24032 August 1998 Conflict Prevention lPost-Conflict Recoi struction: Perspectives and Prospects _~~~~~~~ U The Worl FILE COPY Bank Conflict Prevention Post-Conflict Reconstruction: Perspectives and Prospects April 20-21, 1998 Paris, France The World Bank Post-Conflict Unit Social Development Department August 1998 Cover photo from UN/DPI. Photo hy John Isaac. E _Intents Preface and Acknowledgments ............... ............................ 1 Introduction .2 Toward a New Type of Development: Bridging Relief and Reconstruction . 4 Post-Conflict Reconstruction: The Folly of Conventional Wisdom ........... ........................... 5 Conflict Prevention: Lessons from Recent History ............................................ 6 Strengthening Social Capital: Trust, Institutional Capacity, and Civil Society. 8 Creating an Enabling Environment for the Private Sector .10 The Challenge of Conflict Prevention and the International Community .12 Expanding the Vision .13 New Partners and New Processes .15 Appendix A-Agenda, Day One and Day Two .19 Appendix B-List of Participants .21 Appendix C-Directory of Post-Conflict Units .26 E face and Acknowledgements s part of a global workshop series on the transition from war to peace, the A+ World Banlk Post-Conflict Unit, in collaboration with the World Bank's Paris Office, held a workshop focusing on conflict prevention and post-conflict reconstruction in Paris, France between April 20-21, 1998. The workshop was organized by the following World Bank staff associated with the Post- Conflict Unit: Johanna Mendelson Forman, social scientist; Nat J. Colletta, manager; and Steve Holtzman, social scientist, as well as Nicholas Van Praag of the Paris Office. They were assisted by Michelle Cullen and Taies Nezam, operations analysts with the Post- Conflict Unit, and Luisa ChLodi, intern, of the Paris Office. This report was prepared by Michelle Cullen and Johanna Mendelson Forman under the guidance of Nat J. Colletta. The report was edited by Alison Raphael. Peter Howard pro- vided much assistance with Appendix C, the directory of post-conflict units. The views expressed in this report are those of the authors and participants, and do not nec- essarily reflect the opinions of the World Banl, or any of the World Bank's affiliated organizations. August 1998 EE ilroduction I vents during the past decade have chal- Those engaged in the initial effort to create lenged the thinking of donors about programs to assess and heal the immediate h1 wether development efforts, which Ewounds of war will discover that their missioD have formed a prominent part of post-Cold requires not only the ability to analyze an War engagement in Africa, Asia, Latin Ameri- unstable on-the-ground situation, but also the ca, and Eastern Europe, have really achieved an capacity to design programs flexible enougb to enduring legacy of inclusion, economic growth, meet emergency needs, yet visionary enough to and human well-being. In a world where the create the foundation for further development, power of centralized authorities is rapidly as the situation stabilizes and life returns to diminishing and intrastate conflict is on the normal. The changing nature of international rise it becomes evident that the ability to pre- relations is forcing those in traditional devel- vent conflict has less to do with a scarcity of opment to meet this challenge through the donor resources than with a lack of under- creation of new products and specialized standing of the causes of conflict and the organs to address a less certain, more volatile appropriate tools to address them. The need to environment. nurture that understanding and develop new tools has led to the emergence of specific Tbe two-day meeting upon which this report is offices within bilateral and multilateral donor based was cosponsored by The World Bank's agencies to address the development issues of Paris office and held in Paris in April, 1998. post-conflict societies. It involved two distinct, but interrelated, efforts to bring together recent thinking about Since the early 1990s, the reconstruction and the area of post-conflict reconstruction. The rehabilitation of war-torn societies has become first day was dedicated to explorilng new Bays a subspecialty within the broader development that development assistance and private invest- agenda. The special needs of societies emerging ment can address the root causes of conflict.' from conflict have hastened the development The second day of the Paris conference was planning cycle in such a way as to demand planned as a follow-up to an October 1997 more flexibility of programs and resources and conference sponsored by the U.S. Agency for greater responsiveness to emergencies hereto- International Development's (USAID) Office fore handled only through humanitarian assis- of Transition Initiatives (OTI). The 1997 tance operations. conference brought together donor agencies' newly created post-conflict offices, with the Post-conflict reconstruction is a critical step in aim of gaining a clearer vision of how govern- the continuum between humanitarian relief ments and multilateral organizations are and longer-term development assistance. It moving forward to address the operational requires all the responsiveness of an emergency needs that have emerged since the end of the operation, as well as a vision of how interven- cold War. tions fit into the longer-term development scheme. It is understandable that units dedicat- ed to meeting immediate post-conflict develop- mentneeds may operate in isolan from Dav One's meeting was the second of a Global 'Workshop series on war-ta-peace transitions sponsored bv the those involved in planning long-term, tradi- w7orld Bank. The first workshop, 'From Civil War to tional programs geared to improve economic Civil ,iyety, was cosponsored bf she Carter Center il performance and institutional development. Atlanta, Georgia, and iocused on war to peace transi- The future, however, will demand that short- tions using Guatemala and Liberia as case studies. The relief and long-term development next event in the series will be co-sponsored by the Ccu- term rellet and lterm erm development tee for Conflict Resolution and take place in South processes become merged into the type of Africa in October 1998. This event will examine 'The transition programming that is now beginning Nexus between Economic Management and the Restora- to occur. tion f Civil Soeietya" 2 This report, prepared by the World Bank Post- It is our hope that this event enabled a number Conflict Unit, seeks to capture the ideas and of diverse actors, particularly those on the issues that flowed from discussions during the European scene, to reflect upon and share two days of deliberations in Paris. The intent is mutual understandings and concerns regarding not to be totally inclusive of all points made, societies making the transition from war to nor to reflect a consensus, but rather to sum- peace. marize the main points made by keynote speak- ers and other participants. The agenda for the meeting is included as Appendix A; Appendix B provides a list of participants. Appendix C is a directory of various post-conflict units of bilateral and multilateral donors. It is not a comprehensive listing of such organizations, but a representation of those units that attend- ed the Paris conference. 3 I I | I 111 _ / R - tvard a New Type of Development: dging Relief and Reconstruction f anything is evident from the growth of " 'Working at the edge of the development post-conflict units, it is that development of human society is to work on the brink agencies are seeking to merge several dis- of the unknown. Much of what is done tinct development 'cultures:' including conflict will one day prove to have been of little prevention, humanitarian assistance, human avail. That is no excuse for the failure to rights monitoring, and traditional develop- act in accordance with our best under- ment. By seeking to create all-purpose pro- standing, in recognition of its limits but grams to address differing post-conflict needs, with faith in the ultimate result of the development agencies may well he setting creative evolution in which it is our priv- themselves up for failure-unless partnerships ilege to cooperate. can he formed hetween the various types of organizations with expertise in the different Post-conflict support by donor organizations is cultlres associated with the post-conflict world. very much at the cutting edge of development activities. Yet whether such activities will ulti- During the two-day session, it became clear mately lead to greater development or will push that each agency starts from a different per- a country deeper into the abyss remains spective and point in time when responding to unknown. As Hammarskjold correctly noted, the needs of war- failing to provide some means of restarting torn societies. I economic life and social institutions in the ..OL~i 1 1 7 ,, t . i~ I Some units have wake of conflict is likely to be far more trou- -Good6 dsevelopment, ^ t3 arJvelopmenL, O~\i~ more experience in blesome in the long run. Good development Jovelopmn?enlt that moving from requires t wat we look at the situation even as I tv exc humanitarian crises the fighting continues, so that planning carries ;iiie71'itu, exclusion, al i to transition envi- with it important lessons for a transition that is iniiqn,tq .tel . ~ . . 1 tronments, while responsive to the structural causes of the con- ll diLlnrty,Iis itl7 isel others are better flict and the demands of different interest /L.irinl f.7~nfljj 6' .4 suited to supporting groups, while also reflecting a concern for I LjrLLi of on c emergency recon- human security. -Nat CuiIIet±a, M~ -struction programs, Po'it-Conflid ~~~~~ and others still are best at linking reconstruction pro- grams to sustain- able development goals. It is not clear whether any of these interventions can be strictly cate- 1 gorized as conflict-prevention programs, but an emerging consensus in the development i community notes that 'good" development- development that addresses inequity, exclusion, i and indignity-is the host form of conflict prevention. In a speech made nearly 40 years ago, former UT.N. Secretary General Dag Hammarskjold sought to define a framework for international coopeatio. Hisrespnse culd s easlyaply 2Dag Hanmmarskjold, -The Development of aCnst. cooperation. His response could as easily apply tional Framework for International Cooperation,' in 1998 as it did when he first presented his address at the University of Cbicago Law Scbool, May 1, ideas in 1960: 1960, in Brian Urquhart, 'Looking for a New Sheriff", AN0e? York Retn;ew of Books, July 16, 1998, p. 53. 4 --Conflict Reconstruction: Folly of Conventional Wisdom hf lhe hybrid field of post-conflict level- i The complexities associated with macro- opment, which so many organizations economic restructuring must be addressed. in the post-ICold War period are calling The fragile political and social conditions a new form of development assistance, still endemic to war-torn societies complicate the requires additional definition and begs for use of traditional methods of structural comparative lessons from the field. This year adjustment. If undertaken improperly and the World Bank's Operations Evaluations without special attention to social needs, the Department (OED) released a report3 that adjustment process may exacerbate conflict reviews the Bank's experiences and perfor- situations or create new disparities from mance in post-war reconstruction. Among the which new conflict may arise. Political and key findings of the OED report were: social factors must be considered, along with economic realities, during post-war recon- Post-war reconstruction should involve struction and rehabilitation. In certain cases, collaborative efforts not only among differ- such as in some African countries, the over- ent development agencies, but also with relief and emergency assistance organizations. In the fragile environment after war, there is a distinct need for transitional support strate- i awlbpment is something that gles that close the gap between humanitarian I assistance and development, and help to 4 , bou "daries Lft iraditi.l"Lf71pripZs of organize cooperation and partnering. To date, ainale deuelopiiwiit however, few such initiatives have been taken. Success requires strong local ownership. I Without a solid base and investment at the |rown , Vice President, community level, development efforts were i i ;1d Bank found to be less likely to succeed or he sus- tainable. The OED report suggested that, to support this focus on local ownership, mili- tary spending should he reduced and the all economic program has undermined the savings used to strengthen social institutions peace process by forcing too many budget and civil society. At the same time, however, cuts. The report suggests that new guidelines issues such as demilitarization, demobiliza- for debt relief should be established, espe- tion, and the reintegration of ex-combatants cially for some of the particularly indebted must not be overlooked. A fine balance nations trying to recover from conflict. must be sought between social sector and military spending, nurturing and thinning The credibility of the development community each respectively at an adequate rate. The rests on its performance in this new post-con- successful implementation of either of these flict environment. As is the case for all devel- processes demands the presence of a strong, l opment efforts, there is a risk of doing more legitimate government. Thus capacity build- harm than good with every intervention. Sum- ing and guidance for good governance must maries of lessons learned, such as the OED be provided as well. report, and conferences, such as the Paris gath- ering, are essential to help improve the stan- dards of interventions, promote better relations The World Bank's Experience with Post-conflict Recon- among development agencies and more collab- struction. Volume 1: Synthesis Report, Operations Eval- orative efforts, and increase overall knowledge uation Department, World Bank, Washington, D.C., May of how to operate within a post-conflict society. 