89951 FORCED  DISPLACEMENT  OF  AND  POTENTIAL   SOLUTIONS  FOR  IDPS  AND  REFUGEES  IN  THE  SAHEL:   Burkina  Faso,  Chad,  Mali,  Mauritania  &  Niger                                                         The  World  Bank    |    Global  Program  on  Forced  Displacement    |  August  2014                               ©  2014  The  World  Bank  Group   1818  H  Street,  NW   Washington,  DC  20433   Telephone:  202-­‐473-­‐1000   Email:  nharild@worldbank.org.   Web  site:  www.worldbank.org/forced-­‐displacement     All  rights  reserved.     This  paper  is  a  product  of  the  World  Bank  Group.  The  World  Bank  Group  does  not  guarantee   the  accuracy  of  the  data  included  in  this  work.  The  views  expressed  herein  are  those  of  the   authors   and   do   not   necessarily   represent   the   views   of   the   World   Bank,   its   Executive   Directors  or  the  governments  they  represent.       Rights  and  Permissions   The  material  in  this  publication  is  copyrighted.  Copying  and/or  transmitting  portions  or  all   of  this  work  without  permission  may  be  a  violation  of  applicable  law.  The  World  Bank  Group   encourages   dissemination   of   its   work   and   will   normally   grant   permission   to   reproduce   portions  of  the  work  promptly.     For   permission   to   photocopy   or   reprint   any   part   of   this   work,   please   send   a   request   with   complete  information  to  the  Copyright  Clearance  Center  Inc.,  222  Rosewood  Drive,  Danvers,   MA  01923,  USA;  telephone  978-­‐750-­‐8400;  fax  978-­‐750-­‐4470;  Internet:  www.copyright.com.         Acknowledgements       Niels   Harild   leads   the   GPFD   and   was   the   task   team   leader   for   the   study,   which   was   prepared   by   Patrick   Vinck   (Research   Scientist,   Harvard   University),   Susanne   Vedsted   (Senior   Consultant,   Tana   Copenhagen),  and  Joanna  P.  de  Berry  (Senior  Social  Development  Specialist,  World  Bank).  Cordelia   Chesnutt  (Consultant)  provided  background  material  and  editorial  support.  The  report  underwent   a  review  process  chaired  by  Colin  Bruce  Director  (AFRVP).    Invaluable  peer  review  comments  were   received   from   Katrina   M.   Sharkey,   Country   Program   Coordinator   (AFCCI),   Paul   Jonathan   Martin,   Sector  Leader  (AFTSN),  Carlo  Del  Ninno,  Senior  Economist  (AFTSW),  Zie  Ibrahima  Coulibaly,  Senior   Infrastructure   Specialist   (AFTU2),   Michael   Morris,   Lead   Agriculture   Economist,   (AFTA2)   Solange   A.   Alliali,   Lead   Operations   Officer   (AFCRI),   Sébastien   C.   Dessus,   Sector   Leader   /   Lead   Economist   (AFTP4)   and   Bernard   Harborne   (Lead   Social   Development   Specialist   SDV).   The   strong   support   of   Ian  Bannon  and  Aileen  Marshall  is  also  acknowledged.         Contents   ...................................................................................................................................................................  2   Executive  Summary   1.0  Introduction  ..........................................................................................................................................................................  5   2.0  Current  Situations,  Context  and  Causes  ....................................................................................................................  8   2.1  Context  ...............................................................................................................................................................................  9   2.2  Country  Situations  ......................................................................................................................................................  11   2.3  Displacement  Characteristics  ................................................................................................................................  14   3.0  Durable  Solution  Prospects  .........................................................................................................................................  18   3.1  Criteria  for  return  .......................................................................................................................................................  18   3.2  Country  Specific  Prospects  for  Return  ..............................................................................................................  20   3.3  Development  Needs,  Challenges,  And  Opportunities  .................................................................................  21   ...........................................................................................................................................................  29   4.0  Recommendations   4.1  Towards  a  Regional  Framework  ..........................................................................................................................  29   4.2  Defining  Development  Responses  .......................................................................................................................  30   ...........................................................................................................................................................................  35   4.3  Partners   .....................................................  37   Annex  1:  Notes  on  legal  framework  for  displaced  population  by  country   References  ..................................................................................................................................................................................  40     1     Executive  Summary     Currently   in  the  Sahel  region,  approximately  1.1  million  persons  are  forcibly  displaced  as  a  result   of  conflict.  Of  these,  the  largest  groups  are  the  353,000  internally  displaced  persons  (IDPs)  in  Mali,   who  fled  the  armed  fighting  in  2012,  and  the  280,000  refugees  from  Sudan,  who  have  crossed  into   Chad.   Renewed   violence   in   Mali   in   September   and   October   2013   highlights   the   volatility   of   the   region  and  the  challenge  for  those  displaced  who  seek  to  return  to  their  place  of  origin.     Prospects   for   the   displaced   look   bleak.   Refugees   and   IDPs   are   on   a   pathway   into   deeper   poverty,   they   have   lost   livestock,   livelihoods   and   access   to   services.   The   situation   looks   set   to   be   a   long   term   challenge;   approximately   70%   of   those   displaced   in   the   region   currently   have   no   prospects   for   a   sustainable  return.  Already  some  of  those  affected  have  been  living  away  from  their  areas  of  origin   for  more  than  twenty  years.     Beyond   the   1.1   million   displaced,   a   much   larger   population   is   impacted   by   the   affects   of   displacement.  This  wider  group  includes  members  of  host  communities  where  the  displaced  come   to  reside,  those  who  are  left  behind  in  communities  of  origin,  and  ‘returnees’  who  have  been  able  to   resettle  in  a  previous  residence.       Tackling  displacement  in  the  Sahel  is  critical  for  both  poverty  alleviation  and  stabilization,  and  only   a   development   response   will   be   adequate   to   the   task.   There   are   important   incentives   for   Governments   and   international   actors   to   build   upon   current   humanitarian   responses   with   a   holistic,  longer  term  development  response  to  the  challenges  of  forced  displacement  in  the  region.   These  incentives  include  the  following:   • Given that the majority of the displaced in the region face protracted displacement, their risks of vulnerability and exclusion will increase as their displacement continues. Mitigating these risks requires a development planning timeframe that anticipates the displacement to continue for the medium and long term. • If designed with a development lens, implementing support for displaced persons can address some of the underlying causes of conflict, instability and fragility in the region. Targeting development resources at the displaced and their host/return communities, can be an effective entry point for investing in broader conflict-mitigation work, such as strengthening governance, livelihood improvement, building resilience, and fostering social cohesion. • Seeing displacement as a development challenge will ensure that displaced persons are integrated in strategic development initiatives. If they continue to be seen as a humanitarian target, there is a risk the displaced will not benefit from broader national and regional development investments, lose human capital and become even more marginalized in that process. A  development  response  to  forced  displacement  in  the  Sahel  requires   a  regional  approach.  Such   an   approach   would   have   the   benefits   of   being   able   to:   (i)   overcome   challenges   relating   to   cross-­‐ border   movements,   (ii)   obtain   commitments   by   host   governments   to   support   the   prospects   of     2     displaced   from   neighboring   countries,   and   (iii)   facilitate   common   approaches,   shared   conceptualization  and  learning.  A  regional  approach  will  be  appropriate  in  the  context  of  ECOWAS   cooperation,   as   three   of   five   countries   suffering   the   heaviest   displacement   in   the   region   are   members  of  that  organization,  namely  Burkina  Faso,  Mali  and  Niger.         The  purpose  of  this  scoping  study  on  forced  displacement  is  to  contribute  towards  the  formulation   of   a   regional   policy   framework   for   sustainable   solutions   to   displacement   and   towards   the   substantiation   of   a   development   response.   This   study,   undertaken   jointly   by   UNHCR   and   the   Global   Program   on   Forced   Displacement   (GPFD)   in   the   Social   Development   Department   (SDV)   of   the   World  Bank  in  June  2013,  indicates  that   the  main  development  challenges  for  the  displaced  in   the  region  are  as  follows:   • Livelihoods.   Most   displaced   persons   have   been   unable   to   resume   farming   or   pastoralist   livelihood  practices;  doing  so  would  put  further  strain  on  limited  land  and  water  resources   in   the   areas   where   they   have   settled.   The   location   of   temporarily   displaced   people   varies   based   on   their   pre-­‐displacement   livelihoods:   IDPs   are   in   large   majority   agriculturalists;   refugees   are   in   majority   pastoralists.   Outside   of   camps,   the   displaced   have   often   relied   on   intense   mobility   to   mitigate   the   burden   placed   on   host   families   and   communities.   This   mobility   further   undermines   conditions   for   the   resumption   of   livelihood   activities.   In   camps,   livelihood   opportunities   are   limited   and   are   very   different   from   the   displaced   pre-­‐ displacement   activities,   requiring   new   skills   and   assets.   The   ability   of   displaced   pastoralists   to  retain  livestock  varies  across  the  region  but  there  have  been  considerable  losses.  The  loss   of   livestock   has   affected   women   with   the   decrease   in   milk   availability,   affecting   their   revenue  and  supplemental  feeding  for  small  children.       • Relations  with  host  communities.  Support  from  communities  hosting  refugees  and  IDPs   has  been  an  important  response  in  the  crisis  so  far  but  is  now  stretched  to  breaking  point.   Tensions   are   becoming   more   frequent,   as   displaced   populations   compete   with   host   communities  for  the  same  limited  resources.  Under  these  circumstances,  ethnic  differences   between  host  and  displaced  population  become  the  focus  of  resentment  and  tension.     • Cohesion.   Ethnic   and   social   tensions,   which   were   among   the   drivers   of   conflicts   in   the   region,   remain   active   among   the   displaced   communities.   There   is   some   evidence   that   protracted   displacement   and   expectation   of   retaliation   on   return   is   leading   to   greater   politicization   of   the   displaced   along   ethnic   lines.   Traditional   community   based   structures,   which  have  long  regulated  relations  between  pastoralists  and  agriculturalists,  appear  to  be   increasingly  weakened  and  ineffective  in  conflict  resolution.  These  conflicts  present  a  high   risk   of   escalation   along   ethnic   lines   because   livelihood   activities   traditionally   reflect   an   ethnic  division  of  labor  (even  though  that  division  is  increasingly  blurred).     • Depletion  of  services.  The  outflow  of  civil  servants  -­‐  teachers  and  health  workers   -­‐  during   displacement   has   forced   the   closure   of   services   for   those   who   remained.   In   areas   of   settlement,  the  population  influx  has  put  further  pressure  on  already  struggling  educational   services  and  corresponding  decline  in  attendance.     • Governance.   Across   the   region,   there   is   general   discontent   among   displaced   populations   towards   various   governments   for   enabling   the   conditions   that   led   to   displacement.   These     3     include:   marginalization   of   the   affected   populations,   the   lack   of   rule   of   law,   and   the   absence   of  adequate  services  for  stability.     The   priorities   for   development   responses   for   displacement   related   challenges   in   the   Sahel   -­‐   addressing  the  needs  of  the  displaced,  their  host  and  return  communities  -­‐  are:   • Securing  political  buy-­‐in  and  Governmental  support  at  a  regional  and  country-­‐specific  level   for  a  development  response  to  forced  displacement   • Improving  the  monitoring  of  population  movement  and  knowledge  on  the  locations,  profiles   and  needs  of  the  displaced,  their  host  and  return  communities.     • Ensuring   that   the   displaced   and   those   affected   by   them   can   benefit   from   ongoing   wider   development  investments  in  the  region  by  designing  ‘displacement-­‐sensitive’  interventions   which   include   the   displaced   as   targeted   beneficiaries   and   adapt   project   activities   to   take   their  needs  into  account  alongside  other  poor  and  vulnerable  groups.   • Strengthening   services   in   affected   areas   through   targeted   regional   investment   programs,   which   mitigate   the   strain   on   infrastructure,   education,   water   and   other   resources   availability  posed  by  the  influx  of  refugees  and  IDPs.     • Responding   to   the   particular   needs   of   the   transhumant   pastoralists   who   have   been   displaced.   Although   population   movement   and   migration   is   a   way   of   life   for   them,   those   affected  by  conflict  now  have  severely  constrained  migration  and  coping  choices  and  have   suffered   loss   of   livestock.   Supporting   their   livelihood   recovery   is   a   key   imperative   for   the   region.     • Employment  creation  and  livelihood  generation  for  those  displaced  into  urban  settings,  to   facilitate   them   acquiring   useful,   applicable   new   skills,   which   can   benefit   themselves   and   their  host  communities.   • Delivering   resources   for   the   displaced   in   such   a   way   that   important   outcomes   are   achieved:   the   resilience   of   affected   persons   is   increased,   host   and   return   communities   also   benefit,   governance   and   state   building   is   strengthened   and   affected   persons   are   consulted   and   participate  in  the  decisions  that  affect  them.     • Exploring   the   creative   use   of   new   technologies   to   extent   information   and   development   benefits  to  the  displaced,  who  are  often  mobile  and  hard  to  access.     4     1.0 Introduction Currently  in  the  Sahel  region,  approximately  1.1  million  persons  are  forcibly  displaced  as  a   result   of   conflict.   This   includes   refugees,   who   crossed   an   international   border,   and   internally   displaced  persons  (IDPs)  who  fled  to  new  locations  within  their  own  country.  These  refugees  and   IDPs   are   on   a   pathway   into   deeper   poverty,   they   have   lost   livestock,   livelihoods   and   access   to   services.  They  have  suffered  from  violence  and  loss  of  assets,  from  the  destruction  of  ways  of  life.   They  are  faced  with  the  difficulty  of  adapting  to  new  locations.  The  situation  looks  set  to  be  a  long   term  challenge;  approximately  70%  of  those  displaced  in  the  region  currently  have  no  prospects  for   a   sustainable   return.   Already   some   of   those   affected   have   been   living   away   from   their   areas   of   origin  for  more  than  twenty  years.     Beyond   the   1.1   million   displaced,   a   much   larger   population   is   impacted   by   the   effects   of   displacement.  This  wider  group  includes  members  of  host  communities  where  the  displaced  come   to  reside,  those  who  are  left  behind  in  communities  of  origin,  and  ‘returnees’  who  have  been  able  to   resettle  in  a  previous  residence.  These  groups  are  also  at  risk  of  impoverishment,  especially  in  the   context   of   strained   services   and   diminishing   resources   in   the   Sahel.   Competition   over   access   to   scarce  resources  is  causing  tensions  amongst  communities  affected  by  displacement,  these  in  turn   exaggerate  and  politicize  the  ethnic  and  social  differences,  which  contributed  to  the  conflict  in  the   first  case  and  could  perpetuate  the  instability  of  the  region.     Tackling   displacement   in   the   Sahel   is   therefore   critical   for   both   poverty   alleviation   and   stabilization,   and   only   a   development   response   will   be   adequate   to   the   task.   