Nardello Country Operations Adviser LCC7C Operations AFTME - Financial Fridolin Ondobo Financial Management Specialist HIS Management Jean-Jacques Pesquet Consultant MIGOP Agric. Specialist Ousmane Seck Sr Rural Development Specialist GFADR Agric. Specialist Lead Water Resource IJsbrand Harko de Jong GWA03 Water Specialist Management Supervision/ICR Aissatou Diallo Senior Finance Officer WFALA Finance Jeanne d'Arc Edima Program Assistant AFCC1 Team Support Marie-Claudine Fundi Language Program Assistant GFA07 Team Support Mathurin Gbetibouo Lead Agriculture Economist GSURR Agric. Specialist AFTME - Financial Sekou Keita E T Consultant HIS Management Omar Lyasse Senior Agriculture Economist GFA07 Agric. Specialist Lucienne M'Baipor Miayo Senior Social Specialist PA44P-HIS Safeguards Emeran Serge M. Menang Senior Environmental Specialist GEN07 Safeguards Evouna Kouami Hounsinou Messan Senior Procurement Specialist GGO07 Procurement Nathalie S. Munzberg Senior Counsel LEGEN Legal Specialist Jeehye Kim Agricultural Specialist GFARD ICR TTL and Author Leny Van Oyen Consultant GFA07 ICR co-Author Helene Simonne Ndjebet Operation Analyst AFCC1 ICR preparation Yaka (b) Staff Time and Cost Staff Time and Cost (Bank Budget Only) Stage of Project Cycle USD Thousands (including No. of staff weeks travel and consultant costs) 53 Lending 42.51 277,418.96 Total: 42.51 277,418.96 Supervision/ICR 172.01 723,732.30 Total: 172.01 723,732.30 214.52 1,001,151.26 54 Annex 5. Beneficiary Survey Results 5.1 Introduction The section starts with addressing the general question: «who were the beneficiaries? ». The subsequent analysis of the beneficiaries and their perception on the efforts undertaken by PACA is based on a number of consecutive documents, namely the baseline survey (2009), the impact studies (2012 and 2014), the satisfaction survey (2014) as well as the statements on beneficiary perceptions contained in the ISRs prepared during the life of the project. Moreover, it uses observations of beneficiaries obtained by the ICR preparation team during meetings with stakeholders (field mission Yaoundé and Bafoussam). 5.2 The beneficiaries: targeted and actual The target beneficiaries of PACA were agricultural producer organizations (POs) engaged in the targeted value chains. The stated target was 20,000 rice producers and another 20,000 engaged in sub-projects. Moreover, as per the PAD, other beneficiaries were people benefitting from the rehabilitation of rural roads, other actors along the value chains (traders, transporters, processors) who would benefit from increased quality and quantity of products as well as from reduced transport costs and other smallholders in the targeted areas who were expected to indirectly benefit from the project activities. In terms of data on the actual beneficiaries, PACA reporting includes information on some but not all beneficiaries and the table below constitutes an attempt to get an overview picture with at least approximate data to the extent available. Direct beneficiaries Male Female Total estimate 831 POs *Membership est. 4 570 est. 3 740 est. 8 310 -no precise consolidated information available for all 831 OPs with implemented sub-projects -size varies largely; using (low end) hypothesis of at least 10 members per PO)18 -based on information on 613 POs (annual report 2015): 55% male and 45% female *Employees full-time 8 225 1 290 9 515 *Employees part-time 208 283 24 835 233 118 Sub-total/POs 221 078 29 865 250 943 Indirect beneficiaries Traders, transporters, processors n.a. n.a. n.a. Other producers (individual or family n.a. n.a. n.a. operations; other POs) on whom the project had a “tâche d’huile” effect Number of partners (MFIs; other EPs) n.a. n.a. n.a. 18 In line with findings of the 2015 impact study that on average 10 members of OPs are effectively producers 55 Staff of multisectoral apex POs and of n.a. n.a. n.a. sectoral associations Staff of participating institutions (e.g., n.a. n.a. n.a. SEMRY, UNVDA, CARBAP, DRCQ, COGEB, LaNaVet, RESCAM) Experts recruited by project funds 352 42 394 (OALs; sub-project analysis; consultants; excluding staff of PCU and of RCUs In terms of outreach to PO members, the project covered at least 8310 persons (likely more, as the estimate of 10 members per PO is on the low end). When including not only the members but also the employees of the POs, the project reached out to more than 250 000 persons as direct beneficiaries. Data on indirect beneficiaries are missing (with the exception of information on/perceptions by POs not having benefitted from PACA in the 2012 and 2015 impact studies). 