

THE WORLD BANK GROUP STAFF ASSOCIATION

ORAL HISTORY PROGRAM

Transcript of interview with

JAMES CHAFFEY

**October 25, 1988
Washington, D.C.**

Interview by: Charles Ziegler

[Begin Tape 1, Side A]

ZIEGLER: Today is October 25, 1988. My name is Charles Ziegler, and I have with me here at the Headquarters of the World Bank Mr. James Chaffey. Mr. Chaffey was one of the small group of staff who in early 1971 originally discussed the creation of a staff association. Mr. Chaffey was elected as the Chairman of the Delegate Assembly of the World Bank Group Staff, which was the provisional body set up to explore the feasibility of a staff association in depth and to draw up a draft constitution. After the ratification of the Constitution, Mr. Chaffey was elected the first Chairman of the newly established World Bank Group Staff Association. He subsequently served as a member of the Executive Committee in 1973, and in 1976 he was again elected as Chairman of the Staff Association.

Mr. Chaffey, to begin, what factors initially impelled the staff to create a staff association in the first place?

CHAFFEY: Impelled . . . What stands out in my memory is not so much a factor but an incident. You know, in those days there used to be an annual party given by the President of the Bank for all staff in the Sheraton Hotel, I think it was, or Shoreham or something. And I think in 1970--the party normally was held around about Christmas time--the party was cancelled, and the money was donated to a Bangladesh relief fund which had been set up following a cyclone in that country. The incident was not so much the fact that the party had been cancelled. I think most everybody felt that was a very worthwhile cause and sacrificing a party and giving the money to Bangladesh was equally worthwhile. However, there was circulated a memorandum by Mr. [Robert S.] McNamara's personal assistant of the time, Leif Christoffersen, which said in effect that this decision had been taken because all of the staff wanted it.

And I remember a few of us--we were friends, people like Ian Hume, Soren Holm and Frank Stubenitsky and others. I guess we were sitting around and having a drink or playing tennis or whatever else, were angry that a decision had been taken in our name, and we hadn't had any consultative mechanism. And we wondered in fact who were the people who were consulted. And I think somebody had endeavored to find out, with rather negative results. Those of us, the group that I mentioned, perhaps Tom [Thomas A.] Blinkhorn was also involved and Mats Hultin. We had from time to time discussed the idea that there should be something like a staff association; we felt that it was lacking. And some of us had had some experience of these sort of things. I was President of the Students' Union at the London School of Economics, for example, and I think others had had similar experiences. But it was rather desultory; we were all very new, I think even probably still on probation, and it wasn't the sort of thing that was encouraged, I don't think.

But as a result of that incident, we did feel--to use your word impelled, if you like--to perhaps take our interest a notch or two further. And as I recall what we did, since we were all very inexperienced, we agreed that we would each approach two or three more experienced senior-level staff members that we knew personally, just to get their reaction

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to the plausibility, desirability of setting up a staff association. In fact, if my memory is correct, it was at that time that, for example, I think Soren Holm was a good friend of Mats Hultin and that's where Mats came into the group; I don't think he was originally a part of . . . We were a group of four originally, a gang of four I suppose. It was Soren, Tom, probably Ian and myself. I think we all agreed to approach two people; I know that one of the two that I approached was Jim [James B.] Hendry who has since retired from the Bank and who was I think in his last position the Ombudsman. But I had known Jim in a different incarnation when we had both lived in East Pakistan, as it then was.

And we approached these individuals, and then we met again to discuss reactions. And I remember that the reactions were very mixed. For example, Jim Hendry was quite horrified at the thought of a staff association and equally horrified that I, as a very junior member of the staff, should get involved in it. He strongly counseled against that. And I think from the eight or ten people that were approached in this fashion, we got the same sort of mixed bag of reactions. But as a result of it we decided that we would as a group seek an appointment with Hugh Ripman, who was then Director of Administration, which embraced all of the personnel functions. And I have quite vivid memories of that meeting, which went extremely badly. Ripman was very courteous, a long-serving member of the World Bank. But clearly he thought two things: one, that the staff association was anathema to the World Bank, and second, that it was no business anyway of these sprogs who were coming into his office. And again I have memories of Hugh, when the meeting was over, opening the door and saying, "My door is always open." You know, like this, leaving us with the impression that it certainly was not.

But we felt sufficiently . . . What is the word? Not sure of ourselves. We were not not sure, but we did feel that there was a need to be served, and as a result of the momentum that had been generated by these meetings and some encouraging results, including I may say from my own masters, the people for whom I was actually working at the time, that probably this was a good thing. And so we went ahead with these arrangements to call a meeting of the . . . We got in touch with somebody in every department and called a meeting. And that's really how it started.

ZIEGLER: There were--I hear some echoes in the background about the--certain references in the Board to the possibility of a staff association. Are you familiar with this? Or was this perhaps after you people had originally kind of got the ball rolling?

CHAFFEY: I don't recall anything like that. I think we felt that we were pioneering something. I can't say for certain whether we were, and there were probably other people who had similar thoughts at that time, or maybe even earlier. But I think we did feel that we had generated a certain momentum and a certain level of interest. And by the time--for you reminded me of this note of the meeting in March of 1971--by the time that came around, clearly, and you can see by the participation there that there were a lot of people who similarly felt that there ought to be a forum for a representative staff view. It didn't drive from a feeling that the Bank was mistreating staff or anything like that. Perhaps, if anything, it drove from a feeling that the Bank was rather paternalistic, avuncular. And

that perhaps if there were such a thing as an orchestrated staff viewpoint, it could contribute positively.

And I mention that deliberately because again I think Reg [Reginald A.] Clarke was then called Deputy Director of Personnel or something like that. He was in charge of the personnel function under Hugh Ripman. And he was one of the most encouraging people, his private counsel. And indeed as later events showed, when we still had only what we called a provisional assembly, it was quite the normal thing for Reg to use us as a sounding board for many things. I think he did not feel a great deal of confidence in some of the staff that were allocated to Personnel. In those days, you know, the Bank was growing and moving, with tremendous sense of activity and enterprise; McNamara's leadership was beginning to take hold. The Bank was a ferment of growth and excitement. And I think Personnel was suffering from this in the sense that they were not attracting the good people. It was sort of rather like the Shavian dialectic; those that could did; those that couldn't went into Personnel. And I think Reg felt this, and he found it very useful, for example when drafting policy papers, to send them to some of us because we were better able to give him a reading or, you know, just straightforward suggestions as to the strength and weaknesses of any proposal. But he was one of the people who was very encouraging from the outset.

In 1971 I was--my official title was--Secretary of the Economic Committee, and I was formally located in the Secretary's Department. Mort [Morton M.] Mendels was then the Secretary, and Donald Fowler was the Deputy Secretary. They did not approve at all of these activities; both of them quite horrified by them in fact. But the Chairman of the Economic Committee, who had recently come on board at that time, was Hollis Chenery. He had replaced [Irving] Friedman. But Hollis was very, very supportive indeed, very supportive. So we--there was enough support coming. Two people I knew and other people who came in, people like Mats Hultin, who was then, I think, Division Chief or Adviser in Education or something like that, but a man of some standing in the Bank. And there were one or two like him who encouraged us to go ahead with the exercise.

ZIEGLER: When you proceeded to set up the first Delegate Assembly, which is of course pre-constitutional. .

CHAFFEY: Right.

ZIEGLER: . . how was this done? You didn't have any mechanism as exists now with the Staff Association . .

CHAFFEY: No, we didn't.

ZIEGLER: . . where you can actually go out and hold elections. How did you actually go about doing this?

CHAFFEY: We agreed among ourselves on a few ground rules which we . . . First of all, we agreed that the best thing was to have a meeting. There should be one or two, I can't remember, representatives from every organizational unit, basically departments, so

that there was all sort of, lot of odds and ends of organizational units. We agreed that the most senior of our group, who was Mats Hultin, should chair the meeting and that we would--we really had two purposes. One was to discover whether there should be a staff association, whether people wanted it, and what purposes it would serve. And the second question was in the event that the answer to the first question was yes, what form it should take.

ZIEGLER: So you still weren't a hundred percent sure?

CHAFFEY: Oh, no. No, no. Quite the contrary. What we wanted to do was to test the idea, on a much wider, preferably semi-representational basis. And these people were all volunteers; they were just approached because we knew them, and we knew we were not representational in that sense. But we were representational in the sense there were however many people from all different departments. And they were encouraged, indeed mandated I think, to explain to everybody to circulate pieces of paper like this. And in fact the issue of legitimacy never really cropped up because people accepted that this was a reasonable way to get something started. Particularly, as I say, the primary objective was to explore whether there should be such an association and what it would do, and second what form it would take. And these two separate task forces were set up. Tom Blinkhorn, if I remember rightly, chaired the first task force, and I can't remember who chaired the second. But those were the primary purposes.

And as you know, eventually this led to a referendum on whether there should be a staff association and the setting up of a committee--not a committee but a small working group--to draft a constitution and so forth.

ZIEGLER: Luckily that's fairly well documented in the files, I find.

CHAFFEY: Good. But I presume also these meetings are fairly well documented. I do remember doing quite a bit of drafting on this. And quite a number of things. We had a concept from the very beginning that--I should go back and say that I don't think the personnel function was terribly well carried out in those days. As I mentioned, Clarke had very little support and often lamented the lack of support in these things. But everything was done in a very charismatic and personal basis. There was--oh well, many examples, but my mind is confused as to when exactly they came up. But put it this way, that in the nature of the organization and the pace and tempo of change were such that considerations such as equity between staff members really hadn't become prominent issues. There was growing concern about them. After one had got here, it became apparent that people were recruited under very different bases, at very different salary levels and all that sort of thing.