4, 1998 (draft). 5 nflict Prevention: sons from Recent History J7 erceptic,ns held bL both the internation- raised expectations and thus, to some extent, j al community and societies in a post- hindered national reconciliation and reintegra- _ conflict environment play an important tion of former combatants. Social unrest and role in the success of any intervention. Donor- violent conflict have reemerged in areas already supported interventions responsive to deadly heavily effected by armed conflict. This new conflict and its prevention often create local instability is partially a result of the highly expectations of end results that exceed the focused distribution of emergency assistance, capacity of international actors. In addition the which excluded some of the most vulnerable international community's perception of what groups, including large numbers of indigenous events and conditions should or should not communities. In these sensitive areas initial aid cause concern in terms of potential conflict programs were too focused on specific groups, can affect its ability to read, or correctly i particularly former soldiers and refugees. interpret, early warning signals. Thus oppor- Although this practice is not unusual during tunities to prevent man-made tragedy are the reconstruction process to help support a sometimes missed. This potential failure to more secure environment, they carry an associ- connect the support given to a society emerging ated risk that some people will feel unfairly from war with a longer-term vision of develop- treated, especially those not destined to receive ment may exacerbate tensions and undermine a aid. Non-recipients perceive this resulting fragile peace. inequity as a continuation of unfair and unjust 'treatment; therefore, to some degree, aid allo- cation can serve to refuel or create tensions. Guatemala Guatemala has made great strides toward peace. I The Great Lakes However, the development and humanitarian assistance that came with the end of war overly Perceptions bv the international community of what constitutes an early warning signal of conflict have not always been correct. Amiong 'the concerns of those working in post-conflict states are issues such as whether better-plannedi Newu/L tiner.7i77 7stability in l development assistance and an earlier acknowl-- q intabiity n cuaNtv6 Iedgment of warning signals might have pre- partaaclllu a re 1/t * f the highlhy g vented a Rwanda or Burundi. In this sense the partli7liz/ .r.ut,Jt7 77/ tragedy of the Great Lakes genocide can be of elmergency/ assisZtan2ce, Uwhich has E I transformed into a powerful lesson learned. Although development assistance may not have sonic ol the 17ost vulnerable group&_ been able to prevent the massacre of thousands Of arO-2s'a d prograrns sihould nok of people, recognition of early warning signs prt'Llrarns flOW ~~~~~~~anid decisive action from the interniational pref .?rrd .ad7pproach. " community might have reduced the extent of I human, physical, and natural destruction in the -\laurici.. \'aldez. .&.-}¢t \. Et. c | mid-1990s. Signs 0f building tensions in the D~~~~~~~puk ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ Get Lakes region became more apparent in I D)eptih [)lrectolr, kJND)PiI.uate}na1a ' '~I ll | 0 0 0 the late 1980s wit the drought, 'the fall of coffee prices, rapid population growth, and an increasing shortage of land. After 1990, and in particular with regard to the genocide in 1994, there is one painful lesson to he learned from Rwanda. Conflict dynamics may become 6 leader. Denying access was seen as a method of ii^ . .: . protecting hi. political power. After it became more clear that neither economic, social, nor political factors weighed heavily in th's particu- /t1 Ilk' Ili-eat Lakes, scgnah lar conflict, the U.N. Secretary General began I to negotiate. TLis eleventh-hour response was butildi,,1n tenlsions becamle - clearly risky, but as noted by Staff an de Mistu- -- he. j ra, a hClpful synergy created a situation of mili- O7pparen.t il tl7 e late 1 98L 4 0a4 * tary deterrence, on the one hand, and moral the drouglt, the fall . ffa ' pressure on the other. t'rirts. risi174 oLe rpopulaertvin Participants in the Paris meeting noted that * * 7 { J { \- I many questions need to be resolved regarding 117.-rO'L7Sill7 Ilo rtiage Of/ both the relationship between development assistance and conflict prevention, and between -Dr)!. Vinrick KueLtne, Cou.qt those who are giving and receiving aid. How Pr5e enticin Network, Ge i can international actors control the expecta- .w 'tt'. 1 '1;3 |tions arising from development efforts? How . ': do international actors choose appropriate methods of mediation and negotiation, f I hi depending on the differing contexts of conflict and the actors involved in the arena of war? Finally, can a donor policy be formulated to so powerful and dramatic that the long-term take into account the need to balance programs instruments of development aid may not exer- in conflict prevention as part of a more sophis- cise any meaningful constraint on them. In ticated approach to early warning? these situations, more powerful and decisive action may be needed to stop violence, such as an international peace operation. Iraq , $ oor response to the Iraq crisis The mcdiation that took place during the crisis ; pection sites was clear/it a bAit risky, between the U.S., the U.N., and Iraq over 4:' chemical weapons-site inspections represents a . syneerg bet ween the ll7/7jor teami good example of conflict prevention through 0a wedfr elen ts of deterrence negotiation. Controversy began when Saddam Hussein denied U.N. weapons inspectors access presence and a CLnL)7oM 017 M0o7 to presidential sites. Psychological analysis 11 became cruclal to dissecting the conflict and churches and public opinlOn. clarifying U.S. and U.N. perceptions of what i - was actually occurring. Negotiators perceived -W i nde Mistura, leader, U.N. Secretarv Genneral that Hussein's submission to outside invaders Team to Iraq would have most likely caused him a loss of public respect and threatened his survival as 7 engthening Social Capital:Trust, itutional Capacity, and Civil Society n the past, post-war reconstruction has ety in question, thereby absolving the policy of focused on rebuilding infrastructure; it is economic liberalization for any share of the easier to rebuild roads and bridges than it i blame for the breakdown of the social conitract. is to reconstruct institutions and strengthen the I Efforts to nurture social capital should focus social fabric of a society. Thus the restoration, on enabling forms of capital that arc socially or transformation, of social capital has not owned, such as education, health, or technolo- been the primary focus of development in the gy-transfer services. Overall, rehabilitation of post-war context. War militarizes societies, dis- , social capital may play an important role in the rupting existing social organizations and creat- recovery of a war-torn society, but the forms ing others. While some of the latter may and manifestations of social capital to be endure, others are inappropriate once hostilities restored should be monitored, and the reasons end. Many difficulties are associated with for support need to be regularly and systemati- restoring trust and social cohesion after violent cally examined by all involved. conflict, and much debate exists over the appropriate means of restoring social capital and the nature and value of this process. The West Bank: Paying Attention to Politics To some extent international actors can help strengthen social capital by increasing citizen Efforts to rebuild trust among civil society and participation in reconstruction processes, other institutions can be thwarted if they are enforcing government accountability, and fos- i not matched by strong political will. A good tering creative avenues for peaceful change. Yet example is provided by events in tbe Middle to do so effectively, development agencies need East in the early 1990s. Tbe peace process for to better understand how to define and bolster the West Bank and Gaza had great momentum civil society in a post-conflict setting; that is, in September 1993. Aid oirganizations had to be aware of how conflict affects civil society, agreed on a blueprint for the development of what factors increase group cohesion under infrastructure and social rebuilding and acted adverse conditions, and which issues are most in coordination toward this end. Yet little has critical for civil society (human rights, health, been accomplished, because it was implicitly or others). assumed that the development process could proceed separately from the political process. Social capital as a concept has also created its Donors and development agencies presumed detractors, for it has the potential to yield the that politicians would continue to implement negative effect of social exclusion. Develop- the peace process, and that tb's political process ment agencies attempting to restore social cap- was not directly related to the efficacy of devel- ital in war-torn countries must be cautious of opment intervention. However, when violence the groups that they nurture and aware of how erupted in 1994, the international community, these groups gain support. The trust and confi- donors, and the Israelis were forced to re- dence-building that constitute social capital examine their assumptions and pay closer must be examined as part of the larger develop- X attention to the potential impact of political ment strategy before investments are made. events on social reconstruction. The restoration of social capital should not be used as a subterfuge for transforming develop- Rwanda: Seeking Justice ing countries into models of liberal, free-mar- ket democracies. When outbreaks of violent Also in 1994, another tragedy was unfolding conflict are explained as "deficits of social cap- in Rwanda. The ethnic war between Hutu and ital, the roots of the problem are conveniently Tutsi came to a head in April with the death of located in the psychological profile of the soci- the nation's president, provoking a total break- Bosnia: Keeping an Eye on the Media I7 /'L1St-L1CJJOCidJC Rwanda, , - The media also wield a strong influence on efforts to nurture civil society and social capital rf.717ts anid7 /justice issues t in the reconstruction period. In Bosnia, even CLolplicated the7 rebuilding 41 after the Dayton Peace Accord was signed, the media continued to operate as it had during the Sˇi ct i. Rebiabilitation in conflict, and the war-mongering continued. This demands -' . . t - toccurred for two principal reasons: first, differ- CL1;1tCX1d na /7dSL UtC. ent parties to the conflict supported various -Ilasszan Ba, media groups during the war; and second, writing b out war was familiar territory to journalists, n ncrgic Atrique hut economic reconstruction was not. Most Bosnians were largely concerned about finding obs, rebuilding society, and reinstating some t ft I' X gJ .form of normalcy, hut the media's stance helped refuel tensions and posed a potential threat to down of public order The result was the geno- rehabilitation and the restoration of social capi- cile of over 500,000 people. In post-genocide tal. Since the media have a strong impact on the Rwanda, human rights and justice issues have formation of public opinion-and thus the possi- complicated the rebuilding of civil society. bility of restoring social capital-the international Rehabilitation in such a context demands jus- community should monitor media activities dur- tice. Yet the efforts required to restore social ing war-to-peace transition periods and try to capital in the wake of such massive tragedy clamp down on hate-mongering. exceed the current capacity of the international community to respond. Survivors and perpetra- | tors alike must be treated according to appro- priate legal standards that encourage healing I and a restoration of trust. Many important, hut n outbreak of v ioleitt conflit t s a unresolved, issues surround the reconstruction ;. a o r cj t of a judicial system adequate to respond to the | st.ta pt the roots of tlhe probliin legal rights and obligations of the state toward I , its citizens. Part of resolving these issues located in the pSycho loi;Cal requires that the international community and in p governments hetter define criminal hehavior, Iquesion, t the status and rights of criminals, and the f p cy econo77ic liberalization lor process of demilitarization and demobilization of (f criminal forces. Considering the level of , blame for the breakdown L./ the devastation that occurred in Rwanda, it is still too early to determine whether Rwandan society can deal with accountability, punish- ment, and reconciliation in the short-run, or whether a much longer-term approach will he ( E a .) necessary to restore trust and legitimacy among social groups. 