Humanitarian   agencies  -­‐  Government  and  Non-­‐Governmental  –  are  addressing  the  immediate  shelter,  protection   and   food   security   needs   of   the   refugees   and   IDPs   in   the   region.   But   global   experience   shows   that   short  term  humanitarian  assistance  for  the  displaced  cannot  fully  mitigate  the  risk  of  vulnerability   and   marginalization   associated   with   displacement.   Indeed,   all   too   often   a   humanitarian   response   for  the  displaced  contributes  to  their  dependency  and  lack  of  self  reliance.  Their  eventual  need  for   safety  nets  and  further  support  can  be  a  fiscal  drain  for  the  Government  for  years  to  come.     There   are   important   incentives   for   Governments   and   international   actors   to   build   upon   humanitarian  responses  with  a  holistic,  longer  term  development  response  to  the  challenges   of  forced  displacement  in  the  region.  These  incentives  include  the  following:   i. The   majority   of   those   displaced   in   the   Sahel   region   appear   likely   to   remain   in   protracted   displacement.  Without   sustainable   solutions,   their  risks  of  vulnerability  and   exclusion  will   increase,   the   longer   their   displacement   continues.   Mitigating   these   risks   requires   a   development   planning   timeframe,   which   anticipates   the   displacement   to   continue   for   the   medium  and  long  term.   ii. Unlike   humanitarian   support,   development   responses   focus   on   building   the   resilience   and   self   reliance   of   those   affected   by   displacement,   through   improved   skills   and   assets.   These   resources  will  enable  the  displaced  to  better  flourish  whatever  their  location,  whether  they   remain  in  new  communities  or  are  able  to  return.       5     iii. Equipping   the   displaced,   their   host   and   return   communities   with   assets   for   recovery   can   bring   development   benefits   for   the   wider   society.   Investing   in   the   human,   social   and   economic   capital   of   those   affected   can   reinvigorate   the   wider   communities   where   they   settle   or   return.   In   the   case   of   return   of   refugees   and   IDPs,   these   resources   can   speed   the   recovery  and  bring  new  potential  and  economic  dynamism  to  these  regions.     iv. Seeing   displacement   as   a   development   challenge   will   ensure   that   displaced   persons   are   integrated  in  strategic  development  initiatives.  If  they  continue  to  be  seen  as  a  humanitarian   target,   there   is   a   risk   the   displaced   will   not   benefit   from   broader   national   and   regional   development   investments,   and   become   even   more   marginalized   in   that   process,   which   could  lead  to  further  instability.     v. If  designed  with  a  development  lens,  implementing  support  for  displaced  persons  can  at  the   same  time  address  some  of  the  underlying  causes  of  conflict,  instability  and  fragility  in  the   region.  Targeting  development  resources  at  the  displaced  can  be  an  effective  entry  point  for   investing  in  broader  conflict-­‐mitigation  work,  such  as  strengthening  governance,  livelihood   improvement,  building  resilience  and  fostering  social  cohesion.   vi. Based  on  global  experience,  international  humanitarian  actors  are  increasingly  stressing  the   need   for   early   displacement-­‐related   interventions   to   be   influenced   by   development   thinking.   There   is   recognition   that   early   development   responses   can   mitigate   the   adverse   outcomes  of  protracted  displacement.  This  position  is  growing  in  emphasis  in  global  policy   on  displacement  and  good  practice  examples  of  the  approach  are  increasing.1   Defining   a   development   response   for   forced   displacement   in   the   Sahel   requires   both   a   country-­‐specific   and   regional   approach.   A   regional   approach   is   required   to   address   the   situation   of   refugees.   In   the   Sahel,   refugees   account   for   two-­‐thirds   of   the   displaced   population.   Country   specific   development   responses   cannot   fully   meet   the   needs   of   refugees   who   have   crossed   international  borders.  Promoting  development  responses  for  the  displaced  will  entail  commitments   by   host   governments   to   supporting   the   prospects   of   persons   who   originated   in   neighboring   countries.  Addressing  displacement  will  also  need   policy  and  practical   cooperation   on   cross-­‐border   development  challenges,  for  which  a  regional  framework  will  be  beneficial.       A  regional  response  is  also  appropriate  in  the  context  of  ECOWAS  cooperation.  Three  out  of   five  countries  suffering  the  heaviest  displacement  in  the  region  are  ECOWAS  members  –  Niger,  Mali   and   Burkina   Faso.   ECOWAS   provides   a   unique   framework,   which   establishes   freedom   of   movement   and   the   right   of   residence   and   establishment   for   all   nationals   of   member   states.   In   practice,   numerous   challenges   remain   to   cross   border   movement,   the   establishment   of   residence,   or   free   work.2    ECOWAS  collaboration  on  displacement  challenges  would  turn  this  legislation  into  reality.  It   would   also   set   an   important   precedent   for   regional   collaboration   on   other   humanitarian,   development  and  migration  issues.       There   are   many   regional   commonalities   in   the   development   challenges   for   the   displaced.   One   issue   that   transcends   national   borders   is   that   of   displaced   nomadic   pastoralist   groups   who   are   dependent  on  being  transitory  but  are  unable  to  repeat  traditional  migration  patterns  due  to  armed   violence   impeding   their   routes   and   livelihoods.   A   regional   approach   will   allow   shared     6     conceptualization   of   and   learning   on   how   to   address   this   and   other   common   issues.   There   are   currently  strong  opportunities  for  such  mutual  cooperation  and  shared  learning  in  the  formulation   of  the  World  Bank  Regional  Sahel  Initiative.       Nevertheless,   due   to   the   specificity   of   contexts   and   causes   of   displacement,   a   regional   response   will   need  to  be  complemented  by  country-­‐specific  policies  and  programs.    Many  of  the  issues  will  need   to  be  addressed  in  the  setting  of  political  economy  incentives,  which  only  national  governments  can   determine.       The   purpose   of   this   study   is   to   contribute   towards   the   formulation   of   a   regional   policy   framework   for   sustainable   solutions   to   displacement   and   towards   the   substantiation   of   a   development  response.  It  does  this  by  providing  ECOWAS  leadership,  governments,  World  Bank   country   teams,   UNHCR   and   other   actors   in   the   Sahel   region   (particularly   Burkina   Faso,   Chad,   Niger,   Mali,  and  Mauritania),  with  an  analysis  of  (i)  the  drivers,  spatial  patterns,  nature,  and  scale  of  forced   displacement   in   the   Sahel   region   (including   profiles   of   displaced   populations,   their   needs,   and   durable  solutions  prospects),  and  (ii)  the  development  options  and  actions  for  supporting  durable   solutions  for  displaced  populations.       This   note   first   provides   an   overview   of   the   extent   of   displacement   in   the   region,   as   well   as   the   contextual   factors   and   historical   forces   leading   up   to   the   current   dynamic   of   displacement   in   the   Sahel.   The   note   then   discusses   the   profiles   of   the   various   displacement   situations,   needs   and   priorities,  the  likelihood  of  protracted  displacement,  the  prospects  for  durable  solutions.  Finally,  it   lays   out   options   for   policy   dialogue   and   development   interventions.     In   recognition   that   both   regional   and   country-­‐specific   solutions   are   required,   the   report   describes   situations   and   possible   development  responses  at  both  levels.       Methodology:  The  study  is  based  on  a  desk  review  of  existing  documentation  and  rapid  in-­‐country   fieldwork  undertaken  in  June  2013.  Fieldwork  consisted  mainly  of  meetings  with  key  stakeholders   (Government   representatives,   UN   agencies,   bi-­‐lateral   partners   and   NGOs)   currently   involved   in   responses  for  refugees  and  IDPs.       7     2.0 Current Situations, Context and Causes Across  the  region,  more  than  1,100,000  persons  are  forcibly  displaced.  For  the  purpose  of  this   study,   ten   situations   of   forced   displacement   were   explored   in   order   to   identify   opportunities   to   support  durable  solutions  through  development  interventions.  Working  figures  for  the  numbers  of   displaced  in  the  region  are  currently  as  shown  in  Table  1,  rounded  to  the  nearest  thousand.3       In  the  region,  refugees  account  for  about  two-­‐thirds  of  the  displaced  population  and  IDPs  for   about  one  third.  There  are  some  differences  between  challenges  faced  by  refugees  and  those  faced   by   IDPs.   There   has   been   far   less   research   on   appropriate   durable   solutions   for   IDPs   compared   to   refugees.4   Legal   norms   and   protection   is   typically   not   as   clearly   defined   for   IDPs   compared   to   refugees.     Table  1:  Overview  of  displacement  figures  in  the  Sahel   SITUATION   POPULATION   SOURCE   5 Sahrawi  in  Mauritania  (refugees)     26,000  in  refugees-­‐like  conditions    (2013)   6 Afro-­‐Mauritanians     12,000  Refugees  in  Mali    (2013)   24,000  Returnees  in  Mauritania   7 Mali  crisis  of  2012  (refugees  and  IDPs)   353,000  IDPs  (June  20,  2013)    (09/2013)   171,000  Refugees:   50,000  Refugees  in  Burkina  Faso   70,000  Refugees  in  Mauritania   50,000   Refugees   in   Niger,   including   approx.  3,000  returned  nationals   8 Burkina/Mali/Niger  borders  (IDPs)   Cyclical  conflicts    (2013)   9 Northern  Niger   11,000  (2012),  all  returned    (2013)   10 Returning  migrants  from  Libya   (Organized  returns  only:)     Burkina  Faso:  1,600   (03/2013)   Chad:  87,000   Niger:  97,000   11 Boko   Haram   in   Nigeria/Niger   (returning   nationals   10,000  -­‐  20,000  Refugees  and  returning     and  refugees)   nationals  including  at  the  minimum:   (09/2013)   3,000  Nigerian  refugees   3,000  Returning  nationals     12 Central  African  Republic  crisis  (refugees  in  Chad)   79,000    (2013)   13 Chadian  internal  displacement   0  (govt.)  –  120,000  IDPs  (UNHCR)    (2013)   14 Darfur  crisis  (refugees)   281,000  refugees  in  Chad    (2013)     8     Figure  1:  Key  Displacement  Situations  in  the  Sahel  (2013)   ❻ Fderik ! ❶ 26  000     87  189   96  721   Refugees Returned  Migrants Returned  Migrants Atar Akjoujt ! Mauritania ! 1  500   Tidjikdja Mali Refugees ! ❺ ! Nouakchott ❸ Faya ! Aleg 311  016    IDPs Niger ! 68  016   Ayoun El Atrous Nema Timbuktu ! Agadez Rosso Kiffa ! Kaedi ! ! ! Refugees ! Gao ❷   ! 12  000     ! 24  000 47  000  Refugees      R efugees Selibabi >  7  000  Refugees Returnees ! Tahoua Migrants    3  000  Returned   Chad Kayes Mopti ❹ ! >  3  000  Returned  Migrants ! Biltine ! ! Djibo ! Dori Mao 49  975   ! ! Zinder ! Abeche Niamey Maradi Bol ! ! Segou Refugees ! ! Dosso ! ! Diffa ! Ati ❿   Bamako Nouna ! ! !! Ouagadougou ! ! ❼   ! ! ! ! ! Mongo ! ! Diapaga Ndjamena 281  000   Burkina !! ! Faso ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ❾ Refugees ! ! Bobo Dioulasso Po Am Timan ! ! ! ! ! ! Refugee        R population   efugee  p opulation  m movement ovement ! Gaoua Bongor 120  000    IDPs ! ! Lai DP  p      IIDP   opulation  m population   movement ovement ! Sarh ! Moundou Doba !! Nationals        N orced  tto   ationals  fforced   o  rreturn   eturn  b y  e by   vents                                                                                                 events   79  000        R Returnees   eturnees   ❽ Refugees 0 250 500 1,000 Kilometers 0 250 500 1,000 Kilometers 2.1  Context   With   long   traditions   of   pastoralism   in   the   region,   population   movement   is   not   a   new   phenomenon  in  the  Sahel.   Population  movement  is  a  normal  aspect  of  life  for  pastoralists  in  the   Sahel   who   migrate   according   to   seasonal   patterns   and   climatic   variations.   Migration   is   also   the   result   of   rapid   urbanization,   economic   migration,   and   a   general   southward   movement   due   to   increasingly   marginal   living   conditions   in   the   northern   part   of   the   Sahel.   Forced   displacement   does   not  occur  in  isolation  from  these  movement  cycles  and  trends.       Recent   political   and   environmental   stressors   have,   however,   resulted   in   a   critical   level   of   forced  displacement.   This  forced  movement  resulting  from  conflict  is  different  from  other  cycles   of  population  movement.  Forced  displacement  may  prevent  such  cycles  (e.g.  transhumance)  or  on   the   contrary   accelerate   trends   (e.g.   urbanization).   The   impact   of   forced   displacement   on   pastoralists,  for  example,  is  that  they  have  more  constrained  choices  and  limited  power  over  access   to   resources.   One   direct   effect   of   forced   displacement   on   existing   migratory   patterns   is   that   economic  migrants  are  forced  to  return  to  their  country  of  origin  as  a  result  of  conflicts.       The   drivers   of   conflicts   and   subsequent   forced   displacement   in   the   Sahel   include   environmental,   economic,   socio-­‐ethnic   and   governance   factors.   An   initial   discussion   of   the     9     drivers  of  conflict  and  subsequent  forced  displacement  is  useful  as  the  nature  and  causes  of  conflict   influence  durable  solution  prospects.  These  causes  include:15   • Environmental   characteristics   (drought,   floods),   limiting   livelihood   opportunities   and   productivity,  with  recurrent  humanitarian  crisis;   • Livelihood   patterns,   resulting   in   regular   tensions   between   agriculturalist   and   pastoralist     activities,   especially   regarding   access   to   water   and   grazing   areas,   reinforced   by   changing   migratory   patterns   due   to   climate   change   and   extreme   weather   patterns.   This   is   further   compounded   by   the   fact   that   there   was   a   traditional   ethnic   division   of   labor,   with   specific   ethnic  groups  engaging  in  pastoralism  engaged  in  agricultural  activities.  This  division  is  no   longer   maintained   in   all   cases   but   remains   an   important   feature   of   the   socio-­‐economic   context.   • Development   decisions,   including   a   historical   inequality   of   investment   in   infrastructure   across   the   region.     Agricultural   development   did   not   take   into   account   pre-­‐existing   migratory   arrangements   or   pastoralism   as   a   viable   livelihood   in   general,   reinforcing   disputes   over   access   to   water   and   land,   and   the   marginalization   of   northern   areas   of   the   Sahel;   • Ethnic   and   social   tensions,   resulting   partially   from   structural   inequalities   and   competition   for  limited  resources;   • Weak  institutions  and  capacity,  and  poor  governance,  limiting  the  states’  ability  to  provide   basic   services   and   security,   especially   in   the   northern   parts   of   the   Sahel   characterized   by   low  population  density,  leaving  opportunities  for  traditional  structures  and/or  criminal  and   radical  groups  to  compete  for  control;   • Increased  dependency  on  trafficking  and  other  criminal  activity  as  a  livelihood  alternative   because  of  limited  opportunities;   • Growing   population   sizes,   with   major   bulges   of   youth   who   compete   for   limited   socio-­‐ economic   opportunities,   including   education   and   jobs,   resulting   in   high   youth   unemployment;   • A  growing  threat  of  extremist  groups,  fueled  by  the  increased  availability  of  weapons;   • Limitations   of   existing   early   warning   systems   which   undermine   the   prevention   and   mitigation  of  complex  crises.       There   has   been   a   steady   increase   in   the   absolute   numbers   of   displaced   in   the   region.   The   factors  outlined  together  with  impoverishment  and  political  marginalization,  they  have  contributed   to   grievances   along   ethnic   lines   over   several   decades   –   leading,   for   example,   to   the   Touareg   rebellion  of  1989.  These  factors  reinforce  a  growing  disconnect  and  mistrust  between  populations   and   the   central   government,   and   they   have   ultimately   led   to   conflicts   and   mass   violence   in   the   region,  compounded  by  recurrent  food  crises  and  chronic  poverty.  The  numbers  of  people  fleeing   these  challenges  have  steadily  increased.       10     Figure  2:  Refugees  in  the  Sahel     2.2  Country  Situations   Mali:  the  Malian  crisis  accounts  for  the  large  majority  of  the  IDPs  and  about  one  third  of  the   refugee  population  in  the  Sahel.   As  of  September  2013,  the  total  number  of  Malian  displaced  is   approximately   524,000   individuals.16   This   comprises   171,000   Malian   refugees   in   Algeria,   Burkina   Faso,  Guinea,  Mauritania,  Niger  and  Togo  and  an  estimated  353,000  IDPs.17       The  current  crisis  in  Northern  Mali  has  deep  roots.  Traditionally,  populations  in  this  area  have  been   dependent   on   nomadism,   keeping   of   livestock   and   trans-­‐Sahelian   trade.   The   artificially   imposed   national   boundaries   of   the   19th   century   had   already   interrupted   trade   routes,   while   the   nomads’   livelihood  was  undermined  by  the  Sahelian  droughts  of  1973  and  1984,  which  led  to  major  loss  of   livestock   and   large-­‐scale   desertification.   