ZIEGLER: What, in the event, proved to be the most difficult organizational issues, in actually setting up the Staff Association?

CHAFFEY: Well, it was remarkably straightforward. Perhaps because the ground was reasonably well prepared. I think the first report on whether there should be a staff association was a very well-produced document by Tom Blinkhorn and his associates.

Tom was a journalist, and I haven't seen the document for years, but I recall that it was well put together and was very well received. And it set out the objectives, the possible objectives, of a staff association in a very reasoned and nonthreatening manner. We were not setting up a radical group or anything like that. But that report was very well put forward, I think.

I have less memory of the second report on what form the association will take, and I have a feeling that did not [inaudible].

ZIEGLER: It was a working party or something like that?

CHAFFEY: There was a working party. There were two working parties. The second one I don't think jelled in quite the same way. The first report was very quickly accepted and then the task was . . . Well there were two tasks: one was to see whether there were sufficient grounds for support. And since we were not legitimately set up, we had no obvious representational basis. There had to be a referendum of staff. And then again in this I remember that Reg Clarke was very helpful in helping to organize this, and encouraging, presumably. He must have done a great deal more than I was aware of, encouraging people at the senior level to accept that this was a logical development.

I may say, at the same time in the IMF [International Monetary Fund] something similar was happening. And I was personally in touch with one of the people who was doing the same sort of thing in the IMF. They eventually came up with a very different staff association, but it moved at roughly--I think we stimulated them slightly. I had a friend in the IMF who picked up a little from our activities. His name is Grant Taplin. And I think we felt we had sponsored them just slightly. Maybe they felt the other way around. I don't know.

ZIEGLER: I may be wrong, I seem to recall reading that there was a staff union of some sort in the IMF going back many years, but it had become dormant.

CHAFFEY: Possibly. Possibly.

ZIEGLER: And so this was really a . . .

CHAFFEY: A revival, yes. That could be so, that could be so.

Your question was, what major difficulties. The referendum was very straightforward and was in fact a very pleasant occasion. I remember when we were counting the votes. We counted them one evening. I think it took place during the day and then Reg Clarke set aside a room. And he actually came and helped us count them. I remember he brought in--he came with his wife, his then-wife and brought in a few crates of beer and sandwiches and so on. And it--and that was important because one of the first things that the Staff Association established very clearly was--and it happened almost from the first meeting--that this was an occasion when people of all different levels in the Bank and . . . We didn't have grades before 1969 I don't think. The grading structure came in 1969, but even by 1971 people were still not terribly used to this. But we were all officially graded.

But this was an occasion when the grades disappeared, and everybody was very much on a personal first-name term with everybody else.

And it became a tradition which was followed through in the first year or so religiously to, after a meeting, go across to Marty LaFalle's and have beer and French fries or fried potatoes or chips as we'd call them in England. And I remember that it was Steve [Stephen D.] Eccles in fact who contributed to that, the fact that we always had vinegar on them because that was English style. But it became a tradition. Afterward we'd all go and sit at Marty LaFalle's. You know, you'd find yourself sitting with a guy who was a chauffeur and someone else who was in the administration and so on. And there was a tremendous sense of well-being across layers and structures. And that was personified in this referendum count when Reg brought in all of this beer, I remember, and we had--it was an overwhelming result. I can't remember now.

ZIEGLER: I think it was 78 percent.

CHAFFEY: Of the total number of staff, I think. It was a very, very convincing result.

So then the next step was--armed with that--was to set up a constitution. And that was where I think we ran into our first really serious disagreements within the group rather than without. And they basically stemmed from . . . I think the second working party had set up guidelines as to what form the Staff Association should take. And my memory is that the constitutional drafting group--which comprised Raymond Cope (who was then a very senior man, I think Deputy Chairman of the Loan Committee), Peter Eigen and Gill [Gillian R.] Kaplan--effectively disobeyed their orders. They were given guidelines on what they should produce, but they came up with a totally different model. They were also supposed to share their thoughts as they went along, but it became really an exercise heavily dominated I think by Cope and Peter Eigen, as to the way they felt I should be regardless of the wishes that had been expressed.

By this time I was Chairman of the then-provisional Assembly, and I remember the report was supposed to be delivered to me. And the delivery was typical of the problems that we were about to encounter because it was delivered to me during the Annual Meetings up at the Sheraton Park Hotel. And of course Cope, who was a very senior staff member . . . I got a message summoning me to his office. And I went in and he presented the report. I mean, the manner in which it was done was the manner of top down, master to servant. Here's your report, go away and put the right ribbon on and so forth.

And I asked him a couple of questions. And I remember, I said, "What should I look for in this? Do you have any problems?"

And he dismissed it saying, "Well, you just read it and you'll see what we've done."

And I walked out of there feeling this is not the way the Staff Association is supposed to work; I am supposed to be the boss, and in this capacity he was working for me.

And then when I read it I was horrified because they had, as I say, completely ignored the guidelines. And I think I got in touch with Tom Blinkhorn and one or two others, and we realized immediately we had a problem on our hands because although the actual structure of the Association was a controversial issue, the controversies had been sorted out in the working party meetings. And we recognized that. And we were very concerned from an early stage that once an agreement had been reached we should adopt a procedure, not the rule of law exactly, but we should abide by our decisions because we felt, many of us, that the enemy of an effective staff association would be one in which it never had any procedures, it never had any rules, and it just lurched from one sort of crisis to another with every decision, every policy, being overturned at the next meeting. But what you sought to provide was appropriate opportunity for exploration of issues and selection of options, but thereafter, after they had been discussed and agreed upon and voted in, whatever was the procedure provided, you had to stick to it for a reasonable period of time, set the policy and adhere to it. And this was the first crisis of that kind that we reached, I remember.

ZIEGLER: Could you contrast just slightly the two models, if you will?

CHAFFEY: Oh, yes.

ZIEGLER: The one that was presented to you, I gather, is the one that was ultimately adopted, was it not?

CHAFFEY: No, no, no. It wasn't. It was heavily changed. And the changes were voted on in this provisional Delegate Assembly. Principally I think the first big issue was whether the head of the Association, the Chairman of the Committees, should be Chairman of the Assembly. This had been an issue, as I say. It had been resolved in the working party, and it had come down in one particular, on one particular side of this. There were a number of other issues, and frankly I can't remember all of them. Maybe they had to do with the size of the committee or maybe even the structure of the Delegate Assembly, but I remember that the drafting group had done a good job. It had come up with a model, but it was a very different model in several key respects from the one that it had been asked to produce. And so in the Delegate Assembly there were very detailed discussions about this, and ultimately I think the Assembly rejected several of the major features of the Eigen-Cope design and went back to a model that had been called for by the working party. And the Constitution was redrafted accordingly.

Now, the drafters were all members of the Delegate Assembly, the provisional Delegate Assembly, and so there was plenty of debate. And I think we had two or three meetings on this topic before finally coming up with a constitution.

ZIEGLER: Given constitutional questions--well, this is not strictly a constitutional question, but it touches on some of the workings of the Staff Association. What were the thoughts of the founding members concerning the problem of representing what were then in fact three different categories of staff: that is to say, professional, special services and general services, which at least potentially have different interests?

CHAFFEY: Well, I think the so-called F/I job grades group had not at that time emerged as an issue with anything like the same force as it subsequently did. But clearly there were already, at the time we were setting this up, problems of the differentiation of staff. And I think one of the early objectives that was formulated was that with respect to conditions of employment and so forth, this distinction should be done away with.

ZIEGLER: Equal access to benefits, I know.

CHAFFEY: That's right. The professional, nonprofessional thing was inappropriate in many respects, particularly since a clarion call of the management that you often heard McNamara say was that this was an institution which could only survive with the best staff. And clearly we had the right to expect high performance at all levels. And it was very apparent, I mean, to all of us, even within a very short space of time, that that meant high performance not simply from the so-called professional but also from the support staff member. Without that your productivity was heavily undermined. But more important, I think it was felt as a matter of policy, the rules of equity demanded that there should be equal access to benefits.

That was one of the early issues. The other major issue as I again recall was that there was really no opportunity to deal with perceived inequity. There was no way that a staff member, locked into a particular unit--not locked, but located in a particular unit--could form a judgment as to whether his treatment . . . He might know a little bit about his treatment vis-à-vis other people within the unit, but he had no knowledge, if he worked in East Africa, what was going on in Latin America or in Administrative Services or whatever else. And of course this problem was exacerbated by rumor and by various things. And indeed my memory is that it was even an issue that Clarke raised with me on a number of occasions--that this became a problem.

One issue I do remember very clearly in my mind was in merit reviews. There were very few if any rules about merit reviews and so it was apparent . . . I can remember some of the names in all this, I'm not sure how appropriate it is to mention them all. But for example there was one director in one, I think they were called area departments in those days, whose concept of good performance measured by the amount of merit review was very different, say, to another area department whose concept of good performance led to a totally different type of merit package. And I think this was the thing that for Personnel, which was rather weak vis-à-vis the operating departments and other departments, was already a matter of concern. And certain examples of this were brought to our attention. And this explains why one of the early, if not indeed the first, policy paper that as an association we ever tried to write was on how to deal with grievances or concerns that would arise out of this. And in fact the paper was written by Bengt Sandberg, Ed [A. Edward] Elmendorf and me. The three of us formed a little working group and produced this paper, which led to the first example of a judgment by peers group, which I think subsequently led to the Administrative--not to the Administrative Tribunal but to the Appeals Committee and so forth.