9 'I E ~ rc|!-)-I~ I _c Cs' S .;1 .~, ating an Enabling Environment - III the Private Sector X fter the fighting stops, the economic term community investments. When develop- reconstruction of a country requires a i ment work was undertaken, it was usually in the Lvariety of interventions from both form of charity to health or education institu- international donors and the private sector tions, with the goal of improving relations with The country's infrastructure is typically the public or the government. Based on these destroyed, its markets depleted, and its curren- findings, the Bank encouraged increased SANC cy weakened or worthless. Human resources are investment by stressing the resulting long-term diminished by refugee flows and the flight of benefits-a healthier, more educated, and more the elite, and little institutional capacity exists gainfully employed community will better sup- to help quickly rebuild and replenish these i port MNC's through labor and demand for deficits. The destruction of financial, govern- products. As a result of this consultative ment, and legal structures makes economic- process, members of the surrounding commu- restoration all the more difficult. Although nities and the MNCs helped undertake reLabil- there is much economic activity after war, for itation efforts and came to understand that the most part it is informal and trade-oriented investment offered benefits for both sides. and does not involve production. Unregulated trade is usually rampant, leaving little money in the country and often involving smuggling. In Private Investment and most cases funds for businesses must be pro- Infrastructure vided quickly at the local level to prevent cor- ruption. Alliances between government, civil Lebanon provides an example of the important society, and multinational corporations role to be played by aid to utility companies in (MNCs ) are crucial Lo restrucLurinig business. j post-conflict economies. In genieral, utilitv companies invest for the long-term; and after From Eastern Europe to southern Africa, the war, the basic services they provide are neces- private sector remains an important force in sary for the reconstruction process to begin- development. Partnerships between local com- and to attract new investment. In order for munities, private business, and international companies to stimulate new investment in a actors have begun to transform reconstruction post-conflict society, transition governments from a donor-driven operation to one with must create conditions capable of attracting more emphasis on the marketing of a country's international capital and the relocation of resources as a source of new capital. In the long companies. International banks and financial run the local private sector will remain the institutions should focus on assisting business- main source of new investment, jobs, and an es by creating incentives for such ventures. expanding resource base in the community. E Electricit6 de France has played in important role in rebuilding Lebanon's electricity net- work, hut with the understanding that local A Public-Private ownership is critical to sustainability. Local Partnership in Angola staff must be motivated, appropriately trained, and employed to facilitate a complete transfer The 'World Banik's recent private-public initia- of knowledge and technical operations. tive in war-torn Angola is a good example of partnering between the government, MNG'S, and civil society. The Bank sponsored an assessment of the private sector to determine whether it had contributed to Angola's devel- opment. The survey revealed that MNGCs had made few attempts at development activities, and that there were few incentives for long- 10 Security and Development times weapons are one of the country's major investments; close attention must be paid to Military conversion is another important aspect the disarmament process to avert further con- of the transition from war to peace. Since the flict. A reformed security sector will alleviate end of the Cold War, almost 3.9 percent of the many concerns of potential investors, and thus world's gross domestic product has been freed help to rebuild the economy. for use in other sectors. However, the results of this "peace dividend" have not been immediately visible. After a war there is an immediate need for the creation of a sustainable rl ld7, weapons I security sector, which implles @ ueapofls some reinvestment of savings police forces, and restructurn)iqL7 from fighting to other types of , ; s u [t appropriate defense operations, as n por -ant stab -ilzi f--tors IJI well as retraining combatants for ionirig from tar to pcac-c. productive 2 70peacetirme occupa- tions. External actors need to Director, play an active role in the area of I D i post-conflict security needs. %tIonal Convera e Controlling the illegal weapons trade, demilitarizing police forces, and restructuring armies can be important stabilizing factors in countries mak- ing the transition from war to peace. Some- * Challenge of Conflict Prevention the International Community J')articipants at the Paris meeting general- failing to weaken the power of wayward i ly agreed that the international com- leaders. A more effective strategy on the munity should not concentrate on pre- part of the international community might venting conflict so much as preventing violent be to freeze the assets and personal accounts conflict and genocide-which until now it has of sucb leaders being held abroad and to failed to do. International actors can gather j limit the number of visas and permits they lessons learned from cases such as Rwanda or and their families are allowed. Bosnia to assess what went wrong and what may be done in the future to avert similar man- Justice is a key concern for conflict preven- made tragedies. tion, for without justice, there can be no post-conflict reconciliation. Each country In Bosnia the inter- must be considered independently. Bosnia, "Ifg enocide is still national community Rwanda, and South Africa, for example, was aware of the each require different types of truth com- the world in which WX l preparations for eth- | missions, for their situations are quantita- nic cleansing several I tively and qualitatively different in terms of people cabln be sure of m 1131 ll | months before con- the level and impact of conflict. The Inter- surZvil7'a t' +pkf | i | flict erupted, yet did national Court of Justice has not been help- nothing to stop it. ful in developing guidelines. For a lasting *-.Alin Desztexhe, P r - lS The U.N. Security peace to take root, there must be a percep- International Crisi6 * - l | Council and Secre- ! tion and some tangible evidence that justice tary General, as well has been served. In this regard local courts as a number of key must be involved in the reconciliation governments process. involved, all ignored their legal obligation under the international convention against Institution building is critical to post-war genocide by failing both to prevent the ethnic reconstruction, both within government and cleansing from occurring and to protect the civil society, to create an adequate political, victims. This failure was caused by a lack of social, and economic structure for the political will and sound analysis of political j future. events, as well as a flawed understanding of the root causes of the crisis. In other situations, Civil society. Within civil society organiza- such as the Democratic Republic of Congo, the tions, special attention should be paid to the international community and various humani- media, given its enormous potential to tarian organizations were responsible for rein- influence the attitudes and behavior of stating those who allegedly launched the geno- citizens. Investment in a well trained, cide and did not provide sufficient support to autonomous media can serve as a strong the victims. building block for reconstruction and pre- vention of future conflict. Lessons from the past, both technical and political, need to be absorbed and taken into Overall, however, no state-of-the-art formula consideration for future policy. The interna- 1 for preventing and solving conflict has yet been tional community should focus on conflict pre- devised. In order to avoid further deaths, the vention in four areas: international community must come to terms witLh and learn from its past failures. Interna- Politics. In the past the political will to curb tional political will to avoid conflict, and the conflict has involved economic sanctions political instruments required to achieve this and embargoes. This type of behavior often j goal, must also be nurtured. leads to huge humanitarian disasters, while 2 anding the Vision T_ he second day of the Paris conference, Donor Collaboration attended mainly by post-conflict unit managers, marked the second time that 1 Representatives of USAID's Office of Transi- leaders of donor organizations gathered to tion Initiatives (OTI) opened the second day of share information and Letter understand their the meeting. As one of the first bilateral respective missions. The first meeting, spon- donors to create a post-conflict office with sored by USAID in October, 1997, allowed operational capacity and resources, OTI's rep- each unit to introduce itself and descrihe its resentatives suggested that participating agen- activities and operational capacity in relation- cies should try to benefit from knowledge of, ship to other similarly situated units. This rep- and lessons learned from, each other's field resented a crucial first step to information operations. In particular, it would be useful if sharing and collaboration in the realm of post- one agency could build off another's platform conflict reconstruction. The success of this in a post-conflict environment, thereby reduc- meeting led the World Bank to sponsor the ing initial investments and duplication of Paris meeting to enable the units to continue human resources. For example, OTI has and expand their discussions. One of the most already created several bases of operation that notable trends at the Paris gathering was the could be developed further by other donors to growing universe of post-conflict units. In the support large-scale short period between October 1997 and April programming in the 1998, ten new units had been created and were Democratic Republic actively up and running (see appendix B). of the Congo. This i practice would be ug post-conflict Among the key outcomes of the Paris meeting especially useful in th a7 were a clearer understanding of the operational situations where one throug an capacity of different units, more detailed infor- donor might not have A as pohlCc)7tric mation about the resources each unit has avall- resources available cf able to address post-conflict needs, and a more immediately for various types o accurate sense of the timing required for a intervention, but imp lnj * / e donor to disburse resources or provide opera- could easily partici- Emenica tional support in the wake of a conflict. Anoth- pate in initial plan- e a/actors wh0 er important outcome was increased openness to ning and transition a: partnerships among donor agencies. Acceptance from crisis to medi- different high- of the notion of working together-combining um-term develop- s@utn *hn scarce resources and using the technical skills ment programming. simulcneous/y. that each unit could lend to a given situation- made it evident that a new type of development In addition post-con-ib5 ;n- is emerging in post-conflict situations. The new flict units might be approach is less territorial, more client-orient- well served by devel- ed, and more attuned to devising programs to oping a set of priority - address some of the root causes of conflict. countries where Unit managers also discussed the role of new reconstruction will frameworks for post-conflict operations, the inevitably be required. By expanding the vision comparative advantages of bilateral versus mul- of where such units might work in the future, it tilateral donors, how to define priorities, and might be possible to develop a strategic sequencing resources and functions in a way approach to such places as Colombia, the that will support reconstruction. Democratic Republic of Congo, Kenya, or Nigeria. Integrated planning would allow units to set goals that could move two or three coun- tries from war to peace every year. Most large- 13 scale reconstruction efforts require the bulk of of programs implemented by a wide range of a donor's resources; fewer resources are allocat- actors who, together, could support different ed to developing new models for rebuilding high-priority needs simultaneously. institutions or providing for community reha- I bilitation. Joint training of staff, especially for special tasks, is another way to stretch limited Canada and resources, and could also help agencies to Peacebuilding respond collaboratively to crises. Staff from In Canada, a special fund for apeacebuilding I,'- tt'Z} jactivities" was initiated to support both politi- - A ~ ;cal and development needs in post-conflict 'PoStconflt nit t its 7Zylgb be well periods. The fund was designed to support short-term, gap-filling activities that can sup- by et'd/c op ai7 a set of priority cou port interim stability, while other longer-term where 7 encotistr leti ?7 U'l/1 i>2euitabk tM f ¼ ' i 1arrangements are bein-g imiade. Canada views its -ev L -k3 J"§-t.