Facilitating Transitions for Children and Youth
Lessons from Four Post-Conflict Fund Projects

Aly Rahim
Peter Holland
Summary Findings

This review draws on international practices to highlight promising approaches and assesses four PCF projects that address the needs of children and youth. Lessons from these projects are consistent with the lessons from other post-conflict program evaluations. The following guidance emerged:

**Voice, Inclusion, and Community Participation.** Voice and inclusion projects should always involve youth and (to the extent possible) children from design to completion; and staff must be willing to listen to and act upon what they propose. The project might involve them in participatory monitoring and evaluation, as a further means of empowerment.

**Demobilization and Reintegration of Young Ex-Combatants.** During demobilization, young ex-combatants should be housed in dedicated facilities, with critical services such as psychosocial support, family tracing, health, community sensitization, and rehabilitation of social skills. Over the long term young combatants can benefit more from psychosocial support provided through the family and communities than from institutionalized trauma programs.

Young ex-combatants consistently express a desire to resume formal education but they also face economic responsibilities, and therefore require education programs suited to their needs. Traditional vocational training programs have had an inconsistent record; other programs, such as second-chance education opportunities for overage and working youth, the rehabilitation of family-based small enterprises and apprenticeship programs, have shown more promise.

**Employment Generation and Livelihoods.** Securing livelihoods can help to foster stability in post-conflict environments. Employment generation programs should capitalize on existing assets, and care must be taken to match skills training with demand, by linking employers and trainers.

Labor-intensive projects offer great potential for broad-based growth, but careful planning is needed to balance the labor intensity and cost effectiveness of infrastructure projects, and to ensure that young women have access to the same training and learning opportunities as their male counterparts.

**Emergency Education.** Emergency education programs can lessen the psychosocial impact of war by providing physical, social and cognitive protection, and by disseminating vital survival messages. It is critical that all children have access to some form of structured educational activity to help them overcome the psychological disruption of conflict and take part in the restoration of cross-cutting and bonding social capital, that is, strong social cohesion both within and between distinct groups. Exclusion from education ultimately results in a second-class group of children and youth who become a post-conflict at-risk category.

Donors should not neglect local first responses to educational needs, but should assimilate these community interventions into the emergency education strategy. However, inappropriately designed local responses can further entrench conflict, and donors must discern between effective and potentially harmful local responses.

**General Recommendations**

**Distinguish between children and youth,** who have differing needs. Further, due to the time lag between project design and implementation, the roles and responsibilities of beneficiaries may evolve as they transition between life stages.

**Create linkages among sectors.** Projects aimed at youth and children should foster strong linkages among sectors such as education, health, and labor, which can be effective at the community level.

**Be wary of expectations.** Avoid raising unreasonable expectations in youth consultations. Youth will be more inclined to accept the limitations of the project when they feel their views have been considered.

**Involve youth and children from the outset.** Projects that include youth and children through the project cycle will benefit from an enhanced sense of ownership and avoid exacerbating feelings of alienation.

**Build flexibility and adaptability into the project design.** Ensure that project phases can be delayed or rearranged without undue harm, and that objectives can be refined to reflect changing scenarios.

**Account for geographic remoteness.** Geographic dispersion should not exclude assistance to isolated populations where vulnerable youth reside.

**Foster understanding, not entrenchment.** Ensure that multicultural and multilingual programs do not unintentionally solidify conflict fault lines.
Facilitating Transitions for Children and Youth

Lessons from Four Post-Conflict Fund Projects

Aly Rahim
Peter Holland
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Foreword

Children and youth living in conflict settings face an array of complex and urgent needs. Today, over 300 million young people below the age of 25 live in countries affected by armed conflict, representing nearly a fifth of the world’s total population of children and youth. Indeed, people under the age of 25 are consistently the majority group in populations afflicted with the world’s bloodiest wars. Exemplary cases include Sierra Leone, where during the civil war, 63% of the general population was under 25 years old; or Northern Uganda, where presently, 70% of the population is under 25 years old. Furthermore, more than 300,000 children and youth fight alongside adult combatants in regular armies and rebel groups around the world. The gender dimension of armed conflict’s impact on youth and children is also often overlooked, despite the forced recruitment of over 120,000 girls to become front-line fighters or otherwise suffer exploitation by armed groups.

The impetus behind this paper was to begin a sustained inquiry into programming for children and youth living in these conflict-affected environments. The World Bank’s Post-Conflict Fund (PCF), established in 1998, aims to support innovative programs in conflict-affected settings. This study selects four case studies out of the 20 PCF projects that have focused specifically on children and youth. Our goal is to draw some lessons about the specific issues pertaining to the needs of this critical demographic, as well as examine the unique challenges of implementing projects in such complex and volatile settings.

At present there is a small but growing collection of effective, sustainable and adequately funded programs addressing the needs of children and youth in conflict and post-conflict situations. Furthermore, the World Bank has recently increased its support for initiatives to better understand the broader development needs of children and youth, and more specifically their needs in post-conflict settings. Past reports such as the 2005 Children and Youth: A Framework for Action and the 2005 Children and Youth: A Resource Guide for World Bank Staff has set motion to a wider institutional review of these critical issues. Indeed, the World Development Report (WDR) for 2007 will center on the theme of “Development and the Next Generation,” focusing on the needs of young people aged 12-24, specifically studying five transitions to adulthood. Similarly, this report aims to examine the transitions of children and youth in conflict-affected and post-conflict settings with a view to informing emerging Bank initiatives championing children and youth, such as the WDR 2007.

The authors would like to thank Ana Paula Lopes and Sigrun Aasland for their patience and sustained insight as they guided this review through its various stages. Thanks are also due to Ian Bannon, Pia Peeters, Markus Kostner, Joanna de Berry, Juana Brachet, Florian Fichtl, Aigli Zafeirakou, Aurelian Kruse and Linda McGinnis for their invaluable comments on several drafts.
Acronyms

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<th>Description</th>
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<td>ASCA</td>
<td>Service Civil Actif</td>
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<tr>
<td>BEFARe</td>
<td>Basic Education for Afghan Refugees</td>
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<tr>
<td>CCF</td>
<td>Christian Children’s Fund</td>
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<td>DDR</td>
<td>Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration</td>
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<td>DRC</td>
<td>Democratic Republic of Congo</td>
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<tr>
<td>ECD</td>
<td>Early Child Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EDUCO</td>
<td>Educación con Participación de la Comunidad</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GTZ</td>
<td>German Agency for Technical Cooperation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HIV/AIDS</td>
<td>Human Immunodeficiency Virus/Acquired Immune-Deficiency Syndrome</td>
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<tr>
<td>IDP</td>
<td>Internally Displaced Persons</td>
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<td>ILO</td>
<td>International Labor Organization</td>
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<td>INEE</td>
<td>Institute for Emergency Education</td>
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<td>PCF</td>
<td>Post-Conflict Fund</td>
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<td>TTL</td>
<td>Task Team Leaders</td>
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<td>UNHCR</td>
<td>United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees</td>
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<td>UNICEF</td>
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<td>USAID</td>
<td>United States Agency for International Development</td>
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<td>WDR</td>
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Executive Summary

The Post-Conflict Fund (PCF), launched in 1998, works through governmental and non-governmental partners to support nascent efforts to transition to peace and foster the conditions for economic growth. Young people are at the forefront of these efforts, even while they are facing their own transition from childhood to adult life.

This review draws on international practices to highlight promising approaches and assesses four PCF projects that address the needs of children and youth. It draws some lessons about their specific needs, as well as the unique challenges of implementing such projects in conflict and post-conflict settings. These projects fall into four functional areas considered important for youth interventions in post-conflict societies:

- **Voice, Inclusion, and Community Participation** (Youth in Crisis, Sierra Leone)
- **Demobilization and Reintegration of Young Ex-Combatants** (Demobilization and Social and Economic Reintegration of Vulnerable Ex-Combatants, Democratic Republic of Congo)
- **Employment Generation and Livelihoods** (Employment Generation for Anjouan Youth, Comoros)
- **Emergency Education** (Teacher Training for Afghan Refugees, Pakistan)

**International Good Practices**

The lessons from these projects are consistent with the lessons from other post-conflict program evaluations in many parts of the world. Though the literature on these program evaluations is not extensive, the following clear guidance for good practices in operations has emerged:

**Voice, Inclusion, and Community Participation.**

To be effective, voice and inclusion projects should always involve youth and (to the extent possible) children from the project design phase through to project completion; and project leaders must be fully willing to listen to and act upon what they propose. Youth and children may be more inclined to accept a project’s limitations and contribute to its effectiveness if they understand the decision making process and believe that their views are being accorded due respect and consideration. The project might even involve them in participatory monitoring and evaluation, as a further means of empowerment. This is especially crucial in conflict-affected environments, where the absence of clear goals and targets can increase disaffection among youth who may be inclined to resort to violence if it is viewed as their only available means of empowerment.

**Demobilization and Reintegration of Young Ex-Combatants**

During demobilization, young ex-combatants should be housed in dedicated reception facilities, which should provide critical services such as psychosocial support, family tracing, health services, community sensitization, and rehabilitation of social skills. Over the long term, however, young combatants can benefit more from psychosocial support provided through the family and community environments than from institutionalized trauma programs. When family reunification is not possible, alternative family-based living environments, particularly foster care, are effective approaches.

Children and youth ex-combatants consistently express a desire to resume formal education following the termination of conflict; but they also face economic responsibilities, and therefore require education programs suited to their unique needs. Traditional vocational training programs have had an inconsistent record in helping them enhance their skills and income. Other income generation programs, such as
second-chance education opportunities for overage and working youth, the rehabilitation of family-based small enterprises and apprenticeship programs, have shown more promise.

Employment Generation and Livelihoods

Securing the livelihoods of young ex-combatants can help to foster stability in post-conflict environments. Employment generation programs should capitalize on existing assets, including skills gained during combat experience, such as leadership, initiative taking, and various kinds of entrepreneurial skills. Care must be taken to match skills training with existing demand, by fostering a strong connection between employers and trainers. In communities characterized by an absence of employers and labor demand, programs that develop a labor supply may serve to absorb labor in the near term, while at the same time preparing for future economic growth.

Labor-intensive projects offer great potential for broad-based growth, but careful planning is needed to balance the labor intensity and cost effectiveness of infrastructure projects, and to ensure that young women have access to the same training and learning opportunities as their male counterparts.

Emergency Education

Emergency education programs can lessen the psychosocial impact of war on children and youth by providing physical, social and cognitive protection as well as by disseminating vital survival messages.

Such programs should be as inclusive and equitable as possible to avoid reinforcing rivalries and conflict. It is critical that all children have access to some form of structured educational activity to help them overcome the psychological disruption of conflict and take part in the restoration of cross-cutting and bonding social capital that is strong social cohesion both within and between distinct groups. Exclusion from education ultimately results in a second-class group of children and youth who become a post-conflict at-risk category, and are more vulnerable than their educated peers to recruitment into rebel militias and/or criminal groups which offer immediate rewards.

Donors and humanitarian agencies should not neglect local first responses to educational needs, but should assimilate these community-driven interventions into the emergency education strategy. However, inappropriately designed and exclusivist local responses can further entrench conflict issues, and donors must be fully engaged to discern between effective and potentially harmful local responses. Emergency education should also incorporate peace and tolerance initiatives, encouraging co-existence and understanding.

General Recommendations

In addition to the lessons summarized above, the following general recommendations offer important guidance for successful post-conflict operations.

Distinguish between children and youth, who have differing needs. Further, due to the time lag between project design and implementation, the roles and responsibilities of beneficiaries may evolve as they transition between life stages.

Create linkages among sectors. Projects aimed at youth and children should foster strong linkages among sectors such as education, health, and labor. These linkages need not necessarily occur at the level of national institutions, but can be effective at the community level.
Be wary of expectations. When undertaking widely participatory youth consultations, task teams must avoid raising unreasonable expectations. Youth will be more inclined to accept the limitations of the project when they feel their views have been accorded adequate concern.

