SYnthesis REPORT Water Supply: the transition from emergency to Development Support Evidence from Country Case Studies in Africa Dominick de Waal, Michel Duret, Anita Gaju, Maximilian Hirn, Sam Huston, Nitin Jain, Deo Mirindi, Ngoni Mudege, Deo-Marcel Niyungeko, Chantal Richey, Christine Ochieng, Chris Print, Muyatwa Sitali, and Heather Skilling February 2017 Authors: Dominick de Waal, Michel Duret, Anita Gaju, The Water Global Practice Maximilian Hirn, Sam Huston, Nitin Jain, Deo Mirindi, The Water Global Practice helps clients develop multisectoral Ngoni Mudege, Deo-Marcel Niyungeko, Chantal Richey, solutions to improve service delivery and manage water sustainably Christine Ochieng, Chris Print, Muyatwa Sitali, and through its focus on: (i) Ensuring poor people are included. The Water Heather Skilling Global Practice aims to help governments ensure basic access to water and sanitation services particularly for the poorest people. The Cover Photo: Maada Kpenge Bank also seeks to increasingly ensure its water projects explicitly factor poverty into project development; (ii) Delivering cutting-edge knowledge. The World Bank Group is helping governments solve complex water development challenges through transformational finance, knowledge and innovation. Working on a global level, closely integrated with the other 13 Global Practices at the World Bank Group and the 5 Cross-Cutting Solutions Areas, the Water Global Practice brings together both the knowledge and operational service delivery arms of the water family—from irrigation and water resources management, to water and sanitation service delivery; and (iii) Securing sustainable financing for the water sector. The Water Global Practice is currently responsible for the supervision of a portfolio of approximately US$21 billion in lending through 184 projects and about 200 active Knowledge Products, with the largest programs currently in Water Supply and Sanitation  followed by Irrigation and Water Resources Management. Disclaimer The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed herein are entirely those of the author and should not be attributed to the World Bank or its affiliated organizations, or to members of the Board of Executive Directors of the World Bank or the governments they represent. The World Bank does not guarantee the accuracy of the data included in this work. Copyright Statement The material in this work is subject to copyright. 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Water Supply The Transition from Emergency to Development Support: Evidence from Country Case Studies in Africa Dominick de Waal, Michel Duret, Anita Gaju, Maximilian Hirn, Sam Huston, Nitin Jain, Deo Mirindi, Ngoni Mudege, Deo-Marcel Niyungeko, Chantal Richey, Christine Ochieng, Chris Print, Muyatwa Sitali, and Heather Skilling February 2017 Contents iv Acronyms and Abbreviations AFD Agence Française de Développement (French Development Agency) AfDB African Development Bank AMCOW African Ministers’ Council on Water AWS Autonomous Water Schemes CPA Comprehensive Peace Agreement CPIA Country Policy and Institutional Assessment DFID Department for International Development DRC Democratic Republic of Congo ESA External Support Agency EU European Union EVD Ebola Virus Disease FCV Fragility, Conflict, and Violence FM Financial Management FY Financial Year GDP Gross Domestic Product GoC Government of Congo GoL Government of Liberia GoN Government of Nigeria GoSL Government of Sierra Leone GoSS Government of South Sudan GoZ Government of Zimbabwe GVWC Guma Valley Water Company HR Human Resources HWA Hargeisa Water Agency IDA International Development Association IMF International Monetary Fund IO Intermediate Outcomes ISN Interim Strategic Note JMP (WHO/UNICEF) Joint Monitoring Programme JSR Joint Sector Review km Kilometer LRRD Linking Relief, Rehabilitation, and Development LWSC Liberia Water and Sewer Corporation m3 Cubic Meter MDG Millennium Development Goal MDTF Multi-Donor Trust Fund MoF Ministry of Finance MoPW Ministry of Public Works MTEF Medium Term Expenditure Framework NGO Nongovernmental Organization NWSHPC National Water, Sanitation and Hygiene Promotion Committee O&M Operation and Maintenance v The Transition from Emergency to Development Support: Evidence from Country Case Studies in Africa | Acronyms and Abbreviations ODA Official Development Assistance OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development PFM Public Financial Management PHWC Port Harcourt Water Corporation PIU Project Implementation Unit PSIP Public Sector Investment Program REGIDESO Regie de Distribution d’eau de la Republique Democratique du Congo ROC Republic of Congo SDG Sustainable Development Goal SIP Sector Investment Plan SLB Service Level Benchmarking SNDE Societé Nationale de Distribution d’ Eau (ROC) SPR Sector Performance Report SSA Sub-Saharan Africa SSP Sector Strategic Plan SSUWC South Sudan Urban Water Corporation SUWASA Sustainable Water and Sanitation (USAID project) SWA Sanitation and Water for All SWAp Sector-Wide Approach TA Technical Assistance UN United Nations UNICEF United Nations Children’s Fund USAID U.S. Agency for International Development WASH Water, Sanitation and Hygiene WB World Bank WHO World Health Organization WSP Water and Sanitation Program vi Acknowledgments This report is a synthesis of technical assistance (TA) work The peer reviewers for this work were: Bill Kingdom (Lead carried out under the project entitled “Delivering Water Water and Sanitation Specialist, Water GP), Vivek Srivastava Supply and Sanitation in Fragile States: The Transition (Lead Public Sector Development Specialist, Water GP), from Emergency to Development” (P131964). The work Jurgen Blum (Senior Public Sector Development Specialist, was funded by donors to the World Bank’s Water and Governance GP), and Nadia Piffaretti (Senior Economist Sanitation Program. [Fragility, Conflict, and Violence CCSA], Water and Sanitation Specialist). This project and the synthesis report was led and written by Dominick de Waal (Senior Economist). Team members over A special thanks to Bill Kingdom and Heather Skilling the duration of this technical assistance project included: (Consultant) who provided detailed reviews and invaluable Michel Duret (Senior WSS Specialist, Water GP), Anita advice on drafts of the report. Gaju (Consultant), Maximilian Hirn (WSS Specialist, Water GP), Nitin Jain (Consultant), Deo Mirindi (Senior The team would like to thank Joel Hellman, Jae So, Glenn WSS Specialist, Water GP), Ngoni Mudege (Senior WSS Pearce Oroz, Bhuvan Bhatnagar, Jamal Sagir, and Jyoti Specialist, Water GP), Deo-Marcel Niyungeko (Senior Shukla (Director, Water GP), for their managerial support WSS Specialist, Water GP), Chantal Richey (Consultant), and encouragement over the period of this project. Christine Ochieng (WSS Specialist, Water GP), Chris Print (Consultant), and Muyatwa Sitali (Consultant). All team The team is especially grateful to all our government members led specific elements of the technical assistance counterparts and partners in the Democratic Republic of across the eight countries and wrote background papers for Congo, Liberia, Nigeria, the Republic of Congo, Sierra this synthesis report. Leone, Somalia, South Sudan, and Zimbabwe, who inspired us with their persistence and dedication, often in the face of The team is grateful for feedback and discussion with extremely difficult circumstances. Christine Wallich (Senior Advisor) and Jean Doyen (Consultant) who led a learning review for this TA project This report was edited by Anjali SenGupta and type set by in 2014 which shaped and inspired the team. Eric Lugaka. vii Executive Summary Background affected countries in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) to Conflicts, economic crises, and natural disasters in transition their water sectors from being dominated by low-income countries not only leave water supply ad hoc emergency interventions to country-led sector infrastructure damaged but also decimate government development programs. The countries were: Democratic capacity to deliver basic services. As a result, emergency Republic of Congo (DRC), Liberia, Nigeria, Republic funding is often channeled to humanitarian agencies that of Congo (ROC), Sierra Leone, Somalia, South Sudan, deliver water and sanitation services directly to affected and Zimbabwe. populations. Although this provides urgently needed emergency relief it does not set in place the foundations The large data sets on service delivery, generated through for government institutions to oversee and sustain services this TA, confirmed that the current approach results once the crisis has passed. in the vast majority of aid being delivered directly by international agencies and non-state actors—an approach This challenge to (re-)establishing sustainable services in that persists for too long after the peak of crises (six to 10 low-income countries affected by fragility, conflict, and years). This bypassing of state delivery mechanisms then violence (FCV) is described in this report as the ‘capacity locks countries into a humanitarian aid modality that conundrum’. The conundrum is, essentially, how to build shows few signs of building sector institutions that can take the capacity of institutions to deliver sustainable water on the delivery of water services or building the capacity services whilst addressing the short term emergency of of government to oversee service delivery carried out by providing services to those affected by conflict and crisis. non-state actors. Targeting, quality, and sustainability of With humanitarian response focused on the latter there infrastructure delivered this way was poor—particularly is often less attention on addressing the former—yet, in the case of handpumps. Local coping strategies—such without building that capacity, countries can get locked as hand dug and manually drilled wells—have become into a pattern of unsustainable short-term service delivery mainstream supply models in countries where groundwater solutions. was easily accessible, thus marginalizing the potential for utility service delivery models. This conundrum, long recognized by both humanitarian and development actors working in low-income stable This TA explored entry points for rebalancing the direct countries, is brought into even sharper contrast in FCV provision of services with building the capacity of affected countries. As progress to deliver improved water governments and service providers to resume their sector roles and sanitation services is made across more and more in the postcrisis period. The work was aimed at responding to stable countries, two-thirds of which met the water different country contexts and to help in actively managing target under the Millennium Development Goals, it the transition toward country-led development programming has become more obvious that development actors must over time. The TA generated rich case material illustrating prioritize their efforts to improve service delivery in ways of understanding and approaching development countries where less progress has been made, especially interventions in both the postcrisis period and in protracted in FCV affected countries. crisis of FCV affected countries. This report, and the Technical Assistance (TA) on which it Key Lessons Learned is based, examines how to tackle the capacity conundrum Two work-streams emerged from the TA: one by rebalancing the relative effort placed on delivering supporting the sector oversight role of ministries and water supply directly versus the effort that is placed on the other supporting utility reform. Valuable learning building the sector institutions that deliver and oversee was drawn from each of these work-streams as well as water supply services in the medium to long-term. from the interaction between sector oversight and utility reform. The six key lessons included two general lessons Over the past five years the World Bank’s Water and on identified trends and incentives as well as two for sector Sanitation Program (WSP) provided TA to eight FCV oversight and two for utility reform. viii The Transition from Emergency to Development Support: Evidence from Country Case Studies in Africa | Executive Summary Lessons 1 and 2: Identifying trends and incentives. Lessons 3 and 4: Building sector oversight. Capacity Governments of low-income FCV affected countries face of ministries responsible for water was fundamental to a chaotic mix of alternative service delivery arrangements support the transition from emergency to country-led (as local coping strategies), dilapidated utilities and development programming. externally-driven support to water service provision on the one hand, and rapid population growth and urbanization 3. Primary data collection on service delivery was an on the other. These general lessons were derived from effective entry point for restoring government into a the large datasets collected on service delivery in each sector oversight role by enabling ministries responsible country under this TA. This data provided insights into for water to pinpoint critical sector issues. Through the the common trends and variations that had shaped the extensive datasets developed under this TA, government evolution of water supply provision over the previous ministries were able to better identify both sector decade or more. opportunities (such as service delivery models that were working well) and sector challenges (such as poor targeting 1. There is a common trend that as time goes by it gets of water points, poor quality well construction, and health harder, not easier, to rebalance the trade-off between hazards due to inappropriate technology use). Across the directly delivering water supply infrastructure versus countries WSP worked with, the data and knowledge building institutions that deliver sustainable water generated through this TA influenced US$323 million of supply services. This was due both to the build-up donor and government funding (see Appendix C). The of unmanaged infrastructure delivered by the external data on service delivery were used by governments and humanitarian response and a proliferation of alternative development partners to better target sector investments service delivery arrangements that had filled the service and stimulate new investment in service delivery models delivery void. The latter resulted in the emergence of strong that were shown to work well. Service delivery models private sector interests which become more entrenched evaluated by WSP, such as sand dams in Somalia and over time and thus more resistant to the rebuilding of autonomous piped water systems in the DRC, were government institutions to provide or oversee service adopted by new projects. Studies, such as that on utility delivery. Together these raised the threshold of capacity billing systems in fragile environments, led to donors and required to manage and regulate services. governments financing specific upgrades in accounting and billing systems. 2. Variation in the evolution of service provision across countries was influenced by political incentives to get 4. Though service delivery data were the basis for services working, on the one hand, and characteristics renegotiating roles with external responders and of alternative service delivery arrangements, on the alternative service providers, the difficulty of upholding other. Though the emergence of alternative service these sector agreements was underestimated. In all arrangements was common to all the countries supported, countries the data sparked constructive dialogue on better the extent to which these arrangements subsequently targeting and management of service delivery between dominated service delivery was inversely related to the government and sector actors. In two countries—Liberia political incentives to charge for services. Greater political and Zimbabwe—this data has been used by governments to incentives to charge for utility services—observed where shift the relationship with the multitude of actors operating subnational authorities were striving to prove themselves in the sector from that of passive recipient towards one in in the face of weakening central governments—bolstered which sector oversight institutions play a role in defining utility viability and provided a viable alternative to the where and how services are delivered. However, getting temporary coping arrangements. In wetter countries, where these agreements—or compacts—to stick was undermined the economic threshold for tapping into groundwater was by the vested interests of both external responders and the lower and the political incentive to charge for services was alternative service providers. Agreements were established lower, the alternative arrangements were able to proliferate and upheld through multistakeholder consultative and become more entrenched. mechanisms—such as Joint Sector Reviews—that facilitated ix The Transition from Emergency to Development Support: Evidence from Country Case Studies in Africa | Executive Summary the state’s step (back) into a policy making role. These 6. Tackling cost recovery supported performance compacts with external responders were more likely to improvements and was an entry point for broader stick where there was international pressure to demonstrate utility reform. Acting on cost recovery led to direct mutual accountability through the monitoring of aid improvements in revenue trends in utilities in Liberia and effectiveness—such as through Sanitation and Water for Sierra Leone. In addition to improving operating ratios, All. More work is needed on exploring agreements with the improved customer information management systems alternative providers, particularly where the alternative installed helped these utilities cope with the economic providers have become the dominant service delivery shock resulting from the Ebola Virus Disease (EVD) model. outbreak—by substituting revenues from businesses that closed with revenues from the relief operation that opened Lessons 5 and 6: First steps of utility reform. TA up. Cost recovery also provided an entry point to other for utility reform was initiated through short-term, reform actions focused on human resources and financial low-cost actions undertaken to improve the level of management at utilities in Somalia and Nigeria. In Somalia cost recovery. This included support to upgrading of and Zimbabwe where utilities had a tariff structure that accounting and billing systems; customer enumeration enabled them to cover operating costs, utilities reinvested surveys to update customer databases; reducing non- revenues in reducing physical losses and more efficient revenue water by regularizing illegal connections; and pumps and generators. Not tackling cost recovery early expanding the revenue base by streamlining approaches in the postcrisis period led to dependency on government to connecting new customers. These actions were subsidies and, in the extreme case of Port Harcourt, led to an entry point to broader utility reform actions on near collapse of the utility. governance and a precursor to infrastructure investment. Recommendations 5. Utility provision can provide a lower cost service, The above insights, based on the experience and evidence even in extremely fragile operating environments, that generated in this project led to the following central can benefit the poor. There was a substantial differential recommendations to governments of countries that are FCV between utility network tariffs and charges levied by affected, to donors funding service delivery, and international alternative providers. Charges levied by alternative development agencies operating in these countries. supplies of water ranged from 2.5 times utility tariffs in Kinshasa to over 6 times utility tariffs in Hargeisa, These recommendations are based on the realization that Somaliland. Though data on differential access to utility delaying investment in both sector oversight and utility supplies by wealthier and poorer households was limited, reform increases the costs of, and reduces the prospects in urban areas of the DRC piped water on premises (a for, achieving a transition from emergency to country- proxy for utility supply) was almost exclusively captured led development programming. As time passes the by the wealthiest households (the top quintile). Virtually combined effect of unmanaged aid and the entrenchment all other households (in the bottom four quintiles) had of alternative service providers makes it ever more difficult to fetch water from other sources including: buying from to reestablish arrangements between sector oversight neighbors with utility connections who sell utility water institutions and the growing number of non-state and with a mark-up; from utility standposts which charge a informal private suppliers. It also makes it harder to mark-up for the standpost operator; from alternative reestablish utility service provision. more expensive sources; or from unimproved sources. The reasons for the lower cost of utility provision compared Governments in countries that are FCV affected should with alternative providers needs further research to establish actively encourage utilities to cover their operation and whether these are genuine economies of scale or explained maintenance costs through consumer tariffs as early as by differential capital subsidies or deferred maintenances possible and even during subsequent emergencies (for costs of the various service delivery models. example, EVD). x The Transition from Emergency to Development Support: Evidence from Country Case Studies in Africa | Executive Summary The demonstrated benefits of setting cost recovery tariffs Governments, international development agencies, were that utilities used their own revenues to make and donors should agree and regularly review the roles immediate improvements in performance. It also made and responsibilities of different actors with the aim of utilities more demand responsive and keen to connect improving aid and development effectiveness. new customers, as new customers could generate revenues While policies and laws are a key component of defining the to further build the utility. division of labor between the state and providers, their role in fragile contexts is limited by the state’s ability to enforce Utilities that recovered their costs reduced their need for them. Rather, agreements—or compacts—established and operating subsidies, releasing funds for other purposes upheld through multistakeholder consultative mechanisms such as improving sector oversight institutions, further can facilitate the state’s step (back) into a policy making expanding infrastructure or extending access to the poor. role. The formation of these compacts should be at country level. In the short-term they should aim to improve the International development agencies should engage targeting, quality, and sustainability of service delivery. In earlier—in the first years of the postcrisis recovery the medium-term they should support the development of period—in building both sector oversight capacity and country-led programming. To increase the likelihood that in reforming utilities. these compacts are upheld, recourse to an internationally The demonstrated benefits of earlier engagement include agreed set of aid effectiveness standards such as Sanitation better targeting and accountability of available resources, and Water for All’s Collaborative Behaviors or the New the possibility of improved utility cost recovery, and the Deal for Engagement in Fragile States may be needed to opportunity to develop appropriate institutional and incentivize mutual accountability of external actors. governance structures. This early engagement, whilst heading off the possibility of alternative providers There is a need to invest more in crafting solutions becoming a barrier to future utility service provision, to the challenges of managing the transition from might also allow for engagement with those same providers emergency to development support. to become a part of the solution to the delivery of services While it is fully recognized that the transition from in the postcrisis recovery period. emergency to development is neither unidirectional nor linear, stretching development interventions into the In rural areas the early engagement can help support the postcrisis recovery phase opens up greater opportunity for establishment of databases for performance and asset a double dividend: that of improving WASH services and management, which can be used to better target resources, of state building. This TA has brought to light a number and to help set up supply chains that will lead to more of challenges for which more analytical work is needed sustainable service delivery. to provide a better understanding of how to work with countries and partners as they transition from conflict to Donors should reassess the balance between investing in stability. What are the most appropriate utility models in this infrastructure versus investing in capacity building. transition period? How might subsidies be used to benefit A dollar spent on building sector oversight capacity or the greatest number of people? How can development utility reform is a dollar lost to infrastructure investment. partners better engage with humanitarian response actors, But it is clear from this project and the data it has generated and vice versa, to ensure a smoother transition between that there is a need to invest in the sector management the two types of response? These questions all need more interventions needed for sustainable service delivery. The thought and will create more opportunities for faster and rates of nonfunctional systems, the poor construction more cost effective transitions. quality, the burgeoning low quality local coping strategies— all point to the efficiency gains that could be achieved by investing in the capacity necessary to monitor, oversee, and sustain infrastructure. xi The Transition from Emergency to Development Support: Evidence from Country Case Studies in Africa | Executive Summary xii I. Introduction The current ways of working in fragile states need serious improvement. Despite the significant investment and the commitments of the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness (2005) and the Accra Agenda for Action (2008), results and value for money have been modest. Transitioning out of fragility is long, political work that requires country leadership and ownership. Processes of political dialogue have often failed due to lack of trust, inclusiveness, and leadership. International partners can often bypass national interests and actors, providing aid in overly technocratic ways that underestimate the importance of harmonising with the national and local context, and support short-term results at the expense of medium- to long-term sustainable results brought about by building capacity and systems. A New Deal for engagement in fragile states is necessary. Opening paragraph of the New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States [Signed 2011, Busan, Korea] The effects of fragility, conflict, and violence have a long- lasting and deep-rooted ability to undermine a country’s economic growth and escape from poverty. On average, a country that experienced major violence over the period from 1981 to 2005 has a poverty rate 21 percentage points higher than a country that saw no violence. The cyclical nature of violence and conflict also has a crippling effect on growth; countries that have faced civil war require an average of 14 years of peace to recover to original growth paths (World Bank, 2011b). As an increasing number of developing countries sustain strong economic growth and made good progress towards Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), international aid agencies must face up to the greatest remaining challenge in development: the growing share of poverty prevalent in countries affected by fragility, conflict, and violence (FCV). Engagement in fragile contexts carries significant risk, but failing to engage in these contexts carries far greater consequences. Based on existing rates of investment in institution building and conflict reduction, an estimated half a billion people in FCV affected countries (6 percent of Spaghetti pipes connecting households in Freetown, the global population) will remain below the US$1.25 Sierra Leone. (Photo credit: Deo-Marcel Niyungeko.) poverty line by 2030. Under this scenario, the proportion Picture on facing page: Liberia: A rusting treatment plant of the world’s poor living in FCV affected countries will (tank feeding chlorine into water). (Photo credit: Dominick rise from 40 percent today to over 60 percent in 2030. Revell de Waal.) 1 The Transition from Emergency to Development Support: Evidence from Country Case Studies in Africa | Introduction Even under more optimistic scenarios of rapid institution This report first explains a central challenge to this building and conflict reduction, over 350 million people transition—the capacity conundrum—that is considered (4 percent of the global population) would remain below a key contributing factor to the growing divide in this poverty line in these states in 2030 (OECD, 2015b). service delivery performance between low-income FCV affected countries and other low-income countries. The Though FCV affected countries have made some progress report then sets out the WSP’s approach to supporting towards MDGs, it has been much slower than in more the transition towards country-led sector development other developing countries. Nearly two-thirds of FCV programming by providing tools and methods to affected countries missed the target of halving poverty by overcome the capacity conundrum. 2015, while only a third of other developing countries fell short of this target. Despite per capita aid flows to The primary audience of this report are sector practitioners FCV affected countries doubling since 2000, progress working on improving water supply and sanitation service on human development targets for education, health as delivery in FCV affected countries whether from within well as water and sanitation was even slower than progress the government or from external support agencies (ESAs) on overall poverty reduction in fragile states. Only 28 working with these governments. An important secondary percent of FCV affected countries met the water supply audience is potential funders of water supply and sanitation MDG compared to over 60 percent of other developing service delivery responsible for making funding into FCV counties. A mere 18 percent of FCV affected countries affected countries, be they domestic ministries responsible met the basic sanitation target compared to a third of for finance or ESAs. other developing counties. There is a growing water and sanitation access gap between FCV affected countries and Following this introduction, Chapter 2 presents the endemic other developing countries that will have to be eliminated challenge: the so-called capacity conundrum. Chapter 3 over the Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) period. summarizes the WSP’s approach taken to the TA including the rationale for country selection, team composition and As the opening paragraph of the New Deal for engagement how entry points in each country were defined, and an in fragile states points out, “The current ways of working in overview of the types of intervention. Based on the large fragile states need serious improvement.” datasets that were collected, Chapter 4 describes what the TA revealed about common trends and sources of variation Over the past five years the World Bank’s Water and in the evolution of service delivery across countries. Sanitation Program (WSP) provided Technical Assistance Chapter 5 summarizes the outcomes of the TA, drawing (TA) to eight FCV affected countries in Sub-Saharan out lessons based on the relationship between the way that Africa (SSA) to better understand the reasons for this the TA was provided and the overall transition progress growing gap in WASH progress and to work on potential made. Chapter 6 concludes with recommendations to approaches to narrow the gap. The countries that the WSP governments, donors, and international development worked in were: Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), agencies working in FCV affected countries. At the end of Liberia, Nigeria, Republic of Congo (ROC), Sierra Leone, the report there are appendixes for each of the countries Somalia, South Sudan, and Zimbabwe. WSP worked in, describing the interventions and their results (Appendix A). The development objective of the TA was to support FCV affected countries to transition their water supply subsector from being dominated by ad hoc emergency interventions 21% The difference in average poverty rate for a country that experienced major violence over the to country-led sector development programs. period from 1981 to 2005, higher than a country that saw no violence. 