And again it was all done with the knowledge of Personnel and, you know, we started to function. We started to meet as a group and encouraged people to come to us and we would discuss cases and go to Personnel and represent people in their dealings with Personnel. And we had a number of early successes in this type of exercise. I can remember some of the cases quite well.

But that was the second major issue. There was no way in which issues like this, equity across the Bank, could well be aired, if you like, in the first place and then of course to be resolved.

ZIEGLER: You've already touched on this question to some extent, but mainly with regard to Reg Clarke. What was the attitude of the Management with a capital M toward the creation of the Staff Association? Obviously Reg Clarke was very supportive, but let's say people even higher up at the vice presidential level and even Mr. McNamara. And if you have any reports on what the Board was thinking about all this, it would be interesting to hear.

CHAFFEY: I don't recall anything with the Board. I do recall that we did have discussions in our own gatherings about who we should work with, and I think we came to the conclusion that we should work with management and not with the Board. I mean, that was one of the early positions taken which was later revised, and I think rightly so. But at that early stage I think it was definitely our corporate wisdom that we should work with management. And frankly once the thing had started to move, I don't recall any serious opposition. Managers with whom I was in contact--I already mentioned Hollis Chenery, and then sometime late in 1971 I moved into the Europe/Middle East Department as a loan officer, and then my area manager was [Munir P.] Benjink. And again he was very supportive indeed. I'm sure there were people who were opposed to it. I used to play golf with a couple of people who were in fairly senior positions, and I remember one of them, Lars Lind, who was the deputy head of the External Relations Department. Lars was a very charming man. He was always poking fun of the concept with gentle irony. He supported it in principle, but he always said it would degenerate, and he actually proved quite right, quite prescient in a number of things.

But I think he just reflected the general attitude, which was it seemed like a logical and normal step. And the hope was that the association that emerged would be fairly responsible. And I think that's reflected in the makeup of this committee. But if you looked at the list of delegates of the first Delegate Assembly and compared that with a Delegate Assembly today--although I'm not very familiar with the Delegate Assembly today, I say with the Delegate Assembly two or three years ago when I was more familiar with it--you would be struck by the very broad range of participation. For example, Raymond Cope, as a level above department head, was a delegate, and it was quite normal to have managers as delegates. Indeed, that was an issue that was discussed at some--should managers be delegates? And we said, yes, of course. I mean, that was the opinion of the Association that they could if they wanted to be. And there was a very wide sprinkling of people from all management levels, and indeed all levels in the Bank. And this, as I say, was one of the very nice things that the Association created. A quite

strong body of fellowship among participating delegates and so forth which was reflected in the aftermath of every meeting, the going across to Marty LaFalle's, for example.

ZIEGLER: I recall Bengt Sandberg saying to me in a similar interview that many people who subsequently had very illustrious careers in the Bank, and who are still here many of them, were extremely supportive of the Staff Association, in fact directly contributed to its creation and to its early work.

CHAFFEY: Oh, yes. The first committee of the formal Association included certainly Tony [Anthony A.] Churchill. Ping [Ping-Cheung] Lo was on it if I remember rightly. [A. Edward] Elmendorf, Sandberg were there. I remember more clearly the Assembly. There were plenty of people who, as you say, all had very good careers.

But it's worth interjecting at this point that it wasn't always quite like that. On a personal note, my involvements in the Staff Association cost me quite dearly. It almost led to my leaving the Bank. Because I think it was at the end of 1970-- the time somewhere round about the very early period. In those days you used to get your merit increase at the end of the year, right at the end of the year, some sort of last act of your boss with you. And I remember on this particular occasion the day before Christmas was a working day, and I was still in the Secretary's Department. And I didn't get the call from Mr. Mendels, and finally I got the call long after everybody else and after mid-day. Officially we'd gone back just to get my package. And I remember I got a zero increase or something like that, which was quite shattering. I joined in mid-1969, and I had an accelerated confirmation, and I had thought things were going quite well. But Mendels, he was a very nice man and always very friendly, but he said in no uncertain terms that he didn't think I had a future in the Bank, and he did not appreciate--and it was not appreciated--that I was active in the Staff Association, and he recommended that I should leave.

This happened on Christmas Eve, Christmas Eve afternoon. And I remember I was hurt; I was vulnerable. And this was very early in the Staff Association process. And none of the--you know, you gather a certain amount of strength through people around you and positive feedback and so on, and we didn't have any of that at this stage. And the worst fate was to befall Soren Holm, who was in fact dismissed. And I have no doubt in my mind, and he had none in his, that it was partly due to his involvement. He never did get his confirmation. You know, he was subsequently rehired by the Bank as a consultant and so on, but he was definitely a victim, and I was almost a victim.

Fortunately, Chenery came on board on January 1, 1971, if my memory serves, and after it became apparent that I would continue to work for him, I was able--I built a working relationship with him very quickly. He played tennis and so did I so we became quite good friends. In fact we remain good friends to this day.

But it was a very unpleasant period for me. And the Secretary's Department was, well, a rather loose organization in those days. And, you know, it wasn't an easy place to work in. And I remember feeling that it was no good. After Christmas, one of the first things I did to come back was to see my personnel officer who is today a very senior personnel

officer in the Bank. And he confirmed this and said, “No, I don't think there's any place for you in the Bank, Jim.”

ZIEGLER: Was there any opposition from the staff to setting up the Staff Association?

CHAFFEY: Not that I recall at all. From the referendum results, and if I'm right I think the referendum was based upon the draft Constitution.

ZIEGLER: It was.

CHAFFEY: By that time--no, I don't think so. Clearly there was some opposition, but it was apparent that we were perceived as going about the matter in a very responsible way. Because of the depth of participation and the breadth of participation perhaps, we didn't face any issues of that kind.

ZIEGLER: You were elected unopposed as Chairman of the Constituent Assembly, or the Constituent Assembly, rather sort of the provisional Assembly before the Constitution was ratified. Were you anticipating any opposition? In other words, were there any political rivalries there, or were things pretty much cut and dried?

CHAFFEY: The first meeting--I presume it was the first meeting we had--a group of us had sort of initiated this and asked Mats Hultin to take the chair because he was a senior and better known person. But it soon became apparent to some of us that he was not a very effective chairman. He had a very monotonous, heavy, boring sounding voice, and he made everything seem very somber and humorless. And as a result, at some stage during the process, during 1971 I think--I can't really remember how it, what the volition was, but the feeling was that somebody else should take over as Chairman, and I got the nod on this. And I was very happy to do it. And I certainly had no qualms about feeling I could be a better Chairman than Mats Hultin, having had some of that experience, but it was just that, you know, he did not have that type of confidence and manner. And I suppose that having become Chairman of the provisional Assembly gave me a head start. It was just assumed that if I wanted to I could carry on. And I enjoyed it. It gave me an opportunity. My early years in the Bank in the Secretary's Department were not very good years. I didn't like [inaudible] and I didn't like the job. And this gave me a definite interest. And it opened a lot of doors. It brought me into contact with a lot of people, and I'm sure contributed to the fact that by late in 1971 I was able to make the jump into Operations, which of course was the objective of everybody in the service departments.

ZIEGLER: Going on with your position of Chairman, it has been said that as Chairman you of necessity ran the Delegate Assembly meetings with an iron hand, as you had some very articulate members of the Delegate Assembly who were, I gather, inclined to run on a bit. As a result, there apparently were some grumblings about dictatorial methods. How would you respond to that?

CHAFFEY: The last part I don't remember, about the dictatorial methods, because I don't think that's a valid charge. I don't think you could be dictatorial. But it's certainly true that we had a lot of very articulate people, and it's certainly true that in a voluntary assembly

of this kind, bringing a discussion to a conclusion, assessing consensus or taking a vote and so forth are difficult tasks. Within an assembly framework people don't easily sometimes take the position that they should abide by the majority. They take the position, rather, that they should be allowed to carry on their views and perhaps return time and again to that view. I don't recall it being very difficult.

Much later, when I became Chairman of the Association a second, separate time, it was a major issue. But that time I recall it primarily as being fun; I recall the level of discussion as being articulate and amusing and worthwhile; and I recall a lot of humor in the Assembly. I remember there was a debate on whether we should admit IFC [International Finance Corporation] and I can remember chiding Barbara Eschenbach on one occasion for some comment she made. There was a lot of repartee, there was a lot of good humor, but there was a lot of serious intent.

And my impression was that the members of the Executive Committee enjoyed very strong support within the Assembly. We were prepared to do the work. We did work very hard. We produced a lot of papers, we worked efficiently, we got our papers out on time. And in those days there was no full-time support; everything was voluntary. We did our own typing and our own writing and so forth. But we had high standards. It was important to all of us that the Association should be perceived as meeting the sort of standards that the Bank itself demanded. We didn't want scruffy papers; we didn't want inaccuracies. We didn't want to take positions which we couldn't defend against, you know, the purview of those who were dealing with them in a professional fashion. And we also realized that we did have strengths because we had a wide variety of disciplines, and our task was to make use of them. And the formula we adopted was to find people who were willing and able to handle tasks and to submit draft reports and so on to the scrutiny of the Executive Committee, which was a tough body.

ZIEGLER: One issue that we had touched on before, I don't know if we've covered it exhaustively, but one the Delegate Assembly was elected and the Staff Association was under way, the issue of discrimination in access to benefits based on categories of professional, special services, and general services became an issue in the Delegate Assembly, and I believe you mentioned to me that the first policy paper written by the Staff Association was on that issue. Is there anything further to be gained from pursuing that line?

CHAFFEY: No, the first policy paper was not on the issue of access to benefits. I think it was on the issue of some . .