Involve youth and children from the outset. Projects that include youth and children through the entire project cycle will benefit from an enhanced sense of ownership and avoid exacerbating feelings of alienation.

Build flexibility and adaptability into the project design. Task team leaders must ensure that implementation of phases can be delayed or rearranged without undue harm, and that objectives can be refined to reflect changing scenarios.

Account for geographic remoteness. Conflict programming often clusters around key hubs of assistance, which often consume a disproportionate share of resources. Geography and uneven dispersion should not exclude assistance to isolated populations where vulnerable youth and children reside.

Foster understanding, not entrenchment. Multicultural and multilingual programs may allow for targeted and effective delivery of programs. However, programs which acknowledge such divisions may unintentionally solidify conflict fault lines – a delicate balance is required.
1. Introduction

The Post-Conflict Fund (PCF) supports innovative work in conflict-affected environments, where traditional forms of World Bank assistance may not be suitable. Launched in 1998, the PCF works through governmental and non-governmental partners to encourage nascent efforts to foster conditions for sustainable peace and economic growth. Young people are at the forefront of these efforts to transition from conflict to peace, even while they are facing their own transition from childhood to adult life. This review assesses PCF projects that address the needs of children and youth, and draws some lessons about the specific issues pertaining to their needs, as well as the unique challenges of implementing such projects in conflict and post-conflict settings.

In the last eight years, 20 out of 164 PCF projects, totaling more than US$15 million, have focused specifically on children and/or youth. These projects fall into four functional areas, reflecting general categories in the overall PCF portfolio: voice and inclusion, reintegration of ex-combatants, employment generation, and emergency education. For this review, one project per functional area was selected to serve as a case study. The selection was based on the quantity and quality of available information, and according to a representative sample of the geographic and thematic distribution of the total projects.

To draw valid lessons from experience, context must be at the heart of the program analysis. Contextual aspects include cultural norms, conflict-related factors, and psychological trauma suffered by the program beneficiaries. A good understanding of local context will, to a certain extent, dictate programmatic success. What may prove to be a success factor in facilitating youth transitions on the island of Anjouan in Comoros – which has a small-scale, low-intensity separatist conflict – is not necessarily applicable to, for example, the Balkans.

The methodology consisted of an analysis of existing literature on development assistance for youth and children in conflict-affected environments, a desk review of available project documents, and interviews with task team leaders. This review is organized in four sections. The second section presents lessons on international good practices gleaned from the literature on interventions to address youth needs in conflict-affected and post-conflict contexts. These lessons are presented according to four functional areas considered important for youth interventions in post-conflict societies: (i) voice, inclusion, and community participation; (ii) demobilization and reintegration of underage ex-combatants; (iii) employment generation and livelihoods and (iv) emergency education. Section three analyzes the case studies in light of the four functional areas. Section four then discusses considerations for project design and implementation. Finally, some overall conclusions are presented in the last section of this report. The analytic and evaluative frameworks used in each case are included in an annex.

There is as yet no consensus on the age definitions of children and youth, and indeed, cultural characteristics delineate the transitions between each age group. Countries tend to define youth as beginning at either 15 or 18, and usually ending at either 24 or 29, although some include youth as old as 35 in their definition. The forthcoming World Development Report has chosen 12-24 as the age range for youth, given the beginning of adolescence and the onset of puberty in particular. For the purposes of this review, children are generally considered to be under 15, and youth are defined as young people between the ages of 15-24. However, whether one is considered to be a child or a youth has more to do with the maturity one demonstrates, the responsibilities and the challenges one faces rather than the chronological age. The delineation of identities are especially difficult for those affected by conflict: 13 year-old girls
who have been forced to serve as sex slaves may now be mothers, but have also been known to regress to childish (and even baby-like) behavior (Brachet, 2006).

Another inconsistency in the terminology is the distinctions between child soldiers, children associated with armed conflict, and child combatants. This paper touches on the needs of all children and youth living in post-conflict situations, perpetrators and victims alike.

The four functional areas and their respective case studies are as follows:

**Voice, Inclusion, and Community Participation**

**Youth in Crisis, Sierra Leone**
This $250,000 grant, awarded in 1998, supported the design of a strategic framework for youth education and skills development, through consultations held in the Western Area of the country and provincial districts of Bo and Kenema. The grant also featured pilot projects in low-cost housing construction, fishing, income generation, recreation and social integration, and peacebuilding.

**Demobilization and Reintegration of Young Ex-Combatants**

**Demobilization and Social and Economic Reintegration of Vulnerable Ex-Combatants, Democratic Republic of Congo**
The first grant to be approved under the PCF, this $1.5 million project had the following three objectives: (i) conduct six studies in support of the interim demobilization and reintegration program; (ii) strengthen Congolese capacities on issues of disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR); and (iii) pilot reintegration activities in three areas of the country.

**Employment Generation and Livelihoods**

**Employment Generation for Anjouan Youth, Comoros**
This $800,000 project, started in 2001, provided youth with six months of residential professional training, and included education components on human rights and the culture of peace. It also created a permanent Active Civil Service (ASCA), responsible for continuing the management of the civic education program.

**Emergency Education**

**Teacher Training for Afghan Refugees, Pakistan**
Still ongoing, this teacher training program began in 2001 with a budget of almost $1,000,000. The project’s four objectives are to: (i) improve access to basic education and provide teacher training for refugees living in remote areas; (ii) expand and develop the quality of education in selected middle and secondary schools through an integrated teacher training program; (iii) improve the quality of teaching in self-help schools; and (iv) build the capacity of women and vulnerable populations through non-formal vocational education and training.

2. **International Good Practices**

In ensuring the quality of interventions in conflict-affected countries, the preeminence of context cannot be overstated. Despite the paucity of literature on evaluated post-conflict programs, the few documented past experiences do provide useful guidance for task team leaders who want to ensure that they proceed with a firm understanding of insights generated by the successes and failures of similar programs. The good practices summarized below should, however, be viewed as a complement to and not a proxy for a nuanced understanding of the multifaceted and unique circumstances that attend any individual conflict situation. The good practices are presented according to the four selected functional areas: (i) voice, inclusion, and community participation; (ii) demobilization and reintegration of underage ex-combatants;
(iii) employment generation and livelihoods; and (iv) emergency education. Due to the limitations of the scope of this paper, the good practices reviewed do not include those relating to transitions more broadly (such as from school to work, or regarding family formation), nor is there a thorough discussion of other youth interventions such as health\textsuperscript{1} or risky behaviors.

2.1. Voice, Inclusion, and Community Participation

Voice and inclusion projects aim to empower young people by facilitating their input into and stewardship over activities that have a direct bearing on their development and future. Young people usually lack access to the processes through which adults voice their interests, and are seldom included in decision making processes that affect their needs and interests (Boyden and de Berry, 2004). Projects that include mechanisms for voice and participation of youth aim for more inclusive policy formulation and better design and implementation of projects that affect them. Ultimately participatory projects have significant personal, familial, communal, and institutional impact on those young people who have participated. One example is the expansion of life-enhancing knowledge, such as what occurred as a result of children involved in Kenyan Misingi Bora (‘good foundation’) clubs. Participating children gained clear knowledge and skills on HIV/AIDS which they later extended to community wide efforts. Another example is the Indian Bal Panchayats or “children’s parliaments.” These participatory initiatives have increased the influence of young people at the community and village level, while bolstering broader awareness of their key issues. Furthermore, the Bal Panchayats have raised the profile of young people to the point where key resource people (such as service-providers and government officials) seek out project participants for their insights and use of their research/records (Ackerman et al, 2003).

To be effective, children and youth projects should always involve youth and, to the extent possible, children from the outset. This is especially true in post-conflict settings. If youth and children are brought in at a later project stage, they will have little capacity or opportunity to impact processes or outcomes. Genuine engagement of young people, involving strong and creative ideas about how a project can be made meaningful and relevant to them, requires early involvement through extensive consultations and input into project design (Lansdown, 2001).

Project leaders must be prepared to pay attention to the inputs of children and youth. Most societies discount the inputs of young people when they clash with presumably sounder views held conventionally by older members of society. If their active involvement in decisions affecting their lives is to be taken seriously, then such presumptions need to be challenged. The priorities they identify are likely to differ significantly from those of adults. However, if projects do not seem relevant to their day-to-day lives, it may be difficult to sustain their participation (Save the Children, 2005). Thus there must be a full willingness to listen to and act upon what children and youth propose. Though it may not always be possible to respond to every proposal, they will be more inclined to accept the project’s limitations if they understand the process of decision making and believe that their views are being accorded respect and due consideration (Lansdown, 2001).

Develop clear indicators and goals for effective participation and collaboration with youth and children. Goals and targets for voice and inclusion projects need to be agreed upon with participating young people, based upon their aspirations and expectations (Ackerman et al, 2003). Targets can be quantitative – number of children involved in consultations/pilots or receiving identified services, numbers of meetings organized, etc. Targets can also be based on indications of changes in public life – schools with enhanced participatory structures, local authorities soliciting youth input, improved working conditions, etc. Experiential targets are also valid. These might include changes in self-esteem and

\textsuperscript{1} For a detailed review of the child health dynamics of World Bank operations in four conflict-affected countries, please see Bustreo, Genovese, Emobono, Axelsson and Bannon (2005).
confidence, improvement in the quality of interpersonal relationships, the effectiveness of inclusive
decision making in the project, etc. The latter two categories are more difficult to measure. Nonetheless, a
mix of these targets, regularly assessed and monitored, enables voice and inclusion initiatives to be
sufficiently attuned to the needs of the young people. A project might even incorporate a process for them
to be involved in participatory monitoring and evaluation, as a further means of empowerment
(Lansdown, 2001). This is especially crucial in conflict-affected environments where the absence of clear
goals and targets in government policy and development projects can aggravate disaffection among youth
and children. Without clear avenues for impacting policies relating to their own needs, some youth
become more inclined to resort to violence when consensus emerges that it is their only available means
of empowerment.

**Involve communities.** In most conflict situations communities take on some of the responsibilities for
education that the state is unable to fulfill. Reconstruction efforts should build on this community
involvement, both to quickly re-establish education services and as an opportunity to devolve greater
responsibility for education access and outcomes to parents and communities. The oft-referenced EDUCO
model in El Salvador is the most prominent example of community empowerment in rebuilding education
after conflict. The program, established in 1992, built on the willingness of communities to participate,
and while providing technical assistance to enhance capacity, delegated the management of new rural pre-
school and primary schools to parents and community organizations with resounding success.

### 2.2. Demobilization and Reintegration of Young Ex-Combatants

Typically preceded by disarmament, the demobilization and reintegration components of post-conflict
operations mark the critical transitional phases from combatant to civilian. Although ideally sequential,
demobilization and reintegration activities are often lumped together by practitioners. The literature on
these programs shows that:

**Demobilization and reintegration efforts tend to be male-dominated.** Due to the existence of a
gender-discriminatory framework that views female combatants largely as sex slaves and part of the
support operation to the male fighters, DDR efforts usually focus on boys and men, and women tend to
‘reintegrate spontaneously’, returning directly to their communities without passing through official
channels (Mckay and Mazurana, 2004). This is also a reflection of the structure of DDR efforts, such as
the handing in of a weapon to qualify for programs, or the central location of some sites that discourage
girls’ participation due to its public nature. In Sierra Leone, only 8 per cent of the total participants in the
official DDR efforts were girls or women, a number that improved slightly when the criterion for handing
in a weapon was relaxed to allow for a group to represent one weapon between them (Mckay 2004).

**During demobilization, children and youth should be housed in separate facilities.** It is critical that
children and youth combatants be housed in dedicated reception centers. When young ex-combatants are
housed together with adult combatants, there is a markedly higher risk for re-recruitment, due to high
dependence on commanders as a proxy for family. Lessons from Angola and Liberia underscore the risk
of intermingling adults and children during demobilization – in both countries, more than half of targeted
children and youth ex-combatants were re-recruited (Verhey, 2001). Furthermore, dedicated reception
facilities for young ex-combatants can provide a crucial venue for undertaking meaningful needs and
psychological assessments and begin family tracing.