This   resulted   in   political   marginalization   and   impoverishment   of   the   population,   at   the   root   of   the   Touareg   rebellion,   which   began   in   Niger   in   1989   and   quickly   spread   to   Mali.18   This   Touareg   rebellion   of   1989   caused   the   flight   of   close   to   150,000  persons  from  Mali.  After  protracted  negotiations  and  numerous  setbacks,  efforts  resulted   in  political  settlements  that  paved  the  way  for  the  return  of  the  refugees.   Most  eventually  returned   between  1995  and  1997.19       The   current   crisis   comes   on   the   heels   of   droughts   in   2005   and   2010,   which   impacted   already   vulnerable  households  through  losses  of  productive  assets  and  reductions  in  income,  leaving  many   households  too  poor  to  survive  without  assistance.  More  recently,  erratic  rainfall,  low  agricultural   output,   and   high   food   prices   in   2011   and   2012   led   to   a   food   crisis   across   the   Sahel   that   has   affected   close   to   20   million   people   and   put   one   million   children   at   risk   of   starvation.20   Compounding   the   region’s  problems,  armed  conflict  broke  out  in  Mali  in  January  2012  when  Touareg  separatists  and   an   Islamic   militant   group   linked   to   Al   Qaeda   took   control   of   large   areas   of   northern   Mali,   forcing   thousands  to  flee  their  homes.     Following  a  rapidly  deteriorating  situation  in  Mali,  where  rebel  groups  consolidated  their  control  of   the  north,  leaving  the  area  inaccessible  to  aid  agencies,  and  a  coup  in  the  capital  Bamako  in  March,   the   French   military   intervened   on   January   11,   2013.   For   several   months,   continued   violence   and     11     intimidation   by   armed   actors   in   northern   Mali,   the   inability   of   humanitarian   actors   to   access   affected  areas,  and  the  worsening  humanitarian  situation,  all  forced  more  Malians  to  flee  and  closed   off   the   possibility   of   return.   More   recently,   however,   IDPs   and   refugees   have   started   to   return   to   their   place   of   origin   following   the   signature   of   a   ceasefire   between   the   government   of   Mali   and   Touareg  rebels  in  June  2013  and  the  rapid  holding  of  presidential  elections  in  July  (1st  round)  and   August  (2nd  round)  2013.  The  scale  of  these  returns  is  not  yet  reflected  in  the  statistics  available  as   of   September   2013,   but   there   are   accounts   of   tens   of   thousands   of   returns   among   IDPs,   and   thousands  of  returns  among  refugees.  The  situation  remains  nevertheless  fragile  as  the   outcome   of   the  peace  process  following  the  ceasefire  agreement  between  the  government  and  Touareg  rebels   remains  unknown.  Renewed  violence  in  September  and  October  2013  and  fear  of  attacks  highlight   the  volatility  of  the  region  and  the  challenge  for  those  displaced  who  seek  to  return  to  their  place  of   origin.     Chad:  the  second  largest  displacement  situation  in  the  region  concerns  Chad.   The  country  is   host  to  281,000  Sudanese  refugees  from  Dafur,  79,000  refugees  from  the  Central  African  Republic   and  a  population  of  its  own  IDPs.     The   Darfur   conflict   of   Sudan,   originating   from   2003,   has   several   root   causes,   among   which,   two   are   particularly  salient:  (i)  the  scarcity  of  resources  such  as  land  and  water.  This  problem  has  become   more  acute  due  to  demographic  growth  and  desertification,  which  has  been  taking  place  since  the   1980s.   The   tribes   traditionally   solved   conflicts   around   resources   peacefully   at   so-­‐called   “conferences”   but   desertification   has   resulted   in   mass   migration   from   neighbouring   countries,   driven  by  livestock  keepers  searching  for  grazing  lands;21  (ii)  the  ethnic  diversity  of  the  region:    the   population   of   Darfur   is   predominantly   Islamic   (so   there   is   no   decisive   religious   difference   with   Northern   Sudan)   but   ethnically,   there   is   a   division   between   “Arab”   and   “non-­‐Arab”   (Negroid,   African)   tribes.22   As   long   as   political   conditions   are   not   appropriate   for   their   return   to   Darfur,   refugees   are   likely   to   remain   in   Chad   in   the   coming   years,   requiring   protection   and   humanitarian   support  in  accordance  to  Chad’s  international  legal  commitments.       Internal  tensions  and  trans-­‐border  impact  of  conflict  in  Darfur  also  displaced  Chadians  in  eastern   Chad  from  2006  and  onwards.  After  decades  of  sub-­‐regional  political  instability,23  2011  marked  a   turning   point   in   the   relationship   between   Chad   and   the   Sudan.   Change   was   also   marked   by   the   signature   of   the   peace   agreement   of   January   15,   2010,   which   officially   ended   the   seven   year   old   proxy   war.   Following   a   tripartite   summit   in   May   2011,   it   was   decided   to   deploy   a   joint   force   (Chad,   Sudan   and   the   CAR)   among   others,   to   protect   common   borders   through   enhanced   security   coordination   and   to   foster   a   culture   of   peaceful   co-­‐existence   amongst   the   tribes   living   along   the   borders   and   in   the   sub-­‐region.24   According   to   the   Chadian   government,   the   stabilisation   of   the   situations  means  there  are  currently  no  more  IDPs  in  the  country.  However,  this  assertion  is  subject   to  debate  since  not  all  IDPs  from  the  eastern  part  of  the  country  have  yet  returned.       The  ongoing  conflict  in  CAR  and  the  coup  in  March  2013  have  resulted  in  an  influx  of  refugees  into   the  southern  part  of  Chad.  In  addition,  about  90,000  registered  Chadian  migrants  have  arrived  from   Libya   since   2011.   Apart   from   these   conflicts,   food   insecurity,   failed   harvests,   and   inconsistent   rains     12     have   affected   movement   patterns.   Regional   socio-­‐economic   challenges   and   political   dynamics   contribute  to  trends  that  have  resulted  in  Chad  being  a  host  country  not  only  to  refugees,  but  also  to   victims  of  human  trafficking.     Niger:  in  addition  to  the  influx  of  refugees  from  Mali,  Niger  is  experiencing  a  separate  wave   of   displacement   in   Diffa   due   to   the   conflict   between   the   government   of   Nigeria   and   Boko   Haram.  An  estimated  3,500  Niger  citizens  are  living  in  Nigeria,  and  2,500  Nigerians  have  crossed   the  border  between  2012  and  2013  to  Niger  and  are  considered  refugees.  Boko  Haram,  an  Islamic   guerilla  group,  has  allegedly  grown  in  numbers  of  fighters  and  gun  power.  The  current  situation  has   its  origin  in  2006,  when  important  migrations  from  Niger  to  Nigeria  occurred,  possibly  as  a  result  of   recruitment  by  Boko  Haram,  and  likely  as  a  result  of  economic  opportunities  (e.g.  Nigeria  provides   subsidies   for   agriculture,   unlike   Niger).   As   security   degraded   in   northern   Nigeria,   the   population   started  fleeing  local  violence,  beginning  in  February  2013.  As  insecurity  became  more  widespread,   displacement   became   more   permanent,   as   opposed   to   a   back-­‐and-­‐forth   movement.   Refugees   are   reluctant  to  identify  themselves  as  Nigerian  or  as  citizens  from  Niger  due  to  fear  of  being  seen  as   Boko  Haram  sympathizers.       Mauritania:   Mauritania   is   associated   with   two   groups   linked   to   two   of   the   most   protracted   refugee   situations   in   the   Sahel   -­‐   the   Sahrawi   in   northern   Mauritania,   and   the   Afro-­‐ Mauritanians  in  Niger.  Displacement  of  the  Sahrawi  started  in  1973  as  Spain,  the  former  colonial   power,  withdrew  its  presence  and  the  Polisario  Front  began  an  armed  struggle  for  independence.   Most   Sahrawi   sought   refuge   in   Morocco   and   Algeria,   but   some   went   to   Mauritania.   Refugees   continue  to  arrive,  with  some  coming  after  spending  years  in  Algeria.  These  refugees  are  generally   regarded   as   citizens   of   Mauritania   and   have   full   rights   to   work   and   move.   They   do   not   seek   refugee   status  or  assistance  and  are  usually  not  in  contact  with  UNHCR.  However,  many  have  expressed  a   desire  to  return  to  their  place  of  origin  if  a  referendum  for  self-­‐determination  were  to  be  held.  The   referendum  was  one  of  the  provisions  of  a  ceasefire  brokered  by  the  UN  in  1991  but  that  was  never   implemented.       Groups   of   African   farmers   –   Afro-­‐Mauritanians   –   were   forcibly   displaced   from   Mauritania   on   the   order   of   the   government   in   April   1989,   in   the   context   of   ethnic   and   border   conflict   between   nomadic,  Arabic-­‐speaking  ethnic  groups,  and  sedentary,  African  farming  groups  in  both  Senegal  and   Mauritania.  The  Mauritanian  government  policy  dispossessed  African  farmers  of  land  in  the  Senegal   River   Valley   and   throughout   Mauritania,   re-­‐distributing   land   to   Arab   groups   displaced   by   desertification.   Meanwhile,   Senegal   began   to   forcibly   evict   Mauritanian   Moors   who   were   living   in   Senegal.   In   retaliation,   Mauritania   denounced   and   expelled   Afro-­‐Mauritanians   mainly   from   the   Pulaar,   Soninké   and   Wolof   ethnic   groups,   which   had   previously   dominated   many   positions   in   government.       Up  to  60,000  of  these  Afro-­‐Mauritanian  refugees  formed  settlements  in  Senegal,  in  and  around  the  Senegal   river  valley  towns  of  Dagana,  Podor,  Matam,  and  Bakel.  Relations  with  local  communities  were  reportedly   good   in   general.   Following   the   normalization   of   relations   between   Senegal   and   Mauritania   in   the   early   1990s,  thousands  of  Afro-­‐Mauritanians  returned  to  Mauritania  with  the  help  of  UNHCR  or  spontaneously.     13     UNHCR   facilitated   the   reintegration   of   35,000   returnees   into   Mauritania   through   the   Special   Program   for   Rapid  Integration  (SPRI)  from  1996  to  1998  (UNHCR).  Voluntary  repatriation  continued  until  2012,  but   14,100  refugees  chose  to  locally  integrate  in  Senegal  as  of  2013.       The  situation  of  those  who  chose  to  return  to  Mauritania  remains  unclear.  Many  lost  land,  houses,   and   herds   when   they   fled   or   were   expelled   from   Mauritania,   and   the   redistribution   of   land   and   properties   toward   Arab   groups   is   a   source   of   conflict.25   The   expropriation   of   the   land   that   was   formerly  used  by  fleeing  refugees,  the  multiplicity  of  traditional  land  use  practices,  the  intervention   of   legislation,   and   the   changing   ecology   from   water   control,   irrigation   and   climate   change   have   made   land   a   complex   and   controversial   issue   (World   Bank,   May   2008).   This,   in   turn,   has   had   a   direct   impact   on   livelihood   opportunities.   Finally,   Mauritanian   authorities   destroyed   or   confiscated   birth   certificates   of   those   expelled   in   1989.   In   1998,   the   government   insisted   on   evaluating   citizenship  on  a  case-­‐by-­‐case  basis  as  part  of  the  return  process.  However,  in  many  instances  this   did  not  yield  identity  documents  for  those  who  had  returned  prior  to  2002.       Over  12,000  Afro-­‐Mauritanians,  mainly  Peuhls,  remain  refugees  in  Mali,  mainly  in  the  southwestern   Kayes  region  close  to  the  Mauritanian  border.  The  refugees  are  not  restricted  to  camps  and  can  live   where  they  want.  They  are  essentially  self-­‐supporting  through  agricultural  activity,  growing  maize,   peanuts,  and  other  crops.  They  have  the  same  rights  as  nationals  to  obtain  health  services  and  have   access  to  public  education  equivalent  to  nationals.       In   addition   to   these   situations,   cyclical   displacement   occurs   due   to   local   level   conflict   between   agriculturalists   and   pastoralists.   This   is   especially   the   case   along   the   Burkina   Faso/Niger/Chad  border.  There  is  little  conflict  about  the  driest  parts  of  Touareg  territory,  and  the   different   pastoralist   groups   have   been   moving   around   in   the   region,   crossing   borders   when   necessary,   following   a   “principle   of   reciprocity.”26   However,   access   to   water   sources   and   pastures   needed   for   cattle   breeding   remains   a   major   source   of   conflict   among   pastoralists   and   between   pastoralists  and  agriculturalists.  Insecurity,  on  the  other  hand,  hinders  pastoralists’  ability  to  move   livestock   to   water   and   pasturage   points.   With   limited   opportunities   for   movement   and   an   added   increased  presence  of  refugees  and  their  herds,  the  pressures  on  natural  resources  in  the  region  are   amplified,   which   could   be   a   potential   source   of   conflict   between   refugees   and   local   communities.   Finally,   there   are   unresolved   land   conflicts   involving   many   stretches   of   agricultural   land   located   just   south   of   the   Sahara.   Farmers   in   the   Sahel   region   have   experienced   the   impact   of   the   drought   cycle  on  their  livelihoods  capacities  and  resilience.  The  food  crisis,  as  in  other  parts  of  the  Sahel,  is   considered  to  have  further  catalyzed  the  rural  to  urban  migration  pattern  already  observed  in  the   region.  This  underlying  factor  of  vulnerability  is  an  essential  element  to  consider  when  looking  at   the  current  crisis  and  potential  post-­‐crisis  and  recovery  options.   2.3  Displacement  Characteristics   Ethnic  diversity  is  an  important  element  of  displacement  in  the  Sahel.  There  is  ethnic  and  cultural   variability,  even  within  the  same  displacement  situation.  In  displacement,  stemming  from  the  Mali  crisis  of   2012,   for   example,   limited   data   from   refugee   camps   and   a   survey   of   urban   IDPs   in   Bamako   and   Segou     14     shows   that   there   is   a   strong   ethnic   divide   between   IDPs   and   refugees.   Ethnic   ties   are   a   factor   in   the   location  of  displaced  populations.  The  influx  of  large  numbers  of  individuals  of  the  same  group  can  tilt  pre-­‐ existing  ethnic  balances  in  the  host  population.  This  is  reportedly  the  case  in  selected  areas  of  Mali,  where   the  influx  of  Songhai  in  minority  areas  has  turned  the  ethnic  group  into  a  majority.       The  location  of  temporarily  displaced  people  varies  based  on  their  pre-­‐displacement  livelihoods.   In  addition  to  ethnic  differences,  there  is  variability  in  the  livelihood  of  those  displaced.  IDPs  are  in  large   majority  agriculturalists.  Refugees  are  in  majority  pastoralists.  Typically,  traders  and  civil  servants  favor   urban  areas.  In  Bamako,  IDPs  are  mainly  traders,  artisans,  and  civil  servants,  while  in  Segou  and  Mopti,   they   are   often   agriculturalists.   However   information   on   this   issue   is   incomplete   and   there   is   need   for   better  local  understanding  of  these  displacement  situation  profiles.     Table  2:  Ethnic  distribution  of  displaced  populations  (Malian  crisis)   SITUATION   LOCATION   ETHNIC  GROUPS   Malian   Songhaï  (82%),  Bambara  (5%),  Bella  (4%),  Bozo  (3%),  Dogon   Bamako  (IDPs)   Crisis   (2%)27   Songhaï  (45%),  Touareg  (15%),  Peulh  (10%),  Bella  (10%),  Bambara   Segou  (IDPs)   (7%)28   Mbera  camp   Touareg  (35%),  Arabs  (55%),  the  remainder  of  the  population   (Refugees,   being  subdivided  between  Songhai,  Bella,  Soninké  and  other   Mauritania)   minorities.29   Touareg  (54%),  Arab  (27%),  Songhai  (4%),  Peuhl  (2%),  Other   All  Malian  refugees   (3%)30   For   transhumant   or   nomadic   pastoralists,   forced   displacement   is   characterized   by   their   inability   to   follow   their   traditional   patterns   of   migration   or   inability   to   return   to   pasture   land;  this  has  devastating  impact  for  their  livelihoods  and  ways  of  life.  It  is  important  however   to  differentiate  the  difference  between  transhumant  pastoralists  –  who  follow  cyclical  movements   on  a  yearly  basis  -­‐  and  nomad  pastoralists  –  who  follow  a  seasonal  migratory  pattern  that  can  vary   from  year  to  year.  Arguably,  transhumant  pastoralists  are  more  likely  to  be  negatively  affected  by   forced   displacement   since   they   have   regular   encampments,   which   they   would   lose   access   to.   But   more   analysis   of   migratory   patterns   is   required   to   substantiate   this   hypothesis.   The   relationship   between   migratory   pastoralists   and   forced   displacement   is   further   complicated   by   reports   that   some  may  be  voluntarily  identifying  as  IDPs  or  refugees  in  order  to  receive  assistance.       Solidarity   and   community-­‐based   hosting   of   the   displaced   has   been   an   important   feature   of   displacement   across   the   region.   There   is   a   strong   sense   of   solidarity,   which   means   that   displaced   populations   typically   receive   support   from   host   populations,   including   shelter.   Overall,   the   political   trend   in   Mali   and   Niger   is   to   avoid   setting   up   camps   for   displaced   populations;   the   Nigerien   government   is   not   creating   camps   in   relation   to   the   Boko   Haram   crisis,   there   are   no   camps   for   IDPs   in  Mali,  and  a  mix  of  camps  and  reception  zones  in  Niger  for  the  Mali  crisis.  