99503 RUSSIAN FEDERATION AGING PROJECT FAMILY POLICIES IN RUSSIA: C OULD E FFORTS TO R AISE F ERTILITY R ATES S LOW P OPULATION A GING ? V ALERIY E LIZAROV AND V ICTORIA L EVIN *† September 12, 2015 *Corresponding author. Social Protection and Labor Global Practice, World Bank. Email: vlevin@worldbank.org. †This paper was prepared as a background note for the World Bank report “Searching for a New Silver Age in Russia: The Drivers and Impacts of Population Aging” under the guidance of Victoria Levin. We thank Emily Sinnott, Elena Besedina, Tami Aritomi, Andrea Atencio, and Irina Denisova for their contributions to this note. The team greatly benefited from comments by Ana Maria Muñoz Boudet, Joost de Laat, and Birgit Hansl. The team also thanks Michal Rutkowski, Ana Revenga, Alberto Rodriguez, Roberta Gatti, and Omar Arias for their guidance in the preparation of this paper. FAMILY POLICIES IN RUSSIA 1 Content Executive Summary ................................................................................................................................................................ 2 I. Introduction ..................................................................................................................................................................... 3 II. Fertility Trends in Contemporary Russia ............................................................................................................ 4 III. Explaining Low Fertility in Russia: Childlessness or One-child Families? ............................................. 6 IV. Determinants of the Decision to Have a Second Child.................................................................................. 10 V. Analysis of Current Pro-natalist Policies............................................................................................................ 15 VI. Is the Recent Increase in Birth Rates Likely to Continue? .......................................................................... 23 VII. More Effective Family Policies for Russia .......................................................................................................... 27 References ................................................................................................................................................................................ 30 Appendix. Descriptive Statistics ...................................................................................................................................... 33 FAMILY POLICIES IN RUSSIA 1 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Policymakers in many countries, including the Russian Federation, are attempting to encourage fertility as part of their response to the challenge of population aging. Whether pro-natalist policies will be effective depends crucially on how well they address the underlying causes of low fertility and barriers to larger family size. While in some countries in Western Europe postponing childbearing and increased childlessness seem to be driving the fertility decline, these factors do not appear to be as influential in Russia. Instead, the problem seems to be the relatively low frequency of second and higher-order births, which persists despite major changes to pro-natalist policies introduced in 2007 and the prevalence of the two-child ideal of family size. This study analyzes current and prospective fertility trends in contemporary Russia, with special attention to second-child birth dynamics and its determinants. Stable employment and accessibility of formal childcare options are found to be factors that are correlated with mothers’ preferences for additional children and the probability that they will have a second child. In light of this observation and international experience, a menu of policies to improve work-family balance is suggested. FAMILY POLICIES IN RUSSIA 2 I. INTRODUCTION Population aging is a global trend, and Russia is no exception. According to the World Economic Forum (2011), the share of people over 60 in the global population has risen from about 8 percent in 1950 to 11 percent and is expected to reach 22 percent by 2050. In Russia, this share had already reached 19 percent by 2013, up from 15 percent in 1989. A population is considered to be relatively old when the share over 65 is more than 8–10 percent (Kinsella and Velkoff 2001). In 2013, this share in Russia constituted about 13 percent of the total Russian population, a 35 percent increase from 9.6 percent in 1989. The share has been quite stable for the last decade, but Rosstat projects that it will reach about 19 percent by 2031. While population aging reflects in part a significant achievement in terms of increased longevity, it can cause problems for economic development and put a strain on social insurance systems. Longer life expectancy is a cause for celebration, especially after precipitous falls in this indicator during Russia’s transition period in the 1990s. Still, as discussed in the companion study on active aging (Levin 2015), population aging everywhere raises concerns about the sustainability of economic development as some societies experience both aging and shrinking working-age population, causing increased burdens on financial and healthcare systems. Many countries, Russia among them, still rely heavily on pay-as-you-go pension systems that use social security contributions of current workers to fund pensions for retirees. Deterioration of dependency ratios—the number of working people per pensioner—calls into question the fiscal sustainability of such systems. The statutory retirement age for