2 II. The Challenge in Providing Sustainable Water Supply Services in Fragile and Conflict Affected Countries Over the period of designing and delivering this TA, the is a state bureaucracy lacking the capacity to deliver WSP team has often been asked by both policy makers a peace dividend to citizens that meets basic service and practitioners working in international development standards and donor accountability requirements. On the how service delivery in FCV affected countries should be other, there is an opportunity to deliver urgently needed done differently from that in other low-income countries. services through non-state actors, including the private While FCV affected countries certainly do face unique sector, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and policy challenges—such as the urgent need to address United Nations (UN) agencies, but, with the unintended root causes of conflict—a key reflection based on the consequence of not building capacity of the state WSP’s experience of providing TA to water and sanitation bureaucracy to organize and oversee service delivery. service delivery in FCV affected countries is not that service delivery should be done differently but that it is The UN and humanitarian presence, vital in the early stages already done differently and this is a binding constraint to of transition to prevent conflict, promote stability and meet progress in the sector. basic needs, soon faces difficult trade-offs in balancing quick wins with approaches that build institutions and states. In the aftermath of prolonged conflicts and the resulting Getting this balance right makes the difference between protracted crises, governments and their external partners leaving states without the capacity to direct or deliver basic face the ‘capacity conundrum’. On the one hand, there services versus building a core state capacity that is able to Box 2.1: THE ROOTS AND LASTING EFFECTS OF THE CAPACITY CONUNDRUM IN LIBERIA Emerging from years of war, the water sector in Liberia was highly fragmented and lacked cohesive planning and management systems. Non-state actors provided emergency relief but lacked the overview and reach to deliver services equitably across the country, or to put in place management processes to sustain interventions. Ineffective government institutions remained on the sidelines. The dearth of investment in the country’s water sector institutions was accompanied by, and has contributed to, a deep-seated lack of absorption capacity. A sector capacity development plan completed in 2012 reported that central government ministries responsible for water, sanitation, and hygiene services struggled with chronic technical and financial capacity gaps. There were inadequate staff numbers at the national level to supervise and support subnational staff where there were shortages at county, district, municipality, and health facility levels without the skills and facilities to carry out basic core duties such as pump monitoring and maintenance (Government of Liberia 2014). An institutional audit, in the same year, described Liberia’s national utility as “an organization in crises [sic]”, “financially insolvent”, “unable to meet basic service deliverables […] with most of its infrastructure left inoperable or in poor condition”, an organization in “firefighting mode with almost all of its limited capacity dedicated to dealing with daily emergencies” (GBSI/Government of Liberia 2012). Almost a decade after the war the prospect of a transition to a country-led development program for the water sector was even more challenging as bypassing sector institutions had left (a) the government with no overview of where services had or had not been delivered in rural areas; (b) rural water supply solutions in urban areas with poor water quality outcomes competing with the demand for LWCS’s services; and (c) the government with little more capacity to deal with this aid fragmentation. Source: World Bank data. 3 The Transition from Emergency to Development Support: Evidence from Country Case Studies in Africa | The Challenge in Providing Sustainable Water Supply Services in Fragile and Conflict Affected Countries Figure 2.1: THE NONLINEAR PATH OF LINKING RELIEF, RECOVERY, AND DEVELOPMENT COUNTRY-LED WASH PROGRAM EXTERNAL STRESS Development Recovery Relief Emergency EXTERNAL SUPPORT Source: WDR 2011 (World Bank). organize and oversee non-state actors and to progressively This TA project aimed to support the relief to development replace humanitarian, oriented with development-oriented, transition. While the long-standing attempts on ‘linking service delivery capacity. Where non-state actors continue relief, rehabilitation, and development’ (LRRD) have been to dominate service delivery after the initial humanitarian approached from the perspective of relief actors designing response period, the state’s role will remain weak and exit strategies, this TA investigated complementary entry undermines the opportunity to foster a virtuous cycle of points for development actors in FCV affected countries. country-led service delivery that builds citizens’ confidence Stretching development interventions into the recovery in state institutions. phase opens up greater opportunity not just for LRRD but for linking service delivery with state-building through The consequence for service delivery in particular is that the double dividend of improving water supply services weak sector institutions persist, holding governments and improving citizen-state relations. back from taking a lead role in key aspects of sector oversight including: targeting available resources for new While it is fully recognized that the transition from services; capitalizing on economies of scale for managing emergency to development is not unidirectional or linear, existing services, and attracting new investment. This the aim of this project has been to provide practical leadership weakness has long-term consequences for recommendations on the steps that can be taken to inclusion and sustainability. make this transition during periods of relative stability. Though limited, there is also some evidence that these 28% The percentage of FCV affected countries that met the water supply MDG compared to over 60 steps add to the resilience of service delivery in countries weathering external shocks, be they climatic, economic percent of other developing counties, despite or health related. per capita aid flows to such countries doubling since 2000. 4 iii. The Approach Taken to the Technical Assistance 3.1 Project Objective and Scope well—to contribute to improved citizen-state relations The WSP worked with eight FCV affected countries through improved state responsiveness to citizens and in SSA over the period (2011–2015) to facilitate the increased citizen confidence in the state’s capability. transition towards country-led development programs: the ROC, the DRC, Liberia, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Underpinning this objective the project tracked progress Somalia, South Sudan, and Zimbabwe. In the case of across six intermediate outcomes (IOs) in eight countries, South Sudan the TA was curtailed due to increase in civil which were: conflict in late 2013.1 1. Reestablish country leadership in sector coordination and policy development. The selected countries reflected four key characteristics 2. Institutionalize rigorous sector monitoring and joint of the wide range of FCV affected countries in SSA: sector review (JSR) processes. population size, language, relatively wet versus dry 3. Restore cost recovery in urban utilities, small-towns, conditions, and proportion of GDP from primary and large rural piped water schemes. commodity rents. These countries were selected from a 4. Establish an inclusive Sector Investment Plan (SIP) pool of around 20 FCV affected countries in SSA on the and process that mobilizes infrastructure investment. World Bank’s harmonized fragile states list and 28 on 5. Increase domestic investment in the sector. the broader OECD list (see Appendix A). The selection 6. Increase use of country systems by development included a range in the status, nature, and time since peak partners. of conflict: protracted on-going violent conflict (DRC, Somalia, South Sudan); distinct peace settlements within While all IOs were pursued in each country—as they the past decade (Liberia and Sierra Leone); long-standing were seen as complementary and reinforcing—it was tensions over resource control (the Niger delta and ROC), anticipated that not all would be achieved in all countries. and Zimbabwe’s principally economic crisis. All the This reflected that the opportunities available to pursue countries had an operational program with the World the various IOs was shaped by country context. Though Bank or had intent to develop an operational program the original scope was water supply and sanitation the with the Bank.2 greater emphasis on water supply was driven by its (lack of ) visibility in FCV environments and a precursor to The development objective of this TA was to support greater engaging on sanitation and hygiene being taken FCV affected countries to transition their water supply up in subsequent WSP interventions. and sanitation subsectors from being dominated by ad hoc emergency interventions to country-led sector 3.2 Team Composition development programs. In the medium term this objective Extending development programming into countries aimed to rebuild the institutions that oversee and provide experiencing recurrent or protracted crises requires careful services. In turn, over the longer term, the objective was analysis and risk-taking. Development agencies initiating to create the possibility for service delivery—if managed work in FCV environments need their staff to accommodate new ways of working, heavy on security logistics and light on sector data and institutional analysis. 1 However, a joint case study with UNICEF has documented the complexities of improving WASH service delivery duringthe protracted crisis with its overlapping The WSP built up a team of 11 people working on the and often cyclical phases of emergency, relief, recovery, and occasionally, development (Mosello, 2015). fragile states business area in SSA: the team included five 2 ‘Operational program’ refers to loans or grants financed from IDA or MDTFs. staff members, a secondee from the French Development 5 The Transition from Emergency to Development Support: Evidence from Country Case Studies in Africa | The Approach Taken to the Technical Assistance Agency (AFD: Agence Française de Développement), and delivery. In the DRC it was the resilience of so-called five consultants. There were staff members stationed in- autonomous water schemes (AWS) in rural and peri-urban country in the ROC, DRC, Nigeria, and Zimbabwe for areas, including some that had existed for over 30 between one to three years covering at least part of the years, supplying over 4 million people. In Somaliland, the period of this TA (see table 4.1), and a regional team Hargeisa Water Agency (HWA) had non-revenue water supporting these staff members and delivering TA to the losses of only 20 percent with a 90 percent bill collection other four countries from a hub in Nairobi. rate, well above the median for Africa, reflecting the high cost of alternatives and strong social norms for enforcing The team brought together experience in both humanitarian payment for services. and development water, sanitation, and hygiene (WASH) service delivery. A series of internal workshops were held In other countries, there were service delivery models to come to a consensus on the overall approach to the TA that had deteriorated beyond recognition. The teams that was set out in the project concept note (summarized encountered utilities that had no cost recovery mechanism below). Training on operating in insecure environments at all, surviving on hand-outs from government and was provided (SSAFE) and World Bank corporate security serving only the elite and the army; rural water supply arrangements were used to enable staff to travel in the sectors in which over 50 percent of schemes built were not field. The team worked with a combination of government functioning five years after construction; routine extraction staff and firms to implement the activities in each of the of rents from water schemes by predatory politicians; and selected countries. rural improved sanitation levels below 10 percent. In some countries a water sector with no lead ministry or 3.3 Defining Entry Points in Each Country senior representation at all, while in others an archaeology In all the countries, other than the DRC, the WSP had of institutions responsible for water one piled one upon to initiate and build a relationship with government the next in a vain attempt by those in power to address the and development partners from scratch. Though the successive failures of predecessor water intuitions. interventions across all countries were developed with the same objective—transitioning to country-led development Without exception the sector-enabling environment—laws, programming and working towards the same six IOs—the policies, definitions of institutional roles and responsibilities— specific TA interventions were shaped by country context across the eight case studies was in an incoherent state: a and opportunities. disabling rather than enabling sector environment. Determining the WSP’s initial intervention in each With such a large number of things needing attention, country was done through scoping visits which identified what criteria should be used to prioritize TA? Should the areas of comparative advantage relative to other sector priority be to fix the enabling environment, to reform players and WSP capabilities. These were matched with the institutional set-up or to work with the institutions specific requests from government and development in place? Should it be on planning to attract finance for partners in each country. As the WSP engaged in each infrastructure or actions to sustain existing infrastructure? country, new information and understanding was developed which also helped to shape the interventions. A principle for selecting, or rather, not selecting, The teams maintained a degree of flexibility to allow this interventions, explicitly stated in the concept note was responsiveness to opportunity. to avoid getting involved in changing the existing institutional set-up. While the basic characteristics of In three of the countries, there were unexpectedly strong successful utilities and water sectors in low-income stable service delivery models that had emerged, or ‘survived’, countries is well documented, there are real limitations and that could be built on. In Zimbabwe it was municipal in transplanting these institutional models (for example, water supply models where rate-payers associations a water regulator) into FCV affected countries. These and unions held local authorities to account for service transplanted institutions can be illusory, appearing to be 6 The Transition from Emergency to Development Support: Evidence from Country Case Studies in Africa | The Approach Taken to the Technical Assistance Clear water reservoir at the local water treatment plant in Port Harcourt, Nigeria. (Photo credit: Alexander V. Danilenko.) present but actually behaving differently or dysfunctional ‘hard-to-get’ basic data on existing water supply due to both capacity constraints and the political services. This would (a) provide a baseline for environment—sometimes referred to as ‘isomorphic planning; and (b) reveal the structure and status mimicry’ (Lant Pritchett, 2010). The team had observed of service delivery (the number and type of protracted, but fruitless, institutional reorganizations. For service providers) providing ministries with the example, in Liberia, the reorganization of sector institutions information they would need to orchestrate actors failed to come to fruition years after inception. Rather, the in the sector—a critical first step in transitioning approach taken under this TA was to focus on building toward a sector development strategy. capacity for critical processes and functions of successful (ii) Utility reform, starting with restoring cost service delivery within the existing institutional set-up: recovery. An assessment of utility billing systems for example, focusing on service level benchmarking in fragile states, conducted early during this TA, of providers rather than setting up a regulator (see the highlighted a wide range in the ability of FCV Zimbabwe case study). affected utilities to collect revenue from customers. Those utilities able to finance operating costs from In practice two work-streams emerged, one supporting customer revenues were making better progress on sector ministries and the other supporting utilities. service improvements. This led to the second entry (i) Reestablishing sector oversight role, starting with point for this TA, which was to work with utilities basic data on service delivery. Recognizing that to improve the quality of customer databases and crises led to mass destruction of infrastructure and billing systems. This would generate vital cash to that ministries had been bypassed by humanitarian make short-term service delivery improvements aid processes, often for many years, the first entry leading to a virtuous cycle of improved services point was supporting sector ministries to generate and higher revenues. 7 The Transition from Emergency to Development Support: Evidence from Country Case Studies in Africa | The Approach Taken to the Technical Assistance Longer-term efficiency and effectiveness gains, the knowledge of WASH service delivery generated into contribution to country-led development programming, World Bank investment operations; and (b) tracking the and, ultimately the state-building process, was made by uptake of the data by governments and other development influencing downstream funding to WASH service partners in their investments in WASH (see Appendix delivery. This was done by (a) actively pursuing C—Influence of Results on Domestic and Donor opportunities to incorporate the data, information, and Financing). Box 3.1: DEFINING THE TWO STREAMS OF TA IN LIBERIA BASED ON THE WATER POINT MAPPING RESULTS During the humanitarian support phase after the 2003 peace agreement, non-state actors mobilized a nationwide response and increased the number of improved public water points built per year from around 100 in 2003 to a peak of 1,435 in 2007 (World Bank, 2011a). The government was still transitional and had little involvement in either directing or implementing service delivery— 97 percent of water points had been built by non-state actors. There was little attention to building service delivery models that would endure. As a result, up to a quarter of water points failed within the first year with barely half still fully functional after five years. In urban areas, where at least half of Liberia’s population is concentrated, 80 percent of households’ access depended on the rapid response handpump driven model of service delivery. What could be done to build government capacity to lead a sector dialogue and improve the sustainability or rural services? Why was it that a rural solution had become the dominant form of supply in urban Liberia? With Monrovia being a hot-spot for cholera, what was the quality of water supplied? These questions led to the two separate streams of follow-on TA illustrated below. FIGURE 3.1: WSP ENTRY POINT AND TWO EMERGING STREAMS OF TA IN LIBERIA WSP entry point Ebola Crisis Water to Liberia WASH Point Sector ... leading to Mapping two streams of TA 2013 2014 Sector Sector Key sector SWA WASH Sector Sector documents Strategic Investment Rebuilding Compact Performance Performance Plan Plan GoL’s Report Report sector oversight National WASH Uganda National Water role Promotion First Joint Second Third Joint Key events SWAp SWA Joint Resources & Committee Sector Joint Sector Sector Learning Mission Sanitation Board Set Up Review Review Review Visit Appointed Water LWSC Updating LWSC Quality Institutional Customer Enumeration Customer Performance Improving cost Monitoring Audit Survey Database Contract recovery at LWSC to (Monrovia) reform urban service delivery Design of Upgrading Streamlining Regulating US$10m Accounting Customer Illegal World Bank System Connections Connections Investment in LWSC YEAR 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 Source: World Bank data. 8 The Transition from Emergency to Development Support: Evidence from Country Case Studies in Africa | The Approach Taken to the Technical Assistance 3.4 Overview of the Technical Assistance Renegotiating service delivery roles between Provided government and external partners: The large datasets, This section provides a synopsis of the main types of such as those on water point mapping, pinpointed key TA carried out under each of the two work-streams (i) sector opportunities (service delivery models that worked reestablishing the sector oversight role; and (ii) utility well) and challenges (poor equity in the distribution of reform. It illustrates the nature and scale of the WSP’s water points). This evidence was used to renegotiate the interventions. The interventions across all countries were state oversight role with the multitude of actors operating developed with the same objective—transitioning to in the sector through multistakeholder consultative country-led development programming—with the actual mechanisms, such as JSRs, a process actively supported areas of intervention being shaped by specific context and by the WSP in Liberia, Zimbabwe, and the DRC. In opportunities in each country. addition to supporting the state’s step back into a policy making role it encouraged external actors to invest more in The specific intervention mix by country is presented in building capacity of sector institutions and greater mutual a summary table 3.1. There are also country appendixes accountability for sector outcomes. at the end of this report that illustrate more fully how the interventions were applied in each country, progress against Water resource development potential: In Somalia the IOs and the degree to which counties have transitioned the State of Puntland and the Somaliland governments towards country-led development (Appendix A). requested a way of mapping the potential for small dams (sand and subsurface dams) in ephemeral rivers (wadis) Work-stream 1: Reestablishing a sector oversight role for multiple use water developments (people, livestock, Water point mapping: In Liberia, Sierra Leone, and and agriculture). A decision support tool for rapidly Congo, the WSP worked with the respective government assessing water harvesting potential on a broad spatial and their development partners on complete nationwide scale was developed. The tool brings together layers of databases of water points, including their type, location, remote sensing data into a suitability map showing sites and functionality. These surveys have covered over 30,000 within a defined area of interest, ranked according to improved water points serving (or not) some 10 million their water harvesting potential. The tool combines ‘use’ people. In Nigeria, the WSP provided TA to a Federal parameters (for example, for sites near livestock routes, Government-led exercise to update its 2006 national settlements, roads, and so on) with given ‘physical’ inventory using the water point mapping to cover over parameters (precipitation, slope, soil composition, and so 100,000 water points. In the DRC a variation of the on) to determine the most appropriate locations for water water point survey method was used to map and assess harvesting. The tool was used in determining the locations investments needs in over 500 autonomous rural and small for the World Bank–financed Water and Agro-Pastoralist town piped water schemes that serve around 4 million Livelihoods pilot project. people. The data generated from these surveys were used to: assess different technologies and models of rural water Impact assessments: The WSP assessed different types supply; build sector investment plans; and better target of WASH investments for their impact on broader state donor investments. and peacebuilding outcomes. In Beitbridge, Zimbabwe, WSP examined the impact of a World Bank project, one National Sector Investment Planning and Review: The year after the project closed, on both its service delivery WSP supported partner governments to develop national outcomes and on whether it had strengthened citizen- sector investment plans and improve sector coordination. state relations—pointing to a possible “double dividend”. For instance, in Liberia, the WSP has built on the data In Somalia the WSP examined a range of existing water collected during the water point mapping exercise to help the resource development investments, by various agencies, government produce its official national Sector Investment to better understand the winners and losers in these Plan 2012–17, giving Liberia a coherent, comprehensive investments and whether the investments had led to sector plan for the first time in the postwar period. cooperation or exacerbated conflict over water resources. 9 The Transition from Emergency to Development Support: Evidence from Country Case Studies in Africa | The Approach Taken to the Technical Assistance Work-stream 2: Utility reform Urban water quality surveys: The water point mapping exercise revealed that a large number of public wells (1,400) with handpumps were being installed in Liberia’s capital Monrovia. A water quality survey of 200 randomly selected water points showed high levels (>80 percent) of microbiological contamination. This provided empirical evidence that handpump solutions were failing in urban areas and that there was a need to work with the utility to displace wells with piped water supplies. In Port Harcourt, Nigeria, a similar survey, carried out in the wet and dry seasons, revealed that 99 percent of households were using nonutility water sources as their main source of water—a strategic problem for the reform of the utility. Assessments of recovering utility billing and accounting systems: Five assessments of utility accounting and billing system functionality were carried out for REGIDESO (DRC), Liberia Water and Sewer Corporation (LWSC), Port Harcourt Water Corporation (PHWC, Nigeria), Guma Valley Water Company (GVWC, Sierra Leone), and HWA (Somaliland). These are all utilities that have suffered significant setbacks either due to violent conflict or prolonged poor governance. The WSP assessments examined the functionality and underlying data of these billing systems; identified useful coping strategies and innovations; and made recommendations for upgrading systems. In four of the cases the utilities self-funded the WSP recommendations or worked with development partners to secure implementation funding. Customer enumeration surveys: In Liberia (Monrovia A Senior Water and Sanitation Specialist, WSP-Zimbabwe, and Kakata), Nigeria (Port Harcourt), and Sierra Leone assessing rehabilitation work done to low lift pumps, under the (Freetown) the WSP supported large-scale customer Beitbridge Emergency Water Supply and Sanitation Project, to enumeration exercises aimed at cleaning and improving extract surface water from rivers. (Photo credit: Anusa Pisanec.) the data on tens of thousands of customers in utility billing systems. This data were used to improve the quality and reliability of data used in billing systems—contributing to of incentivizing and monitoring investment in utilities. improvements in revenue collection and supporting resilience In Nigeria utility benchmarking has been incorporated to the economic downturn experienced during the Ebola into the World Bank’s US$250 million credit (currently Virus Disease (EVD) crisis in Sierra Leone and Liberia. at negotiation stage) as the principle monitoring mechanism. In Zimbabwe (which is in arrears with the Service level benchmarking: In Zimbabwe (32 Bank) the ministry responsible for local government is municipalities) and Nigeria (36 states) utility building benchmarking into its mechanisms for allocating benchmarking provided a baseline of utility performance infrastructure grants to municipalities under the Public against which to structure a regulatory process and a means Sector Investment Program (PSIP). 