SWP582 Policies for Strengthening Local Government in Developing Countries Glynn Cochrane WORLD BANK STAFF WORKING PAPERS Number 582 MANAGEMENT AND DEVELOPMENT SERIES Number 9 FILE COpy No WORLD BANK STAFF WORKING PAPERS Number 582 MANAGEMENT AND DEVELOPMENT SERIES Number 9 Policies for Strengthening Local Government in Developing Countries Glynn Cochrane INTEhNATIONAL MONETARY FUND JOINT LIBRMY MAR 8 1984 INTERNATIONAL BANK FOR IIECOrSTRUCTION hND DLVELOPMb"T WASHINGTON, DC. o!21 The World Bank Washington, D.C., U.S.A. Copyright i 1983 The Intemational Bank for Reconstruction and Development / THE WORLD BANK 1818 H Street, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20433, U.S.A. First printing July 1983 All rights reserved Manufactured in the United States of America This is a working document published informally by the World Bank. To present the results of research with the least possible delay, the typescript has not been prepared in accordance with the procedures appropriate to formal printed texts, and the World Bank accepts no responsibility for errors. The publication is supplied at a token charge to defray part of the cost of manufacture and distribution. The views and interpretations in this document are those of the author(s) and should not be attributed to the World Bank, to its affiliated organizations, or to any individual acting on their behalf. Any maps used have been prepared solely for the convenience of the readers; the denominations used and the boundaries shown do not imply, on the part of the World Bank and its affiliates, any judgment on the legal status of any territory or any endorsement or acceptance of such boundaries. The full range of World Bank publications is described in the Catalog of World Bank Publications; the continuing research program of the Bank is outlined in World Bank Research Program: Abstracts of Current Studies. Both booklets are updated annually; the most recent edition of each is available without charge from the Publications Distribution Unit of the Bank in Washington or from the European Office of the Bank, 66, avenue d'Iena, 75116 Paris, France. Glynn Cochrane is professor of anthropology and public administration at Syracuse University, New York. Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data Cochrane , Glyn0 Policies for strengthening local government in developing countries. (World Bank staff vorking papers ; no. 582. Manage- ment and development subseries ; noo 9) lo Local government-Developing countries. 2. Intergovernmental fiscal relations-Developing countries0 10 Title. 11 Series: World Bank staff working papers ; no0 5820 IIIo Series: World Bank staff working papers. Management and development subseries ; no0 9o JS780C59 1983 352'oO0O47509L724 83-14687 ISBN 0-8213-0240-X Abstract Most developing countries have highly centralized govern- ments that naturally concentrate on their own role in development, in isolation from local government. This paper argues that government performance in the pursuit of development objectives is influenced by all the levels of government--moreover, that effective public sector management depends on the ability of the central government to harness the resources of lower levels of government. Local governments should be given elastic revenue sources, that is, sources that grow as the economy grows and that are not beyond their administrative capacity to collect. Personnel performance at the local level has improved when one or more of the following elements were present: (a) well planned horizontal or vertical integration of personnel systems; (b) adequate compensation and incentives; (c) a determined effort to make officials accountable for their performance; (d) effective training of local officials. The division of responsibilities between levels of government needs to be carefully examined before a plan can be constructed for the improvement of local government. Which level of government is best suited to perform a particular function? Experience shows that some degree of continuing centralization is necessary. Finally the paper suggests that new institutional arrangements may be needed if local government is to be strengthened. A major obstacle to such reform is the absence of a holistic view of government that argues for integrating the efforts of all levels of government. Acknowledgement Within the World Bank, Richard Heaver, Geoff Lamb, Selcuk Ozgediz, Pierre Landell-Mills, and Peter Wright provided helpful comments and advice. Externally, assistance was received from Ken Davey, Bill Siffin, and Milton Esman. In addition, the author is indebted to Rhoda Blade-Charest and her colleagues for assistance in producing various drafts of the work. Foreword This study is one in a series of World Bank Staff Working Papers devoted to issues of development management. Prepared as background papers for the World Development Report 1983, they provide an in-depth treatment of the subjects dealt with in Part II of the Report. The thirteen papers cover topics ranging from comprehensive surveys of management issues in different types of public sector institutions (for example, state-owned enterprises, the public service, and local government agencies) to broad overviews of such subjects as planning, management training, technical assistance, corruption, and decentralization0 The central concern underlying these papers is the search for greater efficiency in setting and pursuing development goals. The papers focus on the role of the state in this process, stress the importance of appropriate incentives, and assess the effectiveness of alternative institutional arrangements. They offer no general prescriptions, as the developing countries are too diverse--politically, culturally, and in economic resources-- to allow the definition of a single strategy. The papers draw extensively on the experiences of the World Bank and other international agencies. They were reviewed by a wide range of readership from developing and developed countries inside and outside the Bank. They were edited by Victoria Macintyre. Rhoda Blade-Charest, Banjonglak Duangrat, Jaunianne Fawkes, and Carlina Jones prepared the manuscripts for publication. I hope that these studies will be useful to practitioners and academicians of development management around the world. Pierre Landell-Mills Staff Director World Development Report 1983 Papers in the Management and Development Series Agarwala, Ramgopal. Price Distortions and Growth in Developing Countries. World Bank Staff Working Paper no. 575. Agarwala, Ramgopal. Planning in Developing Countries: Lessons of Experience. World Bank Staff Working Paper no. 576. Cochrane, Glynn. Policies for Strengthening Local Covernment in Developing Countries. World Bank Staff Working Paper no. 582. Gordon, David. Development Finance Companies, State and Privately Owned: A Review. World Bank Staff Working Paper no. 578. Gould, David J., and Jose A. Amaro-Reyes. The Effects of Corruption on Administrative Performance: Illustrations from Developing Countries. World Bank Staff Working Paper no. 580. Knight, Peter T. Economic Reform in Socialist Countries: The Experiences of China, Hungary, Romania, and Yugoslavia. World Bank Staff Working Paper no. 579. Kubr, Milan, and John Wallace. Successes and Failures in Meeting the Management Challenge: Strategies and Their Implementation. World Bank Staff Working Paper no. 585. Lethem, Francis J., and Lauren Cooper. Managing Project-Related Technical Assistance: The Lessons of Success. World Bank Staff Working Paper no. 586. Ozgediz, Selcuk. Managing the Public Service in Developing Countries: Issues and Prospects. World Bank Staff Working Paper no. 583. Paul, Samuel. Training for Public Administration and Management in Developing Countries: A Review. World Bank Staff Working Paper no. 584. Rondinelli, Dennis A., John R. Nellis, and G. Shabbir Cheema. Decentralization in Developing Countries: A Review of Recent Experience. World Bank Staff Working Paper no. 581. Shinohara, Miyohei, Toru Yanagihara, and Kwang Suk Kim. The Japanese and Korean Experiences in Managing Development. Ed. Ramgopal Agarwala. World Bank Staff Working Paper no. 574. Shirley, Mary M. Managing State-Owned Enterprises. World Bank Staff Working Paper no. 577. Table of Contents Page mn I. Introductionoo............. .............o .........o ......... Comparative Advantages of Local Governmento0000000o00 00003 Problem Areas0 0.0000 0o0..00 ..000000.0.0.00.0000000000.0.0 05 What Needs to be Done0 .....00000.0.0.0000 .0000000000.0.0000 7 II. Intergovernmental Fiscal Relationso0 000000000000000000000008 Some Patterns of Revenue Generation.000000000000000000.. .11 Sources of Revenue.0.0.0000000000000000000 0o0 ........0 0 l2 User Charges0..................ooooooooooooooooooooooooool3 Grants0 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 ol5 Property Taxes.000....o.....oo oooooooooooooooooooooooooool7 Enterprises0 O........ oo........ o ..... oooooooo oo- .. 19 Credit 0000000000000000000000000 0000 0 000 0000000000000000 20 Budgeting.000000000.0.o.......-..........o...............21 Conclusions 0 .0.000000000000000000000000000000000 000000000 22 III0 Personnel Management 0000000000000.00000 000 000.000000000000 23 Strengthening Personnel Management 0000000000000 00 000000 24 Horizontal Integration.0.000000000000000000000000000000000 26 Vertical Integration0.0.0.00000000000000000 0 000.000000000000 28 Compensation and Incentives0 000.00000000000000000000000003 Accountability 000 0000 00000 000000 0000 00000000000 000000 0032 Trainingo000000000000.............-ooo..... . oo. .ooooooooo35 Conclusions o.00000000000000000000000000000000000.00.0.0..o.0o39 IVo Allocation of Functions 00000.0000000000000000000000000000040 Size of Local Governmentso 00 0000000000000000000000000000043 Conclusions0 0000 0 000 0000.00000000000 0000.000000000000 45 Annex: Service Delivery Functionso00000000000000000000000000000 -51 Footnotes 0.0.0.00000000000000000 0000 0000 ooo0000 .... 0oo0 ... 0oo00 53 I. Introduction Few developing countries have fully recognized the contribution that local government can make in achieving national development goals. Instead, government activities at the local level have, by and large, been considered extrinsic to central concerns. One of the main reasons for this attitude, no doubt, is that most developing countries have highly centralized governments that naturally concentrate on their own role in development, in isolation from local government. 1/ In the experience of industrialized countries, however, economic growth has been accompanied by significant growth in the size, efficiency, and effectiveness of local government relative to the center. The share of state and local government in employment, for example, averages 11 percent in the member countries of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (countries with a large share are the United States, 14.3 percent; Australia, 19.5 percent; Denmark, 19.6 percent; Sweden, 25.1 percent; and the United Kingdom, 12.6 percent). In the developing countries, by contrast, the average share of employment in the modern sector of the economy is only 4.5 percent (it ranges from 2.5 percent in Africa to 8.0 percent in Asia). These figures suggest that local government may indeed have a role to play in the management of development. Taking that idea a step further, this paper argues that government performance in the pursuit of development objectives is influenced by all levels of government--moreover, that effective public sector management depends on the ability of the central government to harness the resources of the lower levels of government. 2/ The first point that needs to be clarified in any discussion of this topic is that the term "local government" does not denote a small segment of government. In industrialized countries, and some developing countries, the number of civil servants at the local level, in relation to the central government, is much larger than is commonly believed. In the United StatesD for examples there are four times as many local government employees as federal employees; in India, local level employees represent 40 percent of federal employees. 3/ Another source of confusion lies in the varying definitions of local government in some countries. In this discussion, the term is taken to mean levels of government that are subordinate to the central governments but that do not include state governments in federal systems of government. Within that contexts it is useful to consider what recent experience can tell us about the possible methods of strengthening local government and the role of central government in this processo This paper focuses mainly on rural local governments, since less work has been done there than on urban issues, which have already been studied more extensively. Clearcut lessons should not be expected, however, in view of the economicD cultural, and political diversity present among Third World local governments. However, a slight overemphasis on the traditions of local government drawn from the United Kingdom may be detected--a bias that seems unavoidable because much of the literature deals with countries affected by these traditions. Nonetheless, the central discussion here of intergovernmental fiscal relations, personnel managements and allocation of functions applies to most developing countries, regardless of the source of their administrative traditions (see Annex). Before that discussion can go forward, a few general observations need to be made about the comparative advantages of local government over central government in the development process, the problems for local government in this area, and the basic steps that must be taken to make local government an effective participant in development activities. - 3 - Comparative Advantages of Local Government The idea that local government has underutilized development potential has been voiced before now. When the socialists were returned to power in Great Britain after World War II, for example, the Secretary of State for the Colonies, Arthur Creech-Jones, sent a dispatch to African governors of the colonies preparing for independence in which he noted: 1. Local government has the potential to increase local participation in the development process. 2. Local government assistance is more efficient than central government assistance, or could be made so. 3. Local government is, or could be, democratic. 4/ These remarks lead one to ask what particular kinds of development activity can or should be more efficiently discharged by local government. Among the countries posing the same question, the Philippine government seems interested in strengthening fiscal performance at the local level; 5/ Tanzania is giving local government a role in promoting economic development; 6/ Peru is enacting legislation to greatly increase autonomy at the local level; and Ghana's experiments aimed at increasing tax yields at the local level have produced a substantial improvement in revenue. 7/ Also relevant is the fact that almost half of the Agency for International Development's public finance projects up to 1979 were concentrated at the local level. 8/ In certain situations revenues are more easily generated by systems with strong local governments than by those dominated by central governments. This can be seen in the cases of Egypt and Yemen, both of which rely heavily on the Zakat, a religious tax. In Egypt, where local government is weak, collection is poor and 90 percent of local government revenues in rural areas have to come from the central government, 9/ whereas in rural areas of Yemen, where local government is strong , 80 percent of these revenues are locally raised. 10/ In municipal areas of Thailand, too, collection is not a problem where it is delegated to community level organizations. Wherever a central government intervenes to upgrade management capacity at the local level, however, the result may be even more beneficial than it is when a local or central government attempts to act alone. Following up on the idea of such a partnership to promote economic development, the World Bank undertook the Hill Farming Technical Development Project in Azad Kashmed, Pakistan, in 1978, which was designed to improve forestry practices at the local level by having local people and their local government work closely with the central government. To meet the needs of 300,000 families in the area, the project had to produce 800,000 tons of firewood annually. At 200 rupees an acre, however, the Rs. 600 million required for the entire project was beyond the resources of the central government. Village authorities were therefore used to mobilize the people for new plantings. Thus the central government's investment costs were reduced and social pressure was organized to protect the government lots. An added advantage was that women were encouraged to participate in the projecto By 1981 it was well on the way to achieving its target of 130,000 hectares of new planting. 