5.3 Perceptions of beneficiaries According to the baseline study (2009) - that covered a survey of 360 POs in the selected regions/sectors and 150 apex organizations - the POs were generally not satisfied with the different support services to the extent available in their vicinity. Some expressed satisfaction with the services of the decentralized entities of the MINEPIA and MINADER. To the extent the baseline covers a general assessment of PO perceptions on a large number of apex POs (with neither the POs nor the apex POs necessarily being included in PACA - as that selection was not yet made at the time), the baseline does not allow for comparison with impact studies/beneficiary survey. Incidentally, this baseline study contains also detailed information on the way the surveyed POs and apex POs were run, including the latter’s service capacity. The impact study of 2012 provided information on the degree of satisfaction on the services provided by the apex PO of a cross-regional/-sector sample of 48 POs (PACA). Only 11 (23%) responded and there were variations across regions, with satisfaction rates from 25 to 50%, and with some outliers above and below. This first impact study highlighted the gaps in the service capacity of the apex POs as main reasons for the above findings (logistics; office equipment; lack of understanding of the PACA procedures). This study also measured the degree of satisfaction with the OALs, separating between the one regarding design and the one engaged in implementation support. According to the findings, 19 of 48 POs responded to the question regarding their satisfaction as regards “design OALs”, the average across the regions was 66%, with several cases (including regions) of 100% satisfaction. With respect the question on “implementation OALs”, there was a 56% response rate (covering 27 OPs) and average of 80%. In both cases the non- or low response by POs was attributed to funds not yet having been obtained or gaps in required competencies. The PO Satisfaction surveys (2012 and 2013) 19 covered respectively 281 and 276 POs. If in 2012 some 63% of the POs were satisfied with the support, this increased to 77% as per the 2014 report, stating in particular the increase in their productivity (80%), in their sales (72%) and in their revenues (76%). The graph below shows the evolution in the satisfaction, comparing 2012 and 19 Information based on the 2013 survey (survey report dated 2014) 56 2013 ratings as regards each of the components. Among the issues (challenges) raised as regards PACA in general in the second survey covering 2013, the following are highlighted: the length and complexity of procedures, delays in the availability of funds, the complexity of determining in-kind contributions of POs, difficulties in accessing some inputs, storage facilities and in selling to processors, and no attention to crop variation (season bound). PO Satisfaction with PACA by component, 2012 and 2013 Source: CAEC, Rapport de l’Enquête de Satisfaction des OP (final version, August 2014), p.50 Regarding the satisfaction of POs with OALs, the average was 66%. In the majority of cases the support was positive, with a minority of POs complaining about their insufficient capacity or understanding of realities on the ground, or about their absence. As far the degree of satisfaction with the services provided by the apex POs, only 21% of the respondents stated to have received support from an apex PO, with 80% of these being satisfied with the assistance. The limited coverage of the apex POs is to be noted: it was found that 50% of the POs interviewed were not member of any apex body. As far as support from the line ministries MINADER and MINEPIA is concerned, 41% indicated to have received assistance and the average degree of satisfaction with this support was 54%. . Another impact study was launched in 2015, covering a sample of 327 POs, of which 272 among the beneficiaries of PACA and 55 non-PACA POs. Regarding the degree of satisfaction of the POs with the services of the apex POs, a rather low proportion of POs (19%) confirmed to have received services from their apex body – although 67% of the POs were reported to be member of an apex PO. Based on those having received services, this covered primarily training, miscellaneous advice and management support. There is some variation in the satisfaction rate among regions (highest in the Extreme North region; lowest in the Littoral and Centre regions) as well as among sub-sectors (highest in plantain and lowest in rice sub-sector). Overall, about 60% of the POs were not satisfied with the services offered by the apex POs. 57 The 2015 impact study also measured the degree of satisfaction with the project in general. Virtually all POs interviewed confirmed having received training that was considered useful and having positively impacted on their management and revenue situation. The material support received was highlighted by some 55% of the POs and all recognized its positive effect on their performance (production, management, transport). Only 13% listed having received office support, the majority of which assessed this support as having a positive effect on the way their organizations (in particular the improvement in filing their records). In terms of other support, about 70% confirmed having received and using manuals (production and management related) and some 60% stated to have received information services that were relevant for in particular production, sales, and PO’s organization in general. Only some 48% declared having been engaged in consultations (considered useful) between them, public support services and PACA or their apex PO. One third gave a negative mark as regards the project’s financial procedures as well as not having respected certain promises (without specification what these