10 The Transition from Emergency to Development Support: Evidence from Country Case Studies in Africa | The Approach Taken to the Technical Assistance TABLE 3.1: OVERVIEW OF WSP’S TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE BY WORK-STREAM Country WSP Resourcing Technical Assistance by Work-Stream Staffing Funding Reestablishing Sector Oversight Role Utility Reform (US$ M) Congo AFD 0.75 • National map of 1,500 rural points • Assessment of service models for Brazzaville Secondee reporting location, functionality, urban poorincluding through social for two technology, and management connections and standposts years • Facilitated sector institutional assessment (2012/14) to gauge the level of implementation of the reform based on the 2003 Water Act • Facilitated dialogue on development of national policy DRC Staff 1.75 • Provincial sector overviews to assess • Assessment of REGIDESO billing member institutional capacity and development and accounting systems three prospects at provincial level in Sud Kivu, • National map and assessment of years Nord Kivu, and Katanga 4,100 REGIDESO standposts and (2013/15) • National map and assessment of 520 their management autonomous piped water schemes • Facilitated delegated management covering 4 million people of 150 standposts by REGIDESO in • Support to sector coordination and Kinshasa building on study tour to dialogue on water law Burkina Faso • Study on improving WASH service delivery in protracted crises (with UNICEF) Liberia Staff 2.0 • National map of 10,000 urban and rural • Water quality survey of 200 public member (o/w 1.0 points reporting location, functionality, water points in Monrovia three from technology, and management • Assessment of LWSC billing and years USAID) • Sector investment plan for 2012–17 accounting systems (2013/15) translating PRSP targets into specific • Support to LWSC enumeration of project investments over 5,000 customers in Monrovia • Support to sector coordination and and Kakata as well as pilot dialogue including joint sector reviews connection program in 2013, ’14, ’15, and 2013 sector • Prefeasibility study for implementing performance report an output-based aid approach • Prefeasibility studies for the development to expand access to piped water of piped water systems in Monrovia, supply to low-income households in Gbarnga, Greenville, and Harper Monrovia Nigeria AFD 0.75 • Support to Government of Nigeria for an • Water quality survey (dry and wet Secondee update of the 2006 inventory using the season) of household water use in for one water point mapping method Port Harcourt year • Customer enumeration survey in (2014/15) service area targeted by PHWC pilot rehabilitation • Assessment of PHWC billing and accounting systems • Replacement of PHWC accounting and billing system (with USAID SUWASA) • Introduction of FM and HR policies and procedures for PHWC • Urban utility service level benchmarking in 36 states (funding of national workshop) 11 The Transition from Emergency to Development Support: Evidence from Country Case Studies in Africa | The Approach Taken to the Technical Assistance Sierra Regional 0.75 • National map of 28,000 urban and rural • Assessment of GVWC billing and Leone support points reporting location, functionality, accounting systems only technology, and management • Replacement of GVWC billing • Fixing Freetown case study examining system (with DFID) rationale for a holistic approach to tackling • Support to GVWC enumeration dilapidated urban services and institutions and management of over 19,500 in postconflict countries household, commercial, and public customers Somalia Regional 1.0 • Sector assessment and infrastructure • Assessment of HWA billing and support policy note to inform the World Bank accounting systems only Somalia ISN • Assessment and support to the • Study to assess the potential for corporate governance of HWA implementing small dams (sand/ including HWA exposure visit to subsurface dams) across northern Somalia Windhoek, Namibia • Study of the socioeconomic impacts (winners and losers) of water resource developments in northern Somalia • Preparation of Water and Agro-Pastoralist Livelihoods pilot project (with State and Peace-building Fund) South Regional 0.2 • Assessment of management options for Sudan support small town systems leading to sector only regulatory framework • Study on improving WASH service delivery in protracted crises (with UNICEF) Zimbabwe Staff 1.0 • Support to national water policy • Urban utility service level member • Review of sector coordination and benchmarking in 32 municipal three regulation assessing whether existing councils over three annual cycles years institutions were fit for purpose (2013/15) • Impact Assessment of Beitbridge Emergency Water Supply and Sanitation project Source: World Bank data. 12 IV. What the Technical Assistance Revealed about Country Context The TA itself generated a detailed data picture of service 2016). In South Sudan too, though no primary data was delivery in each country. Large datasets were collected collected by this project, the joint study with UNICEF on through water point and scheme mapping, urban water aid effectiveness confirmed that since the conflict resumed quality surveys, service level benchmarking, assessments in 2013, donors have spent $73.6 million on WASH of billing systems, customer enumeration surveys, through the Common Humanitarian Fund. Humanitarian mapping of water resource development potential, and funding in ‘emergency mode’ has remained the main type socioeconomic and project impact assessments. of assistance delivered to South Sudan (Mosello, 2015). This data on service delivery was an input to the subsequent Across these countries the bypassing of government was steps of the TA process for building sector oversight initially justified due the emergency nature of aid. The capacity and utility reform—the focus of Chapter 5. challenge is that subsequent development aid followed the established emergency pathway entrenching the But the data also provided insights into the contextual bypassing of government. Governments in these countries factors that had shaped the evolution of service delivery have, therefore, had no part in delivering the vast majority in each country over the previous decade or more. Across of the water points and water supply schemes identified countries there were both common trends and sources through the mapping processes. The infrastructure, of variation in these contextual factors that defined both mapped across these countries, was delivered directly the starting conditions and the parameters of engagement with no strategic sector oversight from the state. It is throughout the process of delivering transition TA in each also important to stress that this infrastructure was not country. They described, in other words, the very different built through “parallel structures” to the public service— scenes on which the TA was acted out. defined as units partially supported by donors to perform government functions; it was built by organizations 4.1 Common Trends across Countries separate to the public sector and with no accountability Aid modalities bypassed sector institutions and failed to the public sector in these countries. to build sector oversight capacity. Across five of the eight countries (the DRC, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Somalia, and In contrast, external aid to water supply services in South Sudan) the starting assumption that aid to water Nigeria and the ROC was not largely humanitarian and supply is delivered directly by external and non-state actors, constituted only a small proportion of the overall spend bypassing government, is strongly supported by the large on the WASH sector. In Nigeria official development primary datasets collected on service delivery through assistance (ODA) is estimated to be 20 percent of the total this activity. Whether this externally-driven direct service capital spend allocated nationally (AMCOW, 2011). In delivery is precipitated by humanitarian crisis or through the ROC, ODA to WASH service delivery has averaged ODA practice, the net result is a missed opportunity under US$5 million a year over the past decade (OECD, to build country capacity and systems. In Liberia (97 2016) against an estimated government allocation to percent) and Sierra Leone (86 percent) the vast majority WASH capital expenditure of just under US$50 million a of all water points had been financed and built by external year (AMCOW, 2011). A common theme, though, is that and non-state actors. In the DRC, 93 percent of the AWS the majority of funding for water supply infrastructure were financed and constructed by external and non-state bypasses sector institutions. In Rivers State, Nigeria, two- actors. In Somalia the data on water point financing are thirds of water points surveyed had been built by donors, poor; however, for those water points for which there are data on the source of financing, all are linked to external 3 Personal communication with the Commissioner of the Ministry of Water Resources and non-state actors (Food and Agriculture Organization, and Rural Development. 13 The Transition from Emergency to Development Support: Evidence from Country Case Studies in Africa | What the Technical Assistance Revealed about Country Context NGOs, philanthropy, and federal funding agencies such In common across all these countries was that aid as the Niger Delta Development Commission—the latter or domestic financing modalities that bypass sector in many ways behaves like an external donor.3 Likewise institutions endured long after the end of crises. in the ROC, much of the capital expenditure for WASH has been channeled through the “Delegation General des Local coping strategies and external interventions Grands Travaux” (DGGT), a government entity established marginalized utility supply. The degree to which utilities by the President in 2002 for large public works, again in FCV affected countries faced massive competition from bypassing sector ministries.Thus a similar if domestic locally emerging coping strategies was unexpected. Though capacity conundrum has beset these oil-rich FCV affected competition from alternative nonutility water sources is countries where nonsector institutions deliver services common in most low income settings, the degree to which without consultation with sector institutions. coping strategies in FCV affected countries have emerged and become mainstreamed is extreme—mirroring the In the last of the eight countries, Zimbabwe, aid bypassing marginalization of mainstream state-led service delivery the state has been a more recent phenomenon. The vast models.In Port Harcourt, the water quality survey was key majority of existing infrastructure was either built by the to revealing that 99 percent of households, businesses, and state, or through aid under the strategic oversight from the government institutions depended on nonutility sources of state, until the early 2000s—in particular, its municipalities water as their main sources of water for drinking, washing, and districts. However, since the onset of the economic and cooking. Similarly, significant local coping strategies crisis in the early 2000s, funding to manage and maintain have become mainstream in Mogadishu, Somalia, where this existing infrastructure all but evaporated. In addition, private boreholes and networks serve over a million people since the European Union (EU) placed sanctions on and have entirely substituted for the municipal water Zimbabwe in 2002 and with the cholera crisis in 2008 supply system—and led to the sabotage of attempts to very little aid to WASH services has been managed by the revive the municipal water supply. The mainstreaming Government of Zimbabwe (GoZ) directly. Instead aid, of alternative sources in urban areas was additionally initially humanitarian and then development aid, to the fueled by the fact that adoption is facilitated by simple water supply services has flowed through multilateral, technologies, the speed of coverage, the low cost, and, bilateral and non-state institutions. In contrast to other depending on the context, the hydrogeology (as explained countries, Zimbabwe’s capacity for overseeing aid to WASH in the following subsection). services is latent rather than absent. For instance, in the 1980s there were well-established systems for managing inventories of infrastructure at district level known as Externally financed solutions in urban areas also contributed ‘pump record cards’ which were regularly updated. These to the wide-spread availability and adoption of nonutility systems, however, were subverted by crises and, as pointed sources, often with adverse results for urban consumers. out in the 2013 review of WASH aid coordination, the In Monrovia, Liberia, hand-dug wells and boreholes with cluster coordination mechanism for managing emergency handpumps built by non-state actors accounted for a half aid persisted even six years after the 2008 cholera crisis. of the 1,400 water points installed around the city. While In 2010, the National Action Committee (NAC) for providing basic services, the sample water points evaluated Water and Sanitation was made responsible for the overall reported high rates of contamination—57 percent testing coordination of the water sector, but this has received positive for E. coli and 80 percent for fecal coliform— limited support from, and limited attendance by, donors. indicating both poor installation methods and that this From the Ministry of Finance (MoF) perspective, without rural solution is not appropriate in an urban setting. having an institution that coordinates and prioritizes investment projects in the water sector as a whole it is difficult to get an overview of whether Public Sector 700 Number of hand-dug wells and boreholes with handpumps built by non-state actors in Investment Program budget allocations and available aid Monrovia, Liberia, accounting for a half of the have been consistent with policies and priorities for the 1,400 water points installed around the city. water sector (ECA 2014). 14 The Transition from Emergency to Development Support: Evidence from Country Case Studies in Africa | What the Technical Assistance Revealed about Country Context Water vendors in Yei, South Sudan, distribute water in jerry cans under a small town water project financed by the German government. (Photo credit: Chantal Richey.) 4.2 Sources of Variation across Countries scale that enabled services to be delivered at prices well The incentive to charge for services was fueled by below alternative solutions (private boreholes or water political competition but dampened by alternative water tankers—often by multiples). With lower costs per cubic sources. In implementing the utility reform work-stream, meter, water revenues were seen as a way of directly and the WSP found that results were strongly influenced by indirectly increasing the tax base. Taxing water sales the degree to which there was political incentive to charge directly increased the tax base, for instance, 5 percent of for services. This political incentive, in turn, was stronger the HWA’s sales are remitted to the Somaliland Central where central crisis led to an upsurge of subnational Bank and water revenues in Zimbabwe account for up authority. Where crisis had diminished the central state to 50 percent of the municipal revenues. Water services, through war (Somalia) or hyperinflation (Zimbabwe), particularly in Zimbabwe, were also seen as an indirect politicians at the subnational level saw opportunity for mechanism to increase and broaden the tax base. Water water supply as a tangible collective action problem worth could be cut off by municipalities where housing rates acting on—to demonstrate local competence against were not being paid. Servicing new housing plots with central impotence. water and sewer connections could raise the auction price of land and expand the population of houses that Addressing water supply had potential to bolster both the are ratable. These opportunities together propelled these legitimacy and the local tax base of emerging subnational emerging regional and local governments to be both entities. Where the centralized tax system no longer willing to deliver and willing to charge for services (see functioned there was no possibility for national subsidies case studies on Somalia in Box 4.1, and the notable to finance utilities. Cost recovery was a prerequisite to exception of South Sudan in Box 4.2). keep services going. Network supplies had economies of 15 The Transition from Emergency to Development Support: Evidence from Country Case Studies in Africa | What the Technical Assistance Revealed about Country Context BOX 4.1: SOMALI REGIONAL STATES: WILLING TO CHARGE AND PARTIALLY ABLE TO DELIVER WATER SERVICES In Somalia the collapse of the central state in the 1990s led to the emergence of regional states, especially in the north. With the destruction of water systems during the war and the collapse of centralized subsidies to urban and rural water supply, solving the water supply crisis became a key issue for politicians of regional states.4 In Somaliland and Puntland the limited aid available was used to restore basic system functionality. With a very limited tax base there was no option for regional states to subsidize the recurrent costs of utilities. Cost recovery for operation and maintenance was viewed by politicians as a prerequisite to keep utilities going, and client power as a means of keeping the provider in check. Different solutions have emerged as a way to delegate this authority to local utilities. In Puntland the municipalities of Garowe and Bosaaso have contracted water services to the private sector. In Somaliland there has been a mixed approach with service delivery variously under municipal management (the main model both pre- and postindependence), public private partnership (PPP) and corporatization. In Borama, the municipality transferred responsibility for service delivery to a private operator, the Awdal Utility Company (SHABA), in October 2003 through a 10-year PPP lease agreement. Household connections have since risen from 130 in 2002 to 5,435 by the end of 2009 with a billing efficiency of close to 100 percent (Print, 2010). In Hargeisa, where aerial strikes bombed the city and its water transmission lines in the early ’90s, basic system functionality for 180,000 people was restored with subsequent donor support. Since then the city has grown to around 1 million people. Supported only by tariff—US$1.2 a cubic meter in 2016 reflecting the high operational costs of pumping water from a well field over 20 km north of the city—the corporatized utility has managed to grow and sustain a basic level of service to around half a million people through 25,000 household connections and 402 water kiosks with a billing efficiency of close to 100 percent.5 The high cost of alternative water supplies in the northern Somali semi-arid environment—up to US$7 per m3 from water trucking in the driest times of year—has certainly been a factor contributing to the urgency with which politicians have sought to enable network solutions. Even with relatively high tariffs these deliver economies of scale, and so value, for citizens which reflect well on the nascent state authorities by making these cities and towns more livable. Source: World Bank data. By contrast, in countries like Liberia and Sierra Leone jetting and hand auguring to quickly and cheaply install which have abundant water resources, high rainfall and household or compound wells. While the number of shallow aquifers water was of a lower political priority people in urban Nigeria served by household connections than in semi-arid contexts of Somalia and Zimbabwe. For has dropped from 9 million in 1990 to 3 million in 2015, wealthier households it was relatively simple to privatize the manual drilling service model is largely responsible a solution to water supply by sinking a well in a back for the increase in coverage of other improved sources yard. Alternative service delivery models spring up. In in urban areas, jumping from 12 to 68 million people Nigeria, the booming manual drilling industry uses well over the same period (UNICEF/WHO Joint Monitoring Program, 2015a). 4 Personal communication: Dr. Edna Adan Ismail, former Foreign Minister of the autonomous Somaliland (2003 to 2006). 5 All prices for domestic customers are in local currency on a single tariff of 9,975 SLSh per m3. For international customers there is a rising block tariff structure paid in US$ (0-10 m3@ $2, 10-20 m3@ $4, 20+ m3@ $5). 16 The Transition from Emergency to Development Support: Evidence from Country Case Studies in Africa | What the Technical Assistance Revealed about Country Context Across these case studies the magnitude of utility competition from alternative sources was related to hydrogeology and so the potential for alternative sources. Where hydrogeology was conducive to low-cost alternative water sources (such as manually drilled wells) a vicious cycle of expanding alternatives and shrinking utility services was more likely to occur. Where hydrogeology did not lend itself to low-cost alternative water sources (where only deep boreholes or water tucking were the only alternative option) this vicious cycle of expanding alternatives and shrinking utility services was less likely to occur. However, the realization of potential into actual competition was influenced by utilities’ ability to cover Hargeisa Water Agency in Somaliland delivers water to public operational costs from tariffs, underpinned by the political tap stands for onward sale by water vendors. (Photo credit: Chantal Richey.) incentive to charge for water services. TABLE 4.1: OVERVIEW OF UTILITY DATA DRAWN FROM BILLING SYSTEMS STUDY Company GVWC LWSC REGIDESO PHWC HWA City Freetown Monrovia (all urban DRC) Port Harcourt Hargeisa Country Sierra Leone Liberia DR Congo Nigeria Somaliland Year of reference 2012 2012 2013 2013 2012 Estimated no. of inhabitants 2013 1,350,000 1,300,000 28,000,000 1,400,000 1,000,000 No. of active customers (water) Domestic 15,840 3,716 266,500 492 24,000 Non-domestic 2,060 1,600 18,500 400 Total 17,900 5,316 285,000 492 24,400 Inactive customers in the database 7,900 3,684 243,200 2,984 - Total water produced (mm3/year) 29.2 4.7 273.2 3.2 3.1 Total water billed (mm3/year) n.a. 2 166.9 0 2.5 NRW rate (%) n.a. 58% 39% 100% 19% Total amount billed (US$/year) 4,200,000 2,258,000 125,683,000 - 3,509,640 Apparent average price (US$/m ) 3 n.a. 1.13 0.75 1.4 Total amount collected (US$/year) 3,100,000 1,666,000 96,315,000 - 3,360,684 Collection rate (%) 74% 74% 77% 96% Actual operating costs (US$/year) 3,100,000 4,835,061 96,315,000 3,000,000 3,192,650 Number of employees 330 293 4,500 180 329 Number of meters (active) 2,814 4,000 109,725 - 24,400 Source: World Bank data. 17 The Transition from Emergency to Development Support: Evidence from Country Case Studies in Africa | What the Technical Assistance Revealed about Country Context Aid, in turn, can either exacerbate or mitigate the operating ratios or billing to collection ratios as was the problem of utility competition with alternative sources. case at REGIDESO in the DRC. Humanitarian investment in alternative sources in urban areas—particularly where these sources do not charge for It is the interaction of these sources of variation—political water—exacerbated competition with utility supplies. incentives, hydrology, and aid—over time that has led to Yet, development aid to utilities early after crises was the extraordinarily wide range in utility performance: from either not forthcoming or did not significantly raise the total dependency on subsidy at the PHWC to the total self-reliance of cost recovery at the HWA (Table 4.1). BOX 4.2: SOUTH SUDAN URBAN WATER SUPPLY: WHY DID THE LIBERATION MOVEMENT NOT LEAD TO BETTER RESULTS? South Sudan has fluctuated between a state at risk and one that is weak but willing since the 2005 signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) that paved the way for establishment of the independent Republic of South Sudan in 2011. This fluctuation in the state’s incentive to invest in and otherwise develop urban water supply was a result of the availability of oil revenues to subsidize urban water supply, the inexperience of the nascent government in undertaking reform, and the overall security challenges which often disrupted government revenue flows and the interest and will of government and development partners alike. The post-CPA period offered an opportunity for improved services in Southern Sudan as oil revenues flowed into the autonomous region and there was a desire to secure the peace and to buy political advantage in the lead up to the referendum for independence. Lack of institutional strength and low human capacity, in particular, resulted in the water sector being unable to absorb the wave of donor funding that sought to address the overwhelming humanitarian needs following the signing of the CPA. Early donor funds focused on emergency water supply, on a protracted basis (Huston, 2014). Following the referendum for independence, the urban water sector remained institutionally weak and continued to struggle with the ‘capacity conundrum’. Uncertain oil revenues and resulting inconsistent subsidizes for urban water services made public water supply at best unreliable, but more often nonexistent for urban residents. During this period private sector water providers mushroomed to meet demand in urban areas with water bottlers, jerry can vendors and water truck haulers serving customers with both treated and untreated water supply, often at very high prices. The expensive, informal, and unregulated private water supply was a daily reminder for most urban residents that the new government was unable to provide the most basic water services. A political crisis at the highest level of the government broke out into open violence in December 2013, pushing the country back into conflict. During this period of political crisis and continued low oil revenues, the government seemed more focused on improving water services and increasing cost recovery in order to keep limited services operational, to maintain some sense of legitimacy, and to avoid systemic collapse of public water services. The government was keen to work with donor agencies as international support for the government diminished with the expansion of tribal violence. The public water supply continues to serve approximately 10 percent of urban residents and is a regular reminder of governance and service failures. Source: World Bank data. 18 V. Outcomes and Lessons from the Technical Assistance This chapter summarizes the achievements recorded 5.1 Relative Influence of TA and Context on IOs against the IOs for each of the countries. It then reflects Progress against the IOs was the shared and collective on the relationship between the way that the TA was result of government, external partner, and WSP effort. provided and the overall transition progress made as well An overview of the status of each IO in each country as as how the input-to-IO relationship was influenced by the at mid-2016 (the end point of the TA) is set out in the contextual factors described in the previous chapter. large two-page Table 5.2 at the end of this section. The spectrum of progress against the IOs to which the WSP The second half of the chapter critically examines whether made a substantive contribution is also summarized in the strategic choices made in the approach to the TA were the condensed Table 5.1 below. This shows the relative valid, drawing out the key lessons for each of the two work- progress made against each IO as well as a crude measure of streams, that is, (i) reestablishing the sector oversight role; cumulative ‘transition progress’ made in each county (the and (ii) utility reform. last column). The color coded cells were the IOs to which the WSP contributed and the white cells show the 2016 status even where no direct WSP contribution was made. TABLE 5.1: SUMMARY OF PROGRESS ON INTERMEDIATE OUTCOMES ACROSS COUNTRIES Intermediate 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. Outcomes Reestablish Institutionalize Restore Establish Increase Increase use country rigorous cost an inclusive domestic of country Cumulative leadership sector recovery sector investment systems by ‘transition in sector monitoring in urban investment in the development progress’ coordination and joint utilities, plan (SIP) and sector partners across IOs and policy sector review small- process that by country development processes towns, mobilizes and large infrastructure rural piped investment water schemes DRC 2 1 1 1 5 Liberia 2 3 2 3 1 1 12 Nigeria 1 1 2 ROC 2 1 0 3 Sierra Leone 1 3 4 Somalia 2 3 1 2 2 10 South Sudan 0 Zimbabwe 3 3 2 3 1 2 14 No WSP Substantial Legend: No progress Slight progress Moderate progress Good progress intervention progress Source: World Bank data. 19 The Transition from Emergency to Development Support: Evidence from Country Case Studies in Africa | Outcomes and Lessons from the Technical Assistance Before reflecting on the progress made by countries, it is The measure of cumulative transition progress across useful to note that the differential progress across each of IOs shows the relatively greater progress made in three the six TA IOs reflects the hierarchy of outcomes illustrated countries (Liberia, Somalia, and Zimbabwe), moderate in Figure 5.1. Sector monitoring, improving cost recovery progress made in two (the DRC and Sierra Leone) and in utilities, and investment planning (IOs 2, 3, and 4) limited or no progress made in the other countries. were precursors to reestablishing country leadership in sector coordination and policy development (IO 1). In To explain the reasons for this differential progress, the turn, it was this sector leadership that underpinned the way that three process aspects of the TA interacted with willingness of ministries of finance to increase domestic contextual factors in each country needs to be understood. investment (IO 5) and of donors to use country systems These process aspects were: (i) when, relative to the start (IO 6). Under this TA, greater progress was made on the of the postcrisis period, the WSP engaged in the country; precursor IOs as these were closely linked to the WSP’s (ii) the intensity of the relationship with sector civil interventions and less dependent on the interaction of TA servants; and (iii) the degree to which the WSP worked in with contextual factors. collaboration with other external partners. Of these process aspects the timing of the TA intervention relative to the start of the postcrisis was the most critical. FIGURE 5.1: A HIERARCHY OF OUTCOMES Though identifying the start of the postcrisis period can be TOWARDS ESTABLISHING COUNTRY-LED difficult—particularly where there is not a definitive peace DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMMING settlement—it is possible by tagging the start of postcrisis period to sector events such as the restarting of utility operations, the restarting of water point construction or a specific disease outbreak. The earlier the WSP got involved Increase domestic Increase use of in a country after these critical sector events the greater investment in the country systems was the TA’s influence on the transition trajectory of the sector by development sector. In Zimbabwe, the WSP got involved very soon partners after the 2008 cholera outbreak and was able to create strong partnerships with both sector civil servants and with other external responders (both humanitarian and Reestablish country development). By contrast, the WSP only got involved leadership in sector in Liberia in 2011 and in Sierra Leone in 2012 nearly a coordination and decade after their respective peace settlements. In addition policy development to making it more difficult to develop trusted relations with sector civil servants and break into established networks of Restore cost Establish external partners, it was observed that as time passes the Institutionalize rigorous recovery in an inclusive combined effect of unmanaged aid and the entrenchment sector urban utilities, sector of alternative service providers makes it ever more difficult monitoring small towns investment to reestablish arrangements between sector oversight and joint and large rural plan that institutions and non-state service providers (whether for- sector review piped water mobilizes profit or not-for profit). processes schemes infrastructure investment The intensity of the relationship with sector civil servants was pivotal in adding value to the TA resources available. In most of the countries the WSP developed Source: World Bank data. strong relations with civil servants adept at shaping and 20 The Transition from Emergency to Development Support: Evidence from Country Case Studies in Africa | Outcomes and Lessons from the Technical Assistance Rubbish collection point. Prior to the World Bank-supported Beitbridge Emergency Water Supply and Sanitation project, the entire town was covered in solid waste. (Photo credit: Anusa Pisanec.) managing the TA process. Leaders at the GVWC in brokering a multistakeholder agreement with external Sierra Leone, for example, were very clear about their partners. To get a real transition from emergency to need to replace their utility billing system and carry out development programming there needed to be mutual a customer enumeration survey. They quickly took over accountability for sector results—external partners had the management of the firm hired to carry out the work to be transparent and accountable to government for and developed new ways of using the data generated, their results and vice versa. As time since the start of such as using SMS text messages to let customers know the postcrisis period passed and bypassing government their outstanding balances with the utility. In Somalia, became the norm, the transaction costs of brokering with virtually no external partners involved in financing these multistakeholder compacts (see section 5.2.1) government-led service delivery or oversight, sector civil grew. Where, for example, the WSP engaged many years servants skillfully matched the TA resources for corporate after the start of the postcrisis period, intense work with governance with their local political connections to put in other external partners was needed to get agreement to place the board of directors for the HWA. support, not undermine, government oversight in the sector. This, for example, explains the greater progress The degree to which the WSP worked in collaboration made in Liberia where the WSP invested a great deal with other external partners reflected a growing of time and effort in supporting the multistakeholder realization, over the TA period, that building government compact, compared with Sierra Leone where the WSP capacity for sector oversight had to be matched with did not have a continuous in-country presence. 