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**Report No.: 54979**

**PROJECT PERFORMANCE ASSESSMENT REPORT**

**JAMAICA**

**SOCIAL SAFETY NET PROJECT  
(LN. 70760)**

**AND**

**NATIONAL COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT PROJECT  
(LN. 71480)**

**June 28, 2010**

*Sector Evaluations (IEGSE)  
Independent Evaluation Group (World Bank)*

## Currency Equivalents (end year)

Currency Unit = Jamaican Dollar (JMS)

2001	US\$1.00	JM\$45.1	2006	US\$1.00	JM\$64.9
2002	US\$1.00	JM\$49.3	2007	US\$1.00	JM\$63.6
2003	US\$1.00	JM\$51.8	2008	US\$1.00	JM\$72.5
2004	US\$1.00	JM\$60.1	2009	US\$1.00	JM\$80.0
2005	US\$1.00	JM\$80.1			

## Abbreviations and Acronyms

BIS	Beneficiary Identification System	JSLC	Jamaica Survey of Living Conditions
CAS	Country Assistance Strategy	M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation
CBC	Community Based Contracting	MDG	Millennium Development Goal
CBO	Community Based Organization	MLGCD	Ministry of Local Governance and Community Development
CCT	Conditional Cash Transfer		
CDB	Caribbean Development Bank	MLSS	Ministry of Labour and Social Security
CDC	Community Development Committee		
CDP	Community Development Plan	NCDP	National Community Development Project
CIDA	Canadian International Development Agency	NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
DfID	Department for International Development	OPEC	Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries
EERL	Emergency Economic Rehabilitation Loan	PAD	Project Appraisal Document
GDP	Gross Domestic Product	PATH	Program of Advancement through Health and Education
IBRD	International Bank for Reconstruction and Development	PER	Public Expenditure Review
ICR	Implementation Completion Report	PIOJ	Planning Institute of Jamaica
IDB	Inter-American Development Bank	PNP	People's National Party
IEG	Independent Evaluation Group (formerly OED)	PPAR	Project Performance Assessment Report
IEGSE	Independent Evaluation Group Sector Evaluations	SDC	Social Development Committee
IEGWB	Independent Evaluation Group World Bank	SDR	Special Drawing Right
IMF	International Monetary Fund	SIL	Specific Investment Loan
JLP	Jamaica Labour Party	SPAD	Social Protection and Development Division
JMS	Jamaican Dollar	SMP	Staff Monitored Program
JSIF	Jamaica Social Investment Fund	SSNPP	Social Safety Net Project
		UBP	United Benefits Program

## Fiscal Year

Government: April 1 - March 31

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**About this Report**

The Independent Evaluation Group assesses the programs and activities of the World Bank for two purposes: first, to ensure the integrity of the Bank's self-evaluation process and to verify that the Bank's work is producing the expected results, and second, to help develop improved directions, policies, and procedures through the dissemination of lessons drawn from experience. As part of this work, IEGWB annually assesses about 25 percent of the Bank's lending operations through field work. In selecting operations for assessment, preference is given to those that are innovative, large, or complex; those that are relevant to upcoming studies or country evaluations; those for which Executive Directors or Bank management have requested assessments; and those that are likely to generate important lessons.

To prepare a Project Performance Assessment Report (PPAR), IEGWB staff examine project files and other documents, interview operational staff, visit the borrowing country to discuss the operation with the government, and other in-country stakeholders, and interview Bank staff and other donor agency staff both at headquarters and in local offices as appropriate.

Each PPAR is subject to internal IEGWB peer review, Panel review, and management approval. Once cleared internally, the PPAR is commented on by the responsible Bank department. IEGWB incorporates the comments as relevant. The completed PPAR is then sent to the borrower for review; the borrowers' comments are attached to the document that is sent to the Bank's Board of Executive Directors. After an assessment report has been sent to the Board, it is disclosed to the public.

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**Outcome:** The extent to which the operation's major relevant objectives were achieved, or are expected to be achieved, efficiently. The rating has three dimensions: relevance, efficacy, and efficiency. *Relevance* includes relevance of objectives and relevance of design. Relevance of objectives is the extent to which the project's objectives are consistent with the country's current development priorities and with current Bank country and sectoral assistance strategies and corporate goals (expressed in Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers, Country Assistance Strategies, Sector Strategy Papers, Operational Policies). Relevance of design is the extent to which the project's design is consistent with the stated objectives. *Efficacy* is the extent to which the project's objectives were achieved, or are expected to be achieved, taking into account their relative importance. *Efficiency* is the extent to which the project achieved, or is expected to achieve, a return higher than the opportunity cost of capital and benefits at least cost compared to alternatives. The efficiency dimension generally is not applied to adjustment operations. *Possible ratings for Outcome:* Highly Satisfactory, Satisfactory, Moderately Satisfactory, Moderately Unsatisfactory, Unsatisfactory, Highly Unsatisfactory.

**Risk to Development Outcome:** The risk, at the time of evaluation, that development outcomes (or expected outcomes) will not be maintained (or realized). *Possible ratings for Risk to Development Outcome:* High, Significant, Moderate, Negligible to Low, Not Evaluable.

**Bank Performance:** The extent to which services provided by the Bank ensured quality at entry of the operation and supported effective implementation through appropriate supervision (including ensuring adequate transition arrangements for regular operation of supported activities after loan/credit closing, toward the achievement of development outcomes. The rating has two dimensions: quality at entry and quality of supervision. *Possible ratings for Bank Performance:* Highly Satisfactory, Satisfactory, Moderately Satisfactory, Moderately Unsatisfactory, Unsatisfactory, Highly Unsatisfactory.

**Borrower Performance:** The extent to which the borrower (including the government and implementing agency or agencies) ensured quality of preparation and implementation, and complied with covenants and agreements, toward the achievement of development outcomes. The rating has two dimensions: government performance and implementing agency(ies) performance. *Possible ratings for Borrower Performance:* Highly Satisfactory, Satisfactory, Moderately Satisfactory, Moderately Unsatisfactory, Unsatisfactory, Highly Unsatisfactory.



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This report was prepared by Victoria Monchuk, who assessed the project in October 2009. Viktoriya Yevsyeyeva and Marie-Jeanne Ndiaye provided administrative support.

## Principal Ratings

<b>Social Safety Net Project (Ln. 70760)</b>			
	<i>ICR*</i>	<i>ICR Review*</i>	<i>PPAR</i>
Outcome	Satisfactory	Satisfactory	Satisfactory
Risk to Development Outcome	Low or Negligible	Moderate	Moderate
Bank Performance	Moderately Satisfactory	Moderately Satisfactory	Moderately Satisfactory
Borrower Performance	Satisfactory	Satisfactory	Satisfactory
<b>National Community Development Project (Ln. 71480)</b>			
	<i>ICR*</i>	<i>ICR Review*</i>	<i>PPAR</i>
Outcome	Satisfactory	Satisfactory	Moderately Satisfactory
Risk to Development Outcome	Moderate	Moderate	Moderate
Bank Performance	Satisfactory	Moderately Satisfactory	Moderately Satisfactory
Borrower Performance	Satisfactory	Moderately Satisfactory	Satisfactory

\* The Implementation Completion Report (ICR) is a self-evaluation by the responsible Bank department. The ICR Review is an intermediate IEGWB product that seeks to independently verify the findings of the ICR.

## Key Staff Responsible

<b>Social Safety Net Project (Ln. 70760)</b>			
<i>Project</i>	<i>Task Manager</i>	<i>Sector Director</i>	<i>Country Director</i>
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<b>National Community Development Project (Ln. 71480)</b>			
<i>Project</i>	<i>Task Manager</i>	<i>Sector Director</i>	<i>Country Director</i>
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## Preface

This is the Project Performance Assessment Report (PPAR) for two investment loans to Jamaica. The Social Safety Net Project (SSNP, US\$77.5 million) was financed through IBRD Loan 70760 in the amount of US\$40 million. The SSNP was approved by the Bank's Board on September 4, 2001, with a midterm review on March 26, 2004, and closed on March 31, 2009, nearly 3 years later than planned. The National Community Development Project (NCDP, US\$29.7 million) was financed through IBRD Loan 71480 in the amount of US\$15 million. The NCDP was approved by the Bank's Board on May 30, 2002, with a midterm review on January 9, 2006, and closed on June 30, 2008, 6 months later than planned. Both loans were fully disbursed.

The two projects were part of the Bank's overall social protection and development support to Jamaica albeit applying different approaches. Both were classified under the Bank's social safety net theme. Therefore, the projects were chosen for review to feed into the forthcoming IEG evaluation of Bank support to social safety nets worldwide.

This report was prepared by Victoria Monchuk. Evidence was collected from a review of World Bank project files, government project reports and evaluations, and independent published and un-published project assessments, and interviews with Bank staff and consultants at World Bank headquarters. During a mission to Jamaica in October 2009, additional interviews were conducted with government officials, development partners, and members of civil society who were knowledgeable of Bank support in the social safety net area, and with Bank staff and consultants in the Jamaica Country Office. The IEG team also conducted field visits to five parishes, where it met with parish program officers, social workers, school staff, health clinic staff, post office staff, workers from the Social Development Commission, community development committee representatives, and beneficiaries. A list of people interviewed is attached in Annex E. The IEG team gratefully acknowledges all those who made time for interviews and provided documentation and information. Mission support by Ms. Juliet Georgette Williams in the Jamaica office was also greatly appreciated. Viktoriya Yevsyeyeva and Marie-Jeanne Ndiaye provided administrative support.

Following standard IEG procedures, copies of the draft PPAR were sent to the relevant government officials and agencies for review and comments. The Planning Institute of Jamaica and the Ministry of Labour and Social Security provided comments in track changes to the document which were taken into account in the final version of this report.



## Summary

This is a Project Performance Assessment Report of the Jamaica *Social Safety Net Project (SSNP)* (Ln. 70760) and the *National Community Development Project (NCDP)* (Ln. 71480). Both projects fall under the Bank's social safety net theme, but applied different approaches to support Jamaica's social protection efforts. The *SSNP* disbursed US\$40 million with the objective of providing better and more cost-effective social assistance to the poor. The *NCDP* complemented a Bank emergency rehabilitation loan and disbursed US\$15 million aimed at a) providing basic services and temporary employment in low-income communities, and b) promoting greater social and community development among the poor.

Poverty rates in Jamaica have declined over the last two decades but poverty remains high among certain groups, fueled by unemployment and Jamaica's vulnerability to natural disasters. In the late 1990s the government embarked on a social sector reform for reducing poverty. However, Jamaica's debt burden, caused by a reduction in the country's main income sources such as tourism and mining as well as a domestic financial crisis, severely restricted the fiscal space for social programs. Efforts to curb expenditure disproportionately fell on capital outlays and social and community services.

To strengthen the existing social safety net, which suffered from weak targeting and high overheads, the government launched a reform program in 2000 focused on children. It was geared towards the second pillar of the government's 1997 development agenda: "Protecting the poor and ensuring inclusion." The reform encompassed all safety net programs and aimed to consolidate the three major income transfer programs, increase benefits, improve targeting, and use cost-effective and transparent identification and delivery systems.

In 2001, a drop in tourism following the September 11<sup>th</sup> terrorist attacks in the United States, coupled with domestic instability in the form of riots and floods, hit the Jamaican economy hard. Renewed attention was placed on community-based social service upgrading and productive growth in low-income and vulnerable communities.

The Bank's support to social safety net reform came in the form of the *SSNP*. The objective of improving social assistance in Jamaica was consistent with the government's development agenda and Medium-Term Economic and Social Policy Frameworks (2000-03 and 2004-07). It was supported by both political parties and well aligned with the overall package of donor support. Because fiscal space for expanding social and development spending was limited there was need for a focused approach to Bank support. The Bank concentrated its support to the social sectors and to areas where it had a comparative advantage (for example safety nets) and argued for linking social assistance to investments in human capital.

The *SSNP* introduced the new Program of Advancement through Health and Education (PATH) which provided conditional cash transfers to families with children up to 17 years old, pregnant and lactating women, and the elderly and disabled. Receipt of payments was conditional on regular school attendance and health check-ups. A conditional cash transfer design was a valid instrument for meeting the objectives, albeit rather narrow for addressing the sources of vulnerability that stem from unemployment. The mechanisms for determining targeting and benefit levels were flexible and could be adjusted. At the same time, the results framework was weak.

The Bank designed the *NCDP* in response to the negative developments in Jamaica in 2001. The *NCDP* spoke directly to the country's development priority of protecting the poor and ensuring inclusion. The Bank's 2006-09 Country Assistance Strategy (CAS) also emphasized the need for providing basic services for the poor to improve human development and prevent crime. In this sense, the relevance of the project objectives was substantial but could have been higher if the project had also aimed at improving incomes and creating more sustainable employment opportunities.

The *NCDP* was implemented by the Jamaica Social Investment Fund (JSIF) and designed to address some existing weaknesses of JSIF operations. The approach was warranted based on JSIF's mandate and capacity. Also, the demand-driven nature of JSIF's work made it a good tool for building greater community cohesion. However, the project did not incorporate mechanisms for ensuring unskilled employment and did not guarantee continued maintenance of the infrastructure after it had been created. This was mainly because of weak working agreements with the Social Development Commission (SDC) which partnered with JSIF in order to strengthen social development outcomes. The results framework was also weak.

*SSNP*'s achievement of the three parts of its objective was as follows: The first objective, to improve the social assistance system, was achieved. The new cash transfer system is better targeted; has reduced waste and overlap; and benefits appear to have had a small effect on reducing poverty. The program is well-managed and the project strengthened the capacity of the systems and staff in place to implement PATH. However, evidence for increased human capital investment is not strong. The effectiveness could be improved by further increasing the benefit level, fine-tuning targeting, addressing remaining administrative overlap, and understanding constraints that may limit the impacts on health and education outcomes.

Achievement of the second objective, providing a more cost-effective social assistance system, was substantial. Overall and administrative costs were contained. Cost-effectiveness was enhanced. But beyond the development and implementation of the PATH program, efficiency gains in social assistance programs in Jamaica have not been reported.

The third objective, reaching the poor and vulnerable, was also achieved. Although *SSNP* did not reach its ambitious targets, PATH still reached the poor well compared to earlier programs and compared to other conditional cash transfer programs throughout the world. Moreover, except for difficulties in reaching many elderly, PATH is benefitting the vulnerable groups on which it focuses.

*NCDP*'s achievement of the two objectives was as follows: The project provided well-targeted and good quality basic services and created some temporary jobs. Fifty-nine percent of the 276 sub-projects were in communities located in the poorest income quartile areas. The project increased access of poor communities to social services and roads. Maintenance of the infrastructure created, however, was poor due to the lack of maintenance training to communities. Some temporary employment opportunities were created, although precise data are not known.

Achievement of the second objective, to promote greater social and community development, was modest. The project had some positive impact on the social development in the poor communities reached. For example, some communities have been mobilized to generate

complementary funding for new projects. The use of community-based contracting was higher than expected but community participation in planning was lower than planned. Many of the project's social outcome indicators were achieved, but without baselines or targets we do not know if they represent an improvement in overall social and community development.

## Ratings

The *SSNP* achieved its relevant development objectives, with only minor shortcomings in design. Therefore, and due also to substantial relevance and efficiency, the overall outcome of the project is rated *satisfactory*. The risk to development outcomes is rated *moderate*. The economic downturn has started to erode benefit levels. However, political support for PATH is strong and implementation of the program continues to be refined. Bank performance is rated *moderately satisfactory*. Quality at Entry was *moderately unsatisfactory*. Important implementation arrangements were lacking which caused delays. Bank supervision was *satisfactory* and helped strengthen the capacity and systems in the implementing agency. Most of the gaps in design were addressed during supervision. Borrower performance is rated *satisfactory*. Both the government and the implementing agency performed well. Policy decisions for reform and the financial commitment to PATH have been unwavering. The implementing agency (Ministry of Labour and Social Security) has been strengthened for carrying out the program and is now equipped to do so.

The *NCDP*'s outcome is rated *moderately satisfactory*. It substantially achieved the objective of providing basic social services and modestly achieved the objective of promoting greater social and community development with substantial efficiency, although there were weaknesses in relevance of design. The risk to development outcome is rated *moderate*. There has been inadequate attention to operation and maintenance, thereby reducing the likelihood that the assets created by the project will be sustained. Bank performance is rated *moderately satisfactory*—stronger in supervision than at start up. Borrower performance is rated *satisfactory* overall. Government performance is rated *satisfactory*. Despite the tight fiscal stance, government support to the project was strong. But much of the achievement of *NCDP* can be credited to JSIF, the implementing agency, whose performance was *satisfactory*.

## Lessons

- *The SSNP demonstrated that conditional cash transfer programs, such as PATH, can be useful tools for protecting the poor after localized shocks.* PATH was able to quickly double benefit levels and waive compliance requirements in communities seriously affected by Hurricane Ivan, but only to those already participating in the program.
- *Monitoring and evaluation in conditional cash transfer programs should pay more attention to the objective of protecting the chronically poor and vulnerable.* Six of the eight *SSNP* performance indicators reflected human development outcomes. No indicators measured the extent to which social assistance benefits effectively reached the poor.
- *Compliance requirements should be set with attention to supply side constraints (in health), the level of impact that could be expected on outcomes (in education), and*

*any costs incurred in conditioning benefits.* Even though the Ministry of Health advised on the number of health visits required per child, the **SSNP** still failed to fully consider the limited capacity of the health system to absorb the demand for health care. Similarly, school attendance rates, at least at the primary level, were already high in Jamaica and significant impacts from the project due to the education conditionality were small. Any impacts on behavioral changes also need to be viewed in relation to costs incurred for monitoring compliance rates.

- *Social Investment Funds, such as JSIF, can be useful for dealing with emergencies and for experimenting with new approaches.* The **NCDP** proved flexible in addressing the urgent need caused by Hurricane Ivan and for helping communities gain experience with community contracting. However, uncertainties about a fund's longevity may create ambiguity about responsibilities for continuing activities and sustaining the benefits.
- *The delivery of infrastructure through Social Investment Funds needs to be accompanied by measures that ensure the effective use, operation, and maintenance of assets.* When using a Social Investment Fund to help provide community chosen investments quickly, it is also important to explicitly delineate the responsibilities for operating and maintaining the social infrastructure and to ensure that the capacity for service provision and infrastructure maintenance is built.

Vinod Thomas  
Director-General  
Evaluation

# 1. Background and context

## Macroeconomic and Political Context

1.1 Prior to the turn of the millennium economic growth in Jamaica was slow. From 1981 to 2001 real Gross Domestic Product (GDP) grew at an average annual rate of only 1.5 percent.<sup>1</sup> As a result of international economic shocks and the government's bailout of large banks during the financial crisis of 1997, the country was left with a large debt. Moreover, in 2001 the decline in tourism due to the September 11<sup>th</sup> terrorist attacks in the United States, coupled with domestic instability in the form of riots, strikes, and floods, hit the Jamaican economy hard. Nevertheless, poverty declined in the 1990s, from 45 percent in 1991 to 16 percent in 1998, but only to increase to 21 percent in 2002 (World Bank 2010).

1.2 The four pillars of the government's development agenda prepared in 1997 were: a) restoring economic growth; b) protecting the poor and ensuring inclusion; c) improving governance, efficiency and effectiveness of the public sector; and d) ensuring sustainable development. The strategy for social safety nets included a focus on more development-oriented programs, centering on families with small children and youth, and improving the overall targeting and cost-effectiveness. Moreover, the government through its 2000-03 and 2004-07 Medium-Term Economic and Social Policy Frameworks also emphasized increasing access to social and economic opportunities, facilitating human capital development for the poor, and enhancing social harmony.

1.3 But the debt burden severely restricted fiscal space for social programs. In 2001, public debt reached 144 percent of GDP with interest payments of 62 percent of government expenditure (IDB 2001). Rigid public wages further crowded out productive spending directed towards improving social welfare especially of the poor. Efforts to curb expenditures and restore the fiscal balance had mainly fallen on capital outlays and social and community services. Public investments on essential services were on the back burner. In 2000/01 the government spent 6.2 percent of GDP on education, a sizable allocation for a middle-income country. However, the 2.6 percent of GDP (18 percent of government spending) spent on social protection programs was well below the regional average even after controlling for the countries' demographic profiles (World Bank 2001, Blank et al. 2000, World Bank 2007).<sup>2</sup> At the same time, the lack of real economic growth placed increased demands on social welfare services.

## Poverty Profile and Social Sector Challenges

1.4 Poverty is highly concentrated in Jamaica. Children make up 49 percent of the poor and intergenerational transmission of poverty is strong (Blank 2000; JSLC 1998). Erratic school attendance by children in the low income group is commonly attributed to "money

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<sup>1</sup> Although Jamaica and Barbados shared colonial and institutional backgrounds and had similar GDP per capita in 1968, by 1999 per capita income was three times higher in Barbados than in Jamaica (World Bank 2010).