were). Regarding the OALs, all POs interviewed indicated the name(s) of their OAL but one quarter was unable to give their telephone number. Awareness of environmental issues scored rather low (30%) and the same was the case for veterinary and phytosanitary matters (25%). Awareness of issues regarding women and youth scored even lower (16%). Finally, about 57% of the POs indicated not having received any assistance from public services engaged in support to agriculture – although those that had received such assistance (in particular from MINADER and MINEPIA) were satisfied with the same (88%). Such services covered seeds, certified planting materials, fertilizers (chemical/organic), and introduction to new/improved techniques (covering in particular production, storage, conservation, and marketing). Beyond the satisfaction of POs with the support services, it is relevant to refer at this point to the benefits of PACA in general, as highlighted in this 2015 impact study: its results being tangible, the investment (co-financing of buildings, equipment etc.) being visible and durable and the organizations having been strengthened. More specifically, the listed benefits for POs and their members included, among others: improved agriculture/livestock practices, increase in production and productivity (including labour productivity), improved storage, information on product quality and quantity, attention to bio-security and environmental issues, link to financial institutions (debt situation related to sub-project implementation considered manageable), better governance, clear management and marketing procedures, increased revenues for the PO and its members, reinvestment of benefits in PO infrastructure/operations. The degree of organization of the sub- sectors also improved, such as the creation of an inter-profession (pig farming) in the West Region, stronger linkages between seed suppliers and farmers in view of securing seed quality. The impact study also listed challenges and weak points among which: the “heavy paper work” (justification of expenditures that POs needed to get used to), under-estimation of costs of the sub-projects (requiring mobilisation of more funding by the POs including at the level of MFIs), cases of frictions between the OAL and the PO, deficiencies in the qualifications of some OALs, a disconnect between OAL/design and OAL/implementation, gaps in cooperation between the RCU and the Focal Points (latter not fully used), deficiencies in functioning of the teams of experts that were to advise on the sub-projects, challenges related to procedures or their implementation (such as changes in reporting formats, delays in availability of funds or cases of untimely availability (not linked to production calendar). Concluding, whereas it is to be commended that different studies have been conducted to assess impact including beneficiary satisfaction, it is observed that there could have been more coherence and continuity between the studies that somewhat overlap, also time wise. More precisely, most studies were conducted by a different firm/team of consultants (most likely related to the procurement procedures). A one by one approach was followed for these studies rather than an approach according to which, from the baseline up to the final impact study, the same firm would be tasked with these consecutive studies. It meant that the opportunity to follow progress, impact 58 and also beneficiary perceptions at the level of cohorts of PACA POs/non-PACA POs from the start of their engagement in the project until the end of the project was forgone, as most studies were based on samples that may/may not have included the same beneficiaries. 5.4 Observations from meetings with beneficiaries (ICR team) The meetings held with representatives of some 25 POs during the mission (Yaoundé including field trip to Bafoussam) allowed for complementing the document review with directly obtained beneficiary perceptions. These are generally in line with the findings of the above-cited reports and summarized as follows: PO perceptions on PACA – observations from ICR team meetings with stakeholders Its strong points Its points for improvement  Tangible results in terms of increase in  Lengthy procedures and a lot of production, modern infrastructure paperwork  Participatory approach (role of POs in  Size of funding was limited sub-project development) considering the needs to become  Relevant advice pertaining to competitive (“on a lutté contre la production, bio-security, PO misère, mais on n’est competitive”; management “on nous a laissé à mi-chemin”)  Good relationship with and  Under-estimation of costs (first appreciation of OAL in several cases; generations of sub-projects) resulting some continue to use their OAL in increased debt  Change of vision in PO: it gave us a  Market challenges after increased “coup de pousse”; “it opened our production and processing capacity eyes”; “we learned new techniques” missing (obstacles in the value chain  PACA looked for real producers in a remain) context in which “il y a beaucoup de  Availability of funding not always in faux” (“GIC malette”) harmony with production calendar  More cooperation of producers around  Some