21 The Transition from Emergency to Development Support: Evidence from Country Case Studies in Africa | Outcomes and Lessons from the Technical Assistance of a protracted crisis but as one of the first external actors working through government. The progress was also aided by contextual factors as the respective governments had a strong political incentive to demonstrate their ability to deliver service, especially urban water services. The moderate progress in the DRC, also a protracted crisis, was held back by there being no clear locus of government authority in the sector with which to build a strong relationship, in spite of strong and well established relations with external partners. This stemmed from contextual factors including the fragmented nature of the water sector institutions in government and, until recently, the lack of decentralization. In Sierra Leone, the progress made on utility reform driven by the GVWC leadership contrasted strongly with that made on rural water which would have required brokering a multistakeholder process between government and external partners—impossible due to not having an in-country presence. In the remaining countries, contextual factors trumped any influences in the way that TA was delivered, most obviously in South Sudan where since 2013 the WSP was unable to operate. In Port Harcourt, Nigeria, the build-up of alternative sources over time presents the utility with an almost insurmountable problem and may require devising a completely different approach to service delivery based A water pumping station in Somalia. on regulating alternative sources. In the ROC, a very strong (Photo credit: Robert Kogi.) relationship with government needs to be built at the level of the Presidency to reach agreement on the need for sector institutions to sustainably manage the infrastructure that Returning then to the relative transition progress made is currently being built by external contractors. across the eight countries the greater progress made in Zimbabwe, Liberia, and Somalia was for different reasons. In summary, there is a high dividend to initiating In Zimbabwe, the good progress was due to early entry development interventions early in the postcrisis period. after the 2008 cholera crisis that was able to trigger Intervening early sets in place the foundations for positive contextual factors, namely, the latent government building sector oversight capacity and initiating utility capacity for sector oversight in an environment where reform that can help prevent countries getting locked into municipal revenues from water services bounced back as unsustainable aid modalities and can stem the proliferation the country dollarized. By contrast, in Liberia, the late of alternative water sources. As time passes, the effort and entry of the WSP led to there being high transaction costs capacity required to overcome what become operational to renegotiating the multistakeholder compact to support norms and vested interests increases. Contextual factors the transition to development programming and a struggle change and crystalize around dominant service delivery to raise utility revenues. In Somalia, the relatively good modalities. Political incentives to tackle cost recovery wane progress reflects the situation in the north—Somaliland and aid modalities get entrenched, making the transition and Puntland—where the WSP’s entry was in the context to development programming more difficult. 22 The Transition from Emergency to Development Support: Evidence from Country Case Studies in Africa | Outcomes and Lessons from the Technical Assistance TABLE 5.2: SUMMARY OF PROGRESS ON INTERMEDIATE OUTCOMES ACROSS COUNTRIES Substantial Legend: No WSP intervention No progress Slight progress Moderate progress Good progress progress Intermediate 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. Outcomes Reestablish Institutionalize Restore cost Establish an Increase Increase use country leadership rigorous sector recovery in inclusive sector domestic of country in sector monitoring and urban utilities, investment investment in systems by coordination joint sector small-towns, plan (SIP) the sector development and policy review processes and large rural and process partners development piped water that mobilizes schemes infrastructure investment DRC Water law ratified Survey and REGIDESO Investment plan Funding to No sector and promulgated evaluation of is testing for autonomous WASH has budget support by the President in autonomous delegated piped water not been mechanism. early 2016 piped water management of schemes prioritized WB investment schemes initiated standposts but developed but by the managed by dialogue on no conclusive not for sector as government PIU led by management and results on a whole Secretary regulation impact on cost General for recovery REGIDESO Liberia WASH Compact A regular Updating of the Detailed Raised level WB investment signed by the JSR process billing system SIP exists of domestic ($10 million) President in 2011, supported by an and customer for 2012–17 funding in Monrovia’s established and a SPR in place led databases mobilized (circa thwarted in urban water series of guiding by NWSHPC helped increase US$30 million FY14 by lack supply will be documents and revenue as of 2016) with of absorption managed by events collection at greater attention capacity PIU embedded LWSC since the EVD of ministry in LWSC epidemic responsible for rural water supply Nigeria Dynamic Water quality Assessment Urban water Domestic AfDB and WB (Rivers State) Commissioner monitoring of systems led supply investment as investment for responsible for institutionalized to installation investment counterpart PHWC to be water in Rivers at PHWC of basic attracted for funds to WB managed by State drove reform accounting and Port Harcourt and AfDB external PIU agenda (2011– billing system from AfDB ($170 investment 2015) million) and WB ($80 million) ROC GoC has initiated Water point No progress No SIP GoC has GoC financing sectorwide mapping on delegated established reduced 80% of dialogue on a new initiated policy management of investment in WB project policy dialogue but standposts in the sector due managed monitoring not urban areas to lower than through a PIU institutionalized expected oil in the Ministry and no JSRs revenues in of Equipment 2015 and Public Works 23 The Transition from Emergency to Development Support: Evidence from Country Case Studies in Africa | Outcomes and Lessons from the Technical Assistance Intermediate 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. Outcomes Reestablish Institutionalize Restore cost Establish an Increase Increase use country leadership rigorous sector recovery in inclusive sector domestic of country in sector monitoring and urban utilities, investment investment in systems by coordination joint sector small-towns, plan (SIP) the sector development and policy review processes and large rural and process partners development piped water that mobilizes schemes infrastructure investment Sierra Leone A sector policy Ministry of Water Replacing No SIP has No increase WB was approved in created civil billing system been developed in GoSL Decentralized 2010 but provides service posts for and updating investment Service weak guidance on sector monitoring customer in WASH Delivery cost recovery or but did not retain databases has infrastructure Program tariff setting and staff recruited increased billing used country review and stabilized systems but utility revenues link with sector institutions not made Somalia Where it exists, Multiple Strengthened No SIP but HWA WB investment sector leadership data sources corporate analysis of reinvesting using from regional integrated into governance potential scope surplus utility embedded state level but wadi evaluation improved cost for, and impacts revenues PIUs led by implementation by tool used recovery at HWA of, rural water in strategic civil servants non-state actors by regional supply used improvements complemented very fragmented governments to to design WB- to its by WB support guide investment financed project infrastructure to MoF for such as PFM systems additional strengthening pumps South Sudan Leadership JSRs with Main utility Juba sanitation Significant A decrease from ministry representation SSUWC agreed SIP included drop in GoSS in donor responsible from states in on a corporate investment investment appetite for for water has 2011/12 have not plan which planning due to dispute use of country not translated been repeated enshrined a processes but over revenue systems into country- due both to commitment to neither have sharing from compounded led program as capacity and cost recovery mobilized oil pipeline with sanctions external response security issues but restoring infrastructure followed by against GoSS fragmented only a low level investment escalation in by some achieved conflict since donors 2014 Zimbabwe GoZ led dialogue Service-level SLB process has SIP established Some WB and approved benchmarking led to gains in and detailed municipalities investments National Water (SLB) process efficiency across small town using water in Beitbridge Policy (2013). in place for some of the 32 investment revenues ($2.6 million) Coordination 32 urban municipalities planning led for system and ZINWA strengthened municipalities to $20 million improvements ($20 million) with peer to peer ZIMREF use(d) review process investment embedded and JSRs administered by PIU led by civil the WB servants or utility staff Source: World Bank data. 24 The Transition from Emergency to Development Support: Evidence from Country Case Studies in Africa | Outcomes and Lessons from the Technical Assistance 5.2 Work-Stream 1: Reestablishing the BOX 5.1: COMPACTS—AGREEMENTS BETWEEN Sector Oversight Role Relies on THE POLICY MAKERS OF A STATE AND SERVICE Government’s Ability to Access Critical DELIVERY PROVIDERS Sector Data The WSP’s starting assumption was that bringing the The WDR 2004 describes compacts as the state back into a sector oversight role would be facilitated agreements between the policy makers of a by generating hard-to-get field data. This data would state and service delivery providers. It may be an provide sector oversight institutions with the evidence explicit contract or an implicit understanding and, base to pinpoint critical sector issues—poor quality well more often than not, a combination of the two. It construction or health hazards due inappropriate technology can be between the state and an agency, private use—and so the authority to renegotiate a “compact” (see or not-for-profit organization or between tiers Box 5.1) among the disparate array of external responders of government agreement. Compacts are about and local coping strategies to service delivery. inducing providers to achieve the outcomes of interest to citizens through: This data-focused approach was a strategic choice selected Clarifying responsibilities—by separating the against a more conventional policy-led approach which role of policymaker, accountable to citizens, from would have led off with institutional analysis. While in that of provider organizations, accountable to politically stable countries policies, laws and regulations policymakers. are seen as means of upholding the “compact” for inducing providers to achieve outcomes of interest to citizens, these Choosing the appropriate provider—civil instruments are less viable in FCV affected countries. servants, autonomous public agencies, NGOs or In low-income FCV affected countries the experiences private contractors. generated by this TA have confirmed that: Providing good information—Just monitoring the a) Most service delivery is done directly by non-state performance of contracts requires more and better actors including private actors with little or no measures. Keeping an eye on the prize of better incentive to comply with the state. outcomes requires regular measurement as well b) State institutions have very little capacity to as finding out what works by rigorously evaluating enforce laws and policies. programs and their effects. c) There is a vacuum of evidence on which to base policy formulation. Source: World Bank, 2004. d) In the absence of the traditional sector service roles and instruments, good sector data provide a platform for governments to broker sector agreements. Reestablishing state leadership of the sector through compacts with existing and emergent providers requires It was established that policy tends to lag against practice— data on the, often, co-existing service delivery models especially good practice as was the case in the DRC with driven by (a) the remaining if weak public sector providers AWS (see DRC case study in appendix). In FCV affected (utilities, municipalities, and districts); (b) household countries, where service delivery models emerge largely coping strategies including informal market provision; outside the control and purview of public institutions, and (c) external and non-state and private actors which standard analysis of sector institutions was of limited use. provide direct service. This is not to say that there is no place for policy, there may be especially in the latter stages of transition, but the This evidence informs the public sector choices on which of idea that de jure policy is able to direct practice is flawed the multiple service delivery models (public sector, coping as the levers to translate policy into practice, or to redirect strategies, externally supported) will deliver the best sector practice, are so weak. outcomes and so which models to promote and which to 25 The Transition from Emergency to Development Support: Evidence from Country Case Studies in Africa | Outcomes and Lessons from the Technical Assistance phase out. Further, reliable data also helps states to defend BOX 5.2: USING WATER POINT MAPPING AS A and manage the conflict which can emerge when shifting the BASIS FOR ESTABLISHING SECTOR OVERSIGHT balance towards, and then expanding, the service delivery IN LIBERIA models that have better sector outcomes—especially where models are in direct competition, for example, when The Ministry of Public Works’ focal point who promoting a return from manually drilled coping strategies had led the water point mapping exercise tried to to utility supply in Port Harcourt. institutionalize the capture of data on new water points being built or rehabilitated by the large Work-stream 1 not only confirmed the valuable role of number of sector actors operating in Liberia. sector data in reasserting the role of the state, but generated Agencies were consulted, simple reporting forms additional related lessons on the nature of the sector were drawn up and circulated, and the focal point agreements that the data facilitates, as described below. followed up regularly with agencies to get updates. Despite a number of attempts to reinvigorate the 5.2.1 Compacts are more likely to stick where there updating mechanism, including migrating it to the are incentives for mutual accountability digital “Really Simple Reporting” platform,6 uptake Compacts with existing, external, and emerging providers has been limited. need to be negotiated rather than established through There was some voluntary reprioritization by sector a top-down legalistic approach. A number of different actors responding to the water point atlas that negotiated approaches to developing compacts among was published. UNICEF explicitly incorporated the sector actors were tried under this TA including: issue- data into project designs to improve the targeting based approaches (for example, to improve water point of investment. In late 2015, the Ministry of Public functionality); investment-based approaches (for instance, Works decided to use water point mapping data a sector investment plans); internationally-led sectorwide and technology for a self-financed campaign to compacts, and; country-led JSR processes. repair 500 water points requiring only very simple spare parts costing less than US$100. Based on this Examples of issue-based approaches were (a) specifically intervention criteria, teams of WASH coordinators, targeting the poor construction quality of externally pump technicians, and social workers have repaired financed wells in Sierra Leone (see appendix on Sierra handpumps within Mountserrado County. Leone); and (b) getting all agencies operating in the sector in Liberia to register new and rehabilitated water But the greater opportunity to use the water point points (see Box 5.2). Taking a narrow, but evidence based, mapping data as the basis for a regularly updated approach to translating analytics into action, such as sector overview—or even a compact for results where handpumps were needed most or where handpumps based financing—has not yet materialized. needed fixing, was a logical first step in developing a Source: World Bank data. compact between the state and non-state actors’ service providers. The anticipated advantage of compacts based on single issues such as infrastructure functionality, was A second approach to developing compacts with sector their simplicity and focus. An additional benefit was some actors, tried in Liberia and Zimbabwe,7 was through voluntary use by external actors of the water point mapping sector investment planning. SIPs were an opportunity data in financing agreements with donors—a sign that the to break down ambitious national plans into bankable data were both useful and that donors want to see better projects that could be picked up by a range of sector targeting of their finance. Yet despite creative attempts, both the governments of Liberia and Sierra Leone have 6 Akvo Really Simple Reporting is a web and Android-based system that makes it easy for development aid teams to bring complex networks of projects online and instantly found it difficult to make this means of establishing sector share progress with everyone involved and interested. oversight stick as sector actors do not feel obliged to be 7 The Zimbabwe Water Sector Investment Framework was financed by the AMDTF, accountable to government. not this project, but its utility has been monitored under this TA. 26 The Transition from Emergency to Development Support: Evidence from Country Case Studies in Africa | Outcomes and Lessons from the Technical Assistance financiers. SIPs have potential to be an investment-based government (led by the Ministry of Planning). At the compact to coordinate both government and donor inputs time many sector representatives managing investments to a sector without transaction-heavy regular coordination in Liberia were based in other countries and so had not meetings.Initially, after the SIP in Liberia was launched, met before. The compact committed both donors and there was a limited response from donors or the MoF. But government to strengthen institutional capacity, reinforce in support of the funding response to the EVD crisis the efforts to provide equitable services, support sector SIP was used as a means of structuring and prioritizing monitoring, and improve sector-financing mechanisms. critical, and vetted, investment requirements to donors. The WASH Compact created a new multistakeholder This included private sector donors such as Firestone coordination committee led by the MoPW that provided and NOCAL who committed to financing water supply a locus of authority and coordination for rural WASH for projects in their areas of operation in Harbel and Ganta, the first time. The compact was a very simple document respectively. By contrast the SIP in Zimbabwe, at the time that outlined commitments to the WASH sector arranged of writing this report, had not been widely used by donors around four key thematic areas, for delivery over a two- or private sector—evidence that mutual accountability in year time period, to: the sector had not yet been generated. • Strengthen institutional capacity. • Ensure equity, prioritize service provision. 5.2.2 Though mutual accountability is in short supply • Develop a monitoring system. the solution is to demand more • Improve sector financing mechanisms. A third approach to sector compacts based on sector data is a multistakeholder approach. Two examples were A significant result of the compact has been the improved an internationally-led approach through the Sanitation coordination and networking across the WASH sector and Water for All (SWA) partnership and a country- in Liberia. Regular meetings of the sector coordination led approach through JSRs. A distinction between these committee provided a forum for information sharing and multistakeholder compacts and those described above, a focus for sector discussions. The four commitments of is the greater emphasis on mutual accountability in the the 2011 Compact formed the structure of the Sector multistakeholder approach. Rather than relying on weak Strategic Plan (SSP). The SSP set out a detailed roadmap of sector oversight institutions to enforce accountability, sector reform and became the focus of the JSRs in Liberia, the onus both to make and to uphold multistakeholder and even more robust, country-led compact process. compacts lies with all parties. JSR processes, a country-led multistakeholder compact, SWA is a multistakeholder partnership committed to can provide a dynamic and flexible basis for a compact achieving universal, sustainable access to water, sanitation between the state and other sector actors. JSRs are a and hygiene services by 2030. Recognizing that much of periodic process that brings different stakeholders in a the investment by donors still comes through projects particular sector together to engage in dialogue, review status, (85 percent in 2013), often concentrating on direct progress and performance, and take decisions on priority infrastructure investment, SWA members agreed to actions. JSRs have their origins as a review mechanism work towards an internationally-led multistakeholder within the Sector Wide Approach (SWAp) although compact in Liberia. today they are carried out in contexts without a SWAp. JSR processes have been introduced into countries with The Liberia WASH Compact was the result of a Joint a high dependence on aid (Packer, 2006), and have been Mission of SWA members undertaken with the support of driven by the Paris Declaration and Accra Agenda’s push the Government of Liberia (GoL). This was the first time for results-oriented reporting and assessment, as well as sector representatives from nearly all agencies (bilateral, the principles of ownership, alignment, harmonization, multilateral, and civil society) working in the Liberian and mutual accountability. WASH sector came together under the leadership of In a background study for this report, to better understand 27 The Transition from Emergency to Development Support: Evidence from Country Case Studies in Africa | Outcomes and Lessons from the Technical Assistance Figure 5.2: SCHEMATIC OF THE JOINT SECTOR REVIEW CYCLE Pregathering preparation such Postgathering as: meetings, data report, commitments JSR collection, field and follow-up gathering visits, preparation of meetings input papers and/or sector report National context, reforms and WASH service delivery CYCLE 1 CYCLE 2 CYCLE 3 Key: Communication Status and action Time Source: World Bank data. the scope for fostering mutual accountability through It takes political incentives to uphold multistakeholder JSRs, the first study of countries reporting to have a compacts as they require a step change in the behavior WASH JSR process were studied. The study included a both of sector oversight institutions and the multitude of review of the experience in Liberia, Sierra Leone, South actors in the sector. Making the shift to more collaborative Sudan, and Zimbabwe. behaviors can be assisted with international attention. Just as international advocacy from SWA helped rally sector A key tenet of JSRs is getting agreement on priority actions. actors into closer collaboration and a series of JSRs in But the review showed that this is a major challenge in most Liberia so similar processes could initiate more mutual countries and only in two cases—Uganda and Nepal—were accountability in other countries. International pressure priorities both committed to and reviewed in subsequent to monitor and periodically peer review JSRs would likely JSRs (see Table 5.3). Frustration with this aspect of the JRSs strengthen these processes. was raised repeatedly from all sides. Despite the centrality of mutual accountability to JSRs, with few exceptions, the 5.3 Work-Stream 2: Cost Recovery can documentation of JSR processes and outputs in WASH was Support Performance Improvements hard to find without contacting those directly involved and and is an Entry Point for Broader Utility only available online in seven out of 19 countries where Reform JSRs had taken place. Though improving cost recovery in FCV affected countries may seem particularly intractable, as conflict has left The study concludes that, despite its potential, WASH JSR’s utilities with severely damaged infrastructure, inefficient contribution to mutual accountability can be demonstrated organizations, and widespread illegal connections, in only a few countries. Yet with a growing number of JSRs the experience in Liberia and Sierra Leone shows that taking place and few other options for bringing sector improvement is possible and indeed an essential building oversight to the multitude of actors operating in the sector, block for sustained and improved service provision. particularly in FCV affected countries, the way forward must be to strengthen and not abandon these processes. 28 The Transition from Emergency to Development Support: Evidence from Country Case Studies in Africa | Outcomes and Lessons from the Technical Assistance TABLE 5.3: EVIDENCE OF JSR PROCESSES LEADING TO MUTUALLY AGREED ‘BINDING COMMITMENTS’ Criteria Objectives Accountability Priorities No. of Agreed Actions, Binding Commitments JSR No. of Years of JSRs Wide Representation Documentation Reports Recommendations Commitments or Presents Online at JSR Gathering Information on: Undertakings Explicitly Set JSR Year Country Sector Report No. of Expenditure Gathering Outputs Status Burkina 7 2013 - - 10 Faso Burundi 5 2014 22 0 Ethiopia 6 2013 4–9 per year Ghana 4 2013 - - - 27 0 Liberia 3 2015 13 0 Kenya 9 2015 5 34 ? 21–28 Malawi 8 2014 - (2012–2014) Nepal 2 2014 Niger 8 2015 ? 20 (+39) 0 Rwanda 11 2015 Senegal 8 2014 - 0 - South 4 2012 3 Sudan Sierra 2013 ? ? 2 Leone 2014 - - - 37 4 Tanzania 9 2014   Uganda 15 2005-2015 2006 - - Yemen 2 2007 - - Zambia 6 2014 - 30 - Zimbabwe 3 2011 - 4 (+21) Source: World Bank data. 29 The Transition from Emergency to Development Support: Evidence from Country Case Studies in Africa | Outcomes and Lessons from the Technical Assistance BOX 5.3: THE JOINT SECTOR REVIEW PROCESS IN LIBERIA In 2014, the Government of Liberia (GoL) published the country’s first Sector Performance Report (SPR) on WASH. The SPR collated information from surveys, studies, and reports for stakeholders to use as an evidence base to debate and agree priorities for action. The report was written by a team of Liberian authors identified from the key WASH ministries and agencies. The support team helped find and repackage data from the Institute of Statistics and Geo-Information Services and supported a robust process of peer review, discussion, and refinement.Over 200 attendees spent the two days reviewing the SPR, listening to each other’s points of views, and deciding on the best way forward for the sector by prioritizing actions. The multistakeholder planning and review process has further strengthened sector coordination including greater circulation of information among actors and has created a focus for annual reporting on the activities in the Sector Strategic Plan. However, key institutional changes such as setting up the Water Supply and Sanitation Commission and a National Water Resources and Sanitation Board have been slow, undermining momentum on other equally important steps such as consolidating sector monitoring and attracting sector investment which were to be done by these institutions. Furthermore, more support will be required to help the government maximize the SPR and the joint sector reviews and to use them as a means to assess sector performance. Data on the relation between inputs and outputs in the sector is still far too fragmented to enable a quantitative analysis of sector performance. The principle of mutual accountability, in turn, is not well understood among actors—both by GoL’s water sector institutions and by development partners in the water sector. The persistence of highly contractual norms of humanitarian aid in Liberia instead of the more collaborative norms of development assistance in low-income politically stable countries is likely one of main reasons for this. There are also no internal or external oversight mechanisms to hold the GoL and partners in the sector accountable to specific commitments. The ministries of finance, planning or the President’s Office, for example, currently play very limited roles in the multistakeholder planning and review process. Similarly, there are no obvious external budget support or Peace and State- building Goal processes that could be used as accountability mechanisms. Source: World Bank data. To improve revenue collection, the WSP helped the LWSC interventions and tariff reform. This revenue increase and GVWC locate and enumerate tens-of-thousands of its helped stabilize the financial positions of the utilities and own customers, found thousands of suspicious connections increase the confidence of customers in the performance triggering a clampdown on unregistered and nonpaying of the utility. users, facilitated the upgrading of billing software systems at both utilities, piloted improved metering and customer In addition to improving operating ratios the improved acquisition processes, and worked on developing a pro- customer information management systems installed poor output-based connection subsidy program to through this TA helped these utilities cope with the overcome a major barrier to expanding the customer economic shock resulting from the EVD outbreak—by base—high connection fees. substituting revenues from businesses that closed with revenues from the relief operations that opened up. The progress made was reflected in positive cost recovery trends both at the GVWC and LWSC, the latter recording The increased credibility gained by the LWSC also more than a 100 percent increase in revenue in 2014 contributed to the World Bank’s decision to finance the compared with 2011 through a combination of these first stand-alone International Development Association 30 The Transition from Emergency to Development Support: Evidence from Country Case Studies in Africa | Outcomes and Lessons from the Technical Assistance (IDA) allocation to urban water in post-war Liberia—a US$10 million investment targeting improvements of the LWSC’s infrastructure expected to start in 2016. 