97833 CASE STUDY Empowering Women through Land Tenure Regularization: Evidence from the Impact Evaluation of the National Program in Rwanda DANIEL ALI, KLAUS DEININGER, MARKUS GOLDSTEIN AND ELIANA LA FERRARA* INTRODUCTION Given that Rwanda is one of the most densely populated countries on the planet, pressure on land has long been considered as a serious hindrance to its development, and -by some scholars- even as one of the contributing factors to the 1994 genocide. Soon after peace was settled, Rwanda embarked on far- reaching legal and institutional changes to deal with land-related issues. In this context, the adoption of the 1999 inheritance law was a first act that aimed, among others, at eliminating traditional bias against female land ownership rights. It was followed by the 2004 land policy and its codification in the 2005 organic land law (OLL) as well as the establishment of national and local institutional structures for overall land management and administration in the country. In 2010 the Government of Rwanda (GoR) launched a nationwide land tenure regularization (LTR) program, a first time land adjudication and registration process that was imagery-based and low Fig. 1. Women attending a sensitization meeting organized by the Government prior to the start of cost (US$ 5 per parcel). LTR program in their cell In less than three years, the Rwanda Natural Resource Authority (RNRA) registered more than 10.7 million RNRA, DFID and the World Bank’s Research a reduction in land market activity rather than parcels (of the estimated 11.5 million parcels of land Department and Africa Gender Innovation Lab distress sales (Ali et al., 2014). in Rwanda) and delivered about 6.7 million titles have been collaborating on an initial evaluation of (Republic of Rwanda, 2014). In light of these the pilots (using a geographic discontinuity Building on these initial results, a rigorous impressive achievements, Rwanda’s LTR program approach) as well as the national roll-out (using a randomized impact evaluation was designed for has set a new standard and is now being widely randomized evaluation strategy). The results of the the roll-out of the LTR at the national level. 100 adopted across sub-Saharan Africa. While some of evaluation of the pilots pointed to three main sectors nation-wide were randomly selected from the issues confronted are highly context specific, effects of the program: (i) improved land access for all sectors eligible for ‘regular’ LTR rigorous monitoring and evaluation of the process and legally married women and better recordation of implementation.1 Half of the selected sectors were impact of this program can inform the long-term inheritance rights, although women who were not pre-assigned to an ‘early’ group that had sustainability of the system and provide lessons for legally married saw diminished property rights; (ii) adjudication and demarcation done immediately other countries. significant investment impacts (i.e., doubling of upon the completion of the baseline data the change in investment in soil conservation) that collection. The other 50 randomly selected sectors were particularly pronounced for women; and (iii) were in a ‘late’ group where LTR implementation * The first draft of this note was prepared by Marguerite Duponchel. was set to start at the very end of the regularization exercise. 3,600 households drawn from 300 villages (half in the ‘early’ group, half in the ‘late’ group were interviewed in early 2011, gathering information at household-, individual- and parcel-level before the start of the program in the treatment villages. The first round of re-interviews was carried out in early 2012. This note presents the main findings on program implementation, as well as the short- term impacts of the LTR program on perceived tenure security and women’s access to land and land rights. A RELATIVELY SUCCESSFUL FIRST PHASE PROGRAM IMPLEMENTATION Before the start of the LTR program in the cells, demand for legal certificates was already very high, including among the more vulnerable Fig. 2. Parcel demarcation groups, i.e., female headed households and bottom quartile in asset ownership (Table 1, columns 2 and 4). About 96 percent of the participating in the LTR program. During the HIGH TITLES DEMAND & PARTICIPATIVE sampled households would have liked to obtain sensitization meetings special emphasis was put IMPLEMENTATION RECOGNIZED AS FAIR a certificate; of these, more than 70 percent were on female and girls’ land rights and on the AND TRANSPARENT willing to pay for it, despite variation across implications of the 1999 Inheritance Law. Yet, population groups, with female headed attendance from female headed households was Field level participation by relevant