This  community-­‐based     15     hosting   of   displaced   populations   has   numerous   advantages   in   terms   of   strengthening   the   resilience   and   agency   of   displaced   individuals   and   increases   the   potential   economic,   civic,   and   social   contribution   of   these   individuals   to   the   host   communities.   At   the   same   time,   it   complicates   the   delivery   of   services   specific   to   those   displaced   and   makes   it   harder   to   quantify   the   numbers   of   displaced.   For   example,   in   Niger,   in   the   villages   adjacent   to   the   camps   for   Malian   IDPs,   a   large   number  of  Malians  are  unregistered  displaced  individuals  who  prefer  to  remain  out  of  the  camps.   Community   hosting   presents   the   advantages   of   better   local   integration   and   access   to   livelihood   opportunities   but   has   disadvantages;   in   a   context   of   extreme   poverty   and   chronic   insecurity,   the   burden  on  host  communities  is  considerable,  and  sometimes  results  in  tensions.     Displacement   in   the   region   is   a   dynamic   process.   During   the   Mali   crisis   and   to   this   day,   displacement   of   refugees,   for   example,   occurred   in   several   waves,   representing   different   ethnic   groups.  The  displaced  are  divided  along  ethnic  lines,  with  the  first  wave  of  migrants  being  mainly   composed   of   agriculturalists   groups   and   pro-­‐government   Touaregs,   and   the   later   waves   increasingly   composed   of   pastoralists.   At   first,   agriculturalist   populations   fled   the   Islamic   extremists  allied  with  pro-­‐independence  Touaregs.  Populations,  including  an  increasing  number  of   pastoralists,   then   fled   the   now   divided   Islamic   extremists   and   pro-­‐independence   Touaregs,   and   finally  the  population  fled  during  operation  Serval  –  the  French  led  military  operation  in  Mali  aimed   at   ousting   Islamic   militants.31   These   different   waves   of   displacement   have   caused   different   experiences,  needs  and  expectations  for  return  (see  durable  solutions  prospect).       Table  3:  Refugee  population  trends  by  country  –  Mali  Crisis.  March  2012  –  July  2013   COUNTRY   REFUGEE  POPULATION  TREND       Mauritania       Burkina  Faso       Niger       Total       16     Other  notable  characteristics  of  displacement  in  the  Sahel  include  the  frequent  separation  of   households.   For   example,   in   Bamako,   a   survey   conducted   among   IDPs   suggests   that   30%   of   the   households  had  at  least  one  household  member  stay  behind  –  typically  the  head  of  household,  likely   to   attend   and   maintain   assets   (land,   livestock,   dwelling)   although   no   further   disaggregated   data   exists  on  the  subject.32  In  Mali,  the  IDP  population  is  very  mobile  and  families  are  scattered  because   after   being   hosted   by   friends   and   families,   as   the   burden   on   hosting   families   has   been   too   great.   IDPs   have   had   to   leave,   ultimately   having   to   pay   rent   and/or   keep   moving   from   place   to   place.   Families  are  frequently  separated  to  reduce  the  burden  on  any  given  host  family.  One  study  shows   that  nearly  half  the  displaced  households  in  Bamako  (45%)  had  to  separate  from  members  living  in   various  places  to  reduce  the  cost  of  housing  or  burden  on  host  families.33       17     3.0 Durable Solution Prospects   3.1  Criteria  for  return   Across   the   region,   the   displacement   experience   is   predominantly   a   protracted   one,   i.e.   those   affected   have   been   displaced   for   more   than   five   years.   This   situation   is   likely   to   continue   as   prospects  for  return  for  the  majority  of  the  displaced  remain  limited.  Approximately  70%  of  those   displaced  in  the  region  currently  have  no  prospects  for  a  sustainable  return.     Table  4:  Protracted  nature  of  situations   SITUATION   PROTRACTED?   Sahrawi  in  Mauritania  (refugees)     Protracted   Afro-­‐Mauritanians   Protracted   Mali  crisis  of  2012  (refugees  and  IDPs)   Return  of  IDPs,  may  be  protracted  for  refugees   Burkina/Mali/Niger  borders  (IDPs)   Cyclical   Northern  Niger   Short-­‐term   Returnee  migrant  workers  from  Libya,  Mali,  and   Short/Medium-­‐term   Ivory  Coast   Boko  Haram  in  Nigeria  /Niger     Protracted   (returning  nationals  and  refugees)   Central  African  Republic  Crisis  (refugees)   Protracted   Chadian  internal  displacement   Protracted   Darfur  crisis  (refugees)   Protracted   The   choice   of   and   ability   to   return   is   influenced   by   a   range   of   political   economy,   security,   livelihood,   service   delivery   and   governance   issues.   It   is   typically   assumed   that   displaced   populations  will  return  home  once  security  is  achieved  in  the  place  of  origin.  However,  experience   shows  that  the  decision  to  return  home  is  influenced  by  wider  contextual  factors,  and  is  influenced   by   analysis   of   the   advantages   and   disadvantages   of   various   options.   Decision-­‐making   among   displaced   populations   (including   the   decision   to   return   home,   remain   in   the   current   location,   or   resettle  in  an  alternate  location)  depends  on  a  number  of  factors:   • Political   economy.   Given   that   forced   displacement   stems   from   political   conflicts   and   territorial  disputes,  displacement  is  always  a  highly  charged  political  issue.  Political  will  and   associated   government   policy   can   often   prove   to   be   the   single   greatest   determinant   of     18     whether   displaced   persons   return,   integrate   or   end   up   settling   on   the   margins   of   society.   The  influence  of  the  political  economy  context  will  include  elements  such  as:   o Presence   of   a   state   viewed   as   legitimate   –   in   Mali,   holding   the   elections   were   a   necessary  step  for  IDPs  and  refugees  to  consider  returning  to  their  place  of  origin;   o Political  progress  toward  peace  and  negotiated  settlement  of  conflicts,  and  inclusion   of  displacement  as  an  issue  to  be  addressed  in  those  resolutions;   o Level   of   commitment   and   resource   allocation   by   a   Government   to   sustainable   solutions  for  those  affected  by  displacement;   o Degree   of   political   ideology   in   relation   to   the   displaced,   for   example   their   political   affiliation  may  lead  to  responses  that  position  them  either  as  victims  or  scapegoats,   which  can  affect  the  type  and  support  extended  to  them;   o Availability   of   aid   and   access   to   development   resources   in   places   of   settlement   or   return.       • Security   (generally   defined   by   the   absence   of   violence   and   the   presence   of   legitimate   security  actors,  including  UN  forces)  and  level  of  violence  and  traumatization  experienced.   Fear  of  reprisal  is  also  a  major  factor,  especially  in  areas  with  mixed  ethnic  composition  that   include  both  pastoralists  and  agriculturalists;     • Livelihood  opportunities,  such  as  access  to  land  and  agricultural  season  for  farmers,  recovery   of   livestock   for   pastoralists,   or   credit   for   basic   inventory   among   traders,   the   loss   of   productive  assets,  and  prospects  for  restitution;   • Access  to  basic  needs,  especially  shelter  and  food;   • Access  to  services,  health,  education,  social  services  and  utilities;   • Family   ties/solidarity,   especially   the   presence   of   groups   with   similar   ethnic   background   and/or  Diaspora  communities;34   • Distance  and  accessibility  from  their  respective  area  of  origin.   • Degree  of  impoverishment,  and  whether  those  affected  have  the  necessary  capital  and  assets   to  return  or  rebuild  a  life  in  a  new  location.   • Social   compositions,   family   losses   sustained   in   conflict   –   such   as   loss   of   an   adult   male   and   creation  of  a  female  headed  household,  or  the  loss  of  children  and  carers.   Analysis   of   these   factors   in   the   Sahel   can   help   to   assess   whether   ongoing   displacement   situations   will   become   or   remain   protracted   or   will   be   resolved   rapidly.   The   following   assessment   of   prospects   for   return   is   based   on   initial   analysis   of   these   factors   in   country-­‐specific   situations.  However,  fuller  conclusions  on  whether  the  displaced  will  return  can  only  be  based  on:   (i)  stronger  understanding  of  the  specific  political  economy,  context  and  individual  characteristics   in   each   location,   even   within   a   given   crisis   or   situation,   (ii)   in-­‐depth   assessment   work   of   the   opinions   and   circumstances   of   the   displaced   themselves,   which   explores   their   experience   of   the   incentives  and  disincentives  for  return.         19     3.2  Country  Specific  Prospects  for  Return   Return   is   most   likely   in   Mali,   where   IDPs   express   the   intention   to   return   home   and   small   numbers   of   families   have   begun   to   reclaim   their   places   of   origin,   although   large-­‐scale   returns  have  yet  to  begin.  According  to  the  Commission  des  Movements  de  Population,  there  are   major  population  movements  to  and  from  the  north;  movements  toward  the  north  approximately   equated   the   movement   from   the   north   between   January   and   May   2013,   and   the   return   trend   –   although   not   massive   -­‐   was   confirmed   in   subsequent   months.35   The   government   has   been   supporting   the   return   of   IDPs   to   their   place   of   origin,   with,   for   example,   local   officials   paying   transport.         The  reasons  why  few  people  expect  a  protracted  displacement  crisis  are  multiple  and  include  the   fact  that  the  situation  in  northern  Mali  is  rapidly  stabilizing  with  a  relative  return  to  security  and   service   delivery,   while   IDPs   still   have   little   access   to   livelihood   opportunities   or   assistance.   As   a   result,  most  have  had  to  spend  whatever  they  have,  sell  assets,  or  rely  on  support  from  family  and   friends.   Community-­‐based   support   mechanisms   (solidarity)   are   limited   as   host   families   and   IDPs   have  exhausted  their  resources  to  pay  for  rent  and  other  basic  needs.  A  March  2013  IOM  survey  in   selected  areas  of  internal  displacement  in  Mali  (Bamako  and  Koulikoro)  suggests  strong  intentions   to  return,  with  93%  of  the  displaced  households  planning  to  return,  mainly  to  their  former  dwelling   (92%).   The   decision,   according   to   the   survey,   is   mainly   based   on   security   conditions   (62%),   the   school   calendar   (37%),   and   the   agricultural   seasonal   calendar   (5%).   In   Burkina   Faso   and   Niger,   refugee   representatives   questioned   for   the   purposes   of   this   study,   all   expressed   a   wish   to   return   to   their  place  of  origin  as  soon  as  possible.  However,  they  also  stressed  that  improved  security  would   be   a   primary   precondition   for   return.   It   is   also   important   to   recognise   that   the   displacement   consequences  of  the  conflict  will  continue  long  after  stability  has  returned.36       The   assessment   is   different   among   Malian   refugees   in   Niger,   where   there   is   more   uncertainty   about   return   intentions.   Specifically,   there   is   thought   to   be   a   divide   between   pro-­‐ MNLA   and   pro-­‐government   refugees   (mainly   pastoralists),   which   conditions   their   willingness   to   return.  While  security  is  also  seen  as  a  necessary  condition  for  the  return  of  refugees,  the  presence   of   the   state   and   security   forces   are   polarizing   aspects.   With   regard   to   security   forces,   pastoralists   fear   reprisal   or   being   targeted   because   of   perceived   links   to   the   MNLA   or   even   Islamic   extremist   groups.   The   2013   elections   were   an   important   criterion,   as   a   lack   of   legitimacy   of   the   elected   government   would   have   hindered   returns.   However,   the   elections   are   hardly   sufficient,   especially   among  refugees,  for  whom  political  settlement  of  the  conflict  remains  an  important  issue  (i.e.  need   for  a  peace  process  following  the  ceasefire).  With  regard  to  socio-­‐economic  factors,  according  to  UN   workers,   the   high   level   of   services   available   to   refugees   in   Niger   may   be   discouraging   them   from   leaving,   and   may   have   been   a   driver   of   displacement   among   the   latest   waves   of   refugees.   On   the   other  hand,  grazing  areas  are  reputedly  better  in  Mali,  which  could  drive  the  return  of  pastoralists.       It  is  anticipated  that  the  displacement  from  the  crisis  in  Diffa  related  to  the  presence  of  Boko   Haram  in  Nigeria  and  on-­‐going  military  operations  against  the  group  by  the  Nigerian  army   will  be  protracted.  Little  information  is  available  about  the  unfolding  crisis  in  Diffa.  As  mentioned     20     earlier,  the  displacement  profile  is  notable  by  the  absence  of  camps,  with  returning  nationals  and   Nigerian  refugees  living  together  with  host  communities.  It  is  also  notable  because  over  half  those   forcibly   displaced   are   returning   migrants   (approximately.   3,500   out   of   6,000,   based   on   May   2013   estimates   –   current   numbers   are   unknown,   but   the   total   displaced   populations,   refugees   and   returning  nationals,  is  estimated  at  10  to  20,000).  It  is  anticipated  that  the  crisis  will  be  protracted   for  several  reasons:   • There   appears   to   be   no   rapid   solution   to   the   conflict   as   Boko   Haram   is   a   diffused   and   resilient  network,  making  a  military  victory  unlikely;   • Even  if  Boko  Haram  were  to  be  defeated,  most  refugees  would  be  unlikely  to  return  in  areas   under  control  by  the  army  for  fear  of  reprisal.  The  Nigerian  army  has  been  singled  out  for  its   targeting  of  civilians,  and  many  displaced  fear  being  associated  with  Boko  Haram.   In   Chad,   though   refugees   in   the   East   and   South   would   like   to   return,   the   perspectives   are   unclear.   Sudanese   refugees   from   Darfur   have   been   in   the   eastern   part   of   Chad   for   ten   years   and   with   the   recent   outbreak   of   the   conflict   in   the   Tissi   region,   it   seems   unlikely   that   refugees   will   return   in   the   near   future.   This   fact,   combined   with   budget   constrains   for   UNHCR   in   Chad   in   general   and   in   the   eastern   part   in   particular,   invite   reflection   on   the   future   of   this   refugee   population   as   well  as  on  what  is  needed  in  order  to  strengthen  their  resilience.     With  regard  to  returning  migrants  from  Libya,  the  crisis  appears  to  be  resolved.  Many  have   benefited   from   assistance,   but   the   main   driver   for   a   durable   solution   was   the   decision   of   the   displaced   to   move   again   in   search   of   other   economic   opportunities   (e.g.   in   Ghana).   No   figures   are   available  on  the  numbers  who  remained  in  their  place  of  origins  and  those  who  migrated  again.       Regardless   of   whether   they   are   IDPs   or   refugees,   a   number   of   displaced   households   will   decide  not  to  return  to  their  place  of  origin.  Across  displacement  situations,  anecdotal  evidences   suggest   that   intentions   to   resettle   elsewhere   are   higher   among   those   who   have   higher   socio-­‐ economic  status  and/or  have  already  found  alternative  livelihood  opportunities,  and  are  located  in   urban  areas.  The  trend  may  reinforce  on-­‐going  rapid  urbanization  trends  in  the  Sahel.         3.3  Development  Needs,  Challenges,  And  Opportunities   Given   the   varied   prospects   for   return   in   the   region,   a   regional   development   response   to   displacement   in   the   Sahel   will   need   to   encompass   responding   to   situations   of   return,   protracted   displacement   and   relocation.   Without   fuller   assessment   of   the   specific   political   economy  context  and  return  possibilities  and  intentions  of  those  affected,  it  is  beyond  the  scope  of   this  paper  to  make  determinations  on  either  the  likely  and  best  case  scenarios  for  the  displaced  to   return  or  remain.  Towards  formulation  of  a  regional  policy  framework  for  sustainable  solutions  to   displacement   and   towards   the   substantiation   of   a   development   response   this   review   does,   however,  identify  the  following  common  development  challenges  for  the  displaced  in  the  region.         21     Livelihoods:  Most  displaced  persons  have  been  unable  to  resume  farming  or  pastoralist  livelihood   practices   as   affected   families   temporarily   have   commonly   settled   in   areas   that   are   chronically   insecure.  The  livelihoods  activities  pursued  by  the  host  populations  in  these  temporary  settlement   sites   are   often   similar   to   those   pursued   by   the   displaced   populations   in   their   place   of   origin   (farming,   pastoralism),   but   due   to   competition   with   hosts   over   access   to   limited   resources   (land,   water)   most   displaced   households   are   unable   to   resume   activities.   