5.3.1 Cost recovery is best addressed at the point of restarting utility operations in the postcrisis period when government budgets are still constrained Utility cost recovery of at least operation and maintenance (O&M) varied greatly across countries, from the PHWC, in Nigeria that was entirely subsidized from government revenues, to the HWA, in Somaliland, that was a net contributor to government revenues. Most municipal water utilities and departments in Zimbabwe were net contributors to the government revenues and, in the DRC, the national utility REGIDESO recovered over 80 percent of its O&M costs. Once tariff structures were set below a level sufficient to cover O&M costs it was difficult to raise them to reflect O&M even where alternative sources were more expensive. In Freetown, Sierra Leone, for example, the average GVWC tariff was US$0.17 per m3 while alternative sources were up to US$6.00 per m3. In Brazzaville, ROC, the national utility’s (SNDE: Societé Nationale de Distribution d’ Eau) average tariff was US$0.35 per m3 while alternative Collecting data in the field on Fiamah. providers charged at least US$3.50 per m3. Yet in both (Photo credit: Kerstin Danert.) these situations renegotiating the tariff to reflect at least TABLE 5.4: THE COST OF WATER SUPPLY PER CUBIC METER FROM UTILITIES VERSUS PRIVATE PROVIDERS Country City Utility Cost Per Cubic Meter (USD) Utility Alternative Provider   (Average Tariff) Charges Sierra Leone Freetown Guma Valley Water Company  $0.17 $6.00 Liberia Monrovia Liberia Water and Sewer $1.32 $10.00 Port Nigeria Port Harcourt Water Corporation -  $2.00  Harcourt DRC Kinshasa REGIDESO $0.75 $2.00–$5.00 ROC Brazzaville  Societé Nationale de Distribution d’ Eau  $0.35 $3.50 Zimbabwe Harare  Harare Water and Sanitation $0.40 $12.00 South Sudan Juba SSUWC/Juba $1.00 $15.00 Somalia Hargeisa Hargeisa Water Agency $1.20 $8.00–$12.00 Source: World Bank data. 31 The Transition from Emergency to Development Support: Evidence from Country Case Studies in Africa | Outcomes and Lessons from the Technical Assistance O&M costs has not been possible. In the case of the 5.3.2 Recovering operation and maintenance GVWC there has not been a tariff adjustment since 2006 costs for utility services is unlikely to impact despite there being evidence that raising the average tariff the poor negatively and may reduce their to US$0.73 per m3 would benefit both GVWC viability expenditure on water and consumers (PEM consult, Colan Consult & Dalan Where utilities had no option but to recover all operation Development Consultants, 2014). Likewise, at SNDE and maintenance costs from customers, there was still a in the ROC, despite there being agreements to raise the substantial positive differential between utility network tariff to cover O&M costs, both in a performance contract average tariffs and charges levied by alternative providers. between government and SNDE and under a private In Hargeisa, Somaliland charges levied by alternative sector service contract that was signed with VEOLIA in supplies of water were over 6 to 10 times those charged 2013, tariffs remain at 1994 levels (Government of the by the utility. In Kinshasa and urban parts of the DRC Republic of Congo, 2011). where its national utility REGIDESO operates, alternative supplies of water were priced between 2.5 and 6 times those Moreover, there may only be a narrow window of charged by the utility. This positive differential highlights opportunity for fragile states to put in place cost recovery. the economies of scale available through utility provision Both Liberia and Sierra Leone are resource rich countries versus alternative sources but needs to be confirmed and there is a danger that not addressing cost recovery through further analysis of concessional capital support early in the emergency to development transition will and deferred maintenance across utility and alternative leave utilities dependent on subsidy, as has been the case source delivery models. in a large number of utilities in Nigeria. However, these benefits, whether or not from economies This TA and the underlying case material points to of scale, were not always being spread to the majority of addressing cost recovery at the point when utility households, let alone the poor. Though data on access to operations are restarted in the postcrisis period and while utility supplies by wealthier and poorer households was government budgets are constrained. limited, analysis carried out for urban DRC showed that FIGURE 5.3: POORER HOUSEHOLDS WOULD BENEFIT FROM CONNECTING TO UTILITY-PROVIDED PIPED WATER ON PREMISES 100% 90% 80% 70% 60% 50% 40% 30% 20% 10% 0% Improved water Piped water Piped on premises (in Piped off-premise dwelling or yard/plot) (public tap or from neighbor) Wealthiest quintile Second quintile Third quintile Fourth quintile Poorest quintile Source: World Bank data. 32 The Transition from Emergency to Development Support: Evidence from Country Case Studies in Africa | Outcomes and Lessons from the Technical Assistance piped water on premises (a proxy for utility supply) was 5.3.4 TA to improve cost recovery should have almost exclusively captured by the wealthiest households been combined with limited infrastructure (the top quintile). Virtually all other households (in the investment bottom four quintiles) had to fetch water from alternative A question for future interventions in utilities in FCV sources including: buying from neighbors with utility affected situations is whether the low-cost, short-term connections who sell utility water with a mark-up; interventions taken under this TA would have been more from utility standposts which charge a mark-up for the effective if combined with infrastructure investment operator; from alternative, more expensive sources; or funding. Because there were huge investment needs in all from unimproved sources (World Bank, Forthcoming). the targeted utilities, availability of investment funding Spreading the benefits of lower utility tariffs to poorer would likely have shifted attention away from the difficult households can, therefore, be a progressive strategy even work of increasing revenues from the existing utility with levels of cost recovery for covering O&M. operation to building infrastructure. 5.3.3 Cost recovery is an entry point to other reform However, there were good examples of where small actions investments would have been very effective in reducing The focus on cost recovery was explicit, in the case of operating costs for utilities, particularly in relation to the LWSC and GVWC, but was an implicit focus of the water pumping costs. Many utilities in FCV affected TA provided to two other utilities operating in fragile countries are dependent on diesel generated power for environments, namely, PHWC in Rivers State, Nigeria, water pumping. The utility in Hargeisa has spent an and HWA in Somaliland. In these utilities the initial average of 60 percent of its revenues on supplying 7,000 interest in supporting improvements in cost recovery liters of diesel a day to its generators. In 2013 the LWSC morphed into support on other reform actions, but for spent an average of US$28,000 a week on diesel equal two different reasons. In the case of the PHWC the utility to one-third of its operating costs. In both these cases was in the midst of crisis requiring leadership change, investing the equivalent of one year of turnover in more complete review of staffing skills, and an emergency line efficient solutions to these energy needs would have freed of credit to keep it going at all. Working directly on cost up a great deal of revenue with a repayment period of less recovery would have been premature, though it remained than three years. an implicit target even of efforts to stabilize the immediate crisis. In the case of the HWA, water sales were enough In summary, though understanding the issues underlying to cover its basic staff, electricity, chemical, and other cost recovery (or the lack of it) was the right entry point costs. Cost recovery mechanisms were ‘good enough’ for engaging with utilities in FCV affected situations, an so the WSP’s TA focused on strengthening the utilities’ understanding of the cost recovery issues led to a range corporate governance by setting up a board of directors of broader reform actions. In the case of the LWSC and to oversee the organization’s operations and ring-fence GVWC these actions, such a customer enumeration, were its revenues in advance of a large increase of production very closely associated with improving revenues, while in capacity coming on-stream. In this case safeguarding the PHWC the focus shifted to putting in place the human future (increased) revenues was a primary concern resources to manage the operation and, in the HWA, the addressed both by setting up the board of directors and in governance mechanism to oversee the revenues. These shifting from cash accounting to International Financial low-cost, short-term actions were productive interventions Reporting Standards. even without the indirect impact on cost recovery. Some complementary, and relatively modest, investment to address specific cost cutting measures such as energy needs for water pumping would have freed-up valuable revenue US$28,000 Average amount spent by the Liberia Water and Sewer Corporation (LWSC) for addressing other aspects of cost recovery including in a week on diesel, equal to one- physical losses. third of its operating costs. 33 VI. Conclusion and Recommendations A central challenge in providing sustainable water supply In all countries the data sparked constructive dialogue services in FCV affected countries is described in this between government and its development partners and report as the capacity conundrum. This is a central trade- have influenced the nature and targeting of funding to off between delivering urgently needed water supply service delivery. infrastructure in the quickest way possible versus investing in building institutions that deliver water supply. In a subset of the countries this data have been used by governments to shift the relationship with the multitude The large datasets on service delivery generated through of actors operating in the sector towards one in which this TA confirm that the current response to this trade-off state sector oversight institutions play a more decisive in FCV affected countries results in the vast majority of role in defining where and how services are delivered aid being delivered directly by international agencies and (the sector oversight work-stream). The tools used for non-state actors. This leaves local water sector institutions this reestablishment of oversight included issue-based in their postcrisis weakened condition. This bypassing of agreements, sector investment plans and, most importantly, the state locks FCV affected countries into an aid modality, multistakeholder compacts based on mutual accountability that even years after the peak of crisis shows few signs of of both government and other actors in the sector. building sector institutions that deliver water services. Under the utility reform work-stream, short-term, low- This WSP project took initial steps to rebuild capacity of cost actions undertaken by the WSP included upgrading sector oversight institutions and initiate reform in utilities. accounting and billing systems; customer enumeration In doing so WSP has: surveys to update customer databases; reducing non- • Demonstrated new tools and methods for working revenue water by regularizing illegal connections; and in FCV affected countries. expanding the revenue base by streamlining approaches • Generated new data and insights on service to connecting new customers. These led to direct delivery, particularly water supply services. improvements in cost recovery trends at both the GVWC • Influenced new funding flows to FCV affected and LWSC. The initial assessment of cost recovery also countries. provided an entry point to reform actions focused on • In a subset of countries, shifted the role of the sector human resources and financial management at both the oversight institutions towards a developmental PHWC and HWA. In the case of the HWA there was leadership role. also strengthening of the utility’s corporate governance through the setting up of a board of directors to oversee The extensive primary data collection on service delivery the organization’s operations. across countries facilitated by using a range of tools—from water point mapping, through water quality monitoring, Across the countries the WSP worked with, the data and to service level benchmarking—enabled ministries knowledge generated through this TA influenced both responsible for water supply to pinpoint critical sector levels and direction of over US$323 million of donor and issues, both: government funding (see Appendix C). The data on service • Opportunities—such as service delivery models delivery, for instance, were used by governments and that were working well, and; development partners to better target sector investments • Challenges—such as poor targeting of water and stimulated new investment on service delivery models points, poor quality well construction, health that were shown to work well. Service delivery models hazards due inappropriate technology use. evaluated by the WSP, such as sand dams in Somalia and autonomous piped water systems in the DRC, were 34 The Transition from Emergency to Development Support: Evidence from Country Case Studies in Africa | Conclusion and Recommendations Ben Daw Weah collects water at a new pump in Vai Town, Monrovia. Before a pump was built here, Ben and other Vai Town residents spent hours every day walking to collect water. (Photo credit: Liberia WASH Consortium, 2010.) adopted by new projects. Studies, such as that on utility • Local coping strategies—such as hand dug and billing systems in fragile environments, led to donors and manually drilled wells—had become mainstream governments financing specific upgrades in accounting supply models, marginalizing utility service and billing systems. delivery models. The experience gained during this TA, and revealed in Even in oil-rich ROC, where the government was the main the related primary data on service delivery, provided financier, sector oversight institutions had been bypassed insights to common issues across countries that were in favor of rapid roll-out of infrastructure delivered by holding back the transition from relief to development. a foreign company with similar consequences to those These included that: enumerated above. • The vast majority of services were delivered by international agencies and non-state actors. The TA also provided a better understanding of the sources of • These aid modalities bypassed sector institutions variation in results across countries—valuable information long after the end of crises (6 to 10 years). for future intervention strategies and program design. • Targeting, quality, and sustainability of handpumps delivered this way was poor. Though the emergence of local coping strategies was • The capacity of sector institutions to deliver or common to all the FCV affected countries studied, the even oversee WASH service delivery had not been extent to which these strategies dominated service delivery built. was inversely related to the political will to charge for services. Greater political incentives to charge for utility 35 The Transition from Emergency to Development Support: Evidence from Country Case Studies in Africa | Conclusion and Recommendations services—observed where subnational authorities were This TA project showed that investing relatively small striving to prove themselves in the face of weakening amounts of funding in the focused developmental entry central governments—bolstered utility viability and points yields short-term sector results. Progress on building stemmed the proliferation of local coping strategies. In the capacity of sector oversight institutions and of utility wetter countries where the economic threshold for tapping reform in FCV affected countries supports the transition into groundwater was lower, the proliferation of local to country-led development programming. coping strategies was higher and political will to charge for water services was lower. Sector oversight institutions are able to shift the relationship with the multitude of actors operating in the The bigger question for those living and working in sector towards one where there is mutual accountability FCV affected countries is: What does it take to address for sector results with development partners. fragility itself, and is improving WASH services a means to this end? Support to utilities on cost recovery led to improved revenues and reinvestment in improved service delivery. This system building TA is underfunded in low-income FIGURE 6.1: HIERARCHY OF OUTCOMES TOWARDS FCV affected countries. Judiciously increasing funding ESTABLISHING COUNTRY-LED DEVELOPMENT to this type of TA would increase the likelihood of a PROGRAMMING AND THE DOUBLE DIVIDEND transition from humanitarian driven interventions to ones OF IMPROVED WASH SERVICES AND IMPROVED that are country-led and development oriented, and reduce CITIZEN-STATE RELATIONS the likelihood of countries sliding back into relying on humanitarian assistance for water supply service delivery. With the ultimate aim of delivering a double dividend— both improved water services and improved citizen-state relations—this hierarchy of objectives forms a ground- up approach to reestablishing country-led WASH service delivery. Double dividend 6.1 Recommendations Delaying investment in both sector oversight and utility reform reduces the prospects for achieving a transition from Hierachy of outcomes emergency to country-led development programming. As time passes, the combined effect of unmanaged aid and Mutual the entrenchment of alternative service delivery providers accountability makes it ever more difficult to reestablish a compact between sector oversight institutions and the growing number of non-state and informal private suppliers. Direct delivery of infrastructure leaves an unmanaged infrastructure burden. The burgeoning of local coping strategies makes it harder to reestablish and reform utility Developmental service provision. entry points in fragile states The above insights based on the experience and evidence generated in this TA project lead to the central Source: World Bank data. recommendations to governments of countries that are 36 The Transition from Emergency to Development Support: Evidence from Country Case Studies in Africa | Conclusion and Recommendations FCV affected, to donors funding service delivery, and The evidence from the water point mapping exercises to international development agencies operating in in Liberia and Sierra Leone demonstrated that existing these countries. emergency cluster coordination mechanisms are inadequate in ensuring equitable coverage or ensuring accountability Governments in countries that are FCV affected should for the quality of rural water supply service delivery. actively encourage utilities to cover their operation and Improved data for sector oversight led to voluntary maintenance costs through consumer tariffs as early as incorporation of data for targeting in the investments of possible and even during subsequent emergencies (for both governments and external actors (see Appendix C). example, EVD). The demonstrated benefits of setting cost recovery Engagement in utility reform led to demonstrated tariffs was that utilities used their own revenues to make improvements in cost recovery at the LWSC and GVWC. immediate improvements in performance. It also made Earlier engagement may have headed off the possibility utilities more demand responsive and keen to connect new of alternative providers becoming a barrier to future customers—as new customers could generate revenues to utility service provision. It might also have allowed for further build the utility. In Somalia and Zimbabwe, where engagement with those alternative providers to become utilities have a tariff structure that enabled them to cover a part of the solution to the delivery of services in the operating costs, utilities reinvested revenues in reducing postcrisis recovery period. physical losses and more efficient pumps and generators. Even in Liberia where the LWSC was not yet able to fully Donors should reassess the balance between investing cover operating costs, positive cash flow from revenues in infrastructure versus investing in capacity building. was invested in improvements to customer enumeration A dollar spent on building sector oversight capacity or and billing systems as well as connecting new customers. utility reform to respond to the capacity conundrum is a dollar lost to infrastructure investment. But it is clear from Utilities that recovered their costs reduced their need for this project and the data it has generated that there is a operating subsidies, releasing funds for other purposes need to rebalance support for building infrastructure versus such as improving sector oversight institutions, further investing in the sector management interventions needed expanding infrastructure or extending access to the poor. for sustainable service delivery. The rates of nonfunctional systems, the poor construction quality, the burgeoning low International development agencies should engage quality local coping strategies—all point to the efficiency earlier–in the first years of the postcrisis recovery gains that could be achieved by developing the oversight period–in building both sector oversight capacity and capacity necessary to monitor, oversee, and sustain in reforming utilities. infrastructure. The benefits of earlier engagement in building sector oversight capacity and in reforming utilities include TA to the water sector across 32 FCV affected countries better targeting and accountability of available resources, averaged below 2 percent of total sector ODA over a 10- the possibility of improved utility cost recovery, and the year period (Figure 6.2). Carefully redirecting a proportion opportunity to develop appropriate institutional and of this existing ODA to sector oversight capacity and governance structures. utility reform would help better prepare countries for managing investment in infrastructure, sustaining service In rural areas the early engagement can help support the delivery and, ultimately, helping countries transition from establishment of databases for performance and asset dependency on humanitarian response to country-led management, which can be used to better target resources, development programs. and to help set up supply chains that will lead to more sustainable service delivery. Across the countries the WSP worked with, the data and knowledge generated through this TA influenced both levels and direction of over US$323 million of donor and government funding 37 The Transition from Emergency to Development Support: Evidence from Country Case Studies in Africa | Conclusion and Recommendations FIGURE 6.2: SHARE OF ODA THAT IS TA VERSUS INFRASTRUCTURE AND TOTAL FUNDING LEVEL FOR PERIOD 2005-2014 Total WASH ODA (US$ million) Technical assistance Infrastructure Total WASH ODA Source: OECD and author’s calculations. Governments, international development agencies, There is a need to invest more in developing solutions and donors should agree and regularly review the roles to the challenges of managing the transition from and responsibilities of different actors with the aim of emergency to development support. improving aid and development effectiveness. While it is fully recognized that the transition from emergency While policies and laws are a key component of defining the to development is neither unidirectional nor linear, stretching division of labor between the state and providers, their role development interventions into the postcrisis recovery phase in fragile contexts is limited by the state’s ability to enforce opens up greater opportunity for a double dividend: that of them and because most service delivery is done directly by improving WASH services and of state building. This TA non-state and private actors with little or no incentive to has brought to light a number of challenges for which more comply with the state. Rather, agreements—or compacts— analytical work is needed to provide a better understanding established and upheld through multistakeholder of how to work with countries and partners as they transition consultative mechanisms can facilitate the state’s step (back) from conflict to stability including: What are the most into a policy making role. The formation of these compacts appropriate utility models in this transition period? How should be at country level. In the short-term they should might subsidies be used to benefit the greatest number of aim to improve the targeting, quality, and sustainability of people? How can development partners better engage with service delivery. In the medium-term they should support humanitarian response actors, and vice versa, to ensure a the development of country-led programming. To increase smoother transition between the two types of response? These the likelihood that these compacts are upheld, recourse to all need more thought in order to create more opportunities an internationally agreed set of aid effectiveness standards for earlier, lasting, and more cost effective transitions. such as SWA’s Collaborative Behaviors or the New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States may be needed to incentivize mutual accountability of external actors. 38 The Transition from Emergency to Development Support: Evidence from Country Case Studies in Africa | Appendix A: Country Appendixes Appendix A: Country Appendixes This chapter provides additional details of the Each case study begins with a summary table of the achievements recorded against the intermediate outcomes TA provided by the WSP and progress made across for each of the seven FCV affected countries which intermediary outcomes. The color coded cells are areas received WSP TA. No substantive TA was provided in the in which the WSP intervened; white cells are where no eighth country, South Sudan, due to the outbreak of civil intervention was made. The table is followed by a narrative conflict in 2013. of the context, WSP activities, and results. The interventions across all countries were developed The order in which countries appear is to aid comparisons with the same objective—transitioning to country-led in the results across the different countries. A summary development programming—but the actual areas of table at the end of the chapter provides the country results intervention were shaped by the specific context and in alphabetical order. opportunities in each country. Each of the case studies, therefore, brings to light different context-appropriate tools and methods. Re-establishing sector oversight role Re-establishing sector oversight role • Sector assessment and infrastructure policy • National mapping of 28,000 urban and note to inform the World Bank Somalia ISN rural points for sector planning • Study to assess the potential for • Fixing Freetown case study implementing small dams Utility reform • Study of the socioeconomic impacts • Assessment of GVWC billing system (winners and losers) of water resource • Replacement of GVWC billing system developments (with DFID) Utility reform • Support to GVWC enumeration and • Assessment of Hargeisa Water Agency management of over 19,500 billing system household, commercial and public • Assessment and support to the corporate customers governance of HWA Re-establishing sector oversight role Re-establishing sector oversight role • Provincial sector overviews for Sud Kivu, • National mapping of 10,000 urban and rural Addressing fragility Nord Kivu and Katanga water points for sector planning • National mapping of 520 autonomous piped • Sector investment plan for 2012-17 water schemes covering 4 million people • Support to JSRs in 2013,14,15 • Support sector dialogue on water law • Studies for piped water systems in Monrovia • Study on improving WASH service delivery requires action on: and secondary towns. in protracted crises (with UNICEF) Utility reform Utility reform • Water quality survey in Monrovia • Assessment of REGIDESO billing system • Assessment of LWSC billing system and • National mapping of 4,100 REGIDESO stand- enumeration of over 5,000 customers posts • Study for output based aid approach to low- • Facilitated delegated management of 150 • Jobs income households in Monrovia stand-posts by REGIDESO Re-establishing sector oversight role Re-establishing sector oversight role • Justice • Support for an update of the 2006 • Support to national water policy inventory using the water point mapping • Review of sector coordination and method regulation assessing whether existing Utility reform Re-establishing sector oversight role institutions were fit for purpose • Water quality survey (dry and wet • National mapping of 1,500 water points • Impact Assessment of Beitbridge Emergency season) of household water use in Port • Facilitated sector institutional assessment Water Supply and Sanitation project • Security Harcourt following the 2003 Water Act Utility reform • Customer enumeration survey in service • Facilitated dialogue on development of • Urban utility service level benchmarking in area targeted by PHWC pilot national policy 32 municipal councils over 3 annual cycles rehabilitation Utility reform • Assessment of PHWC billing and • Assessment of service models for urban accounting systems poor including through social connections and stand-posts 39 The Transition from Emergency to Development Support: Evidence from Country Case Studies in Africa | Appendix A: Country Appendixes Liberia WSP Technical Assistance by work-stream Reestablishing sector oversight role Utility reform • National map of 10,000 urban and rural points reporting • Water quality survey of 200 public water points in location, functionality, technology, and management Monrovia • Sector investment plan for 2012–17 translating PRSP • Assessment of LWSC billing and accounting systems targets into specific project investments • Support to LWSC enumeration of over 5,000 customers in • Support to sector coordination and dialogue including Monrovia and Kakata as well as pilot connection program joint sector reviews in 2013, ’14, ’15, and 2013 sector • Prefeasibility study for implementing an output-based aid performance report approach to expand access to piped water supply to low- • Prefeasibility studies for the development of piped water income households in Monrovia systems in Monrovia, Gbarnga, Greenville, and Harper Intermediate outcomes 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. Reestablish Institutionalize Restore cost Establish an Increase domestic Increase use of country leadership rigorous sector recovery in urban inclusive sector investment in the country systems in sector monitoring and utilities, small- investment plan sector by development coordination joint sector review towns, and large (SIP) and process partners and policy processes rural piped water that mobilizes development schemes infrastructure investment WASH Compact A regular JSR Updating of the Detailed SIP Raised level of WB investment signed by the process supported billing system exists for 2012–17 domestic thwarted ($10 million) in President in 2011, by an SPR in place and customer mobilized (circa in FY14 by lack Monrovia’s urban established and a led by NWSHPC databases helped US$30 million as of of absorption water supply will series of guiding increase revenue 2016) with greater capacity of ministry be managed by documents and collection at LWSC attention since the responsible for rural PIU embedded in events EVD epidemic water supply LWSC Legend: No WSP intervention No progress Slight progress Moderate progress Good progress Substantial progress In 2003, Liberia emerged from 14 years of civil war and Water service delivery in Liberia faces real and complex conflict that destroyed government institutions, forced structural problems rooted in the postconflict emergency the flight of thousands of Liberians, including an exodus response. For many years after the war, the water sector of educated Liberians, and decimated infrastructure remained highly fragmented and lacked cohesive planning, in the country. Following the signing of the Accra with ineffective government institutions remaining on the Peace Accord in 2004, Liberia embarked on national sidelines. Non-state actors provided emergency relief but reconstruction, which included rebuilding government lacked the overview and reach to deliver services equitably institutions and infrastructure. across the country, or to put in place management systems and processes to sustain interventions effectively. 