-S peacebuilding initiative asaridge between begi7. T17is integrated planning co J'i humanitarian assistance and development. It - U ^^;i 't'jj'.'s | also uses its resources to set in operation the a/ll/oi' iui:ts to set goals that couldt political initiatives and foreign policy obje.- two or thr,e countries from war tsP tives of its counterpart unit in Canada's foreign t'nLt LoLEnLrIeb I ~~~~~~ministry. evern ycar. -Frederick Barton, director, U'SAID'D Office of Transw,* ;i Inltiat 'ts -'i different agencies that have received similar training will be more likely to take similar approaches and work well together. Another difficult issue is determining who to collaborate with in a new, post-war government. This issue can have a tremendous impact on the ability of an agency to function during interven- tion, as well as on the effectiveness of the inter- vention. Fragile, unstable government leadership can further complicate responsiveness. Central to effective intervention is the ability of a donor agency to help support long-term development needs and build institutions to support these needs, without overburdening the government of countries emerging from crisis. An ideal approach to these issues would be through an approach called by ITUNICEF "polycentric pro- gramming, or the development of various types 14 w Partners and New Processes onor discussions of their country's the lone voice of authority in a world plagued respective programs highlighted the by conflict. While the ICRC does not have a D_/ existence of different "cultures of special unit devoted to post-conflict manage- development." Reconstruction work can be a ment, it views its field operations as central to challenge for agencies whose dominant devel- informing others of on-the-ground conditions. opment culture is based on longer-term pro- The ICRC remains a key actor in a world witb grams. UNICEF, for example, has no core ill-defined centers of authority and plagued by funding to address manmade emergencies. ongoing conflicts. Transitions to peace are often not given emer- gency treatment. Thus many of the actions The European Community's Emergency required at the outset of a posL-conflict pro- I Humanitarian Operations (ECIIO) was e.r- gram, such as local capacity building, cannot be ganized in 1992 and, in the process, moved supported in a timely fashion. The U. K's beyond its purely humanitarian activities to a Department for International Development (DIFD), in contrast, has experienced a shift in emphasis toward conflict prevention, rather i I than general humanitarian assistance. For DIFD, the concept of "prevention" now Itt l embraces such areas as security sector reform- ; 6js7ethaflenge jor all post-coniflict units reduction of small arms, removal Of land W ow to become re/eu t O1 S mines, and conversion of military resources. DIFD is also engaged in an analysis of conflict .t 1 n/ IltS within traditional through impact assessments. pmenf agenies or ort7al7ittiothz7. The U.N. Food and Agriculture Program rnf ci, (FAO) is another agency long involved in im Stiefel, monitoring of famine and technical support l t Societies Project, IlNRIS) that has assumed a more activist and opera- A '- tional role since the end of the Cold War. Their emergency unit, created to support the more urgent demands on the FAO, is currently being transformed to carry out a new coordination role. In the reconstruction area, however, emer- wider range of support in post-conflict envi- gencies are funded on a case-by-case basis, ronments. As one of the world's largest human- similar to the way UNICEF handles such itarian assistance donors, ECHO has experi- needs. In the absence of stand-by resources or a enced ever-increasing demands on its capacity to respond quickly, it is sometimes resources. It has, however, developed a working very difficult to provide the timely support that partnersbip with other donors to establish post-conflict reconstruction demands, greater capacity to bring timely relief in com- plex emergencies. Operations in the post-con- The International Committee of the Red Cross ! flict field are still being developed as part of a (ICRC) has always been an operational organi- wider effort to be responsive to the changes in zation; in recent years it has become increas- global politics. Since "long-term" to ECHO ingly engaged in all areas of crisis management. means only about six months, its work in the From its original mandate as a neutral inter- rehabilitation phase must he considered only a locutor and guardian of civilians in wartime, temporary contribution, hut one whicb must be the ICRC has assumed an increasingly activist I taken into consideration when other donors role, providing training for police and support plan the reconstruction phase. for reconstruction, and sometimes serving as 15 I j ¼) 7 _1 2) - ''F Cultivating respect for human rights in post- The transition from emergency to development conflict periods has been the work 0f the United assistance may be easier for humanitarian Nations High Commission for Human Rights actors, since those who work at the relief end of (UNHCHR) since its creation in 1994. The the continuum tend to have a wider range 07 UNHCHR has been developing a field capacity partners-due to the nature of emergencies and and carrying out technical training to meet the the varied skills required to address their needs. challenges posed by the world's most horrific Those in traditional development agencies usu- human rights violations-genocide in Rwanda, ally work in a more isolated fashion. It is obvi- ongoing massacres in Burundi, and investiga- ous from the most recent experiences in post- tions of ethnic cleansing in Bosnia. Currently i conflict reconstruction that the development the UNHCHR can serve as a source of informa- aspects of these complex emergencies require a tion and advice about conditions in the 31 much more team-oriented approach. countries where it is working. Often the organi- zation can provide up-to-date information about The international community has only begun local conditions and insights into the sources of to apply the lessons learned in the early 1990s conflict to involved post-conflict units. The to the field. We still lack a consistent analvtical UNHCHR is also concentrating on work in framework for assessing the post-conflict peri- conflict prevention and training U.N. personnel od. If post-conflict work is to be effective, the and others who participate in LUNHCHR moni- international community needs to develop spe- toring missions in the relationship between law cific standards for peacebuilding that take into enforcement and human rights. I account the short- and long-term nature of this work, so that such standards become a part Despite these new activities, post-conflict units 0f every operation. Three important steps in are still marginal to the work of most multilat- the direction of achieving such standards would eral and bilateral donors. This problem stems, include: on the one hand, from international humani- tarian actors that have no political component, Improving networking and coordination and on the other, from development actors who among existing post-conflict units and non- are unwilling to admit the political origins of governmental actors engaged in this aspect most intrastate conflicts. Indeed, the clear rela- | f development tionship between politics and field operations makes post-conflict units important interlocu- . Developing a series of indicators for peace- tors between development agencies and the building unfolding 0f local events. Yet for many donors, responding to the needs of the post-conflict Developing a more solid methodology for world seems inimical to the ordered, planned, assessing hot spots and creating paradigms and integrated nature of development. The for exit strategies under a variety of condi- challenge for all post-conflict units will he how tions. to become relevant as functional units within traditional development agencies or organiza- tions. Approaches to post-conflict reconstruc- Clash or Congruence of tion require more flexible methodologies in the Development Cultures? field. Whether such practices can be main- streamed will determine the future of post- Examination of the different types of cultures conflict activities within the hroader vision of I that intersect in the transition environment rais- how the special skills of those involved in es questions about the issue of conditionality. reconstruction will be utilized and valued. Should it play a role in the transformation from humanitarian relief to post-conflict programs? The absence of conditions in the humanitarian 16 assistance phase, and the wider use of conditions *A plan for the restoration of host country in traditional development programs, leaves the authority ... particularly applicable to transition period a gray area that begs for greater intrastate conflict."4 definition. Without the creation of operational principles, it will be difficult to integrate post- Participants also stressed the need to focus on conflict work into the mainstream thinking of the security aspects of post-conflict situations; those who precede this type of intervention for example, there is currently no international (humanitarian actors) or those who follow it (the mechanism for police training during such development strategists). periods. The huge gap in police, justice, securi- ty, and, to some extent, human rights policies, In an effort to mainstream emergency assis- must be considered as the international com- tance operations, The International Monetary munity designs its reconstruction programs. Fund undertook a review in 1995. Three main Security and justice policies cannot wait for the recommendations emerged from the study: long-term programming phase; they are time- sensitive and must be handled quickly. Yet * Each project should have only one or two major donors have not developed an appropri- lead agencies ate way to deal with these issues. * An initial blueprint or framework paper for Creating space for reconstruction within the the country should exist to guide actions humanitarian assistance phase is also crucial to long-term development. Unless there is some * An analysis of where the gaps or overlaps awareness in the early phases of a crisis that exist at the outset helps to avoid subsequent reconstruction will follow, the responsibility for duplication of effort and waste of resources. transition work will fall on the shoulders of the i humanitarian groups. While the U.N. High Using this IMF framework as a starting point, i Commission for Refugees may currently be it is helpful to add the Carnegie Commission filling this niche in the humanitarian phase, on the Prevenitioni of Deadly Coniflict's outline links need to be created to allow others in the of other important streamlining factors. development community to enter early and Among those mentioned in the Carnegie participate in developing a more integrated report are: post-conflict strategy. * The identification of a 'lead player-an international organization, country, or even A New Development prominent individual around which or Culture whom preventive efforts can mobilize" The development dimensions of crisis manage- * The development of a 'coherent political- ment still need to be drawn from the various military approach to the engagement cases that have absorbed much of the resources designed to arrest the violence, address the and attention of bilateral and multilateral humanitarian needs of the situation, and donors since the end of the Cold war. what are integrate all political and military aspects of the priorities for post-conflict units, in light of the problem" the difficult situations in which they operate? Those who attended the Paris meeting are * "Adequate resources to support the preven- tive engagement" Tlaken from the Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict's Prerenting Deadly Conflict, Carnegie Corporation of New York, December 1997, p. 40. 