[End Tape 1, Side A]

[Begin Tape 1, Side B]

CHAFFEY: . . sort of administrative tribunal. But the issue of access to benefits was one of the first, if not the first, major issue that the Association tackled. And I think we came clearly to the position that there should be equal access to benefits. And that became a

tenet of the Staff Association's approach in discussions on salary and benefits and so forth, which was obviously an area we very quickly got in.

The subject I am sure was debated exhaustively, but it was a very clearly held view within the Association that it should be that way.

ZIEGLER: During your term as first elected Chairman of the Staff Association in 1972, the Bank underwent its first major reorganization in 20 years. How did the Staff Association address the issues inevitably raised by such a reorganization?

CHAFFEY: Not, I suspect, as well as they probably did in the recent reorganization. The reorganization happened very quickly. And was much less of a public event than, say, the one that was carried out by Mr. [Barber B.] Conable. There were consultants in; they prepared a report. People knew what was going on, but it didn't seem to affect their daily lives. And the very major changes in structure were taken during the summer holiday period when a lot of people were away, and it was all carried out in a very short space of time. I think in the implementation we became very conscious of the fact that a lot of people were getting, or perceived that they were getting, short shrift. And I think that was also one of the factors which led to this policy paper on administrative tribunals. So maybe we had already--I don't know whether we already had it out at that time, but it reinforced our own views on that.

And second, I remember that we were consulted. I mentioned to you that Clarke was in the habit of coming to the Staff Association quite informally and showing us draft papers and policy papers, and a number of papers connected with the reorganization were shown to us. I remember one in particular on termination benefits. In those days I think the personnel manual didn't provide at all for termination benefits. You could be dismissed with two weeks or four weeks pay or something like that. It was a very, very slender reed indeed. And I remember Clarke coming to us with a draft paper. And we had a lot of difficulty with this draft paper and extensively rewrote it. I remember we were calling up different associations and getting in touch with firms to find out how they dealt with this and so forth. We did quite a little bit of gathering of information, and we extensively rewrote the paper. I think I'm right in saying that it was the Association that first of all came up with the formula, which has stood to this day basically, of one month's pay for each year of service, under certain situations of termination. And we had embellishments to that, periods of notice, links to the staff retirement plan and so forth. But the core feature was something that we came up with. And I think we also came up with the second thing, that using that formula you could apply coefficient 100 percent or 125 percent or 75 percent and so on, depending upon the particular circumstances of termination. And I think that that was one, that was a major contribution we made.

But in practice very few people actually terminated in the first reorganization, very few indeed. It was more a question of juggling, of major expansion; in fact overwhelming majority of people benefited from it. But it was an issue which obviously concerned the Staff Association at that time.

But for the rest, I don't think we got as heavily involved as we might have done. I should backtrack a little. Although I think we had been well received at management level, fairly widespread management level, we did not receive a blessing from our leader from the outset. I remember that I had assumed upon being elected Chairman of the Staff Association that one of the first things that would happen would be that I would be invited by Mr. McNamara to meet him. No such invitation ever came. And I seem to recall we had a discussion in the Executive Committee that if we weren't invited we should stand back and I shouldn't push. You know, that was the attitude, that sort of thing. But we were all of us a little bit shocked that he never formally recognized our existence. I think subsequently we did formally invite him to come and address the Assembly and then to perhaps address the Executive Committee. Such invitations were never taken up. I recall from seeing these papers that [Mohamed] Shoaib came to address the Committee and so forth, or the Assembly. And perhaps through that ultimately some pressure was brought to bear on Mr. McNamara to receive . . . Initially he didn't receive the Chairman; he wouldn't do that. He never received the . . . At least not for a long time would he receive me in my individual capacity.

But he did receive the officers. I think four officers or five. And I remember the first meeting very clearly. I think Reg Clarke was there, and we all sort of wandered in rather stiffly. And he went down the line, and Reg said, "This is Mr. Chaffey who's . . ." McNamara had this sort of . . . Personal bonhomie was not his strong point. I mean, he could make a formal—he could come over quite warmly, but it was somewhat fleeting and somewhat ephemeral. But he went down the line, shook my hand, and I think he shook Madeleine Wyss' perhaps or somebody else's. And then he came to Ed Elmendorf, and suddenly he said, "Oh, hi, Ed. How are you? How's your dad?" And it was such a shock to us because none of us knew that Ed Elmendorf was of the Elmendorfs who were great personal friends of the McNamaras. But that's my memory of that meeting.

ZIEGLER: I gather from some of the previous interviews I've had in this series that McNamara was in fact supportive of the Staff Association. I mean, it wasn't as if he was hostile to it. Perhaps his personal style was one of more studied indifference.

CHAFFEY: I wouldn't say he was supportive. My memory is that he . . . At the very best he was neutral. In fact I would say he wasn't even neutral because I can recall a number of conversations with Hollis Chenery on this subject, and Hollis would say to me, "You know, I tried to persuade Bob to be more supportive, but he really doesn't believe in a staff association. He's really very negative about it."

But he did, to be fair, receive us, and on one or two occasions after that I remember that he received me. Finally I was received once or twice personally. And usually it was when he had something that he wanted to make a point to the Staff Association and so forth. I remember on one occasion being told that he wanted to see me, and the appointment was quite late in the evening, 7:45 or 7:46. You know, you got these very precise timings with McNamara. And I went to the office, and I sat there for, oh, a long time, half an hour, 45 minutes, maybe even longer, which was very unusual. And there was nobody around, just one secretary. And finally he came busting out of his office--he

was always in his shirt sleeves--and he came wandering out to me and said, "Chaffey, I'm terribly sorry I kept you waiting so long, but I had [King] Hussein of Jordan in there and the fellow wouldn't go." And I felt, you know, après moi le deluge or something like that. But I--it was a most curious feeling. I can't really explain it.

ZIEGLER: Do you feel that there was adequate consultation between management and the Staff Association during the 1972 reorganization that has been mentioned previously?

CHAFFEY: Oh, I think it's pretty unlikely. It was not in the style of things at all. I think it was very much a top-down exercise. But the circumstances were very different. It was an exercise designed to loosen the reins and permit greater flexibility, greater potential for expansion to deal with the very clearly, for the first time, clearly articulated growth objectives that the Bank had. I mean McNamara had this doubling of lending in five years and many objectives like this. But not simply quantitative, they were qualitative as well. And the very, very archaic structure on the project and the area side and so on, and within the support departments, clearly needed overhaul. And I think this was designed to permit a much more fluid structure. And as such it was done implicitly with more support because it did provide enormous opportunities to the staff. So I don't think it was the same atmosphere that surrounded the organization last time around. But I think it's probably fair to say there was . . . I don't think there was any structured consultation. And there were, of course, a lot of people who were not particularly happy.

ZIEGLER: All right. There was discussion of it in the Delegate Assembly, but you wouldn't say there was any formal consultation as such?

CHAFFEY: No, there was certainly no formal consultation with us at all. And probably I don't think we sought it. I mean, there were quite a few people at the time. It was one of the issues that came up from time to time, and I think the position the Association took at that time was very clearly that the purpose of the Bank was not our purpose, that we were . . . I think, if my memory serves, it's embodied in the first article of the Constitution, that we supported the objectives of the Bank, and we did not want to get involved in the substantive business of the Bank. And we probably took the position that this was the substantive business of the Bank. A view which I don't think the Association would take today. But I think that was the one we took then.

ZIEGLER: McKenzie and Company also undertook a study of compensation in the Bank in 1972. Could you highlight any of the major issues involved and the Staff Association's response to them?

CHAFFEY: It was very clear from a very early stage that compensation was not the major issue among staff. There was a very high degree of satisfaction with compensation. It was quite unusual. I mean, this came out in our own discussions and so forth. The access to benefits was an issue. Also there was an important issue on the Staff Retirement Plan and the nature of the Staff Retirement Plan and certain characteristics of it. But in general the benefit packages were . . . The salary packages were viewed as being very satisfactory. We had this whole cost of living increase and the separate merit exercise and so forth. There were, of course, grumbles about the application of the merit

exercise, and I've already mentioned that we ourselves pressed for a more uniform approach to the granting of merit increases. I think it was our feeling, it was our position clearly as an association, that we were not dealing with major issues of discontent with salary, not at all. We hadn't yet run into problems with the declining dollar or anything like that which were to have such an impact a year or two later.

ZIEGLER: Yes, I was going to say, this changed.

CHAFFEY: Very rapidly.

ZIEGLER: You were a member of the Executive Committee in 1973 when Gillian Kaplan was the Chairman. I've spoken to Gillian about this, of course, but I'd be interested in your reaction as a member of the Executive Committee at that time, as to how management and staff reacted to the fact that she was both female and a general services--that is in today's terms a support level—staff member.

CHAFFEY: Yes, she was a secretary. Well, I think there was quite an expectation that I would carry on to be Chairman and for various personal reasons I decided at a late stage I didn't want to do this. And it seemed to me that Gill was the most deserving person to succeed. I mean, she had been involved all throughout the previous year. I think she was Deputy Chairman wasn't she, in the previous year? One of the two deputies, I think. And she was an extremely hardworking and responsible person.