40 The Transition from Emergency to Development Support: Evidence from Country Case Studies in Africa | Appendix A: Country Appendixes Rebuilding the sector’s oversight role sector actors. The Liberian delegation discussed the This TA began with a nationwide water point history of Uganda’s sector development with senior infrastructure mapping exercise to create a credible officials, participated in a Joint Sector Review (JSR) to baseline for the sector and as means of analyzing how services see how actors worked together in the SWAp, and visited were being delivered and through whom. Working with small town private sector operators—of specific interest the MoPW, UNICEF, and the NGO WASH Consortium, as USAID and the African Development Bank were the WSP surveyed all protected water points in rural and financing piped systems in six small towns in Liberia. urban areas of Liberia—over 10,000 in total—within a six-month period. As well as establishing the first postwar To provide a framework for better collaboration among baseline,the survey revealed: 85 percent of Liberia’s water actors in the very fragmented Liberian water sector a joint points had been built since 2003; construction had peaked Sanitation and Water for All mission took place in 2011 to in 2007 and by 2010 was tailing off; rates of functionality negotiate a Water, Sanitation and Hygiene (WASH) sector were poor at just 60 percent; 43 percent of handpumps compact.8 This was the first time sector representatives from had no local water committee; and, though 80 percent nearly all agencies (bilateral, multilateral, and civil society) of handpumps were of the Afridev brand, there were no came together under the leadership of the government (led government or market mechanisms to supply spare parts. by the Ministry of Planning). An early intervention organized by the WSP was a south- The compact was a very simple document that south learning visit in 2011which provided a senior Liberian outlined four joint commitments to the WASH sector, sector delegation with exposure to Uganda’s water sector’s agreed by government and development partners, for Sector-Wide Approach (SWAp) and good example of a country-led sector development and monitoring process 8 Sanitation and Water for All is a global partnership of developing countries and de- working with a wide range of donors, nongovernmental velopment agencies campaigning for political leadership and improved accountability organizations (NGOs), local governments, and private to achieve universal access to WASH. Daniel Tomah draws water from a new pump in Chocolate City, Monrovia. His family says he never used to help collect water, but that’s changed now that the pump is close to his home. (Photo credit: Liberia WASH Consortium, 2010). 41 The Transition from Emergency to Development Support: Evidence from Country Case Studies in Africa | Appendix A: Country Appendixes implementation over a two-year time period: strengthen In 2013, WASH related line ministries requested TA institutional capacity; ensure equity and quality in service for the preparation of their annual budget request in a provision; develop a monitoring system; and improve format that conformed to the Medium Term Expenditure sector financial planning and management. Framework (MTEF). Capital funding from the national budget for WASH had been negligible until 2013. The The WASH Sector Compact was a key turning point as WSP’s TA supported the ministries and agencies to it established consensus, among both Government of prepare their budget requests in the MTEF format and Liberia (GoL) institutions and development partners primed staff to defend requests at the Ministry of Finance’s with a stake in the sector, on a short and achievable list (MoF) budget hearings. The TA led to increased budget of priority activities. The process of creating the longer allocations to WASH from US$1 million to US$3.5 and more comprehensive Sector Strategic Plan (SSP) million. However, actual expenditures were only US$2.5 document generated a high level of buy-in across sector million due to slow disbursement and a lack of absorption stakeholders and has proved to be a useful road-map to capacity, particularly at the MoPW. Furthermore, much coordinate sector reform activities by both domestic and of the actual disbursement was channeled into subsidizing non-state actors. running costs of the Liberia Water and Sewer Corporation (LWSC) (LWSC, 2014). The compact was expanded into a SSP that has become the overall road-map for the sector. The 2015-16 budget raised the amount allocated to WASH to US$4,953,612 as part of the Ebola Response Based on a compact commitment, the WSP supported and Recovery WASH Plan. This could be the first year a sector investment plan (SIP) to deepen stakeholders’ that the GoL has not only subsidized the LWSC but will understanding of the specific infrastructure investments finance infrastructure investments. required to meet agreed sector goals. The SIP was a strategic initiative that translated the high-level targets set out in the Annual JSRs were initiated in 2013. This first JSR in government’s “Agenda for Transformation” and SSP, into 2013 was mainly an information sharing exercise. Inputs discrete WASH investment projects, estimating associated from a senior Ugandan water sector official, brought in as costs and time scales required to improved coverage across an observer, convinced government of the need to prepare urban and rural Liberia. Published by the MoPW, the a Sector Performance Report (SPR) prior to the 2014 SIP defined priority projects for WASH, providing the JSR. The WSP then supported the GoL in publishing government with a credible plan and well-defined needs to the country’s first WASH SPR in advance of the 2014 approach investors, both domestic and donor. JSR. This report, written by a team of Liberian authors, TABLE A1: ADDITIONAL FUNDING MOBILIZED BY THE SECTOR INVESTMENT PLAN Donor Implementer Project Amount Status DFID UNICEF Rural WASH Project–Eastern Liberia US$6.5m Under implementation (£4.5m) DFID Liberia WASH Sustainable WASH in Fragile Contexts US$12.5m Not disbursed due to delays Consortium (£8.5m) caused by Ebola Epidemic DGIS UNICEF Accelerating sanitation and water for all US$4m Under implementation in Liberia World Bank LWSC Urban water and sanitation infrastructure US$10m Effectiveness expected 2015 Firestone LWSC Water and Sanitation System in Harbel tba Feasibility study ongoing NOCAL LWSC Water and Sanitation System in Ganta tba Feasibility study ongoing Note: ‘m’ means million. 42 The Transition from Emergency to Development Support: Evidence from Country Case Studies in Africa | Appendix A: Country Appendixes presented stakeholders with an evidence base to debate data and has developed a process of certifying non-state and agree priorities for action. This multistakeholder actors. The Committee’s remaining weakness is that it has annual planning and review process has continued, now a strong rural water supply and sanitation focus but has in its third year of government leadership. been less successful at involving actors working on urban water supply and water resources management. The WASH Sector Compact was a key turning point as it established consensus, among both GoL institutions Utility reform, starting with cost recovery and development partners with a stake in the sector, on a In 2003 Liberia experienced a cholera outbreak with short and achievable list of priority activities. The process over 34,000 cases and it has consistently reported over of creating the longer and more comprehensive SSP 1,000 cases a year up to 2011 (WHO, 2012). In 2014, document generated a high level of buy-in across sector the outbreak of the EVD generated over 28,000 cases stakeholders and has proved to be a useful road-map to and caused over 11,000 deaths. Though not water-borne, coordinate sector reform activities by both domestic and unsafe WASH services and the lack of proper hygiene non-state actors. practices contributed “to the propagation of the Ebola virus”, and was listed as a “critical factor” in the context The 2015 JSR was the third in a row, marking successful of hand-washing in schools (United Nations/World progress towards institutionalization of the JSR process. Bank/EU/AfDB, 2015). For both the cholera and the The introduction of the SPRs, in particular, have brought EVD outbreaks, caseloads in Monrovia were high due greater rigor to the sector monitoring process. The SPRs to its population density and lack of sanitary conditions. consolidate key data from household surveys managed by To better understand the water quality implications of the Liberia Institute of Statistics and Geo-Information supplying Greater Monrovia through handpumps, a water Services, sector inventories such as the water point quality survey was commissioned in 2011. Using the mapping, sector studies, and reports. The evidence base water point mapping data, 20 percent of the water points set out in the SPR provides the evidence base for debate in Greater Monrovia were randomly selected for water at the JSR and for decision making on the priorities for quality testing. The results showed high levels of fecal action over the next year. contamination in both formal and informal water supply with 57 percent of the samples testing positive for E. coli Out of an array of proposed sector institutions, it is the and 80 percent for coliform contamination (Kumpel, National WASH Promotion Committee (NWASHPC) that Forthcoming). These results pointed to the need to move has emerged as the main sector coordination mechanism. away from this emergency handpump infrastructure Chaired by the MoPW and with a small secretariat, it is towards piped household connections in urban areas. this Committee that has succeeded in bringing together the GoL with other sector actors. Through the combination of The LWSC, mandated to supply services to all urban areas, regular meetings and a simple but well managed website9 served 12 cities with piped water in the 1980s. The1989– the Committee greatly improved communication among 2003 civil war destroyed much of its infrastructure as well sector actors. The Committee has driven the JSR process as its institutional and human capacity. In 2010 the LWSC and has been credited with a substantive response by the served only a small proportion of Monrovia’s residents and WASH sector during the Ebola Virus Disease (EVD) was reliant on GoL subsidy to cover all water pumping crisis. Though the sector coordination role was temporarily costs and treatment costs. taken over by the Cluster System shortly after the EVD outbreak, it reverted to MoPW leadership in early 2016, Though improving cost recovery alone would not a signal of the government’s readiness to take back up the guarantee that the LWSC would deliver improved services, leadership. The Committee now requires actors to discuss it was seen as a precondition for enabling it to extend and and submit annual work plans along with monitoring maintain sustainable services. A series of practical actions with immediate operational impact on improving revenues 9 http://wash-liberia.org/ 43 The Transition from Emergency to Development Support: Evidence from Country Case Studies in Africa | Appendix A: Country Appendixes BOX A1: WATER POINT MAPPING IN LIBERIA With developments in Information Communications Technology (ICT), a range of mapping methods have become available to plug difficult-to-fill data gaps. With basic training teams of enumerators (often young unemployed youth) equipped with smartphones and apps such as FLOW, Fulcrum, and DoForms can work their way across countries capturing hundreds of data points on services a day and covering whole countries in a matter of months. The survey covered 10,000 improved water points serving (or not) some 4 million people. The survey generated a comprehensive picture of the number, type (for example, protected springs, wells, standposts), the make of pumps (for instance, Afridev, India Mark, Kardia, Vergnet, and so on), which organization they were constructed by, the age of the installation, the functionality of water points (including reasons for nonfunctionality), adequacy of water (throughout the dry season), how they were managed by the community, and whether there were regular financial contributions for maintenance. Overlaying this data on water points with census data on population, by enumeration areas, relative service levels were calculated—in terms of water points per 1,000 people (Figure A1.a). Adding road infrastructure provides further insights into bias of past investment or opportunities to increase investment around emerging growth points (Figure A1.b). The costs of these surveys were in the order of US$20 to US$30 a water point. FIGURE A1.A: PEOPLE WITHOUT ADEQUATE FIGURE A1.B: “CORRIDOR OF NEED” CONTAINING ACCESS TO IMPROVED WATER IN SHADES OF 75% OF LIBERIANS WITHOUT ADEQUATE ACCESS RED (GREEN REPRESENTS ADEQUATE ACCESS, TO SAFE WATER GREY IS UNINHABITED AREAS) 44 The Transition from Emergency to Development Support: Evidence from Country Case Studies in Africa | Appendix A: Country Appendixes were identified and implemented. These short-term, low- The LWSC has reported a 145 percent revenue increase cost actions included upgrading the accounting and between FY11 and FY14, has increased connected billing system; a customer enumeration survey to customers by 20 percent, and streamlined its staffing. update customer databases; reducing non-revenue water The EVD crisis in 2014–15 impacted revenues in by regularizing illegal connections; and expanding the FY2015, both because collection efforts were temporarily revenue base by streamlining approaches to connecting interrupted due to widespread panic and quarantines in new customers. Monrovia, and due to the closure of many businesses at the height of the epidemic. However, due to a determined These low-cost, short-term actions to improve cost recovery effort by the LWSC which saw collection efficiency on or reduce non-revenue water were prioritized over other issued bills rise from 69 percent to 89 percent, the utility interventions such as: reduction of production costs and still managed to record US$4,085,420 in billed revenue physical water losses which would rely on infrastructure in FY15 compared with US$4,709,932 in 2014. The GoL interventions to reduce energy costs; or tariff reform which continues to provide a significant operating subsidy to would rely on difficult-to-get political support. However, the LWSC, though it fell to 23 percent of total LWSC reducing physical losses and expanding the distribution revenues in FY14, compared with an average of just under network was later built into the design of a World Bank 40 percent annually in FY11–FY13. project, the Liberia Urban Water Project ($10 million), initiated by the WSP team, and the first stand-alone water sector intervention by the Bank since 1985. FIGURE A2: TOTAL CONNECTIONS AND FINANCIAL RESULTS REPORTED BY LWSC FY11 FY12 FY13 FY14 Revenues Billings $1,922,261 $1,950,204 $2,474,158 $4,709,932 GoL subsidy $636,969 $1,325,000 $2,726,299 $1,479,913 Total revenues $2,559,230 $3,275,204 $5,200,457 $6,189,845 Expenses Cost of production n/a n/a $1,638,130 $2,007,330 Selling/distribution n/a n/a $322,815 $274,100 Administration n/a n/a $2,823,813 $3,184,383 Other n/a n/a $50,303 $213,974 Total expenses $3,155,442 $3,693,563 $4,835,061 $5,679,787 Balance -$596,212 -$418,360 $365,396 $510,058 excl. subsidy -$1,233,181 -$1,743,360 -$2,360,903 -$969,855 Sources: LWSC Corporate Audit (2012), IFRS Financial Statement (2014), LWSC Presentation, AfDB MWSSRP Appraisal Report (2007), and JICA Masterplan (2009). 45 The Transition from Emergency to Development Support: Evidence from Country Case Studies in Africa | Appendix A: Country Appendixes Sierra Leone WSP Technical Assistance by work-stream Reestablishing sector oversight role Utility reform • National map of 28,000 urban and rural points reporting • Assessment of GVWC billing and accounting systems location, functionality, technology, and management • Replacement of GVWC billing system (with DFID) • Fixing Freetown case study examining rationale for a • Support to GVWC enumeration and management of over holistic approach to tackling dilapidated urban services 19,500 household, commercial and public customers and institutions in postconflict countries Intermediate outcomes 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. Reestablish Institutionalize Restore cost Establish an Increase domestic Increase use of country leadership rigorous sector recovery in urban inclusive sector investment in the country systems in sector monitoring and utilities, small- investment plan sector by development coordination joint sector review towns, and large (SIP) and process partners and policy processes rural piped water that mobilizes development schemes infrastructure investment A sector policy Ministry of Water Replacing billing No SIP has been No increase in WB Decentralized was approved in created civil system and developed GoSL investment Service Delivery 2010 but provides service posts for updating customer in WASH Program used weak guidance on sector monitoring databases has infrastructure country systems cost recovery or but did not retain increased billing but link with tariff setting and staff recruited and stabilized sector institutions review utility revenues not made No WSP Substantial Legend: No progress Slight progress Moderate progress Good progress intervention progress Sierra Leone has been conflict-free for over 10 years; it has services are still delivered through non-state actors with no grown rapidly and has enormous potential for continued substantive involvement of government. economic growth both from minerals and from other sectors including agriculture, fisheries, and tourism. Reestablishing the sector’s oversight role Progress has been made in reestablishing the civil service As in Liberia, the WSP supported a nationwide water and service delivery including at decentralized levels of point mapping exercise in Sierra Leone. The results, widely government albeit that the process of decentralization disseminated in 2012, revealed many problems common has partially stalled with some functions still effectively to the survey in Liberia. Among these was the need for managed by central government. better coordination of external agencies. Of the existing 28,000 waterpoints, 86 percent were built by non-state Investment in service delivery in this context should therefore actors including thousands of small interventions from be led by government institutions with the aim of building local nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), religious their capacity to sustainably manage services. However, the groups, communities, and private individuals as well as 25 vast majority of Water, Sanitation and Hygiene (WASH) major external agencies. Among the 25 external agencies 46 The Transition from Emergency to Development Support: Evidence from Country Case Studies in Africa | Appendix A: Country Appendixes Water treatment plant at Guma Valley, Sierra Leone. (Photo credit: Ato Brown.) identified there was no geographic division of labor with To address this issue, the WSP supported the Government high numbers of agencies operating in all of Sierra Leone’s of Sierra Leone (GoSL) to develop official government 13 districts and even in the same chiefdoms (of which there guidelines, quality standards, and procedures for the are 149). For example, over the period 2009–12, seven construction and maintenance of hand dug wells. The different major external agencies were active just in Kholifa guidelines were compiled based on international best Rowala Chiefdom (Action Aid, CARE, Concern, GOAL, practice, in close coordination with implementing Red Cross, Save the Children, and United Nations). agencies on the ground and linked the national Water and Sanitation Policy and the rural Water Supply and The survey revealed the specific problem that 40 percent Small Towns Strategy. It was intended for water sector of protected in-use water points provided insufficient practitioners and managers who coordinate and oversee water during the dry season. This was on top of the 18 water supply service delivery with the aim of harmonizing percent of water points not functioning at all (see rates and professionalizing hand-dug well construction of seasonal use in table A2). Technically this seasonality practices. The guideline set basic standards while leaving problem was due to poor construction methods, wells space for adaptation to local conditions. not dug deep enough, and/or an inappropriate choice of waterpoint location. But it was also a symptom of The guidelines included a memorandum of understanding the incomplete accountability there is among donors, to be signed between agencies working in the sector and implementing agencies, and government. An issue-based the Ministry of Water Resources in Sierra Leone. The local compact between government and external agencies control and enforcement of the guidelines and standards was was proposed that included policies and standards intended to be through District Councils based on mandatory for construction and clearer geographic division of well completion forms and a certificate of completion. The labor, which would provide the framework for greater guidelines also recommended consolidation of pump types accountability for water point functionality. around the three most commonly used models (India Mark ii, Kardia, and Inkar). 47 The Transition from Emergency to Development Support: Evidence from Country Case Studies in Africa | Appendix A: Country Appendixes TABLE A2: NUMBER AND FUNCTIONALITY OF SIERRA LEONE’S PUBLIC, IMPROVED WATER POINTS Waterpoints by Functionality Number % of total All public, improved waterpoints 28,845 100% Under construction 1,480 5.1% Broken down 5,137 17.8% Partly functional 4,148 14.4% Fully functional 18,080 62.7% Protected, in-use points 18,908 65.5% ...... of which are seasonal 7,696 - Published in mid-2014, the guidelines have become a Utility reform frequently referenced document in Sierra Leone, with 500 In Sierra Leone, the Guma Valley Water Corporation hardcopies distributed directly to leading NGOs such as (GVWC), responsible for supplying the capital Freetown Concern, GOAL and Oxfam, and through the Ministry for with a population of around 1.2 million, the billing Water Resources to district councils.The guidelines were system and the underlying customer database had become also published online on three sector websites. Statistics a serious bottleneck to cost recovery. An assessment of the are only available from the Rural Water Supply Network billing system reported that the software reached the end site, where the document was viewed approximately 500 of its useful life, that there is no maintenance and support times over the past two years—in the top 15 percent of contract, and technicians with basic knowledge of MS- document downloads for the site. Access were able to alter data, including bills, directly. It took between six and eight hours for the system to update While there was wide distribution of the document, the customer bills.The system often crashed and corrupted planned tracking of the guideline’s application to new wells data tables, requiring staff to rebuild from backup files. using mandatory completion forms and certificates has The customer database consisted of a total of 79,000 remained an unrealized ambition. Though the Ministry accounts, of which around 18,000 were actively billed of Water went through a lengthy process with the Public and only 6,000 paid regularly (Nest Builders Int., 2015:p. Service Commission to create permanent civil service 2). Of more than 8,000 meter numbers registered in the posts for sector monitoring—both to follow up on this database, only 2,814 functional meters could actually be specific issue and to update the water point mapping— ascertained on the ground in late 2012 (ASPA Utilities, the staff recruited were not retained with most of the 2013). district posts remaining vacant. As a result, consistent coordination and tracking of non-state implemented well To improve revenue collection at the GVWC, the WSP construction exceeded the logistical capacity of district supported a survey to locate and enumerate tens-of- governments, and self-submission by constructors has thousands of its own customers to update the GVWC’s not worked due to the weak compliance incentives. This customer database. The survey covered (a) GPS location highlights the need for there to be a broader compact of customers; (b) the current account number; (c) among donors, implementing agencies, and government confirmed the full name of the customers; (d) collected that puts in place incentives for implementing agencies phone numbers; (e) included a photograph of properties; to report to government and for government to report on (f ) detailed address descriptions; and (g) details of meters. not just seasonality but other aspects of functionality are The data was collected using mobile-to-web survey improving or not. applications running on hand-held smartphones and tablets. Surveying teams were also instructed to scan the 48 The Transition from Emergency to Development Support: Evidence from Country Case Studies in Africa | Appendix A: Country Appendixes area for suspected illegal connections, that is, properties had gone out of business (ASPA Utilities, 2013). With receiving piped water but not being billed. funding from the DFID (US$220,000) and around US$70,000 in counterpart funding from the GVWC, Over 19,500 existing GVWC customers and over 3,000 hardware and software was upgraded and the new billing suspected illegal connections in Freetown were mapped. system was rolled out in early March 2015 (see Box A2). The customer data were transferred into upgraded billing The roll-out has been a success in terms of improved bill systems that have allowed management to review and generation and accuracy, improving critical commercial track metering routes better. The precise localization of processes like automating the calculation of bills with customers has helped field officers to assign and supervise the correct application of tariff levels by use, tracking collections more effectively. applications for new connections, and generating and assigning work orders. With the new system, billing takes The data helped to identify additional cost recovery just five minutes and the commercial team is able to use a opportunities through improved accuracy of billing, series queries to run integrity checks on the bills generated including identification of water-intensive businesses such (for example, checking for large deviations in consumption as hotels, that were being billed at lower residential rates, or and ensuring bills are properly addressed). multiple, separate properties sharing one account and thus profiting illegally from single property flat rates. The GVWC Remaining challenges at the GVWC include internal also launched an initiative to use phone numbers collected resistance to the new billing system—especially from meter during the exercise to send monthly bills by SMS, thus readers—that need to be confronted while continuing to reducing costs and delays associated with paper billing. This regularize illegal connections. With the comprehensive data was a particularly helpful step during the Ebola epidemic on customers and an effective billing system, introducing which complicated the physical delivery of paper bills. new meters to customers currently on flat-rate connections and replacing nonfunctioning meters will raise revenues The WSP worked closely with the UK’s Department for and improve demand management. Demand management International Development (DFID) which committed to will be critical in light of the constrained availability of financing a billing system upgrade following the WSP’s water in the Guma Valley dam and the limited prospect of findings that the existing GVWC billing system had developing a new source in the near future. numerous limitations and the billing support company FIGURE A3: OUTCOME OF WSP-FUNDED GVWC CUSTOMER ENUMERATION: DISTRIBUTION OF CUSTOMERS IN FREETOWN 49 The Transition from Emergency to Development Support: Evidence from Country Case Studies in Africa | Appendix A: Country Appendixes BOX A2: PROCURING BILLING SYSTEMS FOR UTILITIES IN FRAGILE STATES The WSP provided technical assistance to the GVWC for the diagnosis of its existing billing system and procurement of a replacement, with financial assistance from the DFID. Assisted by ASPA utilities, the WSP visited and studied a number of utilities in fragile states to take stock of the sorts of billing systems they had in place, their particular constraints, and gain insight into how (and if) the numerous challenges of a weak governance environment were overcome. The WSP also visited a number of small utilities in Kenya and Uganda, where various small-scale computerized billing systems had been successfully implemented. The first striking finding was that the utilities strongly preferred paying for locally-supported and adapted software rather than having donors provide generic applications. The ability to tailor and support the software locally was highly valued but this often came at a relatively high cost, was single-sourced, and depended on a single developer. The second key finding was that identifying providers of utility billing software is not simple. A search leads one to a plethora of small providers who appear to be offering variations on bespoke applications developed for municipalities. Drawing on the World Bank and ASPA’s experience with major utilities in both developing and industrialized countries, a list of known software brands used by large urban utilities was prepared. Finding the actual providers of the software was complicated by the fact that software brands frequently change name, are upgraded, phased out, bought and sold between different IT service providers, and are merged into other systems. Also, many utilities either used “in house” software (Veolia, Suez), or regional providers (the case of the United Kingdom and Australia), used bespoke systems, or used billing modules of highly sophisticated Enterprise Management Systems (EMS) such as SAP. There appeared to be few truly international utility billing software providers. The lessons from the visits, as well as the diagnosis of the GVWC’s current billing system, were used to develop a strategy for procuring the new billing system for the utility. To ensure maximum participation in the procurement process, as well as advertising the contract on dgmarket.com, identified potential providers were directly contacted. Ten companies expressed interest in the project, of which five were shortlisted. A challenge was the scope of the billing system. These can vary enormously between providers, some of whom propose simple MS Access-based systems of the sort the GVWC already had in place, or C++ standalone, single PC type systems, through to very sophisticated web-enabled EMS. From site visits, it was known that utility billing systems often claim to perform a large number of functions, making assessment of quality difficult in a tender evaluation where there is a very wide range of prices (from $2,000 to $50 million). The GVWC had a specific budget constraint, and it was felt that unless bidders had some idea of the budget, such a wide range of prices (and scope) risked that the “quality” weighting of the procurement would be entirely outweighed by the price weighting, leading to the cheapest product being selected even if there were misgivings about the quality. It was therefore decided to announce the budget, and to some extent remove price competition. The terms of reference noted that the budget was a “maximum”, which allowed competitive pricing, and also included minimum software, hardware, support, and service requirements, as well as optional items to be priced separately. Ongoing costs had to be made explicit, so that some consideration could be given to the effect on the GVWC’soperating budget. Services included a training component and three years of support from a local partner as well as two visits per year from the international partner, if requested by the GVWC. The three tenders submitted were of good quality, although the bidders proposed different hardware scope, which necessitated some adjustment to allow a like-for-like price comparison. Bidders also included different tax assumptions which needed to be equalized to allow a fair comparison. The company that won the tender worked closely with the GVWC and persevered during the very difficult circumstances of the Ebola outbreak. The billing system finally went live in March 2015. 