17 attempting to establish a mechanism to coordi- between humanitarian response and long-term nate concepts, now that they have had the development assistance. The presence of so opportunity to share ideas and interact with many donors, the rapid expansion of post-con- those managing units and their staffs. Among flict units within the donor community, and the hey areas for coordination, the group iden- lessons from recent events-from Haiti and tified the bighest priorities as being: Rwanda to Sierra Leone and Tajikistan-all point to a more enduring role for this area of * Training development. The challenge to the internation- al community is to recognize the critical * Communication through Internet links importance of this transition period and pro- vide the support necessary for post-conflict * Benchmarking progress units to become development 'players' with the full responsibilities and obligations that are * Cataloguing best practices and lessons central to sustaining peace, economic growth, learned. and social equality. Crucial links among donors can translate into field programs that support the use of each other's platforms as a springboard for longer- term development activities. While participants expressed concern that, at the operational level, post-conflict develop- ment is still lagging behind traditional develop- ment culture, it was also evident that much has been accomplished in the years since the first post-conflict units were created to fill the gap * lipendix A- enda, Day One and Day Two Conflict Prevention and Post-Conflict Reconstruction: Perspectives and Prospects April 20, 1998 World Bank Paris Office Introduction and welcome Nick van Praag, Acting Director, World Bank, European Office Moving Upstream: From Reconstruction to Prevention Nat Colletta, Manager, Post-Conflict Unit, World Bank The Folly of Conventional Wisdom: The Challenges of Post-Conflict Reconstruction Mviark AMalloch Brown, Vice President for External and UN Affairs, World Bank Session I: Good Development as Prevention: Lessons from Recent History Moderator: Bernard Wood, Director, Development Cooperation Directorate, OECD * Missed Opportunities in the Great Lakes-Winrich Kuehne, Deputy Director, Stiftung Wissenschaft Und Politik * The Role of Parallel Intermediation-Matteo Zuppi, Comunita' Sant'Egidio * Recent Lessons from Iraq-Staffan de Mistura, Leader, UN Secretary General's Technical Team to Iraq * The Post-Accord Period in Guatemala-Mauricio Valdes, Deputy Director, UNDP Mission in Guatemala Session II: Strengthening Social Capital in the Wake of Conflict: Trust, Institutional Capacity and Civil Society Moderator: Steven B. Holtzman, Post-Conflict Unit, World Bank * Building Trust in the Great Lakes-Hasan Ba, Synergie Afrique * Institution-Building in West Bank and Gaza-Rick Hooper, Fafo Institute for Applied Social Science, Oslo * Social Capital Formation in the Wake of Conflict-Nick Stockton, OXFAM * The Media's Role in Building Social Capital-Mark Nelson, Economic Development Institute, World Bank Session III: Creating an Enabling Environment for the Private Sector in Post-Conflict Economies Moderator: Patrice Dufour, World Bank Resident Mission, Sarajevo * Public-Private Partnership in Angola-Andrew Mack, Knowledge Management Unit, World Bank * EDF Experience in Lebanon's Reconstruction-Alain Regnier, Middle-East Area Manager, Electricit6 de France * Local Authorities and the Promotion of the Private Sector in Reconstruction-Fabrizio Pizzanelli, Director, Department of International Activities, The Region of Tuscany * Military Conversion and Economic Development-Herbert Wulf, Director, Bonn International Conversioni Center Concluding Remarks Senator Alain Destexhe, President, International Crisis Group 19 Building New Partnerships for Post-Conflict Operations A Workshop for Post-Conflict Units April 21, 1998 World Bank Paris Office Welcome and Introduction to the Workshop Nat Colletta, Post Conflict Unit, The World Bank Remarks Frederick Barton, Office of Transition Initiatives, US Agency for International Development Session I Post-Conflict Units: Ilow Do We Operate? Moderator: Johanna Mendelson Forman, Post Conflict Unit, The World Bank Panelists: Elizabeth Gibbons, UNICEF Michael Mahdesian, USAID Michael Small, Department of Foreign Affairs, Canada Robert Walker, DIFDA, United Kingdom Anne Bauer, FAO Session II Best Practices in Post-Conflict Operations Moderator: Steven Holtzman, Post Conflict Unit, World Bank Panelists: Matthias Stiefel, War-Torn Society Project, UNRISD Esther Brimmer, The Carnegie Corporation Larbi Mebtouche, UNHCR Lea Drouet, European Union, ECHO Hessemeddin Tabatabai, GTZ, Germany Gianni Magazzeni, UNHCHR William Hyde, International Organization for Migration Session III Organizing for Effective Operations Moderator: Carol Poldermans, The Netherlands Panelists: Harold Siem, World Health Organization Lars Backstrom, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Finland Gerard Peytrignet, ICRC Gerhard Pfister, SDC, Switzerland Closing Remarks Next Steps Nat Colletta, Post-Conflict Unit, World Bank 20 Benndix B- of Participants Eloisa Nos Aldas Larry De Boice CIBPD UNDP Fundacion Caja Castellon Emergency Response Division Geneva Eugenio Ambrosi Alain Boinet International Organization for Migration SOLIDARITES Clare Ansell Esther Brimmer Action Aid Carnegie Commission on Preventing Ingmar Armyr Susan Brown Division for Humanitarian Assistance Peacebuilding Unit Swedish International Development Agency CIDA Hassan Ba Giorgio Cardone Synergies Africa ICS Genova Lars Backstrom Margaret Carey Unit for Humanitarian Assistance Peacekeeping Operations Ministry of Foreign Affairs United Nations Luca Barani Luisa Chiodi Scuola Superiore di Studi Universitari Post-Conflict Organizer for the World Bank Anne Bauer Nat Colletta TCOR Post-Conflict Unit FAO, Special Relief Operation Service World Bank Thomas G. Beck Maria Emerica Cortese Policy and Program Bureau Non-Governmental Peace Strategies Project USAID Sharon Courtoux Anders Bengtcen Survie OECD Swedish Delegation Nadine Cuiburu Forum Delphos Ambassador Rolf Berg Ministry of Foreign Affairs Michelle Cullen Department For Global Affairs Post-Conflict Unit World Bank Christophe Bertauld Bioforce D6veloppement Rhone-Alpes Antonio Donini Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Marco Boasso Affairs Emergency Program United Nations International Organization for Migration Michel Doucini Minist&re des Affaires Etrangeres, DGAPS 21 Tobias Debiel | Francois Grunewald Development & Peace Foundation Ingenieur Agronome Groupe UK Staffan De Mistura G UNIC ! Steven Hansch WHO Senator Alain Destexhe Divison of Emergency and Humanitarian Tnternational Crisis Grouip Action Kolude Doherty Halle Jorn Hanssen PTSS Norwegian People's Aid UNHCR Nancy Happe Lea Drouet Policy Development and Review Dept European Community's Emergency IMPF Humanitarian Operations Steven Holtzman Patrice Dufour Post-Conflict Unit World Bank World Bank Mike Dziedzic Thomas Hoppe National Defense University Professor for Catholic Social Ethics Universitaet der Bundeswehr Hamburg Paul Eavis Fachbereich Paedogogik Saferworld Martin Honeywell Georg Fe]sheim International Alert Embassy of Germany to France Rick Hooper Shepard Forman FAFO Institute Center on International Cooperation Center for International Studies Jean Freymond Hans Ulrich Hugo Centre for Applied Studies in UNOPS International Negotiations William Hyde Mara Galaty Program Support Division Aspen Insitute Berlin International Organization for Migration Elizabeth Gibbons Valeria Izzi UNICEF Scuola Superiore di Studi Universitari Mark Giroud Marie Joannidis-Kristiansen SAMLT 95 MFI Mijargon Agostinho jardim Goncalves 0ik,s Andr6 Kabengele GRERA 22 Winrich Kuehne Erick de Miul Stiftung Wissenschaft und Pliti k UNDP Representative to the EU Vincent Lacour Mark Nelson Economic Development Institute Gen, Alain Lamballe World Bank MCLAAA Taies Nezam James LeMoyne Post-Conflict Unit RBLAC World Bank UNDP David Nyheim Ann Loubignac-Lewis Forum On Early Warning And Early UNESCO Responses Bosco Lyamuge Dott Margherita Paolini CCFD-Comite Catholique Contre La Unita Tecnica Locale (UTL) in Sarajevo Faim et Pour Le Developpement Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs Andrew Mack Remi Paul Knowledge Management Unit International Groupe Generale des Eaux World Bank Joan Pearce Michael Mahdesian Direclorate Genieral II-DGII/F Bureau for Humanitarian Response Martin Ortega Elena Martinez Pierre Peigney OSG Chargee d'Etudes/Groupe Procure UNDP 1 Fondation pour les Etudes d Defense Kim Maynard Nadan Petrovic Civil Society Initiatives ICS Genova Mercy Corps International Peter Pieck Sandra Melone GTZ European Centre for Common Ground Gerard Peytrignet Johanna Mendelson-Forman International Committee of the Red Cross Post-Conflict Unit World Bank Gerhard Pfister Swiss Development Cooperation Peter Meyer European Commission Fabrizio Pizzanelli Central Planning Department (DGIA) Servizio Attivita Internazionali Andr6e Michel Gerard Plantin Recherche CNRS Pharmaciens Sans Frontieres Femme et Changements- Citoyenne pour la paix 23 Caroline Poldermans Harald Siem Conflict Prevention & Crisis Mgmt Inter-Agency Cooperation Unit Ministry of Foreign Affairs Emergency & Humanitarian Action Div. World Health Organization Nick van Praag European Office Michael Small World Bank Peace Building & Human Security Department of Foreigni Affairs & International Josita Profeta Trade Movimondo Mr. Spencer Therse Pujolle ODI/ Overseas Development Institute Commission de Cooperation et D6veloppement Mattbias Stiefel Pascal Queru War-torn Societies Project COSPE-Cooperazione Per Lo Sviluppo UNRISD Dei Paesi Emergenti Finn Stepputat Patrice Quevilly Centre for Development Research IFRI Nick Stockton Charg6e de Recherche OXFAM Union de l'Europe Occidentale Alice Sindzingre Alain Regnier CNRS EDF -France Antoine Sondag Guikje Roethof Secours Catholique Committee on Development Cooperation Hessemeddin Tabatabai Mattia Romani Emergency and Refugee Programs Scuola Superiore di Studi Universitari GTZ Gianni Rufini Fred Tanner VOICE Geneva Center For Security Policy Carlos Santiso Tierry Tardy International Idea Fed-Crest Robert Scharf Allyson Thirkell OECD (DAC) ActionAid Diana Senghor Laurent Jacques Thomas Institut Panos Paris Operations Officer, TCOR Bernard Sexe Marie-Aimee Tourres Celulle D'urgence CERDI 24 Aitor Urkiola Instituto de Derechos Humanos Bernard Wood OECD/OCSE Rene Mauricio Valdes Development Cooperation Directorate UNDP Herbert Wulf Jacques Vaysse i Internationales Konversionszentrum Bonn (BICC) Alain Vidart President Comite Liaison Defense-CNPF Marco Zupi CLambre Syndic.De Const. De Navire CESPI Effif Voutira Don Matteo Zuppi University of Oxford Comunita' Di Sant'Egidio Robert Walker willet Weeks Conflict and Humanitarian Affairs USAID Department for International Development Rachel Winter-Jones World Bank 25 pendix C- wti1~rector of Post-Conflict Units Multilateral and Bilateral Donors Multilateral Organizations .................................. 27 European Community Humanitarian Office ................................. 27 International Committee of the Rec Cross .................................. 27 International Monetary Fund . ................................................ 28 International Organization for Migration .......... ................. 28 United Nations Children's Fund-Office of Emergency Programs ...... ............... 29 United Nations Development Programme-Emergency Response Division ..... ......... 30 United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization ...... ............. 31 United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization-Specia/Re/ief Operations Service .... 32 United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights ........ .................... 33 United Nations High Commission for Refugees-Reintegration and Self-Reliance Unit ..... 34 United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs ...... .......... 34 United Nations Office for Project Services-Division for Rehabilitation and Social Sustainability ............................................... . . . . . ..35 United Nations Research Institute for Social Development-War-Torn Societies Project ... 36 United Nations World Food Program .............. ............................ 36 U,nited Nations World Health Organization-Interagency Cooperation Unit ............. . 37 Wo7rld Bank-Post-Conflict Unit ................. ............................. 37 Bilateral Organizations ...................................................... 39 Canadian International Development Agency, Canada-Peacebuilding Unit ..... ........ 39 Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, Canada- Peacebuilding and Human Security Division ...................................... 40 Deutsche Gesellschaft fur Technische Zusammenarbeit, Germany- FEmergency Aid and Refugee Program ................. .................. 40 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, The Netherlands-Conflict Prevention and Crisis Management Division ......................... 41 Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency, Sweden- Division for Humanitarian Assistance ......................... 42 Department for International Development, United Kingdom- Conflict and Human Affairs Department ......................... 43 United States Agency for International Development, United States- Office of Transition Initiatives, Bureau for Humanitarian Respoonse ....... ............... 