were not lucky with their OAL common problems/needs (feed (“des avonturiers”): not available supply) when needed, sending someone else  Engagement of PACA team (“suivi (subcontracting their job), not having sort de l’ordinaire”) the expertise needed; also: financing schedule of sub-project blocked whenever OAL did not submit report (did not think they could fire their OAL and felt they had to “live with the situation”) 59 Annex 6. Stakeholder Workshop Report and Results (if any) 60 Annex 7. Summary of Borrower's ICR and Comments on Draft ICR The Borrower’s Project Completion Report This annex is a summary of the report entitled « Rapport d’Achèvement du Projet d’Amélioration de la Compétitivité Agricole (PACA) » (final version June 2016). The report constitutes a (self-) evaluation of the project in line with the requirement (as per the financing agreement) that an evaluation be conducted prior to project closure. The methodology adopted for this evaluation was as follows: (i) constitution of a Working Group (as per decision of MINEPAT), (ii) document review, (iii) focus group meetings involving beneficiaries, OALs, decentralized services of MINADER and MINEPIA as well as Regional Coordination Units of PACA, culminating in (iv) the drafting of the report and its validation. Overall, PACA was assessed as being satisfactory, with an implementation ratio of around 96% and having implemented the quasi totality of planned interventions, with the exception of the rural roads component. More specifically, the analysis resulted in the following evaluation findings: Relevance: PACA remained aligned to national strategies (in particular Document de Stratégie pour la Croissance et l’Emploi, Document de Stratégie de Développement du Secteur Rural et Plan National d’Investissement Agricole). However, according to some beneficiaries, other value chains (such as cassava) could also have been targeted. Effectiveness: most indicators reached the targeted values. In the case of the rice value chain, floods negatively affected production, as well as other factors among which late ploughing by SEMRY; as regards the poultry value chain, performance was negatively affected by the supply of one-day chickens. As regards egg production, attention was drawn to the modernization of farming infrastructure, equipment, but animal feed (maize supply and the quality of chicken feed) was listed among the challenges faced. Concerning pig farming, variations in performance were attributed to the relatively low level of productivity of local breeds. However, support to the Kounden centre allowed for the distribution of improved breeds. Efficiency: overall, the implementation mechanism established functioned adequately. Among the difficulties encountered the following were highlighted:  The delays in the provision of counterpart funding (resulting in delays in the organization of some of the project steering committees); compared to the POs (that mobilized an estimated 150% of their expected contribution), the Government share was limited to 73% and, given late allocation, resulted in a balance at project closure;  The multitude of actors involved in steering the implementation of component 1;  The lack of professionalism of some OALs;  The length of procurement procedures (Component 1);  The under-estimation of costs in some cases and over-estimation in other cases. Overall, financial management was considered satisfactory, with 97.5% of expenditures related to sub-projects of POs qualified as justified. Compared to similar earlier operations in the sector a 2% rate of non-justified expenditures is considered a quite satisfactory result. With respect to its monitoring and evaluation, the project is assessed as moderately satisfactory. Whereas the project produced key information on results and impact achieved (against the consecutive work plans), information available does not allow for assessing the physical implementation rate by component and sub-component. The software purchased to facilitate 61 monitoring ended up not being used (related to problems with the formatting of the software for the project as well as lack of qualified staff to use the same, in particular at the level of the regional coordination units. The monitoring of the POs by the OALs was qualified as weak. Impact: the increases in yields (agriculture; livestock) were highlighted, as well as reduction in post-harvest losses. Most production was focused on the market and, accordingly, there was an increase in all value chains in terms of sales when comparing 2009 and 2013/14. Moreover, employment was generated. To illustrate, as at November 2015 the participating POs employed a total of 242.633 workers on full time and part time basis (216.508 male; 26.125 female), there were 320 OALs (285 male; 35 female) engaged in support to POs, 61 experts engaged in the analysis of PO sub-projects (57 male, 4 female) and 13 consultants (10 male, 3 female). As at 2015, 76% of the beneficiaries (OPs) had an increase in their revenues. Moreover, reference is made to 1555 economic partnerships established (regarding input supplies, sales). In terms of the financial and economic profitability of sub-projects, the proportion of sub-project with