50 The Transition from Emergency to Development Support: Evidence from Country Case Studies in Africa | Appendix A: Country Appendixes Republic of Congo WSP Technical Assistance by work-stream Reestablishing sector oversight role Utility reform • National map of 1,500 rural points reporting location, • Assessment of service models for urban poor including functionality, technology, and management through social connections and standposts • Facilitated sector institutional assessment to gauge the level of implementation of the reform based on the 2003 Water Act • Facilitated dialogue on development of national policy Intermediate objectives 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. Reestablish Institutionalize Restore cost Establish an Increase domestic Increase use of country rigorous sector recovery in urban inclusive sector investment in the country systems leadership monitoring and utilities, small- investment plan sector by development in sector joint sector review towns, and large (SIP) and process partners coordination processes rural piped water that mobilizes and policy schemes infrastructure development investment GoC has initiated Water point No progress No SIP established GoC has reduced GoC financing sectorwide mapping initiated on delegated investment in the 80% of WB dialogue on a policy dialogue management of sector due to lower project managed new policy but monitoring not standposts in than expected oil through a PIU in institutionalized urban areas revenues in 2015 the Ministry of and no JSRs Equipment and Public Works Legend: No WSP intervention No progress Slight progress Moderate progress Good progress Substantial progress The Republic of Congo (ROC) is a lower middle income This was followed by a suite of new institutions established country due to its large oil revenues (fourth largest in by decree in 2008 including: the Water Sector Regulatory Sub-Saharan Africa) and relatively small population of 4.1 Body (ORSE: Organe de Régulation du Secteur de l’Eau), million. In the 1990s, the ROC went through a turbulent the Rural Water Supply National Agency (ANHYR: period of civil conflict over control of oil resources. Since Agence Nationale de l’Hydraulique Rural), and the Water the cessation of active civil conflict in 2000, the political Fund (FDSE: Fonds de Développement du Secteur de l’Eau). climate in the country has stabilized but decision making Few of these institutions are fully operational as their remains tightly controlled by the President. governing boards have not been appointed. The decrees establishing the new institutions were not aligned with The government has sought to improve access to Water, the water law nor did they provide for a distinct division Sanitation and Hygiene (WASH) services. Structural of roles and responsibilities. reform over the last decade began with a water law of 2003. 51 The Transition from Emergency to Development Support: Evidence from Country Case Studies in Africa | Appendix A: Country Appendixes A centralized public-owned utility (SNDE: Societé Nationale estimated to be just 26 percent as of December 2012. de Distribution d’ Eau) created in 1967 is responsible for service The data revealed very high average water point failure provision in all urban centers of the country since 2009. rates (26 percent) as well as a further 25 percent of water points that did not yield water year round. These average Reestablishing the sector’s oversight role failure rates increased rapidly with the age of the water The WSP provided TA for a national water point mapping point (see Figure A4.b). Apart from the high level of exercise which was mainly financed by the government. nonfunctionality and the low level of access, the water Over 1,500 water points were surveyed in rural areas point mapping revealed a high level of inequity across and small towns. Though the numbers of water points regions ranging from 4 percent in Sangha region to 39 constructed each year is rising, access in rural areas was percent for the Cuvette region (see Figure A4.c). FIGURE A4.A: NUMBER OF WATER POINTS FIGURE A4.B: PERCENT OF FAILED WATER POINTS CONSTRUCTED BY YEAR BY YEAR OF CONSTRUCTION FIGURE A4.C: ACCESS TO WATER SUPPLY INVERSELY CORRELATED WITH HIGH UNDER-5 MORTALITY 52 The Transition from Emergency to Development Support: Evidence from Country Case Studies in Africa | Appendix A: Country Appendixes A water tanker supplying a broken village scheme in the Republic of Congo. (Photo credit: Michel Duret.) In 2013 a Presidential initiative, the “Water for all Project” In both rural and urban water supply the current array of (2013–2016) was launched to build 4,000 boreholes in sector institutions and contracts reflect an accumulation rural areas with an estimated budget of US$400 million of attempts to improve WASH service delivery driven negotiated by the Presidency directly with a Brazilian from the Presidency, each with limited success and with Contractor, ASPERBRAS. There was no consultation no attempt to dissolve the institutions set up by previous with sector institutions and the contract is managed by rounds of reform. the “Delegation General des Grands Travaux” (DGGT), an agency closely linked to the Presidency. Sector institutions that therefore remain are very fragmented and lack strategic vision, with major Though the water point mapping data were paid for interventions being shaped by the presidential political and collected through a joint exercise by the ministries agenda through a highly centralized process and the responsible for water and planning, the data have not been government is bypassing and undermining the country’s integrated into the planning for the large new investment sector institutions. implemented by the Brazilian contractor. Utility reform In response to the problem of this and previous capital The centralized public-owned utility (SNDE) that investments bypassing water sector institutions, the originally served Brazzaville and Pointe Noire was in 2009 ministry in charge of water requested support from the made responsible for service provision in all urban centers WSP to carry out an institutional assessment as the in the ROC. Following a period of poor performance a basis for developing a new national water and sanitation private sector service contract was signed with VEOLIA policy. The ministry maintained that the previous policy in 2013. dating back to 2009, a sector policy statement (Lettre de Politique), failed to assign clear roles and responsibilities to institutions operating in the water sector. 53 The Transition from Emergency to Development Support: Evidence from Country Case Studies in Africa | Appendix A: Country Appendixes The main problems with this contract have been (a) standpost pilot included participation of beneficiaries nonpayment of the water bills by government ministries, at all stages of implementation of the standposts (from departments, and agencies; and (b) that the new tariff identifying location to management) as well as defining structure, a condition of the contract, has not been appropriate arrangements and defining roles and approved even three years after the start of the contract. responsibilities of management structures and the utility. However, after only a few standposts had been built, the The WSP supported an assessment of service models for development of the standposts program was stopped due the urban poor including through standposts and social to a lack of commitment of the utility to the approach. connections, a component of a WB-funded project, Projet The utility instead shifted the funding to a social private Eau, Électricité et Développement Urbain (PEEDU). The connections program that is yet to be completed. 54 The Transition from Emergency to Development Support: Evidence from Country Case Studies in Africa | Appendix A: Country Appendixes Democratic Republic of Congo WSP Technical Assistance by work-stream Reestablishing sector oversight role Utility reform • Provincial sector overviews to assess institutional capacity • Assessment of REGIDESO billing and accounting and development prospects at provincial level in Sud Kivu, systems Nord Kivu, and Katanga • National map and assessment of 4,100 REGIDESO • National map and assessment of 520 autonomous piped standposts and their management water schemes covering 4 million people • Facilitated delegated management of 150 standposts • Support to sector coordination and dialogue on water law by REGIDESO in Kinshasa building on study tour to Burkina Faso • Study on improving WASH service delivery in protracted crises (with UNICEF) Intermediate objectives 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. Reestablish country Institutionalize Restore cost Establish an inclusive Increase Increase use of leadership in sector rigorous sector recovery in urban sector investment plan domestic country systems coordination and monitoring and utilities, small- (SIP) and process that investment in by development policy development joint sector review towns, and large mobilizes infrastructure the sector partners processes rural piped water investment schemes Water law ratified Survey and REGIDESO is Investment plan for Funding to No sector and promulgated by evaluation of testing delegated autonomous piped WASH has budget support the President in early autonomous management of water schemes (AWS) not been mechanism. 2016 piped water standposts but no developed but not for prioritized by the WB investment schemes (AWS) conclusive results sector as a whole government managed by PIU initiated dialogue on impact on cost led by Secretary on management recovery General for and regulation REGIDESO Legend: No WSP intervention No progress Slight progress Moderate progress Good progress Substantial progress Political instability and armed conflict over the last two of low population density, autonomous (piped) water decades has resulted in a gradual withdrawal of the state schemes (AWS) are increasingly being financed by donors from the provision of basic water and sanitation services. in peri-urban areas of large towns as well as in small urban Institutional and state service provider capacity across the centers and larger villages. This is an increasingly popular sector has eroded, leaving a large portion of the population model with donors in which they provide hardware, the resorting to surface water or turning towards non-state pipes, software, and the management system to sustain the suppliers to meet their service delivery requirements. scheme. But due to the highly fragmented nature of aid in the DRC, little was known about the AWS, including their In the absence of state efforts to build and maintain total number, actual location, their size and the number of water and sanitation infrastructure, a service delivery people they served, how they were managed, the type of model financed, built, and managed by non-state actors technology, their functionality, financial viability or their has emerged across the Democratic Republic of Congo investment requirements. (DRC). While handpumps are still deployed in areas 55 The Transition from Emergency to Development Support: Evidence from Country Case Studies in Africa | Appendix A: Country Appendixes Reestablishing the sector’s oversight role Characteristics of each of the schemes were recorded to In the DRC, the WSP commissioned a nationwide survey build up a picture of the investment costs, the number of that identified 520 AWS, 83 percent of which were tap stands and household connections, water production, functional, serving over 4 million people. Around half were storage and consumption, as well as the nature of gravity-fed systems located in the two Kivus, the other half, management and revenues (see Table A3). pump and engine, spread mainly through a central belt from Bas Congo in the west to Katanga in the east. TABLE A3: CHARACTERISTICS OF AWS Mean Median FIGURE A5.A: LOCATION OF AWS ACROSS DRC Average total collected 830 60 ($/month) Average expenditure ($/month) 620 90 Average investment ($)10 275,000 150,000 Average population coverage 10,850 6,500 Investment cost per tapstand 15,700 6,390 Quantity produced (m3/day) 160 80 Average reservoir capacity 100 60 Average consumption/day/ 16 12 person11 While a quarter of the schemes charged for water by volume used (mainly those with a diesel or electric pump), the other half of schemes levied a monthly flat rate with the remainder not charging (mainly gravity schemes), instead collectively paying for breakdowns. Though most FIGURE A5.B: CUMULATIVE NUMBER OF AWS did have management committees, and nearly two-thirds BUILT BY PROVINCE employed operatives, only 15 percent of schemes had meters at their tapstands to monitor water consumption as a means of monitoring revenue. The results of the WSP’s study on AWS in the DRC clearly demonstrated the emergence of a successful service delivery model that is functioning well in an extremely challenging fragile context. An investment plan, drawing on cost data from recent projects, estimated that access could be expanded to around 19 million people at a cost of US$425 million over a period of six years. The plan proposed a mix of rehabilitation and new systems for each province depending on the existing stock. 10 These costs are declarative. They do not take into account design cost, project management costs, and other soft costs needed to undertake these investments. 11 See the calculated indicators. This per capita daily consumption seems relatively high. Perhaps tap stands cover a greater amount of people for a smaller consumption rate. 56 The Transition from Emergency to Development Support: Evidence from Country Case Studies in Africa | Appendix A: Country Appendixes However, the existing AWS deployment model almost to implement participatory approaches to planning and entirely circumvents the state, which has implications managing the services. for the sustainability, equity, and scalability of services provided through these systems. This point sparked heated Recent developments in the broader policy environment debate between government and donor stakeholders in of the DRC offer a number of entry points for reengaging the sector. Although AWS rates of functionality are higher the state in WASH service delivery. In mid-2015, the than for handpumps, the service delivery model still has a Decentralization Bill was passed, giving greater authority 20 percent nonfunctionality rate. On the one hand there to provinces. This was followed in late 2015 by the long is no mechanism to ensure that cost recovery is adequate anticipated ratification of the Water Law which12 establishes to cover operations and maintenance (O&M). On the the principle of delegated management of water services other, there is no monitoring of affordability or check and recognizes the role of community associations, such on whether revenues are being siphoned off for activities as AWS management committees. It also calls for cost- other than O&M. Government technocrats argued that based tariffs and special pro-poor measures to facilitate there is a key role for government in regulating AWS. access for vulnerable households. Donors, who point to evidence of an extractive, even predatory state, expressed concern at the risks of drawing These developments in devolution and sector policy the state into a sector oversight role. Underlining this provided new opportunities for provincial level sector concern was the national utility’s expressed desire to take institutions to use the data to monitor existing AWS over the ownership of AWS in peri-urban areas. Yet, in services and to work with donors to target investments the medium-term, not involving the state undermines to areas that are underserved. The findings of the study the potential for a constructive dialogue around service and the investment plan are already influencing funding delivery to emerge between citizen and state. flowing into the sector at province level. The African Development Bank has committed US$60 million to Circumventing the state also makes it unlikely that a constructing 60 AWS and is working with the authorities version of the AWS model is scaled up to meet the SDGs. in Kivu Orientale and Kivu Occidental on a provincial While the AWS are serving 4 million people, there are still level investment plans using the data from the study. currently more than 38 million people without access to improved water sources in the DRC. Current population Transitioning service delivery towards a country-led growth rates indicate that this number is likely to more development program in the DRC is still in its very than double over the next decade as the population grows early stages. That the Water Law was passed is a signal of and as urban networks come under greater strain. growing political will to see advances in the sector but this has yet to translate into budget allocations at the province The existing AWS were developed gradually over almost level. In the meantime, ways to better manage the highly 30 years with intensive support from nongovernmental fragmented aid to the WASH sector are needed. While organizations (NGOs) and international donors. It would in urban areas there is emerging competition between not be possible to scale up the AWS models without services provided by the national utility through household adjusting the mechanisms through which the networks connections, through its own standpost programs funded are financed, built, and managed. Even if the state did by donors, and from AWS in peri-urban areas. This needs play a role in constructing infrastructure, it would likely regulating too. need to draw on the expertise and experience of NGOs 38 Million 12 Over the past five years, the WSP has provided numerous inputs to the development Estimated number of people without access to of this comprehensive water sector law, working closely with the national water and improved water sources in the DRC. sanitation committee (CNAEA) and the German Development Cooperation. 57 The Transition from Emergency to Development Support: Evidence from Country Case Studies in Africa | Appendix A: Country Appendixes Nigeria (Rivers State) WSP Technical Assistance by work-stream Reestablishing sector oversight role Utility reform • Support to GoN for an update of the 2006 inventory • Water quality survey (dry and wet season) of household water using the water point mapping method use in Port Harcourt • Customer enumeration survey in service area targeted by PHWC pilot rehabilitation • Assessment of PHWC billing and accounting systems • Replacement of PHWC accounting and billing system (with USAID SUWASA) • Introduction of FM and HR policies and procedures for PHWC • Urban utility service level benchmarking in 36 states (funding of national workshop) Intermediate objectives 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. Reestablish country Institutionalize Restore cost Establish an inclusive Increase domestic Increase use leadership in sector rigorous sector recovery in urban sector investment investment in the of country coordination and monitoring and utilities, small- plan (SIP) and sector systems by policy development joint sector review towns, and large process that mobilizes development processes rural piped water infrastructure partners schemes investment Dynamic Water quality Assessment of Urban water supply Domestic AfDB and WB Commissioner monitoring systems led to investment attracted investment as investment for responsible for institutionalized at installation of investment for Port counterpart funds PHWC to be water in Rivers State PHWC basic accounting Harcourt from AfDB to WB and AfDB managed by drove reform agenda and billing system ($170 million) and WB investment external PIU (2011–2015) ($80 million) Legend: No WSP intervention No progress Slight progress Moderate progress Good progress Substantial progress Since the late 1990s, during military administration of major urban centers in Rivers State. When Governor the oil-rich Rivers State, the Water Board tasked with Chibuike Amaechi was elected in 2007 he appointed a water supply to urban areas has been in crisis. In 1998 its dynamic Commissioner to the MoWRRD with the aim governing board was dissolved and it has only had acting of improving water supply in the state, and Port Harcourt general managers since. From 1998–2006 the water supply in particular. The Commissioner quickly put in motion a service declined rapidly. Since 2006 the state rehabilitated series of sector reforms including a Water Policy and Law and restarted operations under direct control by the defining the roles and responsibilities for all stakeholders Ministry for Water Resources and Rural Development and corporatized the Water Board (now the Port Harcourt (MoWRRD). This move restored a very basic level of Water Corporation/PHWC). service provision to the city of Port Harcourt and other 58 The Transition from Emergency to Development Support: Evidence from Country Case Studies in Africa | Appendix A: Country Appendixes Improving fecal sludge management for protecting water resources in Port Harcourt, Nigeria. (Photo credit: Michel Duret.) Utility reform rainy seasons. During each round of data collection, the While preparing an investment plan for the city it was sample collection teams navigated to the selected locations, recognized that both self-supply from private manually identified the structure closest to each location (home, drilled boreholes and bottled water had become significant office, place of worship, and so on), and asked occupants service delivery models but little was known about their to identify their water sources.14 At each location, water extent, quality, location or the degree to which these samples were collected from the sources identified for alternatives competed with supply from the PHWC. A drinking, cooking, and/or washing (if different). In most better understanding of the structure of service delivery cases, water was stored on-site, and samples were taken in the city would be critical to defining the short- to from the storage containers to assess quality at the point- medium-term reform strategy. of-consumption. In the second study round, enumerators conducted a short survey on sanitation in addition to The WSP used water quality as an entry point to collecting samples. understand the structure of service delivery.13 A stratified sampling method based on the city’s 17 hydraulic zones Both studies showed that the PHWC’s role in the structure randomly assigning 400 sampling locations within each of water service delivery represented less than 1 percent of zone proportional to estimated zonal populations. Half the water sources used in Port Harcourt but were, at the of the sampling locations were in unplanned settlements. point of testing, better quality than other sources. The vast Water quality surveys were carried out both in dry and majority of residents, businesses, and other institutions 13 There was an initial expectation that the water quality of utility-supplied water would be much higher than that of self-provision and so would be a means of encouraging Navigation to, and field data from, sampling points was managed with the Fulcrum 14 people to reconnect to the utility. mobile phone application (Spatial Networks Inc., DE, USA). 59 The Transition from Emergency to Development Support: Evidence from Country Case Studies in Africa | Appendix A: Country Appendixes relied on privately constructed and maintained boreholes not significant. The percentage of respondents drinking for domestic purposes (washing and cooking), which were bottled and sachet water was over 50 percent higher in supplemented with commercially packaged bottled and the dry season than the rainy season, which may reflect a sachet water for drinking. Drinking water sources varied preference for chilled or convenient drinking water during according to neighborhood status (formal versus informal warmer periods. settlements), with residents of planned settlements showing a greater preference for drinking bottled water The major water quality concern detected in Port and residents of unplanned settlements primarily drinking Harcourt was contamination by fecal indicator bacteria borehole water. The differences in drinking water quality (fecal coliforms), which increased in frequency from 21 between neighborhoods and geographies, however, were percent of drinking water sources in the dry season to FIGURE A6: FECAL COLIFORM CONCENTRATIONS IN DRINKING WATER SOURCES BY SEASON a. Dry season b. Rainy season FIGURE A7.A: WATER SOURCES FOR FIGURE A7.B: QUALITY OF SOURCES: FECAL DIFFERENT PURPOSES COLIFORM 60 The Transition from Emergency to Development Support: Evidence from Country Case Studies in Africa | Appendix A: Country Appendixes 42 percent of drinking water sources in the rainy season control stemmed from legacy staffing, contracts and (Figure A6). These increases were particularly striking for behaviors—a carry-over culture formed during direct sachet water: during the dry season; sachet water showed state control of the provision function. In response, the the lowest frequencies of contamination; during the rainy Commissioner took over direct control of the finances. season sachet water showed the highest frequencies of contamination (Figure A7.B). The percent of samples An investment plan was made to rehabilitate the network from boreholes positive for fecal coliform also increased and the Commissioner was successful in attracting US$280 from 29 percent of samples in the dry season to 38 percent million of financing from the African Development Bank in the rainy season, as did the concentrations of fecal (US$200 million), the World Bank (US$80 million) as indicator. A key risk factor that significantly increased well as counterpart funding from the state government. the likelihood of fecal contamination of on-site and However, it became clear that this funding would take neighboring boreholes was hanging/pier latrines found time to mobilize. In the interim the Commissioner mainly in the city’s southern riverine creek system. The worked with the WSP and USAID-SUWASA to jump- findings raised two key policy issues: start operations of the PHWC. i) That the deterioration of drinking water quality in private boreholes and commercially packaged water The Commissioner started rebuilding the utility from during the rainy season is a real public health risk— the ground up. The civil servants were shifted back into particularly in areas of the city with hanging/pier the MoWRRD. A chief executive officer (CEO) with a latrines. private sector background was hired. A small poorer area ii) That, although unsafe, the extremely high levels of of the city called Eagle Island was identified as a possible reliable self-supply water that have developed in target area to start charging for services. It was chosen Port Harcourt pose a challenge to the viability of on the basis of a combination of factors including (a) a the PHWC. customer enumeration survey that had reported that households were willing to pay for the services; (b) that What could be done to shift the structure of service delivery the water quality in the area was showing signs of saline back to the safer utility supply? Two complementary intrusion and groundwater contamination from hanging strategies were considered by the Commissioner: (a) to toilets; and (c) that it was technically feasible to deliver set up a regulator to oversee the borehole development water to the area with limited rehabilitation. Along with in the city; and (b) to reform the PHWC and invest in this plan a new accounting and billing system, a financial its expansion. While a regulator was set up, little progress management, and an HR procedures manual were was made on regulating boreholes and so the main focus installed. The new CEO hired new staff into the utility and became reforming the utility. the state government financed the initial rehabilitation of engineering works. The utility was originally a department of the MoWRRD. Initially when it was corporatized the civil servants staffing This pilot is still at an early stage but the ground-up it were retained. The intermittent services that the utility approach to restarting the PHWC shows promise in provided to the 1 percent of Port Harcourt that it covered restoring the stability of the provider. In the meantime the cost the MoWRRD US$3.5 million a year. The utility did donor funding is still delayed and the Commissioner has not charge for its services, had no accounting or billing moved on since the general elections held in 2015. Whether system, no customer database, and no human resources the same degree of political support will reemerge remains (HR) procedures manual. Despite the corporatization the to be seen. In the meantime the regulator and investors parent ministry found it impossible to make a compact in the PHWC need to develop a clear strategy to deal with the utility as the utility itself was unable to control with the competition the utility faces from manual drilled the quality and functions of frontline staff. This lack of solutions that dominate the market in Port Harcourt. 