44 26 Multilateral Organizations war (that is, wounded and sick soldiers, prison- ers of war, and civilian populations in general) European Community receive protection and assistance. Humanitarian Office Protection activities consist, for instance, of Background Summary visiting prisoners of war and civilian detainees, The European Community Humanitarian tracing missing persons, and arranging for Office (ECHO) is the unit of the European I exchange of family messages. Assistance activi- Commission that deals with humanitarian aid I ties consist of providing medical care and to countries outside the European Union. It material assistance to victims, as well as engag- was created in 1992 and was active in 85 ing in emergency relief and rehabilitation of countries as of 1997. populations affected by armed violence or its aftermath. It ensures that international Regions humanitarian law (the Geneva Convention of All regions: Latin America, Asia, the Mediter- 1949 and additional Protocols of 1977) is ranean, the Commonwealth of Independent respected and promotes its dissemination. The States, Central and Eastern Europe, Africa, the ICRC has observer status to the UN General Pacific, and the CariLbean. Assembly. Resources The ICRC has no post-conflict unit as such. Headquarters staff: 121; field staff: 70. Fund- Humanitarian activities in post-conflict situa- ing in 1997: 442 million ECU. ltions, such as those conducted in the context of other situations under the ICRC's mandate or Publications of ICRC's concern (for example, internal ten- Manual of Best Practices, Manual of Procedures, sions and disturbances, international and non- Manualfor Experts (in preparation). international armed conflicts, and conflicts' direct aftermath), are carried out through the Contact operational and regional field offices (delega- ECHO Information tions), under the hierarchical responsibility of European Commission the headquarters-based geographical zones and 232 rue Belluard sectors, and under the supervision of the rele- B-1049 Brussels, Belgium vant functional units, which include the fol- Telephone: (3 22) 295-44 00 lowing: Fax: (3 22) 295-4572 Health and Relief Divisions (surgery, ortho- E-mail: echo@echo.cec.be pedics, water and sanitation, nutrition, agri- Web page: www.echo.cec.be/homepage.html cultural and veterinary rehabilitation, and others). * Protection Division (detention- and protec- International Committee tion-related activities, tracing services). of the Red Cross IHL Promotion and Communication and Legal Affairs Divisions (prevention activities, Background Summary dissemination to armed and security forces The International Committee of the Red Cross and other target groups, promotion and edu- (ICRC) is a humanitarian, independent organi- cation, campaigns, advisory services on IHL zation with an internationally recognized man- implementation). date, acts as an neutral intermediary between Cooperation within the Red Cross Movement belligerents in situations of international and Division (cooperation with and development internal armed conflict as well as internal 0f National Red Cross Societies). strife, and endeavors to ensure that victims of 27 Regions International Monetary Fund Africa BackgTound SummaTy ICRC delegations: Angola, Burundi, Eritrea, The division's responsibilities include helping EtLiopia, Liberia, Rwanda, Somalia, Sudan, to formulate the International Monetary Zaire (covering the Republic of Congo). The Fund's (IMF) policy framework for assisting ICRC also has seven regional delegations cov- post-conflict countries and reviewing social ering 39 countries. policy and military expenditure. Americas Regions ICRC delegations: Colombia, Haiti, Peru; and Global operation. As of April 1998 the IMF four regional delegations covering more than had 182 member countries. 24 countrics. Resources Asia The IMF provides financial assistance by ICRC delegations: Afghanistan, Cambodia, extending credits and loans to member coun- Pakistan, Sri Lanka; and four regional delega- tries with balance-of-payments problems to tions covering more than 37 countries. support policies of adjustment and reform. It also provides emergency assistance by allowing Europe and Central Asia mcmbcrs to make draw-downs to meet balance- ICRC delegations: European Union, Bosnia of-payment needs in post-conflict situations. and Herzegovina, Croatia, the Federal Republic Technical assistance is also provided through of Yugoslavia (Serbia, Montenegro), Tajiikistan, expertise and aid to its members in several Armenia/Azerbaijan, Georgia; and six regional areas, including institution building. delegations covering more than 21 countries. Contact Middle East and North Africa Ms. Nancy Happe ICRC delegations: Arab Republic of Egypt, Division Chief Israel, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, the occupied ter- Development Issues Division / PDR ritories and the autonomous territories, Syria; International Monetary Fund and two regional delegations covering 12 700 19th Street, N.W. countries. Washington, D.C. 20433, USA Telephone: (202) 623-7000 Resources Fax: (202) 623-4232 Staff: Headquarters has more than 650 staff E-mail: nhappe@imf.org members; field staff numbers 7,850 (850 Web page: www.imf.org expatriates; 200 national societies; 6,800 local recruits). International Organization for Migration Funding: In 1997 the ICRC total budget was US$558 million. Background Summary The International Organization for Migration Contacts (IOM) was established in 1951 under the ICRC name of Intergovernmental Committee for 19, avenue de la Paix European Migration, with the primary function CH-1202 Geneva, Switzerland to assist with the resettlement of refugees and Telephone: (41 22) 734-6001 displaced persons in Europe. Over the years, a Fax: (41 22) 733-2057 necessary extension of IOM role occurred in E-mail: icrc.gva@icrc.org both scope and geographical basis. In 1987 28 IOM's council adopted specific amended Orga- Resources nization's Constitution to reflect these changes Staff: Small headquarters staff and over 200 and altered its name to 'International Organi- staff in the field. zation for Migration." Funding: Over US $35 million per year. IOM has nine major objectives on which it Contact focuses its programming: Mr. Marco-Tulio Boasso-Sanchez * To provide secure, reliable, cost effective ser- International Organzation for Migration vices for persons who require migration assis- 17, Route des Morillons tance 1211 Geneva 19 Switzerland * To provide relief and if necessary migration Telephone: (41 22) 717 9460 assistance, including resettlement and reinte- Fax: (41 22) 798 6150 gration, to persons affected by emergencies E-mail: boasso@iom.int and post-emergency environment, such as Web page: www.iom.ch displaced persons, refugees, former combat- ants and affected population * To be the reference point for information on United Nations Children's Fund- international, regional, and internal migrato- Office of Emergency Programs ry flows * To offer expert advice and cooperation to Backgrounid Summary Governments and other partners on migra- tion matters The United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) * To promote economic and social develop- was established in 1946. Included in its Mission ment in concerned countries through the Statement are the following tasks: design and implementation of migration related programs, including transfer of quali- UNICEF is mandated by the United Nations fied human resources General Assembly to advocate for the protec- * To be a forum for and provide leadership in tion of children's rights, to help meet their the international debate on migration basic needs and to expand their opportunities * To undertake programs that facilitate the to reach their tfull potential.... UNICEF return and reintegration of displaced popula- insists that the survival, protection, and devel- tions and take into account the needs and i opment of children are universal development concerns of local communities of return imperatives that are integral to human and!or origin I progress .... UNICEF mobilizes political will * To help Government and migrants find solu- and material resources to help countries, par- tions to the problems and causes of irregular ticularly developing countries, ensure a 'first undocumented migration I call for children' and to build their capacity to * To work towards effective respect of migrants' form appropriate policies and deliver services rights. for children and their families .. UNICEF aims, through its country programs, to pro- Regions mote the equal rights of women and girls and Countries of operations: Guatemala, Angola, to support their full participation in the politi- Haiti, Tajikistan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, cal, social and economic development of their Philippines, Albania and Mali. Regions of countries.... UNICEF works with all its part- operation: Central and South East Asia, Cen- ners towards the attainment of the sustainable tral America and the Carihbean, Africa, human development goals adopted by the Europe. world community and the realization of the vision of peace and social progress enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations." 29 Regions increasing demand for coordination and pro- Eastern and Southern Africa, West and Cen- gramming. The emergency backstopping of tral Africa, middle East and North Africa, the country offices is accomplished in close collab- Americas and the Carihbean, East Asia and the oration with tLe Office for the Coordination Pacific, South Asia, Central and Eastern of Humanitarian Affairs/Emergency Relief Europe, Commonwealth of Independent States Coordinator (OCHA/ERC), with special units and Baltic States, Central Asia Offices (Turk- in U.N. system organizations and agencies, and meniistan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzhekistan). with bilateral donors anld intergovernmental and nongovernmental organizations. UNICEF operates in over 160 countries, of which 25 are designated as "emergency The ERD is part of the UNDP's Operational countries.' i Support Group (OSG) within the office 0f the Administrator, and is headed hy a director. Resources There are two deputy directors, one located in UNICEF has eight regional offices and more New York and the other in Geneva, where than 130 field offices worldwide. UNDP's Disaster Management Program is located. All ERD staff have extensive experi- Contact ence workling in crisis environments in the field. Elizabeth Gihbons Senior Policy Officer The ERD works in close collaboration with the UNICEF UNDP's regional bureaus and country offices, 3 U.N. Plaza which have direct management responsibility New York, NY 10017, USA for the UNDP's development cooperation pro- Teleph,one: (212) 326-7207 grams, as well as in consultation with other Fax: (212) 326-7037 UNDP units. E-mail: egibbons @ unicef.org Main Switchboard: (212) 326-7000 Regions OPSCEN (Operations Center in the Office of Latin America and the Caribbean, Africa, Emergency Programs): (212) 326-7222 Arab States, CIS States, and Asia and the Web page: www.unicef.org Pacific, including approximately 20 to 25 crisis and post-crisis countries. United Nations Development Resources Programme Emergency Response I The ERD staff includes 15; specialized profes- Division sionals with additional support staff. The ERD has approximately STS$135 million in core Background Summary I funding until the year 2000, but other funding The Emergency Response Division (ERD) of sources are available. Two types of operations the U.N. Development Programme (UNDP) funded by the ERD are: was created to give substantive support to U.N. Country Offices in their multiple roles in Program responses to comnplex developeiont situa- emergency situations, whether natural disaster tions during and after crises: or civil strife. The U.N. resident coordinators Strategic programming instruments for are usually the UNDP resident representatives, international and national action and normally also fulfill the humanitarian Special program initiatives (such as mine coordination function (as humanitarian coor- action, reintegration, and governance) within dinators). Experience has shown that the need such program strategies for U.N. system leadership and coordination becomes crucial during such periods given the 30 * Immediate support to strengthen the country distinction of race, sex, language or religion, by and the U.N. svstem's ability to provide a the Charter of the United Nations. To realize coordinated, rapid response to a sudden crisis this purpose the Organization will: (a) Collabo- * Support is provided for coordination functions rate in the work of advancing the mutual of the government and the resident coordina- knowledge and understanding of peoples, tor or representative, including situation through all means of mass communication and assessment and reporting, response planning, i to that end recommend such international resource mobilization, and logistics support. agreements as may be necessary to promote the free flow of ideas by word and image; (b) Give Capacity building to avoid and prepare for crises: fresh impulse to popular education and to the * Stimulating national awareness and human spread of culture; and (c) Maintain, increase resource development and diffuse knowledge. With a view to preserv- * Assisting national institutions with programs ing the independence, integrity and fruitful aimed at anticipating, preventing, mitigating, diversity of the cultures and educational sys- and managing crisis tems of the States Members of the Organiza- * Providing temporary supplemental support to tion, the Organization is prohibited from resident coordinators and representatives to intervening in matters which are essentially facilitate planning and coordination of spe- within their domestic jurisdiction. cial program initiatives. Regions Contact Field Offices worldwide, including Africa, Arab Omar Babket States Region, Asia and Pacific Region, Latin Director America and the Caribbean Region, Europe and UNDP-ERD North America Region. Other units away from One United Nations Plaza Headquarters: Liaison offices with the United New York, NY 10017, USA Nations, Education Offices/ Institutes. Telephone: (212) 906-5194 Fax: (212) 906-5379 Resources E-mail: erd@undp.org Headquarters: 3 Sections - about 30 staff. 