a (positive) NPV below FCFA 1 million over a 10 years period reduced from 87% to 75%, whereas sub-projects with a (positive) NPV above FCFA 1 million increased from 13 to 25%, in particular in the maize, poultry, pig farming and plantain sub-sectors. This trend was attributed to the application of new techniques and application of good agricultural practices. The IRR of sub- projects was found to be on the rise, as the number of sub-projects with an IRR at 15% or above increased from 2% to 13% in the period 2010-2014. The modernization of farm infrastructure was highlighted (buildings and equipment for production; storage facilities. Overall, there was reported to be an increase in the size of operations (ha in the case of agriculture and turn over in the case of livestock). Finally, PACA supported indigenous population groups, did not have negative impact on the environment as sub-projects were systematically screened for environmental effects. Sustainability: From an institutional perspective, support to POs resulted in more dynamic and stable organizations, capable of implementing their sub-projects in an effective manner. Future projects can capitalize on this (such as has been the case of PIDMA and PRODEL). Technically, the trainings organized for POs equipped these organizations to improve the manner in which they are managed (which is to be taken consideration in future projects in view of sustaining this achievement). With respect to partnerships, PACA facilitated a number of POs to sign financing agreements with MFIs. The latter injected more than half a billion FCFA into POs to fill financing gaps in the implementation of their sub-projects. An MoU with a leasing company is also to be pursued and fructified. Financially, the matching grant funding allocated to the POs allowed them to generate revenues that are expected to enable them to pursue/expand their activities. The PO beneficiaries mentioned that they are from now on well-equipped to engage in and pursue partnerships. Performance of the main partners: as regards the World Bank, its performance is judged as highly satisfactory in that it respected all its commitments regarding this project. As far as MINEPAT is concerned, the Borrower respected all pre-conditions for the loan and, in general, all clauses of the Financing Agreement IDA No. 4612-CM (with the exception of the allocation of counterpart funding – provided partially). MINTP’s performance is assessed as unsatisfactory, given the delays incurred in the implementation of its tasks regarding Component 1.1 (which 62 resulted in the extension of PACA from 30 November 2015 until 31 December 2016. To date a total of 250 km of rural roads have been rehabilitated under PACA, corresponding to a 50% implementation rate (100% when measured against the reduced targets during project implementation). Finally, the performance of the apex POs is considered moderately satisfactory to the extent they engaged in the activities in line with the responsibilities in the context of PACA, but were not able to provide the expected support to POs. Synthesis of lessons learned and recommendations: Lessons  There is a cooperative spirit among producers; they are aware of the need to work together as a group;  The approach developed by PACA to facilitate the evolution of POs into cooperatives has been adopted by MINADER in the context of the establishment of agricultural cooperatives in both rural and semi-urban areas of the country;  PACA’s experience regarding the financial management of sub-projects by collecting documents that justify expenditures did not only strengthen the financial management capacity of POs but also instilled at their level a culture of reporting and accountability;  The average cost of the rehabilitation of the rural roads identified to be covered under PACA is around FCFA 21 million/km;  The rehabilitation of irrigated perimeters is estimated to cost approximately FCFA 3 million/ha;  Improving the support environment aimed at enhancing the competitiveness of the agriculture sector includes o Support to the elaboration of quality standards for agricultural products (maize; pork meat, poultry meat and eggs); o Standards for the establishment and use of agricultural buildings and equipment (including the publication of guidelines/standards in this regard. Recommendations  Encourage more emphasis on a participatory approach in future projects in the sector;  Ensure adequate targeting of beneficiaries, taking into consideration specific groups (youth, women, graduates from agricultural colleges);  Include remote production areas among the intervention zones of future projects;  Put emphasis on rural routes that facilitate access to remote production areas;  Pay attention to securing market access to absorb the production in the targeted sub-sectors;  Follow a value chain approach, covering the different segments (production, storage, conservation, processing, selling);  Transfer certain activities (rural road rehabilitation) to regional entities at decentralized level, involving experienced consultants in the elaboration of bidding documents. Nonetheless, in line with WB procurement procedures, activities related to selection (procurement) and