Despite   the   existence   of   the   freedom   of   movement   provisions   for   the   ECOWAS   countries   (including   Niger,   Mali,   and   Burkina   Faso),   which   might   have   helped   refugees   with   local   integration   while   retaining   their   nationality,   access  to  livelihood  remains  very  limited  and  freedom  of  movement  is  in  practice  limited,  including   access  to  employment.37       Access  to  land  is  especially  critical,  both  for  agriculture  and   for  livestock  related  activities,   and   varies   by   situation.   In   Chad,   for   example,   no   land   is   available   to   refugees,   while   in   Niger,   land   access   is   managed   through   traditional   means   and   access   can   be   granted.   About   half   the   Malian   refugees   are   located   in   hosting   sites   which   provide   the   advantage   of   having   land   for   their   livestock.   Access   to   land   and   water   remain   important   source   of   tension   in   relation   to   displacement.   In   Mauritania,  for  example,  the  return  of  Afro-­‐Mauritanian  refugees  resulted  in  clashes  over  access  to   land.38       With   a   loss   of   access   to   land   and   agriculture   and   livestock   related   activities,   the   displaced   face   considerable   upheaval   and   change   in   their   livelihood   strategies.   The   following   figure   is   adapted   from   multiple   sources   and   illustrates   the   changes   in   livelihoods   among   three   groups   of   displaced  persons  due  to  the  Mali  crisis:  refugees  in  Mbera  camp  (Mauritania),  and  IDPs  in  Segou   and  Bamako  (Mali).       Figure  1:  Livelihoods  Before  and  After  Displacement39   100% 90% 80% Other 70% Day  labor 60% 50% Salaried 40% Livestock    or  agriculture 30% Petty  trade 20% 10% Aid 0% No  regular  source Before Now Before Now Before Now Mbera  (refugees) Segou  (IDPs) Bamako  (IDPs) The  results  show  that  livestock  and  agriculture  no  longer  play  a   major  role  as  a  source  of  livelihood   among  displaced  populations  in  any  of  the  locations  of  temporary  settlement,  but  that  small  trade   and  other  activities  (such  as  transportation,  hairdresser,   etc.)   provide   alternatives.   The   results   also     22     show   that   the   livelihood   at   the   place   of   origin   differs   from   that   in   temporary   settlement,   notably   with   salaried   work   being   more   common   for   IDPs   in   Bamako   than   elsewhere.   This   reflects   the   tendency   of   salaried   personnel   and   civil   servants   to   move   to   urban   areas.   Among   urban   IDPs,   discussion  with  representatives  of  the  IDPs  themselves  and  NGOs  suggest  that  the  IDPs  are  likely  to   be  unemployed,  to  work  in  the  informal  sector,  and  to  see  their  opportunity  to  become  employed   depreciate   over   time,   confirming   findings   from   other   contexts.40   More   generally,   in   Mali,   IDPs   appear  to  have  small  and  unstable  incomes  because  of  the  lack  of  a  functioning  labor  market.  Only   civil  servants  and  traders  have  reported  stable  incomes  –  civil  servants  because  salaries  continued   to  be  paid,  and  traders  because  they  were  able  to  resume  some  activities.       Across  situations,  the  ability  of  pastoralists  to  retain  livestock  varies,  but  is  overall  difficult   to   assess.   During   previous   displacement   (e.g.   1989   Touareg   revolution),   refugees   did   not   move   with  their  livestock  and  as  a  result  lost  all  of  it.  This  time  around,  many  refugees  took  measures  to   protect   their   livestock,   but   the   extent   of   losses   of   livestock   is   unknown.   In   Niger,   some   refugees   were  directed  to  hosting  zones  which  offer  areas  for  grazing  for  their  livestock.  Others  are  in  camps   and   little   information   is   available   about   their   livestock,   which   may   be   in   the   care   of   others   (e.g.   Bella)   –   either   in   Mali   or   Niger.   In   Burkina   Faso   and   Mauritania,   refugees   brought   in   livestock,   outnumbering   the   pre-­‐crisis   livestock   population   and   putting   further   pressure   on   the   environment.   In  Chad,  refugees  from  Darfur  have  lost  the  majority  of  their  livestock.       The   loss   of   livestock   has   particularly   affected   women.   Women   (especially   those   who   are   pregnant   or   lactating)   and   children   (in   particular   children   under   the   age   of   five)   are   affected   by   the   loss   of   livestock   in   the   following   ways:   (i)   total   household   revenue   is   reduced,   as   meat   and   milk   production  decline;  (ii)  children’s  health  is  affected  due  to  decreased  milk  production;  (iii)  women’s   revenue  is  disproportionately  affected  due  to  decreased  milk  production,  as  women  are  responsible   for   selling   and   processing   milk.   Rural   farmers,   particularly   those   who   are   vulnerable,   have   attempted  to  sustain  their  families  by  selling  livestock.         The   displaced   often   rely   on   mobility   to   mitigate   the   burden   placed   on   host   families   and   communities.  This  mobility  further  undermines  conditions  for  the  resumption  of  livelihood   activities.  Mobility  makes  it  difficult  for  IDPs  to  invest  time  and  resources  in  livelihood  assets  and   opportunities  (i.e.  most  of  their  resources  are  spent  on  covering  basic  needs  for  shelter  and  food).   This   also   results   in   a   rapid   depletion   of   whatever   assets   displaced   populations   are   able   to   bring   with  them.       Tensions   are   becoming   more   frequent,   as   displaced   populations   compete   with   host   communities  for  the  same  limited  livelihood  resources.  Displaced  populations  are  tolerated  by   the   host   population.   Sometimes,   however,   there   are   moments   of   tension,   for   example   when   the   livestock  of  newcomers  wander  into  the  fields  of  the  host  population.  Displaced  are  often  seen  as   having   rights   but   no   duties   and   being   much   better   off   (or   served)   than   the   local   population.   The   environmental   burden   is   also   heavy   for   host   communities.   For   example,   in   Burkina   Faso,   Malian   refugees  brought  three  times  more  animals  than  the  number  possessed  by  the  hosting  population,   which  may  exceed  the  carrying  capacity  of  the  local  resources.41  For  agriculturalists,  the  prospect  of     23     a  good  harvest  in  2013-­‐14  could  mitigate  possible  risks  of  tensions  with  displaced  populations  by   increasing   food   supplies   and   reducing   the   risk   of   competition   for   limited   resources.   Rainfall   patterns  are  highly  unpredictable,  however,  and  food  insecurity  is  chronic,  which  means  that  most   of   the   time,   displaced   populations   compete   with   host   communities   for   the   same   diminishing   resources.  Furthermore,  the  repetition  of  crisis  in  the  region  (climate  and  conflicts)  has  afforded  the   population   little   opportunity   to   recover   from   shocks.   For   example,   deteriorating   vegetation,   caused   by  over-­‐exploitation  and  climate  shocks,  are  now  further  pressured  by  displaced  populations.  This   leads   to   livestock-­‐feeding   difficulties   during   the   dry   season,   with   many   animals   suffering   from   under-­‐nutrition.  As  a  result,  the  weakened  state  of  livestock  over  many  months  has  led  to  reduced   levels   of   milk   and   meat   production   and   an   increase   in   the   animals’   susceptibility   to   various   diseases,  creating  higher  mortality  rates.     Short  term  conditional  (e.g.,  cash  for  work)  and  unconditional  cash  transfers  and  vouchers   have   been   a   major   component   of   livelihood   programming   for   IDPs   and   refugees.   WFP,   for   example   has   used   cash   vouchers   in   Bobo   Dioulasso,   Burkina   Faso,   to   enable   refugees   to   buy   food   in   the  market  instead  of  receiving  food  rations  in  kind.  This  program  may  be  expanded  to  the  North  of   Burkina  Faso  (Mentao  and  Goudougou)  depending  on  the  outcome  of  this  first  project.  In  Mali,  cash   transfers   have   been   used   by   multiple   NGOs   to   provide   assistance   with   housing   rental   fees,   and   in   Niger   they   were   used   in   one   camp   to   support   local   food   purchases.   These   approaches,   however,   may  be  inappropriate  in  some  settings.  For  example,  in  northern  Mali,  there  is  no  structure  to  cash   transfers   using   mobile   technology,   and   the   commerce   and   markets,   at   least   at   the   time   of   this   analysis,  remain  dysfunctional.     As   yet,   there   are   few   resources   to   launch   self-­‐sustaining   livelihood   activities.   In   Chad,   income   generating  activities  have  been  launched  by  UNCHR  and  its  implementing  partners  -­‐  although  at  a   small  and  experimental  scale.42  The  main  funding  is  oriented  towards  micro-­‐credit  activities.  This   support  targets  refugees  as  well  as  host  populations.  In  addition  to  this,  in  some  of  the  areas  in  the   south   (five   centres   in   total),   vocational   training   is   offered   to   refugees   and   host   populations.   The   type   of   training   offered   has   been   determined   according   to   the   interests   expressed   by   the   interviewed   target   group   and   to   a   lesser   extent   based   on   socio-­‐economic   or   market   analyses.   But   overall  these  livelihood  support  programs  are  smalls-­‐scale  in  nature.       Some   displaced   persons   have,   however,   managed   to   restore   livelihoods   through   resumed   trade.   Refugees   in   Niger,   Burkina   Faso   and   Mauritania   have   good   access   to   markets,   enabling   them   to   get   news   on   the   situation   in   their   place   of   origin.   In   Niger   despite   the   various   crises   and   the   unsecure   situation,   some   commercial   exchange   is   taking   place   across   borders   because   some   refugees  are  closely  linked  to  their  region  of  origin.       Depletion   of   services;   across   the   region,   health   and   education   service   provision   has   been   adversely   affected   by   displacement.   The   outflow   of   civil   servants   -­‐   teachers   and   health   workers   -­‐   during   displacement   has   forced   the   closure   of   services   for   those   who   remained.   In   northern   Mali   there   are   reports   of   schools   being   destroyed   by   fighting.   In   areas   of   settlement,   the   population     24     influx   has   put   further   pressure   on   already   struggling   educational   services   and   corresponding   decline  in  attendance.     In   Mali,   the   government   is   starting   to   address   the   situation   and   re-­‐assigning   civil   servants   throughout   the   north,   including   teachers   and   health   workers.   There   is   reluctance   to   return,   especially   among   those   who   were   not   originally   from   the   north.   Furthermore,   there   are   different   incentives  for  return  depending  on  the  ministries,  depending  on  external  assistance  since  it  is  not  in   the  budget  of  the  state  (e.g.  WHO  provides  up  to  $500  to  returning  civil  servants).  Returning  staff   are   currently   benefiting   from   psycho-­‐social   training   to   deal   with   the   aftermath   of   the   violence   among  children.  At  the  same  time,  infrastructure  has  been  looted  and  destroyed,  which  means  that   the   personnel   often   return   to   non-­‐functional   facilities.   There   are   concerns   that   youth,   especially   those   who   did   not   finish   school,   may   be   easily   recruited   by   armed   groups.   According   to   key   informants,  the  state  budget  has  no  provision  for  the  reconstruction  of  the  destroyed  infrastructure.       Education   is   singled   out   as   an   important   criterion   for   return   in   relation   to   the   Mali   crisis   among   both   IDPs   and   refugees.   Children   of   school   age   can   be   broadly   categorized   in   three   groups  with  different  needs:   i. Those   who   remained   in   insecure   areas   but   managed   to   stay   in   school   despite   the   official   closure,  thanks  to  volunteers  and  teachers  who  did  not  evacuate.  The  remuneration  of  these   teachers   poses   a   challenge,   since   they   cannot   be   paid   for   work   conducted   when   schools   were  officially  closed;   ii. Those   who   evacuated   and   attended   school   at   the   location   of   displacement   (camp,   community,   etc.)   Among   refugees,   assistance   for   education   is   typically   provided.   For   IDPs,   most   children   were   apparently   able   to   attend   public   and/or   private   schools   for   free.   However,   this   is   unlikely   to   be   an   appropriate   long   term   solution,   and   it   is   expected   that   education  fees  will  become  a  significant  burden  for  IDPs  just  as  they  have  used  all  of  their   resources  to  support  housing.  During  the  Mali  crisis,  an  Norweigan  Refugee  Council  survey   in  Bamako  (March  2013)  found  that  24%  of  the  boys  and  26%  of  the  girls  were  no  longer   attending   primary   school.   At   the   secondary   school   level,   the   proportion   of   children   no   longer   attending   was   17%   among   both   boys   and   girls.43   In   Segou,   another   town   hosting   Malian  IDPs,  the  proportion  of  children  no  longer  attending  primary  school  was  15%  among   boys  and  17%  among  girls.  The  reasons  given  for  no  longer  attending  school  were  primarily   related  to  the  cost  of  education.  In  Burkina  Faso,  only  32%  of  refugee  children  are  attending   primary  school.44       iii. As  a  response  to  this,  parents  are  being  mobilised  and  sensitized  in  order  to  understand  the   importance  of  sending  their  children  to  school.  Many  refugee  children  have  not  been  used  to   going   to   school   on   a   regular   basis   in   Mali.   As   a   result,   their   first   year   of   school   (CP1)   was   crowded  because  children  up  to  even  12  years  had  to  catch  up  to  be  able  to  continue  in  the   school   system.   Another   challenge   has   been   the   fact   that   refugee   children   generally   have   attended  the  Franco-­‐Arab  Schools  (‘medersa’)  in  Mali  and  thus  have  had  difficulties  to  adapt   to   French   as   a   teaching   language.   The   Burkinabe   school   system   is   already   overloaded   and   does   not   have   adequate   infrastructure   or   enough   teachers.   Local   schools   are   also   situated   far  from  refugee  camps.       25     iv. UNHCR   and   its   partners   have   started   to   construct   schools,   though   many   are   of   more   intermediate   character   (tents,   etc.).   Though   efforts   are   made   to   meet   the   need   for   sufficient   primary  school  infrastructures,  secondary  schools  and  vocational  training  opportunities  are   still   insufficient.   Even   for   the   host   population,   access   to   secondary   education   is   limited.   In   Chad,   refugee   children   from   Darfur   are   Arabic   speaking   and   used   to   the   Sudanese   curriculum.  It  has  thus  been  difficult  to  integrate  refugee  children  with  the  host  population   and  have  them  benefit  from  existing  schools.  However,  after  almost  ten  years  of  crisis,  it  has   been   decided   to   integrate   Sudanese   refugee   children   into   the   Chadian   education   system.   During   an   intermediary   period,   students   will   be   offered   accelerated   language   courses   in   refugee  camps.       v. Children   who   evacuated   or   remained   in   insecure   areas   but   who   did   not   attend   school   or   missed   significant   portions   of   the   school   year,   experience   delays   of   their   education.   Remedial   and/or   condensed   coursework   may   be   needed   for   these   children.   For   example,   in   refugee   camps   for   Malians   in   Niger,   primary   school   enrolment   ranged   from   49%   to   63%   among  girls,  and  44%  to  61%  among  boys.  Pre-­‐crisis  primary  school  enrollment  was  66%.45       Security:  Security  is  essential  for  displaced  populations  to  resume  activities  and/or  decide  to   return  home.  Across  the  Sahel,  the  effective  presence  of  security  forces  is  generally  lacking  and,  if   present,   security   forces   are   often   accused   of   committing   human   rights   violations,   especially   against   pastoralists.   Across   the   region,   there   is   a   need   for   security   sector   reform   and   accountability   of   regular   armed   forces.   Training   is   required   so   that   the   army,   police   and   other   security   actors   transform  themselves  in  human  rights  protectors  rather  than  violators.       Cohesion:  Ethnic  and  social  tensions,  which  were  drivers  of  the  conflict,  remain  active  among   the   displaced   communities.   Protracted   displacement,   related   to   security   or   expectations   of   retaliation   upon   return,   can   also   lead   to   politicization,   as   associations   are   formed   along   ethnic   or   political   lines   and   new   grievances   emerge.46   Traditional   community   based   structures,   which   have   long   regulated   relations   between   pastoralists   and   agriculturalists,   appear   to   be   increasingly   weakened  and  ineffective  in  conflict  resolution.  