11/ A similar program in Kenya--the Special Rural Development Program-- succeeded in the Machakos district because local people were involved in the planning and implementation of development activities0 In Turkana, by contrast, such programs have foundered because local people were not able to participate in them. As the World Development Report 1980 has noted, "When beneficiaries are involved through their own organizations, they respond more effectively to services." Of course, this does not mean that local governments are automatically capable of handling development taskso Indeed, - 5 - many would be incapable of doing so. Perhaps a more fundamental problem in harnessing the potential at this level lies in the general attitude about the proper function of local governments. The recent debate over the "new federalism" in the United States is thus a timely one because the central issue--the role of different levels of government in stimulating economic development--is precisely the question that developing countries should tackle. 12/ Problem Areas Specific problems of the type experienced in French West Africa, where only 22 percent of potential revenues were collected by local government, 13/ appear to be sypmtomatic of larger problems--that is, many local governments in developing countries are fragmented, confused about their functions, and all too often either invisible or largely ceremonial. 14/ Considerable effort would therefore be required to strengthen their capabilities. Despite the interest expressed in that idea during the early 1970s, however, most planners have failed to see that a strengthening of local government would help to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of economic management. Not one of the fifty-four development plans examined by the International Union of Local Authorities in the Hague in 1981, for example, explicitly considered the role of local government in the promotion of economic growth. Some might argue that local government is not included in national development plans because politicians of the center do not wish to share their power or may even be anxious to avoid empowering entrenched local elites. Interestingly, the most authoritarian military regimes that have guarded power jealously (for example, in Nigeria and Pakistan) have also promoted local government reform. Most politicians are aware that centralization frustrates the distribution of benefits to the rural massesD and a good number of them consider it politically expedient to strengthen local government and thereby reduce the inability (and possibly culpability) of the center to meet rural needs. Consequently, decentralization has been promoted by politicians in many countries. The reluctance of politicians in central government to share power with local authorities, as this paper argues, is not the real problem-- on the contrary, one of the greatest threats to the successful reform of local governments in developing countries is the politically motivated and, too often, poorly planned decentralization exercises that fail to provide sufficient resources to enable local governments to meet local needs and fulfill their aspirations. Wherever central government ignores the opportunity to work with and through local authorities, the chances of achieving widespread popular participation in development efforts become weakened and mistrust may even develop, as is evident in the reaction of Peruvian campesinos to central government development initiatives: "Be suspicious. Say what they want. Drag your feet, keep doing what you have always done." 15/ The Mills-Odoi Commission on the use of manpower in Ghana also made the point that, from the perspective of the efficiency and effectiveness of all government activity, the establishment of staffing patterns that encourage concentration of high- level personnel in central government has adverse effects on the management of public services at the local government level. 16/ Much of the literature on local government has little to say about the development role of local authorities in the achievement of national objectives or about the prospects for expanding that role0 Moreover, many of the standard works are ten to fifteen years old and are strongly biased toward urban areas and developed countries. 17/ Surprisingly little attention has been paid to important issues such as the number of people employed in local government or local government contributions to economic growth. 18/ The literature provides details of the problems local government must resolve, but has too little to say about how to improve matters. Although a few case studies have produced rich insights, most of the situations selected for examination are atypical, and agreement has not yet been reached on a satisfactory method of comparison. Nevertheless, some useful public finance work has been done on state and local finances (the results suggest that, if local authorities do not enjoy a substantial degree of financial autonomy, their existence is threatened). 19/ A few studies that have examined the political aspects of local government, urban politics, and questions of community power have also underlined the point that local governments vary so greatly that it is impossible to come up with general solutions. 20/ All in all, local government, since it occupies a position between community and nation, does not readily lend itself to either microstudies or to macrostudies. What heeds to be Done To promote greater efficiency and effectiveness in public sector management, central governments really need to review the development functions that local governments now perform as well as the kinds of functions they could undertake in the future and the resources needed to fulfill these functions. Traditionally, local government has had a regulatory and extractive role and has had little to do with economic development. That type of unbalanced allocation of functions between levels of government leads to an unbalanced public service at the local level and gives local governments no basis on which to stimulate economic growth. Since health and education functions are usually carried out at the local level, local officials are -8 - available to provide a useful input to the national planning processo This is usually not the case for agricultural or industrial development, however, because local authorities have inadequate funds and staff in these areas. As mentioned earlier, many argue that decentralization is an effective way to strengthen local government, 21/ but in some countries (for example, Papua New Guinea and Tanzania) initial attempts at decentralization have actually weakened local governmento This paper argues that cooperation between central and local government is certainly a key ingredient of successful development1, but that it must be focused on long-range (five- to ten-year) plans for improvement and on definite targets for generating revenues, managing personnel, and assigning functional responsibilities. This means that improvement plans should be comprehensive, but their implementation should be incremental. II. Intergovernmental Fiscal Relations Revenues from forest products, minerals, trade, fishing, indirect taxation, customs tariffs, and most direct taxation of high income, as well as proceeds from international development assistance, all usually accrue to central governmento Local government obtains most of its revenue from limited sources: property taxes, licenses (firearms, radios, stores, and so on)5, rental of facilities such as markets or abbatoirs, and flat rate taxes levied on all able-bodied males. Furthermore, the amounts are usually very small, the administrative costs of tracking down those who are liable are heavy, and the incidence of nonpayment is usually very high. Government at the center usually takes the taxes that are easy to collect1, leaving local government eith revenue sources that are politically and administratively difficult to gather0 - 9 - The problem for local governments, then, is that they have little chance of raising sufficient revenues to meet current needs or to expand their responsibilities. In such circumstance, residents become accustomed to and expect minimum levels of health, education, and so on, for once these unavoidable expenses have been taken care of, local government spending capacity is exhausted. Local governments should therefore be given elastic revenue sources, that is, sources that grow as the economy grows, and that are not beyond their administrative capacity to collect. The question of administrative capacity raises another important point: the assessment and collection of local revenues depends primarily on the quality and quantity of manpower available to local authorities. Without adequate financial resources, local governments are unable to attract professionally qualified people, particularly accountants, assessors, and surveyors. Without such people, it is, of course, difficult to perform financial activities; it seems reasonable to conclude that upgrading administrative performance would more than pay for itself. In some cases, reform aimed at increasing local revenues has begun by strengthening performance at the center. Brazil's reforms of 1965-67, for example, were intended to strengthen the financial capacity of lower levels of government while reducing disparities within and between regions. States and municipalities were to share in an elastic tax base that was created by enhancing the central government's power to raise and allocate taxes at the same time that some traditional sources of revenue were removed from states and municipalities. As a result of this arrangement, the state and municipal share of federal income and excise taxes is expected to grow from an estimated 14 percent in 1976 to an estimated 24 percent in 1984. 22/ In this instance, 10 - then, the local government resource base was strengthened by transferring responsibilities to a higher level of government. When less than 20 percent of revenues are locally raisedD however, local decisionmaking may be so dominated by central government that local government may lose all credibility as an independent entity. Papua New Guinea is a case in point. A study carried out by the Department of decentralization in Papua New Guinea in 1982 showed that local government in many provinces raised only 1 percent of expenditures from revenue sources under their own control. Thus, decentralization is threatened in Papua New Guinea because many authorities must rely heavily on the central government for operating funds (and advice). Nonetheless, Papua New Guinea is sometimes cited as an example of successful decentralization. Fiscal decentralization may work well when a well functioning central revenue system is already in operation. The issue is not whether there ought to be fiscal decentralization, but rather where revenue-generating powers ought to be located in the government as a whole if local government is to obtain the maximum returns. Brazil's cases which is not atypical, shows that local government may be better off by having central government collect some of its revenues. If the manpower resources of central government are far superior to those of local governments, then it makes sense to approach fiscal decentralization with caution. Many local authorities receive funds from the central government regardless of the local tax effort. In these cases, the central government should index any further transfer of funds to performance. This approach requires effective systems for monitoring local level expenditures and revenue collection, which must initially be supplied by the central government. Some Patterns of Revenue Generation The developing countries can be divided into four broad categories according to the general pattern of fiscal responsibility at the local level. In Anglophone Africa, for one, local government councils have been recognized as independent legal entities, but this arrangement has widened the gap between central and local authorities. Thus the central government has declined to discuss matters thought to be outside the jurisdiction and competence of local government authorities, and local governments have been left to decide how large a tax burden they will bear. Although many have thought that people would be more willing to pay taxes if the funds were locally spent, it has proved hard to disabuse local people of the idea that all development expenditures are a central government responsbility. Ministries of finance have been eager to reduce allotments from central government revenue sources, and the results of their efforts in this direction have been generally unsatisfactory to all parties. 23/ In Francophone Africa the communes have been severely limited in their revenue raising powers. All revenue decisions have had to be approved by the Minister of Interior. Although the potential tax base of many urban areas has increased considerably, many new enterprises have been granted exemption from local taxes. Between 1965 and 1970, for example, despite continuous population growth, real urban revenues declined in French West Africa. In Senegal, only 50-55 percent of assessed property taxes is collected each year. 24/ The absence of strong fiscal autonomy at the local level in Latin America can be attributed to the preeminence of the unitary state model dervied from Europe. Even in federalist states such as Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico, state structures and organizations are highly centralized. Since the - 12 = responsibilities of local government tend to be residual, the only revenue sources left to draw on are limited to areas such as levies on property, fees from municipal licenses, and taxes collected on movies, sports, and cultural affairs. Local government has thus had to continue to extract resources from the central government for the provision of needed services. In these circumstances the development potential of local government remains underutilized. In Egypt, as in other Arabic speaking countries, the principal source of local government revenue is the property tax. Other sources of revenue include taxes on vehicles, returns from public utilities, business licenses, entertainment, and lotteries. In the countries of the Middle East, local government receives a share of the state-administered property tax and the usual list of small fees (for example, those connected with births, deaths, marriages, schools, abattoirs) and taxes on animals, entertainment, and the like0 Egypt has attempted to launch some reforms, such as improvements in local government budgeting, tax mapping, and so on; but it is too soon to judge their effect0 Sources of Revenue Personal income tax is a lucrative and easily tapped source of revenue for central governments; and local governments have been tempted to draw on it as well, either through a direct tax or by means of a surcharge on the centrally administered tax0 The advantage of such revenue is that in a buoyant economy local government would recoup more from income tax than from property tax, since the latter is usually slow in responding to changing economic circumstances. The disadvantage of such a system is that to be successful it requires well-developed economies with substantial numbers of - 13 - employees (as in Japan and Korea). Consequently, this form of taxation has not been successful in municipal areas and even less so in rural areas. A variation of this tax has been tried in East Africa, where a tax on personal incomes lower than the threshold for national income tax has been imposed by Botswana, Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda, and Zambia. In Kenya, the tax was removed from local government control in 1969, at a time when the local government councils were on the verge of bankruptcy; 25/ and in Tanzania it disappeared after independence. In Uganda, until recently, the tax contributed about 75 percent of current revenues. 26/ However, the tax tends to be unfavorably viewed by central governments in order to safeguard their own revenue. 