stakeholders households and the poorest quartile in asset relatively lower than their male counterparts (86 was high, though not as high as expected (Table 2). holdings reporting lower willingness to pay for vs. 93 percent). In addition, only 68 percent of Physical presence of household members of the certificate (around 55 percent). women in male headed households attended landowners at the time of parcel demarcation was these meetings. Overall, over 90 percent of only observed in 80 percent of the cases (72 percent Program participation of landowners at the time respondents from the treatment areas reported for female headed households), despite the fact that of sensitization and information dissemination that they considered the LTR process as attendance was a strict requirement. On the other about the LTR program in the villages was found generally fair and transparent. hand, almost all neighbors (89 percent) attended to be very high (Table 1). More than 90 percent and in 96 percent of the cases the head of the attended meetings organized to discuss the village committee was present at the time of parcel implementation process and potential benefits of demarcation. Only 38 percent of landowners paid Table 1: Demand for and awareness of LTR by gender and asset quartile Total Female Male Bottom Top Baseline Want to obtain a certificate 0.96 0.96 0.96 0.94 0.98 Willing to pay for certificate 0.71 0.55 0.76 0.55 0.81 Follow up Household member at LTR meetings 0.86 0.93 0.92 0.92 Women attended LTR meetings 0.72 0.80 0.68 0.71 0.72 LTR was transparent 0.94 0.95 0.93 0.95 LTR was fair 0.93 0.94 0.90 0.93 Note: Stars indicate significance mean differences between T (Treatment) & C (Control) groups adjusted for clustering at the sector level (the unit of randomization). *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 3 Table 2: Parcel level participation in LTR by gender and asset quartile LTR REDUCES LAND CONFLICT, BUT INCREASES Total Female Male Bottom Top PERCEIVED RISKS OF DISAGREEMENT OVER HH member at demarcation 0.80 0.72 0.82 0.78 0.76 GOVERNMENT ALLOCATED LAND. Share of neighbors at demarcation 0.89 0.88 0.90 0.87 0.90 Village committee head The coefficient on the interaction between Treatment and present at demarcation 0.96 0.96 0.96 0.95 0.97 Post in Table 4 shows that LTR households are 4 to 5 Received claims receipt 0.71 0.69 0.71 0.68 0.75 percentage points less likely to have had a disagreement over land, an effect that is robust across specifications. These Fee has been paid 0.38 0.38 0.38 0.24 0.52 effects are not small as only 6% had raised concerns about If not, cannot afford 0.06 0.12 0.03 0.08 0.06 disputes at the baseline (see Table 3). Column 2 shows that If not, will pay later 0.83 0.76 0.85 0.81 0.80 the effect of LTR is the same on male and female owned Omission and correction has parcels (where ownership is proxied by the right to taken place 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.12 0.14 bequeath). On the other hand, column 3 shows that the Number of parcels 13416 3470 9946 2275 4066 impact of LTR varies by mode of acquisition: the reform seems to increase the perceived risk of disagreement on government allocated land. However, this finding does not the nominal fee (1000 Rwandan franc per parcel, equivalent to 1.7 USD using the January extend to the likelihood of expropriation (column 9), nor to 2011 exchange rate), but the majority of those who did not reported to be willing to pay the risk of losing land if left fallow (column 6). Still, the when picking up the certificates.2 coefficient on the main term Treatment*Post indicates that there is a tendency for LTR to reduce the incidence of such EARLY IMPACTS OF LTR perceived risks by landholders. The impacts of the program on perceived risks of losing fallow land and expropriation In this note, we focus on the impact of the LTR program on perceived tenure security and appear to be gender neutral (columns 5 and 8). female land rights. We use a standard difference-in-differences (DID) approach controlling for baseline covariates (land rights and mode of acquisition in the parcel level A POSITIVE IMPACT ON WOMEN’S LAND RIGHTS regressions; female headship in household level regression; and legal marriage certificate in female land rights regressions).3 Descriptive statistics (Table 5) show a large improvement in the perceived rights for female to be registered as a claimant (alone or jointly) on parcels owned by married couples, from only 33 percent in the baseline, to about 94 percent after the Table 4: Impact of LTR on Perceived Tenure Security No disagreement over ownership Not loose land if left fallow No expropriation risk DID Estimator Treatment * Post 0.040*** 0.051** 0.045*** 0.066*** 