<sup>2</sup> Of this around 0.5 percent of GDP was spent on social assistance and 1.2 percent of GDP on social safety nets overall (Blank 2000).

problems” (Mathematica 2007). Although schooling is free<sup>3</sup> for all Jamaican children, associated costs such as transportation<sup>4</sup> and lunches are costly for the poor. Other important Millennium Development Goal indicators on child health and nutrition are still far from being achieved. For instance, measles immunization rates in 2002 (86 percent) lagged behind the regional average in Latin America and the Caribbean (93 percent).

1.5 Rural areas experience the highest incidence of poverty and susceptibility to shocks. Access to piped water and sanitation services in rural areas is half of that in urban areas (Blank 2000). Quality and reliability of services is also low in rural areas. In addition, inner-city areas are dominated by meager social conditions and are plagued by the highest rates of crime and violence in the hemisphere. Urban poverty has grown quickly, spurring social and political upheavals.

1.6 Unemployment is strongly related to poverty and economic vulnerability in Jamaica and is the main cause of concern among the poor (World Bank 2000a). For 18-25 year-olds in Kingston unemployment is as high as 65 percent (World Bank 2002b). The working poor earn low wages, have large families, and face severe economic and social hardship.

1.7 Finally, the island’s geographic location makes it vulnerable to natural disasters. Storms, floods and landslides periodically ravage the island. Tourism declined after the 9/11 events, drug wars restrict productive growth, and the high debt burden makes the economy sensitive to fluctuations in oil and food prices. Historically, political polarization<sup>5</sup> divided communities and caused violence and conflict. Today, gang wars driven by increased drug trafficking cause insecurity and stir up violence especially in urban centers (World Bank 2005).

## **Social Safety Net Reform**

1.8 Until the year 2000, the evolution of a social assistance system in Jamaica reflected ad hoc political priorities without much coordination or long-term planning. The social assistance system consisted of about 20 overlapping, poorly targeted, and uncoordinated programs aimed at the poor and vulnerable (see Annex A for more details on the key programs). Benefits were low and the program provided few productive incentives for the poor to adopt strategies for escaping poverty, such as by investing in human capital or gaining training and employment. In 2000, in order to protect the poor and vulnerable and correct the above listed inefficiencies, the government launched a large social safety net reform.

1.9 The reform program had a special focus on children and was geared towards the second pillar of the government’s development agenda: “Protecting the poor and ensuring

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<sup>3</sup> Primary schooling is free for all children in Jamaica. In 2008 the government also made secondary schooling free in response to the rising food prices.

<sup>4</sup> In rural areas it is common that secondary students have to use taxis to get all the way to school.

<sup>5</sup> In the 1930s and 40s two cousins, Norman Manley and Alexander Bustamante, established Jamaica’s two political parties, the People’s National Party (PNP) and the Jamaica Labour Party (JLP), in an effort to gain independence from British rule. Ever since, tensions between the two groups of party supporters have been high, especially in urban areas. Party supporters have formed garrison towns and controlled the interaction with other communities.

inclusion,” which aimed at enhancing the effectiveness and efficiency of social safety nets, improving educational access and outcomes, improving health services, and stimulating labor-intensive growth. The four objectives of the social safety net reform were to:

- tailor programs more specifically to risks and conditions associated with poverty and vulnerability and develop an associated targeting mechanism;
- integrate programs in order to reduce delivery costs;
- ensure a comprehensive range of benefits to address different conditions (including age-specific factors) associated with poverty and vulnerability; and
- introduce flexibility of programs, notably by maximizing complementarity and partnerships with nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) (World Bank 2001).

1.10 In 1999/00 a Policy Matrix for Reform of Social Safety Nets was prepared by an inter-institutional task force led by the Planning Institute of Jamaica (PIOJ). The reform proposal was approved by the Cabinet in October 2000. The reform encompassed all social safety net programs targeted to the poor. It called for consolidating the three major income transfer programs<sup>6</sup> into one conditional cash transfer program (CCT) and increasing benefits to meaningful levels using cost-efficient and transparent identification and delivery systems. The new income transfer program, the Program of Advancement Through Health and Education (PATH)<sup>7</sup>, would link benefits to investments in human capital of the poor. The objective of the consolidation was to reduce fragmentation and administrative costs and to increase impact by raising benefit levels. To tighten the targeting, the reform would develop a Beneficiary Identification System (BIS) and use a scoring formula for proxy means testing.<sup>8</sup> The BIS would be adopted by all of the main safety net programs in Jamaica such as school-based and health-based programs (World Bank 2000b). To implement the reform and the new program, the government requested assistance from the Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB).

### **Community-Driven Social Infrastructure Upgrades**

1.11 In addition to creating a unified targeted transfer program, renewed attention was also placed on upgrading community-based social services and productive growth in poor communities most affected by the 2001 crises. The government’s strategy included elements aimed at upgrading the social infrastructure through focused investments essential for growth and developing income-earnings capacity for the working poor. The government’s underlying National Poverty Eradication Program (1997) emphasized community-based and community-led interventions undertaken in partnership with NGOs and the private sector (World Bank 2002b).<sup>9</sup> The Jamaica Social Investment Fund (JSIF) has existed since 1996 as

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<sup>6</sup> These were the Food Stamp Program, the Poor Relief Program, and the Economic and Social Assistance Program.

<sup>7</sup> Initially the PATH was known as the United Benefits Program (UBP).

<sup>8</sup> Proxy means testing is a method used by some government programs in determining eligibility for benefits based on a score composed of household characteristics such as location, quality of its dwelling, ownership of durable goods, demographic structure of the household, and others.

<sup>9</sup> Jamaica’s rural policy envisioned an economically and socially viable rural population enjoying access to services and actively participating in decision-making (World Bank 2005).

a vehicle for undertaking small-scale community-driven projects and to respond to the needs of the most underserved groups. JSIF was a mechanism through which the rural development goals and community-driven economic and social infrastructure updates could be undertaken. Social infrastructure such as schools, and community and health centers were the focus.

## **CAS Priorities—the Bank’s Support**

1.12 The pillars of the 2000 Country Assistance Strategy (CAS) rested on the government’s development agenda with social programs a priority. Given the tight fiscal environment and based on lessons from the past, the Bank focused its attention on priority areas (supported by both political parties and civil society), including safety nets. To support the government’s efforts the Bank’s strategy on safety nets was focused on: a) assisting the reform of the social safety net system through the unification of the three income transfer programs; and b) implementing and delivering social assistance through the development of the PATH including funding conditional cash transfer payments to children. Also, although not envisaged in the CAS but rather in response to the strong negative developments in Jamaica in 2001, the Bank supported the government in updating social services for the poor using community-driven approaches and enhancing inclusion. The three objectives were to be achieved through the two projects reviewed in this report: the Social Safety Net Project (SSNP) and the National Community Development Project (NCDP). It should be noted that the two projects were not coordinated or part of a larger Bank social safety net strategy in Jamaica. The IDB also provided US\$40 million for social safety net reform budget support.<sup>10</sup>

## **2. Social Safety Net Project – Description**

2.1 In response to the social safety net reform, the World Bank assisted the government in designing the US\$77.5 million Social Safety Net Project (SSNP). The project was approved on September 4, 2001, became effective on February 28, 2002 and, after two extensions, closed on March 31, 2009.

### **Objectives and Design**

#### **OBJECTIVES**

2.2 The overall objective of the SSNP was to support the Government’s efforts to transform the social safety net into a fiscally sound and more efficient system of social assistance for the poor and vulnerable. Specifically, according to the Project Appraisal

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<sup>10</sup> IDB support helped to protect spending on non-wage recurrent items for basic health and education while reallocating funds within the safety net towards better targeting of programs. The IDB also provided assistance to the development of the BIS for better targeting of transfers and other social programs such as the school feeding program (IDB 2001). Finally, IDB funded studies and evaluations to support strategies for other government safety net programs such as Lift Up Jamaica, school-feeding programs, and youth-at-risk initiatives.

Document (PAD) the project's development objective was "to provide better and more cost-effective social assistance to the extreme poor" (World Bank 2001).<sup>11</sup>

2.3 To this end, the project would: (a) consolidate the major income transfer programs into a Unified Benefit Program<sup>12</sup> that would ensure (i) meaningful level of benefits, (ii) cost-effective and accessible delivery system, (iii) access to benefits linked to desirable behavioral changes for promoting investment in the human capital development of the poor, especially children, and (iv) effective targeting of social assistance to special groups; and (b) strengthen institutional capacity to (i) operate the program effectively and efficiently, and (ii) implement overall social safety net reform elements, including a transparent targeting mechanism.

## DESIGN

2.4 Table 1 describes each of the three project components. The components and the overall design were not altered during the project duration. The set of key indicators of achievement as well as the institutional reform and strengthening to be under taken during the project are listed in Annex Table B1 (including targets and baselines, when available).

2.5 *Targeting:* Around 17 percent of Jamaicans (about 360,000 people) were poor in 2001. The program focused on certain categories of the poor, such as children, pregnant and lactating women, and the elderly, disabled or destitute adults. The SSNP used a proxy means testing mechanism for selecting participants. The goal was that several social safety net programs in Jamaica (for example school-based programs) would use this common system to select beneficiaries. The Planning Institute of Jamaica (PIOJ) developed a scoring formula that ranked households from highest to lowest score. To apply, households must provide detailed information.<sup>13</sup> The formula initially produced large errors of inclusion and exclusion but was refined during piloting and implementation.

2.6 *Benefits:* In the first year of implementation, the level of monthly per capita benefit was set at JM\$250 or US\$6, the second year at JM\$375 or US\$7.50, and the third year and thereafter at JM\$500 or US\$9. The gradual increase was chosen for budgetary reasons and to keep up with inflation. Benefits were the same for all beneficiaries.<sup>14</sup>

2.7 *The PATH package:* The benefits under the PATH program were not only limited to cash transfers. School children on PATH were also entitled to school fee waivers, free school lunches, and free health check-ups. Younger children, lactating and pregnant women, and the elderly and disabled were provided free health care visits.

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<sup>11</sup> The Loan Agreement phrases the development objective of the project as "to provide better and more cost effective social assistance to the extreme poor in the Borrower's territory". For the purposes of evaluation the two statements are considered identical.

<sup>12</sup> Initially the PATH was known as the United Benefits Program (UBP).

<sup>13</sup> The application form includes questions on name, address, age, sex and schooling of all household members, condition and permanency of dwelling, sanitary facilities, water, electricity and lighting, phone, household amenities, and weekly household consumption.

<sup>14</sup> It was discussed whether older children should receive higher levels of benefits to compensate for higher direct schooling costs. Given the limited budget, it was preferred that the program covered a larger number of beneficiaries instead.

2.8 *Conditions:* Receipt of benefits was conditioned on compliance with education and health care conditions in order to strengthen human capital accumulation. Children under the age of 7 not enrolled in school and pregnant and lactating women were to visit health care centers every two months,<sup>15</sup> while enrolled children between the ages of 6-17 were to attend at least 85 percent of the time. Non-pregnant or lactating adult beneficiaries (mainly the elderly and disabled) were exempt from conditions.

**Table 1. SSNP Logframe: Components, Indicators and Objectives**

Component	Activity description and conditions	Output indicators	Outcome indicators <sup>2</sup>	Development objective
1. Child assistance grants	Conditional grants for poor children aged 0-17. Receipt of grant is conditioned on having children 6-17 who are enrolled in school attend at least 85 percent of the time and taking children 0-6 for regular health check-ups and immunizations	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• 217,000 or more beneficiaries;</li> <li>• 160,000 children receiving the transfers regularly every two months;</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• increase in health care use by very poor children;</li> <li>• increase in immunization rates for very poor children;</li> <li>• increase in school attendance by poor children and youth;</li> <li>• increase in upper secondary enrollment rates;</li> </ul>	To provide better and more cost-effective social assistance to the extreme poor
2. Social assistance grants <sup>1</sup>	Conditional grants to poor pregnant/lactating mothers, elderly poor over 65, poor disabled and eligible destitute adults under 65. Receipt of grant for poor pregnant/lactating mothers is conditioned on regular health clinic visits. No conditions were imposed on the elderly	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• percentage of eligible poor not receiving grant below 30 percent;</li> <li>• more than 70 percent of program beneficiaries below the poverty line</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• beneficiary satisfaction with new program</li> <li>• change in poor pregnant, and lactating mothers visiting health centers;</li> </ul>	
3. Institutional strengthening	Strengthen the institutional capacity of the MLSS and others involved to operate the social safety net. This involves developing the targeting and enrollment mechanism, monitoring and evaluation and information systems, training and promotion, and project management	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• monthly benefits JM\$250 in year 1, JM\$400 in year 2 and JM\$500 in years 3+;</li> <li>• PATH administrative costs do not exceed 15 percent of program costs by year three</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• change in poor elderly, disabled and other beneficiaries visiting health center;</li> <li>• beneficiary satisfaction with the new program;</li> <li>• percentage of overall SSNP expenditure channeled through the PATH</li> </ul>	

Source: Project documents.

<sup>1</sup> Fully funded by the Government.

<sup>2</sup> Annex Table B1 lists targets and baselines when available.

2.9 *Delivery of benefits:* The government decided to use the Postal Corporation for delivering the payment checks to the beneficiaries. Payments were made every two months on the 15<sup>th</sup> of the month. Social workers transferred the checks to local post-offices for distribution. The Government of Jamaica checks were also widely accepted in many stores. Starting in 2006, to increase efficiency of delivering the payments, a cash-card system operated via a large bank was piloted and implemented in late 2007.

<sup>15</sup> For children over 12 months but below school age the number of visits per year was reduced to two.

## IMPLEMENTATION ARRANGEMENTS

2.10 *Implementing agencies:* Implementation of the PATH fell under the Public Assistance Division in the Ministry of Labour and Social Security (MLSS) and its offices in each parish. Hence, the project did not make use of a temporary project executing unit. The PIOJ took the lead in developing the scoring formula for eligibility, the Office of the Prime Minister was responsible for implementing the required reforms, the Ministries of Education and Health would be involved in compliance monitoring, and civil society would participate in an appeals process and in identifying candidates for the program.

2.11 *Institutional strengthening:* In order to carry out the PATH program, institutional changes would take place at different levels. Investments in staff and equipment for the application system and scoring formula mechanism would be substantial. Special training for staff involved in procurement and financial management would strengthen compliance with requirements and procedures in the new program. Public information campaigns across the country were scheduled to raise interest in the program. Finally, investments to ensure adequate project management and evaluation would take place, including commissioning of a rigorous impact evaluation.

2.12 *Risks and fiscal constraints:* Several risks were identified at appraisal. First and foremost was the tight overarching fiscal framework and the uncertainty over the availability of adequate project funds, especially for increasing the benefit level according to schedule. The project also anticipated some opposition to the reform from unionized employees of former programs and from former beneficiaries who would no longer be eligible under the PATH. These risks did not strongly materialize.

## Implementation

2.13 Due to slight delays in finalization, the project became effective two months late on February 28, 2002. The project was extended by almost three years, from June 30, 2006, to March 31, 2009, to carry out the Management Information System (MIS) enhancement work and the large recertification exercise which had been behind schedule. Throughout the project, the supervision rating on the development objective was Satisfactory except in 2005/06, when the project was downgraded to Moderately Unsatisfactory and later Moderately Satisfactory due to the government's temporary decision not to increase benefit levels and to delays in legislation and in MIS development.

2.14 *Adjusting the scoring formula:* The BIS system went through some fine tuning. In 2008, it was agreed to retain two cut-off scores in the formula—one for urban and one for rural households—to allow for differences in poverty status. In January, 2009 a large re-certification exercise began for 40,000 families who had been in the program for four years to verify their continued eligibility.

2.15 *Compliance issues:* Education compliance was smooth over the project but health compliance remained very challenging. For children over 12 months of age the health compliance rate continued to be low (only around 60 percent over the project). Health centers were overwhelmed as a result of the compliance conditions of two visits per year per child. The Ministry of Health suggested limiting the number of clinic visits to one visit per year per child for children over 12 months of age. Instead a parenting health training pilot module

would be implemented. The pilot did not lead to much improvement in compliance rates. By the end of the project, compliance rates had reached 85 percent in primary education, 80 percent in secondary, 85 percent for pregnant and lactating mothers, 92 percent for children under 12 months and 67 percent for children between the ages of 1-6 (Government of Jamaica, 2009).

2.16 *Responding to shocks and hardship:* In 2004, to compensate for the damages made by Hurricane Ivan it was decided to give a one-time doubling of the benefit (JM\$800). Also, according to the loan agreement, if inflation was higher than 8 percent at any time the benefit level was to adjust upward according to a set schedule. The first adjustment in 2004 increased the benefit from JM\$250 to JM\$400. It was further increased to JM\$530 in January, 2006 and to JM\$650 in April, 2008. Moreover, towards the end of the project it was agreed to differentiate the child grant for school children by grade level so that older children received a higher benefit. The higher benefit for older children was meant to compensate for the higher school costs at the secondary level. Also, boys were given higher benefits than girls, as boys are more likely to drop out of school. In 2008, to offset the negative implications on the poor caused by increased food and fuel prices and the international financial crisis, the government launched a mass enrollment exercise. Coverage was increased by 40 percent to all of the 360,000 Jamaicans below the poverty line (about 14 percent of the population). The impact of the coverage increase on poverty rates and other outcomes is unknown.

## **COSTS, DISBURSEMENTS AND FIDUCIARY MANAGEMENT**

2.17 Total project costs were appraised at US\$77.5 million (Table 2). The Bank did not support the Social Assistance Grants component because, due to financial management requirements, it was unable to fund the unconditional transfers.

**Table 2. Expenditure by Component, Planned and Actual (million US\$)**

<b>Component</b>	<b>Planned<sup>a</sup> (Bank contribution)</b>	<b>Actual<sup>b</sup> (Bank contribution)</b>	<b>Actual as a percent of planned</b>
Child assistance grants	50.67 (28.73)	75.26 (33.58)	149
Social assistance grants	14.14 (0.00)	32.06 (0.00)	227
Institutional strengthening	11.92 (10.50)	12.97 (6.02)	109
Unallocated	0.37 (0.37)	0.00 (0.00)	0
Front-end fee	0.40 (0.40)	0.40 (0.40)	100
<b>Total project costs</b>	<b>77.5 (40.0)</b>	<b>120.29 (40.0)</b>	<b>155</b>

<sup>a</sup> As of the PAD, August, 2001.

<sup>b</sup> As of the ICR, August, 2009.

2.18 *Disbursements and procurement:* Counterpart funding at closing was significantly higher than appraised. The main reasons were the larger number of beneficiaries and higher level of benefit than originally planned. Moreover, costs for the impact and qualitative evaluations, fine tuning of the scoring formula and training materials were higher than estimated. Initially, as design modifications were still being made, procurement and disbursements were slow. There were delays in contracting for the MIS system, the pay agency, the impact evaluation, and the operational audits. Consequently the procurement rating of the project was downgraded in the early years. Towards the end of the project and as a result of the positive findings of the impact evaluation, the government, supported by the

Bank, decided to reallocate some of the Bank's credit from goods and consultants to finance an increased number of beneficiaries. Hence, the Bank's contribution to institutional strengthening dropped by over 40 percent of what was planned, while the contribution to child grants increased by almost 17 percent.<sup>16</sup>

2.19 *Financial management and auditing*: Because a large amount of Bank funds went directly to cash transfers the Bank required an external operational audit (in addition to the government's audits) for each payment period (every four months). However, there was no knowledge in the MLSS of how to design and procure an external audit and it took over two years before the first audit was completed. During this time all Bank disbursements were on hold and the government had to borrow elsewhere to finance the program. At the completion of the first few audits it was found that the internal audit procedures in the government were sufficiently strong for monitoring the use of funds and the Bank waived its external audit disbursement requirement.

## Monitoring & Evaluation

2.20 Monitoring and evaluation (M&E) quality is rated *substantial*. The implementation and use of M&E was substantial, mainly due to the quality of the impact evaluation and targeting assessment, notwithstanding weaknesses in the results framework.

### M&E DESIGN

2.21 The SSNP M&E system design consisted of four parts; a) an MIS that recorded program processes such as inputs and outputs; b) two qualitative assessments that measured implementation effectiveness and the perception of beneficiaries; c) impact evaluation assessing impacts on final outcomes and targeting precision; and d) research studies to learn about program fine-tuning and special areas of interest. Moreover, the MLSS internal audit department, the auditor general reports, and the external audits contributed important information on how the project performed.