**Family tracing and community-based support should be central to the demobilization and
reintegration process, and should emphasize psychosocial support, education, and economic
opportunities.** Other critical services that should be initiated prior to reintegration include psychosocial
and health services, community sensitization to key messages, rehabilitation of social skills, and
traditional healing. For example, purification rituals have been known to help with the reintegration of
young girls that were forced to serve as sex slaves (de Watteville, 2003). Also important are services that pay special attention to the medical needs of female ex-combatants: reproductive and pre-natal health, treatment of injuries from sexual abuse (including trauma), and treatment of sexually transmitted diseases (de Watteville, 2003). While reception centers play a crucial role in providing these services during the demobilization phase, experience has shown that longer-term interim care centers are ineffective during reintegration. Such centers ultimately create artificial ghettos disconnected from everyday civilian life, and can stigmatize ex-combatants as trauma cases. Though certainly recovering from the traumas of war, young combatants can benefit more from psychosocial support provided through the family and community environments than from institutionalized trauma programs. Mobilization of the larger community has also proved essential to the effective reintegration of children and youth. Since armed conflict results in a process of social maladjustment, community-based approaches are the ideal instruments for the re-establishment of cultural, moral, and cooperative mores. Although community involvement and ownership is generally a stabilizing force, community members can also be obstacles to the reintegration of young ex-combatants if they are not willing to accept them back because of the atrocities committed, as shown in some cases in Liberia (de Berry, 2006). Experience has consistently demonstrated, however, that family reunification is the most effective means of reintegration, as it facilitates re-entry into the daily cycles of life, which ex-combatants at first find alien and incomprehensible (Williamson and Cripe, 2002). When family reunification is not possible, alternative family-based living environments, such as placement into foster care or small group homes, are effective approaches (Verhey, 2003).

**Reintegration programs must ensure that a balance is achieved between the need to resume education and earn income.** Children and youth ex-combatants consistently express a desire to resume formal education following the termination of conflict. Indeed, in Liberia, a full 77 percent of young ex-combatants said they wanted to return to academic schooling (Verhey, 2001). However, they also face economic responsibilities, and therefore require education programs that are suited to their unique needs. These may include flexible school attendance hours, primary/secondary classes reserved for older students, and bursary/scholarship support (Sommers, 2002). Further, income generation programs or labor-intensive public works should be run in parallel with (not in lieu of) formal education programs.

**The limitations of straightforward vocational training must be understood.** Traditional vocational training programs have had an inconsistent record in helping young ex-combatants to enhance their skills and increase their income. Though more experience is needed before overarching conclusions can be drawn, other income generation programs have shown more promise. For example, programs allowing access to “Quick Impact Project” funds, designed to finance activities that support UN peacekeeping and building efforts, have facilitated family-based poverty alleviation through the rehabilitation of small enterprises; and apprenticeship programs in Angola have successfully arranged for local merchants and craftsmen to integrate ex-combatants into small community-based industries and services (Verhey, 2001).

### 2.3. Employment Generation and Livelihoods

Securing the livelihoods of young ex-combatants can help to foster stability in post-conflict environments. Many interventions aiming to equip young people with skills and occupations toward gainful employment have yielded the following lessons:

**Approach to employment generation programs should capitalize on pre-existing assets, including skills.** Often the process of determining what types of skills training or general assistance to provide is overly needs based, both in terms of what the community is lacking, and what individuals might aspire to. Though this deficit focus may ensure that the response is adequately grounded in the local context, it may risk an overemphasis on what is lacking in the communities, and overlook skills that are already present and could potentially be built upon. Shipler (2004) encourages practitioners to consider some of the skills
that young ex-combatants may have acquired during their combat experience, including leadership, initiative taking, and various kinds of entrepreneurial skills. For example, girls are often relied on to prepare meals for fighting forces, requiring the creative management of resources and intricate logistical coordination, not to mention cooking skills (Mckay, 2004). These skills could be put to use in similar situations requiring timely meal preparation for large groups.

**Skills training should match potential livelihoods with skill sets, and should be demand based wherever possible.** Two important connections should be made when designing skills training: between livelihoods and skill sets, and between employer and trainer. Equipping youth with narrow occupational skills without linking them to post-conflict employment challenges may leave them unable to find employment. Similarly, not fostering a strong connection between employers and trainers risks targeting significant resources toward activities that have little chance of succeeding. UNHCR’s experience in Uganda of settling urban refugees in rural areas failed because the program neglected to consider that the beneficiaries did not have agricultural know-how (Machiavello, 2002). Given that post-conflict communities are often characterized by an absence of employers and labor demand, it is perhaps useful to distinguish between short-term and long-term livelihoods objectives. Programs that develop a labor supply in a zero-growth economic context may serve to absorb labor in the near term, keeping the labor market from even greater flooding while at the same time preparing for future economic growth.

**Labor-intensive projects offer a quick solution to absorbing labor supply shocks, but need careful planning so as to avoid distorting the labor market and being male dominated.** Careful planning is needed to balance the labor intensity and cost effectiveness of infrastructure projects. Targeting the right beneficiaries is particularly important, as many reconstruction projects feature employment gains for the non-poor, and can distort the labor market by offering inflated wages. Labor components of projects also tend to be male dominated, which can be problematic since they typically involve more lucrative activities such as construction. Post-conflict programming should offer an opportunity to facilitate women’s entry into previously male-dominated sectors (ILO, 1998). In addition, employment training should provide equal opportunity for both sexes; young women should have access to as many training and learning opportunities as their male counterparts, even if cultural mores require that they occur separately. Changing gender roles also involves extending the knowledge of what have traditionally been perceived as “female responsibilities” to young men (ILO, 1998). This clearly varies from cultural context to cultural context.

### 2.4. Emergency Education

In conflict-affected societies where education systems have collapsed, emergency education programs can help equip young people with the skills necessary for survival. Ultimately, emergency education can lessen the psychosocial impact of war on children; support cognitive development; provide physical and social protection; sustain study skills; reintroduce schooling, together with predictable routines in a young person’s life; insert peace-building messages and skills; and, of course, respond to the human rights of children and youth by providing them with education. Many analysts conclude that "education is an important instrument to overcome violence and improve respect for human rights" (Salmi, 2000).

**The nature of modern conflict makes it extremely difficult to use conventional distinctions between the emergency (or humanitarian) phase and the reconstruction or development phase.** Consequently, aid budgets should be flexible, and education—generally viewed as a development activity—should not be excluded from emergency budgets and programs. In fact, education programming should avoid a sharp distinction between the emergency and reconstruction phases, so as to minimize the disruption to students and facilitate the stabilization of their daily routines (Bannon, Holland, and Rahim, 2005). Emergency education should be supported where it exists and offered where it does not. Sinclair’s
Principles of Emergency Education are useful for both the emergency and reconstruction phases (Sinclair, 2002).

In emergencies, chronic crises, and early reconstruction, schools are key actors in disseminating vital survival messages. Whether addressing the presence of landmines in their community or educating about the risks of HIV/AIDS, schools provide a unified platform for the dissemination of critical information to protect children and youth (INEE, 2004). Education during crises provides tremendous support to affected youth populations, enabling them to better cope with their situation by gaining additional knowledge and critical skills for survival. Physical, social, and cognitive protection can be gained from participation in various educational forums available in emergency environments, including places of worship such as mosques and churches. In their study ‘the role of education in protecting children in conflict,’ Nicolai and Triplehorn, building on a growing body of work, extensively elaborate the protective sub-factors provided by education in conflict and post-conflict environments (Nicolai and Triplehorn, 2003).

Emergency education programs should be as inclusive and equitable as possible to avoid reinforcing rivalries and conflict. Like all development assistance in conflict-affected environments, emergency education can potentially violate the first principle of “do no harm.” When ineffectively implemented, emergency education can be a divisive factor in conflict-affected communities, solidifying or exacerbating existing ethnic, communal, or socioeconomic divisions. These divisions are often brought to light when internally displaced persons (IDPs) compete for educational resources that are allocated for local residents, thus making access challenging for those in the situation of displacement. Further conflict is generated if permanent populations residing adjacent to IDP areas receive less support than their new neighbors. Similar issues arise when youth and children of diaspora returnees are excluded, because their earlier education in foreign school systems is deemed incompatible. In emergency situations, it is critical that all children have access to at least some form of structured educational activity (not necessarily formal classroom schooling), to help them overcome the psychological disruption of conflict and take part in the restoration of cross-cutting social capital. It should be noted that inclusiveness here refers specifically to broad-based access. Context may dictate that to effectively serve beneficiaries, interventions may still need to be targeted in terms of gender and/or ethnic group (e.g., female-only classrooms). Unequal access resulting in exclusion ultimately leads to a second-class group of children and youth who become a post-conflict at-risk category, particularly vulnerable to recruitment into rebel militias and/or criminal groups which offer immediate rewards.

Education that helps to build social cohesion and stronger resilience to conflict, and does not contribute to a relapse into violence, is critical for post-conflict reconstruction. Managing diversity in education requires both textbook and curriculum reform. Such reform needs to be done gradually and be based on a national vision or consensus (Bannon, Holland, and Rahim 2005).

Ongoing non-formal educational approaches and pre-conflict educational assets should not be overlooked, though donors should take care to distinguish between effective and ineffective local responses. Donors and humanitarian agencies often assume there is an educational vacuum in conflict-affected environments, and do not recognize the tremendous value of systems already operating prior to the intervention. Agencies should not neglect local first responses to educational needs, but should assimilate these community-driven interventions into the emergency education strategy. By building on what local communities have already started and supporting an indigenous vision of education, agencies can contribute to the medium and long-term sustainability of education systems. In Guatemala, for example, organizations called Communities of Populations in Resistance, sustained educational initiatives throughout the civil war. This often entailed open-air classes held under trees with emergency procedures for hiding children in instances of attacks (Nicolai and Triplehorn, 2003). Though local responses often provide a sustainable indigenous complement to international efforts, it must also be understood that they
may not always have beneficial effects. Indeed, inappropriately designed and exclusivist local responses can further entrench conflict issues. Donors must be fully engaged to discern between effective and ineffective local responses. If humanitarian agencies and donors are reluctant to engage in emergency education activities because of “more pressing tasks,” dangerous and potentially harmful alternatives can sometimes fill the vacuum (Sommers, 2002). In Rwandan refugee camps in the DRC (then Zaire), this sort of reluctance led to the unmonitored emergence of schooling by ‘genocidaires’ promoting their hateful and violent ideology.

Debunking myths about “the other,” teaching youth and children about tolerance, and encouraging co-existence in conflict situations are some activities that use education as a means of conflict prevention. Despite limited knowledge about the effectiveness of these interventions, this approach to conflict prevention is favored by many practitioners. Though this review does not assess any cases of this type of programming, we nonetheless felt it important to briefly present some useful findings from the literature that might inform future programs in conflict prevention. For example:

- **Psychosocial support to help students recover from conflict-related trauma is often a key element of post-conflict education programs.** One of the strongest arguments for the quick resumption of schooling is that it helps to re-establish a sense of normalcy, which in turn helps children and youth – as well as teachers – cope with psychosocial trauma. Psychosocial interventions need to be integrated across sectors and government structures, including education, health, social protection, and local administrations (Bannon, Holland, and Rahim 2005).

- **Multicultural education can promote peaceful coexistence, but beware of fostering entrenchment rather than understanding.** Multicultural and bilingual education is an opportunity to provide a culturally relevant curriculum and bridge existing ethno-cultural divides. It is crucial in this context to have impartial teachers who are extensively trained and can supervise students’ interactions (Marques and Bannon, 2003). Studies of peace education programs featuring face-to-face confrontations between members of different ethnic groups suggest that when individuals present their arguments in this way, the result can be entrenchment rather than understanding (Salomon, 2003).