27/ Kenya and Tanzania eventually found it politically easier to move from direct to indirect taxation. The potential for local government income tax is thus very limited, and such taxes are perhaps best left to the central government, which has greater administrative resources. In other words, the comparative advantage of this type of tax lies with the central government. User Charges The cost of local services can be recovered from: (a) the consumer through user charges; (b) the local government revenue base; or (c) the central government, either through revenue sharing or the grant system. Local governments could raise more funds through user charges if only they had the necessary manpower resources. Because administrative resources are difficult to amass, however, user charges are often neglected. They should, in fact, be employed more often by local authorities, since those who consume services and who have the necessary resources are, in principle, those who should pay. Refuse collection, electricity, telephones, public housing, and recreation are areas in which cost recovery is possible. That may not be the case, however, - 14 - for transportation costs, rents, and perhaps water rates1, because they are often subsidized on social or political grounds. User charges are usually designed to break even in meeting operating costs and debt servicing. Broadly speaking, governments have three options in formulating these charges: (a) current cost accounting with income calculated to yield a commercial rate of return on the current replacement costs of capital assets; (b) substitution of depreciation for debt servicing in calculating the contribution to capital costs; (c) marginal cost pricing, which charges every unit of service provided at the full capital and operational cost of units1, in addition to current supply. As in other methods of raising revenues, the implementation of these options requires considerable administrative resources that many local governments1, particularly those in rural areas1, do not possesso Some countries endowed with considerable human resources have used cost recovery effectively. Sidewalk construction in urban areas of Brazil and irrigation works in rural areas of Thailand, for example, have generated user fees assessed on property owners whose land will obviously reap the benefits of these local government expenditures. The user charge in these instances is a one-time, equitable fee; and the method of assessment (that is, according to frontage) does not require great technical skill on the part of local government assessors0 Local governments that have the necessary manpower may find it easier to impose user fees than does the central government because the former are known to need funds1, while central governments sometimes extend grants to cover the full construction costs of projectso An example from India shows how resources can be mobilized at the local level when a community acts in a determined manner to pursue its own notion of appropriate development objectives: - 15 - The construction of the village school was undertaken entirely at the initiative of the members of the panchayat themselves. The cost of the building was Rs. 45,000. Of this, Rs. 10,000 came from a state legislative fund; about Rs. 20,000 came from individual gifts offered, solicited by the Sarpanch and others on the panchayat; and the rest, about Rs. 15,000, was raised by the panchayat in relatively small amounts from village households. The Sarpanch described the collections as 'taxes,' but they were not the legal hearth tax and the panchayat collected them not by force of law but by persuasion. Paying the tax, as he said, was 'voluntary.' The land for the school, about 1.2 hectares, was given by the panchayat as owner of the cremation grounds. The panchayat had been their owner in the same way in 1965, but nothing I heard then suggested taking an initiative in this way. Other actions taken by the panchayat reflect its new decisionmaking autonomy less clearly, but they too have been important. They included raising Rs. 7000 for paving the road through the village lands (an obligatory levy), and several smaller levies to improve village monuments--also 'voluntary' payments. 28/ Grants For many developing countries, grants from higher levels of government constitute 30-60 percent of urban and 70-95 percent of rural local government revenues. 29/ Per capita grants are the most common type, but governments may also use grants to equalize disparities between wealthy and poor areas of a country or between populated and underpopulated areas. Deficiency grants can also be used for equalization purposes. A great handicap that developing countries have in trying to improve their grant systems at the local level is that they lack the personnel to manage these programs. At the national level, meanwhile, more needs to be done to monitor and evaluate the impact of the grants at the local level. Grant systems in developing countries should have a stimulative effect on the local tax effort, and the money from the central government should not simply be a substitute for money that the local government might otherwise have raised from its own sources. Full cost reimbursement grants for construction or service delivery, for example, give local government - 16 - little incentive to improve efficiency and effectiveness of Its revenue raising. In addition (and this is particularly true of rural local government), grants may distort local government budget priorities, for example, through centrally laid down requirements about the payment of teachers' salaries. India attaches a small weight to the grant formula to reward local governments that tax themselves more heavily, but most countries make little effort to ensure that local government taxes are not lowered to substitute for grants. Grant systems should produce adequate revenues1, and this is most easily accomplished when the tax base of the grant pool Is elastic and shared between central and local government, as is the case in the Philippines and in Colombia0 In other developing countries1, however, less sharing is more typical. In Korea, for example, the local tax share of central government revenues in 1972 was 17.6 percent; and by 1977 the local share had fallen to 10.9 percent0 Kenya, meanwhile, abolished local government income tax in 1969 and introduced a compensating grant; but it was much less elastic than the original tax base so that as time passed local governments received much less than they would have if the income tax had been retained0 30/ The effort required to manage grant systems should be given careful scrutiny to ensure that the local government has the administrative capacity to operate the systemo In a large country with a substantial grant pool, the system can quickly become balkanized, as has happened in the United States1, which at times has had as many as 400 separate types of grants0 In these circumstances, administration at the local level requires skillful managemento The detailed effort that should be made to assess the expenditure requirements of local authorities (as the Ashoka Commission did in India) may, however, be beyond the administrative capacity of many countries0 Korea's - 17 - basic grant formula, for example, contains thirty separate assessments of "need." Considerable time, effort, and skill are required to manage all phases of this grant. It would be useful, then, if grant systems were assessed in terms of their administrative transaction costs. Obviously, the smaller the number of types, the lower the administrative costs; and formula grants will usually have lower administrative costs than project grants. The highest administrative costs will normally be incurred with matching grants and, of course, these tend to favor the wealthier areas. Property Taxes Although property tax revenues are a principal source of local government revenues, they are not growing as fast as expenditure requirements in most developing countries. These taxes are levied annually and the rates may be based on fair rent, capital improved site values (meaning the value of the land and attached buildings or other facilities), or unimproved valuation (meaning what the ground could fetch on the open market regardless of the use to which the land has been put by the present owner). The choice of valuation system is in part a policy matter, that is, it usually depends on whether the rating is to be used to encourage or discourage certain types of development. Other factors that may be taken into consideration are the presence of other properties (which are then used for comparison) and the existence of a lively property market. Assessments are inevitably the subject of controversy because they are bound to create difficulties or be considered inequitable by some owners, but most owners have the option of moving to a different jurisdiction. The yield from property taxes can be increased by devoting more administrative resources to areas such as cadastral mapping and assessment; but small local authorities find it hard to obtain specialized staff, and when ° 18 = qualified people are founds they are often exposed to undue pressure from powerful local interest groups. Government wages for assessors, surveyors, and other such workers are often only a fraction of those paid in the private sector. Such problems can be overcome, as Thailand has found, by centralizing the valuation processo Although property values in most countries have been rising very quickly in recent years, the rise will not be reflected in property tax revenue if local governments do not have the manpower to revise property tax assessments within the period called for by legislation. Some ways of obtaining additional revenues from property taxes in the Philippines were recently proposed in a report to the Philippine Institute for Development Studies; it recommended six changes in the administration of these taxes: (1) since fractional assessments (that is, the practice of taxing some improvements such as buildings at a higher rate than land) tend to discourage the mobilization of resources, they should be abandoned; (2) the legal rate ceiling of 1 percent of assessed values should be increased to 1.5 percent; (3) tax mapping and records management should be more widely used; (4) new landowners should be informed of their tax liabilities by the government and a tax amnesty declared on past debts; (5) since assessments made every three years place a strain on manpower and produce rather large jumps in tax rates, all areas should be divided into three sections, with tripartitie assessments being made each year and increases phased over a three-year period; (6) a more determined effort should be made to reduce delinquencies by demanding proof of payment from those who wish to do business with the government--the names of delinquents could be published, for example (a successful tactic in Korea), the help of community leaders could be enlisted, or the worst delinquents could be pursued and the ultimate legal remedy of sale could be employed0 31/ - 19 - Enterprises Local governments obtain some of their revenues from enterprises that either provide or finance certain services. Sometimes these services are provided by a national corporation such as Ghana's National Water and Sewerage Authority, a metropolitan corporation, or a municipally controlled enterprise. Electricity is usually a national responsibility, but in some places it is generated or distributed by local government. Other such enterprises provide rental or purchase housing or service sites; sometimes this is a municipal activity, sometimes it is the function of a special- purpose authority. In addition, some enterprises regulate the use and development of land, usually at the municipal level, but on occasion at the provincial or metropolitan level. Although little has been written about the management of public enterprises at the local level--particularly in rural areas--here, too, shortage of qualified staff is a serious constraint. It is not uncommon for enterprise employees to work part time on the projects and to spend most of their employment time on other local government business. These employees may be paid by several different local government budgets. In these circumstances it is difficult to assess the true operating costs or profits of the enterprise, and it is equally difficult for the local authority to allocate costs among the participating agencies. In a study of four local government enterprises in the Philippines, for example (a Galeria for cottage industry products, a restaurant, a convention center, and a slaughterhouse), it was found that profits were drastically reduced when capital costs were taken into account (only the slaughterhouse showed a profit). 32/ Another problem is that many small urban and rural authorities lack the resources needed to analyze projects and prepare investment proposals for - 20 - local enterprises. The central government could assist here by examining the scheme of smaller authorities to ensure that local resources will not be wasted. Furthermore, central governments could undertake a broad assessment of the quantity and quality of management required to operate the enterprise. They could also investigate the adequacy of the regulatory environment for small local enterprises (for example, the rules on pricing and competition) to ensure that external conditions are favorable to the enterprise. All in all, strong central government activity seems a necessary prelude to the improvement of local government enterpriseso Credit One other important factor concerning fiscal matters needs to be mentioned-local governments must also be able to borrow funds if they are to mobilize resources at the local level. The usual sources of capital are grants1, central government loans1, earmarked taxes (both national and local)1, contributions from local governments themselves in the form of a fixced percentage of revenue, and required deposits from reserve accounts, cash balances, and pension fundso The favored sources vary from country to countryo Central government grants to local government credit authorities make up the major share of cap4.talization in Kenya, Honduras, and Venezuela; the Inter American Development Bank has also used this method with good results in Latin America0 By contrast, Guatemala, Kenya, Uganda, and Zambia have used government loans to local authorities. In Tanzania local governments are required to deposit recurrent funds each year for credit purposes1, while in Niger the local government is required to set aside 3 percent each yearo A similar pattern is followed in Thailand and Honduras. A number of countries have central institutions that raise funds and mobilize loan capital for local authorities. An alternative method of - 21 - financing a credit facility for poor local governments might be to calculate the cash balances that local governments are required to keep on deposit with central banks (often these are on the order of six months' to a year's operating revenues) and to create a "soft loan" window with a concessional interest rate, as proposed in the Philippines recently. To implement such a proposal, however, it would be necessary to set up a national authority with civil service status and ability to review proposals and provide assistance in project work. 33/ Wherever credit restrictions on local governments seem unduly harsh, policies should be examined to see if the provision of additional credit could enhance their capacity to engage in development activity. More liberal credit policies might also enable local governments to employ more of their own funds productively. Budgeting For the most part, local government budgets are old fashioned administrative cash budgets that emphasize inputs rather than outputs. On the whole, these types of budgets fail to amortize capital items, 34/ tend to use cash and accrual accounting at the same time, often estimate revenue very inaccurately, and fail to close and audit accounts on time. Again, manpower is a critical issue and better training is periodically recommended. 35/ Since grants in aid generally constitute 50-80 percent of urban budgets and 70-90 percent of rural budgets, local government budgeting is strongly affected by central priorities. 36/ Local priorities are thus subject to great uncertainty. In Egypt, for example, only 10 percent of local government requests for capital funds are usually funded. 