2.22 At the time of project approval, the M&E framework had not yet been finalized. It was adequate for monitoring some of the objectives, but not all. Significant weaknesses existed. First, the phrasing of the development objective (aiming at creating a 'better' social assistance system) lacked specificity. Adjustments had to be made during the implementation phase in order to specify indicators by which to assess 'better'. Likewise there was no definition in the results framework for who was classified as extreme poor. It was also not clear how fiscal soundness of social assistance (part of the overall objective) would be assessed. Secondly, six out of eight indicators for the development objective focused on the use of health and education services which, while desirable, were not explicitly stated as part of the development objective. Also, even though the number of beneficiaries expanded beyond the initial plans, the target on program coverage (percent of the poor reached) was unrealistic. Provided the budget, targeting criteria and benefit level, the PATH could by default not achieve its goal of providing benefits to 70 percent of the nation's poor.

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<sup>16</sup> To help finance the scale-up in coverage in 2008 the Bank and IDB helped reallocate US\$15million from a non-disbursing IDB infrastructure credit to the PATH program.

2.23 The impact evaluation design was rigorous. It employed a regression discontinuity<sup>17</sup> method in calculating the effect of the program on health and education intermediate outcomes on a set of 2,500 beneficiaries against a group of similar people whose application scores were found just above the eligibility cut-off criterion.

2.24 Although there were significant weaknesses in the monitoring and evaluation framework for assessing achievement of the development objectives, the planned targeting assessment, which provided rigorous evidence on how well the project reached and benefitted the poor, compensated somewhat for this weakness. The targeting assessment would assess coverage, benefit incidence, and poverty impact, and monitor key risk groups.

2.25 Because of the shortcomings in the definition of the development objective, and the design of project results framework for assessing the achievement of the objective, M&E design is rated *modest*.

### **M&E IMPLEMENTATION**

2.26 The provisional MIS was expanded in 2003 to include modules on compliance, case management, appeals, and payment. In 2008 a more adequate system was built, but it still lacked a module for tracking household expansion. MIS data were used for bi-monthly reports to the World Bank on compliance rates and distribution of benefits throughout the project.

2.27 Mathematica Policy Research Inc. was hired to undertake the impact evaluation including carrying out a detailed targeting assessment.<sup>18</sup> The baseline was fielded in early 2004 and the follow-up in the summer of 2005. JSLC data from 2002 was also used for the baseline of the targeting assessment. Interim findings were available in 2005 and the final report was prepared in March, 2007. Two qualitative beneficiary assessments and two research studies on using the cash cards and parental training on child health were also carried out. The research studies showed encouraging outcomes but pointed to limited uptake of the initiatives. The implementation of the monitoring and evaluation system is rated *substantial*.

### **M&E UTILIZATION**

2.28 The targeting assessment, available in 2004, provided information about the poverty level of PATH participants, the level to which the program reached the poor and the expected effects on household consumption of the poor. Adjustments to the scoring formula were made throughout the program, based on findings from the targeting assessment. Focus group data generated in depth information on areas where targeting improvements could be made

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<sup>17</sup> Regression discontinuity is a quasi-experimental evaluation method used to determine whether a program is effective on the basis of comparing outcomes in similar households just above and below the eligibility cut-off score, before and after the intervention.

<sup>18</sup> Originally, a second impact evaluation was planned to be undertaken before project closing. However, because of the evaluation's encouraging findings and significant rigor and cost it was decided not to move forward with a second round. In 2009-10 the new Social Protection Project is undertaking a second impact evaluation of the PATH.

and justified increased resources for social workers to be in regular contact with beneficiaries.

2.29 Because the results from the impact evaluation were not available until 2005, information about the program's effect on human capital investment were not known during the first half of project implementation. However, when available, the results provided direct evidence on the positive impact on school attendance and health care utilization rates of PATH. Moreover, although only a year and a half had passed between the baseline and follow-up surveys, the evaluation shed some light on the limited impact on longer run human development outcomes such as academic achievement and health care status. Final evaluation data are available at the University of West Indies and findings have been widely cited in the World Bank and academic research on CCT programs. The findings have contributed to design modifications of PATH such as increased in the benefit level for secondary students.

2.30 The qualitative assessments generated feedback from beneficiaries, social workers, parish offices, schools, health centers and post offices. Information was sought on program eligibility and selection processes;<sup>19</sup> the payment mechanism and its effectiveness; and beneficiary satisfaction and behavioral change. These findings fed back into the program for continuous fine-tuning. Changes that were made based on the information were: strengthening of the case management system, social worker rotation in order to avoid biases, piloting an alternative payment mechanism, and differentiation of the child grant benefit level by gender and grade level. Therefore, utilization of the monitoring and evaluation system is rated *substantial*.

### 3. Social Safety Net Project - Achievement of Objectives

3.1 Assessing whether the SSNP achieved its development objective amounts to assessing whether the social safety net system is a) 'better' than prior to the project, b) more cost-effective, and c) whether it reached the extreme poor Jamaicans. 'Better' is defined according to what the project intended to improve, namely more efficient social assistance system with a transparent targeting mechanism and stimulating behavioral changes. Fiscal soundness of the social safety net system is not specifically addressed. However, aspects of fiscal sustainability are assessed within the objective of cost-effectiveness. Moreover, although the objective states that the project would target the extreme poor, the project description clarifies that the focus is on particularly vulnerable groups among the poor. IEG assesses whether social assistance reached the extreme poor as well as particular vulnerable poor groups.

#### **Objective 1. Provide a 'Better' Social Assistance System. Rating: Substantial**

3.2 *Two of the three income transfer programs (the Food Stamp Program and the Economic and Social Assistance Program<sup>20</sup> have been successfully consolidated to form the*

<sup>19</sup> Such as program awareness, application, case management and appeals processes.

<sup>20</sup> The Economic and Social Assistance Program includes two components: (i) Old Age and Incapacity allowances for the elderly and incapacitated, and (ii) one-off grants payable in special circumstances to those in

*PATH program.* By merging administrative, selection, and payment procedures of the two programs duplication and overlap have been reduced. Moreover, it has also reduced the burden on beneficiaries as they only have to collect one benefit check instead of multiple kinds of cash and in-kind transfers.<sup>21</sup> However, despite being re-drafted nine times, the National Assistance Act, necessary to legally merge the Outdoor Poor Relief Program with the PATH, has yet to be passed by the Parliament. Centrally, the program is administrated together with PATH in the MLSS and co-administered locally by social workers from both the MLSS and the MLGCD. The payment mechanism is merged and the same form and same criteria is used to determine eligibility for PATH and the Outdoor Poor Relief Program. The Outdoor Poor Relief Program only covers about 16,600 individuals (five percent of the PATH) but the incomplete merge has caused some unnecessary duplication of functions on case management at the parish level. Although data are from 2003, the JSLC 2004 reveals that half of the households which are eligible for both the Outdoor Poor Relief Program and the PATH receive both. With the full merger of the three programs there is further scope for efficiency gains.

3.3 *The beneficiary selection mechanism developed under the project has led to better targeting.* The project helped develop the scoring formula used in the BIS.<sup>22</sup> (Actual targeting improvements are assessed under objective 3). The scoring formula has made the selection of beneficiaries more transparent and depoliticized. Nationwide, PATH uses a standard form for collecting household demographic information and a standard formula for establishing eligibility. Before the project, political groups, churches and NGOs often decided on who should benefit. Under PATH, interest groups still play a role in mobilizing people to apply for benefits but do not determine selection which is done through the nationwide BIS. Also, parish program procedures such as the appeals process and the case-management system help reduce errors of exclusion and inclusion and give rejected applicants a chance for a more in-depth assessment.

3.4 *The targeting mechanism has been moderately successful in its application to other social safety net programs.* The intent behind the BIS was to use it also to identify beneficiaries for social assistance programs in addition to PATH. Initially, education-based programs took on the targeting mechanism for selecting beneficiaries for school fee waivers for the poor. Similarly, provisions were made for schools to giving free lunches to PATH children. However, schools had the discretion of enforcing the collection of fees and providing lunches and many schools opted to treat all enrolled children equally. This observation was confirmed by IEG mission visits to schools. At the time of the evaluation, the new government had abolished school fees at the secondary level and instated universal free health care. With the move to more universality in access to social services, the impact expected from the use of the targeting mechanism in other health and education based programs beyond PATH has been reduced.

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need (“rehabilitation grants,” “compassionate grants” and “emergency relief”). The Old Age and Incapacity component was merged into the PATH program while the one-off grants remain as separate programs. The Food Stamp Program and the Old Age and Incapacity Program commonly handled different benefits for similar purposes to the same groups of people.

<sup>21</sup> When asked to compare the Food Stamp Program and the PATH, beneficiaries preferred the PATH (Hope 2005).

<sup>22</sup> The BIS was a collaborative effort between the Bank, the IDB, and the government, drawing on expertise from the University of West Indies in Kingston.

### 3.5 *Benefit levels under PATH were on average low but had some effect on poverty.*

Although increasing over the project period, benefit levels were low compared to other CCT programs in Latin America (Annex Table C1). On average, the monthly benefit level was around US\$9 per person. This was significantly higher than the Food Stamp Program (in US\$ equivalent and in percent of consumption) but still only around 10 percent of consumption expenditure of the poor and 5 percent of the incomes of the poor (Table 3, World Bank 2008b; Fiszbein and Schady 2009). The PATH benefits were hence lower than international standards for cash transfers.<sup>23</sup> Nevertheless, evaluations show that the transfer somewhat reduced poverty.<sup>24</sup>

3.6 Overall, beneficiaries, social workers and school and clinic staff found the PATH benefits very helpful for them. But beneficiaries explained that the grant was too small to fully compensate for the costs of sending children to school, especially secondary school. They felt that further assistance was needed to cover transportation costs and school lunches. The recent differentiation of PATH benefits effective under the new Social Protection Program (boys and secondary students get higher benefits) was meant to partly address these concerns.

**Table 3. Comparison of Benefit Levels of PATH with Other Programs**

	Benefit level			Effect on poverty			
	US\$	Transfer as a percent of consumption of all beneficiaries	Transfer as a percent of consumption of the poor	Transfer as a percent of household income	Percent reduction in the poverty headcount	Percent reduction in the poverty gap	Percent reduction in the severity of poverty
PATH	9.3	8.2	10.7	5.0	4.5	8.6	13.2
Prior to PATH:							
Food Stamps	2.0	1.1 <sup>a</sup>				3.0 <sup>c</sup>	
Outdoor Poor Relief		9.1 <sup>b</sup>	12.1 <sup>b</sup>			8 <sup>c</sup>	
Economic and Social Assistance		9.1 <sup>b</sup>	12.1 <sup>b</sup>			3.5 <sup>c</sup>	
3 programs combined	5.0						

Sources: Blank et al. 2000; Blank 2000; World Bank 2007 and 2009; Fiszbein and Schady 2009.

<sup>a</sup> Transfer as a percent of household expenditure.

<sup>b</sup> The Poor Relief and the Economic and Social Assistance programs together.

<sup>c</sup> Percent of equivalent individual adult poverty line.

<sup>23</sup> It is debated in the literature what should be commonly accepted standards of cash transfers in order to make an impact on poverty. Blank (2000) suggests that the amount needed is around 40 percent of the food basket. World Bank (2007) suggests a transfer equal to 25 percent of the poverty line. Comparing the headcount of poverty, the poverty gap and the squared poverty gap (severity of poverty) the PATH program performed better than the Bolsa Familia program in Brazil but worse than the programs in Ecuador and Mexico (Fiszbein and Schady 2009).

<sup>24</sup> Under the new Social Protection Project the Bank is considering helping the government to prepare an indexation formula for the benefit level so that it can be more quickly adjustable in response to price changes or shocks.

3.7 *PATH has linked benefits to human capital investments in health and education but increases in service utilization have been modest.*<sup>25</sup> The impact evaluation shows that, on average, PATH children (both primary and secondary students) have three percent higher school attendance (equivalent to 0.5 days more per month) than comparable non-PATH children (Table 4). Albeit statistically significant, this average effect is small in economic magnitude. The impact evaluation did not explore whether there was a difference in the impact by grade level or over time. Because enrollment rates, especially in primary school were already high in Jamaica, primary enrollment rates rose only by 2.9 percentage points (from 96.2 percent in 2000 to 99.2 percent in 2007) over the project period. At the secondary level, enrollment increases were higher especially for 15-16 year olds (14 percent increase from 74.5 to 84.9 percent) (Annex Table B1). These increases are comparable in size to those of similar CCT programs in other countries with high starting levels of school enrollment and attendance (Mexico, Brazil). Countries with low educational outcomes (such as Nicaragua, Cambodia) have generally seen higher effects. Also the observed changes in enrollment are not measured only for PATH children (or compared to non-PATH children) but rather for the nation as a whole. Other factors, such as the ongoing efforts to strengthen secondary school quality, could have led to the enrollment gain. School teachers surveyed for the PATH evaluation did not observe an increase in overall enrollment rates (Hope 2004).

3.8 In the health sector, impacts were stronger, on average, but evidence is not convincing enough to assert that health service utilization has increased among the poor. The impact evaluation shows that PATH has contributed to a 38 percent increase in health center visits for PATH children 0-6 years old compared to control individuals over a six-month period (0.73 visits for control individuals and 1.01 for PATH children) (Table 4). This is equivalent to 0.28 more visits per 6 months for the PATH children. The largest increase was for children under 12 months who (required to attend centers 6 times per year) where PATH children had 0.84 more visits than non-PATH children.<sup>26</sup> On the contrary, the impact evaluation shows no significant differences in the frequency of visits compared to the previous year (before beneficiaries were on the program) compared to non-participants. Both among PATH participants and non-participants, 69 percent report that they attend health clinics with about the same frequency as before. Also there were no noticeable increases in overall children's immunization rates (World Bank 2009; Mathematica 2007).<sup>27</sup> Moreover, there is no reliable information available to judge whether PATH has succeeded in increasing health care utilization for pregnant and lactating women but the program reported high compliance rates in this group. Because the impact evaluation only reflects a snap-shot in time it is not known to what extent school attendance and health care visits also increased compared to the control group over time.

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<sup>25</sup> Education compliance for school aged children and health compliance for 0-12 month olds was high (around 80-90 percent) while health compliance for 1-6 year olds was mediocre (67 percent).

<sup>26</sup> This difference was not statistically significant as sample sizes were small when splitting the sample in subgroups.

<sup>27</sup> Immunization rates were already relatively high in Jamaica prior to the program.

**Table 4. Impact of PATH on Use of Health and Education Services**

	Participant group	Comparison group	Absolute difference	Percent difference
School attendance in specific 20-day reference period (number of days) <sup>a</sup>	17.11	16.60	0.51**	3.1**
Number of health center visits for preventative reasons in past 6 months for children 0-6 years old	1.01	0.73	0.28**	38.0**
Number of health center visits for preventative reasons in past 6 months for elderly (60 years or older)	1.20	1.19	0.01	1.0
Immunization rate (0-5 year olds)				
Oral polio vaccine	95.78	94.49	1.29	1.4
Diphtheria, pertussis, and tetanus	98.46	97.87	0.59	0.6
Tuberculosis	98.23	98.43	-0.20	-0.2
Measles	87.34	86.04	1.30	1.5

Source: Mathematica 2007.

<sup>a</sup> Average across all school grades.

\*\*Statistically significant at the 5 percent level.

Methodological note: Based on a regression discontinuity impact evaluation design of a sample of 2,500 participant households and 2,500 comparison households. The outcomes for the comparison group have been adjusted for the regression result (including household characteristics) to more closely correspond to those in the participant group. Accounts for within family clustering.

3.9 Consequently, although not objectives of the project, the PATH program has not led to any impacts on school achievement or health status (Mathematica 2007; Hope 2004 and 2005; Government of Jamaica 2008). Comparing test scores and health status outcomes between PATH beneficiaries and control groups, no statistically significant differences were detected. This is consistent with findings from other CCT programs in Latin America and the Caribbean, which so far only have had limited impacts on human development outcomes (Robalino et al. 2009; Government of Jamaica 2008).

3.10 *The project has substantially helped improve the capacity of the MLSS to operate safety net programs.* While it is clear that the capacity in the Public Assistance Division of the MLSS was not sufficient at the start of the project, much improvement has been made. The project provided technical assistance, paid for expert consultants, technical training and software. The division has strengthened its procedures on enrolling and managing beneficiaries; collection of information from health centers and schools; the payment mechanism for delivering benefits; MIS and audit systems; and procurement and financial management. MLSS has also received funding from IDB for institutional strengthening (and direct transfers). Full attribution to the project is hence not feasible. However, staff in MLSS expressed great appreciation for Bank technical assistance.

3.11 *In sum, the project has helped the government of Jamaica transform its social safety net system.* The new system is better targeted than the previous programs (see objective 3); waste and overlap has been reduced; and benefits appear to have had a small effect on poverty rates. The program is well managed and operated and the project has strengthened the capacity of the systems and staff in place to implement the program. Nonetheless, there is no strong evidence that indicate that PATH has been able to significantly increase human capital investments for the poor. Also, the effectiveness of the program could be further

improved by increasing the benefit level, fine-tuning targeting and addressing remaining overlap with the Outdoor Poor Relief Program.

## **Objective 2. Providing a more Cost-Effective Social Assistance System.**

*Rating: Substantial*

3.12 *Overall costs have been contained and administrative costs have remained low.* In 2008, the government spent 0.2 percent of GDP on PATH which is consistent with spending on the income transfer programs prior to reform. This level of spending is close to the mode (0.2 percent) and just below the average (0.25 percent) for other CCT programs in Latin America and the Caribbean (Robalino et al. 2009). On a similar budget the Food Stamp Program covered more beneficiaries but provided a lower per capita benefit. Hence, at project closing, the financing had slightly shifted towards covering fewer people but at a higher level compared to before the project. With the expansion of the program coverage it is expected that overall spending will increase to 0.3-0.5 percent by 2010. At closing, administrative costs were 10 percent of total costs, below the target of 15 percent (Table 5 and Annex Table C2). On average, 90 percent of the budget went directly as cash transfers. PATH administrative costs were similar to those of the Food Stamp Program (9 percent) but much lower than in the stand alone Outdoor Poor Relief Program (69 percent) and the Economic and Social Assistance Program (44 percent) (Blank et al. 2000).<sup>28</sup>

**Table 5. Comparison of Costs of PATH with Other Programs**

	Total costs as a percent of GDP	Administrative costs as a percent of total costs
PATH <sup>a</sup>	0.19	10
Prior to PATH:		
Food Stamps	0.16	9
Outdoor Poor Relief <sup>b</sup>	0.05	69
Economic and Social Assistance	0.1	44
3 programs combined	0.27	About 20

Sources: Blank et al. 2000.

<sup>a</sup> Including the costs incurred to the MLSS of the Outdoor Poor Relief Program during the life of the SSNP. Excludes costs incurred to MLGCD for co-administering the Outdoor Poor Relief Program at the parish level.

<sup>b</sup> Includes costs for counseling services and may also include some of some costs of the Indoor Poor Relief Program.

3.13 *Delivering payments using Government of Jamaica checks via post offices has proven to be a relatively efficient method of reaching beneficiaries and an improvement in efficiency and security compared to food stamps.* Under the Food Stamp Program benefits were handed out by social workers at various locations without proper security for printing, transportation and distribution of the stamps. Because most recipients used stamps for non-food items printing the stamps was not an efficient use of funds. Payment receipt and collection rates are now monitored electronically and overdue uncollected checks can be cancelled automatically. The checks used by PATH are widely accepted and beneficiaries can use them directly at most local stores. Nevertheless, post offices, especially in urban areas, are

<sup>28</sup> The costs of the Outdoor Poor Relief Program are very high as they may also include costs for counseling beneficiaries (14 percent of costs) and some of the administrative costs of the Indoor Poor Relief Program. Administration costs of Indoor and Outdoor Poor Relief Programs are very difficult to differentiate.

spending valuable resources on handing out payments and managing beneficiaries. A cash card payment system has been developed and piloted. It has been found that the electronic cash cards are much more efficient than check payments but are not fully accessible for all PATH beneficiaries due to their rural location, especially for the elderly.