financial management should be dealt with at the project management level;  Specify, in case of request for legal documents at the Government level, the time limit for the provision of these documents, to speed up project launching;  Strengthen the capacity of all actors involved in project monitoring and evaluation (M&E) with respect to the formatting, inputting and use of software facilitating M&E – that is to be purchased in future projects;  Cover systematically in the future design of M&E systems the monitoring of the physical execution of projects, allowing to calculate in a valid manner (i) the physical 63 implementation rate at the global project level, (ii) the physical implementation rate at the level of each component, (iii) the physical implementation rate at the level of each sub- component, as well as (iv) the physical implementation rate at the level of each activity. Borrower’s Feedback on the DFIMDP-ICR The following comments are highlights of the stakeholder discussion on the draft ICRR translated from French. The rating "moderately satisfactory" seems coherent, as it applies to all the main actors involved in the project: World Bank, Government and Project Coordination Unit. Project efficiency is rated as "modest" in the report. It should be noted that the period during which the economic and financial analysis of the project was carried out was not favorable. Indeed, this period suffered from external shocks (e.g. the occurrence of avian influenza) with their direct consequences on livestock. It should be noted that not only crisis response was not part of the original objectives of this project, but also the World Bank's budget for managing this crisis was limited. The report does not mention (page 19) PACA performance monitoring indicators, benchmark values (most of which are missing) and expected end-of-project targets. The report highlights weaknesses of the PACA, but no recommendation is suggested to improve them in future projects. As regards the progressive implementation of the project, it should be pointed out that the Project for the Development of Livestock (PRODEL) was formulated by the Government through Application No. 0123 / L / MINEPAT / DGCOOP / DNS / M of 09/01/2015 on the financing of Phase II of the PACA, specific to the livestock sector, to enable Cameroon to capitalize on the achievements and to continue the modernization of the priority livestock sectors; As regards the evaluation of the performance of the OAL, it has been carried out and the report is available; As regards the slow start of the PACA in its first year of implementation, this lesson has been capitalized at the level of PRODEL, whose conditions of implementation are fully fulfilled to date. 64 Annex 8. Comments of Cofinanciers and Other Partners/Stakeholders 65 Annex 9. List of Supporting Documents (a). Bank Economic and Sectoral Work (ESW), AAA Report 25-CM, 2008 Project Appraisal Document, PROSAP, Report No. 43000-AR, August 25, 2008 (????) Project Appraisal Document, PACA, Report N: 47920 – CM, May 22, 2009 PACA Financing Agreement, 16 September 2009 Implementation Status and Results Reports (total of 16 during the project) Reports of preparatory missions, Aide Memoires (September 2008, December 2008, February- March 2009) Supervision Aide Memoires (October 2010, January-February 2011, December 2011, October 2015) Report of PACA Mid-Term Review, December 2012 Audit Reports, Financial Management and Procurement Reviews Financing Agreements and Restructuring documents World Bank Country Partnership Framework for the Republic of Cameroon for the period FY 17 – FY21, February, 2017 WB, Systematic Country Diagnostic, Cameroon – Priorities for ending poverty & boosting shared prosperity, 2016 IEG Report, Responding to Global Public Bads: LEARNING FROM EVALUATION OF THE WORLD BANK EXPERIENCE WITH AVIAN INFLUENZA 2006–13 (b). Client Strategy Paper for Growth and Employment 2010-2020, 2009 Rural Sector Development Strategy Document, 2007 National Agricultural Investment Plan 2014-2020, June 2015 Manuel d’Exécution du projet (updated version), June 2012 Manual of Administrative, Financial and Accounting, and Procurement Procedures, Sept. 2012 PACA, Baseline study, ICMC, December 2009 PACA Annual Reports Report on implementation of activities pertaining to animal husbandry, 2010-2015, October 2015 Report on activities vovering PACA support to address Avian Flu crisis, October 2016 Environmental and Social Audit, CIEFE, April 2014 Environmental and Social Audit, May 2015 Minutes of PACA Steering Committee meetings Minutes of meetings of Technical Monitoring Group Report on alleged funding of subprojects in West and North-West regions, MINADER/ MINEPIA, January 2016 PACA, Beneficiary Satisfaction study, 2012 PACA, Beneficiary Satisfaction study, CAEAC, 2014 Borrower Completion Report, Final version, June 2016 Economic and Financial Analysis of PACA, Final report, January 2017 PACA, Sub-Component 1.1 – Rural Road Rehabilitation Completion Report, April 2017 (c). Completion Reports and ICR Guidelines: ICR IEG Guidelines ICR Guidelines, OPCS, August 2006 (revised July 2014) (d). Impact Evaluations: PACA, Impact study, IDD, 2012 PACA, Impact study, SOREPS, 2015 66 67