- **Human rights education offers a positive and comprehensive approach to peace education.** Most ongoing peace education programs tend to be responsive, particularistic, and problem focused, a finding that echoes the larger point of deficit focused approaches to youth programming in conflict areas (Wessels, 2004). Rather than addressing the causes of war, fostering the conditions for peace may be a more effective approach. Human rights education is one way to develop peace-making capabilities, as it recognizes several forms of violence, including structural, political, cultural, and social violence, and strengthens ethical decision-making among individuals (Reardon, 2002). This is in contrast to detailed, conflict-focused education that highlights what divides people rather than emphasizing their commonalities.

- **Despite the difficulties of operating in a conflict environment, programs can help prevent a deterioration of inter-group relations.** Practitioners of education programs aiming to prevent violence may become discouraged as the political situation worsens and violence escalates. In such circumstances, however, education can prevent the deterioration of inter-group relations. For example, studies of Israeli-Palestinian peace education efforts have found that despite the ongoing Intifada, participants’ perceptions of “the other” have remained constant. Preventing the deterioration of relations is a worthwhile achievement in and of itself.
3. Lessons Learned from Four PCF Grants

This section reviews lessons from four cases, each representing one of the functional areas important for youth interventions in post-conflict societies. As noted in the introduction, these areas are: (i) voice, inclusion, and community participation; (ii) demobilization and reintegration of young ex-combatants; (iii) employment generation and livelihoods; and (iv) emergency education. The cases are compared with the literature on good practices, and key questions are underlined as they arise.

The selected grants represent a cross-section of geography and approaches, and have, to varying degrees, been successful in piloting activities in the four functional areas. Inset boxes provide details about the individual cases, which illustrate the broader lessons learned. We reiterate the caveat that while these lessons provide general guidance for future programming, the overarching lesson of operating in conflict-affected countries is that programming must, first and foremost, be sensitive to the specific context. Taking both specific circumstances and general lessons into account can help to enhance project effectiveness and avoid past mistakes.

3.1. Voice, Inclusion, and Community Participation

Voice and inclusion mechanisms supported through the PCF provided a direct channel for disaffected youth to give input on issues directly affecting their livelihoods and development. In conflict environments, often characterized by bulging youth demographics, where young populations may have been exposed to extreme violence and feel disenfranchised, effective channels for youth participation can serve as a venue for inclusion.

Participatory appraisals ensure that youth of all social categories are included from the outset, and have a hand in determining project objectives and approach. The Sierra Leone Youth in Crisis project conducted participatory rural appraisals in a large number of sites in the target areas. Sites included areas with concentrations of deprived and at-risk youth, such as displacement camps, academic institutions, drug abuse centers, mining sites, lorry parks, and rural areas observing market days. The in-depth consultations that followed included both ex-combatants and non-combatants. The methodology was to compare problems identified by participants in a pair-wise ranking; problems ranging from lack of cash to poor health and sanitation were compared against each other and assigned a ranking based on the input of
Box 2: Demobilization and Social and Economic Reinsertion of Vulnerable Ex-Combatants

The first grant approved by the Post-Conflict Fund was for the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) in the fall of 1997, a time of short-lived optimism for demobilizing ex-combatants in the country. Due to changes in the political situation and the outbreak of renewed violence, it was not until after the signing of the Lusaka treaty in July of 1999 that program activities got underway, although with considerable changes from their original conception. The executing agency was the International Labor Organization (ILO), and the project had three objectives: (i) conduct six studies, resulting in the interim demobilization and reintegration program; (ii) strengthen Congolese capacities in issues of DDR; and (iii) piloting reintegration activities in three parts of the country.

Several components contributed to the program’s success. For one, the flexible and multi-dimensional approach used vis-à-vis the beneficiaries allowed for the project design to adapt to changing realities. Second, the wide selection of livelihood activities was well grounded in local realities, and included hands-on learning opportunities. Finally, the decentralized management structure of the program also contributed to the project’s success in responding to the local context.

The uniform duration of training programs, however, was problematic, as it led to programs that were too long in some instances, and too short in others.

Consultations raise expectations, and responsiveness to such raised expectations is critical. When unreasonable expectations are raised and not addressed, the resulting frustration can be a source of tensions in populations that are already coping with divisiveness and extreme social and economic deprivation. Though unrealistic expectations articulated by youth and children cannot always be met, it is necessary to provide follow-up to the consultations, particularly in cases where expectations cannot be fulfilled. In Sierra Leone, the consultations were followed up with four pilot projects—as described in the inset box—that addressed the identified priority areas of skills development and employment creation linked with rehabilitation and reintegration. These pilots were limited in scope, but did directly address the needs identified during the consultations phase. The pilots were well-designed and responsive to identified needs; however, there seems to have been insufficient attention paid to sustainability. This was mostly reflected in the fact that there did not seem to be sufficient attention to providing the involved youth with support to extend the skills gained through the pilots in their future productive lives.

3.2. Demobilization and Reintegration of Young Ex-Combatants

Facilitating the transition of young combatants into civilian life is a major priority of post-conflict efforts. Though activities supporting the reintegration of young ex-combatants often include a standardized package of transitional support, family tracing, and psychosocial support, it is imperative that opportunities offered to young ex-combatants are identified according to local realities, before specific activities or training programs are designed. For example, the DRC project selected livelihood activities for vulnerable groups that proved “practical and concrete” for ex-combatants returning to their communities, and “activities were found to show early signs of success….The majority [of micro-credit activities] were found to be well prepared, appropriate and some to show early signs of sustainability” (Verhey, 2003).

A notable feature of the Comoros project’s in-center training model was the learning by doing approach to civic education. As reported by Kruse (2004), democratic processes were integral to life at
the center, and helped the transition to civilian life. The residents learned to be considerate neighbors and operate through collective decision making. They even elected a council to govern daily life at the center—all principles of the civic education component of the project. Although not specified in the project documentation, the support that these youth found through the in-center training model seems to have been immensely timely, as they were transitioning not only from combatant to civilian but also from childhood to adult status, often as heads of households. This case supports the idea that intervention should strive to balance the focus on income and the need to resume education and life skills development, as per the good practices discussed in Section 2.

It is important to bear in mind that programs to reintegrate young ex-combatants should have a medium to long-term approach to supporting livelihoods, overcoming psychosocial traumas, and achieving full reintegration into civilian life. Unfortunately, the short-term financing horizon of PCF grants overlooks this need for such a long-term commitment.

Finally, **reintegration activities will differ widely between children and youth**. Given the differences across cultures of youth transitions and responsibilities, rigid age breakdowns between children and youth are generally not useful. Children and youth each require a separate set of interventions, but both groups (and their families) require social reintegration efforts. A clear lesson from the DRC project was that activities that allowed for informal interactions among community members were in the highest demand. Education activities should also be a priority for both groups. However, livelihood activities will not necessarily be appropriate for all youth, and rarely for children. A careful assessment of each participant’s level of transition will be necessary to determine the extent to which income pressures are present and livelihood activities are needed.

### 3.3. Employment Generation and Livelihoods

Livelihood activities pose a considerable challenge, since ensuring labor market integration is difficult in the best of circumstances, let alone in conflict-affected communities. **Livelihood programs generally follow one of two approaches**: some allow participants to choose from among a range of options, while others guide participants into certain professional fields according to potential demand. Each model has its benefits and drawbacks: when leaving the choice up to participants, the risk is that the popularity of one profession will lead to an oversubscription to that training program, and a subsequent flooding of the local market of practitioners. This was the case in the DRC project, where the vast majority of youth (80 percent) in one project area chose to participate in the auto mechanics program. Assigning courses for professional development allows for a more asset-based and demand-based approach to training programs, as per the good practices discussed in Section 2.
Regardless of how programs are selected, attention needs to be paid to the duration of the training. For the sake of simplicity, training programs tend to be of uniform length so that a class enters and graduates together. However, some technical training courses may be more complex and require a longer period of instruction than others. In Comoros, this led to some participants who were ready for the next phase of the program being held back while waiting for their fellow students to graduate.

The Comoros experience also revealed that program participants are sensitive to unequal treatment. At its inception, the program featured two components: the six-month professional training, and a three-month training for community development agents. The latter, however, proved unpopular, requiring the program staff to change the curriculum after the first set of graduates. The subsequent cohort of trainees was offered a uniformly longer training period, which led to resentment among many of the first group.

The lesson is that in addition to matching the duration of training programs to the skills to be learned and adapting programs activities in response to beneficiary inputs, it is also important to avoid privileging one group of youth over another.

Another challenge in the Comoros case was the difficulty of integrating program graduates into their chosen professions. One reason was that expected linkages to microcredit and other lending institutions were difficult to secure, given that few young people have the collateral or experience needed to be deemed creditworthy. The risks of providing credit to young entrepreneurs are clear, given their dearth of professional experience and high failure rates, not to mention the uncertain context in which they would be operating. In response, the project provided toolkits to support newly trained entrepreneurs. In addition, Kruse (2004), in his evaluation report, raised the idea that DDR projects with professional integration components could provide a guarantee fund to help participants to access credit. However, the experience from another PCF grant in Congo-Brazzaville, not reviewed here, which featured both guarantee funds and microcredit schemes, was very negative, with only 29 percent of the credit to young ex-combatants recovered (Biabo, 2003).

Finally, the Comoros project offered training activities at a live-in youth center, which led to increased attendance, reduced drop-out rates, and shortened training periods (Kruse, 2004). The live-in center allowed for activities that were better tailored to the selected participants; and mixing ex-combatants and non-combatant youth avoided the creation of negative group solidarities and broke down traditional

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**Box 3: Employment Generation for Anjouan Youth Comoros, June 2001-June 2003**

Livelihood prospects are a challenge common to youth in all post-conflict contexts. The PCF grant in Comoros worked with CARE (France) in order to provide youth with six months residential professional training. Consultations were held with representatives from a variety of professions to ensure that a demand for the labor existed prior to inviting youth to select the training program that interested them. In tandem, the program included education components on human rights and the culture of peace, and featured the creation of an Active Civil Service (ASCA) that would be responsible for administering the newly created center once CARE withdrew.

The program elements proving most successful were the ‘in-center training’ programs, and offering the participants an opportunity to learn-by-doing. For the professional training, this took the shape of internships followed by a mandatory ‘personal project’. The peace and human rights education was taught through practical application, by having democratic processes govern life at the center, including organized elections.

However, some components to the program were either overlooked or miscalculated. Participants – who had little or no collateral – had difficulty accessing credit to put their skills to use. Sustainability was difficult as the newly-established ASCA was not prepared to administer the training center (in part because local staff were not incorporated into the project early enough). Finally, two years was not long enough to design, implement, and make viable such a comprehensive and innovative program.
Box 4: Teacher Training for Afghan Refugees Pakistan (Afghan Refugee Areas) 2001-present

The provision of emergency education to displaced populations is essential to minimize disruption of intellectual, social, and professional development of youth and children. The PCF grant for the Afghan refugee areas of Pakistan was awarded to GTZ and Basic Education for Afghan Refugees (BEFARe) in the service of four overarching objectives: (i) improve access to basic education and provide teacher training for refugees living in remote areas; (ii) expand and develop the quality of education in selected middle and secondary schools through an integrated teacher training program; (iii) improve the quality of teaching in self-help schools; and (iv) build capacity of women and vulnerable populations through non-formal vocational education and training.

The project, consistent with international good practices for emergency education, addressed an effective mix of traditional and non-traditional needs in education. Due consideration to issues of access and vulnerability led to broad targeting of previously neglected segments of the Afghan refugee population. Furthermore, the project assimilated preexisting non-formal, community-driven first responses to educational needs.