0.055 0.081*** 0.093** 0.103 0.093* (0.011) (0.024) (0.012) (0.021) (0.037) (0.028) (0.042) (0.078) (0.049) T* Post * Female right -0.018 0.016 0.046 (0.031) (0.049) (0.084) T* Post * Joint right -0.015 0.013 -0.030 (0.024) (0.041) (0.075) T* Post * Inherited/Gifted land -0.007 -0.025 0.003 (0.016) (0.027) (0.042) T* Post * Govt allocated land -0.073*** -0.041 0.077 (0.027) (0.061) (0.112) T* Post * Acquired in other 0.002 -0.079 0.113 forms (0.032) (0.062) (0.084) T * Post * Wetland 0.018 0.028 -0.066 (0.018) (0.033) (0.054) Constant 0.949*** 0.949*** 0.949*** 0.918*** 0.918*** 0.918*** 0.757*** 0.757*** 0.757*** (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) Number of observations 20,411 20,411 20,397 20,404 20,404 20,390 20,361 20,361 20,347 R2 0.011 0.014 0.014 0.008 0.010 0.010 0.030 0.032 0.033 Robust standard errors adjusted for clustering at the sector level in parenthesis: *** significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%;* significant at 10%. Time dummy and its interaction with baseline correlates included but not reported. Male only inheritance rights and purchased land are the base categories for the rights and acquisition variables, respectively. 4 4 Table 5: Land rights: sample restricted to married couple households implementation of LTR in the ‘early’ program T C T C areas. Moreover, the increase in perceived rights Female land rights (alone or jointly) for married women to be claimants on the To be registered as a claimant 0.33 * 0.40 0.94 *** 0.666 household parcels is also observed in the ‘late’ To bequeath 0.83 *** 0.90 0.91 0.892 intervention group but to a lower extent (only up To sell 0.82 *** 0.90 0.93 0.912 to 67 percent), possibly a result of the national campaigns on female rights and empowerment. To mortgage 0.83 *** 0.90 0.93 0.902 To lease out 0.83 *** 0.90 0.93 0.918 Number of parcels 3744 4118 3744 4118 Table 6 reports the DID results for the impact of Note: Stars indicate significance mean differences between T (Treatment) & C (Control) the LTR on women’s subjective land rights using groups adjusted for clustering at the sector level (the unit of randomization). *** p<0.01, ** a sample restricted to married couple p<0.05, * p<0.1. households.1 The analysis confirms that women are more likely to be registered as owners alone or jointly with their spouses; the magnitude of the CONCLUSION effect varies from 19 to 34 percentage points. In contrast to what was observed in the pilot study, The observed high demand for land certification women without legal marriage certificates also in Rwanda has been met by a program that was significantly benefit from the LTR program perceived, among the interviewed households (albeit to a lesser extent than those with civil that received it, as fair and transparent; despite an marriage certificates – column 2). A possible observed lower attendance at sensitization explanation is that GoR actions taken in response meetings by women (whether head or spouse). to the experience of the pilot program (e.g., intense sensitization campaigns on female rights) Overall, the LTR program rapidly improved were effective to ensure that women not legally perceived land tenure security on demarcated and married were not left behind. Women’s rights to adjudicated parcels for both male and female mortgage or lease outland also increased participants. This holds for different outcome substantially (between 9 and 13 percentage variables, including the risk of disagreement over points for the former, and between 8 and 10 ownership (apart from government allocated percentage points for the latter). The effect on land), the risk of losing the parcel if left fallow women’s rights to bequeath or sell land (alone or jointly with their spouses) are qualitatively and the risk of government expropriation. similar, though not precisely estimated once we Furthermore, LTR strengthened married women’ introduce further interaction terms.4 subjective rights to be claimants on the land. Fig. 3. Women waiting for her claim While the results on the pilots raised some receipt concerns about the fate of women who were not (photo credit: Clive English/LTR project) Table 6: Impact of LTR on Female Land Rights Registered claimant Bequeath rights Sale rights DID Estimator T * Post 0.337*** 0.210*** 0.189*** 0.081*** 0.078 0.061 0.086*** 0.087 0.073 (0.040) (0.077) (0.069) (0.031) (0.055) (0.067) (0.027) (0.062) (0.071) T * Post * Legal marriage certificate 0.170*** 0.173** 0.005 0.006 -0.001 0.003 (0.065) (0.067) (0.059) (0.061) (0.068) (0.069) T * Post * Inherited/Gifted land -0.029 0.024 0.014 (0.046) (0.033) (0.033) T * Post * Government allocated land -0.213 0.018 0.051 (0.150) (0.088) (0.108) T * Post * Acquired in other forms 0.065 