In  Mali,  tensions  remain  between  groups,  especially   in  the  towns  of  Kidal  and  Gao,  where  Touaregs  fear  reprisal,  while  at  the  same  time  non-­‐Touaregs   report   being   targeted   for   violence   by   Touareg   residents.47   At   the   same   time,   both   Touaregs   and   the   army   are   responsible   of   human   rights   violations   along   ethnic   lines.48   This   highlights   the   need   for   work   on   social   cohesion.   Finally,   throughout   the   Sahel,   and   especially   in   areas   that   have   experienced   chronic   conflicts   between   pastoralists   and   agriculturalists   (e.g.   Mali/Niger/Burkina   Faso   border)   and   in   areas   of   return   after   protracted   displacement   (e.g.   Afro-­‐Mauritanians),   there   is   a  need  to  strengthen  community  structures  including  conflict  and  risk  management  institutions.     Relations  with  host  communities:  Support  from  communities  hosting  the  displaced  has  been   an  important  response  in  the  crisis  so  far  but  is  now  stretched  to  breaking  point.  Tensions  are   becoming   more   frequent   under   these   circumstances,   as   ethnic   differences   between   host   and   displaced  population  become  the  focus  of  resentment  and  tension.  New  waves  of  displacement  can   further   change   the   dynamic   and   the   perception   among   host   communities,   which   have   tolerated   the   displaced  based  on  the  perception  that  they  are  victims.  In  Niger  and  Burkina,  refugees  have  often     26     been   accepted   on   a   temporary   basis,   while   this   has   been   much   less   common   in   Chad   and   Mauritania.   The   way   that   displacement   is   perceived   can   also   impact   the   reinsertion   of   different   groups  as  they  return.  This  may  be  reinforced  by  positive  discrimination  in  providing  assistance  to   returnees,  rather  than  those  who  stayed  in  their  place  of  origin,  but  often  were  similarly  affected  by   the   conflict.   According   to   NGO   workers   interviewed   for   this   study,   returnees   in   Mali   are   increasingly  getting  involved  in  local  disputes  with  populations  that  never  left.  The  IDPs  are  seen  as   having   benefited   from   the   crisis   through   assistance   from   NGOs.   Programming   needs   to   be   sensitive   to  this  dynamic.     Governance:   One   of   the   key   challenges   for   the   governments   across   Sahel   is   the   general   unhappiness   of   displaced   populations   toward   the   various   governments.   Resentment   of   the   population  towards  government  is  centered  on  first,  the  fact  that  governments  seemingly  created   or   at   least   tolerated   the   conditions   that   led   to   displacement,   including   marginalization   of   the   affected   populations;   and   second,   on   the   fact   that   governments   have   failed   to   provide   adequate   services.  Rebuilding  the  trust  in,  and  legitimacy  of,  governments  is  therefore  an  important  priority.       The   lack   of   identification   amongst   the   displaced   hinders   access   to   benefits   and   participation   in  local  governance  structure.   According  to  one  survey  conducted  by  the  Danish  Refugee  Council   in   May   2013,   55%   of   IDPS   in   Mopti,   Mali,   have   no   documentation   (ID,   birth   certificate).   This   presents  a  clear  barrier  to  return,  because  it  provides  opportunities  for  authorities  to  exact  illegal   payments.  Returning  to  Gao,  Mali,  for  example,  IDPs  without  documentation  must  spend  between   500  and  1000  Franc  at  each  checkpoint,  for  a  total  of  3,500  to  7,000  francs  in  total.49     Governance   challenges   also   prevail   in   the   administration   of   displaced   populations.   Refugee   communities   linked   to   the   Malian   crisis   are   organized   according   to   the   governance   structure   in   their   place   of   origin,   and   according   to   their   ethnic   group,   with   two   separate   systems:   one   reflecting   the  state  governance  structure  (for  agriculturalists),  and  another  reflecting  traditional  governance   systems   (for   pastoralists).   Most   situations   also   include   a   framework   for   consultation   and   representation  of  refugees  and  displaced  communities.  Among  refugees,  both  the  Touareg  and  Arab   refugees   are   subdivided   into   clans   and   factions.   This   has   posed   various   challenges   to   the   organization  in  the  distribution  of  food  and  non  food  items  (NFI),  as  well  as  in  camp  management.   For   instance,   initially,   food   was   distributed   to   the   head   of   factions,   who   then   distributed   the   food   to   the   people   under   them.   However,   many   heads   of   factions   quickly   understood   the   power   that   this   system   afforded   them,   and   therefore   they   either   sub-­‐divided   the   existing   factions   to   create   additional  heads  of  factions  or  inflated  the  number  of  people  in  their  group.  Their  actions  generated   a  false  impression  of  the  refugee  population,  which  was  believed  to  be  much  larger  than  it  actually   was.50       Another  issue  that  has  sparked  debate  and  controversy  is  the  so-­‐called  Bella  ethnic  sub-­‐group.  The   Bellas   are   a   sub-­‐group   of   the   Touareg.   In   everyday   life   in   the   camps,   a   certain   culture   of   subservience  can  be  observed  among  certain  groups,  which  is  reflected  in  a  “servant”  to  “master”   relationship  between  different  groups.  For  instance,  Bellas  normally  fetch  water,  cook,  prepare  tea   and   look   after   the   Touaregs’   children,   and   no   payment   is   provided   when   these   activities   are   performed.   In   some   cases,   concerns   have   been   raised   in   food   and   shelter   distribution,   where   the     27     Touareg   “master”   would   claim   a   larger   share   than   the   Bella   “servant”.   UNHCR   considers   that   this   subject  needs  further  study  and  assessment.51       28     4.0 Recommendations 4.1  Towards  a  Regional  Framework   A   regional   development-­‐orientated   response   is   considered   to   be   the   most   appropriate   framework  for  achieving   solutions  to  displacement  in  the  Sahel.   Only  a  development  response   will   be   able   to   fully   and   sustainably   mitigate   the   risk   of   impoverishment   and   marginalization   of   the   displaced,   their   host   and   return   communities.   A   regional   framework   will   provide   a   tool   for   addressing   the   cross-­‐national   movements   of   refugees,   the   displacement   development   challenges   that   span   borders   of   the   affected   countries,   and   will   facilitate   common   approaches   to   common   problems.       A  regional  development-­‐orientated  response  will  require  political  will  and  commitment.  The   influence   of   the   political   economy   on   achieving   sustainable   and   suitable   investments   for   the   displaced   cannot   be   underestimated.   The   first   step   in   moving   the   findings   of   this   report   into   a   usable  framework  will  therefore  be  to  secure  buy-­‐in  from  the  relevant  governments.  A  process  of   engagement   will   be   required   to   find   the   suitable   regional   and   country   political   and   government   structures   who   can   lead   and   coordinate   this   framework.   ECOWAS   cooperation   provides   a   strong   opportunity  for  this  engagement,  as  does  the  current  World  Bank  Sahel  Regional  Initiative.       Country-­‐specific   responses   will   also   require   government   leadership   and   political   backing.   Government   policies   are   a   key   part   of   the   ability   of   displaced   persons   to   return   to   their   places   of   origin  or  build  resilient  lives  in  the  new  destinations  they  settle  in.  Clear  frameworks  outlining  key   development  goals  for  the  displaced  and  those  affected  by  displacement  will  be  needed,  including   clarification  of  where  responsibility  and  accountability  for  addressing  displacement.       The  development  of  a  regional  framework  will  require  stronger  data  and  information  on  the   circumstances   of   the   displaced   and   their   host/   return   communities.   The   absence   and   incompatibility   of   data,   and   incomplete   geographic   coverage   has   been   a   serious   constraint   to   this   study.   The   collection   of   improved   data   on   population   movements   and   needs   of   those   affected   is   imperative.  Solutions  for  addressing  the  current  gap  include  the  following  possibilities,  which  could   be  sequenced  as  resources  and  capacity  becomes  available:     i. Establishment  of  an  improved  regional  monitoring  system  to  track  current  and  anticipated   flows   of   forcibly   displaced   persons.   Beyond   tracking   numbers   the   monitoring   could   contribute   towards   stronger   profiling   of   the   location,   ethnicity,   socio-­‐economic   status,   return  or  integration  prospects  of  the  displaced;   ii. Elaboration   of   this   regional   monitoring   system   to   monitor   circumstantial   changes   in   the   factors   which   are   known   to   drive   displacement.   This   would   allow   early   identification   of   regions  and  occasions  where  forced  displacement,  return  or  resettlement  is  likely  to  occur.   This  could  facilitate  early  intervention  to  prevent  displacement  or  support  return.     iii. Incorporation  of  displacement  issues  into  existing  household  poverty  assessments  such  as   LSMS.   Simple   measures   such   as   disaggregating   household   survey   data   between   IDPs,     29     refugees,   returnees,   host   communities,   over   sampling   displaced   households   and   the   inclusion   of   additional   modules   on   displacement   issues,   can   produce   a   wealth   of   relevant   data.   iv. More  in-­‐depth  household  level  surveys  of  the  displaced,  including  the  following  dimensions:     • Development  dimensions,  including  access  to  services,  land  and  property  concerns   and  integration  into  local  governance  structures  would  be  covered;     • Livelihood  coping  strategies,  decision-­‐making  on  choice  of  solution  and  livelihoods   as  well  as  constraints  to  be  overcome;     • Factors   influencing   attitudes   and   behaviors   among   IDPs   and   refugees   in   the   Sahel,   with   critical   distinctions   between   groups   with   different   ethnic   background   and/or   livelihood  patterns;     • Exploration   of   the   social   and   ethnic   dimensions   of   displacement,   including   identifying   risks   of   social   exclusion,   loss   of   power   and   influence   by   the   displaced,   and  cohesion  dimensions  between  the  displaced  and  their  host  communities.     4.2  Defining  Development  Responses   Once   commitment   has   been   secured   to   a   regional   and   developmental   framework,   responses   to   the   displaced   can   be   substantiated.   There   are   important   principles,   which   underlie   the   proposed   development   recommendations   for   those   affected   by   displacement   in   the   Sahel   and   should   be   a   key   part   of   any   development   response.   These   are:   prevention   of   displacement,   the   promotion   of   resilience,   ensuring   equity   with   the   non-­‐displaced,   integration   of   displacement   concerns  into  wider  development  initiatives,  and  contribution  to  state  building.     There   needs   to   be   increased   attention   given   to   the   prevention   of   displacement.   Prevention   could   be   achieved   through   improved   monitoring   of   changes   against   the   factors   which   are   known   to   drive   displacement.   This   will   allow   governments   to   better   identify   where   preventative   responses   should   be   focused.   Targeted   investment   to   address   and   mitigate   the   environmental,   security,   economic   and   social   drivers   of   instability   and   displacement,   may   limit   forced   and   harmful   population   movement.   Prevention   can   also   be   achieved   by   including   displacement   concerns   into   disaster   risk   management   initiatives.   This   involves   recognizing   that   conflict   and   displacement   is   both   cause   and   consequence   of   environmental   degradation,   and   building   the   capacity   of   communities  to  take  mitigating  action.       Unlike   humanitarian   responses   to   displacement,   which   focus   on   addressing   immediate   survival   needs,   development   responses   stress   concepts   such   as   resilience   and   self-­‐reliance   for  the  displaced  and  their  host  communities.  The  intent  of  a  developmental  approach  is  to  build   sustainable   skills   and   assets   of   those   affected   by   displacement.   The   advantage   of   such   development   investments   focused   on   resilience   and   self   reliance   is   that   they   can   proceed   even   if   the   political   economy   and   intent   around   return   or   remaining   in   displacement   is   unclear.   The   skills   and   assets   gained  will  stand  those  affected  in  good  stead  if  they  either  remain  displaced  or  are  able  to  return   and  rebuild  their  lives  in  their  places  of  origin.       30     A   key   risk   in   targeting   development   investments   at   the   displaced   is   that   it   further   exaggerates   divisions   between   host   and   displaced   communities.   In   a   context   of   increasing   social  tensions,  the  targeting  of  specific  groups,  either  based  on  their  ethnicity,  livelihood,  or  even   displacement  experience  may  be  source  of  conflict  causing  resentment  over  development  attention.   This  risk  will  need  to  be  mitigated  in  three  ways:  (i)  use  of  transparent  targeting  strategies  using   criteria   that   can   ensure   displacement   needs   are   addressed   but   other   vulnerable   groups   have   opportunities  to  benefit  from  project  benefits,  (ii)  using  the  entry-­‐point  of  addressing  displacement   impacts   to   bring   in   new   resources   to   poor   communities,   which   can   revitalize   and   progress   the   wider   population   beyond   the   displaced,   (iii)   using   community   mobilization   and   consultation   process,   which   draw   in   a   wider   set   of   beneficiaries   and   encourage   consensus   on   development   needs.         A   number   of   regional   and   country-­‐specific   development   proposals,   which   are   already   underway   in   the   Sahel   have   strong   potential   for   building   the   resilience   of   communities   affected   by   displacement.   An   effective   approach   to   address   the   needs   of   those   affected   by   displacement   is   to   integrate   them   as   a   target   group   into   wider   development   initiatives.   For   this,   government  clients  and  donors  will  need  to  agree  as  to  whether  IDPs,  refugees,  returnees  and  host   communities   can   be   incorporated   as   an   especially   vulnerable   group   in   need   of   attention   under   these   investments.   Targeting   may   need   to   be   modified   to   include   geographic   areas   affected   by   displacement   and   return,   and   other   design   changes   made   of   which   the   following   are   illustrative   examples:     Regional  Pastoral  Livelihoods  Program.  A  regional  pastoral  livelihoods  program  is  already  seen   as   a   key   development   intervention   proposed   for   the   regional   Sahel   initiative.   States   are   progressively   realizing   that   pastoralism   is   a   potential   solution   to   natural   constraints   that   are   present   throughout   large   parts   of   the   Sahel.52   This   program   should   support   a   mix   of   mutually   reinforcing   activities:   asset   management   at   the   household   level;   relevant   national   and   regional   economic   development   to   support   pastoralism   through   improved   infrastructure,   watering   and   grazing   availability,   protection   of   movement,   market   access   and   improved   technology   for   communication   and   market   information;   achieving   a   guaranteed   solution   to   access   to   land   for   pastoralists  is  guaranteed  to  avoid  conflicts  with  agriculturalists.     To  become  displacement-­‐sensitive  this  program  will  need  to:   i. Undertake   additional   analysis   of   the   asset   loss,   challenges   of   land   access,   economic   marginalization,   loss   of   skills   and   fragmented   social   capital,   which   displaced   pastoralists   endure   and   will   need   to   be   overcome.   The   study   could   also   look   at   how   the   experience   of   displacement   has   bought   livelihood   benefits   to   pastoralists   (exposure   to   new   markets,   livelihood   opportunities,   skills   and   social   networks),   which   can   be   built   upon   to   reinvigorate  local  economies  and  livestock  trade.       ii. Consider  the  replacement  of  lost  livestock  assets  for  the  displaced   iii. A   particular   development   opportunity   concerns   those   pastoralists   who   have   fled   to   pasture   areas  they  were  already  habituating  in  their  seasonal  migration  patterns.  With  a  precedent   of   seasonal   settlement   to   these   locations,   these   would   be   optimal   regions   for   targeted   improvement  in  livelihoods,  living  conditions  and  access  to  land  and  other  assets.         31     Education   Programs.     Strong   political   will   and   backing   will   be   required   to   integrate   IDPs   or   refugee   children   in   education   systems   that   may   be   different   from   the   place   of   origin.   