A fundamental weakness of the program and the overarching strategy for Afghan refugee education was a failure to account for donor retrenchment following political stabilization in Afghanistan. Consequently, well-designed educational systems will soon find themselves short of funds and unable to serve the persisting needs of refugee populations unwilling or unable to repatriate.

perhaps the most critical youth/children-specific service interrupted by conflict is elementary and secondary education. While post-conflict settings understandably privilege the restoration of basic services such as sanitation and health care, the provision of emergency education plays an invaluable role in preventing social backsliding for a demographic that is highly reliant on support to facilitate critical transitions and achieve sustainable livelihoods in adulthood.

Successful emergency education programs must sufficiently account for geographically remote and vulnerable populations of youth and children, who often lack the means to relocate or travel to well-served sites. Aid often concentrates in large camps near border areas, where there is a high proportion of refugees from the conflict; but care must also be taken to provide effective service to geographically remote and vulnerable populations that attend nearly every conflict situation. Children and youth in these areas face greater mobility challenges than the general population, and active outreach is required to serve them. The Afghan Teacher Training Program ensured that assistance moved beyond the larger camps in proximity to major centers and border areas, and was redirected to refugee settlements in the southern parts of Northwest Frontier Province (in Pakistan), where access had been previously inhibited by geographic remoteness, widely dispersed population, and traditional attitudes. Children and youth tend to be among the greatest beneficiaries of efforts to reach beyond major centers of assistance, as their geographic marginalization is greatly amplified by their lack of independent mobility.

The assimilation of community initiated approaches, as noted earlier in the Good Practices section, provides a foundation for medium to long-term sustainability of education initiatives. Youth and children in a community will best be served if the community has a firm stake in the education process. This was
successfully achieved in the Afghanistan program, which used multiple approaches, such as self-help schools and home-based instruction, to promote high levels of community engagement and ownership. Ultimately, an effective mix of support in the program for formal and non-formal systems, vocational training assistance, and income generation enabled the project to address the needs of key vulnerable groups, including young women and orphans, whose heightened vulnerability was often a direct consequence of conflict.

4. Other Considerations for Project Design and Impact

This review of PCF grants also revealed lessons that are not specific to any functional area, but are relevant to operations addressing youth needs in conflict-affected contexts. These lessons are presented here as issues for task managers to consider when preparing and managing such projects.

4.1. Flexibility in Project Design

Projects aimed at youth are complex by nature, given the psychosocial differences encountered in young populations, even in the same age group, and given the evolving needs of young people along the lifespan of a project. These aspects make project design and targeting a particular challenge. In addition, for projects operating in post-conflict environments, adapting to the rapidly changing and often volatile context is critical to keeping the interventions relevant. **Designing a project structure that is flexible and adaptable** will help to ensure that activities remain relevant as more is learned about the needs of the target population in the changing socio-political context. Flexibility might mean postponing the implementation of some phases, adjusting the anticipated outcomes, targeting different participants, and perhaps even changing project objectives. In the case of the DDR project in the Democratic Republic of Congo, the resumption of violence in August 1998 made it necessary to change entire components of the project, as well as the geographic region where they were to be carried out. For young people already transitioning from childhood to adulthood, the pressures they face and subsequent needs change fairly quickly: A 13 year-old ex-combatant may be able to return to his parents’ household, whereas a 15 or 16 year-old may have more difficulty doing so. Hence, a two-year delay in project implementation – as was the case in the DRC – will necessarily have to either target a different set of participants or re-think the planned approach.

4.2. Comprehensiveness in the Approach

Whatever the main developmental need the project addresses, the very act of reaching out to young people offers an opportunity to convey multiple key messages. **The selection of a mixed set of project activities** can serve as a way to integrate components that may not be in demand on their own. For instance, the occupational training programs have great appeal for young people in search of livelihood skills. Information about civic education, healthy sexual behaviors, and HIV/AIDS can be embedded in those programs, and communicated when they are paying attention. The Early Child Development project in Albania (also supported by the PCF though not reviewed here) employed a similarly holistic approach by offering a range of multisectoral activities at the child care centers, including gynecological services, family planning courses, and legal advice that benefited mothers. The project also ensured that people living with disabilities were able to participate fully in all activities. This experience follows the good practice that suggests that interventions aimed at children may also require the involvement of the education and health sectors.
4.3. Clarity of Objectives and Target Populations

As noted earlier in this paper, the psychosocial differences among youth populations of the same age group makes identification of needs and effective targeting particularly difficult. The selection of beneficiaries must be undertaken in a systematic and comprehensive manner, based on needs or other commonality rather than by age group, to ensure effective customization and delivery of any intervention. In addition, the conflict environment provides unique challenges for targeting mechanisms, which must function adequately in environments where there is a significant dearth of information and other conventional instruments for beneficiary selection.

Broad targeting – cutting across demographics – may be suitable for projects for universal services, such as education extension, whereas narrower targeting may be needed to deliver specific assistance to unique and challenged populations such as ex-combatants. Clear criteria for inclusion were difficult to develop in the case of the Employment Generation for Anjouan Youth project in Comoros. The initial targeting criterion – handover of a weapon, indicating status as an ex-militia member – seemed straightforward, but proved to be problematic. Due to the unregulated small arms market, many non-militia youth could obtain weapons, and conversely many ex-militia members no longer possessed a weapon to turn over. In an attempt to adapt the targeting mechanism, the project turned to communities to identify ex-militia. Facing resistance, however, the project ultimately broadened targeting to the wider category of youth-at-risk. Consequently, in the absence of an effective mechanism to identify appropriate beneficiaries, the project lost focus and shifted toward a broad vocational training operation. Without a specific beneficiary profile, the project subsequently found it difficult to justify inclusion/exclusion of a growing number of candidates. The absence of an effective targeting mechanism ultimately shifted the nature of the project from a time-bound initiative (DDR) serving youth ex-combatants to one without a defined timeline or target demographic.

4.4. Focus on Learning

Hiring local youth to undertake monitoring and evaluation activities can have many benefits. Local youth bring a context-specific expertise that even first-rate international experts may lack. The inclusion of young local consultants helps to deepen the domestic absorption capacity for development assistance, and directs scarce resources into the domestic economy, while enabling the participating individuals to engage in professional development early on in their careers. Furthermore, young professionals can extend an initiative beyond the life of the international project, spurring follow-up efforts through professional, governmental, and non-governmental channels. Insights gained from locally based monitoring and evaluation also helps to enhance civic awareness and increases the ability of communities to assess and influence governmental and non-governmental activities. In instances where local youth expertise is unavailable, training of local staff to carry out monitoring and evaluation can help to increase the sustainability of the project.

Given the nature of the Post-Conflict Fund, it is not surprising that the challenge of sustainability was raised in each project reviewed. The PCF is designed to support innovative front-end interventions that can serve as pilots for future programs. As such, they are inherently short-term, and, working in communities devastated by violence, are operating in difficult circumstances to say the least, rendering self-financing viability very difficult. Furthermore, since the lessons from the pilots are meant to be incorporated into larger scale projects, it is perhaps inappropriate for funding to prolong the life of what are meant to be temporary pilot initiatives. Nonetheless, in reviewing the four grants, it has become clear that the transitions considered here - into civic life and adulthood - are multi-year processes. What is more, each transition has very distinct phases, and working with children and youth means that the needs of the target populations are evolving quickly. Thus, one recommendation for the structure of the PCF
is that the fund should consider prolonging the support to interventions that aim to facilitate the transitions of young people, from an average of two years to perhaps five or six. This would only be applicable to those projects that aim to accompany young people through all the phases of the transition, featuring tailored responses to the ever-evolving needs (e.g., demobilization and reintegration programs). Those projects that are only working with one specific facet of the transition, such as employment generation efforts that aim to facilitate labor market insertion, could continue with shorter, timelier, support.

5. Conclusions and Recommendations

As emphasized in the introduction to this study, lessons pertaining to both project implementation and functional programming areas can only provide general guidance (such as outlined in Table 1). This guidance should include keeping a flexible project design that accounts for the ever-evolving exigencies of individual conflict situations, as well as the changing needs of children and youth as they quickly transition between life stages. Involving many actors from across sectors helps to cover the range of needs, and operating with simple institutional arrangements among local actors will facilitate a flexible design.

Another general finding is that the vast heterogeneity of children and youth in post-conflict societies requires carefully tailored interventions. The needs of children are markedly different from those of youth. For younger children, involving families at the outset is particularly important; for older youth, livelihood responsibilities loom larger and interventions should be designed accordingly. Local culture is of paramount importance in determining the appropriateness of interventions, and therefore, the likelihood of success.

With regard to voice and inclusion, the insights of this study consistently point to the particular importance of participation and community ownership. The invaluable perspective afforded through the involvement of local communities, specifically their children and youth, contributes immeasurably to the effectiveness and sustainability of the project. Projects that fail to sufficiently engage the communities and the groups they purport to serve may ultimately fail – or worse, they may aggravate already pronounced feelings of exclusion.

The review also raised the idea of reintegration programs for both combatants and noncombatants. In undertaking such programs, practitioners need to be certain that their efforts are not privileging one group over another. Given the realities of a resource-constrained environment, this may not always be feasible, but is nonetheless a goal toward which the project should strive.

For interventions relating to employment generation, the review suggested that, for older youths, participation in the post-conflict economy is often much more difficult than for their adult counterparts. As many older youth have grown up entirely in the context of conflict, they bring few pre-existing productive skills to the nascent economy, but nonetheless shoulder demands to support aging parents and/or young families. Employment generation and livelihood projects respond to these pressing needs and help to guard against youth reverting to crime and violence for subsistence. The design of these projects, however, must account for the relative dearth of expertise and experience for older youths. Furthermore, such projects must recognize that youth tend to be sharply constrained in their access to capital, given their absence of collateral and experience.

Regarding emergency education interventions, the review suggested that effective programs must account for geographic remoteness. Programs must undertake active outreach to serve children and youth in outlying areas, who are often beyond the conventional reach of aid assistance. Furthermore, the
assimilation of community initiated approaches is crucial to ensure high levels of community engagement and ownership, which ultimately facilitates access for youth and children who might otherwise be prevented from access by skeptical communities without a perceived stake in the delivered program.

Presenting insights from the growing good practices literature and the lessons of four PCF case studies, this paper begins to tackle key issues confronting practitioners of children and youth programming. The limited scope of this paper, however, prevented it from providing a thorough assessment of many other important themes and operational considerations. Perhaps foremost among these is the gender dimension of conflict. Though work has begun on better understanding the gender dimension vis-à-vis young people and conflict, much remains to be done. We also could not touch on all critical areas of children and youth programming. The most obvious gap in this respect is perhaps the theme of health. Health is a critical challenge confronting war-affected children and youth and greater efforts are needed to better understand the role of related programs in conflict affected environments. Within the World Bank, and the development community more broadly, significant knowledge gaps persist in how to better deal with the plight of young people in conflict-affected environments. This paper can perhaps serve as a catalyst for discussion on moving the research agenda forward, while providing basic operational guidelines for emerging and ongoing programs.

The phases preceding adulthood are characterized by transitions that are challenging even during times of peace. In conflict environments, these formative transitions, which are essential not only to individual youth and children but to entire societies, break down. This study finds that the most crucial tasks confronting young people, and programs to benefit them in post-conflict environments, center on facilitating these vital transitions. The consequences of failing to support children and youth during these transitions may often be no less than widespread exclusion that steers a fragile nation back into the conflict trap.
<table>
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References


Salomon, Gavriel. 2003. “Jewish and Arab Youngsters’ Attitudes and Perceptions of the “Other Side” As a Function of Participation in Coexistence Programs Supported by the Abraham Fund Initiatives”. University of Haifa.


Annex 1: Analytic and Evaluative Framework for the Case Studies

In reviewing the fourteen Post-Conflict Fund grants pertaining to youth and children in conflict-affected countries, it was necessary to develop an analytic and evaluative framework against which strengths and weaknesses of the grants could be effectively assessed. Though such frameworks are difficult to deploy when evaluation processes are not built into a project from the outset, we have tried to design a framework that poses critical evaluative questions that can be answered satisfactorily on the basis of existing documentation and interviews with Task Team Leaders.