186 Member States and the 4 Associate Members. United Nations Educational, Scientific i and Cultural Organization Contact Mr. Leslie AtLherley, Background Summary Director, UNESCO The United Nations Educational, Scientific 7, place de Fortenoy and Cultural Organization's (UNESCO) con- 75352 PARIS 07 SP stitution was adopted by the London Confer- France ence in November 1945, and entered into Telephone: (33 1) 45 68 08 81 - 10 00 effect on 4 November 1946 when 20 states Fax: (33 1) 45 68 55 57 - 45 67 16 90 had deposited instruments of acceptance. It E-mail: cofpeace@uniesco.org currently has 186 Member States. The purpose Web page: www.unesco.org/cpp of the Organization is to contribute to peace and security by promoting collaboration among the nations through education, science and cul- I ture in order to further universal respect for justice, for the rule of law, and for the human rights and fundamental freedoms which are affirmed for the peoples of the world, without 31 United Nations Food and relief and rehabilitation needs in sectors Agriculture Organization- within the FAO's field of competence, and Special Relief Operations Service appraising requests for disaster relief and rehabilitation. Background Summary Making recommendations for FAO actions The Special Relief Operations Service (TCOR) in emergency situations, which may include is currently a service within the Field Operations i assistance in the establishment of related Division (TCO) of the Food and Agricultural preparedness, post-emergency, and recovery Organization of the United Nations' (FAO) measures. It formulates and executes emer- Technical Cooperation Department (TC). gency and special relief projects to support the rehabilitation of agricultural, livestock, The FAO is a key player in emergencies. Its and related sectors through the provision of focus is on food production and agriculture, required inputs and services. reflecting its specialization and responsibility *Maintaining contact with recipient govern- within the U.N. family. Assisting in preventing ments and donors through established channels disaster-related emergencies, providing early of communication and administers trust funds warning of food emergencies, and helping to made available for emergency operations. rehabilitate food production systems are the Coordinating the preparation of the FAO's FAO's predominant roles in humanitarian aid. contribution to consolidated appeals on agri- The main forms of the FAO's intervention cultural relief needs for submission to Office include: needs assessments, provision of agricul- for the Coordination of Humanitarian tural inputs, technical assistance for the plan- Affairs (OCHA). ning and management of sustainable recovery, Ensuring periodic reporting on emergenicy and rehabilitation of rural production systems. situations and the development of appropri- The FAO does not provide food aid; that service ate preparedness, post-emergency, and recov- is performed by the World Food Program. ery measures. The TCOR responds to requests for emergency Regions assistance from countries affected by calami- The FAO and TCOR operate worldwide; as of tie-, natural or manmade, on matters falling May 1998 TCOR was intervening in 69 coun- within the FAO'5 mandate. In coordination tries, following natural and manmade disasters. with other units concerned, the Service formu- Between 1991 and 1997 more than 40 per- lates the FAQ's position on emergency matters. cent of TCOR operations were in Sub-Saharan It also provides information and advice on its Africa, 29 percent were in North Africa and activities and functions to FAO representatives the Near East, and 15 percent in Asia. on the Inter-Agency Steering Committee on Humianitarian A.ctivities and its Working Resouirces Groups, and ensures liaison both within and The FAO has offices in more than 100 coun- outside the UN system on emergency opera- tries in Africa, Asia, Latin America, and tions. Its implementation activities focus on Europe. In countries where the FAO is not rep- the urgent recovery requirements of disaster- resented, the UNDP office serves as focal point stricken areas. It also assists in the establish- for FAO affairs. In complex emergency situa- ment of related preparedness, post-emergency, tions, and when funding resources permit, the and recovery measures. FAO may field senior agronomists to set up an emergency coordination unit to strengthen its Activities include: presence in the country for all matters related * In consultation with other units and, as to relief and early rehabilitation. appropriate, with outside organizations, iden- tifying, assessing, and monitoring emergency 32 In 1997 the TCOR spent over US$61 million United Nations High Commissioner on 83 projects in 33 countries. During the for Human Rights first quarter of 1998, the TCQR approved 41 new projects in 24 countries, at a cost of over Background Sumnmary US$50 million. The General Assembly of the united Nations officially established the U.N. Program of Advi- Except for small, limited interventions funded sory Services in the Field of Human Rights by FAoQs Technical Cooperation Program, the through its resolution 926. In that resolution funding for all FAO-assisted agricultural relief the General Assembly (GA) specifically autho- assessment missions and field operations, and rized the Secretary General to make provision, for many emergency prevention and prepared- at the request of governments, for providing ness activities, cornies from extra-budgetary assistance in the field of luimiani riglts, ilncluding resources provided by external donors (govern- advisory services of experts, fellowships and mental and nongovernmental bodies, multilat- . scholarships, and seminars. Subsequently, the eral funding organizations, and U.N. bodies). GA expanded the services available under the program to include regional and national human Publications rights training courses. The program was further Please refer to the UN Humanitarian Assis- strengthened through the establishment of the tance Training Inventory (HATI) site: Voluntary Fund for Technical Cooperation in www.reliefweb.int/resource/training/t27.html the Field of Human Rights by the Secretary General on November 16, 1987. The FAO is currently preparing an FAO emer- gency preparedness and response manual and a TLe objective of the trust fund is to provide publication on integrating household food additional financial support for practical activ- seculrity and ntutrition into relief and rehabili- , ities focuised on the implementation of interna- tation. These publications should be useful to i tional conventions and other international organizations active in emergency aid in the i instruments on human rights promulgated by food and agricultural sector. In addition specif- the UN, its specialized agencies, or regional ic technical publications, such as the recent organizations. States may receive, at their publication La production des semences de qualite request, technical assistance in tLe promotion deciare au Rwanda should be useful to those and protection of human rights. Technical involved in emergency operations. cooperation projects are undertaken in specific countries as well as at the regional and interna- Contact tional levels. Such projects might include train- Anne M. Bauer ing courses for, among others, members of the Chief, TAO armed forces, police forces, or the legal profes- Viale delle Terme di Caracalla sion, as well as advisory services f or the incor- 00100 Rome, Italy poration of international human rights norms Telephone: (39 65) 705-4936 and standards into national legislation. Fax: (39 65) 705-4941 Financed mainly by voluntary contributions, E-mail: anne.bauer@fao.org technical cooperation is a quickly expanding Web page: www.fao.org area of the United Nations Human Rights Pro- gram. Increasingly, technical cooperation pro- jects are implemented through the establish- ment of a long-term presence in the countries concerned. In some cases, along with technical cooperation activities, field presence might also include a monitoring component. 33 Regions tions, and acting as focal point within the U.N. Africa, Asia, Commonwealtl of Independent High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) for States, Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, cooperation with these organizations. Central and South America. Operations in 56 countries. Regions All regions where the UNHCR is present Resources Support to all UNHCR field operations Twenty-two office locations. Resources Publications One office in Geneva with five staff menbers Trainer's Guide on Hum7an Rights and Police, Train- Publications: Policies Frasnework and Manual on i.ng MWanual on Humnan Ri'ghts Monitoring, Human Self-Reliance, Employment and Microfinance Rihts and Pisons (forthc oming), Giidelines for (December 1997) and Operational Framework Electoral Assistance (forthcoming), Human Rigkhts for UNWHCR Interuention in (Post-conflict) Repatri- and Conflict Resolution (forthcoming). ation and Reintegration Operations. Contact Contact Gianni Magazzeni Larbi Mebtouche Senior Human Rights Officer Head Palais des Nations Reintegration and Self-Reliance Unit, PTSS 1211 Geneva 10, Switzerland UNHCR TelephLone: (41 22) 917-2128 Case Postale 2500 Fax: (41 22) 917-0213 CH - 1211 Geneve 2 Depot, Switzerland E-mail: gmagazenni.hchr@unog.ch Telephone: (41 22) 739-8238 Web page: wwwunhchr.ch Fax: (41 22) 739-7371 / 73-66 E-mail: mebtouch @ unhcrnc United Nations High Commission for Refugees-Reintegration and United Nations Office for the Self-Reliance Unit Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs Background Summary Background Summary The Reintegration and Self-Reliance Unit The Office for the Coordination of Hunmani- (RSRU) is responsible, among other things, for: tarian Affairs (OCHA) was established pur- * Providing, mobilizing, and coordinating sup- suant to the adoption of the Secretary-Gener- port (internal and external) for reintegration als program for reform. In accordance with the operations-with a focus on the formulation provisions of General Assembly resolution of reintegration strategies and design of 46/ 182, the Emergency Relief Coordinators related assistance programs functions are focused in three core areas: (a) * Providing and coordinating support (internal policy development and coordination functions and external) for field refugee programs-with in support of the Secretary-General, ensuring a focus on development of self-reliance that all humanitarian issues, including those strategies that promote local integration and which fall between gaps in existing mandates of reintegration agencies such as protection and assistance for * Promotion and development of operational internally displaced persons, are addressed; (b) cooperation and partnership-in refugee and advocacy of humanitarian issues with political returnee aid and development-with multilater- organs, notably the Security Council; and (c) al, regional, and bilateral development institu- coordination of humanitarian emergency tions, including international financial instituL- response, by ensuring tLat an appropriate 34 response mechanism is established, through unique features differentiate UNOPS from Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) other UN system agencies, organizations and consultations, on the ground. programs: UNOPS specializes in the manage- I ment of programs and projects; UNOPS does Regions not fund programs or projects; and UNOPS OCHA currently maintains field coordination operations, like those of UNDP/OPE and arrangements in 16 countries and one region: UNDP/OPS before it, are self-financing. Afghanistan, Angola, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Burundi, Democratic Regions Peoples Republic of Korea, Democratic Repub- Developing countries and countries in transi- lic of the Congo, Georgia, Great Lakes, Repub- tion, United Nations Development Program lic of the Congo, Russian Federation, Rwanda, (IJNDP), UINDP - Trust Funds and Adminis- Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, Taiikistan. tered Funds, Global Environment Facility Trust Fund, United Nations Capital Develop- Resources rment Funds, Montreal Protocol Trust Fund, Headquarters staff (New York and Geneva): United Nations Development Fund for 137 (50 regular budget posts; 87 extrabud- Women, United Nations Fund for Science and getary) Core annual budget: $42.4 million Technology For Development, Office to Com- (regular budget $18.4 million, extrabudgetary bat Desertification and Drought. $24 million) OCHA field staff: 51. Resources Contact Offices: Headquarters in New York. Other Mr. Antonio Donini offices in Copenhagen, Abidjan, Geneva, Kuala Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Lumpur, Nairobi, San Salvador, and Tokyo. Affairs 1 UN Plaza Contact DC1-1556 Mr. Christophe Bouvier New York, NY 10017 USA Chief Telephone: (212) 963-1234 Division for Rehabilitation and Fax: (212) 96-3-1312 Social Suistainability (RESS) E-mail: donini@un.org United Nations Office for Project Services Web page: http:/156.10619213o/dha_ol (UNOPS) 11-13 chemin des Anemones 1219 Chatelaine United Nations Office for Project Geneva, Switzerland Services-Division for Rehabilitation and Telephone: (41) 22 979 9384/5/7 Social Sustainability Fax: (41) 22 979 9062 E-mail: christopheb @unops.org Background Summary Web page: http://www.unops.org! The United Nations Office for Project Ser- vices (UNOPS) manages project resources to help developing nations and countries in tran- United Nations Research Institute sition in their quest for peace, social stability, for Social Development- economic growth, and sustainable development. War-Torn Societies Project UNOPS is an entity of the United Nations System reconstituted as of 1 January 1995 for Background Summary the specific purpose of providing development The War-torn Societies Project (WSP) began services to projects and programs supported by in 1994 as an experimental action-research UN member states and organizations. Three project collectively sponsored by