old-age labor pensions in Russia is relatively low (60 for men and 55 for women), which makes the situation even more troubling. Policymakers in many countries, including Russia, use pro-natalist policies to stimulate fertility and thus slow the aging of the population. Two main factors can contribute to population aging: (1) a decrease in the number of children (lower fertility) and (2) an increase in the number of elderly (higher longevity). As life expectancy in Russia continues to rise, the pace of population aging will intensify and pro-natalist policies may become increasingly attractive. Many countries, like Russia, already have in place policy instruments to support childbearing. One of the most widely used measures is higher payments during maternity leave and an extended duration of the leave. Currently across Europe maternity leave ranges from 90 days in Iceland to 410 days in Bulgaria; some countries provide full compensation for the mother’s pre-maternity earnings while others (such as Ireland, the United Kingdom, and Slovakia) provide a share of such earnings or a flat-rate benefit.1 Other common policy measures are cash transfers (paid either one time at birth or regularly during parental leave), tax deductions, and housing allowances. The effectiveness of pro-natalist policies in stimulating fertility and in slowing population aging can be disputed. (1) There is a significant lag between when a child is born and when that child enters the labor force; thus, even if successful today’s pro-natalist policies will not have an effect 1Women, Business, and the Law database (http://wbl.worldbank.org/data/exploretopics/getting-a-job) and Multilinks database. FAMILY POLICIES IN RUSSIA 3 on economic output for at least two decades. Immigration policy can provide a more immediate payoff in terms of compensating for an aging workforce and thus improve the domestic demographic situation. However, immigration has its own challenges. It can only postpone the impacts of population aging because more and more immigrants would be needed to sustain economic growth. (2) There is no consensus in studies of family policies about whether family policies are effective in raising fertility. While some have shown that child-related cash transfers stimulate childbearing by reducing the associated costs (D’Addio and Mira d’Ercole 2005), others have demonstrated that birth-related payments do not seem to be effective at raising birth rates (Luci-Greulich and Thévenon 2013). Significant increases in parental leave, as in Austria in 1990, can stimulate fertility, but they can also have unintended consequences, such as drawing women out of the labor force for extended periods, or even indefinitely (Lalive and Zweimuller 2005). Rather than specific single measures, what seems to matter more for reproductive behavior is a combination of family-friendly policy measures, with the most promising directed to making motherhood and participation in the formal labor force more compatible (Kohler, Billari, and Ortega 2006). This study examines current pro-natalist policies in Russia and suggests policy options to help make them more effective. Since 2007, Russia has been among the countries with the most active family policies, aimed at raising the proportion of families with two and more children. The objective of this study is to analyze current and future constraints on fertility, assess current policy instruments in light of those constraints, and suggest options for making family policies more effective in achieving their goals. The study is structured as follows: Section II describes fertility trends in post-Soviet Russia. Section III provides possible explanations for the current low fertility rates, and Section IV uses a panel household survey (Russia Longitudinal Monitoring Survey [RLMS]) to examine factors that correlate with Russian mothers’ decisions to have a second child. Section V reviews the package of pro-natalist measures introduced in 2007. Section VI analyzes fertility projections, focusing on the extent to which current trends can be sustained, and Section VII concludes with policy recommendations stemming from the analysis. II. FERTILITY TRENDS IN CONTEMPORARY RUSSIA Though Russia’s population has been declining since 1992, the decline may now be over. Between 1992 and 2012, the population fell by about 5.2 million people. The nadir of births was reached in 1999, when 1.22 million children were born, and deaths peaked in 2003, when 2.37 million people died. According to the United Nations Population Division, the rate of Russia’s natural increase in population in 1990–2005 was among the lowest in the world—higher only than in Bulgaria, Latvia, and Ukraine. Unlike other countries in the region, migration to Russia, mainly from Central Asia, has been partly compensating for the precipitous natural decrease in population. In 2013, for the first time since 1991, Russia recorded a natural, though small, increase in its population (by 22,900 people). Population size and structure, as well as fertility rates, vary considerably from region to region in the Russian Federation. The North Caucasus, Tatarstan, and Yakutia have had sustained natural population growth; meanwhile, in some areas of Northwest Russia and the Central Federal FAMILY POLICIES IN RUSSIA 4 Okrug, the death rate exceeds the birth rate by more than 50 percent. In 2013, in half of Russia’s regions (40, including two capitals, which together account for 56 percent of Russia’s population) the number of births registered exceeded the number of deaths; in the other 40 regions, the opposite was