3.14 *Efficiency gains from the project on other social assistance programs in Jamaica have been limited beyond the development and implementation of the PATH program. Cost-effectiveness could have been higher if the targeting mechanism and consolidation of the reform initiatives with other social assistance programs had been more extensive. On balance, cost-effectiveness was enhanced as a result of the project.*

### **Objective 3. Reaching the Extreme Poor and Particularly Vulnerable Groups among the Poor. Rating: Substantial**

3.15 *More people than expected benefitted from the PATH and coverage compares to the coverage rates of other programs.*<sup>29</sup> At closing, PATH benefits reached 306,699<sup>30</sup> people of which 233,206 were children (Government of Jamaica 2009). This is well above the expected 217,000 people (57,000 adults and 160,000 children) and similar to the number of persons reached under the previous transfer programs (which PATH replaced). Towards the close of the project the government expanded the number of beneficiaries to 360,000 in response to the food and fuel crisis. However, the JSLC (2008) calculates that half of the poorest quintile island-wide does not receive PATH. IEG calculates that PATH covers 39 percent of the poor.<sup>31</sup> Fiszbein and Schady (2009) rank Jamaica as having the fourth best coverage rates of the poor out of 12 CCT programs worldwide. Although coverage rate of the poor was lower than anticipated, PATH compares well with the coverage of other programs (Table 6 and Annex Table C3).<sup>32</sup>

3.16 *PATH is better targeted than most existing social safety net programs in Jamaica<sup>33</sup> and compares well with targeting in other CCTs (Table 6 and Annex Table C3). Fifty-nine percent of beneficiaries fall below the poverty line, 58 percent fall in the bottom quintile, 33 percent in the bottom decile (World Bank 2007; Mathematica 2007). The impact evaluation*

<sup>29</sup> The project did not have an indicator for reaching the extreme poor but had two poverty targets: more than 70 percent of beneficiaries should be below the poverty line and more than 70 percent of the nation's poor should receive the benefits. Neither of these targets was met. The 70 percent coverage target was very ambitious since even with perfect targeting the expected number of participants would only account for less than half of all of the poor Jamaicans. However, compared with other programs PATH is well targeted and has relatively good coverage.

<sup>30</sup> Of which the Outdoor Poor Relief program reached 16,568 people. Excluding Outdoor Poor Relief PATH reached 290,131 people during the project.

<sup>31</sup> Based on 59 percent targeting, 290,000 total beneficiaries, a national poverty level of 17 percent, and 2.6 million population size.

<sup>32</sup> However, the impact evaluation, using data collected in the early years of the project, finds a actual coverage rate for PATH of only 20 percent accounting for those eligible participants who do not regularly comply and hence have their benefits revoked for any given time period. Similar data on actual coverage rates are not available for other programs.

<sup>33</sup> Food Stamp Program, School Fee Assistance Program, Outdoor Poor Relief Program, Social and Economic Support Program, and the Jamaica Drugs for the Elderly Program.

classified 27 percent of PATH beneficiaries as living in extreme poverty.<sup>34</sup> Eleven percent of beneficiaries have consumption levels of more than 50 percent below the poverty line but 17 percent have consumption levels of more than 150 percent above the poverty line (Mathematica 2007). In terms of allocating funds to the poor (benefit incidence) PATH compares well with other CCT programs. PATH delivered around 61 percent of total benefits to the poorest quintile. The average for six programs in Latin and Central America was 62 percent (Fiszbein and Schady 2009).

**Table 6. Comparison of Coverage and Targeting of PATH with Other Programs**

	Coverage: Percent of the poor receiving benefits	Targeting: Percent of beneficiaries in the poorest quintile
PATH <sup>a</sup>	47 <sup>b</sup>	58
Prior to PATH:		
Food Stamps	30 <sup>c</sup>	36
Outdoor Poor Relief	7 <sup>c</sup>	35
Economic and Social Assistance	12 <sup>c</sup>	60

Sources: Latest estimates available in Mathematica 2004 and 2007; World Bank 2007.

<sup>a</sup> Based on a question in the JSLC survey which asks the respondent if they received PATH.

<sup>b</sup> Percent of households in the poorest decile receiving benefits.

<sup>c</sup> Percent of households in the poorest quintile receiving benefits.

3.17 *PATH is well targeted to particularly vulnerable groups among the poor.* At closing 80 percent of beneficiaries were children and 19 percent were elderly (Government of Jamaica 2009). While qualitative assessments<sup>35</sup> show there is room for improvement of targeting and coverage, PATH covered significant proportions of large households, those without basic amenities and those who did not work over the last 12 months (Mathematica 2004).<sup>36</sup>

3.18 *In sum, although it did not reach its ambitious target on coverage of the poor, PATH still reaches the poor well* compared to earlier programs and compared to other CCT programs throughout the world. Moreover, except for the elderly, PATH is benefitting the vulnerable groups on which it focuses. Therefore, the objective of reaching the extreme poor and particular vulnerable poor groups is rated substantial.

<sup>34</sup> People whose adult-equivalent consumption is below Jamaica's official food poverty line. In 2002 the percent of extreme poor in Jamaica was about 8 percent.

<sup>35</sup> Qualitative assessment 1 and 2 (Mathematica 2004 and 2005), qualitative assessment in St. Catherine's parish (Government of Jamaica 2008).

<sup>36</sup> Forty-nine percent of PATH participants come from households of six or more people, 43 percent are from households where the head did not work over the previous 12 months, 80 percent have a pit toilet, and only 9 percent have indoor tap water (Mathematica 2004). Compared to all poor Jamaicans PATH households are on average larger and have fewer household amenities (JSLC 2002). Beneficiaries and social workers noted that the selection process was biased against those who possess household amenities (such as TV, refrigerator, flushing toilet) but who were still in dire need of assistance. It is also known that the PATH has had difficulty in enrolling the elderly and disabled who cannot register for benefits on their own initiative. In December 2009, the Bank approved a grant for more intense recruitment of elderly and disabled to PATH.

## 4. Social Safety Net Project - Ratings

### Outcome

4.1 This section discusses the overall SSNP outcome consisting of relevance, efficacy and efficiency. Table 7 summarizes the outcome ratings of the project. Based on the substantial rating of relevance, efficacy, and efficiency the overall project outcome is rated *satisfactory*.

**Table 7. Summary of Outcome Ratings SSNP**

Development Objective	Relevance		Efficacy	Efficiency	Outcome
	of objectives	of design			
Provide better and more cost-effective social assistance to the extreme poor	Substantial	Modest	Substantial	Substantial	Satisfactory
<b>Overall Rating<sup>a</sup></b>	Substantial		Substantial	Substantial	Satisfactory

<sup>a</sup> Please see the discussion in the text below for a justification of how the overall ratings were derived

### RELEVANCE

4.2 Relevance is rated *substantial*, on balance, based on consistency with government objectives and Bank strategy. Although a CCT approach was suitable to address some of the sources of chronic poverty and vulnerability there were shortcomings in design.

4.3 **Relevance of objectives.** The objectives of the SSNP, although poorly articulated, were consistent with the second pillar of the government's 1997 development agenda: "Protecting the poor and ensuring inclusion". The objectives also remained relevant throughout implementation as the top priority of the Medium-Term Economic and Social Policy Frameworks 2000-03 and 2004-07 was to facilitate human capital development among the poor through the use of CCTs with links to behavior change in health and education. Moreover, the project was targeted towards the groups of Jamaicans most vulnerable to shocks and those who constantly struggle with poverty. These social goals were relevant to both of the main political parties and supported by the larger NGO community.

4.4 The investment operation supporting selected parts of the larger reform was also consistent with the 2000 CAS objectives which emphasized a focused Bank approach in areas where the Bank had a comparative advantage (including safety nets). In the next CAS (2006-09) the Bank's focus shifted more strongly to accelerating inclusive economic growth, generating employment, and preventing crime while maintaining the priority of improving human development. The conditional aspect of the child grants was consistent with the Bank's social safety net strategy to support safety nets that encourage investments for the future. The project supported the start of the Jamaican safety net reform which was envisioned to roll out over several years. Therefore it was not intended to address such issues as labor market weaknesses and the need for labor-intensive growth. The Bank's follow-on Social Protection Project addresses these new priorities through labor market training for adult members of PATH households and an expanded secondary school benefits intended to

curb youth-at-risk behaviors. The project was also aligned with the broader IDB sector support program protecting social sector expenditures.

4.5 Based on the relevance to the country's social safety net reform agenda, the prevailing social and economic context and the setting within broader development support, the relevance of project objectives is rated *substantial*. The one shortcoming was the lack of attention to the strong links between poverty and unemployment and the weak articulation of the objectives.

4.6 **Relevance of design.** In order to meet the dual goals of protecting the poor and encouraging investment in human capital a CCT design was fitting. As discussed above, the project took a pragmatic approach and did not try to be comprehensive in developing safety nets to address all sources of vulnerability.

4.7 The overall design of the project, to help develop a targeting formula and the Beneficiary Identification System to be used throughout social safety net programs and to finance the start and implementation of the PATH while strengthening government's own capacity to manage the program, was highly consistent with the project objectives. Merging of the three income transfer programs and the development of a transparent and universal targeting mechanism was based on supporting studies and evidence from other countries. Initially, benefit levels under PATH were relatively low, especially for urban areas. However, enough flexibility was built into the project to adjust the eligibility cut-off criterion and differentiate the level of benefits at higher school grades when it was found necessary. The comprehensiveness of the coverage of both younger and older children as well as pregnant and lactating mothers and elderly and disabled was adequate for protecting the various groups at risk (other CCTs have mainly focused on school aged children only). Applying conditionality also to children below school age and to pregnant and lactating mothers aimed at improving important child malnutrition and mortality outcomes which were of high priority to the government.

4.8 The results framework of the project was adequate for monitoring some of the objectives of the project but not all. It was not clear from the results framework how providing a "better" social assistance system would be assessed. On the other hand, results indicators mainly focused on health and education outcomes that were not explicitly part of the development objective. While there was no indicator linked to poverty rates the targeting assessment addressed the effect on poverty levels. The envisioned causal chain between project funding and intended outcomes was straightforward.

4.9 Overall project design was appropriate given the government's general capacity and willingness to undertake a social safety net reform. But the Public Assistance Division in the MLSS was not initially set up to handle a program of this character. For instance, adequate financial and information management systems were lacking. The choice to frontload the capacity building and strengthening components of the project was wise but weak implementation arrangements caused significant delays in implementation. The Bank's requirement of a strict external audit proved to be expensive for the government which had to borrow additional funds. The project should have better accounted for supply constraints in the health sector for meeting the increased demand on clinics and health centers.

4.10 The overall choice of design (a CCT program) was fitting for meeting the objectives, albeit a narrow approach for addressing other sources of vulnerability. But there were weaknesses in the results framework, and some of the institutional realities and constraints were not well thought through in the design stage. Relevance of design is therefore rated *modest*.

#### **EFFICACY**

4.11 Efficacy is rated *substantial* due to the substantial achievement of all of the three parts of the development objective (see section 3). Annex Table B1 lists the achievement of the outcome and output indicators of the project and the progress on institutional reform and strengthening. Although only two of the eight outcome indicators were fully achieved, most of the outputs were produced.

#### **EFFICIENCY**

4.12 Cost-effectiveness is discussed at length in section 3. The core project activities were carried out with relatively high efficiency. Although the targeting formula has not been extensively applied to other safety net programs (other than the PATH) as intended, it has helped to improve PATH's benefit incidence and targeting of the benefits to the poor (similar to that of other programs). Moreover, delivering payments using government checks via post offices has proven to be a more efficient method of reaching beneficiaries compared to before the program. As a result, the reduction in leakage and better process efficiency in delivering benefits has kept PATH program costs on target.

4.13 Administrative costs have also remained low at 10 percent (target 15 percent), in line with the Food Stamp Program (9 percent), and much lower than costs in the other two previous transfer programs. Over the project period, the increase in the share of project costs that went directly to grants (92 percent in 2009) suggests that overheads were reduced as the project matured. Rate of return analysis was used in making design decisions on whether to cap the educational grant to three children per family. It was shown that the return was almost twice as high with no cap on the number of children per family.

4.14 Based on the increased efficiency in terms of beneficiary targeting, program implementation and overall administration of social safety nets, as well as the containment of costs, efficiency is rated as *substantial*. Compared to the social assistance system in Jamaica prior to the project, efficiency was increased. However, efficiency could have been higher if the targeting and consolidation aims of the projects had also been applied to other non-core social safety net activities as intended before the introduction of free universal schooling and health care. Moreover, the hold up in Bank disbursement in the early years of the projects, caused by the Bank's external audit requirement and which resulted in the government having to seek funds elsewhere to maintain the program, induced some unnecessary costs for the government.

#### **Risk to Development Outcome**

4.15 The risk to development outcome of the SSNP is rated *moderate*. Political support for the program is strong and implementation of the PATH continues to be refined. However,

financial resources for sustaining outcomes are uncertain and the economic downturn has started to erode benefit levels.

4.16 Even after the shift in government in 2007 political support for the social safety net reform and for the PATH program continued to be strong. Building on the reforms achieved under the SSNP the Bank has followed up with a second investment loan which continues to support the PATH and address pensions and employment generation.<sup>37</sup>

4.17 However, there are several risks to the outcomes produced by the SSNP. The key risk is the increasingly difficult economic and fiscal environment that threatens both the fiscal sustainability of the program but also the real values of benefits for the poor and the capacity of families to continue to invest in human capital.

4.18 Recently, close to 20,000 jobs were lost in Jamaica due to changing trade conditions and the effects of the global crisis. Remittance incomes have dropped and earnings from the tourism industry, bauxite mining, and the agriculture sector are diminishing. Further labor market declines are expected. More and more Jamaicans are falling into poverty but financial resources are not available to increase the coverage of social assistance. The PATH program has thus far been effective in responding to local crises. To compensate those affected by natural disasters the program has been able to temporarily increase benefit levels and void conditionality requirements. Also, in response to the food price increases in 2008 government expanded PATH coverage to 360,000 people. But CCT programs that are means tested based on household characteristics and amenities are not well equipped for responding to the temporary needs of new groups of non-traditionally poor who may not be eligible based on their household data but who suddenly lose their source of income as a result of a shock. Other types of social safety net programs, such as public works, may be more appropriate for addressing these sources of vulnerability at the same time as giving the government the ability to scale back benefits in times of less need.

4.19 Government discussions have been initiated on the creation of a tiered system of social assistance with a universal tier the elderly, disabled or destitute poor who cannot participate in the economy, a second tier for private employment insurance, another one for government employees, and the PATH for protecting poor children. Within the conditional part of the PATH program work is being undertaken for the possibility of removing the conditionality on the child grants for the poorest during this time of economic hardship.

4.20 In order to sufficiently protect the poor and stimulate self-reliant economic opportunities the social assistance system in Jamaica needs to develop mechanisms for protecting incomes and jobs and alignment with long-term economic growth strategies. The “second generation reforms” and the links to labor markets under the Social Protection Project is an important move towards achieving these objectives. But the PATH is only a component of the overall social assistance system in Jamaica and it remains challenging to

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<sup>37</sup> The new Social Protection Project aims at implementing “second generation reforms” including fine-tuning the targeting system and benefit levels (especially for secondary school children); linking adult members of PATH households with labor market initiatives; and addressing some youth-at-risk issues.

address the needs for the non-chronic poor not captured by the PATH. For example, the National Insurance Scheme does not adequately cover workers in the large informal sector.<sup>38</sup>

4.21 Moreover, the program has not been able to increase benefits sufficiently enough to compensate for the economic downturn. As poor people lose income earnings the real benefit levels have been eroded. For some of the extreme poor who depend on the additional support from the PATH the economic crisis has made it difficult to continue to comply with the education and health requirements. As a result, benefits may be pulled from those who need it the most. Moreover, with the move to increased universality, part of the PATH package (school and health fee waivers) is no longer only targeted to the poor. Hence, the impact of the scoring formula and the BIS supported by the Bank has been reduced.

4.22 With the continuing high debt and severe difficulties in tax collection it is not certain whether the government can keep funding the program without the assistance of the World Bank or other donors. In February 2010 Jamaica signed a stand-by arrangement with the IMF, and the World Bank and IDB have agreed to provide budget support. Social expenditures are not formally protected under these arrangements but it is the hope that they will not be reduced. Without specific support for the social assistance sector from a major donor, it may be difficult for the government to maintain PATH coverage and benefits at current levels.

## **Bank Performance**

4.23 On the whole, Bank performance is rated *moderately satisfactory*. Quality at entry was less than ideal but many of the weaknesses were improved during supervision.

### **QUALITY AT ENTRY**

4.24 The Quality at Entry of the project was *moderately unsatisfactory*. The Bank had the technical capacity and expertise to prepare the project but important preparation and implementation arrangements were lacking which caused subsequent delays.

4.25 The entry point for Bank lending to social safety net reform in Jamaica was based on numerous studies funded by the Policy and Human Resources Development Fund grants and by the IDB. The existing inefficiencies were well known and the Bank was familiar also with the JSLC systems and data availability for monitoring program implementation. With the Bank's advice and guidance, the government was encouraged to take action on its strategy for social safety net reform.

4.26 However, during IEG's mission Jamaican authorities and other development partners expressed some frustration with the Bank for taking too much of a cookie cutter/prescriptive approach to developing social safety nets. A CCT addresses many of the needs but more attention could have been paid, already at the design stage, to the links between unemployment and poverty as well as to how to develop a safety net system that can be scaled up in times of crisis and scaled down when needs are less.

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<sup>38</sup> Consistent with the new emerging development priorities the Bank is preparing two projects on employment creation and skills building and economic growth.

4.27 The Bank had significant experience with financing CCTs in many countries, particularly in Eastern Europe and Latin America. In Jamaica the Bank is praised for its technical knowledge and innovation. The Bank's inputs for policy formulation were effective and broad stakeholder consultation and non-partisan participation was undertaken to gather support for the reform agenda and PATH program development. The Bank also drew on senior experts on project design and development of the operational manual. The Bank took a pragmatic approach to intervention and favored carrying out first generation reforms with room for second generation improvements at a later stage. This strategy was consistent with government priorities. During preparation the Bank and the IDB worked together effectively. The Bank's inputs were well integrated into the coordinated donor package in the social sector. For instance, preparation missions were joint between the Bank and IDB.

4.28 But at the time of appraisal, the state of readiness of the project was not ideal. This was the first time a CCT program was implemented directly by a ministry. The results framework was not fully developed and the implementation arrangements in the MLSS were far from set. Entrusting the MLSS with the overall project management and opting not to use a project implementation unit was the right decision in the long run. But the Bank should have assured that the necessary systems and staffing were in place in the MLSS before rolling out the program. Although the Bank undertook the necessary procurement and financial management assessments, many items were not satisfied at effectiveness. There was no procurement plan and the lack of knowledge of MIS and financial management in the ministry caused hold-ups in implementation and contributed directly to the two project extensions.

4.29 Despite the Bank's experience with CCT programs in other countries, the Bank was not familiar with operational requirements for cash transfers. The capacity of the health system to absorb the increase in required health visits was overestimated (although the recommended number of visits per year per child was set by the Ministry of Health itself). Also, the strict external audit requirement, which came about just before approval, was a poor design choice from the Bank's side. Bank disbursements were on hold for the two first years of implementation until the MLSS had prepared terms of reference, hired a firm, and carried out the first audits. In the mean time, the government had to borrow funds in the market to finance the grants. The disbursement delays slowed implementation and reduced efficiency. In setting conditionality for investment loans the Bank needs to provide the required systems and capacity up front so as not to negatively affect implementation.

#### QUALITY OF SUPERVISION

4.30 Bank supervision was *satisfactory*. The Bank significantly helped strengthen the capacity and systems in the MLSS to carry out the PATH program. Most of the gaps in design and implementation readiness were addressed during supervision.

4.31 Some of the design weaknesses were cleared up during the first years of implementation but some initial delays continued to hamper the project throughout. Indicators and targets to measure achievement of the development objective were fine-tuned after project effectiveness. Moreover, the Bank extensively helped strengthen the administrative systems within the MLSS to carry out the program. Especially the procurement, financial management and internal audit functions have been improved based on Bank support.

4.32 After it was shown that the external audit requirements imposed by the Bank did not add value to the country's own audit processes the Bank helped build up the internal control mechanisms. For example, the Bank asked the internal audit staff to deepen its field based controls with more household visits and focus groups with beneficiaries. Also, the appeal process was strengthened so as to ensure transparency of targeting and eligibility selection and to ensure that the transfers reached those intended. The Bank also helped provide software for systematizing the audit plan and reporting. Staff in the MLSS was pleased with the responsiveness and technical expertise of Bank supervision on procurement, auditing, and financial management.

4.33 Throughout the project the dialogue between the Bank, the PIOJ and the MLSS was continuous. Supervision missions were frequent and the balance was adequate between strengthening internal processes; furthering the reform agenda; and delivering payments to beneficiaries. However, the Bank could have acted sooner and amended the loan agreement earlier to prevent the disbursement delays that resulted from the external audit requirement.

4.34 The Bank was also instrumental in ensuring rigorous monitoring and evaluation implementation. The impact evaluation was contracted and undertaken early in the project cycle and the findings helped focus project management towards development results. Finally, the constant focus on the part of the Bank on maintaining meaningful benefit levels was successful in guaranteeing that benefits were not eroded and that the government kept to its commitment to provide adequate support to the poor and vulnerable even during times of extreme fiscal crunch.