With   government  support  secured,  practical  steps  would  involve:     i. Rapid   restarting   of   education   services   in   areas   of   return,   through   the   reconstruction   of   school  buildings  and  incentives  for  teachers  to  take  up  previous  jobs   ii. Additional   resources   to   be   made   available   to   schools   hosting   displaced   children   to   ensure   that   services   have   the   capacity   to   meet   the   expanded   demand   (including   additional   class   room  construction  and  teacher  recruitment)   iii. Outreach   and   support   programs   to   encourage   trained   teachers   amongst   displaced   populations   to   re-­‐train   and   be   amalgamated   into   the   teaching   system   in   the   country   or   region  of  settlement   iv. Training   and   capacity   building   for   teachers   on   how   to   respond   to   the   particular   needs   of   displaced   children   including   amending   curriculum   and   learning   expectations   for   those   adapting  to  a  second  language   v. Policy   discussion   and   agreement   as   to   whether   displaced   children   may   be   taught   in   their   native  language  and  original  curriculum   Infrastructure   Investments.   Both   displacement   source   locations   and   destinations   need   to   be   included   in   comprehensive   regional   development   programs   that   focus   on   strengthening   infrastructure  and  the  presence  of  the  state.  This  can  be  done  through:   i. Use   of   displacement-­‐sensitive   targeting   criteria   (i.e.   the   identification   of   displacement   affected   communities   through   proxy   indicators   such   as   population   movement  and   strain   on   services)   to   guarantee   inclusion   of   displacement   affected   communities   in   wider   regional   development  programs   ii. Application   of   community-­‐driven   development   approaches,   with   the   formation   of   local   community   based   management   structures   that   allow   beneficiaries   to   be   consulted   in   the   development  decisions,  which  affect  them.  The  displaced  should  be  included  in  these  local   level   institutions   alongside   the   non-­‐displaced,   building   cohesion   through   joint   decision   making  and  community  mobilization.     Resource   Investments.   Forest,   water,   energy   and   land   management   operations   have   strong   potential   to   address   the   impacts   of   displacement   through   improving   the   availability   of   resources   and  enhancing  the  community  based  mechanisms  which  mediate  conflict  and  stress  over  access  to   those  resources.  Such  projects  would  benefit  from:   i. Analysis   of   the   community   based   mechanisms   for   resource   sharing,   management   and   conflict   resolution,   and   how   they   can   be   bolstered   to   mediate   disputes   between   the   displaced  and  non-­‐displaced  over  access  to  resources   ii. Ensuring   that   refugees   and   IDPs   are   represented   as   valid   stakeholders   for   access   to   resources  in  the  locations  they  settle  in   iii. Exploration   of   possibilities   for   alternative   technologies   to   improve   the   level   of   resources   (e.g.  energy  and  water)  in  areas  where  there  is  high  refugee  and  IDP  influx   iv. Extension   of   irrigation   services   to   locations   where   returnees   and   refugees   have   access   to   land,  but  are  unable  to  pursue  agricultural  production  because  of  a  lack  of  irrigation     32     Urban   Improvement.   Many   of   the   displaced   have   settled   in   urban   locations,   where   they   are   in   danger   of   becoming   economically   marginalized   and   financially   destitute   and   dependent.   Their   presence  puts  huge  strain  on  inadequate  urban  utilities  and  services.  Building  the  resilience  of  the   displaced  and  their  host  communities  in  these  urban  contexts  involves:   i. Improved   analysis   of   the   additional   pressures   placed   on   urban   settings   by   the   arrival   of   refugees  and  IDPs   ii. Ensuring  that  informal  settlements  of  displaced  and  their  host  communities  are  included  in   urban  upgrading  plans   iii. Making   areas   of   cities   with   large   displaced   populations,   a   priority   for   utility,   services   and   infrastructure  investment   iv. Undertaking   thorough   socio-­‐economic   analysis   and   market   studies   to   better   identify   the   urban   activities   and   professions   for   which   there   is   demand   in   the   local   communities,   and   designing   urban   livelihood   support   programs   so   that   the   displaced   can   take   up   these   opportunities.   This   may   involve   livelihood   activities   such   as   vocational   training,   micro-­‐ enterprise  support  and  micro-­‐credit  availability.       Safety  Nets.   Cash  and  in-­‐kind  safety-­‐net  transfers  under  humanitarian  programs  are  an  important   coping   resource   for   the   displaced   (for   example,   safety   nets   are   now   being   used   by   UNHCR   in   the   Mali   and   Boko   Haram   displacement   situations).   Lessons   learned   from   these   programs   indicate   that   safety   net   programs   need   to   be   delivered   before   households   have   to   resort   to   negative   coping   mechanisms  (such  as  selling  assets).  At  the  same  time,  many  governments  in  the  region  are  starting   to   strengthen   and   roll   out   national   safety   net   programs  for   the   extremely   vulnerable.   This   provides   an  opportunity  for:   i. Incorporation   of   lessons   learned   and   good   practice   developed   under   humanitarian   safety   net  programs  into  these  national  strategies   ii. Amalgamation  of  the  displaced  into  wider  safety  net  programs  through  use  of  beneficiairy   targeting   methods,   which   are   adapted   to   facilitate   identification   of   qualifying   IDPs   and   refugees     Much  can  be  gained  by  integrating  communities  affected  by  displacement  as  a  target  group   within  wider  development  schemes,  but  some  stand-­‐alone  initiatives  may  also  be  required.   Due   to   the   scale   of   the   problem,   the   issue   of   loss   of   livelihoods   for   the   displaced   and   increasing   competition  over  livelihood  assets  between  displaced  and  host  communities  is  a  topic  that  demands   additional  attention  in  both  urban  and  rural  settings.           Support   for   displaced   persons   in   the   region   should   be   delivered   in   such   a   way   that   it   contributes   to   strengthening   the   role   and   presence   of   the   state   and   to   good   governance.   On   a   macro   level,   more   work   is   needed   to   support   the   relevant   government   bodies   and   to   strengthen   their  capacities  and  resilience  in  dealing  with  displacement  issues.       At   the   local   level,   there   is   an   important   opportunity   for   responses   to   forced   displacement   to   strengthen   local   authorities.   For   example,   in   Diffa,   UNHCR   will   operate   its   relief   operations   through     33     local   structures   rather   than   establishing   parallel   ones   as   it   is   often   happening   in   traditional   camp   settings.   Strengthening   the   various   decentralization   processes   in   the   Sahel   is   an   essential   component   to   stabilization.   The   decentralization   process   involves   both   decentralization   (the   transfer   in   whole   or   in   part,   of   competences   from   the   central   level   to   the   local   level)   and   ‘deconcentration’   (a   division   of   powers   and   administrative   and   financial   responsibilities   between   different  levels  of  central  administration,  with  a  subordinate  relation  between  local  representatives   and   a   central   ministry).   The   lack   of   clear   demarcations   between   competencies   of   decentralized   and   deconcentrated   services   results   in   tensions   at   the   local   level.   Durable   solutions   for   the   displaced   must  be  mindful  of  these  tensions  when  adopting  local  consultation  and  ownership  as  part  of  their   approaches.   There   is   a   tendency   to   focus   on   decentralized   services,   but   working   with   deconcentrated  services  is  equally  necessary  to  build  the  legitimacy  of  and  support  for  the  central   government.       At   the   community   level,   development   approaches   which   apply   consultation   and   participation   will   allow  those  affected  by  displacement  to  have  voice  and  influence  in  the  decisions  affecting  them  and   in  choices  over  the  deployment  of  development  resources.  Investing  in  forum  for  community-­‐based   governance  can  encourage  consensus  across  different  stakeholders  (for  example  the  displaced  and   host  communities)  addressing  social  tensions  and  contributing  to  cohesion.     Given  the  mobile  and  dispersed  nature  of  displaced  persons,  innovative  use  of  technologies   for  data  gathering  should  be  piloted.  New  technologies  offer  unprecedented  abilities  to  monitor   trends   in   population   movements   and   individual   needs   and   improve   the   delivery   of   development   investmens  in  the  following  ways:   i. Human   mobility   analysis   using   cell   phone   tower   data,   or   anonymized   Call   Detail   Records   (CDR).  This  will  require  a  public-­‐private  partnership  with  cellphone  network  providers  for   which  there  are  existing  examples.   ii. The   use   of   mapping   and   geospatial   technologies  to  increase  monitoring  of  migration  trends   and  conflict  regionally  and  serve  as  an  overall  data  mapping  service.     iii. The   use   of   mobile   data   collection   platforms   to   engage   with   a   network   of   trusted   interviewers   that   can   provide   real-­‐time   data,   in   effect   setting   up   a   rapid   polling   system   that   is  responsive  to  policy  or  programmatic  questions   iv. Improving   resilience   of   affected   persons   through   information   services   using   new   applications   of   ICT.   This   may   include   SMS   and   mobile   based   information   services   around   weather   forecasts,   water   availability,   pasture,   and   market   prices   to   enable   better   decision   making.   v. Establishing   m-­‐governance   (or   e-­‐governance)   as   a   means   to   better   deliver   services   and   public  administration  to  populations  in  low  density  areas     Finally,   there   needs   to   be   a   strong   commitment   to   monitoring   and   evaluation   of   the   effectiveness   and   impact   of   support   for   the   displaced.   Globally   there   remains   all   too   little   evidence   of   how   far   development   investments   for   the   displaced   and   their   host   communities   reach   goals   of   improving   incomes,   livelihoods,   cohesion   and   resilience.   A   common   set   of   indicators   used   to   measure   such     34     outcomes,  used  across  all  displacement-­‐focused  programs  in  the  Sahel  would  allow  mutual  learning   and  the  adjustment  of  project  design  for  greater  impact.         4.3  Partners   One   of   the   challenges   for   partnerships   in   the   Sahel   is   the   relative   inexperience   of   dealing   with   a   large   influx   of   forcibly   displaced   populations,   resulting   from   conflicts   as   opposed   to   chronic  displacement  due  to  weather  patterns,  food  insecurity,  or  livelihood  patterns.  At  the   regional  level,  many  agencies  are  only  recently  operational,  or  have  had  a  traditional  focus  on  food   security   and   humanitarian   assistance   related   to   food   crises.   At   the   national   level,   structures   exist   throughout   the   Sahel   to   deal   with   humanitarian   crises,   but   these   typically   have   a   focus   on   humanitarian   and   food   crises   as   well.   For   example,   in   Niger,   the   Prime   Minister’s   office   includes   social   safety   nets   cells,   as   well   as   the   National   Mechanism   for   the   Prevention   and   Management   of   Food  Crises  (Dispositif  National  de  Prévention  et  de  Gestion  des  Crises  Alimentaires)  and  its  early   warning   system,   response   cells,   and   humanitarian   coordination.   The   granting   of   refugee   status   is   handled  by  the  National  Commission  on  Eligibility  (Commission  Nationale  d’Eligibilite)  which  was   created   in   1998.   In   Mali,   several   ministries   are   involved   in   response   to   large   displacement.   The   Ministry   of   Territorial   Administration   and   Land   Management   (Ministère   de   l’Administration   Territoriale,   de   la   Décentralisation   et   de   l’Aménagement   du   Territoire)   handles   issues   relating   to   land   and   the   rehabilitation   of   key   infrastructures.   The   overall   response   is   coordinated   by   the   Ministry   of   Humanitarian   Action   and   Elderly   People   (Ministère   de   l'Action   Humanitaire   de   la   Solidarité   et   des   Personnes   Agées),   especially   its   National   Direction   for   Social   Protection   and   Economy,  and  its  direction  for  humanitarian  affairs.  In  Burkina  Faso,  UNHCR  has  been  coordinating   the  response  and  the  provision  of  assistance  jointly  with  CONAREF  (Commission  Nationale  Pour  les   Réfugiés)  along  with  operational  and  implementing  partners  (including  national  and  international   NGOs).  Civil  society  is  active  but  has  limited  capacities,  and  a  more  detailed  mapping  is  needed  to   identify   existing   resources.   Among   international   actors,   the   response   also   remains   focused   on   humanitarian  interventions  and/or  food  security.     Implementing   the   development   responses   outlined   in   this   report   will   need   a   new   configuration  of  actors  and  and  a  commitment  to  capacity  building  of  relevant  institutions.  It   will   require   coordination   across   relative   mandates   and   institutional   strengths.   The   following   division   of   responsibility   of   tasks   is   merely   illustrative   and   should   be   the   subject   for   further   dialogue  and  agreement.       RECOMMENDATION   RESPONSIBLE     1. Starting  dialogue  towards  a  regional  development   ECOWAS,  World  Bank  (under  the  Sahel  initiative)   framework  for  displacement  responses,   coordinating,  substantiating  and  monitoring  and   the  framework     35     RECOMMENDATION   RESPONSIBLE     2. Improved  data  collection  on  population  movement,   UN  agencies  (UNHCR,  WFP,  ILO),  World  Bank   changes  in  the  drivers  of  displacement  and  profile   of  the  displaced   3. In-­‐depth  analytic  work  on  coping  strategies,   UN  agencies  (UNHCR,  WFP,  ILO,  OCHA)  NGOs  (NRC,   decision-­‐making  on  solutions  and  livelihoods  of  the   DRC,  ICRC),  World  Bank   displaced  ,  factors  shaping  their  decision  making   vis-­‐à-­‐vis  return,  resettlement  and  integration.   4. Country-­‐specific  policies  and  actions  plans  on   Relevant  government  ministries  and  agencies,  World   development  support  for  the  displaced   Bank,  UN  agencies,  Bi-­‐lateral  donors   5. Adaption  of  project  design  to  integrate  those   Relevant  government  ministries  and  agencies,  World   affected  by  displacement  into  existing   Bank  (Task  Team  Leaders  of  specific  projects),  UN   development  investments   agencies  (UNDP),  Bi-­‐lateral  donors   6. Design  of  development  programs  specifically   Relevant  government  ministries  and  agencies,  World   focused  on  those  affected  by  displacement   Bank,  UN  agencies  (UNDP),  Bi-­‐lateral  donors   7. Innovative  ICT  tools  to  address  displacement  data   UNHCR,  World  Bank,  Private  sector   needs  and  deliver  development  responses     36     Annex 1: Notes on legal framework for displaced population by country BURKINA  FASO   International   • Refugee  Convention  1951  -­‐  June  18,  1980;   • Declaration   under   section   B   of   article   1   of   the   Convention   upon   signature:   (b)   "Events   occurring  in  Europe  or  elsewhere  before  1  January  1951";   • Refugee  Protocol  1967  -­‐  June  18,  1980.   • Regional   • 1969   African   Union   Convention   Governing   the   Specific   Aspects   of   Refugee   Problems   in   Africa  -­‐  March  19,  1974.     Domestic   • Decree  N°1994-­‐055/PRES/REX  of  10  February  1994  on  Refugee  Status;   • Commission  nationale  pour  les  réfugiés  (CONAREF).  The  1994  Decree  (94-­‐055/PRES/REX)   provides   that   CONAREF   can,   at   any   moment   and   where   reasonable,   decide   to   withdraw   refugee  status  from  an  individual  (Article  13).  This  legislation  provides  no  details  as  to  what   motivations   would   be   considered   ‘reasonable’.   However,   an   earlier   article   in   the   same   Decree   guarantees   that   refugees   in   Burkina   Faso   benefit   from   the   same   rights,   and   are   subject  to  the  same  obligations,  as  provided  in  the  relevant  international  conventions;  this   would  indicate  that  ‘reasonable’  motivations  would  be  in  line  with  the  situations  envisaged   by  Article  1(C)  of  the  1951  Convention.       CHAD   International   • Refugee  Convention  1951  -­‐  August  19,  1981;   • Refugee  Protocol  1967  -­‐  August  19,  1981.   • Regional   • 1969   African   Union   Convention   Governing   the   Specific   Aspects   of   Refugee   Problems   in   Africa  -­‐  August  12,  1981.     Domestic   • Décret   n   211/PG.-­‐INT.   du   6   novembre   1963   portant   application   du   code   de   la   nationalité   tchadienne;   • Ordonnance  33/PG.-­‐INT.  du  14  août  1962  code  de  la  nationalité  tchadienne.     37     MALI   International   • Refugee  Convention  1951  -­‐  February  2,  1973;   • Refugee  Protocol  1967  -­‐  February  2,  1973.     