37/ Uncertainty means that more time has to be spent trying to present a convincing case for funding to the central government, and that when resources are scarce there - 22 will be greater competition between local unitso Thus, each authority will tend to inflate its bid for funds (100 percent in excess of the previous year's approved estimate is quite common in Africa and Asia)0 Sorting out these bids takes considerable effort. Then, too, the central government's review of local government budgets tends to be restrictive and concerned with obvious financial imprudence rather than with careful analysis of the economic needs and constraints facing local governmento 38/ Some other budgeting problems occur in connection with capital projects in that there is often a shortage of trained manpower to identify and prepare projects that are consistent with the national plan. Furthermore, "spillover costs" are frequently unanticipated in urban areas where a housing project, for example, may create the need for additional health, recreation, or medical infrastructure. Conclusions The past experience of developing countries indicates that local governments need to allocate their scarce administrative resources to those revenue-generating areas where the greatest returns lie1, instead of devoting the same effort to all revenue sourceso Furthermore, they need to identify the revenue sources that they will have a comparative advantage in collecting, and then they must try to persuade the central government to assume responsibility for areas in which it has a comparative advantage0 Such an arrangement would help to avoid situations like the one in Guatemala1, where 60 percent of city parking meter revenues go for administrative overhead0 (The returns would undoubtedly be higher if the same administrative resources were applied to collecting revenues from the largest twenty or thirty property tax defaulters.) - 23 - Another common problem is that central government often regards local level decisions concerning the allocation of resources as intrinsically weak, with the result that local government expenditure of grant money, taxing powers, access to credit, and so on, is tightly controlled by the central government, which assumes that, if the local level is given more discretion, there will be more waste. (This attitude toward local level resource mobilization can become a self-fulfilling prophecy.) When the local level is granted more discretion, the results can be unsatisfactory if the central government does not help the local government to develop sufficient management capacity. The central government should therefore use intergovernmental fiscal relations to promote a stronger capacity to manage finances at the local level and to promote a longer term goal of local level fiscal autonomy. Unless successful institution-building has already taken place, fiscal decentralization is likely to have a negative impact at the local level. Central governments cannot assume that enacting legislation or establishing regulations will alone improve local level resource mobilization. Institution-building interventions (for example, training or expert assistance with property tax administration) may be called for to upgrade the local capacity to mobilize additional resources while optimal use is made of central government funds. These central government interventions may take ten to fifteen years to produce results. III. Personnel Management The greatest task that developing countries face at present is to involve the growing number of poorly trained and poorly paid local government employees in the development process. As a recent IMF study has observed - 24 - about local government in industrialized countries,, "What is striking is how high the local government wage bill is, compared to the central government wage bill, in many countries where we think government is centrally dominated." It is indeed striking that in Japan, for instance, 69 percent of the wage bill is paid to local government officials and that in Denmark it is almost 70 percent. In the Netherlands 58 percent is paid to local government and in Britain 51 percent; in other countries the percentages paid to local government are also large (for example, in Argentina and Costa Rica it is 50 percent and 43 percent1, respectively)o 39/ Data on the growth of local government personnel in developing countries are poor, since neither international agencies nor developing countries maintain a consistent time series. It appears, however, that for countries where data are available, local government has grown at about the same rate as central government (Table 1),D and that local government in developing countries1, particularly in Africa, is much smaller than in OECD countrieso Strengthening Personnel Management Where overall personnel management has improved (for example, Korea, India, and the Philippines),D the improvements seem to have been the outcome of central government initiatives and a lengthy process of gradual improvement. The performance of local government personnel has improved not only when the central government has made a sustained effort to improve local performance, but also when one or more of the following elements have been present: (a) well planned horizontal or vertical integration of personnel systems; (b) adequate compensation and incentives; (c) a determined effort, as in Tanzania,D by central government to make officials accountable to local people for their - 25 - performance; and (d) effective training of local officials. 40/ Wherever these elements are linked, performance is likely to improve significantly. Table 1 Size of Local Government Local Government Central Local as a percentage Government Government of Central and Local Country Employment Employment Government Combined Philippines 521,664 68,280 23 (1979) (1979) Japan 730,222 1,459,070 66 (1980) (1980) India 3,168,000 2,076,000 40 (1980) (1980) Egypt 572,611 1,067,724 65 (1979) (1979) Portugal 313,046 58,427 16 (1980) (1980) United States 2,866,000 9,793,000 77 (1980) (1980) United Kingdom 2,320,000 3,013,000 56 (1980) (1980) El Salvador 72,392 44,275 58 (1980) (1980) Note: Base year indicated in brackets under figure. Experience discussed later in this section suggests that central government must continue to be responsible for the development of local government personnel. Consequently, decentralization needs to be accompanied by a - 26 - strengthening of central government's capacity to regulate, monitor, and assist in the development of personnel at the local level. Horizontal Integration The horizontal integration of local government minimizes the disadvantages experienced by small authorities having a limited resource base (for example, they have difficulty establishing adequate service schemes or resisting political intrusion into personnel Issues). In particular, personnel management functions that these authorities cannot afford to undertake on their own are carried out and ate paid for by all local authorities, and the smaller members of the group shoulder a relatively smaller burden. A number of countries have unified their local government services--Ireland did so in 1926; Ceylon in 1945; and recently Jamaica, Thailand1, Nigeria, India1, Tanzania, and Ghana. The task of establishing and maintaining uniform standards is usually entrusted to a local government commission or a ministry of local government. Common standards for appointments, promotions, and terms and conditions of service introduce objectivity and equity to local government affairs and minimize the possibility of political interference or arbitrary action. When appointments are on the basis of political considerations, however-as in Mexico, Brazil, Chile,, Panama, and Colombia--the performance of local government seems to be adversely affected. The extent to which local government services have been unified varies from country to country0 In Kenya, loczl authorities have discretion to appoint whomever they wish. In Senegal, as in other former French territories, standards for local authorities and comparable pay have been established by national laws and regulations0 In Japan, meanwhile, the - 27 - municipal law of 1950 laid down standards for local government personnel systems.that must be followed by all authorities. Ghana has had a unified local government service since 1965 for the post of clerk and treasurer of the council, administered by the minister of local government, as well as a National Association of Local Government Councils. In Jamaica there are two unified local government services, both administered by the Municipal Councils Commission; one is for parish staff, the other for municipal staff. Thailand has a unified municipal service, the terms and conditions of which are very similar to those of the national service. Unified local government services do not exist in Latin America or the United States; in Brazil, Chile, and the countries of Central America, a combination of low salaries and intrusion by political forces has weakened the local government services. As for wages and benefits, common pension funds and common funds for payment of salaries have been introduced in Yugoslavia, Kenya, the Netherlands, and France. Wherever strong central government influences are not present, there may be considerable disparities between pay scales, as is the case in Brazil between municipalities, or in Chile and Thailand between local and central government terms and conditions of service. Meanwhile, in Latin America, Asia, and Africa local civil servants are on lower pay scales than central government officials, but the two are comparable in Papua New Guinea, Tanzania, and Kenya. Horizontal integration can also have useful political consequences in that it can help to develop a local government lobby strong enough to negotiate with powerful central ministries. Establishing nationally administered personnel rules and regulations is not enough, however. The national agency that is made responsible for administering local government - 28 - should also be able to asslt with appointments, promotions, the maintenance and upgrading of officer records, and so on. Integration also offers considerable training opportunities and transfers that can help produce more uniform local gover=ent responses to important issues and technical matters. Vertical Integration Frequently, the most pressing need is for a small number of well qualified peoplc to look after key local government activities such as accounting or tau assessment. Vertical integration presents local governments with an opportunity to obtain the services of such technical specialists from the center, but it also allows local officials to spend a period of service at the centero Thus It offers incentives to civil servants at both national and local levels and can increase local competence while promoting more uniform treatment of technical lsoues. This approach has been used in Asia and Africa with some succesco Increasing intergovernmental personnel transfers might also reduce ovemanning In central departments. It should be pointed out1, however, that local authorities often disagree with the center over personnel issues. A vertically integrated personnel system in which local and central government officals form separate branches of the same service is found in and Egypt, Papua New Guinea, and Tanzania, (These countries also have horizontal integration.) In general, the system is found in countries that have had highly centralized administrative systems and in which attempts to decentralize are being made. Ecuador has also taken steps to introduce a vertically integrated local government and central government personnel systemo 3hen power is highly centralized, local and national services may be integrated, as in China, Taiwan, Ecuador, Morocco, Nepal, certain states in - 29 - India and Pakistan, and small island states such as Mauritius. The Taiwanese system, which goes far back in time, involved entry examinations and wide possibilities for transfer, and there is little difference between the terms and conditions of service for central and local officials. In Morocco the national government is responsible for the appointment, promotion, and transfer of local government officials; but even with this system it has not been easy to provide technicians and other skilled personnel to the more remote and smaller authorities. In Tanzania vertical integration of central and local government services was imposed from the center. Local government was strengthened by assigning well qualified central government personnel to help local officials. They helped local officials stimulate revenues, for example, by placing cesses on agricultural produce; they also helped the Rural Development Bank to grant loans and acted as buying agents for some of the large parastatals in the agricultural sector. 41/ Service delivery was improved by seconded health and education officials. Vertical integration also made it possible to get doctors, dentists, and well-qualified teachers to serve in remote areas. Vertical integration can be permanent, as in Tanzania, or temporary, as in Panama where in 1970 the government promoted settlement on the sparsely populated Atlantic coast. A settlement was established at Coclecito with the idea of producing a model for the development of local government that could then be used in other areas of the Atlantic coast. Initially, the settlement had fewer than fifty settlers, and they had very few technical skills. In consultation with the central government, the people decided to concentrate on aquaculture, cattle, and poultry production. To assist the local government, the central government seconded technical experts who were told before they - 30 - arrived at Coclecito that they had to train local counterparts as soon as possibleo Ten years later, there were almost 2,O0O people In the area, the project was close to being financially self-sufficient (it produced meat and fish at low prices), and it was run by the settlers themselves0 The initial idea of obtaining technical assistance from central government was extended to a mini hydro scheme and the production of lumber. Before long, the settlement even had a radio station, Radio Coclecito. 42/ One advantage of vertical integration is that, when the terms and conditions of service for all government employees become standardized, there is both a wider pool for recruitment and wider career opportunities for service entrants. Furthermore , each level of government is not forced to maintain its own personnel system since some functions can conveniently be centralized; in this way manpower and finance can be saved. The disadvantage of such systems, however, is that, when functions are centralized there may be delays in processing work and the system may not be sufficiently responsive to local requirementso Also1, the least able central government officials may be posted to local governmentso Compensation and Incentives On the average, central government employees are uniformly better paid than the average employee at the state or local government level. A recent IMF study shows that, on the average, local government employees in OECD countries received 83 percent of salaries paid to central government employeeso In developing countries, however, local government employees received only 50 percent of the salaries given their central government counterparts. It is interesting to note that in the Philippines1, although the national civil service law covers most positions in provincial government, - 31 - only about half are regular civil service employees while the remainder hold temporary positions. The reasons for the large number of temporary appointments include the delay in certification for entry by the national Bureau of Civil Service, and the inability of many provinces to pay the national minimum wage scale for employees. Papua New Guinea, meanwhile, has an integrated public service, but top grades are only for central government. The shortage of manpower is certainly a serious problem in a number of countries. In Botswana in 1980, for example, 15 percent of local government vacancies had been open for a year, the greatest shortages being in the professional and technical fields. Several methods of coping with the problem have been tried in rural areas, with varying degrees of success. Some countries (Kenya, Korea, and Panama) have offered monetary incentives to make life in remote areas more attractive. As a percentage of salary, the allowances have ranged from 15 percent in Kenya to about 80 percent in Panama. In Korea, the Saemaul Undong Movement (SMM) seems to have been successful in employing nonmonetary incentives to attract personnel. SSM local government leaders were offered greater access to higher levels of decisionmaking in the central government bureaucratic structure as well as a host of benefits not usually accorded to citizens of their status (a special identification card, priority status when applying for government loans, special discounts in public transportation, and favorable treatment for children in the allocation of scholarship funds). 