I don't think that it presented any problems with the Committee or the Assembly. It was very much in keeping with the spirit to which I constantly make reference because it was so important that we didn't see ourselves as grade this or grade that. We saw ourselves as very much equals, and the judgments that we passed on each other were related to the effort and the contribution we made. You know, we had capable people on the Committee who it turned out would never do anything. They were always too busy or something like that. People were not afraid to identify that as the judging factor rather than the fact that a person might be higher or lower level. So I don't really remember that there was any serious issue about the fact that Gill was female and Jewish and a secretary and so forth. These alleged impedimenta were not an issue at all. I think there was an issue in Gill's own confidence. Her personality is more . . . She's a very warm person, but she's slow-speaking. She's not quick on the take and so forth. And she was vulnerable. Although she could be quite tough, she could be hurt and she would internalize wounds sometimes. And I think she herself had some doubts about the matter. And I remember she received very strong support from Sandberg, who was actually her boss, and from me and from others. In fact, I don't know when it occurred. I can't place it in historical terms, but I know that this contributed to a subsequent promotion. Kaplan became then I think first person ever promoted from a secretarial position to a professional position as a loan officer. And I was consulted on that and was very strongly supportive of it.

ZIEGLER: The year 1973 also saw two salary increases within the same year. Could you relate some of the issues surrounding these increases and the role of the Staff Association?

CHAFFEY: Without refreshing my memory, I would find it quite difficult to do so. I think this was the time when we started to deal with the falling dollar and the question of the . .

ZIEGLER: Expatriation allowance.

CHAFFEY: . . expatriation allowance came up. And this is when I think we started the . . . You could start taking part of your salary in home currency option, or something was introduced around about this time, as I recall. But my own interests and allegiance to the Staff Association started to weaken very considerably at this time. We're talking 1973-1974. Professionally my career started to take off. I moved I think in January 1974 to become a loan officer from the . . . I had been working in a division headed by Mr. Adi Davar working on some Middle Eastern countries, Iraq and Egypt and so forth, and on January 1, 1974, I moved to a division headed by Norman Horsley which handled East European countries. And the move there was partly to allow a separate division to be formed out of that one to head up the Romania program, which was just starting. And [Hans] Eberhard Kopp, who was the loan officer, was destined to become a division chief just a few months later. And that's what happened. And I took over Yugoslavia, which was a very active country and quite a difficult and interesting country. And a whole grab-bag of smaller countries like Ireland and Spain and so forth. And Horsley, who was the Division Chief, had a rather mixed bag of people. And it was clear that there was supposed to be some sort of turnover, and I was a key part in that. I had already established a reputation as a sound loan officer in the Region, and I was brought in to make up the gap when Kopp left.

And then suddenly in March or April or something like that, Horsley had a very serious heart attack and was out of action. So I found myself acting as Division Chief for most of the rest of that year. So, you know, I became very immersed in my work and traveled to Yugoslavia almost monthly at that time. So it was that plus the fact that I sort of grew away a little bit from the Staff Association. And, you know, I think I resigned at the end of that year. I didn't run for the Assembly again, as I recall. Maybe I did, but I didn't run for the Committee I think. But I felt during that year, after about halfway, my own interest began to flag quite considerably. I couldn't attend all the meetings. And I wasn't able to all my obligations. And after such an intense involvement over a period of whatever it had been, two and a half to three years, it was very unsatisfying not to be able to give fully. And so I started to withdraw. I intended to pack up . . .

ZIEGLER: When you say resign, though, you didn't mean from the Association as such but . .

CHAFFEY: No, no.

ZIEGLER: . . simply from . . .

CHAFFEY: In those days there was no contracting in as you have now. I mean, we all are members of the Staff Association.

ZIEGLER: Unless you specifically request not to be.

CHAFFEY: Unless you contracted out. So that was a non-issue. But I remember my own attitude changed, and for the first time I really had very intense involvement I my work, and I felt people looked to me and relied upon me. And as I say, with Norman Horsley being sick I was surprised when I was asked to act as Division Chief. It was a golden opportunity for me, suddenly in the space of about, well, two years from being an also-ran in the Secretary's Department where I spent my time writing minutes of meetings to suddenly running an operational meeting in a very active and difficult country. So I was just very lucky. And Norman's sad misfortune was my great opportunity.

ZIEGLER: Having been chairman of the provisional Delegate Assembly and the first elected Chairman of the new Staff Association, you were elected Chairman for the 1976-1977 term. What induced you to again stand for election, especially in light of what you've just said?

CHAFFEY: In reading your questions, that was the one that I had the most difficulty with. In fact I called my wife to talk about it because she played a very prominent role in that. I married for the second time; I was divorced shortly before I came to the Bank in 1969, and I was single all of this time, which greatly facilitated my involvement in the Association. Time was not a problem for me. But in mid-1975 I got married again. And in that year I think Amir Al-Khafaji was the Chairman. We were having a lunch today, Amir and I, sitting opposite one another, and we were recalling this briefly. But there came an issue . . . And also what was important was I had formerly been promoted to Division Chief in the summer of 1975 and moved to take care of a division in West Africa. And I got married and so forth. Major changes in my life. I had to learn French, which I didn't speak at the time, and so forth. But the Staff Association was beset by--I can't even remember what the issue was, it was salaries perhaps.

ZIEGLER: I know they were very prominent during that time, yes.

CHAFFEY: It must have been salaries. But the Association under Amir Al-Khafaji called for a strike.

ZIEGLER: That was over the salary issue?

CHAFFEY: It was over the salary issue. It must have been about, when was it? Late 1975, early 1976. I can't remember exactly when. It was the spring, it was about April or May of 1976 because we were negotiating a very complex regional industrial project called the CIMA Project which covered three countries and large delegations of those countries--a long project which I had inherited when I took over the Ivory Coast Division. And it was sort of a major issue for me handling these negotiations, the first time I had negotiated in French. Actually we negotiated in both languages because Ghana was also in the group. But it was a big thing for me to conduct my first operation

in French, which I had worked quite hard to acquire some fluency in the previous nine months. And in the middle of all this there was this meeting in the foyer . .

ZIEGLER: The courtyard?

CHAFFEY: . . in the courtyard, a huge meeting on the issue of a strike. I was only peripherally interested, but I do recall that one or two people came to me--I can't remember who they were now, but one or two people did come to me because there was some concern about the drift toward a strike. I think there had already been some sort of industrial action by the IMF at this time and maybe that was one of the factors which had influenced the then-Executive Committee. I can't say for certain. But I know people came to me because maybe by that time I embodied already an old-fashioned notion that the Association was not about strike actions, and this was highly detrimental. Certainly I was vigorously opposed to this form of industrial action I thought was quite inappropriate. But I do know that a number of people came to me and urged me to attend the meeting and if necessary to speak against the strike action because they felt that it was risking some of the credibility and the bona fides, if you like, of the Association.

Anyway, I attended the meeting. I cut off the negotiations, I remember. It was a beautiful, sunny day. Amir made his speech and then started calling for speakers. And I remember that I--I signaled to be called and he called to me, and I strongly opposed the action. And as a result of that, a lot of people came back to me and said, please, you know, would you get involved again. We need your voice and this sort of thing. I know it sounds rather egocentric, but that's exactly the way it happened. And as a result, I decided to run for the Assembly again. And then, well, the Assembly came. I was asked if I would stand for Chairman. It was, looking back, I think a major mistake. It was a terrible year to be Chairman.

ZIEGLER: We'll get into that, yes.

CHAFFEY: As I said, I was newly married. My first few months of my marriage were not very successful. The lady who did me the honor of agreeing to be my wife rather regretted the decision I think initially, but fortunately we weathered that storm and, you know, luckily for me. But I remember that was one of the factors. It really hurt my marriage because I was very busy. I ran a West African division. There was no time off for stuff. I was traveling quite a lot. I worked for a boss, Xavier de la Renaudiere, who was a fascinating and imaginative person, but who liked to work in the evenings. Xavier didn't have much of a home life, as I recall, and for him sort of work started maybe half past five, half past six, when he would wander down or expect you to wander up to his office. And that's when you did the most interesting part of your day. So, I remember that I never, ever got home before 10 or 11 o'clock at night, and there was the Association on top of it all.

But that's how I got in. People approached me. Sandberg was one of them actually, but there were a number of other people who asked me to get back involved, and I just sort of went along with the tide. I think perhaps I was flattered. I was concerned about the strike thing. I thought that was just absurd for people like us to go on strike, and with the sort of

salaries we were drawing and the benefits and so on. There was a legitimate issue; there was no doubt about that. We had moved from an era of doing what . . . Well, the McNamara promises about salary and so on simply had not borne fruit. And the management I think had got itself into a terrible dilemma over this; it had basically welshed on many of its assurances. And the resort to the bureaucratic methodology which was involved, which was as you know never carried through faithfully.

So there was a genuine issue. But resolving it in the way that Amir I think and his colleagues wanted to do it was something which was out of keeping with the culture of the institution and the nature of our task. That was my own view. And that was the substantive reason I got back involved. And the other reason, as I say, was a lot of people asked me to. And there was this meeting, and I made a speech and that started the ball rolling again.

ZIEGLER: Now I'm the one who doesn't recall. Were there yet full-time chairmen?

CHAFFEY: No.

ZIEGLER: Or did that come just slightly after your time?

CHAFFEY: No, there were no full-time . . . There were still part-time chairmen.

ZIEGLER: During the time, during your second chairmanship or second elected chairmanship there, the 1977 salary adjustment was an important issue also. Could you highlight--do you remember what were the important issues involved there?

CHAFFEY: I think the most important thing was clearly the expatriation allowance. The basic problem was the payment in dollars. There were many ancillary problems connected with the pension plan, the general level of salary increases and I think separation of merit and cost of living or joining together and so forth. But the real issue, the critical issue, was the expatriation allowance. Here we were faced with a situation, declining dollar and the loss of competitiveness for salaries denominated in dollars by contrast with certain other areas of the world. That problem had always existed. In the earlier days, for example, Bank salaries had never been really competitive with certain Latin American countries, for example, and one or two others. And it was common knowledge that one or two countries which were sponsoring people paid salary supplements; even the Yugoslavs did, for example. But this was a major new situation, almost I think without precedence since the founding days because the founding fathers never envisaged that one would have any interest in working other than in the dollar and here we were in a totally new situation where the dollar was rapidly losing its value. And the Bank was very slow to recognize the implications of this. Of course it had immediate implications for recruitment, and there were steps taken to compensate for that, but there were also implications for the established staff.