Quality of Problem Diagnosis and Project Design

Problem diagnosis is the crucial first stage of project development. The evaluative questions posed here attempt to assess whether the task team and implementing partner fully understood the relevant problem, and whether the proposal and design reflect such an understanding.

- Was there a holistic and systematic diagnostic approach reflecting general conditions and a good understanding of sociopolitical and cultural context? Was the problem clearly identified and understood?
- Did the task team undertake a participatory assessment, taking into account the needs articulated by children and youth, as well as other key stakeholders?
- Did the proposed project design reflect a comprehensive understanding of the diagnosed problem?

Appropriateness of Approach vis-à-vis International Good Practices and Conflict Environment

International good practices, distilled from iterated design and execution of projects in respective programmatic areas, can provide valuable guidelines for the formulation of appropriate methodologies and approaches. Moreover, projects executed in conflict-affected societies must be suited to the unique exigencies of such environments.

- How did the project line up with international good practices for the grant’s given program area?
- Did the task team and implementing partner demonstrate conflict sensitivity during project design and execution?
- Were the task team and implementing partner responsive to the unique needs and circumstances surrounding the given intervention?

Strength and Relevance of Targeting Mechanisms

The selection of beneficiaries must be undertaken in a systematic and comprehensive manner to ensure effective customization and delivery of any intervention. The conflict environment provides unique challenges for targeting mechanisms, which must be expertly tailored to function adequately in environments where there is a significant dearth of information and other conventional instruments for beneficiary selection.

- Were rigorous and effective methodologies, relative to project size and cost, employed to select project beneficiaries?
- Did targeting mechanisms effectively account for conflict factors that might otherwise impede the accurate identification of beneficiaries?
- Were targeting mechanisms tailored to suit specific contextual needs – sociopolitical, cultural, and/or economic?
Efficacy and Efficiency in Attaining Proposed Outputs and Outcomes

The disconnect between proposed and actual outputs and outcomes may reveal major flaws in design and implementation. Likewise, a correspondence between them is often indicative of efficacy and efficiency. Furthermore, particularly in conflict-affected environments, it is critical to ascertain whether methodologies and approaches are responsive to changing circumstances and condition.

- Were the proposed outputs and outcomes achieved?
- Were the initial approaches adapted or modified in response to changing conditions?
- If the grant fell short of attaining proposed outputs and outcomes, was that attributable to external conditions (including local government capacity), ineffective project design, poor implementation?

Quality of Monitoring and Evaluation Mechanisms

Ex post facto evaluation is often unsuccessful, because inadequate planning is undertaken during the design and implementation phases to ensure sufficient documentation for review and evaluation at project completion. Strong monitoring and evaluation mechanisms must be present at every stage of the project cycle.

- Did the task team and implementation partner utilize robust monitoring and evaluation mechanisms? If so, were these mechanisms built into the project from the outset?
- In addition to formal evaluation (if any), did the task team make effective use of periodic monitoring through formal/informal memoranda and reports throughout the project cycle?
- Were discrete, substantive lessons learned and good practices clearly identified following project completion?

Potential of Grant to be Scaled Up and Advance Operational Practices

The PCF provides a valuable piloting mechanism for approaches and methodologies that can inform subsequent Bank operations. However, not all approaches that are effective on a smaller scale can necessarily be scaled up. Critical questions must be posed to discern approaches that can and should be assimilated into standard Bank operations.

- What components of the project design are scalable and can be effectively assimilated into standard Bank operations?
- Does the grant provide any strategic insight that can inform the emerging agenda for research and operations related to children and youth in conflict-affected countries?
- What elements of the grants are not scalable (due to cost, design, etc.) and should not be incorporated into standard Bank operations?

Level of Innovation in Given Programmatic Area

The PCF fosters innovative approaches that may not be testable under the strictures of standard Bank operations. Innovation, by definition, often involves testing the untested. Lessons must be carefully drawn to retain successful innovative approaches and discard those that do not meet expectations.

- Did the methodologies and approaches in the grant represent any level of innovation beyond standard practices for the given programmatic area?
• If innovative methodologies and approaches were utilized, did they contribute to the effective and efficient attainment of outcomes?
• If innovative methodologies and approaches were effective, can they be replicated in future grants and/or standard Bank operations?
Annex 2: Analytic and Evaluative Framework – Sierra Leone

1. Project Description

Duration: 1998-1999  
Location: Western Area & Provincial Districts – Bo, Kenema

Scope: <1000 participants  
Budget: $250,000

Partner: ActionAid Sierra Leone (with UNICEF support)

The Youth in Crisis project undertook an in-depth consultative process with Sierra Leone youth, with a view to designing a strategic framework that would enable them to acquire the education necessary to realize their potential and the skills to engage in meaningful work. Consultations were held in the Western Area and the provincial districts of Bo and Kenema in the Southern and Eastern regions, respectively. A resurgence of conflict precluded the consultative exercise in other parts of the country. Pilot projects were subsequently implemented in low-cost housing construction, fishing and income generation, recreation and social integration, peacebuilding, and mobilization/sensitization.

2. Summary of Lessons Learned

Key Success Factors

- *Participatory rural appraisal* ensured that community needs were identified and youth of all social categories were included from the outset.
- *Reasonable expectations raised* during the consultation stage were followed up with pilot projects addressing the identified priority areas of skills development and employment creation, which were linked with rehabilitation and reintegration.
- *Pilot programs* addressed short-term needs and provided valuable skills-building activities to youth, based on their own priorities identified during consultations.

Obstacles and Challenges

- *External conditions*, namely the escalation of violent conflict throughout Sierra Leone during project implementation, precluded the extension of the project to other rural areas.
- *Insufficient attention was paid to the sustainability* and long-term objectives of the pilots.
- *Weak monitoring and evaluation* mechanisms resulted in a disparity between the thoroughness of the consultations and the evaluation of the pilot projects. The enhanced evaluation methods called for in the technical assessment of the proposal by the PCF secretariat were not sufficiently pursued.

Quality of Problem Diagnosis and Project Design

UNICEF/ActionAid SL undertook a strong problem diagnosis prior to the proposal for Post-Conflict Fund support. The project team carried out a six-day visit to the target Western Area to clarify issues regarding youth population distribution, the range of available productive and recreational activities, and opportunities and threats in the area. The project documentation clearly identified and demonstrated a sharp understanding of the problem being addressed – namely, youth-at-risk confronted with marginalization and frustration as a consequence of a lack of productive and recreational activities, which posed a major impediment to peace. In addition, the diagnosis of the problem touched on the motivations of young people underlying the decision to fight or not to fight. This understanding was well-situated in the sociopolitical context of Sierra Leone, which was crucial for determining what it would take to reintegrate young people – both ex-combatants and non-combatants – into the economic and social life of
the country. This approach was appropriate to the country’s wider strategy for transition from war to peace and development, as it provided an important input on a key target group for this emergency recovery project.

The project itself consisted of widely participatory consultations, and indeed, a participatory approach was also piloted during a pilot exercise. Participatory rural appraisal methodologies were field tested over a period of two days in Lakka village (20 km beyond Freetown) following comprehensive training of staff of implementing agencies, individuals experienced in working with Sierra Leone youth, and selected youth representatives. The proposed project design was suited to the identified problem, as it provided for context-sensitive consultative and evaluative approaches to determine the best mix of education, training, employment, health, and recreation schemes to address the problem of marginalized youth.

**Appropriate Approach vis-à-vis International Good Practices and Conflict Environment**

**Strength and Relevance of Targeting Mechanisms**

A robust set of criteria were applied to ensure that consultations took place at a wide range of sites in the Western Area, Bo, and Kenema. Site selection criteria included high concentration of youth, deprivation, accessibility, and business activity. Sites included entertainment centers, war-affected areas where youth have resettled, displacement camps, academic institutions, drug abuse centers, mining sites, lorry parks, and rural areas observing market days. Using these criteria, the project ensured that consultations occurred among a diverse cross-section of school-age and ex-combatant youth. However, the outbreak of intensified violence in Sierra Leone precluded extension of the project beyond the initial three areas.

Following the in-depth consultative process that identified skills development and employment creation linked with rehabilitation and reintegration as priority areas, several pilot interventions were launched. One such scheme, a youth housing scheme promoting skills development and employment generation, had 62 youth beneficiaries (54 male and 8 female) at Goderich in the Western Area. No justification or explanation was provided for the marked gender disparity in this component. Another, incoming generating artisanal fishing enterprises scheme, achieved gender parity, targeting 70 youths (40 male and 30 female) in Congo Town and Lakka village. Although the consultative process involved sufficiently rigorous screening criteria, it remains unclear whether strong criteria for targeting beneficiaries were employed during the pilot projects. The project documentation did not describe any rigorous beneficiary selection methodologies for the pilot, but only alluded to the fact that group sizes were increased in the artisanal fishing enterprises component to accommodate more beneficiaries. Targeting spatial areas instead of subcategories of beneficiaries limited access to the project by vulnerable groups. More attention should have been paid to beneficiary selection criteria for the pilot projects, as was done during the consultation phase.

**Efficacy and Efficiency in Attaining Proposed Outputs and Outcomes**

External conditions, namely the escalation of violent conflict throughout Sierra Leone during project implementation, precluded the extension of the project to more rural areas throughout Sierra Leone. Though retaining methodologies and approaches developed during preparation, the project narrowed its scope to regions where implementation was feasible, and consultative processes were suspended prematurely in other areas. Nonetheless, apart from the restricted scope resulting as a consequence of conflict, the program proved highly adaptable and delivered strong outputs for both the consultative and pilot project stages.
The in-depth consultative process was successfully implemented in the three areas, using strong participatory rural appraisal tools. The processes yielded detailed information, which was effectively collected, sorted, and ranked through a matrix/pair-wise system. The pair-wise ranking compared problems ranging from lack of cash to poor health and sanitation against each other, and assigned a ranking based on the responses of participants. These techniques, reflected in each of the three regional reports, clearly documented problems and opportunities and ranked their importance based on the perceptions of participants. Methodologies and data from the consultative stage were very well-documented, and easily met the objective of gathering sufficient information in a highly participatory fashion to design a strategic framework for pilot projects.

Based on the findings of the consultative process, four pilot projects were developed and delivered. Income generation and skills-building objectives were fulfilled through a youth housing scheme and an artisanal fishing enterprises program. The rehabilitation of a Freetown recreational facility provided a non-violent outlet for youth empowerment. Mobilization and sensitization programs provided training on critical issues. Though the projects appear to have been well designed and responsive to needs identified during the youth consultations, there seems to have been insufficient attention paid to the sustainability and long-term objectives of the pilots. In particular, the youth housing scheme appears to have been a one-off experiential program, which while building highly useful skills, did not provide sufficient support for transitioning youth from skills development to employment. In sum, though the pilot projects may have provided solid remedies to short-term needs, there is little evidence that they also “serve[d] as operational research to test approaches and feed back into the process of strategic formulation,” as originally aimed for in the project proposal.

**Quality of Monitoring and Evaluation Mechanisms**

Monitoring and evaluation mechanisms were somewhat weak, as reflected by the limited amount of substantive documentation available to assess the grant. Since the Youth in Crisis project was one of the earlier PCF grants, it is understandable that robust mechanisms were not built into the design of the project. The project files contain only one periodic report and the implementation completion report (“Donor Report”). The completion report, though sufficient in detail, could certainly have provided more data on project implementation. The reports that emerged from the consultation process were very thorough and provided detailed information about the process in each of the three areas. Nonetheless, the clearer evaluation methods called for in the technical assessment of the proposal by the PCF secretariat were not sufficiently pursued. In sum, the participatory research was well documented, but the implementation of the project was insufficiently documented.