43/ Another type of solution to local government manpower shortages comes from Papua New Guinea, where an experiment that is underway will make it impossible for a national civil servant to be confirmed in his or her appointment unless he has served at the local level for a period of at least three years. This procedure, it is hoped, will ensure that national civil servants will be aware of local goavsanEt pgob2lG 9, 2kLe provding 80efu1 manpower at the local level. This SoluitIou hae &loo been etied in Tenzania and China. Accountabililty A basic impediment to more i pe6 lnoel p iaiptio is that people would like but do not expect thihi local 8*Temxant to do Emeh for them0 Thus, one argument against ch naGeing Eo(a r@Gourcee through local government has been that the center eca cso thz Ezre afficiently. If local governments cannot be held accountable, ccgtiMl govaerents 3'ill be reluctant to provide more resources for the local level and local people will provide minimum supporto The accountability of local to c=2trol Governr2enT was a fundamental issue in the Korean S1M4 Before the eatnbli5amant of S14 sections and divisions within the local bureaucratic otructuro0 local officials were not accustomed to taking, or indeed were not eapectec to tate, any initiative in developmental schemes. Moreover, they teno6d nOt to consult widely with local residents on matters affecting progres ialecenttionD and they sere even know,n to be contemptuous of their Ucsnsituontoa hile not usually recruited from the same elite academic institutione ehnt trained future generations of central ministry officialsD they c=1ld 1istlao bonot of so2a higher level of educational achievement than moot ouTal 6uaUszro- Under the auspices of SW, local OME looder uwee Invested with the poyer to bargain legally uith the state for a Soeoter ohare of its resourcesO These leaders in effect IsQca tVn cgoato of the state, while at the same time maintaining their &rtistRe2n ft&s o0 ehe representatives of local interestsO To ensure that the local u eats with whom such leaders uould have to share this newly w'on powEr 9ulg aat resent ouch incursions into - 33 - their domains, they in turn were offered conspicuous rewards for working within the new system. One of the most striking aspects of the change in local governance in Korea since the advent of SMM has been the improvement in the quality of administrative support given to rural development projects. Formerly listless local bureaucracies have been transformed into major staging areas for serious developmental efforts. 44/ Local officials who found themselves under extreme pressure from above to achieve certain production quotas could no longer rely on the more blatant forms of coercion to obtain results. Under the new SMM guidelines, mutual consultation and shared responsbility tended to temper any latent tendencies to act in a harsh or authoritarian manner. Local leaders, for their part, found that cooperation could reap tangible rewards for their communities (and for themselves). In any event, they were now part of the "system" and could not simply blame "the government" if things did not work out as planned. Technical central government personnel who are in charge of development projects in the districts do not usually answer to local government; they answer to central government in the capital, or locally to the district administration. Although most civil servants, may be conscientious, they are aware that, though the needs of their rural clients are great, their promotion and service prospects are not determined by those clients. Civil servants concentraze on those matters deemed important by their central government masters; it is easy to understand why local interests can become less important than the concerns of the center. What happens to control at the local level, then? When control is strong at the center, local government involvement in rural 4evelopment may be weakened and the costly duplication between field arms of central ministries increased. Furthermore, - 34 it may be difficult to develop a strong local personnel systemo The insistence on accountability has had negative consequences in several instances. In some former French colonies, for example, a conflict arose between the mayor representing the people and the prefect representing central governmento Such a conflict can be overcome by having one person hold both offices. In general, when central government personnel are posted to local areas the lines of communications between the center and the field are too long, and the development goals being pursued often become fuzzy or ambiguous. A harmonious relationship between local and central government officials working in the rural areas was envisaged in Tanzania following the Arusha Declaration to decentralize government operations by means of the Village Act of 1975. 45/ Despite the great respect rural people had for President Nyerere1, they were uncertain about the rural development goals being pursued0 After its vigorous start1, local government development faltered and the conflict between local and central government officials grew worse. Several problems were evident here: giving power to the "grass roots" did not guarantee that there would be uniformity in what villages wanted or that government would have the resources to meet their wishes; and central government officials often ignored the wishes of village people0 To overcome these problems1, Tanzania enacted legislation in 1982 which, in addition to giving greater financial resources to local governments1, also made the rep'esentatives of line ministries accountable to local authorities0 This means that, in the future, personnel evaluations will be based on accountability at the local level0 The transfer of development responsibilities from the center to the field has also increased accountability because local people now realize that they must look to their - 35 - local government for help--it will not come from central government. Central government has installed monitoring and evaluation systems to pinpoint problem areas and to emphasize the accountability of local government for progress. Training As noted earlier, strengthening local government depends on improving the performance of poorly trained and poorly educated officials. The problems experienced by the Chilalo Agricultural Development Units (CADU) in Ethiopia are typical of many local governments: "Communications with Addis were so poor that most bureaucrats were anxious to avoid being posted in this remote area. The local administration was, therefore, staffed by poorly educated local civil servants who could maintain order and collect taxes but who had little interest or ability in performing public services or development related functions." 46/ Many countries--Brazil, Egypt, Nigeria, Papua New Guinea, Philippines, Tanzania, and Zambia, among others--offer special training to local government officials. In other countries, local government officials must attend the same training programs as central government employees. Responsibility for training may rest with a ministry of local government or interior (as in Zambia), a Commissariat General de developpement under the president (as in Niger), or a public service commission (as in Papua New Guinea). Some excellent training programs are found in Brazil, East Africa, India, Pakistan, and the Philippines. Among the institutions of note that offer these programs are the Brazilian Institute of Municipal Administration (IBAM) founded in 1953, which is a private, nonprofit organization; the Local Government Center, College of Public Administration, which is part of the - 36 - University of the Philippines; the All-India Institute for Local Self- Government, founded in Bombay in 1951; and the Eastern and Southern African Management Institute (ESAMI), established by a consortium of governments and donors in 1979. These institutions continue to be funded because they have shown that local government training can be successful--for example, IBAM has installed a model tax code in more than 1000 Brazilian municipalities. 47/ Part of their success is undoubtedly due to the fact that these institutes blend together training, consulting, and research. Thus, the faculty gain wide consulting experiences research sharpens and informs the teaching, and instruction becomes relevant to the concerns of trainees. Training goals are not always clearly defined, however. Some local governments wish to concentrate on courses for councillors, others wish local government employees to undergo the same training as central government officials. Local government manpower surveys detailing the number of personnel needed in particular areas are not available, and there is no strategic planning of the type that would identify local government operations in which training could make the greatest impact. Central governments should perhaps do more to identify and meet the training needs of local governmento However, training courses run by the central government and designed primarily for central government employees will do little for local officials. Lower level local government employees usually do not have the necessary educational backgrounds nor do they have the same needs or problems0 Furthermore, senior local government employees are so few that they usually cannot be spared for training0 Cost is another factor to consider, since local government usually has to cover training expenseso (It costs local government in the North Solomons Province of Papua New Guinea U.S.$500 in travel expenses to send an employee to a centrally run course in Port Moresbyo) - 37 - Local government training is most useful, however, when it is focused on critical functional areas, for example, on training property assessors rather than all technical or managerial personnel. The implementation of this strategy depends on having a sufficient number of trained employees to make an impact on their work. By concentrating on focused functional training in key problem areas, a local government can sometimes quantify the impact training can make on performance. There should, by the way, be some reward for the successful completion of training. One example of useful training comes from the Philippines, where a USAID-funded training project had, by 1980, mapped 4,820 barangays in 160 cities and was beginning on another 3,710 barangays in 138 localities. The area involved, however, covered 20 percent of local government in the Philippines. Within this area the outstanding amounts owed to local government by the five largest property tax delinquents in 1979 were equal to one year's total local government revenue. Training helped collectors concentrate on these individuals rather than hundreds of small defaulters. The program increased the number of taxable properties by more than 10 percent and eliminated duplicate records. This development was useful since it prevented overestimation of revenues. For example, in Albay 2,000 duplicate tax declarations out of 14,000 were discovered as a consequence of tax mapping. 48/ In the Junin and Cajamarca provinces of Peru, meanwhile, local officals are being trained to maintain and update fiscal cadasters, carry out tax mapping, and manage records. The training has been instituted by the governments' regional integrated rural development programs to determine the financial base for local government planning. In addition to property tax, business activity and, in particular, markets have been studied to arrive at 38 - an assessment of potential revenue generation and to determine a suitable content for training programso Provincial development committees are now in the process of training assessors and collectors. Another example of a functionally oriented training program comes from Ghana, where the government asked USAID for help in improving financial management at the local level. Many district-level officials were unaware of the provisions of the new decentralization system giving districts the right to collect and retain numerous revenues as an internal financial resource for funding development projectso Constraints that were identified included the lack of a comprehensive list of revenue sources that could be retained, the lack of data on the potential magnitude of each revenue source in a district, and the lack of control and accountability measures to assure that revenues collected were actually deposited in the district treasuryo Participants in the training were required to define the potential revenue base for their district, describe the constraints to revenue collection, and develop mechanisms for improving revenue collection. Under the guidance of the Commissioner for Valuation in the Ministry of Local Government, the project tabulated a checklist of eighty-eight types of revenue (such as property rate, basic rate, a head tax, twenty-five different fees and tolls, forty-one types of licenses, and others). Using this revenue source checklist as the basis for a training exercise, teams were required to work on the role of data in planning, estimating the potential total revenue for each type of revenue in the district. Since each district in Ghana is divided into wards and each ward is represented on the district council by an elected district councillor, each collectible revenue source was estimated cumulatively by ward on large "Potential District Revenue" chartso For example, item one, the basic rate, would have an estimated amount for Ward - 39 - One added cumulatively to amounts for all other wards. The potential total amount available for the district from the single revenue source would be the cumulative total for all wards. The graphs were to be shaded according to actual amounts collected and deposited in the district council treasury. The cumulative total was always far greater than any participant estimated. Estimated potential total revenue was usually five times or more the amount acutally deposited in the previous year in the district treasury. In one important district, participants estimated total revenue to be at least 4 million cedis. The amount actually deposited in the treasury for the entire previous year was 278,000 cedis. This immense financial loss to the district made a great impression on trainees. As a consequence of this training program, there has been a 668 percent increase in the amount estimated for 1981-82 over the amount estimated for 1978-79, and the amount collected in 1980-81 was 422 percent of the amount collected in 1978-79. 49/ The success of this exercise underscored the point that there are more resources at the local level than is usually assumed. Conclusions Local government personnel management needs to be seen as part of a national strategy for the allocation of scarce administrative resources. Without vigorous and continuing central government initiatives, personnel management at the local level is unlikely to improve. Although increased local autonomy tends to be needed in fiscal affairs, the reverse is true for personnel management. The need for continuing interdependence between individual local authorities and the central government should be recognized. Useful initiatives, such as horizontal and vertical integration, increased accountability, and relevant training, have been introduced by the central government in many countries. None of these developments could have - 40 - emerged from small autonomous local government units. Successful personnel management at the local level appears to call for a continuing measure of centralizationo IVo Allocation of Functions The traditional allocation of local government functions does not differ much between industrialized countries and developing countries in terms of what local governments are permitted to do. Differences between industrial countries and developing countries pertain to administrative and fiscal capacity0 In the United States, for example, local government functions usually include: (1) police; (2) fire protection; (3) construction and maintenance of local streets and highways; (4) public health; (5) education; (6) public service enterprises (usually utilities); (7) recreation; (8) public welfare; (9) election administration; (10) judicial administration; and (11) public finance and taxation0 In Nigeria, local government functions are defined in a similar manner (Table 2), but in practice they may be shifted to or carried out concurrently by the federal government, states, and local authorities0 In 1952 there was one central government official for every 2,406 people in the northern Nigeria, and one local government official for every 603 people0 But by 1964, central government regional officials had grown eightfold, while local authorities had only grown threefold; and by 1966, 58 out of 173 senior regional officers had been lured away from local authorities0 Subsequently, appointments and discipline of local government staff became a central government responsibility0 Then between 1966 and 1976 - 41 - Table 2 NIGERIAN LOCAL GOVERNMENT FUNCTIONS Exclusive Functions of Local Government (a) markets and motor vehicle parks (b) sanitary inspection, sewerage, refuse, and nightsoil disposal (c) control of vermin (d) slaughterhouses, slaughter slabs (e) public conveniences (f) cemeteries and burial grounds (g) registration of births, deaths, and marriages (other marriages under the Marriage Act) (h) provision of community and recreation centers (i) fuel plantations (k) licensing, supervision, and regulation of bake houses, eating houses, and laundries (1) licensing and regulation of bicycles, hand carts, and other types of vehicles (other than vehicles which are mechanically propelled) and canoes (m) control of keeping of animals (n) control of hoardings, advertisements, use of loudspeakers in or near public places, and drumming (o) control of land held under customary tenure (p) naming of roads and streets and numbering of plots and buildings (q) control and collection of revenue from private forest estates (r) collection of vehicle parking charges (s) collection of community tax, property and other rates and other designated revenue. Functions Shared with Other Levels of Government (a) health centers, maternity centers, dispensaries and health clinics, ambulance service, leprosy clinics, and preventive health services (b) meat inspection and abattoirs (c) nursery, primary and adult education (d) information and public enlightenment (e) provision of scholarships and bursaries (f) provision of public libraries and reading rooms (g) agricultural and animal health extension services and veterinary clinics (h) rural and semi-urban water supply (i) fire services (j) provision of roads (other than trunk roads), their lighting and drainage (k) support for arts and culture (1) control of population (m) control of beggars or prostitution and repatriation of destitutes (n) provision of homes for destitutes, the infirm, and orphans (o) provision of public utilities, including road and water transport (p) public housing program (q) town and country planning (r) operation of commercial undertaking (s) control of traffic and parking (t) piped sewerage systems = 42 confusion arose over how local government should be developed. In 1972 the central government in Western Nigeria attempted to introduce the U.S. idea of the city manager to local authorities, but an acute shortage of managers caused the government to abandon this program in 1976. Heanwhile, the federal military government issued Guidelines for Local Government Reformo The 303 councils established were to be assisted by personnel with proven administrative and technical competenceo In addition, the Udoji Commission recommended that local government officials be given the same terms and conditions of service as federal and state employees, and these were to be established through a uniform grade structure following an analysis of the job involved. Implementation has been adversely affected by a number of factors, not the least of which has been the decline in Nigerian oil revenueso Political factors, too, have been important. Proponents of regionalism opposed those advocating local government uniformity, and an attempt to break up the powerful Emirates in Northern Nigeria into smaller sized units failed. The states had little interest in promoting local government1, and Nigeria did not have the manpower or capacity to undertake either the job analysis or the training recommended by the Udoji Commission. 50/ Wherever local government has capable personnel and a well developed capacity to generate revenue1, it can assume responsibility for a greater range of economic development functions. In Japan, for example, local governments have the right to manage their own property affairs and administration and to enact their own regulations. Local authorities deal with the maintenance of public order; the management of parks, roads, bridges, reservoirs, public utilities, and transportation services; the establishment of schools, libraries, museums1, hospitals, and public sanitation services; public welfare; - 43 - natural resources; agricultural land development; and the laying down and collection of local taxes, rents and fees. The national government, however, reserves to itself the right to pass laws concerning local affairs; and these, of course, take precedence. The central government by itself, or by means of conditional grants to local government, undertakes to provide minimum levels of health, education, law and order, and so on to all citizens. Once these minimum criteria have been met, central government allocates additional responsibilities in response to specific demands made by local government. Size of Local Governments Twenty years ago, the United Nations suggested that the size of a local government entity should be defined by the largest number of people who share a sense of community at the lower level, and by the smaller group of people at the upper level to whom technical services can be effectively supplied. 51/ Developing countries have found, however, that size varies according to many factors, and that even within countries local governments may vary widely in terms of both their size and financial resources. Independent Papua New Guinea, which replaced its district administration with provincial administration in 1977, has nineteen autonomous local government units, each of which has a provincial secretariat and the ability to impose sales and other taxes. The population of one of these provinces, Manus Island, is less than 20,000 and the island has very limited power for generating revenue. Meanwhile, Marobe province with a population of a quarter of a million and North Solomons province with 100,000 people have revenues from one of the largest copper mines in the world. Thus Manus has too little money to do very much while the North Solomons has been able to hire sixty expatriates. As time passes, these disparities are bound to grow, unless perhaps Manus can be merged with other areas. - 44 - Another interesting case is Uganda, where pre-independence efforts to combine local government with kingdoms (Ankole, Bunyoro, Buganda, Toro) had failed. During the Amin era local government was not financially viable. Recognizing that the previous administrative units were too large to provide contact between government and the people, the Uganda government increased the number of units from 39 in 1973 to 88 in 1982. 52/ Meanwhile, in Nigeria no local unit is to be smaller than 150,000 or larger than 800,000. 53/ The World Bank's urban experience, particularly with housing and waterborne sewage, suggests that, when urban areas grow much beyond one millions the management burden becomes too great for the available resources. As the cities of developing countries have grown larger, they have adopted more and more of the administrative apparatus of cities in the industrialized countries. As a result, the number of administrative and political levels has increased, and, in turn, the problems of monitoring activity at the local level have mounted. The overall results have therefore been disappointing. 54/ Another complicating factor has been that many of the management strategies practiced in the industrialized countries are too management-intensive for developing countries. For example, the elaborate systems of property valuation, building codes, and business regulations used in developed countries are more likely to produce chaos and lower revenues than simpler systems designed to fit the manpower locally available in developing countries. Local governments that are too large will be out of touch with their constituents; those that are too small will have little enthusiasm for exerting themselves0 Certain factors should therefore be taken into account when local government is reorganized by consolidation or reduction: (a) the country's total size and population; (b) the existence of state or provincial - 45 - governments; (c) regions with special need for political expression; (d) the number of local government units that can be supervised by higher levels; (e) the ability of the population to finance and administer local government services; and (f) the need to prevent or promote centralization. On one hand, highly centralized government may stifle local initiative to raise revenues and meet the recurrent costs of centrally funded projects, and a very strong central government may allocate more services to urban than rural areas. On the other hand, local governments that are stronger than the central government may make decisions independently and fail to coordinate their activities with national policies. The point is that a balance has to be struck between the tiers of government so that disparities of power and influence will not be too great. Conclusions Countries with scarce resources and limited management skills cannot afford to neglect local government or to engage in debilitating struggles for power and control between levels of government. It cannot be denied, of course, that some of this friction may be caused by political factors, but any effort to emphasize either local autonomy or central control alone will merely exacerbate the political tensions. Rather, local government relations with higher tiers of government need to be guided by a sense of balance between local and central concerns. 55/ The question of developing local government is often discussed solely in terms of legal or administrative "decentralization" of central government functions. It seems a mistake to assume that local government can be strengthened only by giving it more legal or administrative responsibility. In reality, the administrative needs at the local level may change with the needs imposed by development. 56/ Unfortunately, 46 decentralization is still being discussed in theoretical terms, and little empirical work has been undertaken to show its real value. Thus it seems reasonable to conclude that any proposals for local government reform that concentrate on the need for decentralization and its implementation while ignoring centralization requirements should be viewed with caution. Neither is it sensible to concentrate exclusively on centralizationo British colonialism, for example, began by focusing administrative responsibilities at the center, but as the competence and capacity of local government increased, it was year by year given more responsibilities. 57/ In many casesD howeverD this process of gradual deconcentration was arrested at the time of independenceD as in the case of Sudan0 There the local government councils experienced five stages of growth: (1) a local government inspector was first appointed as the statutory authority; (2) a council with budget powers was appointed to help the inspector; (3) the appointed council received delegated powers from the inspector; (4) the council received a warrant under the Local Government Act; and (5) powers were increased under the warrant in the light of performance0 By the end of the 1950s two-thirds of the councils had reached the fourth stage. 58/ In many developing countries independence reversed the trend toward stronger local government because politically inspired centralization appeared necessary to counteract regionalism, ethnic separation, and so ono Experience suggests that the existing division of functions between levels of government needs to be carefully examined before a plan can be constructed to transfer financial and technical assitance between the levels of government responsible for improving personnel and revenue generating capacitieso Such plans are seldom attempted because central government usually has a reactive posture toward local government. Even in countries - 47 - such as Nigeria or Pakistan, which have expressed considerable interest in improving local government, it is not possible to say that by a certain date central government intends to strengthen local authorities so that they can perform certain new functions as well as carry out old functions more effectively. By and large, the task of strengthening local government has been left to local governments themselves; without exception, the results have been disappointing. Developing countries need well articulated plans for comprehensive development at the local level and coordination between levels of government. This is not the case at present. Instead, the focus has been on isolated activities, such as the revenue sharing system in Brazil or personnel policy in Tanzania. Similarly, Pakistan and Ecuador have paid attention to functions of personnel but have failed to deal adequately with local finances, while Nigeria has concentrated on planning functions and finance but has neglected personnel and ignored the resistance of states to local government reform. In other words, no central governments have taken a comprehensive forward planning approach to strengthening local governments by attending to questions of personnel and finance, as well as the sharing of functions. Any assistance that central governments have provided to local governments has usually come only after protest from below. Reform obviously needs to be more comprehensive than it has been hitherto, but it may be implemented on an incremental basis. Nonetheless, it is important to remember that the areas in which central government assistance is required are interdependent. Management and fiscal autonomy at the local level cannot be strengthened unless central government works through local authorities. In turn, local government must be able to pay for capable people who can generate revenues. Such people cannot be recruited, trained, or - 48 motivated unless central government takes the initiative to consolidate the personnel resources of local authorities and, on occasion, second its own personnel. Both finance and personnel considerations are affected by the nature of the functions given local government; and if developing the potential of local government is not made a part of the national development process, valuable opportunities will be lost. A Degree of Centralization Is Always Necessary. As this discussion has already suggested, the most successful development policies will allocate powers, duties, and responsibilities among the various levels of government according to their comparative advantage at any point in time and a long-term assessment of development needs in terms of personnel, finances, and the sharing of functions. Decentralization, in the form of either legal devolution or administrative deconcentration, is not the real issue; in some matters, such as customs or national defense, the question of devolution to local government is not even relevant. 59/ Rather, it is the assignment of functions between local and central government to the best advantage that is important. In other words, developing countries must ask which level of government is best suited to perform a particular function. No matter what the particular circumstances may be, experience shows that some degree of continuing centralization is an indispensable prelude to successful local government reform, and that the center must have continuing responsibility for national policymaking in areas such as agriculture or minerals and timber resources. Institutional Arrangements for Reform0 This paper has indicated that many complex issues have to be resolved if local government is to be strengthened in the developing world0 There are certainly no easy solutions, especially since little effort has been made to adopt an integrating or - 49 - simplifying theory. Perhaps some institutional mechanism outside the main bureaucratic stream could be made permanently responsible for these diverse and troublesome local government issues since local authorities cannot solve these problems on their own. Ministries of local government seem ineffective as promoters of stronger local government; they lack the necessary power and authority. An interesting alternative is being tested in Tanzania, where the prime minister's office now takes responsibility for local government matters. Line departments (for example, agriculture and finance) are required to include local government in their work. The designated unit in the prime minister's office performs a coordinating, backstopping, and policymaking role, while sectoral ministries, charged with working together with local government in the field, implement central policy and at the same time try to accommodate the wishes of different local authorities. 