0.066 0.056 (0.091) (0.093) (0.103) T * Post * Wetland 0.015 0.013 0.014 (0.053) (0.039) (0.040) Constant 0.376*** 0.376*** 0.376*** 0.865*** 0.865*** 0.865*** 0.863*** 0.863*** 0.863*** (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) Number of observations 13,926 13,920 13,906 15,365 15,362 15,348 14,623 14,620 14,610 R2 0.342 0.344 0.348 0.014 0.015 0.017 0.029 0.029 0.031 Robust standard errors adjusted for clustering at the sector level in parenthesis: *** significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%;* significant at 10%. Time dummy and its interaction with baseline correlates included but not reported. Male only inheritance rights and purchased land are the base categories for the rights and acquisition variables, respectively. 5 Table 6: Impact of LTR on Female Land Rights (Cont.) Mortgage rights Lease rights DID Estimator T * Post 0.090*** 0.124* 0.126** 0.080*** 0.096* 0.097 (0.024) (0.064) (0.057) (0.021) (0.056) (0.067) T * Post * Legal marriage certificate -0.042 -0.043 -0.018 -0.019 (0.062) (0.061) (0.060) (0.061) T * Post * Inherited/Gifted land 0.005 -0.005 (0.031) (0.030) T * Post * Government allocated land 0.022 0.012 (0.103) (0.102) T * Post * Acquired in other forms 0.004 0.026 (0.095) (0.094) T * Post * Wetland -0.007 0.017 (0.041) (0.035) Constant 0.857*** 0.857*** 0.857*** 0.869*** 0.869*** 0.869*** (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) Number of observations 14,798 14,792 14,784 15,365 15,362 15,348 R2 0.029 0.030 0.031 0.014 0.015 0.017 Robust standard errors adjusted for clustering at the sector level in parenthesis: *** significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%;* significant at 10%. Time dummy and its interaction with baseline correlates included but not reported. Male only inheritance rights and purchased land are the base categories for the rights and acquisition variables, respectively. Republic of Rwanda (2014). Land tenure legally married, the effective measures taken in 1. Kigali and some atypical ‘hotspots’ had to be excluded as the program was implemented there in an regularization support program. Quarterly response by GoR translated into clear accelerated manner. Report for 3rd Quarter, July to September improvements in inclusion in the national roll-out. 2014, Ministry of Natural Resources, Rwanda Indeed, non-legally married women in areas that 2. The GoR later lifted the 1,000 RwF fee for the poorer Natural Resource Authority, Department of received LTR are more likely to be registered as rural households. Lands and Mapping. claimants on a parcel than similar women on control areas (though to a lesser extent that women 3. The DID approach is complemented by an Analysis of Covariance (ANCOVA) estimator, as DID tends to with marriage certificates). This underlines the overcorrect for differences that have low predictive importance of piloting programs, and of their power if autocorrelation in outcome variables is low. rigorous monitoring and evaluation, before Results of the ANCOVA estimator are available upon national roll-out to ensure the inclusion of request from the authors. vulnerable groups. 4. The same analysis was performed on male perceived subjective land rights. Results are not reported but While the first two waves of data collection available upon request from the authors. In contrast to enabled us to identify immediate effects of the female rights, LTR does not significantly change systematic land adjudication and demarcation male land rights. program in Rwanda, a second follow up survey planned for 2015, will allow for the assessment of REFERENCES the medium- -term impacts of the project on a range of outcome variables that would take Ali, D. A., Deininger, K., & Goldstein, M. relatively long time to materialize (such as land (2014). Environmental and gender impacts of related investment, agricultural productivity and land tenure regularization in Africa: pilot other measures of female economic evidence from Rwanda. Journal of Development empowerment). Economics, 110, 262-275. Photo Credit: Marguerite Duponchel This case study was prepared by a team from the Development Economics Research Group and Africa Gender Innovation Lab of the World Bank in collaboration with the Rwanda Natural Resources Authority. The UK Department for International Development, the Bank Netherlands Partnership Program and the International Growth Centre provided generous financial support. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed are entirely those of the authors. They do not necessarily represent the views of the Government of Rwanda, and of the World Bank and its affiliated organizations, or those of the Executive Directors of the World Bank or the governments they represent.