Regional   • 1969   African   Union   Convention   Governing   the   Specific   Aspects   of   Refugee   Problems   in   Africa  -­‐  October,  10,  1981.       Domestic   • Decret   n°   98-­‐354/P-­‐RM   du   28   octobre   1998,   portant   création   de   la   Commission   nationale   chargées  des  réfugiés  (CNCR);   • Act  No.  1998-­‐40  of  20  July  1998  on  the  Status  of  Refugees;   • Law  No.  1997-­‐016  of  7  March  1997  on  amnesty;   • Act  No.  1962.18  AN.RM  of  3  February  1962,  Code  of  Malian  Nationality  (amended  1995).     MAURITANIA     International   • Refugee  Convention  1951  -­‐  April  5,  1987;   • Refugee  Protocol  1967  -­‐  April  5,  1987.     Regional   • 1969   African   Union   Convention   Governing   the   Specific   Aspects   of   Refugee   Problems   in   Africa  -­‐  July  22,  1972.     Domestic   • Décret   no.   2005-­‐022   Fixant   les   Modalités   d'Application   en   République   Islamique   de   Mauritanie   des   Convention   Internationales   Relatives   aux   Réfugiés   -­‐   sets   forth   the   procedures   for   implementation   of   International   Refugee   Conventions,   adopts   the   principles   set   forth   in   the   1951   Convention   relating   to   the   Status   of   Refugees   and   the   1969   African   Union   Convention   Governing   the   Specific   Aspects   of   the   Refugee   Problem   in   Africa.   The   country's  laws  provide  for  the  granting  of  asylum  or  refugee  status,  and  the  government  has   established   a   system   for   providing   protection   to   refugees.   The   National   Consultative   Commission   for   Refugees   (CNCR)   is   the   national   body   for   the   determination   of   refugee   status.   UNHCR   carries   out   refugee   status   determination   under   its   mandate   and   presents   cases   to   the   CNCR   for   recognition.   The   government   granted   refugee   status   and   accepted   refugees  recognized  by  UNHCR.  In  practice,  the  government  provided  protection  against  the   expulsion   or   return   of   refugees   to   countries   where   their   lives   or   freedoms   would   be   threatened  on  account  of  their  race,  religion,  nationality,  membership  in  a  particular  social   group,  or  political  opinion.     38     NIGER     International   • Refugee  Convention  1951  -­‐  August  25,  1961;   • Refugee  Protocol  1967  -­‐  February  2,  1970.     Regional   • 1969   African   Union   Convention   Governing   the   Specific   Aspects   of   Refugee   Problems   in   Africa  -­‐  September  16,  1971.     Domestic   • Order   No.   208/MI/AT/SP/CNE   of   14   July   2000   on   the   Rules   of   Procedure   of   the   National   Commission   of   Eligibility   for   Status   of   Refugees   -­‐   http://www.placng.org/lawsofnigeria/node/227;   • Ordinance   No.   99-­‐17   of   4   June   1999   Amending   Ordinance   No.   84-­‐33   of   23   August   1984   Nationality  Code  Nigerien;   • Decree  No.  98-­‐382/PRN/MI/AT  on  Implementation  of  the  Law  on  Status  of  Refugees,  1998;   • Law  No.  97-­‐016  on  Status  of  Refugees,  1997.  This  law  addresses  the  protection  of  refugees   and  establishes  the  National  Commission  of  Refugees  and  welcomes  the  states  parties  policy   with  regard  to  refugee  children  but  is  concerned  at  the  fact  that  all  births  are  not  registered;     • Ordinance  No.  84-­‐33  of  23  August  1984  Promulgating  the  Code  of  Nigerien  Nationality.  This   code   was   the   introduction   of   inequality   in   the   transmission   of   nationality   by   men   and   women.   For   example,   article   11   stated   that   a   child   born   abroad   of   a   mother   with   nationality   of   the   Niger   must   prove   that   his   or   her   father   had   nationality   of   the   Niger.   Furthermore,   under   article   22,   a   child   born   of   a   mother   with   nationality   of   the   Niger   and   of   a   foreign   father   could   opt   for   Niger   nationality,   whereas   a   child   born   of   a   father   with   nationality   of   the  Niger  automatically  had  Niger  nationality;   • Circular   No.   3/MJ   Regarding   Act   No.   1973-­‐10   of   27   February   1973   Amending   the   Code   of   Nigerian  Nationality;   • Law  No.  1961-­‐26  of  12  July  1961  Determining  Nigerian  Nationality  (modified  in  1973)  Jus   sanguinis   by   paternal   descent.   Nigerien   mothers   transmit   their   nationality   only   when   the   father   is   unknown   or   stateless.   Jus   soli:   double,   without   any   discrimination:   nationality   of   origin   for   the   child   born   in   Niger   to   parent   who   was   also   born   there.   The   foreign   woman   getting   married   to   a   Nigerien   man   acquires   nationality,   unless   she   renounces   said   nationality.   The   foreign   man   married   to   a   national   woman   does   not   get   any   easier   access   to   nationality.  Possible  naturalization  after  ten  years  in  the  country.  There  is  no  right  to  stand   for  election  for  ten  years,  and  no  access  to  the  civil  service  for  five  years  after  naturalization.   Dual  citizenship  is  allowed.   • Ordinance  of  2012  according  prima  facie    status  to  refugees  from  Mali         39     References                                                                                                                               1  See  for  example  the  5  year  action  plan  of  the  UN  special  Rapporteur  for  IDPs,  and  development  of  the  UN   Transitional  Solutions  Initiative,  which  has  guided  coordination  between  humanitarian  and  development   actors  in  Colombia  and  South  Sudan.  It  is  beyond  the  scope  of  this  paper  to  give  good  practice  details  of   examples  of  combined  humanitarian  and  development  approaches  but  such  information  can  be  made   available.     2  Florianne  Charrière  and  Marion  Frésia  (undated)  West  Africa  as  a  Migration  and  Protection  area,  UNHCR     3  It  should  be  noted  that  estimates  of  displaced  populations  have  a  high  margin  of  error,  especially  in  a   context  where  the  displaced  primarily  reside  with  host  communities.   4  Mundt,  Alex,  and  Elizabeth  Ferris.  "Durable  Solutions  for  IDPs  in  Protracted  Situations:  Three  Case  Studies."   (2009).   5  UNHCR  Mauritania  –  available  at  http://www.unhcr.org/pages/49e486026.html     6  Ibid.   7  UNHCR  –  Operation  Sahel,  portail  partage  de  l’information  –  available  at   http://data.unhcr.org/SahelSituation/regional.php   8  Source  to  be  completed   9  IDMC  –  Internal  Displacement  Monitoring  Center  –  available  at  http://www.internal-­‐ displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/%28httpCountries%29/325C89FAFA46492CC1257627003E16CC?O penDocument     10  IOM  –  March  2013  Policy  in  Brief  -­‐  Available  at   http://publications.iom.int/bookstore/free/Policy_in_Brief_Libya2013_5Mar2013_FINAL.pdf   11  UNHCR  –  June  2013  -­‐  NE  Nigeria  insecurity  sees  refugee  outflows  spreading  to  Cameroon  -­‐   http://www.unhcr.org/51c05dd76.html   12  UNHCR  Chad  –  available  at  http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-­‐bin/texis/vtx/page?page=49e45c226&submit=GO     13  Ibid.   14  Ibid.   15  For  a  detailed  discussion  of  multiple  causes  of  displacement  in  the  regions,  see  Aderanti,  Adepoju.   “Migration  in  West  Africa.”  Development  46.3(2003):  37-­‐41.;  Brachet,  Julien.  “Blinded  by  Security:  Reflections   on  the  hardening  of  migratory  Policies  in  Central  Sahara.”  International  Migration  Institute:  Working  Paper   26(October  2010);  Ferris,  Elizabeth  and  Chareen  Stark.  “Internal  Displacement  in  West  Africa:  A  Snapshot.”   Brookings-­‐LSE:  Project  on  Internal  Displacement.  January  2012:  1-­‐23.;  Haug,  Ruth.  “Forced  Migration,   Processes  of  Return  and  Livelihood  Construction  among  Pastoralists  in  Northern  Sudan.”  Disasters   26.1(2002):  70-­‐84.;  Ibrahim,  Fouad  N.  and  Helmut  Ruppert.  “The  Role  of  Rural-­‐Rural  Migration  as  a  Survival   Strategy  in  the  Sahelian  Zone  of  the  Sudan  -­‐  a  case  study  in  Burush,  N.  Darfar.”  GeoJournal  25.1(1991):31-­‐38.;   International  Peace  Institute.  “Mali  and  the  Sahel-­‐Sahara:  From  Crisis  Management  to  Sustainable  Strategy.”   February  2013;  Kharoufi,  Mostafa.  Forced  Migration  in  the  Senegalese-­‐Mauritanian  Conflict:  Consequences   for  the  Senegal  River  Valley.”  Center  for  Migration  Studies  Special  issue  11.4(2012):  140-­‐155,   16  UNHCR:  Mali  situation  Update  no.  18,  May  1,  2013   17  As  of  June  2013,  according  to  the  Commission  of  Population  Movements   18  For  more  details,  see  Abdalla,  M.  “Understanding  Natural  Resource  Conflict  Dynamics:  The  Case  of  the   Tuareg  in  North  Africa  and  the  Sahel.”  Institute  for  Security  Studies,  Pretoria:  2009.;  Bakrania,  Shivit.  “Conflict   Drivers,  International  Responses,  and  the  Outlook  for  Peace  in  Mali:  A  Literature  Review.”  Governance  and     40                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               Social  Development  Resource  Centre  Issue  Paper:  31  January  2013.;  Benjaminsen,  Tor  A,  “Does  Supply-­‐ Induced  Scarcity  Drive  Violent  Conflicts  in  the  African  Sahel?  The  Case  of  the  Tuareg  Rebellion  in  Northern   Mali.”  Journal  of  Peace  Research  45.6(2008):  819-­‐836.;  Guetelius,  David.  “Islam  in  Northern  Mali  and  the  War   on  Terror.”  Journal  of  Contemporary  African  Studies,  25.1(2007):  59-­‐76.;  Human  Rights  Watch.  “Mali:  Rising   Ethnic  Tensions  Threaten  New  Violence.”  20  December  2012;  International  Organization  for  Migration.   “Return  Intention  Survey  on  Displaced  Populations  -­‐  Mali.”  February  2013;  Oxfam.  “Mali’s  Conflict  Refugees.”   Oxfam  Briefing  Paper  167:  22  January  2013.;  Sidibe,  Kalilou.  “Security  Management  in  Northern  Mali:   Criminal  Networks  and  Conflict  Resolution  Mechanisms.”  Institute  for  Development  Studies,  Research  Report   77:  August  2012.   19  UNHCR,  Refugees  Magazine,  1  December  1996   20  Source  to  be  completed   21  UN  Security  Council,  2011   22  For  a  more  detailed  description  of  the  Darfur  conflicts,  see  Bromwich,  Brendan.  “Environmental   Degradation  and  Conflict  in  Darfur:  Implications  for  Peace  and  Recovery.”  Humanitarian  Exchange  Magazine:   39,  July  2008;  Cohen,  Roberta.  “Legal  Protections  for  the  Displaced  People  of  Darfur  and  Chad.”  Brookings   Institute:  Speech,  Panel  on  the  Displaced  from  Darfur:  The  Legal  and  Human  Implications,  Harvard  University.   15  March  2007;  Deng,  Francis  M.  “The  Darfur  Crisis  in  Context.”  Forced  Migration  Review  22:  2005,  44-­‐45;   Geoffroy,  Agnes.  “From  Internal  to  International  Displacement  in  Sudan.”  Paper  prepared  for  Migration  and   Refugee  Movements  in  the  Middle  East  and  North  Africa:  October  23-­‐25,  2007.;  Hagan,  John  and  Joshua   Kaiser.  “The  Displaced  and  Dispossessed  of  Darfur  Explaining  the  Sources  of  a  Continuing  State-­‐led  Genocide.”   The  British  Journal  of  Sociology  62.1:  2011.;  Human  Rights  Watch.  “Sexual  Violence  and  its  Consequences   among  Displaced  Persons  in  Darfur  and  Chad.”  Briefing  Paper:  April  12,  2005.;  Internal  Displacement   Monitoring  Centre.  “Internally  Displaced  in  Chad:  Trapped  between  Civil  Conflict  and  Sudan’s  Darfur  Crisis.”   July  2007;  Patrick,  Erin.  “Intent  to  Destroy:  The  Genocidal  Impact  of  Forced  Migration  in  Darfur,  Sudan.”   Journal  of  Refugee  Studies  18.4:  2005.;  Verney,  Peter.  “Forced  Migration  Overview  Country  Guide:  Sudan.”   February  2006;  Young,  Helen,  Jacobsen,  Karen  and  Abdal  Monium  Osman.  “Livelihoods,  Migration  and   Conflict:  Discussion  of  Findings  in  Two  Studies  in  West  and  North  Darfur,  2006-­‐2007.”  Feinstein  International   Center:  April  2009.   23  BBC:  The  Sudan  Liberation  Army  (SLA)  and  Justice  and  Equality  Movement  (Jem)  began  attacking   government  targets  in  early  2003,  accusing  Khartoum  of  oppressing  black  Africans  in  favour  of  Arabs.  Darfur,   which  means  land  of  the  Fur,  has  faced  many  years  of  tension  over  land  and  grazing  rights  between  the   mostly  nomadic  Arabs,  and  farmers  from  the  Fur,  Massaleet  and  Zaghawa  communities.   24  UNHCR:  Operation  Plan  Document,  2013   25  Jeune  Afrique.  4  March  2010.  Marianne  Meunier.  "Après  l'exil,  la  désillusion."   26  Allowing  cattle-­‐herders  from  one  locality/country  facing  scarcity  in  pasturage  and  water  to  stay  in   localities  with  access  to  sufficient  feeding  opportunities  for  the  animals.     27  Rapport  Bamako  -­‐  Enquête  sur  les  Conditions  de  vie  et  la  Situation  Abri  des  Personnes  Déplacées  Internes   au  Mali  -­‐  NRC  -­‐  3/25/2013   28  Rapport  Ségou  -­‐  Enquête  sur  les  Conditions  de  vie  et  la  Situation  Abri  des  Personnes  Déplacées  Internes  au   Mali  -­‐  NRC  -­‐  4/18/2013   29  “Staying  a  little  longer”  The  refugee  crisis  in  Mauritania,  May  2013  –  WFP  and  UNHCR   30  Mali  Operation  –  Regional  Overview  as  of  May  10,  2013  -­‐  UNHCR   31  "la  France  a  mené  une  série  de  raids  contre  les  islamistes"  (in  (French)).  Le  Monde.  12  January  2013;  Hugh   Schofield  (12  January  2013).  "Mali  and  France  'push  back  Islamists'".  BBC.       41                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               32  ACTED,  September  2012,  Enquete  de  Vulnerabilite  des  Population  Seplacees  et  Hotes  Affectees  par  la  Crise   du  Nord  Mali.     33  Rapport  Bamako  -­‐  Enquête  sur  les  Conditions  de  vie  et  la  Situation  Abri  des  Personnes  Déplacées  Internes   au  Mali  -­‐  NRC  -­‐  3/25/2013   34  IOM:  The  Mali  migration  crisis  at  a  glance,  March  2013   35  UNOCHA  -­‐  Mali:  urgence  complexe    Rapport  de  situation  no  36  (05  juillet  2013)   36  IOM:  The  Mali  Migration  at  a  glance,  march  2013   37  Aderanti  Adepoju,  Alistair  Boulton,  and  Mariah  Levin.  “Promoting  Integration  Through  Mobility:  Free   Movement  Under  Ecowas.”  Refugee  Survey  Quarterly  2010  29:  120-­‐144.   38  Jeune  Afrique.  4  March  2010.  Marianne  Meunier.  "Après  l'exil,  la  désillusion."   39  Adapted  from  Rapport  Bamako  -­‐  Enquête  sur  les  Conditions  de  vie  et  la  Situation  Abri  des  Personnes   Déplacées  Internes  au  Mali  -­‐  NRC  -­‐  3/25/2013  ;  Rapport  Ségou  -­‐  Enquête  sur  les  Conditions  de  vie  et  la   Situation  Abri  des  Personnes  Déplacées  Internes  au  Mali  -­‐  NRC  -­‐  4/18/2013  ;  “Staying  a  little  longer”  The   refugee  crisis  in  Mauritania,  May  2013  –  WFP  and  UNHCR.  The  documents  use  slightly  different  livelihood   groups,  which  were  edited  for  simplicity   40  Aysa-­‐Lastra,  Maria.  "Integration  of  Internally  Displaced  Persons  in  Urban  Labour  Markets:  A  Case  Study  of   the  IDP  Population  in  Soacha,  Colombia."  Journal  of  Refugee  Studies  24,  no.  2  (2011):  277-­‐303.   41  According  to  OCHA,  May  2013,  the  number  of  refugee  animals  is  203.000  whereas  the  one  of  the  hosting   population  is  65.000     42  In  the  past,  Africare  also  organised  micro-­‐credit  schemes  however,  the  mission  was  told  that  recovery  costs   were  never  collected.   43  Rapport  Bamako  -­‐  Enquête  sur  les  Conditions  de  vie  et  la  Situation  Abri  des  Personnes  Déplacées  Internes   au  Mali  -­‐  NRC  -­‐  3/25/2013   44  UNHCR  Briefing  note,  p.  13:  For  secondary  school  and  –primary  school  the  %  are  even  lower,  7  %  and  15%   respectively.   45  UNHCR:  Mali  situation  /  Niger  Overview,  20,  May  1,  2013;  UNICEF  –  Mali  Statistics,  available  at   http://www.unicef.org/infobycountry/mali_statistics.html   46  IOM,  March  2013:  Mali  Crisis  at  a  Glance   47  See  for  example  AFP,  July  8,  2013  “Mali's  army  accuses  Touaregs  of  violating  peace  deal”  –  available  at:   http://reliefweb.int/report/mali/malis-­‐army-­‐accuses-­‐Touaregs-­‐violating-­‐peace-­‐deal   48  See  for  example,  Human  Rights  Watch,  Mali:  New  Abuses  by  Touareg  Rebels,  Soldiers,  June  7,  2013   available  at:  http://www.hrw.org/news/2013/06/07/mali-­‐new-­‐abuses-­‐Touareg-­‐rebels-­‐soldiers   49  Evaluation  rapide  de  protection    –  Rapport  préliminaire  du  pilotage  -­‐  Cluster  Protection  -­‐  Mai,  2013m   Cercles  de  Mopti  et  de  Gao   50  UNHCR  Briefing  note,  May  2013,  p.  14-­‐15   51  UNHCR:  Briefing  note,  op.cit.   52  In  the  Sahel  region,  pastoralism  has  been  seen  as  part  of  a  problem  rather  than  a  solution  by  the  involved   governments.  The  constant  movement  of  nomad  groups  and  the  perceived  datedness  of  the  related  economic   activities  have  been  mistrusted  by  governments.  However,  apart  from  commerce,  pastoralism  is  one  of  the   only  legal  livelihood  sources  in  the  Sahel  (trafficking  being  widespread).  The  unpredictable  availability  of   natural  resources  necessitates  the  mobility  of  populations  with  their  cattle.  Nomad  groups  also  migrate  in   response  to  markets  and  social  relations  with  other  groups.  A  transhumance,  not  static  lifestyle,  is  thus  key  to     42                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               the  survival  of  nomad  populations.  This  lifestyle  has  long  time  been  seen  by  the  post-­‐colonial  states  as  an   anarchic  and  outdated  phenomenon  that  was  in  need  to  be  replaced  by  sedentary  farming  and  a   maximization  of  the  productivity  of  meadows.  States  are  today  progressively  realizing  that  pastoralism  is  a   potential  solution  to  natural  constraints  in  large  parts  of  the  Sahel.  For  Humanitarian  Dialogue:  Observation   of  the  Dynamics  of  Cross-­‐border  movements  by  cattle  herders  and  creation  of  network  of  leaders  from  the   nomad  populations,  June  2013.     43