4.35 Overall, without the assistance of the Bank, which funded 45 percent of the child assistance grants, the PATH could not have provided the level of benefits to the wide number of people that it did and continues to do. During the project Jamaica tapped the Bank for both financial as well as technical assistance. The Government of Jamaica views the Bank's technical and innovative leadership as its main contribution and something that other development partners cannot bring to the table in the area of social safety nets. But as capacity of the government has been continuously strengthened while the fiscal stance remains fragile, the government may draw relatively more on the financial assistance of the Bank in the future.

## **Borrower Performance**

4.36 Borrower performance is rated *satisfactory*. Both government and implementing agency performed satisfactorily.

## **PERFORMANCE OF THE GOVERNMENT**

4.37 Overall, government performance is rated *satisfactory*. Policy decisions for reform and the financial commitment to social safety net reform and to the project have been unwavering.

4.38 From initial inception through implementation the government was strongly committed to social safety net reform and the development of the PATH program. With the PIOJ in the lead and broad representation via the inter-ministerial steering committee the Policy Matrix was developed. There was buy-in from both sides of the political spectrum and

from NGOs and other relevant groups. The government adopted a comprehensive approach to CCTs<sup>39</sup> and depoliticized social assistance.

4.39 Given the political neutrality of the PIOJ and the continuity of staffing in the government there was scope for taking a long term strategic approach to social assistance reform in Jamaica and for implementing it in a staggered fashion. The government's agenda included merging the income transfer programs, improving targeting of all social safety nets, developing a cash grant system, and strengthening early childhood development outcomes, including for example via school feeding programs. With the staggered approach the SSNP succeeded in the full merger of two of the three transfer programs (see paragraph 3.1 for more detail).

4.40 The financial commitment to the program also remained strong throughout implementation. The government fully funded the pilot, and ensured that beneficiaries could receive their grants when the disbursements from the Bank were on hold. Moreover, the government maintained its commitment to increasing benefit levels over time. Even during severe financial hardship in 2005/06 the government provided additional funds for raising benefits from JM\$400 to JM\$530 to keep up with inflation. It should be noted that IDB's policy loan likely contributed to the government's unwavering financial support to PATH.

4.41 Toward the end of the project the government made a decision to expand the coverage to 360,000 beneficiaries; part of the process of scaling up the program's success. However, with the new political party in place there has been a slight change to the aim of increased targeting. Although the BIS was intended to be applied by other safety net programs, the move towards universally free access to health care and education has caused some of the rationalization envisioned with the BIS to be washed out and targeting weakened. It will be important for authorities to maintain focus on the long term vision of the reform and consider potential trade-offs in targeting and efficiency gains when altering the larger social safety net agenda. The government has not yet repealed the 1886 Poor Relief Act, nor has it approved the National Assistance Act. Therefore, some administrative duplication still remains as the Outdoor Poor Relief program is still not fully merged into PATH.

#### **PERFORMANCE OF THE IMPLEMENTING AGENCY**

4.42 Implementing agency performance was *satisfactory*. Although not set up to manage and implement the program at the start, the MLSS has constantly been strengthened and is now equipped to do so.

4.43 The Public Assistance Division in the MLSS was the implementing agency of the project. This was the first time a CCT program was implemented through a ministry directly. The systems in place in the MLSS for carrying out the PATH program were not adequate at the time of effectiveness. For instance, no computerized financial management system was in place, the MIS was basic, and parish office capacity was especially poor. Instead of hiring new technically qualified staff to run the program the ministry opted for using already established staff. This approach led to several initial delays.

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<sup>39</sup> The PATH program covered children, pregnant and lactating mothers and the elderly, disabled and destitute. Other CCT programs in Latin America have focused only on children.

4.44 On the other hand, the long term vision and constant operational strengthening has provided consistency and ownership of the program objectives and processes within the MLSS. For instance in procurement, when the current procurement manager came into place, compliance with government and Bank, procedures improved. Except for the severe delay with the procurement for the MIS, procurement procedures were satisfactory for the remainder of the project. With the help of the PIOJ and the Bank the MLSS developed strong relationships with the Ministries of Health and Education for applying and monitoring the conditionalities.

4.45 Over time the implementing agency was significantly strengthened. At closing, staff and systems were in place to operate a program of PATH's magnitude. In general, capacity is still fragile in Jamaica however.

## **5. National Community Development Project - Description**

5.1 At the request of the government and in response to the strong negative developments in 2001, the Bank approved the US\$29.7 million National Community Development Project (NCDP). The US\$15 million loan complemented the Bank's US\$75 million Emergency Economic Rehabilitation Loan (EERL). The NCDP was approved on May 30, 2002 and became effective April 8, 2003. After one extension the NCDP closed on June 30, 2008.

### **Objectives and Design**

#### **OBJECTIVES**

5.2 The development objective of the NCDP was to "*a) provide basic services and temporary employment opportunities to low-income communities in Jamaica; and b) promote greater social and community development in Jamaica, especially among the poor*" (World Bank 2002c).<sup>40</sup> In this sense, the project had a basic services/employment generation objective as well as a social development objective.

#### **DESIGN**

5.3 Table 8 describes the project components and lists the key indicators mapped to each of the components.<sup>41</sup> The NCDP was designed as a follow-on to previous Bank support to JSIF. Overall design was not altered during implementation but in response to the devastation

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<sup>40</sup> The PAD phrases the development objective as "a) help communities in the most affected areas by providing basic services and temporary employment opportunities, and b) assist the Government of Jamaica in its current effort to promote greater social and community development, especially for the poor." The "most affected areas" were areas of the country most affected by the effects of violence and lingering post 9/11 impact on tourism flows. For evaluation purposes, the wording of the objective in the PAD and in the loan agreement are consistent.

<sup>41</sup> Annex Table B2 lays out the full set of outcome and output indicators of achievement as well as the institutional reforms and strengthening to be undertaken during the project (including targets and baselines when available).

caused by Hurricane Ivan in 2004, a reprioritization of funds occurred to finance the rebuilding of 100 damaged schools.

5.4 To address the weaknesses of JSIF's operations (listed in the first chapter) and to improve on outcomes generated by the previous Bank project the NCDP sought to take a stronger social focus and improve on maintenance and operations of completed assets.<sup>42</sup> On paper, JSIF maintained its temporary "project-like" status as an implementer of donor projects in areas where line ministries were not able to deliver. But with the planned institutional changes JSIF started to shift from a pure emergency response system to a more permanent mechanism for providing social infrastructure based on multi-year predictable investments. The NCDP delineated the following components, indicators and objectives as shown in Table 8.

5.5 *Types of subprojects:* The project was to finance three types of subprojects: a) basic infrastructure; b) social facilities; and c) social services. Basic infrastructure included water and sanitation distribution, storage and connections; street, road, path, walkway and bridge bottlenecks; and minor drainage systems. Social facilities included a range of structures that are used to provide services in the communities such as health clinics, day-care centers, community centers, homes for children, elderly and disabled, training facilities, public sanitary facilities, and parks and recreation amenities. The types of works carried out were generally repairs, renovation, expansion, or installation of small and basic infrastructure works necessary for improving service quality. Social service subprojects concerned initiatives for job placement and guidance, conflict resolution and drug-abuse counseling, parenting and family education, skills training and assistance for disabled groups.

5.6 *Depoliticized and targeted to poor communities:* The NCDP aimed at improving the targeting and project selection cycle from the earlier JSIF procedures and providing more flexibility and transparency to the system. Previously, JSIF had favored relatively high cost projects and communities that could financially contribute the stipulated five percent of costs. NCDP used a weighting system whereby smaller subprojects would receive higher weights and rankings. Also, more weight would be placed on projects with low-skilled labor needs and projects favoring strong community participation. Eligible communities were located in quartile 4 areas (the lowest income quartile) of the national poverty map or were communities in other quartile areas but with Poverty Index scores below a certain cut-off. JSIF and SDC jointly developed the Poverty Index based on socio-economic characteristics of the community. Accounting for community needs by using a poverty map and a weighting system was intended to remove some of the political sensitivities that are deep rooted in Jamaica.

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<sup>42</sup> The EU also provided funding for institutional analysis and assessment of JSIF operations as well as the performance and suitability of the MIS. The lessons from these studies fed into project design.

**Table 8. NCDP log-frame: Components, Indicators and Objectives**

Component	Component description	Outputs and institutional strengthening	Outcome indicators	Development objectives
1a. JSIF subprojects	Provide basic services while helping to create temporary employment opportunities for the poor. JSIF will contract projects in the pipeline which are too large for direct community contracting	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• sub-projects are completed and appropriately utilized;</li> <li>• improved quality of design and preparation of subprojects;</li> <li>• increase in community contribution in subprojects</li> </ul>	<u>Basic services/employment generation outcomes:</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• increase access to and quality of basic services;</li> <li>• increased number of incremental temporary jobs created;</li> <li>• improved operation and maintenance of project facilities</li> </ul>	a) provide basic services and temporary employment opportunities to low-income communities in Jamaica; and  b) promote greater social and community development in Jamaica, especially among the poor
1b. Community subprojects	Finance demand-driven and community-implemented socio-economic infrastructure and works such as basic services		<u>Social development outcomes:</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• increase in the number of projects financed by JSIF after being identified in Community Development Plans (CPDs);</li> <li>• increase the number of communities which develop the capacity to select their own priority projects and manage project contracting and implementation effectiveness to ensure work quality, reasonable cost, and timeliness;</li> <li>• evidence of increased complementary investment generated through JSIF and SDC assistance to community groups;</li> <li>• number of subprojects with active community maintenance plans and clear indication of agreed support from line ministries and/or local authorities; and</li> <li>• level of community satisfaction with subproject and performance of sponsoring entities</li> </ul>	
2. Technical assistance and institutional strengthening	Technical assistance, training and strengthening of JSIF programs and other partners involved in subprojects, especially for strengthening the implementation of community-based contracting (CBC)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• projects are small-scale and targeted to especially poor and underserved groups;</li> <li>• implement JSIF's new operations guidelines;</li> <li>• reduced time to prepare and implement projects;</li> <li>• scale-up the use of CBC</li> </ul>		
3. Administration	Funding for goods needed to select, prepare and undertake subprojects			

Source: Project documents.

**5.7 Labor-intensive works:** Although there was no direct mandate for NCDP subprojects to generate employment, using labor intensive methods and hiring local workers was encouraged by JSIF and viewed as necessary for community ownership and sustained facility use and care. NCDP therefore had as one of its objectives to create temporary employment opportunities and earnings in an effort to help bring incomes to the communities and expose the local population to construction work.

**5.8 Demand driven:** The NCDP sought to empower communities to identify and prioritize needs and investments; build skills to manage investment resources; and strengthen the collective community for dialogue and consensus building. Communities were asked to

contribute at least 5 percent of subproject costs. JSIF would work with local communities through SDC, Community Based Organizations (CBOs), and social workers. Community Based Contracting (CBC) was a new procurement option for increasing community participation in project implementation, and maintenance and operation, and to boost the sustainability of development outcomes.

5.9 *Strengthening of operation and maintenance:* JSIF operated with a mandate to transfer the assets produced to line ministries upon completion. The ministries were responsible for maintenance of the assets and for monitoring their use, although communities were also provided training on maintenance and operations. The evaluation of previous JSIF projects showed that operations and maintenance of completed assets was weak. The NCDP sought to train communities in operations and maintenance, with the help of SDC, and build community interest and capacity in maintaining the infrastructure once completed.

## **IMPLEMENTATION ARRANGEMENTS**

5.10 The Bank team was tasked to create a fast-track approach without forming any new implementing agency. JSIF was chosen as the vehicle for implementing the project based on their strong track record. Funds were channeled to JSIF via the Ministry of Finance. Communities, in turn, applied to JSIF for funding of subprojects. To prevent future build up of a backlog of subproject applications and to reduce the dependency and permanence of JSIF, the government was to streamline the roles and responsibilities of JSIF and all other actors (such as ministries, and parish and local authorities).

5.11 *Risks and fiscal constraints:* The main project risks at effectiveness were: the lack of formal arrangements with contractors for using labor-intensive methods; the lack of agreement on the roles and responsibilities of SDC in generating, implementing, and maintaining subprojects; and concerns over the necessary cooperation between JSIF and line ministries. Moreover, despite strong government commitment to JSIF and to protection and promotion of poor communities, macro-fiscal constraints left no room for cost overruns.

## **Implementation**

5.12 Project implementation began in 2003 and continued for just over five years. In parallel to starting the subcontract process for traditional JSIF funded projects, updates were made to the operations manual. The new criteria for project selection were applied to the JSIF backlog of projects using the newly developed weights and the existing PIOJ poverty map. School updating and expansion were the most commonly requested type of subprojects.

5.13 *Hurricane Ivan response:* When Hurricane Ivan devastated areas of the island in the fall of 2004 implementation suffered delays. Although the project was not restructured, efforts were made in NCDP to rebuild 100 schools in affected areas as identified by the Ministry of Education. Other subprojects in the pipeline were put on hold and had to wait for approval. The appraisal process was slow and the pipeline of projects remained long. To ease implementation in the damaged communities, counterpart contributions were waived and approval, procurement, and contracting mechanisms were expedited. At completion, 95 subprojects (34 percent of the total) were Hurricane Ivan school rehabilitation projects, which tended to be of smaller scale and lower costs than other subprojects.

5.14 *Community-based contracting delays and difficulties:* CBC subprojects took some time to get started due to lengthy discussions with SDC. Eventually JSIF and SDC reached an agreement, the CBC pilot took place (funded by the European Union), and communities were provided training on the CBC processes involved. In total, 58 CBC proposals for funding were delivered through SDC but most were rejected based on poor quality and lack of adherence to the agreed criteria on sustainability and poverty focus. Also, many SDC projects were disqualified since they did not secure appropriate land acquisition. The arrangement between JSIF and SDC remained difficult throughout the project as the objectives of the two organizations were not fully consistent.

5.15 *Procurement delays:* In 2007, a nation-wide cement shortage and preparations for the Cricket World Cup slowed construction. In reviewing the procurement procedures it was also noticed that the same contactor kept winning contracts time and time again. The auditor general was involved in investigating the case but as sanctions against civil servants in Jamaica is a complicated and long process legal actions were never taken.

### **COSTS, DISBURSEMENT AND FIDUCIARY MANAGEMENT**

5.16 Total project costs were appraised at US\$29.65 million in the PAD (Table 9). Actual technical assistance and administration costs were much lower than estimated due to cost-sharing between to a larger number of JSIF funders. Hence, around US\$6million of NCDP funds were available for subprojects. In response to Hurricane Ivan, the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) provided US\$5 million in co-financing to compensate for the loss of counterpart funding. At closing, community contributions averaged 12 percent<sup>43</sup> totaling US\$2.95 million, three times higher than expected.

5.17 *CBC sub-contracting:* In order for community organizations to handle contracting they needed to be registered as legal entities (Benevolent Societies). Once registered, JSIF signed a finance agreement with the community. CBC contracts had to be less than US\$100,000.

**Table 9. Expenditure by Component, Planned and Actual (million US\$)**

<b>Component</b>	<b>Planned<sup>a</sup> (Bank contribution)</b>	<b>Actual<sup>b</sup> (Bank contribution)</b>	<b>Actual as a percent of planned</b>
Subprojects	18.30 (12.38)	24.58	134
Technical assistance and institutional strengthening	3.04 (2.17)	0.45	15
Administration	8.61 (0.30)	4.79	56
Front-end fee	0.15 (0.15)	0.00	0
Total project costs	29.65 (15.00)	29.82 (15.00)	101

<sup>a</sup> As of the PAD, September, 2002.

<sup>b</sup> As of the ICR, November, 2008. Data on Bank contribution per component are not available.

5.18 *Safeguards:* The project triggered the environmental safeguard and was classified as category B. Environmental guidelines were followed during the project. JSIF developed an

<sup>43</sup> If Ivan schools, for which the community contribution requirement was waived, are excluded, the average community contribution increases to 14 percent.

Environmental Management Framework to comply with Government of Jamaica laws. In 2004, JSIF was certified through ISO14001—the highest international environmental standard.

## **Monitoring & Evaluation**

5.19 Rigorous monitoring and evaluation procedures were not used in the project. One summative evaluation was undertaken assessing project outputs and some outcomes. Therefore, M&E quality is rated *modest*.

### **M&E DESIGN**

5.20 At the start of the project JSIF did not have an internal monitoring and evaluation unit. Building on the results of the end-of-project assessment from the earlier phase, indicators on the achievement of the two project objectives were established. But most of the project indicators were output oriented and did not measure whether the infrastructure was used for its intended purposes (for example if school expansions led to increased enrollment) or led to development outcomes.<sup>44</sup> Furthermore, few baselines and targets were established. The JSIF MIS would be used to monitor progress on the basic services objective, but the MIS was not designed to collect and report on performance indicators linked to project objectives. For instance, there was no baseline or target available for creating temporary employment even though it was an explicit objective of the project. Periodic evaluation surveys would monitor progress on the NCDP social objective (World Bank 2002b). A summative evaluation including a) a process evaluation; b) an impact evaluation<sup>45</sup>; c) a qualitative beneficiary assessment; and d) an assessment of infrastructure engineering quality, was to assess achievement of both of the objectives. The design of the project monitoring and evaluation was *modest*.

### **M&E IMPLEMENTATION**

5.21 The JSIF MIS served as the subproject record book and its reports were standardized across all JSIF projects. But Bank supervision missions noted that the MIS provided unreliable reports. In 2006 the MIS system was replaced with a more modern system—the Fund Manager. To compensate for the weaknesses of the MIS, JSIF project managers collected data manually, based on subproject documentation, and kept track of cost and completion data in an Excel spreadsheet. Data on the number of employment opportunities or man-hours created by the project was not systematically collected or monitored.

5.22 The impact evaluation assessed NCDP subprojects in 20 communities using stratified random sampling. Because of the severe delays in contracting the impact evaluation, there was no time to establish a baseline in the selected communities. Eight neighboring communities that had benefited from other projects served as a control group. The choice of comparison communities did not control for self selection of particularly eager and able communities into the project and, therefore, the impact evaluation cannot be considered particularly rigorous.

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<sup>44</sup> Although the summative evaluation addressed these issues.

<sup>45</sup> To be conducted during implementation (baseline study) and nine months after completion of works (follow-up).

5.23 Moreover, the summative evaluation did not address all of the social development indicators. The process evaluation and the engineering evaluation components both suffered from very small sample sizes.<sup>46</sup> Much of the performance monitoring was carried out by the Bank by systematically undertaking site visits and documenting subproject outputs, use and community organization. During the January 2006 mission, 48 site visits were undertaken. Overall the Bank team visited 40 percent of all sites. JSIF did not conduct follow-up assessments of subprojects after completion as required in the operations manual and in the PAD. Implementation of monitoring and evaluation was *modest*.

#### **M&E UTILIZATION**

5.24 Because of the poor MIS reports and late availability of any evaluation data, the results of the evaluation were not utilized for making changes or improvements to the NCDP. However, the report now exists electronically and higher level JSIF staff is familiar with its findings. Nevertheless, the MIS reports tracked the outputs necessary for taking action in instances where implementation lagged behind schedule. Utilization of monitoring and evaluation was *modest*.<sup>47</sup>

## **6. National Community Development Project - Achievement of objectives.**

6.1 Assessing whether the project has achieved its two development objectives amounts to assessing whether the project was well targeted, to what extent it increased access and quality of basic services, whether it helped generate employment and to what extent it promoted social and community development among the poor<sup>48</sup>. Statistics in this section are mainly drawn from JSIF data and from the summative evaluation. Information gathered from the infrastructure assessment and IEG site visits is also used. Annex Table B2 lists the achievement of project outcomes, outputs and institutional strengthening indicators.

### **Objective 1. Providing basic services and temporary employment opportunities to low-income communities in Jamaica. Rating: Substantial**

6.2 *The NCDP project was generally well targeted to low-income areas and communities affected by Hurricane Ivan. At completion, 276 subprojects were completed of which 59 percent were in quartile 4 areas (Table 10), well above the general guidelines of 40 percent*

<sup>46</sup> Only four subprojects were studied in the process evaluation components and seven subprojects were visited for quality of infrastructure engineering assessments.

<sup>47</sup> However, lessons learned from the evaluation have helped the design of the current Bank supported Inner Cities Basic Services Project (ICBSP) and the Rural Economic Development Infrastructure project (REDI). For instance, the continuous challenges with maintenance and the experience with CBC have led to a more broad, active and sustained JSIF involvement in selected communities. At the time of the IEG mission visit, 15 months after project closing, JSIF was providing NCDP communities with maintenance training and disaster management training as a component under the Bank's Hurricane Dean Emergency Recovery and Disaster Management Loan.