**Potential of Grant to be Scaled Up and Advance Operational Practices**

The project component with the greatest potential for scalability is the consultative process. The in-depth consultations effectively clarified immediate and medium-term needs of youth, and empowered them to identify priority areas for development assistance. Systematic and in-depth consultation processes could advance operational practices at all levels of Bank operations pertaining to youth. Consultations need not only be viewed as preparatory work. Though a consultative process should be limited to the design stage in many if not most cases, a complex and rigorous consultative process can also constitute an actual project component, as it may be an effective means of rebuilding social capital and cohesion in divided communities.

**Level of Innovation in Given Programmatic Area**

Making broad-based public consultations with youth a centerpiece of the project represented a high level of innovation beyond standard practice. The process was designed effectively to provide strong data for
the design of readily implementable pilot projects. These consultations provide a model that could be adapted to a wide range of World Bank projects targeting youth in conflict-affected environments. In-depth consultations in the early aftermath of a violent conflict provide an invaluable means by which to provide essential beneficiary-identified assistance to at-risk populations (displaced youth, ex-combatants, etc.), and should be scaled-up in future grants, to test the appropriateness of the approach in larger-scale IDA/IBRD lending operations. Consultations are a good tool to assess the needs of different groups and set priorities and activities accordingly. This is particularly important in conflict-affected countries, where political factors or security concerns had prevented people from voicing their needs and concerns for a long period of time. Consultations should, however, be approached with caution in order not to raise unreasonable expectations in certain groups. In this case, the project did fulfill expectations by following the consultations with implementation of a relevant project.
Annex 3: Analytic and Evaluative Framework – Afghanistan (Pakistan)

1. Project Description

**Duration:** 2001-present  
**Location:**  
Afghan Refugee areas  
Northwest Frontier Province, Pakistan  
**Scope:** 1500+ teachers  
**Budget:** $930,000  
**Partner:** GTZ and Basic Education for Afghan Refugees (BEFARe)

The Teacher Training for Afghan Refugees project aims to support and expand a program to provide education to about 80 percent of Afghan refugees currently living in Pakistan. The project has four principal objectives: (i) improve access to basic education and provide teacher training for refugees living in remote areas; (ii) expand and improve the quality of education in selected middle and secondary schools, through an integrated teacher training program; (iii) improve the quality of teaching in self-help schools; and (iv) build the capacity of women and vulnerable populations through non-formal vocational education and training (VET), and use these approaches to retain students in school.

2. Summary of Lessons Learned

**Key Success Factors**

- *Discrete and measurable targets* established in the project proposal provided clear goals that could be used throughout the project to determine effectiveness of implementation.  
- *International good practices* were followed for emergency education, including dissemination of critical survival messages, assimilation of pre-existing community-driven interventions, and equitable access.  
- *Effective and broad targeting mechanisms* accounted effectively for vulnerabilities resulting from conflict and the conditions specific to refugee distribution and access in northern Pakistan. The initiative was extended to remote sites beyond the main camps, and focused on vulnerable groups, including orphans, women, and children.  
- *Robust monitoring* allowed for transparency about which output targets were achieved and which fell short, even as full project implementation was delayed.

**Obstacles and Challenges**

- *External challenges* relating to out-of-country voting for the Afghan presidency redirected human resources and local capacities and delayed achievement of some of the targets.  
- *Stabilization of Afghanistan’s political situation* has led to significant curtailment of donor funding for the education of refugees, many of whom are not likely to repatriate in the near term.

**Quality of Problem Diagnosis and Project Design**

PCF funding was used to scale up and advance a pre-existing teacher training program run by GTZ/BEFARe, which had been developed in the context of the July 1998 *Strategy for Afghan Education*, at the behest of the donor community. The proposal to expand the program with PCF funds laid out the four principal focus areas enumerated above. The proposal developed discrete, measurable targets in each of the four areas, such as the number of teachers to be targeted, the percentage of teachers using the training module, and the development of a science curriculum, among several others. The longstanding
involvement of BEFARe in delivering educational support to Afghan refugees in northwest Pakistan ensured that the project design was well-suited to the needs and conditions of the communities.

**Appropriateness of Approach vis-à-vis International Good Practices and Conflict Environment**

The approach taken in support of expanded teacher training reflected several of the key international good practices for emergency education programs identified in our review. First, education during emergency situations provides tremendous support to affected youth populations, enabling them to better cope with their situation by gaining additional knowledge and critical skills for survival. The dissemination of these critical survival messages was built into the project; head teachers were trained to incorporate messages on HIV/AIDS, drugs, and community engagement, among other critical topics related to strengthening students’ capacity to survive in their immediate environment. Second, ongoing non-formal educational approaches should not be overlooked, and agencies should not neglect local first-responses to educational needs, but should assimilate these community-driven interventions into the emergency education strategy. From the outset, the project identified “improving the quality of teachers in self-help schools/non-formal schools” as one of its four key program areas. The project recognized the importance of non-formal, community-based vehicles for educational delivery, while also being sensitive to the need to provide these systems with the requisite professional inputs to ensure quality. Finally, equitable access to educational opportunity was provided to all targeted beneficiaries, including vulnerable groups (see section on targeting mechanisms, below).

**Strength and Relevance of Targeting Mechanisms**

The principal beneficiaries of the project are Afghan refugee teachers in northern Pakistan, and by extension the population of current and future Afghan students (initially in Pakistan and ultimately in Afghanistan). The program identified and targeted key vulnerable and neglected segments of the Afghan refugee community in Pakistan. Larger camps close to major cities were already receiving significant assistance, so the project endeavored to reach more remote refugee settlements in the southern parts of Northwest Frontier Province (NWFP) – where access had previously been inhibited by geography, thinly dispersed population, and traditional attitudes. Particular attention was also given to training teachers from vulnerable groups, including women, widows, and orphans, whose heightened vulnerability was often a direct consequence of conflict. School drop-outs were also targeted, as a significant portion of refugee students had left school before completion of grade 4. Drop-outs wanting to continue their education were provided with vocational education and training, basic education, and income generation skills. Communities without access to formal schooling systems also received support for self-help schools and other non-formal educational approaches. In sum, targeting mechanisms accounted effectively for vulnerabilities resulting from conflict, and for the conditions specific to refugee distribution and access in northern Pakistan.

**Efficacy and Efficiency in Attaining Grants’ Proposed Outputs and Outcomes**

Though the project was successful in working toward its proposed outputs and outcomes, the out-of-country registration and voting for the Afghan presidential elections delayed completion of certain targets; consequently, the project has been extended into 2005/2006. Some of the targets enumerated under objectives 1 and 4 (respectively, access to basic education for refugees in remote areas; and capacity of women and vulnerable persons) remain to be achieved (though at a no-cost extension, as the earmarked funds have not yet been expended). The targets enumerated under objectives 2 and 3 (respectively, expansion of middle and secondary school education; and improvement of quality in self-help schools/non-formal education) have been achieved. Over the course of 2005/2006, the project is due to reach completion following support for continuing operations at 10 remote areas schools (reaching 60
teachers and 1500 students, predominantly female); the delivery of 90 non-formal education courses to 1156 vulnerable adults and children; and 10 skills development courses supporting income generation for 100 adults.

**Quality of Monitoring and Evaluation Mechanisms**

Strong monitoring and evaluation mechanisms were built into the project from the outset and maintained throughout project implementation. Quarterly reports provided detailed information about success and/or delays in achieving the discrete, measurable outputs under the four key areas identified in the proposal, along with detailed information about expenditures to date. A midterm review, undertaken by an independent consultant in June 2003, drew on relevant literature, office visits, and field visits. Although this review made effective use of survey activities and interviews, some segments were written rather cursorily. Despite this shortcoming, monitoring was generally effective and allowed for transparency about which outputs were achieved and which fell short – thereby facilitating the two extension decisions.

**Potential of Grant to be Scaled Up and Advance Operational Practices**

The grant provides useful operational insight into how the Bank can support educational development for displaced and vulnerable populations. The project’s effective mix of support for formal and non-formal systems, vocational training assistance, and income generation captures the breadth of required interventions in emergency environments. Scalability concerns may arise, however, due to the difficulty of managing such complex programs. Successful delivery, under this grant, was contingent on an effective national/international partnership of organizations with longstanding presence in the region.

**Level of Innovation in Given Programmatic Area**

The most significant innovation under this grant was its effective mix of traditional and non-traditional approaches to education as a way of addressing issues of access, vulnerability, and the need for skills development in an emergency environment. This mix of interventions under the umbrella of a single emergency project can and should be replicated in future Bank grants and operations.
Annex 4: Analytic and Evaluative Framework – DRC

1. Project Description

**Duration:** 1998-2003  
**Location:** DRC  
**Scope:** 800+ knowledge products  
**Budget:** $1,555,000  
**Partner:** UNICEF, International Labour Organisation

Working through the ILO, the **Demobilization & Rehabilitation Program: Preparatory Phase** project aimed to pilot a demobilization and reintegration program for vulnerable groups, and to plan a larger, national-scale effort for implementation when the situation allowed. After some changes to the initial project plan, implementation occurred in three phases: (i) a series of six studies (see below), culminating in the interim demobilization and reintegration program (PIDR); (ii) piloting of the PIDR through small skills training projects in three regions; and (iii) the integration of lessons learned from this project into the larger nationwide DDR initiative.

2. Summary of Lessons Learned (based on Verhey, 2003)

**Key Success Factors**
- *Flexible and adaptable structure* allowed tailoring to needs of beneficiaries:
  - The evolving situation on the ground was accounted for as project progressed
  - The needs of individual beneficiaries were taken into account
- *Local realities* grounded and guided the project throughout:
  - Locally appropriate opportunities were identified for training programs
- *Relevant, practical, and concrete* livelihood activities offered:
  - Diversity of training activities
  - Hands-on learning opportunities
- *Holistic* approach integrated social, economic, health, and food concerns.

**Obstacles and Challenges**
- *Institutional arrangements* were complex and led to many setbacks:
  - Contradictory information was given to beneficiaries by different actors
  - Delays in flow of funds led to significant delays in activities – most importantly, delays between training and funding for economic activities
- *Poor incorporation of lessons learned* into national program:
  - Disjointed efforts by multilaterals in later phase of the project led to inability to incorporate lessons learned into national DDR initiative
- *Duration* of some training programs was too short:
  - Uniform training length of six months was not appropriate for some programs
- *Absence of social aspects* of project activities was a common complaint
  - Some ex-child soldiers were not ready for livelihood activities
- *Insufficient provision for daily needs*:
  - Many benefits were calculated on an individual rather than a household basis.

**Quality of Problem Diagnosis and Project Design**

Unforeseen delays in obtaining approval for financial disbursements for the project – due to the resumption of fighting in the DRC – resulted in the first program activities occurring a full two years after the signing of the Loan Agreement. This uncommonly long preparation time may have had positive repercussions, however, as the diagnostic conducted for this project was extensive, lasting one year and
consisting of six separate studies: (i) creation of a socioeconomic profile; (ii) assessment of the health status of vulnerable groups; (iii) evaluation of options for the demobilization and reintegration of child soldiers; (iv) surveying social and economic reintegration; and (vi) social protection.

**Appropriateness of Approach vis-à-vis International Good Practices and Conflict Environment**

One of the main areas of divergence between this pilot and the literature on working with youth in post-conflict reconstruction was the absence of family reunification efforts. In other aspects, however, the project seems to have been quite sensitive to the particular context.

With regard to family reunification, the project operated on a different premise than is commonly encountered in the literature. While the main lessons drawn from previous interventions focused on returning young ex-combatants to their families, the diagnostic in this case revealed a more nuanced reality: many combatants were pushed from their families for economic reasons in the first place, and families are not always willing or able to reabsorb young members who wish to return. What is more, as of June 2003 the project was still unable to demobilize many ex-child soldiers in Kinshasa province.

As for the conflict environment, the flexibility of the project timeframe allowed for the incorporation of changes in the evolving context – postponement of project activities, adaptability of training courses, realistic revision of scope of the project, to name a few.