61 The Transition from Emergency to Development Support: Evidence from Country Case Studies in Africa | Appendix A: Country Appendixes Somalia WSP Technical Assistance by work-stream Reestablishing sector oversight role Utility reform • Sector assessment and infrastructure policy note to • Assessment of HWA billing and accounting systems inform the World Bank Somalia ISN • Assessment and support to the corporate governance of • Study to assess the potential for implementing small HWA including HWA exposure visit to Windhoek, Namibia dams (sand/subsurface dams) across northern Somalia • Study of the socioeconomic impacts (winners and losers) of water resource developments in northern Somalia • Preparation of Water and Agro-Pastoralist Livelihoods pilot project (with State and Peace-building Fund) Intermediate objectives 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. Reestablish Institutionalize Restore cost Establish an Increase Increase use of country rigorous sector recovery in urban inclusive sector domestic country systems leadership monitoring and utilities, small- investment plan investment in the by development in sector joint sector review towns, and large (SIP) and process sector partners coordination processes rural piped water that mobilizes and policy schemes infrastructure development investment Where it exists Multiple data Strengthened No SIP but analysis HWA reinvesting WB investment sector leadership sources integrated corporate of potential scope for surplus utility using embedded from regional into wadi governance and impacts of rural revenues PIUs led by state level but evaluation tool improved cost water supply used to in strategic civil servants implementation used by regional recovery at HWA design WB-financed improvements to complemented by by non-state governments to project its infrastructure, WB support to MoF actors very guide investment such as for PFM systems fragmented additional pumps strengthening Legend: No WSP intervention No progress Slight progress Moderate progress Good progress Substantial progress Somalia has struggled with protracted violent conflict a year (OECD, 2016). Typically 15 to 20 percent of for over 20 years. Though progress is being made in humanitarian pooled funding to Somalia is spent on reestablishing the state in Somalia, particularly at the WASH interventions (OCHA, 2016). Development aid municipal level, fragility and conflict define both what specifically allocated to the water sector averaged under is possible to achieve and what needs to be achieved US$3 million a year, over the same period, none of which across Somalia. was channeled through government. The fragmented and non-state dominated service Improving access to water resources for multiple uses— delivery situation typical of low-income countries is domestic and industrial water supply and sanitation, extreme in Somalia. Over the past 10 years humanitarian livestock keeping and agriculture—are key development aid flows to Somalia have averaged over US$400 million objectives for the Somali state. Over years of providing 62 The Transition from Emergency to Development Support: Evidence from Country Case Studies in Africa | Appendix A: Country Appendixes Humans and animals share water resources in Somaliland with devastating health consequences. (Photo credit: Chantal Richey.) direct humanitarian aid to rural water supply in northern and manage construction contracts, set up community Somalia, emergency actors have built a combination of management structures, and evaluate the results. This will boreholes with pumps and engines and small surface water prime regional governments for managing larger scale dams for livestock. Though providing short-term relief, rural water supply projects financed from the Somali this aid has resulted in very low levels of safe water for Multi Partner Fund. people, inadequate permanent sources for livestock, and no capacity in government to manage these sources. In the In preparation for the project, two upstream studies were north of Somalia there are fewer than 100 permanent and carried out: a macro study of water harvesting potential; operational rural water sources for 4 to 5 million people and a micro study examining the socioeconomics of and 20+ million livestock. There are high nonfunctionality water resource development. The macro study examined rates, only 1 percent of functioning sources are reported the potential for exploiting water harvesting in seasonal as protected (a standard proxy for safe water), and water rivers across the north of Somalia. It developed a Wadi from boreholes is often saline. Evaluation Tool (WET) tool combing given ‘physical’ parameters (precipitation, slope, soil composition, Reestablishing the sector’s oversight role and so on) with ‘use’ parameters (for example, for sites The WSP worked with the nascent State Government near livestock routes, settlements, roads, and so on) to of Puntland and the Government of Somaliland to set determine the most appropriate wadis for potential water up the first government-managed rural water supply harvesting (see Figure A8). project in over 20 years. This small US$2 million State and Peace Building pilot project is both building low-cost Water can be a source of cooperation and a source of infrastructure (sand and subsurface dams) and building the conflict in Somalia.The micro study examined the way in capacity of government to scan for potential sites, procure which water resource developments created both winners 63 The Transition from Emergency to Development Support: Evidence from Country Case Studies in Africa | Appendix A: Country Appendixes FIGURE A8: EVALUATING THE SUITABILITY OF POTENTIAL WATER HARVESTING SITES USING THE WADI EVALUATION TOOL and losers. The study drew attention to the way land tenure government capacity to identify and develop sites for patterns influenced access to water. With a growing land government projects is a necessary precursor to using the enclosure movement driven by cash cropping of tomatoes, data to direct the activities of non-state actors in the sector onions, and other horticultural products, powerful and, in the medium term, to develop policy for water individuals or groups fenced off large sections of shallow resource development. groundwater or rationed the use of a pumps between a private farm and public tap stand. This led to households Utility reform in communities with the highest levels of water resource In the Somali civil war of the late 1980s military air- availability with lower levels of access to water even for uses strikes and shelling caused heavy destruction of Hargeisa other than irrigation such as for livestock and domestic city. Along with the physical destruction of water use. The study also demonstrated that communities with transmission lines the fall of the central government of relatively higher levels of water resource availability received Somalia led to the collapse of central ministry oversight the most aid from donor agencies. and of water utilities. Somaliland unilaterally restored its independence from the rest of Somalia in 1991 but These studies are being used by the government teams for was itself affected by conflict until a political settlement the targeting of project investments and for assessing the was reached in 1997. This paved the way for a revival of risks of disrupting cooperation and exacerbating conflict home-grown institutions and the reestablishment of the over water at selected sites. This first step in building Hargeisa Water Agency (HWA) as an autonomous agency. 64 The Transition from Emergency to Development Support: Evidence from Country Case Studies in Africa | Appendix A: Country Appendixes constituencies with interest in the city’s water supply. A persistent problem was that the south of the city—home to a relatively wealthy opposition area—was poorly covered by the network. Though this disparity was a misfortune of geography rather than design—as the city falls on two sides of a valley, it made it difficult to reach from the northern reservoir—the continuous burden of dealing with this grievance fell on the CEO’s shoulders. In January 2015, with support from the WSP, the CEO led a series of consultative meetings on a proposal to set up a Board of Directors to oversee its operation. A wide range of ministers, government officials, elders, businessmen, civil society organizations, religious leaders, and intellectuals were consulted. Importantly, the consultative process captured key players in the Somaliland public and private sector. Geed Deeble well field, north of Hargeisa, Somaliland. (Photo credit: Chantal Richey.) The discussions covered lessons from other boards that had been set up contrasting the first Roads Agency board considered ineffective with that of the one of Hargeisa’s main hospitals considered effective; the need that board A Chinese grant was secured to rehabilitate the core water members should be drawn from all parts of Hargeisa; supply infrastructure in Hargeisa. The boreholes in Geed and the board should be made of people from diverse Deeble, the source for Hargeisa, were repaired, water backgrounds and with a diversity of skills. production and boosting equipment installed, and a new water distribution network extended to new settlements. The board of directors, drawn from all parts of the city, was The water supply system had originally been designed to endorsed by the President in 2015. The board oversees the supply 180,000 but has grown to serve over half a million HWA’s operations and attracts investment to the utility. It people living in and around Hargeisa, a city of just under also act as a liaison with local communities, explaining the a million people. Having restored basic services further issues that the HWA faces helping address grievances. The infrastructure investment has been provided by the utility has adopted new HR and financial management European Commission to increase production from 9 to procedures that are helping the agency transition from 24 million liters of water per day. an informal system of management highly dependent on discretionary decisionmaking by the CEO to one that is based To manage the HWA’s expansion to the rest of the city on organizationwide policies and procedures. The adoption and to address growing grievances about inequitable of these procedures has already helped attract additional supply, the chief executive officer (CEO) requested the infrastructure investment that will be managed by the HWA. WSP’s support to set up a board of directors and to rebuild the HWA’s ‘software’—the systems and processes for managing the people and finance that keep the services +US$400 Million operating and the city. Average amount of humanitarian aid flows to Somalia per year over the past 10 years, with development aid specifically With no board to oversee the institution, there was a huge allocated to the water sector averaging under US$3 million weight on the CEO to be accountable for all aspects of a year, over the same period, none of which was channeled the running of the HWA and of managing the multiple through government. 65 The Transition from Emergency to Development Support: Evidence from Country Case Studies in Africa | Appendix A: Country Appendixes Zimbabwe WSP Technical Assistance by work-stream Reestablishing sector oversight role Utility reform • Support to national water policy • Urban utility service level benchmarking in 32 municipal councils over three annual cycles • Review of sector coordination and regulation assessing whether existing institutions were fit for purpose • Impact Assessment of Beitbridge Emergency Water Supply and Sanitation project Intermediate objectives 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. Reestablish Institutionalize Restore cost Establish an Increase Increase use of country leadership rigorous sector recovery in urban inclusive sector domestic country systems in sector monitoring and utilities, small- investment plan investment in by development coordination and joint sector review towns, and large (SIP) and process the sector partners policy development processes rural piped water that mobilizes schemes infrastructure investment GoZ led dialogue Service-level SLB process has SIP established and Some WB investments and approved benchmarking led to gains in detailed small town municipalities in Beitbridge ($2.6 National Water (SLB) process in efficiency across investment planning using water million) and ZINWA Policy (2013). place for 32 urban some of the 32 led to $20 million revenues ($20 million) use(d) Coordination municipalities with municipalities ZIMREF investment for system embedded PIU led strengthened peer to peer review administered by the improvement by civil servants or process and JSRs WB utility staff Legend: No WSP intervention No progress Slight progress Moderate progress Good progress Substantial progress The story of Zimbabwe’s urban water supply and The fragility of urban services was severely exposed during sanitation sector is one of a high coverage followed by a the devastating cholera outbreak in 2008/09, when over dramatic decline in the wake of political and economic 100,000 people were infected and 4,300 lost their lives. shocks over the decade to 2008. Hyperinflation, out- migration and a halving of the Gross Domestic Product This humanitarian crisis triggered a concerted effort (GDP), eroded domestic revenue and undermined to save lives, secure assets, and halt the decline but it Zimbabwe’s strong institutional capacity, pushing the also coincided with the formation of a Government of country into a state of fragility over the span of less than National Unity and the dollarization of the economy. a decade.15 Urban services were unable to function as The dollarization in particular drove a rebound in revenues collapsed and infrastructure fell into disrepair. municipal service revenues and with it opportunities for stabilizing and incrementally improving services with this cash from customers. From US$8,785,898,074 in 1998 to US$4,407,197,679 in 2008 at 2005 constant 15 market prices. 66 The Transition from Emergency to Development Support: Evidence from Country Case Studies in Africa | Appendix A: Country Appendixes A tractor procured under a project to haul a trailer used to collect rubbish doubles as a watering tank to help the council get the town green. (Photo credit: Anusa Pisanec.) Reestablishing the sector’s oversight role The WSP structured its TA program so that national and and utility reform local actors led the design and implementation of the Noting that water and sewer revenues were being used SLB program from the very beginning. The consultation to finance many other municipal expenditures—to the phase included representation from local authorities, detriment of the autonomy of water and sewer services— Town Clerks’ and Town Treasurers’ Forums, members of the WSP initiated and supported a highly participatory the Urban Councils Association of Zimbabwe (UCAZ), process of service level performance benchmarking (SLB) GIZ, and a GIS and database specialist. The data across 32 urban local authorities. Benchmarking was collection phase, which started with a test-run in Harare, recognized as a tool through which provider autonomy Chitungwiza, Ruwa, and Epworth in January 2013 to and accountability could be reestablished. ensure the methodology worked, was designed to foster ownership of the SLB process amongst local authorities, The SLB program drew on international experience: as well as to help transfer knowledge and to develop establishing a uniform set of indicators, definitions, the capacity of sector stakeholders within Zimbabwe to and calculation methodology to enable meaningful manage and implement the exercise. comparisons, using a participatory approach involving all 32 urban local authorities to create consensus on desired The process of implementing SLB has required service standards; using data reliability scores to highlight engineering, finance, and housing personnel to work and address issues of data quality; and adopting a peer- together to collect, verify, and analyze data. These review mechanism for reporting and verifying performance meetings have helped develop a shared ‘language’ across levels (as against consultants) to ensure ownership of both departments and a more comprehensive understanding data and process. of the core issues across the sector, and the importance 67 The Transition from Emergency to Development Support: Evidence from Country Case Studies in Africa | Appendix A: Country Appendixes of matching service delivery revenues with costs. The finance, and engineering units are better coordinated. finance teams, for example, are better able to see how Most local authorities have responded to similar situations engineering and infrastructure issues, such as metering, by computerizing billing and putting in place processes to affect billing and collections and, as a result, revenues for monitor water sales more closely. the local authority. Similarly, engineers were exposed to the importance of reducing water losses to improve the Zimbabwe’s SLB program has influenced both the thinking financial viability of water services. and practice of local authorities’ approach to service delivery, improved coordination within and between urban Furthermore, local authorities have noted improved authorities responsible for delivering services, facilitated relations with national actors, including the Ministry an evidence-based dialogue between local authorities and of Water, Ministry of Local Government, and ZINWA, central government ministries, and provided a strong as a result of SLB. A number of officials across the local foundation for ring-fencing and regulating the financing authorities observed that the national ministries used to be of services going forward. seen as ‘punishing authorities’ that would fine or penalize local authorities for poor service outcomes without In 2015 the Ministry of Environment, Water and Climate understanding the issues and challenges of providing (MoEWC), initiated the process of establishing a sector services. Officials at the Ministry of Water and ZINWA regulator. SLB’s operational and financial data would be supported this perspective, noting that local authorities an important tool that will eventually form the basis for previously viewed the ministry with trepidation and some determining tariffs and regulating services. Furthermore, suspicion and were therefore often hesitant to share data while the central government is not currently allocating or work closely with the ministry. Political distinctions funds based on SLB data, the MoEWC noted that SLB were one major reason for this divide, but the national does provide a strong evidence base through which the agencies also genuinely did not have access to information government and donors can prioritize support. The that could help them assess services and performance ministry also noted that it would consider using SLB more effectively. data to create incentives for local authorities to make operational improvements in the delivery of services Developing and using an evidence-base for better going forward. management and decisionmaking, SLB has also helped local authorities and, in some cases ZINWA, identify By 2015 the SLB program in Zimbabwe had reached its and better understand critical gaps and weaknesses in the third year of implementation. The program has taken root supply chains for water and sanitation services. In 2012, for within local and national stakeholders and is already being example, local authorities did not have data on the number used to influence decisions and investments. This is in of properties, and therefore the number of connections itself an important result. The successful implementation and customers, they were serving. SLB has helped local of the program provides useful insights on how to design authorities develop and use more robust information and implement SLB programs and, more broadly, on how systems that have revealed significant opportunities to to deliver technical assistance in FCV affected countries. strengthen the revenue stream going forward. Rusape Town Council, for example, reported discovering over The active participation of national and local stakeholders 1,000 customers that were not being billed following the was at the core of every aspect of the SLB program’s housing surveys. design. This was a critical success factor because, while Service providers are increasingly using this evidence- base to improve service outcomes. Ruwa Local Board, for +100,000 instance, upon discovering that a significant number of Estimated number of people who were infected (and customers were drawing water but were not being billed, 4,300 lost their lives) during a devastating cholera has adopted a common form to ensure their housing, outbreak in 2008/09. 68 The Transition from Emergency to Development Support: Evidence from Country Case Studies in Africa | Appendix A: Country Appendixes SLB is a useful monitoring tool, it is most effective if local There are still a number of challenges that need to be stakeholders use the platform to inform decisions and addressed before SLB can truly impact the delivery of investments. Their ownership and understanding of the water and sanitation services. Despite the ownership over processes is therefore critical. The implementation team the process, it is clear that many local authorities still view explicitly moved away from using external consultants SLB as a reporting mechanism and not a daily process to design indicators and the data collection and analysis that is ingrained in how their services are managed. systems. Instead, SLB was entrenched within local Furthermore, while the peer-to-peer reviews are a critical authorities from the very beginning through a heavily feature of the program, there is some risk that they will localized approach where local authorities came together increasingly showcase positive aspects of service delivery to establish indicators and benchmarks and used local as SLB gains more political attention. resources to collect and analyze data. 69 The Transition from Emergency to Development Support: Evidence from Country Case Studies in Africa | Appendix B: World Bank and OECD Fragile States lists Appendix B: World Bank and OECD Fragile States lists There are many definitions of state fragility used by think- Bank. To reflect evolving country circumstances, both these tanks, and bilateral and multilateral donors, both for lists have changed over time. The OECD list is broader, analytical and operational purposes pointing to the very comprising 50 countries and including countries with subjective nature of the term (Pavanello, 2008). For the pockets of instability (OECD, 2015b). The World Bank purposes of this report fragile states are understood to be list, harmonized with the African and Asian development countries, or territories, that lack capacity—or in some banks and based on the CPIA ratings (or equivalent) of cases political will—to deliver security, good governance, these institutions, is a shorter list of around 35 countries and basic services to all their citizens. (depending on which year) with a strong operational focus. The great majority of countries on the World Bank Though definitions of fragile states are multiple, evolving, list are struggling with the “capacity conundrum” and and subjective, two authoritative lists of fragile states are the transition towards country-led service delivery both those published by the Organisation for Economic Co- in WASH and other sectors, 18 of which were in Sub- operation and Development (OECD) and the World Saharan Africa in 2013. TABLE B.1: Harmonized list of fragile situations FY15a/ Country WB CPIA Score ADB/AfDB CPIA Harmonized Political and Peace-Keeping Score Average Peace-Building Missionsc/ Missionsb/ IDA Eligible Afghanistan 2.650 2.842 2.7 P Pk Burundi 3.242 3.409 3.3 P Central African 2.500 2.262 2.4 P Republic Chad 2.600 3.247 2.9 Comoros 2.758 2.392 2.6 Congo, DR 2.883 3.290 3.1 Pk Cote d’Ivoire 3.183 3.342 3.3 Pk Eritrea 1.992 1.933 2.0 Guinea-Bissau 2.525 2.644 2.6 P Haiti 2.833 – 2.8 Pk Kiribati 2.908 2.983 2.9 Kosovo 3.592 – 3.6 Pk Liberia 3.125 3.492 3.3 Pk Madagascar 3.017 3.162 3.1 Mali 3.383 3.775 3.6 Pk 70 The Transition from Emergency to Development Support: Evidence from Country Case Studies in Africa | Appendix B: World Bank and OECD Fragile States lists Country WB CPIA Score ADB/AfDB CPIA Harmonized Political and Peace-Keeping Score Average Peace-Building Missionsc/ Missionsb/ Marshall Islands 2.642 2.967 2.8 Micronesia, FS 2.692 2.883 2.8 Myanmar 2.950 – 3.0 Sierra Leone 3.267 3.447 3.4 P Solomon Islands 2.933 3.308 3.1 Somalia – 1.104 1.1 P South Sudan 2.092 2.279 2.2 Pk Sudan 2.358 2.620 2.5 Pk Togo 2.967 3.093 3.0 Tuvalu 2.767 3.050 2.9 Yemen 2.992 – 3.0 Territories West Bank and Gaza – – P Blend Timor-Leste 3.058 3.317 3.2 Pk Zimbabwe 2.258 2.173 2.2 Middle Income Bosnia & Herzegovina – – – P Iraq – – – P Libya – – – P Syria – – – P Notes: a/ “Fragile Situations” have: either (a) a harmonized average CPIA country rating of 3.2 or less, or (b) the presence of a UN and/or regional peace- keeping or peace-building mission during the past three years. This list includes only IDA eligible countries and nonmember or inactive territories/ countries without CPIA data. IBRD countries with CPIA ratings below 3.2 do not qualify on this list due to nondisclosure of CPIA ratings; IBRD countries that are included here qualify only by the presence of a peace-keeping, political or peace-building mission—and their CPIA ratings are thus not disclosed. b/ Specifically defined as the presence of a UN and/or regional (for example, AU, EU, OAS) peace-building and political mission in this country in the last three years. [Sources: UN DPKO website, AU website, EC website.] c/ Specifically defined as the presence of a UN and/or regional (for example, AU, EU, OAS, NATO) peace-keeping operation in this country in the last three years, with the exclusion of border monitoring operations. [Sources: UN DPKO website, AU website, EC website.] 71 The Transition from Emergency to Development Support: Evidence from Country Case Studies in Africa | Appendix C: Influence of Results on Domestic and Donor Financing Appendix C: Influence of Results on Domestic and Donor Financing The information and knowledge generated by the and investment plans triggered new investments. Service WSP’s interventions across the seven FCV affected delivery models evaluated by the WSP, such as sand dams countries influenced over US$323 million of donor and in Somalia and autonomous piped water systems in the government funding (see Table C1). WSP interventions DRC, were adopted by new projects. Studies, such as that in improving sector data (water point mapping, water on utility billing systems in fragile environments, led to quality monitoring, service level benchmarking) were donors and governments financing specific upgrades in used for better targeting investments. New sector policies accounting and billing systems. TABLE C1: SUMMARY OF FUNDING LEVERAGED OR INFLUENCED Country WB Donor or Funding How WSP has or intends to influence funding, for example, target funding government source population OR model of service delivery leveraged funding influenced (US$ million) DRC 3.00 85.00 AfDB, The model developed by the WSP and Belgian Technical Cooperation in AFD the mid-2000s was adopted by the AFD and DFID as a service delivery model. The 2013 WSP-financed national study mapping and evaluating 500 autonomous piped water systems (AWS) serving over 4 million people has been used by the AfDB to define the service delivery model used and areas to be targeted for the $60 million PIRUS project which will add 60 more AWS in peri-urban and rural areas in the Kasai regions. Liberia 10.00 25.50 UNICEF, The 2010 water point mapping (WMP) exercise used as method of targeting DGIS, funding to poorly served rural areas and water points in need of repair and DFID, rehabilitation by UNICEF and the Liberia WASH consortium drawing on DGIS GoL and DFID funding. In 2016 GoL allocated 100k to carry out minor repairs of 500 waterpoints using the WPM data. WB allocated $10 million to finance rehabilitation and expansion of the national utility’s (LWSC) distribution network in Monrovia. This was based on investment planning and preparatory design studies carried out by the WSP. Post-Ebola crisis, the LWSC and Ministry of Public Works used the Sector Investment Plan to request $2.5 million of GoL capital investment allocated in the 2016 budget. Nigeria 75.00 2.50 USAID, In Rivers State, recommendations from the WSP’s TA to the Port Harcourt GoN utility (PHWC) were implemented by USAID-SUWASA and the Rivers State ministry responsible for water. USAID-SUWASA installed an accounting system based on the WSP’s billing options study and supported a pilot investment in Eagle Island based on the WSP’s customer enumeration exercise and water quality monitoring. The PHWC has adopted financial and HR management procedures supported by the WSP, setting the foundation for reestablishing cost recovery initially in Eagle Island, to be expanded to other parts of Port Harcourt with WB financing to rehabilitation and expansion of network. 72 The Transition from Emergency to Development Support: Evidence from Country Case Studies in Africa | Appendix C: Influence of Results on Domestic and Donor Financing ROC 2.00 0.00 GoC The 2012 water point mapping exercise revealed 50% of water points nonfunctional after five years of installation. The institutional audit in 2014 showed that the water reforms of 2009 had not been successful in delineating roles and responsibilities and institutions were only partially staffed. To address these issues the ministry responsible for water is leading a process to develop a national water policy aligned with the SDG 6. This policy dialogue was initially supported by the WSP and in 2016 will be financed from the WB loan which is 80% financed by GoC. Sierra 10.00 80.25 AfDB Water point mapping used by UNICEF and AFDB drawing on DGIS Leone and DFID funding as method of targeting funding to areas in need of rehabilitation, poorly served areas, and as baseline for projects. WB investment in Resilient Cities Project will build on improved financial stability of the main utility in Freetown (GVWC) resulting from a customer enumeration survey and replacing the billing system, jointly funded by DFID and WSP. Somalia 10.00 0.00 Two WSP studies informed the design of a $2 million WB pilot investment in sand dams: (a) a ‘macro level study’ that defined the potential for enhancing water storage in the north of Somalia; and (b) a ‘micro level study’ evaluating the impact of existing water infrastructure interventions in wadis (sand rivers) on cooperation and conflict over water resources. A $6 million WB investment will build on the WSP’s improvements to Hargeisa Water Agency’s corporate governance (formation of a board of directors, strengthening FM, procurement and HR policies and procedures), and; exposing the senior management team to good practice of utilities in other arid areas of Africa through an exchange with Windhoek, Namibia. South 0.00 0.00 No influence due to upsurge in conflict though strong relations and dialogue Sudan kept with GoSS on improving aid effectiveness reported in “Improving WASH service delivery in protracted crises: The case of South Sudan”. 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