And what was particularly sad about this period was that there was a lot of interaction between certain executive directors and staff and strong movement toward national

groups. You know, the Germans would protect their interest, the British--the British less so. The British are always less homogeneous than any other group. I remember the Executive Director more or less told us to get lost when the group went to meet--not me, but a group of Englishmen went there. But certain groups certainly did become more, seemingly organized on a nationality basis.

More important than that was that the Executive Committee at that time had a majority of Americans on it. What's the name of the Deputy Chairman?

ZIEGLER: I can look it up.

CHAFFEY: It's gone out of my mind. Oh, dear. He was in Administrative Services.

Anyway, there was a majority of Americans. And unfortunately when this issue, particularly the expatriation allowance issue, came up in the Committee--and it came up on different occasions and in different contexts or resolutions or decisions or whatever else--ultimately the issue always fell, came down on nationality grounds. So the Americans were strongly opposed to expatriation allowances because they wouldn't benefit from them and because they argued that there were compensating benefits like education and so forth which the expatriates got and the Americans did not. Plus also at the time there were these complications on the Staff Retirement Plan because of the taxation issue, which was coming into the situation.

But the key issue was that the Executive Committee divided on nationality grounds. I was the Chairman and I was a European. And my personal view was not that of the Committee, but I was bound--and I've always been strongly legalistic at these things--by the Committee's judgment on this, or the Committee's formally voted position. And this strength of the Committee was a reflection of the strength in the Delegate Assembly. The Americans, while not necessarily organizing better, had taken more of an interest in the setting up of the Executive Committee, rather in the elections to the Assembly, which by this time had lost a lot of its repute and did not attract anything like the interest in elections that had characterized the earlier years, and you had many constituencies unfilled and so forth. But the American strength was there, and that was the problem, because the Executive Committee's position, while democratically entered into and democratically and appropriately conceived and formulated, was nonetheless one which was hotly opposed and was very divisive. Even within the Committee we faced a couple of resignations. I remember Gottfried Ablasser, for example, resigned on this issue. And at the time it was very difficult to make any statement.

This was also the time when I think for the first time the Executive Committee was allowed to address the Board. That was done in a very nasty manner, I remember, because we had sought the opportunity, and it had been denied and then right at the last minute, late one evening, a Monday evening or something like that, [Bernard] Chadenet called me. I think he was then Vice President of Administration or something like that, or Senior Vice President of Administration. He was the person above Reg Clarke. He called me and said, you know, your wish is granted, you can appear before the Board. I said,

“What the hell? You know, it's too late to give me a chance,” even though we had been asking for this. But it was typical of the sort of legerdemain which had begun to characterize the relationships between the Staff Association, including with Clarke--and I can't remember who was the deputy. I think maybe [Eugenio F.] Lari was the deputy by this time in Personnel. I'm not sure. But they were bad. There was no . . . The trust had gone. It was very difficult.

ZIEGLER: You say this included Clarke, too.

CHAFFEY: Well, I personally always had a good relationship with Reg. I always felt able to . . . I respected his integrity. I mean, he had quite a . . . People thought Reg had a gruff manner. I never found that. He was always very, very straightforward with me, and I always felt able to be straightforward with him. But there was no doubt that the Committee did not feel that. And there were a number of issues. The F/I issue was a major issue at this time also in which there clearly was a great deal of difficulty.

But I remember with Bernard Chadenet we had a lot of difficulty because we felt that his attitude to the Staff Association was determined by other factors, and as a result we didn't feel that we got very straightforward response from him. And I remember this incident of the appearing before the Board. It was quite clear that the Staff Association should by this time make an appearance before the board. Of course by this time we had informal contact with a number of E.D.s, and we were being pressed by some of them to talk to the Board. This was by no means a unanimous view. But the manner in which it was finally done was very suspect, very suspect indeed. And I remember--as I say, overnight I remember going home. My wife was very upset because I got home very late that night or something. I had to ring around the Executive Committee trying to get them in to a 7:30 meeting in the morning so that we could discuss what position I was going to take at 10:00, because I didn't want to go . . . First of all, I wanted their support before going, and then they had to agree. So I had to try and write a statement.

And we had a very acrimonious meeting. People said I shouldn't go; some people said I should. Everything had to be voted on, and of course we were up against time. And maybe looking back we probably should have declined the invitation, but had we done so we would have been heavily criticized. It was the first time. Anyway, I made the statement, the statement sort of drafted in Committee. It was a dreadful statement. It was sort of half-cocked, you know. I wasn't at all proud of it. And I remember in the process, Gottfried Ablasser resigned, and that information was conveyed immediately to one of the E.D.'s offices, and I'd no sooner finished my statement than the French E.D. made a speech in which he said, well, we can ignore that because I don't think this gentleman is representative of the Staff Association. My information is there have been a number of resignations from the Committee this morning and so forth. And I was virtually just pulled out of order. I sent a little note to McNamara. I had been invited to speak at the outset, and then was sort of told to sit in the back and shut up. And I sent a note to McNamara demanding the right to reply because I had my legitimacy challenged, and he of course ignored it.

But it was a very, very unpleasant experience. It signaled the nature of what were the changed circumstances. Whereas before there had been . . . I would characterize my involvement, my attitude toward the Staff Association as one in which I made, one made, a lot of friends, developed contacts and friendships in the Bank which, you know, survived throughout my career. Whereas in this period it was totally different. It was acrimony, highly personalized, and no understanding, no sense of cohesion. I was unable to create that in the Executive Committee, still less in the Delegate Assembly. I remember there were some people, you know [inaudible] the thing was highly personal. And I may say that, and I think I would like this to go on the record because I don't think it's on the record at all, that my wife and I were harassed by phone calls late at night, and threatening phone calls and so forth, and that was a very, very unpleasant aspect to it.

The whole thing was very nasty. I was tempted to throw in the towel on many occasions.

ZIEGLER: Very understandably.

CHAFFEY: But I do recall that Cliff [Clifton E.] Senf . . . Cliff was a Deputy. Very good man and in a frightfully difficult position. I mean, he believed in the Association, as did his wife, and he wanted to contribute. As an American he found it quite difficult. I mean, he felt the same way I did. We were placed in impossible positions. But we mounted a program of bilateral meetings with departments. I would go around and address departments and try to explain to them where we were coming from, where the issues had been solved, and so on. But we were up against all sorts of difficulties. I would say 90 percent of the delegates never accurately reported what happened at the Delegate Assembly meeting. I mean, they were supposed to go back and write a note and call constituency meetings, which they used to do in the early days, but I don't think that happened anymore. Clearly we were dealing with a very different level of delegate in many cases. But I remember Senf and I and Paul Applegarth and one or two other members of the Committee started going around and addressing these departmental meetings. We got a lot of invitations, and they were very, very acrimonious indeed. I remember the worst I went to was in the Legal Department. My good friend, Chris [Christian H.] Walser, and one or two others having a real go at me. As I say, all this in an atmosphere when my wife and I were harassed by these phone calls, obscene phone calls and threatening phone calls, and so on, which were very unpleasant. It was a bad time for us. My wife couldn't get a job, and various things had happened like that. So it was a miserable year. I hated every minute of it.

ZIEGLER: Given the, if I may say, the sweetness and light at the outset of the Staff Association, is there anything in your mind that would account for this almost 180 degree change? Was it institutional?

CHAFFEY: No. I think first and foremost there was such a major development in economic history, if you like. The dollar had ceased to be the currency of the world. This was the first indication of, well, many of the international economic problems of the day. But this was the first major impact of it in the mid-1970s. And we started to feel it personally. And people could not compete with that. We still had that attitude at the time, that McNamara-induced attitude, that we were super human beings. The status of the

World Bank was very high. We always traveled first class. I think there was a lot of arrogance; I still think there's a lot of arrogance in the institution. But 10 or 12 years ago there was a great deal more. And borrowers had to put up with it. They were beginning to start complaining about it, but it was mainly among the professional ranks that these troubles occurred. And people just did not know how to cope with this situation.

And I also think that the reaction of management was extremely sluggish. I mean there's nothing so special or unusual about an expatriation allowance. It's a very normal thing. But I think we were moving into a different era of reaction from the Americans, for example, who were beginning to exert some of the pressures which I think have been felt very strongly ever since.

There were a whole lot of major trends going on, and to some extent we were all sacrificial lambs. And there was this poor Staff Association still groping with its amateurish habits, its nonprofessional staff and so forth, and really unable to cope with this and a Chairman who was just frankly bitterly regretting having re-entered the fray. And what was very noticeable at the time was that none of us had the time for this. Cliff Senf I think was working as a sort of loan officer in the Nigeria Division at the time. We just couldn't spare the time for these sort of things. The demands during these days were immense. Every day, meetings, 2 to three hours, going to visit people . . .