some 20 35 bilateral and multilateral actors in the interna- Publicatiolns tional assistance field. The U.N. Research Institute for Social Development (UNRISD) The WSP's Central Co-ordination Unit in and its Program for Strategic and International Geneva is recording and comparing findinigs Security Studies are the WSP's institutional and drawing lessons useful to the international hosts, providing the institutional structure and community. A set of core papers, articulating the multiple identities (such as United Nations, and analyzing the WSP experience in the four Swiss, political, and academic) that the project selected countries, including comparative analy- needs to perform its tasks. ses and overall evaluation of tLe WSP, are being compiled for dissemination in late 1998. Based The project aims to assist the international on lessons learned, the project will produce a set community, along with national and local of tools relevant to and useful for policymakers actors, to understand and better respond to the and operational actors-such as guidelines and complex challenge of rebuilding war-torn soci- recommendations. The project will then dissem- eties in post-conflict situations. The WSP has inate WSP lessons and tols to discrete audi- established four country projects, located in ences in specialized packages that will make Eritrea, Mozambique, Somalia, and Guatemala. project results easy to use and adapted to the In each country the project has set up a mecha- needs of those likely to make use of them. nism (a project group and working groups) that provides a neutral forum for the main external Contact and internal actors to meet and jointly cboose The War-torn Societies Project pertinent rebuilding issues to discuss and ana- UNRISD lyze. Each country team produces final country Palais des Nations project evaluations and a set of policy and 1211 Geneva 10, Switzerland operational recommendations, in addition to Telephone: (41 22) 789-8400 papers and reports from workshops, seminars, Fax: (41 22) 789-8321 and local-level research and thematic studies. E-mail: wspinfo@unrisd.org Web page: www.unrisd.org/wsp/ Regions Africa: Eritrea, Mozambique, Somalia; Central America: Guatemala United NationsWorld Food Program Resources Background Summary Once central office in Geneva with eight to 15 Tbe vision of thc World Food Program (WFP) staff members. One to three field offices in each is a world in which every man, woman and country project, with five to 10 staff members in child has access at all times to the food needed each country. The number of staff members for an active and healthy life. Without food, varies depending on the phase of the project. there can be no sustainable peace, no democra- cy and no development. WFP is the frontline At present, the project is phasing out and will United Nations organization fighting to eradi- conclude its activities by the end of 1998. cate world hunger- wether it is the hunger Funding of between US$2 and US$2.5 mil- that suddenly afflicts people fleeing ethnic lion per year during the various stages of the conflict in Rwanda or Bosnia or the chronic project. The WSP is a multidonor project, with hunger that affects the hungry poor in coun- over 26 donors. Voluntary contributions range tries such as Bangladesh or India. WFP became from US$1,000 to more than US$1 million operational in 1963 and is now the world's per donor. largest international food aid organization. WFP's mission is: 1) to save the lives of people caught up in humanitarian crises, through 36 Food-For-Life; 2) to support the most vulner- the World Health Organization in relation to able people at the most critical times of their other agencies, for complementarity and part- lives, through Food-For-Growth; and 3) to nership; (2) to promote policies, standards, and help the hungry poor become self-reliant and guidelines for good public health practices dur- build assets, through Food-For-Work. In emer- ing emergencies and post-conflict transitions; gencies, WFP provides fast, efficient, life-sus- and (3) to facilitate research in the areas of taining relief to millions of people who are the health and population movements. victims of natural or man-made disasters, including refugees and the displaced. The Pro- The main project goals are to consolidate gram is responsible for mobilizing all basic emergency technical guidelines, develop health food commodities, and funds for meeting information systems for use by agencies in transport costs, for all large-scale refugee feed- early warning and during emergencies, and ing operations managed by the United Nations develop a conceptual framework and practical High Commissioner for Refugees. guidelines for health interventions during the transition phase. Regions Sub-Saharan Africa, South and East Asia, Regions North Africa and Middle East, Latin America Africa, Asia, and the Pacific and the Caribbean, Europe and CIS. The WFP operates in 84 countries. Resources Three offices: One each in Angola, Cambodia, Resources and Liberia. WFP's staff of 4,000 people work in food aid Funding: Nearly US$1 million from multiple emergency and development operations that sources. benefit 53 million people. WFP expenditure Publications: Best practices and guidelines. for 1997 was $1.2 billion, which provided nearly one third of all global food aid - 2.7 Contact million metric tons. Dr. Takako Yasukawa ICU Contact Avenue Appia 20 Mr. Aranda da Silva 1211 Geneva 27, Switzerland Chief ODT Telephone: 41 22 (791) 2903 United Nations Food Program Fax: 41 22 (791) 4844 Via Cesare Giulio Viola, 68 E-miiail: yasukawat@who.ch Parco dei Medici Web page: www.who.ch/eha Rome 00148 Italy Telephone: (39-6) 6513-23 94 TheWorld Bank-Post-Conflict Unit Fax: (39-6) 6590 - 632 /637 E-mail: Arandadasilva@wfp.org Background Summary Peter-Scott-Bowden@wfp.org TheL Bank created the Post-Conflict Unit (PCU) within the Social Development Depart- ment in July 1997. The Unit's work includes: United NationsWorld Health m Organization-Interagency Cooperation Unit Policy development and operational support to Bank staff and client governments. This Background Summary includes social and economic analysis that The Interagency Cooperation Unit (ICU) has looks at the sources and causes of conflict three main missions: (1) to define the role of with the aim of reducing the potential for 37 a ,,,J27 r3r/i JH} I. '': I jF&j13"q J;J I' till ' c11 'ts Resources Following conflicts in a large number of The Conflict Prevention Unit consists of a countries, even outside SIDA's circle of part- division head, a deputy head, and four policy ner countries, in order to be prepared to advisers. There are no field offices apart fromr assess needs for humanitarian assistance their embassies. The unit shares a budget with I should they arise the Humanitarian Assistance Division. In Preparing, following up on, and evaluating 1997 it disbursed NGL39 million. These two projects financed by through appropriations organizations fund both long-term (demobi- for humanitarian assistance as well as lization) and short-term (symposia) projects. humanitarian projects financed through other funds Contact Maintaining a constant dialogue with other Caroline Poldermans parties involved in the field of humanitarian DCH/CP assistance, in Sweden and internationally Ministry of Foreign Affairs Taking the initiative to ensure that strategic P.O. Box 20061 resources are available for such activities as 2500 EB The Hague, The Netherlands mine clearance, through dialogue with differ- Telephone: (31 70) 348 5157 ent organizations. Fax: (31 70) 348 4486 Regions A listing of the regions whiere SIDA is operat- Swedish International Development ing is presented yearly in the division's Situation Cooperation Agency, Sweden-Division Report for Humanitarian Assistance. for Humanitarian Assistance Resources Background Summary SIDA will be providing some 8 billion hronor in The Division for Humanitarian Assistance is 1998, including cooperation with Central and responsible for government funding to the Eastern Europe. SIDA has around 1,500 part- Swedish International Development coopera- ners in cooperation, most of them Swedish. tion Agency (SIDA) for humanitarian assis- These include companies, popular movements, tance to alleviate the consequences of nlatural orgaanizdtions, universities, anid governmeient agen- disasters and armed conflicts. Priority is given cies that have the know-how necessary to make to countries that lack resources of their own to Swedish development cooperation successful. miti'gate the effects. Long-term development effects are taken into consideration in the Publications planning of projects, which, in addition to SIDA publishes a yearly report. emergency relief, can be of a preventative or rehahilitation nature. In emergency situations, Contact for example, where refugees are involved, Ingmar Armyr humanitarian considerations must govern the Pro,ramme Officer planning and organization of the projects. SIDA, SEKA-Hum Humanitarian assistance is administered SE-105 25 Stockholmi, Sweden through grants to Swedish nongovernmental Telephone: (46 08) 698-5000 organizations, international organizations, and Web page: www.sida.se U.N. bodies, as well as directly through Swedish agencies and consultants. SIDAs work in the area of humanitarian assis- tance includes: 42 Department for International fore difficult to give a definitive list of post-con- Development, United Kingdom- flict countries for which CHAD is responsible. Conflict and Human Affairs Department Resources Background Summary CHAD has 18 staff members. DFID funds a The purpose of the Conflict and Human range of projects in post-conflict situations but Affairs Department (CHAD) is to make an does not have an allocated figure to spend in effective contribution to the overall aim of the post-conflict countries. Funding decisions are Department for International Development made by relevant geographical departments. (DFID) to eliminate poverty by working global- CHAD has a conflict and humanitarian policy ly to help: 'Reduce the incidencc and impact of seed-corn fund of $1.5 million (Canadian) for violent conflicts, and manmade and natural the current financial year. disasters, through promoting cost-effective pre- paredness, response, mitigation, and recovery Publications measures via partnerships that create sustain- CHAD has developed, with the help of outside able improvements in international systems for consultants, a training package in conflict conflict prevention, migration management, awareness for DFID geographical departments. and humanitarian assistance." Contact C HAD develops and maintains an overview of Robert Walker policy and provides advice and support in areas CHAD/DFID such as: 94 Victoria St. * Conflict prevention and resolution and con- London SWIE 5JL, United Kingdom flict handling/post-conflict peace building, Telephone: (01 71) 917-0697 including disarmament, demobilization, Fax: (01 71) 917-0502 demining, and peacekeeping E-mail: r-walker@dfid.gtnet.gov.uk * Refugee and other forced migration issues * Human rights in conflict situations * Emergency response preparedness and con- United States Agency for tingency planning arrangements International Development, United * Disaster and vulnerability/risk reduction ini- States-Office of Transition Initiatives, tiatives Bureau for Humanitarian Response * Use of military assets for humanitarian work, including links and protocols for cooperation I Background Summary with U.K. and other military establishments The Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI) was * Directly imanaging certain humanLitarian pro- created in 1994 to bring rapid, direct, and overt grams (for example, Afghanistan or the political development assistance to countries Democratic People's Republic of Korea). emerging from crisis. Working both in countries where USAID maintains a presence and coun- Regions tries where it does not, OTI has engaged in areas C HAD funds humanitarian assistance projects as diverse as demobilization of combatants, in rapid-onset emergency situations and pro- media strengthening, and human rights. OTI's vides baclup to DFID's regional departments role is to focus on the immediate concerns of the involved in humanitarian response operations. population in countries in crisis. CHAD also plays a policy formulation role in relation to post-conflict reconstruction and a support role to DFID geographical departments involved in post-conflict situations. It is there- 43 Regions Contact USAID operates worldwide. As of June 1998, Mr. Rick Barton OTI countries of operation were Angola, Director Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, the Democ- Office of Transition Initiatives ratic Republic of Congo, Federal Republic of Bureau for Humanitarian Response Yugosldvia (Serbia/Monteniegro), Guatemiiala, E USAID Liberia, the Philippines, and Rwanda. USAID Washington, D.C. 20523 plans to recommence operations in Sierra Telephone: (202) 712-0962 Leone. It has previously conducted operations Fax: (202) 216-3397 in Haiti and plans to conduct operations in E-mail: fharton@usaid.gov Indonesia. Resources Funding: Fiscal 1997, US$25 million TDA funds; fiscal 1998, US$30 million; fiscal 1999, US$45 million requested. 44 OCIAL DEVELOPMENT f H F W O R L D B A N K Post-Conflict Unit Social Development Department The World Bank 1818 H Street, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20433 USA Facsimile: 202-522-1669 E-mail: PCU Group@notes.worldbank.org