60/ Although it is too early to say whether these efforts will be more successful than previous attempts to decentralize in Tanzania, similar efforts to institutionalize a new series of relationships between different levels of government could be used elsewhere with advantage. Even when the political climate is otherwise favorable, a major obstacle to successful local government reform will be absence of a holistic view of government that argues for integrating the efforts of all levels of government. Policymakers can expect nothing but poor fiscal performance at the local level and weak personnel management if they focus on any one level to the exclusion of other. Such an approach seems to be an outgrowth of poorly planned decentralization schemes that also contain segmented views of government. As a result of these nonholistic views, central governments fail to stimulate local development initiatives. Central government's attempts to stimulate economic growth are likely to be improved significantly with - 50 - assistance from local governmento In other wordsD central government cannot afford to ignore the manpower resources available at the local level; neither can local government afford to ignore the assistance central goverment could give toward upgrading performance of the local government workforce. The policies discussed in this paper can help break the current deadlock. - 51 - Annex Service Delivery Functions Although the role of local government in the process of economic development has not been clearly defined in the developing countries, many of them rely heavily on local authorities to deliver basic services. The United Nations has prepared useful classification of local systems of delivery in various parts of the world. The dual system common to rural areas of Latin America gives the central government and local authorities separate responsibilities and functions. This system seems to be characterized by a good deal of friction and a lack of coordination. The system is static, since little provision is usually made for central government to enhance the technical capacity of local authorities, and they themselves do not possess the necessary resources. Integrated service delivery of health, education, and so on is characteristic of Southeast Asia and many parts of the Middle East. Central government agencies administer all technical services, and district administrators are responsible for field coordination. Local authorities have limited functions and little control over development activities in their areas (as in Morocco and Malaysia). India, Pakistan, Sudan, and Egypt have comprehensive local government, according to which services are usually performed by the local government on its own behalf, or as an agent of the central government. The system cannot succeed unless a substantial unity of purpose exists and competent personnel are available at the local level (that is not always the case). The system has high administrative costs and is characterized by - 52 - considerable inflexibility. There is little evidence to show that it is more responsive to public needs and demands than more centralized systems. Rural and urban local government in Anglophone Africa is characterized by partnerships, that is, functions are performed by either central or local govermento Coordination is achieved, if at all, at the regional level. Partnership, however, has often turned out to be static rather than dynamic, with little change over time in performance. The form of modern local government is still largely shaped by the colonial heritage as well as new patterns of service delivery that have evolved since independence0 U.S.1, British, and Spanish traditions treat municipalities as separate political, legal, and administrative entities but subject them to varying degrees of external supervision. French and Ottoman traditions place local government within a vertical hierarchy of governmental institutions; locally elected assemblies have legislative powers, but executive responsiblity is often exercised by administrators (governors or prefects) with a dual responsibility to central and local government. Metropolitan areas may be governed by a department or bureau of central government. This arrangement allows local activities to be integrated with national plans, makes technical assistance accessible, and gives local decisions the weight of governmento But such a model can develop the semblance of remote government, so citizen alienation needs to be closely watched0 61/ Functional fragmentation (for example, in health and housing) is found in most Latin American cities0 62/ Many cities have very restricted activities because of the existence of autonomous statutory bodies with their own sources of revenue from earmarked taxes and user fees, and which largely operate independently of legislative authorities in the cities0 - 53 - Footnotes 1/ See Local Government as a Promoter of Economic and Social Development (The Hague: International Union of Local Authorities, 1971.) 2/ The idea that every level of government has an effect on national goals is explored in Peter Dawson's "A Review," in A Revival of Local Government and Administration? (University of London, Institute of Commonwealth Studies, 1978). For a discussion of the need for coordination among the levels of government, see S. E. M. Sadek, Balance Between Local Autonomy and National Control (Paris: O.E.C.D. 1972). 3/ A. A. Tait and P. Heller, "Government Employment and Pay: Some International Comparisons" (Washington, D.C.: International Monetary Fund, 1982. Processed). 4/ Ursula Hicks, Development from Below (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1960), p. 4. 5/ R. Bahl et al., Strengthening Local Level Fiscal Performance (Syracuse: Maxwell School, 1981). 6/ S. Galinoma, "Tanzania National Paper." Paper read at the Workshop on Institutions for Rural Development, Arusha, 1982. 7/ D. M. Warren and J.D. Issachar, "Understanding and Changing Local Revenue Policies and Practices in Ghana's Decentralization Program." Paper read at the meeting of the American Anthropology Association, Los Angeles, 1981. 8/ P. D. Little, "Local Level Projects: A Diachronic Study of AID's Public Finance Projects." Consultants' Report to DS/RAD (Washington, D.C.: USAID, 1979). 9/ James Mayfield, Local Government Budgetary Process in Egypt (Washington, D.C.: USAID, 1972). 10/ International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Yemen Arab Republic: Local Developing Associations (Washington, D.C., 1980). 11/ Michael Cernea, Land Tenure Systems and Social Implications of Forestry Development Programs. World Bank Staff Working Paper no. 425 (Washington, D.C., April 1981). 12/ See Emil J. Sady, "Improvement of Local Government and Administration for Development Purposes," Journal of Local Administration Overseas vol. 1 (1962), 135-48; Norman T. Uphoff and Milton J. Esman, Local Organization of Rural Development: Analysis of Asian Experience (Ithaca, Center for International Studies, Cornell University, 1974); Victor A. Thompson, "Administrative Objective for Development Administration," Administrative Science Quarterly (1964-65), 91-108; and A. W. Kent, Report on the Services to be Administered by Local Authorities in Tanganyika and the Consequential Financial Arrangement (Dar es Salaam: Government Printer, 1962). -54 - 13/ J0 Cohen, "Francophone Africa" in International Handbook on Local Government Reorganization, edited by G. Rowat (Westview, Conn.: Greenwood Press1, 1980o) 14/ A0 Churchill, "Policy Responses to the Problems of the Cities of the Developing World." Paper read at the Conference on Urban Problems and Policies in Developing Countries, University of Chicago, May 19820 15/ A comment by William Mangin quoted in Lenore Ralston, James Anderson, and Elizabeth Colson, Voluntary Efforts in Decentralized Management (Berkeley: University of California, Institute of International Studies, 1982.) 16/ The Commission on the Structure and Remuneration of the Public Service in Ghana (Accra: Government Printer, 1962)o 17/ This can be substantiated by reading S. Humes and Eo Martin, The Structure of Local Government: A Comparative Survey of 81 Countries0 (The Hague: International Union of Local Authorities, 1969)o 18/ See treatment in G0 Rowat (edo)1, International Handbook on Local Government Reorganization (Westview, Conn. Greenwood Press1, 1980)o 19/ K0 J0 Davey1, "Local Autonomy and Independent Revenues," Public Administration volo 49 (1971), po 45o 20/ S. L. Elkin, "Cooperative Urban Politics and Inter-organizational Behavior," in Essays on the Study of Urban Politics, edited by Ko Young, (London: Macmillan, 1975), 158-59. 21/ David Ko Leonard, Dale Marshall, et al. Decentralization and Linkages in Rural Development: The Partnership of Ce-ntral and Local Organization (Berkeley: University of California, 1981); Philip Mauhood, "Decentralization for Development: A Lost Cause?" in Local Politics, Development and Participation, edited by F0 C0 Bruhns, F0 Cassola, and J0 Wiatr (Pittsburgh: University Center for International Studies1, 1974); A0 Dotson, "Democratic Decentralization in Local Self- Government," Indian Journal of Public Administration vol4 (1958)1, 38-50; M. J0 Esman, Administration and Develovment in Malay sia: Institution Building and Reform in a Plural Society (Ithaca: Cornell University Press1, 1972); Fred Rigg, Administration in Developing Countries (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1964); Victor A0 Thompson, Bureaucracy and Innovation (Birmingham, Ala0: University of Alabama Press, 1968); J0 C0 de Wilde et al, Experiences with Agriculture Development in Tropical Africa (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1967); Jack Koteen1, "Key Problems in Development Administration," in Administrative Issues in Developing Economics1, edited by K0 J0 Rothwell (Lexington, Masso: Lexington Books1, 1972)1, 47-67. 22/ Based on William Dillinger, "Regional Aspects of State and Local Finance in Brazil," (Washington, D.C.: International Bank for Reconstruction and Development1, May 1982)o - 55 - 23/ K. J. Davey, "Anglophone Africa," in International Handbook of Local Government Reorganization, edited by G. Rowat (Westview, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1980). 24/ J. Cohen in International Handbook on Local Government Reorganization, edited by G. Rowat. 25/ Reuben K. Musyor and Altumeis U. Wandera, "Kenya." Paper read at the Workshop on Institutions for Rural Development, Arusha, April 1982. 26/ Peter Ucanda, "Uganda." Paper read at the Workshop on Institutions f*or Rural Development, Arusha, 1982. 27/ Mary Edith Scoville, "Taxation in Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda" Ph.D. dissertation, University of Illinois, Urbana, 1967. 28/ Murray J. Leaf, "Formal and Informal Power of a Panjah Panchayat," (University of Texas at Austin, 1982. Processed). 29/ Based on R. Bahl, "Intergovernmental Fiscal Transfers in Less Developed Countries," in Roy W. Bahl and Johannes Linn, Urban Public Finance and Management in Less Developed Countries (forthcoming). International Bank For Reconstruction and Development. 30/ Roy Bahl, Urban Government Financial Structure-and Management in Developing Countries (Washington, D.C.: USAID, 1982). 31/ Raul de Guzman and Angel Yoingco Strengthening Local Level Fiscal Performance in the Philippines. Report submitted to the Philippines Institute for Development Studies, June 1981. 32/ David Greytak, "Public Enterprises as an Instrument of Local Government Finance in the Provinces," in Roy Bahl et al., Strengthening the Fiscal Performance of Philippine Local Governments (Syracuse University, The Maxwell School, 1981.). 33/ United Nations Commission on Human Settlements, Meeting of the ad hoc Group of Experts on Ways and Means of Establishing orstrengthening Financial Institutions for Human Settlements Financing and Investments (Nairobi, 1981). 34/ Anthony Acevedo, "The Design of a Capital Budget," Local Government Bulletin vol. 9 no. 1, 1964, Local Government Center, University of the Philippines. 35/ L. Schroeder and R. Bahl, Local Government Budgeting (Syracuse N.Y.: Metropolitan Studies Program, 1978). 36/ Based on CENTO seminar on local government budgeting, Ankara, 1971. 37/ James B. Mayfield, The Budgetary Systems in the Arab Republic of Egypt-- Its Role in Local Government Development (Washington, D.C.: USAID 1977). - 56 - 38/ See remarks on budgeting by Peter Bowden, "The Administration of Regional Development," Journal of Administration Overseas vol0 18, no0 3 1979; Samuel Hume, "The Role of Local Government in Economic Development in Africa," Journal of Administration Overseas vol0 12 noO 1, 1973; G. A0 K0 Bonsu, "The Role of Local Authorities in National Development Planning in Ghana," Planning and Administration vol0 3, no0 1, 1976. 39/ A0 A0 Tait and P0 Heller, Government Employment and Pay: Some International Comparisons (Washington, D.C.: International Monetary Fund, 1982. Processed)o 40/ Irish Institute for Public Administration "Needs Assessments, Ghana, Tanzania, Zambia 1981-82." 41/ Louise Fortman, Peasants, Officials, and Participation in Rural Tanzania (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1980), po 60O 42/ Based on data supplied by Professor Giuraud, Technical Director of the Atlantic Project0 43/ Based on Ronald Aqua, "The Role of Government in the Samael Movement"; Man Cap Lee, Toward a New Community Life (Institute of Saemaul Undong Studies Seoul University, 1981.) 44/ Vincent R. Brandt, A Korean Village Between Farm and Sea (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1971). 45/ S. J. Galinoma, "Tanzania National Paper0" Paper read at the Workshop for Institution Building for Rural Areas, Arusha, 1972. 46/ JO M. Cohen and N0 To Uphoff, Rural Development Participation: Concepts for Measuring Participation for Project Design, Implementation and Evaluation (Ithaca, N0 Y.: Cornell University Press, 1976) po 181. 47/ Relatorio des actividades (Rio de Janeiro, IBAM 1975)o 48/ R. Bahl et. al, Strengthening Local Level Fiscal Performance (Syracuse, N0 Y.: Maxwell 1981)o 49/ Based on D. M. Warrena and Joseph D. Issachar "Local Revenue Policies and Practices in Ghana's Decentralization Program0" Paper read at the meeting of the American Anthropology Assocation, Los Angeles, 1981. 50/ Based on Oyeleye Gyediran (edo), Nigerian Government and Politics under Military Rule, 1966-79 (New York: St0 H -Martins Press, 1979)y- 51/ United Nations Technical Assistance Program, Decentralization for National and Local Development (New York: 1962) ppo XZ223 52/ Peter K0 K0 Ucanda, "Problems in Developing Effective Local Governments0" Paper read at the workshop for Institution Building for Rural Areas (Arusha, Tanzania, 1982)o - 57 - 53/ A. D. Yahaya, "Local Government as an Agent of Rural Development," Nigerian Journal of Political Science, vol. 1 (June 1979). 54/ A. Churchill, Policy Responses to the Problems of the Cities of the Developing World. Paper read at the Conference on Urban Problems in Developing Countries, University of Chicago, May 1982. 55/ J. W. Fesler, "Approaches to Understanding of Decentralization," Journal of Politics vol. 27 (1965), 536-66. 56/ Useful introductory material is given in Harold A. Alderfer, Local Government in Developing Countries (New York: McGraw-Hill, 196T4),and Ursula Hicks, Development from Below (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1961). 57/ M. Perham, "A Restatement of Indirect Rule," Africa vol. 7 (1939). 58/ John Howell, "Provincial and Local Government in the Sudan" in A Revival of Local Government? (University of London Institute of Commonwealth Studies, 1978). See also B. J. J. Stubbings, "Integrated Rural Development in Pakistan," Journal of Administration Overseas vol. 14 (1974), 91-104; and Lucy Mair's chapter "Local Government," in Australia in New Guinea (Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 1970). 59/ H. H. Welin, "Elasticity of Control: An Analysis of Decentralization," Journal of Comparative Administration vol. 2 (August 1970), 125-209. 60/ S. J. Galinoma, "Tanzania National Paper." Paper read at the Workshop on Institution Building for Rural Areas, Aruhsa, 1982. World Bank The Design of Development Economic Development Pro- Jan Tinbergen jects and Their Appraisal: P bl>{icationis Formulates a coherent govemment C a and Principles from of Related wicy to further development objec- the Experience of the Xves and outlines methods to World Bank Interest stimulate private Investments. John A. ling The Johns Hopkins UnIuersity Press, The English-language edition is 1958; 6th printIng, 1966. 108 pages out of print (Including 4 annexes, Index}. trench: Projets de developpement LC 58-9458. ISB1 0-80180633-, economique et leur evaluation. Dunod Accelerated Development $5.00 (f3.00) paperback. Ed iteur, 24-26, boulevard de l'tf6pital. In Sub-Sabaran Africa: 75005 Paris, France.1969. An Agenda for Action Development Strategies in 99 francs. In the fall of 1979, the Afritan Gover- Semi-IndustrIal Economies Spanish: La evaluacion de proyectors de nors of the World Bank addressed a Bela Balassa desarrollo economico. Editorial Tecnos, memorandum to the Bank's president id i i f d I1m t 1970. 545 pages (including indexes). e-xpressing their alarmn at the dim stroveides an aei-nalysIs iao dv mn 800 peets economic prospects for the nations of state8ies In semniIndustriali0 ests econmic rosectsfor he aUon of economies that have established an sub-Saharan Africa and asking that endust bat. tq iEavorsi Grtot aann the Bank prepare a 'special paper on thsytmofI-etvshaarEcn icG whad the economic development problems the__ sytC of Incntve that arethan atthesecounomies"evandpanntpproprem- applied In six semi-industrial develop- Human Resourmes ate program for helping them. This Ing economies-Argentina, Norman Hicks, assisted by report, bulding on the Lagos 81an of Colombia. Israel, Korea. Slngapore. Jahangir Boroumand repot, uilingon te LgosPta of and Taiwan-and to Indicate the Actior, is the response to that effects of these systems on the alloca- World Bank Staff Working Paper No. The report discusses the factors tion of resources. Intemational trade. 