[End Tape 1, Side B]

[Begin Tape 2, Side A]

CHAFFEY: . . . the working understandings about giving delegates time off, or the Executive Committee time off, had long since ceased to be functional. And it was just very difficult to mobilize them. Delegate Assembly, Committee meetings were quite acrimonious. There was some very strong support. Paul Applegarth was on the Committee and did marvelous work. But I would say, half the Committee members were just very negative, not just lazy but also not willing to understand the need to reach consensus and to maintain consensus. What I remember is that almost every Committee meeting opened with somebody saying they wanted to change the agenda and go back to what was discussed last week and reopen it. And you'd hear the same arguments again. You'd have to have a procedural vote to change the agenda, to introduce a new item, and everybody wanted to do that. And you'd go over this ground over and over and over again. And it always came out the same way because ultimately the voting was always on nationality lines. And the Bank was a very divided institution in those days. We had these meetings and these groupings of--particularly Europeans. I think the biggest problem at the time.

ZIEGLER: This sounds rather worse than it is today, not that it's all sweetness and light today, either, but I think it's calmed down a little.

CHAFFEY: Yes, I suspect they have. Well, I think we've become adjusted as individuals and as a Bank to some extent to a very different situation to that which the founding fathers of our institution envisaged when Bretton Woods was set up. I think the history of the Bank is one in which, you know, the Bank has faced major problems and has shown a

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great deal of ingenuity in creating and adapting to meet them. The creation of IDA [International Development Association], the creation of IFC, the use of technical assistance. None of these things were envisaged in the original articles of Bretton Woods. And I think the Staff Association, too, really faced its major challenge. And I think we were sluggish. I don't think the leadership that I provided was of the highest order, certainly not as good as I would have liked to provide, but I remember finding it personally, I think extremely difficult and demanding period. One in which it was only some sort of loyalty to the institution of the Association, having contributed to its founding that, you know, helped me to see out my year. But it was the most unpleasant period of my World Bank career, I think.

ZIEGLER: Are there any other issues that we should cover regarding your 1976-1977 term as chairman? You've covered expatriation allowance, salary . . .

CHAFFEY: Well, the F/I issue was very prominent then as well. I'm sure you probably get a great deal of that from other people. It was a vexed issue because there was no solution to it. The Bank, the management, was determined at that time not to admit F/I to professional levels, so we had interminable study groups and meetings and so forth. And it became very clear--I think it was clear to people like Cliff Senf long before it occurred to me--that there really was no intention on the part of management to resolve the issue. I had sort of professional, I mean personal experience of this because around about this time, somewhere toward the end of the issue, my wife eventually got a job with the IMF and herself was put into this level, from which she always found it extremely difficult to emerge. And seeing that on a daily basis made me very conscious of how many F/I staff viewed that situation.

And at the same time there were so many examples of people--for reasons of luck here or there, Gill Kaplan is an outstanding example, there were many, many others--people who had been able to make the jump from F/I or even nonprofessional to professional levels, and had clearly demonstrated that there is such a thing as learning on the job. And within an institution there are people who relatively quickly can compensate for, say, the fact that they haven't had as broad an educational background as somebody else, by simply learning the institution's requirements rather more quickly. And by the same token, the fact that somebody comes in with a Ph.D. is not necessarily a guarantee that that person is going to meet all the needs.

I, coming from an English background and coming as I did originally from the Civil Service. As a matter of fact, the . . . It was quite traditional within the Civil Service for the administrative class to be recruited internally as well as externally. We just didn't have that concept. And part of the reason was not so much philosophical as patronage. The unit was always the division, the division chief; this was the patronage he exercised. Recruitment was one thing. And still in those days it was a big thing and rather charismatically carried out. Individual division chiefs had a lot of freedom. Somehow they prefer the opportunity to recruit internationally or whatever that meant rather than take somebody who had been ten years in the Bank and come up through the hard way. That never seemed quite so glamorous a customer. Didn't have the several Ph.D.s and so forth. And you saw all of this. And you realized that the culture was just so rigid and that

the management did not have the teeth to deal with it, or didn't want to. It was never I think for the management a major issue because the numbers of F/I staff were relatively small.

ZIEGLER: You often hear people say in the Bank that the staff will say something and say something and nothing will happen; you get a consultant to say the same thing and things happen. Or some external source to say the same thing and something will happen.

CHAFFEY: Well, I don't think that's [inaudible] I think you can positively use a consultant to say something unpleasant and then do it because the consultant . . . That trick I think is clearly employed. But on this sort of issue I think the culture, stronger in the Fund than in the Bank but it's one which even today still exists. This concept that, when I read specifications . . . I'm in exile now in Turkey so these things don't involve me very much these days. But when I read, say, a job description and see the person must have an MBA and 5 years' experience and six computer languages and so on. Frankly I think you could have just written the job description saying we need somebody with common sense who knows, you know, one or two computer languages.

For my trade in the Bank, which was a loan officer's trade . . . For example, when I think back of the people I've worked with whom I respect highly--were not necessarily--they did not have the normal qualifications. The best country economist I ever worked with was in fact a naval architect who had an MBA, and I just asked him to do this work. The best loan officer I ever had the pleasure working with was the person who did physics at Cambridge, an Indian, now on the budget side of the Bank.

I think that notion of intelligence and capacity and so forth and the combination of the two, and the ability to absorb what is going on, is still not being accepted. We are still preoccupied with qualifications, long qualifications. It's a bit absurd, really. But I think that was what bedeviled us with the F/I thing in those days, and maybe still now. But it was just too difficult to break it down. And yet there were a lot of F/I people in the Staff Association, active in the Association, for that reason. And so you had tremendous frustration. And the other thing I noticed when I came on board was that the working relations were much less good, much less good. You were already in an era where the Bank was beginning to worry about rising budget costs and was beginning to trim here and trim there and so forth.

ZIEGLER: In general, what negotiating tactics and strategies did you use with management?

CHAFFEY: Well, I think . . .

ZIEGLER: We're going to the how-to part of the interview.

CHAFFEY: In the earlier period our intention I think was to show that we were, that we could be clever. That we could analyze an issue or present an argument at least as well if not better than the staff that, say, the personnel managers had to call upon. I think that

was our primary objective. We weren't so concerned with the process--to whom we should talk, what our status was. We had gained a relatively rapid and clear-cut respectability, which perhaps surprised us a little. What we wanted to be was professional. We wanted to show that we could just do a good job. And I think that was the driving factor. I mean, when you think of the names of Tony Churchill, Steve Eccles, even Raymond Cope. I mean, a driving factor in Cope's drafting of the Constitution was to produce Peter Eigen, certainly. And Peter is a very skilled lawyer. I think that was what was driving them. I think they were wrong in that sense for disobeying their instructions. But what they did was highly professional. And what we wanted in the Staff Association was as professional as we could get on all of these issues.

By the time 1976 came around that had changed. There were still examples of that. Paul Applegarth. I mentioned his work on the taxation issue, which was a very, very complex and thorny issue, and I think Paul clearly demonstrated that . . . He was then an IFC officer, and I think his work on the Staff Association led to his promotion very quickly. He became a division chief on the budget side very shortly thereafter. But he was the exception. I think there was still some professionalism in COMPAC [Compensation Advisory Committee]. Dan [Daniel G.] Ritchie and other people were involved, but these were isolated. For the rest I think the professionalism had given way to some extent to more, not necessarily bitching but more polarized, narrow views--presenting cases and wrapping them up with a little more rhetoric and so on. Cases which it was relatively easy for the management, which had its act . . . The Personnel Department had expanded enormously in those days, as you know--was better able to handle those situations and so there was growing frustration. The Staff Association was conscious that perhaps it wasn't doing as good at staff work as it should, and it was being easily defeated on issues. And I think implicit in this was the need to become more professional. Only we didn't. I was opposed to that. I think already there were people starting to talk about this, but I was opposed to it. And perhaps I was opposed to it for hangover reasons, although I must say that the drain on me, the personal drain on me that year, was awful. I mean, it was a tremendously demanding year of time and everything else. And it was true for other people as well.

So I think perhaps we were also slow to recognize that the time had passed when we could do this, you know, in our spare time and so forth.

ZIEGLER: Yes, I think the Staff Association has come around over the past few years to the need for hiring consultants--some real expertise that can be applied to some of the very complex issues such as Staff Retirement Plan, compensation and things like that. You touched on certainly some of the managers with whom you dealt. Would you like to perhaps summarize some of them? You talked about Reg Clarke, McNamara, Chadenet, just off the top of my head. What sort of working relationship did you have with these people? Again, you touched on these, but maybe you'd like to kind of wrap it up here.

CHAFFEY: I think in general in the first period, after the initial shocks with Hugh Ripman and one or 2 others when I think they really had to adjust to the idea . . . After that my recollection is that it was cooperative. I don't want to suggest that it was all, you

know, sweetie, sweetie. I always remember a lovely cartoon, the so-called special relationship between Britain and America, and there was a cartoon in *Punch* of [Dwight D.] Eisenhower and Anthony Eden disguised as two old ladies sitting on a sofa with antimacassar behind them and Eden says, "Darling." And Eisenhower replies, "Yes, darling." And he says, "Oh, nothing, darling, darling." It wasn't like that. But I think we were selective in our issues, and I think generally, as I say, there was the appreciation that there were good things that could come out of the Committee's working groups and the Committee people because there were a lot of very good people around. You know, if we produced a shoddy document in the Delegate Assembly or even in Executive Committee it just got shot down. Those sort of people did not tolerate it.

So I think the managers that we had to deal with, mainly in Personnel, were on the whole supportive. And used us. I'm not saying that there weren't resistances, or that they abdicated responsibilities. I think they probably felt that . . . If you want to put it at its most negative, that we were a bit of a nuisance, and we could be contained. And that, you know, there would be no damage. I think after a while I began to be accepted as some sort of respectable figure. I spoke nicely and always wore a tie and could be relied upon to be polite. And I think these factors contributed.