<sup>48</sup> The project aimed at increasing community ownership and participation in development projects and to build the interest and capacity in communities for maintaining the infrastructure creating.

and better than the earlier project ( 37 percent). This is despite the fact that 34 percent of subprojects were Hurricane Ivan reconstruction projects which to a large extent also included non-poor areas. All in all, IEG estimates that the project reached 144,000<sup>49</sup> residents in poor communities (no baseline or target available).

**Table 10. Completed Subprojects by Quartile Area on the Poverty Map**

Income quartile in the poverty map	Total completed subprojects		Completed subprojects in Ivan areas		Completed subprojects in non-Ivan areas	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
4 (poorest)	162	59	33	35	129	71
3	69	25	34	36	35	19
2	33	12	24	25	9	5
1 (least poor)	10	3	4	4	6	3
Unclassified	2	1	0	0	2	1
<b>Total</b>	<b>276</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>95</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>181</b>	<b>100</b>

Source: IEG analysis of JSIF data.

6.3 *The assets produced were constructed to good quality and were being used for their intended purposes.* At closing, 276<sup>50</sup> subprojects were financed, with an average cost of US\$86,000.<sup>51</sup> Annex Table C4 lists the type of infrastructure created. The infrastructure evaluation showed that all seven projects inspected had high construction quality compared to six assets in neighboring control communities but showed no difference in quality of construction between contracting type (CBC or traditional).<sup>52</sup> NCDP projects compared favorably in construction quality to controls projects. Of the 48 sites visited during the January 2006 Bank mission, 97 percent were being used as intended.<sup>53</sup>

6.4 *NCDP increased access to and quality of basic services in Jamaica.* The number of children attending school in the beneficiary communities increased but not more than in schools that were constructed in control communities.<sup>54</sup> In addition, 96 percent of respondents agreed that NCDP school projects improved work and study conditions for students compared to only 67 percent in control communities. IEG confirmed that the

<sup>49</sup> This is the sum of the number of estimated beneficiaries of all completed projects. Likely overestimated for some subprojects.

<sup>50</sup> The number presented on completed subprojects is slightly lower than what was presented in the ICR and excludes 16 subprojects which were either aborted prior to completion phase or, for various reasons, did not reach the implementation stage.

<sup>51</sup> Using the 2004 exchange rate of JM\$60=US\$1 for consistency with the data reported in the ICR.

<sup>52</sup> It should be noted that the number of projects inspected by the infrastructure evaluation in each construction category was too small for drawing any generalizations. It is not clear whether statistical tests for the difference between treatment and control groups was undertaken in the impact evaluation.

<sup>53</sup> All (four) of the schools visited by IEG were used. Classrooms, kitchens and toilets facilities constructed by NCDP were also in use. The fifth site visited by IEG was a sports complex and regular usage was difficult to verify. The CBO representative explained that the grass field was being used for football tournaments between communities.

<sup>54</sup> IEG site visits confirmed that there was increased access to schooling in two basic schools and one special needs school visited. In the fourth school visited classroom capacity increased as a result of the project but the number of students in the school has since dwindled due to community hardship and migration.

new/rehabilitated schools visited (only 5 sites) had more room and better suited buildings than what was previously described to exist. School principals also expressed satisfaction with improvements in environmental cleanliness and security around the schools. To some extent learning outcomes may also have improved but evidence is very weak. Sixty percent of focus group survey respondents of NCDP schools compared to 48 percent in control communities noted improvements in learning outcomes.

6.5 The impact evaluation also showed an increased availability of health care facilities since the project and also a small increase in the use of health facilities, especially among women and pregnant women. Of the total, 75 percent of respondents in NCDP communities and 65 percent in control communities noted that availability of health centers had increased after the new infrastructure improvements. There is no information available to assess whether health status has improved in NCDP communities as a result of the project.

6.6 Road projects had, according to the impact evaluation, the greatest impact compared to control communities. Ninety-eight percent of respondents were satisfied with the road quality compared to 19 percent in comparison communities. In particular, they found road safety to be higher, travel time reduced, and economic activity increased as a result of the NCDP subproject. Based on respondent perception, there was no indication that transport costs had been reduced. Ninety-three percent of NCDP respondents compared to thirty percent in the control group thought that the improved roads had increased their quality of life.

6.7 *But there are concerns about the upkeep of basic services mainly due to the lack of maintenance training.* Maintenance training undertaken in cooperation with SDC was not undertaken as extensively as planned. This was confirmed by the beneficiary assessment and by JSIF staff. Only 31 communities of the 276 have prepared and implemented community maintenance plans (the target was 100 percent). During Bank team visits, only 27 percent of sites had ongoing maintenance activities. However, at the time of the IEG mission JSIF maintenance training in communities was ongoing as a component of the Hurricane Dean Emergency Rehabilitation Loan.

6.8 Although the 48 site visits conducted by the Bank team did not observe any major maintenance issues, the technical consultants that undertook the infrastructure evaluation concluded that maintenance was a serious issue in the majority of the seven sites inspected. Engineers found signs of deterioration of the infrastructure as a result of a lack of maintenance. However, compared to control communities in the evaluation, actual maintenance of NCDP sites appeared favorable. Seventy-two percent of NCDP beneficiaries state that infrastructure and equipment is being maintained by communities compared to only 42 percent in control communities. This was confirmed by the engineer visits. Community interest in maintenance is also higher in NCDP communities (86 percent compared to 60 percent in controls). IEG visits observed clean and functioning schools (although one school was very over crowded). School kitchens, classrooms, facilities, and yards were clean and appeared safe. In sum, evidence on the upkeep of the infrastructure is mixed. The mixed evidence indicates that the project was not fully successful in strengthening its maintenance activities.

6.9 *Some temporary employment was generated.* According to the Bank's Implementation Completion Report (ICR) 15,420 person months of unskilled temporary

employment was generated in the subprojects. The borrower's ICR reports that 3,855 temporary employment opportunities were created. Neither the summative evaluation nor IEG could verify the number of temporary jobs nor the number of man-hours created. Data were not available in any JSIF records reviewed by IEG. Although this was part of the development objective of the project and an important aspect for assisting poor communities, the lack of baselines, targets and reliable data makes it difficult to determine whether the project substantially achieved its objective of creating temporary employment. The failure of the project to establish formal arrangements with contractors for using labor intensive methods may have hampered employment creation.<sup>55</sup>

6.10 Employment opportunities were a common motivation for communities to engage with JSIF. The temporary jobs and incremental income brought to communities were often seen as the main benefit of subprojects. In the beneficiary assessment 52 percent of NCDP respondents thought that temporary jobs had been created in the community, although there was no significant difference compared to control communities. JSIF and SDC staff, as well as community members, explained to IEG that laborers were paid less than the standard pay rate for the job. The difference between the minimum wage and the actual wage earned by the worker in the community was viewed as community in kind contribution to the project. This helped reduce project costs and the extra income was appreciated by workers. However, the cost sharing approach limited the income generation opportunities of subprojects. This tradeoff (reducing project costs vs. providing income earnings) is a common feature of social investment fund projects.

6.11 On balance, objective 1 of the NCDP is rated substantial. Well targeted and good quality basic services were created. The assets increased access of the poor communities to services. Although the rigor of the impact evaluation was lacking, the evidence suggests that the services produced by NCDP may have been of higher quality than services produced by other agencies. This substantial achievement was not without weaknesses, however. Maintenance of the services is rather limited, mainly due to the lack of maintenance training. Some temporary employment opportunities were created although it is not known exactly how many.

## **Objective 2. Promote greater social and community development in Jamaica, especially among the poor. *Rating: Modest***

6.12 *Community Based Contracting (CBC) was used to a larger extent than anticipated.* The NCDP as well as the Poverty Reduction Project (funded by the European Union) provided JSIF with its first experience with CBC. The use of community contracting was supposed to encourage more community ownership, and better ensure that assets are used after completion. In total, only 52 communities were trained on the use of CBC but 61 (22 percent) of subprojects under NCDP used community contracting (Table 11). Around US\$4

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<sup>55</sup> Only in some instances did subprojects lead to longer term employment. An important labor market issue in Jamaica is the difficulty, experienced by workers, in obtaining the necessary certification required for full employment. In a few cases NCDP workers benefitted from training related to the job which helped them obtain their certification. On the national level the employment created by the project was insignificant, however, highly valued by individual community members.

million of project funds (27 percent) were used for community contracting, higher than the targeted 20 percent despite the hurricane response restructuring. CBC remains a type of contracting used in JSIF.

**Table 11. Completed Subprojects by Contracting Type**

Type of contracting	Number of completed subprojects	Percent completed subprojects
Traditional	120	43
Ivan-school fast track	95	34
CBC	61	22
<b>Total</b>	<b>276</b>	<b>100</b>

Source: IEG analysis of JSIF data.

6.13 *Despite the use of community contracting, the wide community participation envisaged in the project partly failed due to the breakdown in the JSIF-SDC relationship.* According to JSIF's manual one criteria used for selection is that the project should be ranked either as first or second priority by the community. The aim of the cooperation with SDC was to increase the number of projects financed by JSIF after being identified in Community Development Plans (CDPs). This objective was not achieved. Although SDC delivered 173 CDPs, only 15 subprojects were generated in this manner.

6.14 *There was limited community participation in decision making regarding subproject identification and design but more broad based participation in construction.* An earlier evaluation in another JSIF project showed that JSIF subprojects were not necessarily those that were preferred by the majority of the population (Rao and Ibáñez 2003). Instead the decision on what subproject the community would take on was driven by a small group of networked community members. In NCDP the degree of participation of the larger community was, in the majority of cases, limited to providing labor during construction (Oxford Policy Management 2008). It was felt that the most capable and networked members and the members most closely linked to the asset (for instance a parent-teacher group in the case of schools) took the initiative on requesting JSIF funding. In the beneficiary assessment, 65 percent of respondents in NCDP communities with CBC school projects indicated that they were not informed about the project. Another 18 percent were told about the project but were not asked about their views. Only in roads projects did community members indicate that the community's views influenced the project (Oxford Policy Management 2008). Overall, 64 percent of respondents both in NCDP and control projects felt that they had either not been informed or informed but not consulted on the project. Hence, to an extent, the elite capture noticed in earlier JSIF operations remained under NCDP. Although there was limited community participation phase of subprojects, there was more participation in construction (Oxford Policy Management 2008). In NCDP communities 73 percent of survey respondents thought that poor people were the main beneficiaries of the asset compared to 44 percent in control communities.

6.15 *However, communities were strengthened and became able to manage new projects outside of NCDP and generate complementary funding.* According to JSIF social development staff the necessary condition that Community Based Organizations (CBOs) needed to register as Benevolent Societies in order to be awarded community contracts helped communities take their own initiatives. Although only 33 Benevolent Societies were

created, this process empowered groups by giving them greater responsibility and accountability. Even though no data were presented to IEG, JSIF noted that because of the use of local labor, some communities were also able to save funds that could be applied to other efforts. In order to finance maintenance work or afford necessary supplies and materials, active community groups organized fund raising events. As a result, community financial contributions exceeded expectations and reached 12 percent on average in all of NCDP and 19 percent for community contracted projects.

6.16 All in all, the project had some positive impacts on the social development of the poor in beneficiary communities but not to the extent the project had hoped for. Several of the social outcome indicators in Annex Table B2 were achieved. However, their achievement is not considered adequate evidence of the achievement of the social objective. The social objective was difficult to meet as the concept of common goods and shared responsibilities is not well rooted in Jamaican communities. In sum, notwithstanding the extensive use of community contracting and the significant contribution of community funds, there is still only limited evidence of participation and social development in terms of joint decision making and development planning in communities. Therefore the achievement of this objective is rated modest.

## 7. National Community Development Project - Ratings

### Outcome

7.1 Based on the substantial relevance and efficiency and modest efficacy the overall project outcome rating is *moderately satisfactory* (Table 12).

7.2 **Relevance** is rated *substantial* because of the substantial relevance of objectives and modest relevance of design. Overall, the project objectives were consistent with country and Bank strategies and the design approach was adequate for achieving the first project objective. Using JSIF as the implementation vehicle was an appropriate design choice for reaching the objectives. But shortcomings involved insufficient focus on productive use and maintenance of assets and weak implementation arrangements such as for ensuring labor intensive works and employment creation as well as the partnership with SDC for enhancing social development.

**Table 12. Summary of Outcome Ratings NCDP Project**

Development Objectives	Relevance		Efficacy	Efficiency	Outcome
	of objectives	of design			
a) provide basic services and temporary employment opportunities to low-income communities in Jamaica; and	Substantial	Modest	Substantial	Substantial	Moderately Satisfactory
b) promote greater social and community development in Jamaica, especially among the poor			Modest		
<b>Overall Rating<sup>a</sup></b>	Substantial		Modest	Substantial	Moderately Satisfactory

<sup>a</sup> Please see the discussion in the text below for a justification of how the overall ratings were derived.

**7.3 Relevance of objectives.** The NCDP's objective spoke to the country's priority (part of the 1997 development agenda) of protecting the poor and ensuring inclusion and was aligned with the Medium-Term Economic and Social Policy Framework 2004-07. The framework emphasized increasing access to social and economic opportunities for the poor and enhanced social harmony. The social sector strategy prioritized upgrading the social infrastructure and stimulating productive growth in poor areas affected by the 2001 crisis. Moreover, the underlying National Poverty Eradication Program (1997) emphasized using community-based interventions undertaken in partnership with NGOs and the private sector (World Bank 2002b). The objectives of the NCDP were consistent with parts of the government strategy, mainly in terms of upgrading social infrastructure in underserved areas and encouraging better community cohesion. But in order to contribute to economic growth and mitigate the effects of the slow-down in the tourism industry and other sectors in decline the project would have needed a stronger income and employment generation objective beyond the temporary employment created during infrastructure construction. Although the project did not disqualify economic infrastructure from its list of eligible subproject types, the demand-driven nature of the project (as well as the Ivan restructuring) was more tailored to social infrastructure such as schools and health centers.

**7.4** The NCDP's objectives were consistent with the Bank's strategy. Although not planned under the 2000 CAS, the NCDP came about together with the EERL (approved in December 2001) which was meant to provide budget support during the crisis so as to protect social spending and funds to restore public infrastructure. The NCDP was the corresponding micro response to rehabilitate and upgrade the long neglected social services infrastructure, especially in poor areas, and help alleviate tensions in communities and to protect tourism incomes. In the next CAS (2005, period 2006-09) the Bank's focus was set on accelerating inclusive economic growth; improving human development; and preventing and reducing crime. Provision of basic services for the poor through participatory processes remained a priority. Employment creation and skills updating became a priority in Jamaica in the most current CAS.

**7.5** Based on the alignment with the government's priority and Bank's emphasis on upgrading public infrastructure and reducing crime, the relevance of the project objectives is rated *substantial*. Relevance of objectives could have been higher if the project had also aimed at creating incomes and sustainable employment opportunities in poor communities affected by the economic downturn.

**7.6 Relevance of design.** The approach of using JSIF as the implementation vehicle was warranted based on JSIFs solid capacity and support from both political camps. JSIF had proven to be an effective agency through which rural development goals and community-driven social infrastructure updates could be undertaken. JSIF had the capacity and mandate to deliver social infrastructure to underserved communities. Also, the demand-driven nature of JSIF was highly consistent with the focus on building greater community cohesion for reducing conflict and political tension.

**7.7** However, the temporary set up of social investment funds, such as JSIF, is infamous for weak attention to sustainability of the services created and for placing high priority on building infrastructure rather than on longer term productive use of assets (Rawlings et al. 2003). Moreover, continuously channeling donor resources through a semi-autonomous implementation unit such as a social investment fund does not help build the internal capacity

of the government's service delivering agencies whose role it is to provide public infrastructure in the first place.

7.8 The project's technical design was conducive to meeting the development objective albeit not without weaknesses. The attention on strengthening sustainability of asset creation was reflected in the increased resources that the project provided for maintenance activities and the close collaboration with communities using community contracting and development planning for nurturing ownership and participation. Moreover, the design of the project proved flexible to respond to emergency needs caused by the hurricane in 2004. In a country that is prone to natural disasters, fitting this flexibility under the project objectives was appropriate. Finally, the demand-driven nature of the project selection was appropriate considering the political polarization in Jamaica which is pervasive down to the community and even street level. Evaluating applications based on the predetermined poverty map and Poverty Index removed any political conflicts over the selection of target areas.

7.9 On the other hand, the envisioned partnership with SDC was not thoroughly based on mutual agreement and common goals. The subsequent breakdown in the partnership was a direct result of incomplete agreements at the design stage. The social outcomes of the project were therefore not fully achieved. Moreover, the new procurement option under CBC catered mainly to communities that already had the capacity and will to undertake participatory projects and did not always allocate resources in the areas with the greatest needs. Finally, given the objective of creating temporary employment in poor communities, the project did not put in place mechanisms for ensuring labor intensive contracting and the number of jobs created and the income they generated should have been closely monitored.

7.10 The results framework was mediocre. Indicators for monitoring the achievement of the two project objectives were established but lacked baselines and adequate targets and did not include adequate indicators for intermediate outcomes.

7.11 Based on the appropriate choice of using JSIF as the implementer but weaknesses in the design for ensuring job creation, sustainable use of outputs, a working partnership with SDC, as well as the mediocre M&E arrangements, relevance of design is rated *modest*.

## **EFFICACY**

7.12 Efficacy is rated *modest* on balance. The first development objective was substantially achieved, however not without weaknesses. The second objective was modestly achieved. Around half of the outcomes, outputs and institutional objectives were considered achieved although indicators were vague and without baselines and targets. Although the first objective was considered the main objective of the project and rated as substantial, the modest overall efficacy rating is justified due to the fact that the project did not fully achieve two of the main parts of its development objective—creating temporary employment and promoting greater social and community development.

7.13 Under NCDP, JSIF's focus on serving poor and underserved groups of the population and financing small-scale projects was strengthened. Greater community financing was also achieved. More than 90 percent of respondents to the beneficiary survey stated that they were satisfied with the subprojects and the majority indicated that their community was as better place to live after the project. But the project suffered some significant shortcomings

including poor maintenance arrangements, lack of attention to the objective of creating employment, and lower than anticipated community participation and social outcomes.

7.14 While the counterfactual evidence is not rigorous, Jamaica's experience as described above suggests that strengthening basic social services through JSIF likely generated better outcomes in the short run than implementing a similar project through the ministries. Moreover, the large scale basic service provision which targeted underserved communities could likely not have been undertaken without support from an external development partner.

## EFFICIENCY

7.15 Efficiency is rated *substantial*. Both administrative and operational costs of subprojects were contained, execution speed was partially improved, and output quality and use were adequate. Social investment funds are widely credited for being able to deliver services more efficiently than government ministries. In Jamaica, JSIF filled the gap in providing social infrastructure to those communities that the government was not able to reach.

7.16 Administrative costs and costs for institutional strengthening of the project were relatively low (18 percent) and close to international norms for social investment fund overheads (Oxford Policy Management 2008; IDB 1998; Rawlings et al. 2003). Even though the introduction of community contracting raised workloads for JSIF staff, overhead and technical assistance costs at 18 percent were much lower than predicted in the PAD (38 percent). The fixed costs could be spread over a large pool of funders supporting similar projects so that a larger share of NCDP funds were devoted to subprojects.

7.17 The process evaluation claims that subproject construction costs were below the market rate in Jamaica and, even though cost over-runs were common, they were low compared to industry standards in Jamaica (Oxford Policy Management 2008).<sup>56</sup> Community cost-sharing (12 percent) was a large contributor to the containment of subproject costs. On the other hand, as the project aimed at creating employment opportunities there were tradeoffs between community contributions (in terms of providing free labor) and generating income opportunities for community members. Also, some communities involved in community contracting stated that with community control of the contracting they could take advantage of local discounts on goods, and achieve better value for money.

7.18 Compared to the speed of execution of other social investment funds in the Latin America and Caribbean Region the NCDP implementation time-lines were similar (source: Rawlings et al. 2003). On average, the approval phase was 39 weeks, close to the target of 37 weeks and much faster than in the earlier Bank-supported JSIF project (Table 13). Ivan projects were much faster in the approval phase (around 2-6 weeks) compared to traditional projects (67 weeks). Similarly, implementation of Ivan projects was quick (around 34 weeks) while traditional projects went on for 124 weeks on average. Compared to the earlier Bank project NCDP improved in the preparation phase but was slower in implementation. External events such as hurricanes and the 2006 cement shortage affected completion times.

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<sup>56</sup> What defines industry standards is not clear.

**Table 13. Speed of Execution (weeks)**

Project	Approval	Implementation	Total completion
NCDP achievement	39	34-124	144 <sup>a</sup>
Traditional	67	124	n/a
Ivan-school fast track	2-6	34	n/a
CBC	33	n/a	n/a
NCDP target	37	16-32	105 <sup>ab</sup>
Previous Bank-supported JSIF project	61	25	114 <sup>a</sup>

Sources: Oxford Policy Management 2008; World Bank 2002c.