**Strength and Relevance of Targeting Mechanisms**

An independent evaluation noted that the project was successful in targeting the most vulnerable. Since the project documentation does not specify precisely how beneficiaries were selected, it is difficult to determine whether conflict factors were accounted for, and to what extent mechanisms were tailored to the local context.

The project’s awareness-raising activities seem to have been particularly effective in facilitating the location of children in army barracks. Collaboration with the military was said to be satisfactory. Consultations occurred at some of the army bases to inquire whether child soldiers were present. According to one interim report, however, it seems that program representatives took the commanding officer at his word that no minors were enlisted, and no other attempts were made to target these potential beneficiaries. It is unclear whether other options were available to the project staff.

The selection of training institutions seems to have been somewhat structured, with the institutions judged according to four criteria: effectiveness, experience, professional capacity, and credibility of the potential service deliverer. It is not clear how applications were ranked according to these criteria.

**Efficacy and Efficiency in Attaining Grants’ Proposed Outputs and Outcomes**

The continuously evolving context made it difficult to achieve the proposed outcomes, which changed over time. The major discrepancy seems to have been the total number of beneficiaries reached (800) in contrast to original plans (2300).

One point that arose early on was the extent to which peers were influential in how individuals selected training programs. In Kinshasa, for example, more than 80 percent of the 122 project beneficiaries selected auto mechanics from a range of seven options. This was problematic, since the opportunities for auto repair in the rural areas of the country are limited. However, it is not clear that designing a system without allowing beneficiaries to choose their vocation would prove more effective. In addition, only nine women in Kinshasa benefited from the skills training component, and were limited to hairdressing, handicrafts, and some literacy programs. While these are probably the sectors traditionally open to
women, post-conflict situations may present an opportunity to help women penetrate more lucrative industries.

**Quality of Monitoring and Evaluation Mechanisms**

In addition to calling for ongoing monitoring at each stage of the project, the design required that evaluations also be carried out every step of the way. The surveys undertaken during the preparatory phase allowed for the collection of considerable baseline data. What is more, the design calls for ex-ante, ex-in and ex-post evaluations throughout. However, the indicators are not made explicit. The financial management tools developed specifically for the project seem to be effective.

An independent evaluation consisting of a field visit and some reviews of project documentation was conducted (Verhey, 2003). The field visit consisted of consultations with trainers, trainees, project staff, military officials, and other donors.

The lessons learned by the project implementers were thoughtfully compiled, though it remains to be seen whether they were effectively communicated. A succinct two-page brief was made available that candidly articulated the project challenges, but incorporating the lessons learned into future efforts seems to have been a challenge.

**Potential of Grant to be Scaled Up and Advance Operational Practices**

The scalability of the project has been reflected in a proposed grant for SDR 68.1 million to the DRC for an emergency demobilization and reintegration project. This project is part of a larger regional strategy which aims to coordinate country efforts throughout the Great Lakes region. Although the proposed grant explicitly states that lessons learned from this PCF grant were being incorporated into the DRC’s national DDR program, the specific lessons being built upon are not listed.

The activities that are expected to scale up include the sensitization program and some of the skills training components. The sensitization program aims to make potential beneficiaries aware of the project and to bring key government actors on board, thereby helping with the mobilization of resources to support the project. In addition, sensitization serves to prepare communities for the arrival of former combatants.

**Level of Innovation in Given Programmatic Area**

It is difficult to identify any particular program component as innovative, since the same types of project activities had been piloted in many other contexts. What the project may have been testing are the new partnerships that emerged. Whatever the case, it is clear that the IDA grant stands to benefit from the piloted PCF activities, though the main relevance of the IDA grant to children and youth–family tracing–was not a component of the smaller project.
Annex 5: Analytic and Evaluative Framework – Comoros

1. Project Description

| Duration:  | 2001-2003 | Location:  | Anjouan Island, Comoros |
| Scope:     | 650 young ex-militia (Phase I) 1400 young Anjouanese (Phase II) |
| Budget:    | $788,000 |
| Partner:   | CARE France |

The Reintegration of Young Militias in Anjouan project aimed at providing Anjouanese ex-militia youth with an alternative to violence. The activities were divided into two phases: a six-month in-residence professional training component (including human rights education and culture of peace education), and the establishment of a civil service (Service Civil Actif) to ensure the long-term viability of the project.

2. Summary of Lessons Learned (taken from Kruse, 2004)

Key Success Factors
- **In-center training** (i.e., youth living in center) was successful and led to:
  - Increased attendance, reduced drop-out, shortened training periods (due to intensification of activities)
  - Better-tailored activities, avoidance of negative group solidarities, breakdown of traditional allegiances, and achievement of positive group identifications

- **The learning by doing** pedagogical approach was successful in many respects:
  - Democratic processes were integral to life at the center, and helped guide the transition to civilian life

- **Targeting the right activities** was properly done:
  - Small income-generating activities were identified through consultations with representatives of different professions, thereby ensuring that demand existed for the training being offered
  - The project used an individualized approach – each beneficiary was guided by meetings, field visits, and professional monitoring to formulate his or her personal project, which constituted a final component to the training program

Obstacles and Challenges
- **Problematic targeting** resulted in opening up to a more diverse group:
  - At the beginning, handing in a weapon was the criterion for project participation, which proved extremely tricky
  - Entitlement was extended to youth-at-risk, leading to a loss of focus on ex-militia and shift toward a more classical vocational training program

- **Conflicting expectations** and unequal treatment resulted in resentment:
  - Restructuring of the training phases due to unpopular components led to subsequent cohorts of trainees receiving longer training. Two lessons:
    - Youth proved very sensitive to unequal treatment
    - Professional training is central to integrating ex-militia youth

- **Ensuring proper professional integration** proved very difficult:
Expected linkages to microcredit lending institutions collapsed, as ex-militia youth had no collateral and were not considered creditworthy

- DDR projects with professional reintegration components should either directly provide toolkits or a guarantee fund to serve as collateral

- **Establishing sustainability** was difficult:
  - The *Service Civil Actif* (ASCA) was not adequately prepared to take over the management of the structure left behind
  - Expatriate staff did not incorporate enough local staff.

**Quality of Problem Diagnosis and Project Design**

The project both addressed immediate humanitarian concerns (given the context of conflict) and had long-term development objectives. This mix of programmatic approaches proved well suited to the Anjouan context, as the situation called for a prompt response to alleviate the anxieties of Anjouan youth, while providing them with skills that will serve them in the long-term. The first phase consisted of the establishment of a training center, the *Centre d’Education et de Formation à l’Auto-Emploi* (CEFAE), and the second called for the launching of a civic education service (*Service Civil Actif – ASCA*) that would oversee the activities of the center once CARE withdrew.

The independent evaluators found that from its inception, the project focused on the number of participants to the detriment of quality training. This lack of quality seemed to permeate the project, resulting in trainers, beneficiaries, and government officials questioning the value of the project. In addition, the certificates that graduates received were of little value, since the training center had no name recognition, the certificates did not mention what specific skills were acquired, and no type of final examination was required in order to receive one. It therefore seems to have been a strategic error to have recruited so broadly when the training center was being created, as this was the critical period of reputation building, and a better reputation would have boosted the value of participation to the beneficiaries.

Another flaw in the project design which emerged from the documentation was the ambitious timetable set to accomplish the objectives. The uniform training course for the participants in the first phase proved too short for many, and too long for some, as different occupations requiring different amounts of preparation time. With respect to phase two, it is clear that one year was not sufficient for designing the structure, recruiting and training staff, and identifying the beneficiaries of the *Service Civil Actif*. The consequence of this miscalculation was a race against the clock in terms of implementing project activities, to the detriment of quality of services and buy-in from project participants.

** Appropriateness of Approach vis-à-vis International Good Practices and Conflict Environment**

The project design seems to have been in line with international best practices. The designers recognized the importance of creating a demand-driven skills training program, and the beneficiaries were well guided throughout the training process. The unwillingness of microfinance institutions to provide credit to high risk-taking youth was consistent with many lessons learned from previous interventions.

Although in-center training programs were typically not favored in the literature, the use of such a program in this project contributed to the project’s successes. In particular, living in gave participants a first-hand experience of putting civic education into practice. The residents learned to be considerate neighbors and to operate through collective decision making. They even elected a council to govern daily life at the center. The in-center training program was also successful in increasing attendance, reducing drop-out rates, and achieving an intensification of activities due to the proximity of attendees and the ease
with which they could participate after regular hours. The program also enabled staff to become more acquainted with participants, which in turn led to better-tailored activities. Finally, the camaraderie and lasting friendships that were formed had the beneficial effects of breaking down traditional allegiances and achieving positive group identifications, as traditional divisive identities were not reinforced.

**Strength and Relevance of Targeting Mechanisms**

Using the handing in of weapons as the main criterion for identifying beneficiaries proved problematic as there were few records of weapons sales. As a result, the project implementers relaxed this criterion and opened up the project to any youth considered to be at risk. This may have facilitated the project’s success in recruiting women who participated indirectly in the conflict.

**Efficacy and Efficiency in Attaining Grants’ Proposed Outputs and Outcomes**

The independent evaluation tried to quantify two types of reintegration: social and economic. In terms of the former, the survey findings and interviews with trainers, internship supervisors, and participants themselves showed a resounding success. The key players who interacted with the participants on a daily basis reported that the youth had developed a greater sense of respect, a good work ethic, and an appreciation for life in general.

With respect to economic integration, only 37 percent of ex-combatants – and only 25 percent of program participants – were gainfully employed after the training ended, and were therefore considered economically integrated. This was attributed to the inability of participants to access financing for the independent economic activities in which they were hoping to engage. The evaluators highlighted the failure to provide youth with credit – or at the very least, collateral which they could use to leverage some funds – as the major flaw of the project design.

**Quality of Monitoring and Evaluation Mechanisms**

The ongoing project monitoring mechanisms were apparently not clear, though the project did boast a very strong and critical independent evaluation (in French). No follow-up activities were factored into the project design.

The lessons learned were well presented and were widely disseminated (Kruse, 2004). Although successful project components were highlighted, it is not clear what evidence/indicators were used to support those claims.

**Potential of Grant to be Scaled Up and Advance Operational Practices**

The evaluation report indicated that the Anjouanese context facilitated many of the project successes. For instance, the small size of the island enabled the project to include all villages in the program activities – a condition that would be difficult to replicate when going to scale in larger countries. The size of the island also directly contributed to the project’s ability to maximize community participation, which might also be difficult in larger countries. Finally, the absence of a destabilizing force and the relatively bloodless nature of the conflict in Anjouan may render these lessons particular to the Anjouanese context.

Despite these positive factors, sustainability remains a major issue given the lack of capacity of ASCA (the civil service association), and uncertainty as to how CEFAE (the training center) will continue to finance the training programs. For example, ASCA’s three-year plan (2003-2006) for covering the costs of the CEFAE at the end of the project depended on government financing at 60 percent. However, when
the government was erratically making the payments to its own civil service, it is doubtful that it can assume the operating costs of this training center, situated outside of the national budget.

While it is not clear that alternative channels for program support were available (charging user fees would not have been an option, and other donors were scarce), two mitigating steps could have been taken: involving local staff to a greater extent, and extending the project life. The project evaluation underlined the fact that expatriate project staff were reluctant to delegate authority to local staff, were slow in incorporating local staff in project activities, and were late in hiring the new local project leader. Having local stakeholders who would be responsible for the project beyond the life of the grant would have helped to ensure the sustainability of project activities beyond the funding period. In addition, two years proved to be too short a time to establish a training center, build its reputation, and set up a separate institution responsible for management of the center.

**Level of Innovation in Given Programmatic Area**

The project’s most innovative component may have been the learning-by-doing activities surrounding peace education and human rights. Also, the manner in which individuals were accompanied along their path of designing their own small-scale income projects was a new experience for the citizens of Comoros.
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