But I think we felt as an association, regardless of all of this, that we were able to get our views across, and we were able to see changes. Don't forget that in 1971 there was very little by way of equity or anything else, and there was very rapid movement. For example, on the issue of access to evaluations, that was something that was very prominent in our minds. And I think we were able to bring major change in that. Sandberg was very much involved in that. You know, the right of a staff member to see an evaluation; without him seeing it, it didn't really exist. I mean, this was bitterly opposed by many, many managers. But I think we had Personnel on our side very, very quickly. And I think we produced good propositions as to why this should be the case. So I don't—my memory is that it wasn't really an issue. We didn't have to be friends, but there was reasonable respect across the board, and we didn't feel any compunction about putting our views forward. We didn't seek Board access. We recognized that McNamara was barely tolerant, but it didn't seem to matter very much because he anyway was about the business of expanding the Bank, of attracting good people, and was, I suspect . . . You know, the annual budget was not an issue. It was five percent or ten percent. It was none of this zero growth or anything like that. First class travel wasn't an issue. None of those things was an issue in those days. It was a very, very different environment. And what we were doing, I think, was much less important in the total sense of the scheme. And as a result it was easy to be more effective.

ZIEGLER: How did you go about mobilizing staff support? Of course you mentioned at the outset the foundation of the Staff Association. You went out to talk to constituencies and dl. But, especially later on during 1976-1977 was somewhat acrimonious, to put it mildly. What methods did the Executive Committee use to try to get the staff supportive of the Staff Association?

CHAFFEY: Well, we did try to, you know, lobby. No question about that. We would sit down with Cliff [Senf] and one or two other people whose loyalty I could count on, and, “We got a difficult issue. We need to get this through, call up and explain to people what the situation was.” But in the first period I think it wasn't so much lobbying as the fact that we didn't require, we expected and encouraged in various ways, delegates to write their own reports, to hold their own meetings. And sometimes we would go to such meetings. There was much more of that. I mean, a delegate was expected to undertake certain responsibilities vis-à-vis the constituents. And there was more élan in being associated with the Assembly in those days.

By 1976 that had changed completely. It was a lobbying effort on the major issues. I remember that we would go into Delegate Assembly meetings quite nervous because the rumors would run around; there's going to be a savage attack on this and some other item and so forth. Probably you have those experiences. And I knew that we hadn't worked as hard as we should have done to mobilize opinion and so forth. But sometimes it's not easy to get a view across in a Delegate Assembly. You require a certain level of understanding particularly a complex point, and even an expatriation allowance could be quite complex. But you could, you were vulnerable. And I discovered as Chairman it often fell to me to make the statements--that I was vulnerable to the wisecrack, the person who wanted to disrupt, and so forth. And we had a lot more of that.

So again, I think we were just grappling. We were amateurs in a more professional environment, and we didn't recognize it. And we were amateurs in dealing with a much more sophisticated type of problem. And I think we recognized that and we strived, but I remember Paul Applegarth, whom as I say we relied very heavily on the tax situation. I remember spending hours on the tax papers we were presenting. You know, I had to understand them myself. And I remember Executive Committee meetings where people would just vote to hold the thing or against it without even understanding it. And it was a horrifying thing to me that it was such a change from what had gone on before. But just, frankly, the overall caliber of the Committee was 10 percent that of the previous Committee.

ZIEGLER: What do you feel was your greatest accomplishment in the Staff Association, and what would you like to have done better?

CHAFFEY: I don't think of it in those terms. Accomplishment. My greatest accomplishment. Well, I think it was for me to help me feel part of the Bank, quite honestly. I was not happy in the Secretary's Department. And since I am fairly good on paper—it's my mother tongue, after all--I very quickly became the main scribe of most papers. And I had the time to do these things, stuck up there in the eleventh floor of the B building or something like that, between meetings. I had a very good secretary, too, who was tremendously helpful in all of this. But I didn't feel part of the World Bank. As a result of the Staff Association I developed a network of friends, at all levels, and to me that was not my contribution, but what I got out of it mostly was a sense of synthesis with the organization. I felt the Association was part of the overall thing and, however modest, we played a role.

In a more different sense, the one thing I continued to do until the time I left for Turkey a year ago was to work on the--as a friend--a list of people who could be drawn upon to help represent people going through difficulties and making cases for the Appeals Committee. And I've continued to do that and taken many, many cases over the years. It stems from that first paper we wrote (Sandberg, Ed and I wrote), and my belief that this was a legitimate and worthwhile thing. A judgment of peers was a major contribution to settling problems within an institution, which was able to absorb that. I mean, it requires flexibility on both sides. And I must say that over the years I've got far more satisfaction, from representing people who might otherwise have fared rather worse in those sort of . . . I must have taken 20 or 30 cases over the years, sometimes very demanding. But I've enjoyed that. I felt that that was a more worthwhile thing to do because I think, generally speaking--at least for as long as I've taken an active interest--this has been an institution which strives to do well by its staff and strives within its limits to meet the needs of staff. So we were not working in a fundamentally hostile environment. We were working in an environment where tuning and changes, manageable changes, could greatly improve the outcome of something because the fundamental intents were there. Confusions arose I think because of lack of courage, lack of intelligence on the part of some people, but I don't think lack of motivation. We were lucky in that sense. I think we still are, really. And it was a question of . . . Initially at any rate I think the Staff Association was well tuned to that. But subsequently it had to retune itself. In 1976 it was already apparent that we should have done and we didn't do so. And I think those changes came shortly thereafter, and they were probably much needed.

ZIEGLER: So you say—I want to make sure I get this point very clearly--that around 1976-1977 there was a real, almost watershed, in the Staff Association as a result of the external environment that the Bank existed in which had . . .

CHAFFEY: Yes.

ZIEGLER: . . . an effect on the Bank and thereby on the Staff Association.

CHAFFEY: I think there was a much more legitimate case to shift a gear from being an association, a loose-knit association of staff, where staff was generally willing to delegate responsibility without too much accountability to a group of people who had shown some enthusiasm and some intelligence and were reasonably good about reporting back but didn't wait for all of us all the time but got on with it. And so forth. To a situation where as the environment had become more difficult for the Bank in the world as well as for the Association in the Bank, there was a need to have a more thorough and more professional and more representational approach because there were factors dividing staff. You could no longer talk about uniformity. Even original policies like access to benefits need not necessarily have been so valid and subsequently as in an era of much greater cost effectiveness and so on. It might make more sense to contract out certain services. Why do you want to recruit a messenger and send him on home leave when you could contract out those services at a much cheaper cost? Maybe this was a valid argument, but it was one which the Staff Association, as it was constructed, had a great deal of difficulty in

absorbing, and if we didn't imbibe cost effectiveness, for example . . . And I think had one created the Association in 1976, a very different one would have been created.

But I don't think at the time we realized, we didn't have time to realize, we were pole axed by the demands of the job at the time over and above everything else. I think this was true of many of us. We just weren't able to pause and take stock as we perhaps should have done. We really needed to reform the institution very substantially.

ZIEGLER: The institution meaning the Staff Association?

CHAFFEY: Meaning the Staff Association, yes.

ZIEGLER: What advice would you want to leave for your successors?

CHAFFEY: I don't want to give advice to my successors. No, I don't have advice. I just have reflections that I think the World Bank remains a very worthwhile place to be. And I think we're all fairly lucky to be here, by and large, so that one has to keep sight of that. And the second thing is that good Staff Association work requires hard work and intelligence. It requires good staff work. There have to be people . . . You can't, I think, leave this to consultants, only up to a certain point. You have to do professional work because the issues get more complicated; the understanding of the issues is important. You yourself have to master that in order to begin to persuade other people, particularly when the uniformity of interest is nothing like as strong as it used to be, for a variety of reasons.

ZIEGLER: What in your view is the appropriate role of the Staff Association in the Bank? And has your perception of that role changed since you participated in its founding? You certainly touched on a lot of this in the course of this very good interview, but do you want to bring it together?

CHAFFEY: I think my own attitude has changed considerably. I suffered a very sharp reaction after 1976. I didn't want anything to do with it. I had an interest in this Appeals Committee which I kept up. I also had a long-standing interest in the Staff Retirement Plan, and I had been a member of the original working party which had brought about the amendments. We had a Staff Association representative--and I was he for two and half years--in the working party which met about from 1971 to 1973. And that was very good, professional work. We made some very major changes in the Staff Retirement Plan. But after 1976 I wanted nothing more to do with it. I remember I was approached by somebody, the then-Chairman, whoever it was, or somebody, to continue to work on the Staff Retirement Plan group, perhaps in COMPAC or something. But I attended a couple of meetings, and then I found my old, my newfound whatever it was within me--dislike of some of the things I was hearing and my much lower tolerance of these was such that I didn't want any further part of it.

I also opposed the payment of fees. I did join the Staff Association when the fees were introduced, but there was some instance that occurred later when again I was approached

to give my services and then, I don't know what happened, something. I was asked to serve, and then I thought I was not very nicely treated, and so I resigned and had nothing further to do with it. And I'm not a member today of the Association. But I have continued, up until I went to Turkey, to work on the Appeals Committee, and that I consider to be my contribution and my support for the Staff Association. But in the end I think it was an amateur in a more professional environment, and I felt out of date.

ZIEGLER: Is there anything else that this wide-ranging interview hasn't covered that you want to say?

CHAFFEY: I'm sure there are lots of things, but I've probably said too much already.

ZIEGLER: Well, thank you very much for sparing your time.

CHAFFEY: A pleasure.

ZIEGLER: And I think it's a very good interview. Thank you.

[End Tape 2, Side A]

[End of interview]