<sup>a</sup> The number of weeks for approval and implementation do not add up to the weeks for total completion as there was also a phase for contracting. Complete data are not available for this phase and therefore not reported.

<sup>b</sup> 75 maximum as per the Operations Manual.

## Risk to Development Outcome

7.19 The risk to development outcome of the NCDP is rated *moderate*. As evidenced by many other social investment funds (Rawlings et al. 2003) sustainability of outcomes was a weak area of the project.

7.20 With regards to outcomes at the community level, risks are moderate. The main risks to development outcomes are the uncertainty about continued use and maintenance of the infrastructure created. Because of JSIF's mandate to transfer resources back to the line ministries after completion attention to sustained outcomes, albeit being heightened in this project, is relatively weak. Line ministries are constantly plagued by insufficient resources and lack capacity to tend to the disadvantaged communities. No community self assessment or organized ex-post periodic JSIF site visits have been undertaken to ensure that resources are used and maintained as planned. The agreed cooperation with SDC on maintenance training and to serve as a watch dog in communities has not materialized.

7.21 On the contrary, at the time of evaluation, maintenance is being strengthened. JSIF is currently undertaking operations and maintenance training in NCDP communities under the Hurricane Dean Emergency Rehabilitation Loan. Also, the schools that were rehabilitated after Hurricane Ivan were constructed in a manner more resistant to natural disasters boding well for the sustainability of resources in high risk communities.

7.22 With the deepening of the economic crisis and more and more communities losing employment and income in Jamaica there is a risk that the utilization of project-created assets in poor areas will dwindle.

7.23 At the institutional level risks are low. JSIF continues to operate efficiently. JSIF operations have been strengthened especially in terms of CBC as an option for subproject implementation. Government and donor support to JSIF remains strong. However, JSIF is highly dependent on donor financing. A stronger national strategy for building the capacity and leveraging internal resources for social infrastructure seems warranted.

## Bank Performance

7.24 On the whole, Bank performance is rated *moderately satisfactory*. This is based on some significant weaknesses in quality at entry but satisfactory supervision.

## QUALITY AT ENTRY

7.25 Quality at Entry was *moderately satisfactory*. The Bank already had a strong relationship with JSIF based on previous engagement. The design of NCDP was based on lessons from the earlier phase and strongly consistent with government priorities. The Bank is widely credited by the government and JSIF for bringing innovative ideas to the project and for its strong technical assistance. The Bank brought experience with community contracting from other countries to JSIF, organized a workshop on the subject, and conducted two study tours for JSIF staff to Malawi, Romania and Moldova to learn about community-based contracting.

7.26 However, the project had several significant design deficiencies. The M&E system did not record project outputs and progress on project objectives against targets and baselines from the start. The Bank did not provide adequate assistance in establishing and carrying out sufficient monitoring and evaluation and establishing a comprehensive MIS. Despite being recognized as a risk, there was no assessment undertaken of the technical capacity and objectives of SDC for fulfilling its critical role in the project, nor was there a memorandum of understanding between JSIF and SDC prior to appraisal. The breakdown in the relationship between the two organizations directly contributed to the less than sufficient achievement of the social development objective. Also, the transfer of operation and maintenance of assets to line ministries was not explicitly arranged including scheduled follow-up for verifying sustained outcomes. Finally, the Bank should have paid much more attention to the safety net objective of the project—to provide temporary employment in poor communities—given that the project was a response to the economic shocks of 2001. Although implemented more or less during the same time frame, there was no explicit coordinated effort between the SSNP and the NCDP in the way that the Bank strategically addressed social safety net issues in Jamaica.

## QUALITY OF SUPERVISION

7.27 Bank supervision was *satisfactory*. The project had three task team leaders although one was in place during most of the implementation phase. To compensate for the lack in JSIF's monitoring and evaluation procedures the visiting missions conducted a large share of site visits and collected data on project quality and use and community social development. Bank supervision, which included several technical experts; was especially strong in procurement and financial management as testified in aides-memoire and by JSIF staff. The regular supervision visits also involved discussions with many other stakeholders and key informants such as community organizations, NGOs, SDC, Ministry of Finance and the National Contracts Commission. The Bank also provided flexible and quick support to the project to meet the new needs in the wake of Hurricane Ivan although assistance from the Bank on MIS strengthening and training on CBC was lacking.

7.28 Weaknesses in Bank supervision were minor and included a somewhat excessive focus on disbursements and outputs and relatively little attention to intermediate and sustainable outcomes. Moreover, the Bank team could have pushed to establish better baselines and outcome targets at an early stage of the project to ensure a more rigorous and timely evaluation. In the end, the project performance assessment relied heavily on the summative evaluation which was of questionable quality and did not, to a large extent, assess the social development or employment creation objective.

## Borrower Performance

7.29 Borrower performance is rated *satisfactory* overall. Both government and implementing agency performance were satisfactory.

### PERFORMANCE OF THE GOVERNMENT

7.30 Overall, government performance is rated *satisfactory*. Despite the tight fiscal stance, government support to JSIF and to NCDP was strong and remains strong after the change of government in 2007. When counterpart funds were not available following Hurricane Ivan in 2004, sufficient financing was arranged via OPEC so as to limit implementation interruptions to respond in the disaster areas. On the other hand, both JSIF and SDC expressed to IEG that the consultation process at the planning stages of the project (before project objectives were delegated to JSIF) could have involved more stakeholders. It was suggested that insufficient consultation at the early preparation phase may have contributed to the difficulties in the cooperation between JSIF and SDC.

### PERFORMANCE OF THE IMPLEMENTING AGENCY

7.31 Implementing agency performance was *satisfactory*. Much of the success of the NCDP can be credited to the strong performance of JSIF. JSIF still operating as a temporary agency and consistently and diligently follows national procurement and contracting requirements. It has set up transparent processes for selecting communities and subprojects and awarding contracts. Staff turnover has plagued JSIF mainly due to their good performance. Internal monitoring and evaluation arrangements such as performance monitoring in the MIS and more regular follow-up site visits including assessments of intermediate outcomes should have been arranged to feed into periodic evaluations.

7.32 With the introduction of community contracting, staff workload increased but commitment to carry out the project objectives remained strong. The experiences with CBC have been a learning-by-doing process for JSIF and in-house capacity has grown and is being used in other projects.

## 8. Conclusions and Lessons

8.1 This PPAR has reviewed the Jamaica *Social Safety Net Project (SSNP)* and *National Community Development Project (NCDP)*. Both investment projects were classified under the social safety net theme in the World Bank, although they were not included under a coordinated effort to support Jamaica's social protection efforts. The *SSNP* aimed to provide better and more cost-effective social assistance to the poor. The *NCDP* complemented a Bank emergency rehabilitation loan and aimed at; a) providing basic services and temporary employment in low-income communities; and b) promoting greater social and community development among the poor.

8.2 Bank lending to Jamaica since 2000 in the area of social protection has focused on protecting chronically poor individuals as well as poor and disaster-affected communities. At the household level the most vulnerable families and elderly are assisted by cash transfers

and support for school lunches and fees. Tying the support to regular school attendance and health check-ups has raised the ability of poor families to invest in human capital. Moreover, at the community level, neglected localities have benefitted from upgrades to the social and economic infrastructure and a temporary injection of jobs during construction.

8.3 The projects have proven to be flexible in dealing with local emergencies. Both the *SSNP* and the *NCDP* were able to quickly re-channel resources in the wake of Hurricane Ivan. On the other hand, social assistance in Jamaica needs to pay more attention to productive activities since poverty is strongly linked with unemployment. In particular, many young men and women are unequipped for obtaining a job. Those who succeed in the educational system often find opportunities outside the country. With the economic downturn, more and more Jamaicans are losing their sources of income. Rural communities see factories and mines close. Poverty is urbanizing at a fast rate, spurring violence and crime.

8.4 In the future, social safety net programs in Jamaica could link to labor market initiatives. Programs such as PATH provide effective protection to those who cannot participate in the market (for example the elderly and children) but a stronger effort needs to be made to train and connect youth school drop outs and working age adults to employment and incomes. An effective safety net system should strive, given the island's dependence on tourism and foreign income and the regular damage made by force majeure, to respond to economic and natural shocks at the same as protecting the chronically poor. As fiscal room is minimal, it will be important to put in place a safety net system that can be scaled up in times of crisis and scaled down in more stable times.

## Lessons

- *The SSNP demonstrated that conditional cash transfer programs, such as PATH, can be useful tools for protecting the poor after localized shocks.* PATH was able to quickly double benefit levels and waive compliance requirements in communities seriously affected by Hurricane Ivan, but only to those already participating in the program.
- *Monitoring and evaluation in conditional cash transfer programs should pay more attention to the objective of protecting the chronically poor and vulnerable.* Six of the eight *SSNP* performance indicators reflected human development outcomes. No indicators measured the extent to which social assistance benefits effectively reached the poor.
- *Compliance requirements should be set with attention to supply side constraints (in health), the level of impact that could be expected on outcomes (in education), and any costs incurred in conditioning benefits.* Even though the Ministry of Health advised on the number of health visits required per child, the *SSNP* still failed to fully consider the limited capacity of the health system to absorb the demand for health care. Similarly, school attendance rates, at least at the primary level, were already high in Jamaica and significant impacts from the project due to the education conditionality were small. Any impacts on behavioral changes also need to be viewed in relation to costs incurred for monitoring compliance rates.

- *Social Investment Funds, such as JSIF, can be useful for dealing with emergencies and for experimenting with new approaches.* The **NCDP** proved flexible in addressing the urgent need caused by Hurricane Ivan and for helping communities gain experience with community contracting. However, uncertainties about a fund's longevity may create ambiguity about responsibilities for continuing activities and sustaining the benefits.
- *The delivery of infrastructure through Social Investment Funds needs to be accompanied by measures that ensure the effective use, operation, and maintenance of assets.* When using a Social Investment Fund to help provide community chosen investments quickly, it is also important to explicitly delineate the responsibilities for operating and maintaining the social infrastructure and to ensure that the capacity for service provision and infrastructure maintenance is built.

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## **Annex A. Social safety nets and social services in Jamaica prior to 2000**

Prior to the social safety net reform of 2000, the evolution of a social assistance system in Jamaica reflected *ad hoc* political priorities without much coordination or long-term planning. The main part of the pre-reform safety net system was introduced in the 1980s, when general kerosene subsidies were removed. Kerosene subsidies had been highly regressive, benefitting gas companies rather than the poor. The social assistance system consisted of about 20 overlapping, poorly targeted, and uncoordinated programs aimed at the poor and vulnerable. There were three income support programs, four school-based programs, two pharmaceutical programs, housing programs, feeding programs, labor market programs, and various community-based programs including a social investment fund. Benefits were low and the program provided no productive incentives for the poor to adopt strategies for escaping poverty, such as by investing in human capital or gaining training and employment.

### **INCOME TRANSFER PROGRAMS**

Three non-contributory income transfer programs existed in Jamaica prior to the 2000 reform. Together they represented about 0.3 percent of GDP in 1998/99 (Annex Table A1). The main one, the Food Stamp Program, was put in place in order to protect poor users of kerosene from increased prices. Food stamps were provided to poor children 0-6 years old, the elderly, the incapacitated, pregnant and lactating women, and otherwise impoverished single-person households. In 1998, roughly 10 percent of the population was registered to receive food stamps. The fiscal cost of the food stamp program in 1998/99 was estimated at JMS\$395 million (0.2 percent of GDP or almost two-thirds of the cost of income transfers overall). Of this, about 75 percent went to food stamps, a small part to kerosene subsidies, and around 10 percent to administrative expenses (Blank et al. 2000). Benefits were low (US\$2 per month) and not related to income levels. They were considered to have a very small impact on poverty. The program was self-targeted for children and pregnant and lactating women, for other groups it was means tested.

The other two income transfer programs—the Outdoor Poor Relief Program and the Economic and Social Assistance Program—provided benefits to the elderly and disabled. The Outdoor Poor Relief Program was established under the Poor Relief Act of 1886 and provided in-kind and cash benefits. It was run by the Ministry of Local Government and Community Development (MLGCD) through parish councils. Blank et al. (2000) estimate that as much as 69 percent of the costs of the Outdoor Poor Relief Program went to administration (includes counseling costs and some administrative costs for Indoor Poor Relief). The Economic and Social Assistance Program aimed at providing assistance to the elderly poor and to the disabled poor who are not eligible for private insurance or the National Insurance Scheme (NIS). By targeting the elderly and incapacitated, the program was thought to complement the NIS pension system and to enhance the safety net aspect of the pension system for the poor. The Economic and Social Assistance Program includes two components: (i) Old Age and Incapacity allowances for the elderly and incapacitated, and (ii) one-off grants payable in special circumstances to those in need (“rehabilitation grants,” “compassionate grants” and “emergency relief”). Administrative expenditures for this program were also high (Blank et al. 2000). Both the Outdoor Poor Relief and the Economic

and Social Assistance programs were means tested although there was no specific threshold and eligibility was based on home visits by social workers. Frequently interest groups sent lists of people they wanted to be considered (Kock 2001).

**Annex Table A1. Income Transfer Programs in Jamaica prior to 2000**

Program	Implementing agency	Target population	1998 budget (JMS)	Budget as a percent of GDP	Budget as a percent of central government budget	Administrative cost as a percent of total	Number served
Food Stamps	MLSS	Pregnant/lactating women, children 0-6, elderly, disabled, indigent	395.2	0.2	0.5	9	263,302
Poor Relief	MLGCD	Elderly, disabled, indigent	Outdoor: 152.6 Indoor: 139.5	0.1	0.4	Outdoor: 69 <sup>a</sup>	Outdoor: 13,747 Indoor: 2,028
Economic and Social Assistance <sup>b</sup>	MLSS	Elderly, disabled, indigent	121.0	0.1	0.2	44	23,178
Total			808.3	0.3	1.1	1.1	

Source: Blank 2000.

<sup>a</sup> Including costs for counseling services (14 percent of total costs) and may include expenditures on administration of Indoor Poor Relief as it was impossible to separate administration of Indoor and Outdoor Poor Relief.

<sup>b</sup> Includes regular benefits in the form of old age and incapacity allowances as well as one-off rehabilitation and compassionate grants paid to 3,347 people.

The pre-reform non-contributory social safety net system in Jamaica had a multitude of issues hampering its effectiveness:

- *Fragmented programs and lack of consolidated eligibility criteria.* To receive adequate benefits some participants had to take part in multiple programs. Others participated in one but not in others for which they may have qualified. For example, 88 percent of Economic and Social Assistance beneficiaries and 29 percent of Poor Relief beneficiaries also received food stamp benefits (Blank et al. 2000; Blank, 2000). Institutionally the system was also fragmented across various ministries.
- *Poor coverage and targeting with large errors both of exclusion and inclusion.* Some programs were not targeted at all while some included non-poor in the group of beneficiaries while simultaneously excluding poor who were found non-eligible. For instance, of the Food Stamp Program beneficiaries only 36 percent were in the poorest quintile.
- *Low benefit levels.* The benefits provided by many programs were too low to adequately protect the poor and vulnerable. Low benefits may also not sufficiently encourage desired behavior change such as sending children to school or consuming more nutritious foods.
- *High administrative overheads.* The overlap and duplication of safety nets created high costs both to program administration and to beneficiaries.

## LABOR MARKET PROGRAMS

The largest employment generation program was Lift Up Jamaica, a short-term public works program targeted to youth-at-risk. The program, launched in 1999, operated mainly in congested urban areas and selected rural towns was funded by several public sector enterprises, and periodically started and stopped. Projects were proposed by communities and approved by a selection committee. Communities decided how to distribute available employment opportunities. Lift Up Jamaica benefited around 5,000 people yearly by creating temporary employment. At the time of writing, Lift Up Jamaica was no longer active.

A second program, the HEART Trust organization, is Jamaica's official vocational training program; it prepares youth and adults for employment in the labor market. At the end of the training program participants receive their skill-specific certificate which qualifies workers for jobs in the formal sector. However, linking vocational training graduates to employment has proven to be difficult. Labor market programs in Jamaica continue to be heavily politicized.

## COMMUNITY-BASED PROGRAMS

In addition to Lift Up Jamaica, the country had two other main community-based social safety net programs. No longer active, the Social and Economic Support Program (SESP) provided funds to communities for infrastructure projects as well as individual benefits, such as school materials, housing, and entrepreneurial activity support. The program was administered through Members of Parliament, and distribution of benefits was fraught with political interference.

The Jamaica Social Investment Fund (JSIF), which continues to operate today, was established by the government in the mid-1990s in preparing the development agenda. It was set up to undertake small-scale projects and to respond to the needs of the most underserved groups island-wide (World Bank 2002b). JSIF's operations are largely community-driven. Communities may apply for funding for projects and JSIF acts as a financial intermediary. JSIF relies on support from a multitude of donors such as the World Bank, the European Union and OPEC. JSIF had been successful in reaching the targeted poor communities and getting them to express their preference for initiatives. The fund has also shown good performance in improving living conditions in beneficiary communities.

Since its inception several weaknesses have plagued JSIF (World Bank 2002b) and most of them also apply to the NCDP period:

- *JSIF's role is unclear.* Initially JSIF was set up as a four-year temporary project, but as local government and parishes have not been able to meet regular demand for social infrastructure, JSIF has taken on a larger more permanent role in furnishing social infrastructure to communities.
- *Problems assuring appropriate quality, operations, and maintenance.* Completed JSIF projects have not met high quality standards in the past. Moreover, there have been difficulties in ensuring operations and maintenance of projects after works are completed.

- *Uneven participation process.* Wealthier and more politically-savvy community groups have participated more in decision-making and implementation than poor communities with low capacity.

## Annex B. Data on the achievement of project targets

Annex Table B1. SSNP: Outcomes, Outputs and Institutional Reform and Strengthening

	Indicator*	Baseline	Target	At closing	Change	Achievement
Outcomes	Increase in health care utilization by very poor children (0-6 years old)/percentage of poor children brought to health centers	52% visits/18% visits with medical check-ups	No target	n/a	Impact evaluation shows 38% increase (significant)	Achieved
	Increase in complete, on time immunization rates for very poor children (0-6 years old)	No baseline	No target	Oral polio vaccine: 80.6% Diphtheria, pertussis, and tetanus: 98.6% Tuberculosis: 89.5% Measles: 92.7%	Impact evaluation shows no significant increase	Not achieved
	Increase in school attendance by poor children/youth (6-17 years old and enrolled in school)	No baseline	No target	n/a	Impact evaluation shows 0.5 day increase (significant)	Not known
	Increase in enrollment rates for secondary schools	96.2% (12-14 years) 74.5% (15-16 years) 28.6% (17-18 years)	No target	99.2% 12-14 years 84.9% 15-16 years 30.0% 17-18 years	+2.9% 12-14 years +14.0% 15-16 years +4.9% 17-18 years	Not known
	Change in poor pregnant/lactating mothers visiting health centers	Not known	Not known	Not known	Not known	Not known
	Change in poor elderly, disabled and other beneficiaries visiting health centers	Not known	Not known	Not known	Not known	Not known
	More than 19.5% of government SSNP expenditure channeled through the PATH	0	19.5%	16.1%	n/a	Partly achieved
	Beneficiary satisfaction with new program	n/a	No target	Beneficiaries think that PATH is better than food stamps and is giving help	n/a	Achieved
	217,000 or more beneficiaries	0	217,000	307,000	n/a	Achieved
	160,000 children receiving transfers bimonthly	0	160,000	233,202	n/a	Achieved
57,000 adults receiving transfers bimonthly	0	57,000	73,798	n/a	Achieved	
Outputs						

	Indicator <sup>a</sup>	Baseline	Target	At closing	Change	Achievement
	Approximate monthly benefits according to set schedule	JM\$250	JM\$250 (year 1) JM\$400 (year 2) JM\$500 (years 3+)	JM\$250 (2002) JM\$400 (2004) JM\$530 (2006) JM\$650 (April 2008, thereafter differentiated by grade level and gender)	n/a	Achieved
	<b>Indicator<sup>a</sup></b>	<b>Baseline</b>	<b>Target</b>	<b>At closing</b>	<b>Change</b>	<b>Achievement</b>
	At least 70% of the poor receive PATH grant	0	More than 70%	Estimates vary but all are less than 50%	n/a	Not achieved
	More than 70% of beneficiaries below poverty line	n/a	70%	58%	n/a	Not achieved
	Administrative costs less than 15% by year three	About 20%	Less than 15%	10%	About 10 percentage point reduction	Achieved
Institutional reform and strengthening	Identify and implement the institutional arrangements needed for unifying the existing transfer programs under PATH	n/a	3 programs unified	2 of the 3 programs fully unified	n/a	Partly achieved
	Identify institutional arrangements for non-core social safety net activities	n/a	n/a	Other safety net programs started using targeting formula but it has not been used as widely as anticipated	n/a	Partly achieved
	Link the targeting mechanism to other social safety net programs such as school feeding and drug programs	n/a	n/a	Initially formula used by both school-based programs, currently formula not used by other programs	n/a	Partly achieved
	Strengthen the institutional capacity of the MLSS and others involved to operate a streamlined and efficient social safety net in Jamaica	n/a	n/a	MLSS in cooperation with the health and education ministries manage the program well	n/a	Achieved

Sources: Mathematica 2004 and 2007; World Bank 2009; Government of Jamaica 2009.