408. July 1980. lo + 36 pages (includ- that explain slow economic growth in and economic growth. Ing 3 appendixes, bibliography, and Africa in the recent past. analyzes The Johns Hopkins University Press. refemences). policy changes and program orienta- 1982. 416 pages (including appendixes, Stock N1o. WP-0408. $3.00. t'ons needed to promote faster Index). growth. and concludes with a set of LC 81-15558. ISBN1 0-8018-2569-5, recommendations to donors, includ- As9s9 hardcouer. NEW ing the recommendation that aid to Africa should double in real terms to bring about renewed African develop- Easte and Southern Etent of Poverty n ment and growth in the 1980s. The Latin Amerka report's agenda for action Is general; Africa: Past Trends and Oscar Altimir it indicates broad policy and program Future Prospects This work originated In a research directions, overall prioriUes for Ravi Gulhati project for the measurement and action, and key areas for donor atten- tion. Like the Lagos Plan, the report World Bank Staff Working Paper (1o. analysis of income distribution in the recognizes that Africa has enormous 413. August 1980. 24 pages. Latin American countries, undertaken recognizes that Africa has enormous ~joinUy by the Economic Commission economic potential, which awaits Stock N1o. WP-0413. $3.00. for Latin America and the World Bank. fuller development. Presents estimates of the extent of 1981; 2nd printing 1982. 198 pages absolute poverty for ten Latin (including statistical annex, bibliogra- American countries and for the region phy). as a whole in the 1970s. French: Le developpement acc6l6re en World Bank Staff Working Paper Nlo. afrique au sud du Sahara: programme 522. 1982. L17 pages. indicatif d'action. ISBt1 0-8213-0012-1. $5.00. Stock Nos. SA-1981-E. SA-1981-f. free of charge. M m i gl aat o M En. N Q Q@JSS M1 3 U M O 1 =1 ; MS@ ME)D M _ fl gu 2f~ o g xlf0t m g u .1 ) L M _"'qft. E m m H CdS m IEIca u2eg am 0 M Z M (jl ¢ L 2E(32 Faul Streeten, with Reviews the ilungarln e rence tYorld Eanrk Staff forkring Paper Nlo. Shahid Javed BurkE, wih the economic refonrn In hzcted 401. July 1980. 91 pages (inclMding Mahbub ul lHaq, in 1L9S and provides a shat descrip- references). oma H1icks, tion of the antecdents of the reform. and FraIlces Stewart A$ yzes stklc refom mwus bo. rJP-0401. $3.o. an¢:l Franes §tewartconcerning agicultume decistonnh- The besic needs approach to ing by industral firms. price economic development Is one way of detemnatimon, the exchange rate, M]@Q~flo ®g @cffo mE helping the poor emerge from their export subsidies, import protection. MXCaQftM 7 I2nfl poverty. It enables them to eam or and Investrnent decislons and Indi- Laince Taylor, Edmar L. Bacha. obtain the necessities for llfe-nutri- cates their effects on the economy. Lion. housing, water and sanitation. Also emmines the economic effects llana Cardoso, education, and health-and thus to of tendencies toward recentmAlzaton and Ertank J. Lysy increase their productivity. in the 1970s, as well as recent pollcy Explores the Brazilian experience This book answers the critics of the measures airned at reversing thes- from the point of view of poltical basic needs approacht views this tendencies. economy and computable general approach as a logical step in the equilibrium Income distribution evolution of economic analysis and World Bank Staff Working Paper No. e odels. development policy, and presents a 506. February 1982.31 pages (includ- clearsighted Interpretation of the ing references). Oxford Uniuersibj Press, 1980. issues. Based on the actual 5gokc No. r:P-o05S. S3.0. 368 pages (including references, experience of various countries- appendixes, Index). their successes and failures-the LC 80-13786. ISBN 0-19-520206-6, book is a distllation of World Bank l>n@E@ (m $27.50 hardcouerz ISBMf 0-19-520207-4, studies of the operational Implica- tions of meeting basic needs. It also $14.95 paperback. discusses the presumed conflict be- Edlted by Peter T. Knlght;- tween economic growth and bsic prepared by Hat J. Collett needs, the reladon between the iew Jacob Meerman, and others. Interntioonal Economic Order and basic needs, and the relation be- World Bank Staff Working Paper No. tween human rights and basic needs. 403. July 1980. iu + 372 pages Oxford Uniuersiby Pwss. 1981; 2nd (including references). paperback printing, 1982. 224 pages Stock No. WP-0403. $15.00. (including appendix. bibliography, index). LC 81-16836. ISBN 0-19-520-368-2. . n $18.95 hardcover; ISBN 0-19-520-369-0, ofc O.(M $7.95 paperback. F Stewart World Bank Staff Working Paper Ho. 344. July 1979. xii + 166 pages (including references). Stock No. WP-0344. $5.00. Patterns of Development, Ma a burished People: Shelter 1950-1970 A Policy View Anthony A. Churchill Hollis Chenery Alan Berg Deflnes the elements that constitute and Moises Syrquin Discusses the Importance of ade- shelter; discusses the difflculties A comprehensive interpretation of the quate nutrition as an objective, as encountered in developing shelter structural changes that accompany well as a means of economic develop- programs for the poor; estimates or- the growth of developing countries, ment OuUlnes the many facets of the ders of magnitude of shelter needs using cross-section and dme-series nutriUon problem and shows how for the next twenty years; and pro- analysis to study the stability of efforts to improve nutriUon can help poses a strategy for meeting those observed patterns and the nature alleviate much of the human and needs. of time trends. economic waste in the developing September 1980. 39 pages. English, Oxford University Press, 1975; 3rd world. French, and Spanish. paperback printing, 1980. 250 pages June 1981. 108 pages (including Stock Nlos. Bll-8002-E, B1-8002-F. (Including technical appendix. statistl- 6 appendLies, notes). EngiLsh. French BN(-8002-S. $3.00 paperback. cal appendix, bibliography, index). and Spanish (forthcoming). LC 74-29172. ISBN 0-19-920075-0, Stock Nlos. Bl-8104-E, Blt-8104-F, $19.95 hardcouer, ISBN 0-19-920076-9, BN-8104-S. $S.OO. Water Supply and $8.95 paperback. Waste Disposal Spanish: 12 estructura del crecimiento , Basic Neell,: Discusses the size of the problem of Spanish: La estructura del Meeeimino Mtedg Bask meeting basic needs in water supply ec6nornico: un analisis para el perfodo A7 Overview and waste disposal and its signifl- 1950-1970. Editorial Teconos, 1978. Mahbub ul lHaq and cance to development in the context ISBN 84-309-0741-6, 615 pesetas. Shahid Javed Burki of the Intemational Drinking Water Supply and Sanitation Decade. Presents a summary of the main flnd- Examines the Bank's past role in Poverty and Basic Needs ings of studies undertaken in the improving water supply and waste Seni World Bank as part of a program for disposal facilities in developing Series reducing absolute poverty and meet- countries and draws conclusions A series of booklets prepared by the Ing basic needs. for the future. staff of the World Bank on the subject of basic needs. The series includes September1980. 28 pages (Including September 1980. 46 pages. English general studies that explore the con- 2 annexes). EngiLsh, French, Spanish, French, Spanish, and Arabic. cept of basic needs, country case Japanese, and Arabic. Stock Nos. BN-8003-E. BN-8003-f, studies, and sectoral studies. Stock Nos. BN-8001-E, BN-8001-F, BN1-8003-S, Brl-8003-A. BN-8001-S, BN1-8001-J, BN-8001-A. $3.00 paperback. BrazU $3.00 paperback. Peter T. Might and Poverty and the Develop- Ricardo J. Moran ment of Human Resources: An edited and updated edition of the Regional Perspective more detailed publication, BraziL Willem Bussink, David Davies, Hfurnan Resources Speciai Report (see Wie usnc ai ais description under Country Rtudies Roger Grawe, Basil Kavalsky, listing). and Guy P Pfeffermann December 1981. 98 pages (including World Bank Staff Working Paper No. statistical appendix, map). Engilsh. 406. July 1980. iii + 197 pages Stock flo. BN(-8103. $5.00. (including 7 tables, 2 appendixes, references, footnotes). Stock No. WP-0406. $5.00. IYEW Poverty and Human Development Paul Isenman and others Since economic growth alone has not reduced absolute poverty, it has been necessary to consider other strategies. The strategy examined in this study - human development - epitomizes the idea that poor people should be helped to help themselves. Pour chapters provide an overview of $¢Ec&m tX @ Elmo N2W altemative strategies; a detailed look fft@moy at health, education, nutrition d Hollis ahndery n [F@@@p(D Ii fertility; lessons from existing pro- gams; and an examinaton of A retrospective lloo at Cheneryfs Bw [(mmks E2(2flpomem broader Issues in planning. thought and writUng over the pas two IE[EIa vwmnsvc Oxford University Press. 1982. 96 pages dicades and an extension of his Work R (incudig satLtica apzndx).In RedLs humtton with QOmwel and R GetOcOdlad (including statistical appendix). attem ofDzulvopmenL Develops a LC 82-2153. ISBN 0-19-520389-5, $7.95 set Of techniques for analyzing struc- At the current time, approximately paperback. tural changes and applies them to 2(0 million tribal people live in all some major problems of developing regions of the world and number countries tiday. among the poorest of the poosr. This paper describes the problems associ- IYEW Oxford University Pess. 1979: 2nd ated with the development process as papzrback printing, 1982. 54M pages it affects tribal peoples; it outines the McOmB flm aa Ng;Ukeo Am Mn Z;Wfibve the effects of tourism development In The Johns Hopkins University Press, Rashid Paruqee a broad sense, concentrating on 1976; 2nd printing, 1979. 128 pages The bldck majority government of social and cultural questions. (lncluding maps, bibliography, index). Zimbabwe, coming to power after a A joint World Bank-Unesco study. LC 76-17242. ISBN 0-8018-1891-5, long struggle for independence, has Ozford Uniuvrsity Press, 1979. S11.00 (97.75) hardcouer: announced its strong commitment to 378 pages (Including maps, index). ISBN 0-8018-1903-2, $5.00 (93.50) social services to beneflt the vast LC 79-18116. ISBN 0-19-520149-3, paperback. majority of the population. This paper $24.95 hardcouzr; ISBNf 0-19-520150-7, French: Les tropiques et le developpe- health, housing and other important $9.95 paperbacks. ment economique: un regard sans sectors and reviews speciflc plans and French: Le tourisme-passport pour le complaisance sur la pauvrete des resource requirements to help deveioppement: regards sur les effets nations. Economica, 1978. improve the standard of living of the socioculturels du tourisme dans les pays ISBN 2-7178-0110-3, 25 francs. population. en voie de developpement. Economica, Spanish: Los tr6picos y desarrollo World Bank Staff Working Paper No. 1980. econ6mico: reflexiones sobre la pobreza 495. October 1981. IU pages (including 49 francs. de las naciones. Editorial Tecnos, 1978. bibliography, map). ISBII 84-309-0740-8, 350 pesetas. Stock No. WP-0495. $5.00. :Omollnns n970 ESt David Morawetz A broad assessment of development effnrt .shows thaL althouch the remarkably successful in achieving World Development Report 1982 EPRIYmS growth, the distribution of its (See Publications of Particular Interest benefits among and within countries for description and sales information.) asic Meedla The C- of Sri Lanka has been less satisfactory. World Development Report 1981 Woul Isen erin The Johns ttopkins Uniuersity Press. (Discusses adjustment-global and World Bank Rmprint Wo rted oumber 197. 1977: 3rd printing, 1981. 136 pages national-to promote sustainable 19P80) 237-58. (including statistical appendix, growth In the changing world Stock nO. RP-0197. free of charge. references). economy.) LC 77-17243. 1581N 0-8018-2134-7, World Dewelopment Report 1980 Ba1zil ia Development: $16.50 (£8.00) hardcover: (Discusses adjustment and growth in bau for the Eigbties ISBN 0-8018-2092-8, $7.95 (i3.75) the 1980s and pouerty and human Peter T. Knigt paperback. development.) Wor'd Bank Repwnnl Series: Nlumber 203. paperback. development.) ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~Reprinted from World Development, uol. 9, no French: Vingt-cinq annees de deviop- World Development Report 1979 U/12 (1981):1063-82. pement economique: 1950 a 1975. (Discusses deuelopment prospects and Stock No. RP-02a3. free of charge. Economica, 1978. International policy issues, structural 158N 2- 7178-0038- 7, 26 francs. change, and country deuelopment ladienous Anthropologists and experience and issues.) Dewelopment-Oriented Reseamch Spanish: Veinticinco anos de desarrollo WorlIen opant Res.) Michael M. Cemea econ6mico: 1950 a 1975. Editorial World DeBelopment Report 1978 World Sank Reprint Series fumber 208 Tecnos, 1978. (Disusses the development experience, Reprinted ftom Indigenous Anthropology in Non- ISBN 84-309-0792-0, 350 pesetas. 1950- 75, deuelopment priorities in the Western Countnes, edited by tussein Pahlm i 84-09-092- 0peseta. middle-income deueloping countries, (Durham, tforth Carolina: Carolina Academic and prospects for alleuiating poverty.) Pes's. 1982):121-37 World Development Report Stock No. RP-0208. free of charge. A large-format series of annual Latin Amzerica and the Caribbean: studies of about 200 pages, the Economic Performance and Policies World Development Report, since Its Guy P Pfeffermiann inceptionm has been what The Guard- World Bank Reprint Series: Number 228 ian has called a most remarkable ReprintEd from The Southwestem Review of publication. It Is the nearest thing to Management and Economics. uol. 2. no i (Winter having an annual report on the 1982)129-72. present state of the planet and the Stock nO RP-0228. Free of charge people who live on it:' Each issue brings not only an overview of the Modemrizatlon and Development state of development, but also a Potentia of raditonal Gass Roots detailed analysis of such topics as Peasant Organizations structural change, the varying Michael M. Cemea experiences of low- and middle- World Bank Reprint Serie5. flumber 215. income countries, the relation of Reprinted from Directions of Change Modemiza- poverty and human resource tion Theory. Research. and Realities, Boulder, development global and national Colorado: Westuiew Prcss (1981): chapter 5 adjustment and agriculture and food Stock No RP-0215 free of charge stability. Each contains a statistical annex. World Development Indica- tors, that provides profiles of more than 120 countries in twenty-five multipage tables. The data cover such subjects as demography, industry, trade, energy, fnance, and develop- ment assistance and such measures of social conditions as education. health, and nutrition. WORLD BANK PUBLICATIONS ORDER FORM SEND TO: WORLD BANK PUBLICATIONS WORLD BANK PUBLICATIONS P.O BOX 37525 or 66, AVENUE D'IENA WASHINGTON, D.C. 20013 75116 PARIS, FRANCE U.S.A. Name: Address: Stock or ISBN # Author, Title Qty. Price Total Sub-Total Cost: Postage & handling fee for more than two free items ($1.00 each): Total copies: _ _ Air mail surcharge ($2.00 each): TOTAL PAYMENT ENCLOSED: Make checks payable: WORLD BANK PUBLICATIONS Prepayment on orders from individuals is requested. Purchase orders arts accepted from booksellers, library suppliers, libraries, and institutions All pnces include cost of postage by the least expensive means The prices and pubiication dates quoted in this Catalog are subject to change without notice No refunds wili be gtven for items that cannot be filled. Credit will be applied towards future orders No more than two free publications will be provided without charge. Requests for additional copies will be filled at a charge of US $1 00 per copy to cover handling and postage costs Airmail delivery will require a prepayment of US $2.00 per copy Mail-order payment to the World Bank need not be in U.S. dollars, but the amount remitted must be at the rate of exchange on the day the order is placed. The World Bank will also accept Unesco coupons. HG 3881.5 .W57 W67 NO.582 C.3 COCHRANE, GLYNN. POLICIES FOR STRENGHTHENING LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN The World Bank Headquarters European Office Tokyo Office 1818 H Street, N W 66, avenue d'Iena Kokusai Building Washington, D.C 20433, U S.A 75116 Paris, France 1-1 Marunouchi 3-chome Telephone. (202) 477-1234 Telephone. (1) 723-54.21 Chiyoda-ku, Tokyo 100, Japan Telex: WUI 64145 WORLDBANK Telex: 842-620628 Telephone: (03) 214-5001 RCA 248423 WORLDBK Telex. 781-26838 Cable Address INTBAFRAD WASHINGTONDC ISSN 0253-2115/ISBN 0-8213-0240-X