<sup>a</sup> Indicators are classified as outcomes and outputs based on the listing in the PAD and ICR. Other important indicators, not listed in the PAD or ICR, are also included as they are important for achieving the development objective.

Annex Table B2. NCDP: Outcomes, Outputs, and Institutional Reform and Strengthening

	Indicator <sup>a</sup>	Baseline	Target	At closing	Achievement
Outcomes	Increase the access to and quality of basic services	No baseline	Positive improvement by type of intervention	Infrastructure used as intended, increase in school attendance and availability of health care facilities but not more than in control communities as discussed in the main text (for quality see below)	Achieved
	Target poor and underserved communities	37% in quartile 4 in JSIF project	40% in quartile 4	59% in quartile 4	Achieved
	Incremental temporary jobs created	No baseline	No target	15,420 person months, 8,215 temporary jobs (data not verified)	Likely achieved
	Improved operation and maintenance	No baseline	No target	31 communities prepared and implemented maintenance plans, maintenance training not undertaken as planned, mixed evidence on actual maintenance	Partly achieved
	Increase in projects financed by JSIF after being identified in CDPs	0	No target	173 communities prepared CDPs and 15 projects were financed by JSIF	Achieved but to a small extent
	Increase in communities which develop the capacity to select their own priority projects and to manage project contracting and project implementation effectiveness to ensure work quality, reasonable cost, and timeliness	0	30 CBC communities	187 communities undertook prioritization, 173 communities prepared CDPs, 61 subprojects used CBC, 52 communities were trained in CBC	Partly achieved
	Increased complementary investment generated	No baseline	No target	15 subprojects received complementary funding from other agencies	Achieved but to a small extent
	Increase in subprojects with active community maintenance plans and clear indication of agreed support from line ministries and/or local authorities	No baseline	100% of traditional and CBC infrastructure subprojects	31 communities prepared and implemented maintenance plans, all health, education and road subprojects received no-objections from line ministries and parish councils	Partly achieved and to a small extent
	Community satisfaction with subproject and performance of sponsoring entities	No baseline	No target	90% of survey respondents in NCDP communities were satisfied, 62% indicate that their community was a better place to live	Achieved
Outputs	Increase in community contribution in subprojects	5 percent	10 percent	12 percent overall, 18% in traditional projects, 19% in CBC projects, 0% in Ivan projects	Achieved

	Indicator <sup>a</sup>	Baseline	Target	At closing	Achievement
	Reduced time to prepare and implement subprojects	33 weeks at approval stage, 13.6 months overall in JSIF project	37 weeks in approval stage, 16-32 weeks in implementation stage, 105 weeks overall	39 weeks in approval stage, over 50 weeks in implementation stage, 144 weeks overall	Not achieved
	Improved quality of design and preparation of subprojects	No baseline	No target	66% of NCDP communities ranked quality of work as high, infrastructure evaluation showed that all inspected works were done with high quality but not better than control works	Achieved
Institutional reform and strengthening	Refocus JSIF on financing small-scale projects for poor and underserved groups	In the previous project average subproject costs was US\$80,000 and 37% of subprojects were in quartile 4 communities	No target	US\$86,000 average per subproject, 59% in quartile 4	Partly achieved
	Implementation of JSIF's new operations guidelines	No baseline	No target	Implemented	Achieved
	Scale-up the use of CBC	No baseline	30 subprojects (20% of total funds)	61 subprojects (27% of total funds)	Achieved

Sources: World Bank 2008a; Oxford Policy Management 2008; JSIF data.

<sup>a</sup> Indicators are classified as outcomes and outputs based on the listing in the PAD and ICR. Other important indicators, not listed in the PAD or ICR, are also included as they are important for achieving the development objective.

## Annex C. Additional evidence on social safety nets

**Annex Table C1. Benefit Levels of PATH Compared with Those of Other CCT Programs in Latin America**

	Benefit level		Effect on poverty				
	US\$	Transfer as a percent of consumption of all beneficiaries	Transfer as a percent of consumption of the poor	Transfer as a percent of household income	Percent reduction in the poverty headcount	Percent reduction in the poverty gap	Percent reduction in the severity of poverty
PATH	9.3	8.2	10.7	5.0	4.5	8.6	13.2
CCTs in other countries:							
Brazil		6.1	11.7	12.0	2.1	8.1	15.0
Ecuador		6.0	8.3	7.0	8.1	13.7	18.7
Mexico		21.8	33.7	20.0	7.7	19.4	29.0
Nicaragua			29.3	18.0			
Colombia			17.0	6.0			

*Sources:* World Bank 2007 and 2009; Fiszbein and Schady 2009.

**Annex Table C2. Total Cost of PATH Compared with the Cost of Other CCT programs in Latin America and the Caribbean**

	Total costs as a percent of GDP
PATH	0.19
CCTs in other countries:	
Ecuador	0.60
Mexico	0.40
Guatemala	0.40
Brazil	0.35
Dominican Republic	0.34
El Salvador	0.30
Bolivia	0.30
Nicaragua	0.20
Honduras	0.20
Colombia	0.20
Argentina	0.18
Panama	0.15
Peru	0.11
Chile	0.07
Costa Rica	0.03

*Sources:* Blank et al. 2000; imputed from Robalino et al. 2009.

**Annex Table C3. Coverage, Targeting, and Benefit-Incidence of PATH Compared with Other CCT Programs**

	Targeting	Coverage		Benefit incidence	
	Percent of beneficiaries in the poorest quintile	Percent of poorest decile receiving benefits	Percent of second poorest decile receiving benefits	Percent of program transfer budget to poorest decile	Percent of program transfer budget to poorest quintile
PATH	58	47	33	36	61
CCTs in other countries:					
Brazil		63	47	29	56
Chile Solidario		5	4	39	62
Chile Subsidio Único Familiar		42	25	41	64
Ecuador		73	68	18	37
Honduras		33	12	80	85
Mexico	39 <sup>a</sup>	63	33	47	70
Nicaragua		33	23		
Cambodia		2	1	60	73
Bangladesh		5	6	4	8
Turkey SRMP Education		46	28		
Turkey SRMP Health		51	28		

*Sources:* Latest estimates available in Mathematica 2004 and 2007; World Bank 2007; imputed from Fiszbein and Schady 2009.

<sup>a</sup> Percent of beneficiaries in the poorest quartile (bottom 25 percent).

**Annex Table C4. NCDP Completed Subprojects by Type**

Type of infrastructure	Number of completed subprojects	Percent completed subprojects
School rehabilitation	188	68
Life-coping skills/counseling programs <sup>a</sup>	41	15
Improved roads	20	7
Community centers	9	3
Health centers	7	3
Agro- processing facilities	6	2
Water and sanitation facilities	3	1
Homes	2	1
<b>Total</b>	<b>276</b>	<b>100</b>

*Source:* IEG analysis of JSIF data.

<sup>a</sup> Almost all of these projects were summer camps for children, youth, and people with challenges or disabilities. They were generally much cheaper than other subprojects and benefited fewer people

## Annex D. List of people interviewed

### World Bank Staff and Consultants

Badrul Haque	Resident Representative Jamaica (LCCJM)
Andrea Vermehren	First TTL, SSNP (SASSP)
Cornelia Tesliuc	Second TTL, SSNP (LCSHS)
Chingboon Lee	Sector Manager Education, SSNP (LCSHE)
Daniel Boyce	Sr. Financial Management Specialist, SSNP (SACNA)
Fily Sissoko	Sr. Financial Management Specialist, SSNP (AFTFM)
Francisco Ayala	Consultant, SSNP (ECSHD)
Lorraine Blank	Consultant, SSNP (LCSHS)
Jeanine Braithwaite	Sr. Social Protection Economist, SSNP (HDNSP)
Thakoor Persaud	First TTL, NCDP (EASIN)
Abhas Jha	Second TTL, NCDP (EASIN)
Taimur Samad	Third TTL, NCDP (LCSUW)
Julie van Domelen	Consultant, NCDP

### International Development Partners

Akiko Fujii	UNDP
Helen Jenkinson	European Union
Sarah Howden	IDB
Donna Harris	IDB
Antonette Grant	DfID
Lorraine Bélisle	CIDA

### Planning Institute of Jamaica

Pauline Knight	Acting Director General
Collette Robinson	Manager, Social Security and Welfare Unit, Social Policy and Research
Shelly Ann Edwards	Social Security Analyst, Social Policy and Research Division
Barbara Scott	Director, External Cooperation Management Division
Saskia Frater	Project Economist

### Ministry of Labor and Social Security, Public Assistance Division

Colette Riesen	Director Social Security
Dunstan Bryan	Director PATH project
Jacqueline Foster	Director Public Assistance Division
Marlene Miller	Coordinator, Health and education compliance
Stacey-Ann Johnson-Kerr	Financial Manager
Sophia Pearson	Assistant Financial Manager
Michelle Sutherland	Special Accounts Administrator
Joseph Richards	Procurement
Marcia Bolt	Coordinator Steps to Work
Dania Morage	M&E Assistant
Beauverie Foster	Internal Audit
Maurice March	Internal Audit
Donette Smith	MIS

**Ministry of Health**

Howard Lynch Director, Policy, Planning and Development

**Ministry of Education**

Barbara Allen Senior Director, Planning and Development Division

Betsy Davies

**Postal Corporation**

Shawn Sydial

**Jamaica Social Investment Fund**

Scarlette Gillings Managing Director  
 Omar Sweeney General Manager, technical services  
 Shirley McLean-Brown General Manager, finance and procurement  
 Ayanna Demetrius Project Manager  
 Celia Dillon Project Manager  
 Stephannie Hutchinson-French Project Manager  
 Rodey Williams Assistant Project Manager  
 Ryan Bourne Procurement Manager  
 Winsome Hudson-Reid Community Based Contracting Officer  
 Michelle Moses M&E Officer  
 Petula Manboard M&E Officer

**Social Development Commission**

Courtney Brown Director Community Development Planning  
 Dwayne Vernon Acting Executive Director  
 Patrick Watson St. Catherine Parish Manager  
 John White St. James Parish Manager  
 Randy Hayle St. James Community Officer  
 Paula Barrett Trelawny Community Officer

**Field visits - SSNP**

*Kingston/St. Andrews, Public Assistance Division office, Kingston*

Lona Higgins Kingston/St. Andrews parish manager  
 Glen Ford Squire PATH Administrator  
 Marcia Dunbar Social Worker  
 Lorie Nicholson Social Worker  
 Michelle Robinson Lewis Social Worker  
 Nodine Anderson Social Worker

*Hagley Park Post office, St. Andrews*

Mrs. Essor Deputy Postmaster

*Cockburn Garden Primary and Junior High School, St. Andrews*

Mrs. Fagan Assistant Principal

*Hagley Park Health Center, St. Andrews*

Dr. Simmons MD  
 Ms. Williams Public Health Nurse  
 Ms. Jamison Elliott Administrator

*St. Thomas Public Assistance Division office, Morant Bay*

Keisha Douglas                      PATH Administrator  
 Marcia Christian                    Social Worker  
 Shauna Thomas                    Social Worker  
 3 single-mother beneficiaries

*White Horses Primary School, St. Thomas*

Ms. Blake                              Principal  
 Mrs. Thompson                      Grade 1 teacher

*Morant Bay Health Center, St. Thomas*

Ms. Lewis                              Registered Nurse

**Field visits - NCDP***Dunrobin Basic School, Kingston*

Mrs. Jackson                        Principal

*Gordon Town Sports Complex, St. Andrew*

Mr. Norman Rockwood            Gordon Town Community Council member

*Mt. Hermon Basic Primary Schools, St. Catherine*

Mrs. Roberts                        Principal  
 Mrs. Jackson                        Acting Principal  
 Mrs. Lee                                Community organization member, PATH applicant

*Rio Bueno Basic School, Trelawny*

Mrs. Johnson                        Principal/teacher/community development commission member/PATH applicant

*Montego Bay School of Hope, St. James*

Mrs. Jones                            Principal



## Annex E. Basic data sheet

### Social Safety Net Project (Ln. 70760)

#### Key Project Data (amounts in US\$ million)

	<i>Appraisal estimate</i>	<i>Actual or current estimate</i>	<i>Actual as % of appraisal estimate</i>
Total project costs	77.5	120.29	155
Loan amount	40.0	40.0	100
Cofinancing	--	--	--
Cancellation	--	--	--

#### Project Dates

	<i>Original</i>	<i>Actual</i>
Concept Review	07/18/2001	07/18/2001
Board approval	09/04/2001	09/04/2001
Effectiveness	02/28/2002	02/28/2002
Mid-term review	03/26/2004	03/26/2004
Closing date	06/30/2006	03/31/2009

#### Staff Inputs (staff weeks)

<i>Stage of Project Cycle</i>	<i>No. of staff weeks</i>	<i>Staff Time and Cost (Bank Budget only)</i>
		<i>USD (000) (including travel and consultant costs)</i>
<b>Lending</b>		
FY00	18.09	63,888.88
FY01	42	219,226.39
FY02	16.44	63,128.57
Total:	76.53	346,243.84
<b>Supervision/ ICR</b>		
FY02	11.41	121,968.09
FY03	9.46	89,477.72
FY04	9.45	69,357.54
FY05	12.10	81,705.60
FY06	17.16	87,535.56
FY07	19.41	103,029.54
FY08	18.90	93,329.45
FY09	10.0	63,610.79
Total:	290.95	1,402,501.97

**Mission Data**

<i>Name</i>	<i>Title</i>	<i>Unit</i>	<i>Responsibility/Specialty</i>
<b>Lending</b>			
Andrea Vermehren	Social Protection Specialist	LCSHS	Task Team Leader
Luisa Ferreira	Social Protection Specialist	LCSHD	TTL pre-identification
Ana-Maria Arriagada	Sector Manager	LCSHS	Quality Assurance
Francisco Ayala	Economist	Consultant	Cash transfer programs
Lorraine Blank	Social Assessment Specialist	Consultant	Social Assessment
Daniel Boyce	Financial Management Specialist	LCOAA	Financial Management
Jeanine Braithwaite	Senior Economist	LCSHS	Targeting Mechanism
Eduardo Brito	Legal Counsel	LEGLA	Lawyer
Que Bui	Operational Assistant	LCSHS	Mission Logistics
Edward Daoud	Senior Financial Officer	LOAG3	Disbursements
William Experton	Sector Leader	LCC3C	Quality Assurance
Homa-Zahra Fotouhi	Acting Country Officer	LCC3C	Management Oversight
Errol Graham	WB Liaison Officer	LCC3C	Liaison Officer
Margaret Grosh	Senior Social Protection Spec.	HDNSP	Peer Reviewer
Carmen Hamann	Public Administration Specialist	Consultant	New welfare agency
Ashu Handa	Social Sector Specialist	IDB	SSNP reform
Noel Jones	Facilitator Specialist	Consultant	Workshop facilitator
Udo Kock	Institutional Specialist	Consultant	Institutional Capacity Assessment
Marcelo Osorio	Procurement Specialist	LCSHD	Procurement
Hideki Mori	Senior Operations Officer	LCSHS	Processing quality assurance
Cecilia Perez de Castillo	Economist	Consultant	Costing the SSNP proposal
Ricardo Tejada	Research Analyst	LCSPE	Research Analysis
Maurizia Tovo	Social Protection Specialist	LCSHS	Social Safety Nets
<b>Supervision/ICR</b>			
Andrea Vermehren	Social Protection Specialist	LCSHS	Task Team Leader
Cornelia Tesliuc	Social Protection Specialist	LCSHS	Task Team Leader
Nancy Agwu	Financial Analyst	LOAG3	Disbursements
Francisco Ayala	Economist	Consultant	Cash transfer programs
Jorge Barrientos	Social Protection Specialist	Consultant	Project Implementation
Lorraine Blank	Social Assessment Specialist	Consultant	Social Assessment
Que Bui	Procurement Analyst	LCSHS	Procurement
Marta Cervantes-Miguel	Financial Analyst	LCOAA	Financial Management
Edward Daoud	Senior Financial Officer	LOAG3	Disbursements
Mary A. Dowling	Language Program Assistance	LCSHS	Projects Bank Administration

<i>Name</i>	<i>Title</i>	<i>Unit</i>	<i>Responsibility/Specialty</i>
Pilar Gonzalez	Senior Legal Counsel	LEGOP	Legal Related Matters
Patricia Hoyes	Financial Management Specialist	LCOAA	Financial Management
Saman Karunarante	Financial Analyst	LCOAA	Financial Management
Carlos Lacayo	MIS Specialist	Consultant	Mgmt Information Systems
Fabiola Montinel	Senior Legal Counsel	LEGLA	Legal Related Matters
Hideki Mori	Senior Operations Officer	LCSHS	Processing quality assurance
Judith Morroy	Procurement Specialist	LCOPR	Procurement
Fabienne Mroczka	Financial Management Specialist	Consultant	Financial Management
Ahmadou M. Ndiaye	Senior Financial Officer	LOAG3	Disbursements
Emmanuel Njomo	Financial Management Specialist	LOAG3	Financial Management
Guido Paolucci	Procurement Officer	LCC3C	Procurement
Maria Paz-Gutzalenko	E.T Temporary	LCSHS	Bank-Related Administration
Norma M. Rodriguez	Procurement Officer	LCOPR	Procurement
Gloria Rubio	Evaluation Specialist	Consultant	Impact Evaluation Study
Fily Sissoko	Senior Financial Management	LOAG3	Disbursements
Evelyn Villatoro	Procurement Officer	LCOPR	Procurement
Aracelly G. Woodall	Operations Assistance	LCSHS	Bank Administrative Logistics
Yao Wottor	Procurement Specialist	LCOPR	Procurement

## National Community Development Project (Ln. 71480)

### Key Project Data (amounts in US\$ million)

	<i>Appraisal estimate</i>	<i>Actual or current estimate</i>	<i>Actual as % of appraisal estimate</i>
Total project costs	29.65	29.82	101
Loan amount	15.00	14.70	98
Cofinancing	2.59	5.00	193
Cancellation	--	--	--

### Project Dates

	<i>Original</i>	<i>Actual</i>
Concept Review	01/24/2002	01/24/2002
Board approval	05/30/2002	05/30/2002
Effectiveness	04/08/2003	04/08/2003
Mid-term review	12/05/2005	01/09/2006
Closing date	12/31/2007	06/30/2008

### Staff Inputs (staff weeks)

<i>Stage of Project Cycle</i>	<i>No. of staff weeks</i>	<i>Staff Time and Cost (Bank Budget only)</i>
		<i>USD Thousands (including travel and consultant costs)</i>
<b>Lending</b>		
FY02	32	193.74
FY03	9	36.59
FY04		0.48
Total:	41	230.81
<b>Supervision/ ICR</b>		
FY03	7	42.77
FY04	19	131.12
FY05	25	127.61
FY06	23	115.67
FY07	18	102.71
FY08	6	18.13
Total:	98	538.01

## Mission Data

<i>Name</i>	<i>Title</i>	<i>Unit</i>	<i>Responsibility/Specialty</i>
<b>Lending</b>			
Thakoor Persaud	Lead Economist	LCSUW	Task Team Leader
<b>Supervision/ICR</b>			
Abhas Jhna	Sr. Infrastructure Specialist	LCSUW	Task Team Leader
Taimur Samand	Urban Specialist	LCSUW	Task Team Leader
Julie van Domelen	Consultant	LCSUW	ICR author
Eduardo Bayon	Consultant	LCSUW	
Jorge Cavero	Consultant	LCSPT	
Katherine M. Shafer	Consultant	LCSHE	Operational support
Leanne Farrell	Junior Professional Associate	LCSSA	
Daniel A. Hoornweg	Sr. Environmental Engr.	LCSUW	
Mary Morrison	Country Officer	LCC3C	
Ahmadou M. Ndiaye	Lead Financial Management Spec	LCSFM	
Emmanuel N. Njomo	Consultant	LCSFM	
Guido Paolucci	Sr. Procurement Spec.	LCSPT	
Norma M. Rodriguez	Procurement Analyst	LCSPT	
Heinrich K. Unger	Consultant	EAPCO	
Evelyn Villatoro	Sr. Procurement Spec.	LCSPT	