the case. Such variability can be explained by cultural differences (larger families in regions with Muslim-majority populations); economic differences (the richest city, Moscow, saw its population increase); environmental differences; and differences in the level of regional support to families with children. Fertility patterns have been changing over time, and these dynamics reverberate in the age structure of today’s population. Russia has seen several waves of demographic transformation. The first significant drop in the number of newborns in the 1960s (see Figure 1) was caused by two factors: (1) the 1955 abolition of the abortion ban, which had been in place since 1936, and more importantly, (2) the “war echo”: there were smaller cohorts of women in the most reproductive age group (20–29 years) because fewer children were born during World War II. Total fertility rates also started to decline, falling from 2.5 in 1960 to about 2 by the end of the 1960s (Frejka and Zakharov 2012). Family support measures introduced in the early 1980s were associated with a rise in both number of births and total fertility rate, which reached 2.2 in 1987 (Frejka and Zakharov 2012). The social and economic hardship of the 1990s resulting from the collapse of the Soviet Union reversed the positive fertility trends of the 1980s. The breakup of the Soviet Union and subsequent major social and economic transformation in Russia, with poverty and inequality both rising, changed the demographic landscape one more time. All fertility indicators declined in the 1990s, with the total fertility rate bottoming out at 1.16 in 1999. Births declined by more than 60 percent, especially among mothers aged 25 or less. Another major phenomenon observed in the 1990s was the almost doubling of extramarital births and a decline in the number of abortions by about 80 percent due to greater availability of modern contraceptives. Figure 1. Births in Russia, 1946–2013 3.5 1990s: Soviet Union 3.0 collapse, major 1960s: War echo transformations 2.5 2.0 Millions 1.5 1955: End of abortion ban 1980s: Family 1.0 (in place since 1936) support program 0.5 2007: New policy 1998: Default measures introduced 0.0 1962 1982 1946 1948 1950 1952 1954 1956 1958 1960 1964 1966 1968 1970 1972 1974 1976 1978 1980 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 Source: Russian Statistics Committee data, www.gks.ru. FAMILY POLICIES IN RUSSIA 5 Starting in 2000, economic stabilization and recovery of some postponed births led to a rise in fertility. As the economic decline, hyperinflation, and instability of the 1990s faded into history, more and more women born in the mid-1960s or the 1970s who had reached their early 30s and late 20s could afford to become mothers for the first or second time.2 The fertility rate increased for all women aged 25 and older, with the largest increase among women over 30. As a result, the mean age at birth went up from 25.6 years in 1999 to 26.6 in 2006. Postponement of childbearing in Russia started with the mid-1960s cohort and continued thereafter (Frejka and Zakharov 2012). For example, while the cumulative cohort fertility rate (CCFR)3 for women born in 1964 who had children when they were 15–25 was 1.17 births, the CCFR for women born in 1982 who had children at 15– 25 was just 0.7. New government policies to encourage larger families took effect in 2007. Though there were more births, fertility rates were still below the replacement rate of 2. In 2006 the total fertility rate was 1.31—not much higher than its historic minimum of 1.16 in 1999. Low fertility coupled with high death rates led the number of Russians to fall, which attracted the attention of the federal government. The Duma ratified policies to support families with children at the end of 2006; their focus was on stimulating second and higher-order births, with child-related income transfers to mothers or other caregivers becoming differentiated by child’s birth order. The policies are discussed in detail below. Fertility has risen significantly since the family policy package was introduced. Five years after the new measures became operational, the number of births had risen from less than 1.5 million in 2006 to more than 1.9 million in 2012, and the total fertility rate went up by more than 30 percent, from 1.31 to 1.69. The largest increase was recorded in the first two years after the new family policy measures were introduced; in 2007 the rate was up by 8.5 percent and in 2008 by 6.1 percent. Women over 30 having the second or third child contributed most to rising fertility rates, suggesting that the policies achieved their objective. Today, however, as will be discussed later, the effect of the measures seems to be fading out. III. EXPLAINING LOW FERTILITY IN RUSSIA: CHILDLESSNESS OR ONE-CHILD FAMILIES? Many European countries experienced declining fertility rates in the final decades of the 20th century. Rates in traditionally high-fertility countries like Greece and Spain plunged, from levels above 2.2 in 1980 to barely 1.25 by 2002 (Kohler et al. 2006). Similar drops were observed in post- socialist countries like Poland and Romania and in former Soviet Union countries. Scandinavian countries, on the other hand, were able to improve their demographic situation and currently 2 There appears to be a significant correlation (about 0.59) between growth in births and growth in gross domestic product (GDP) between 1990 and 2013. 3 CCFR is defined as the average number of children per woman of a cohort of women who passed through their childbearing years; it is calculated by summing the age-specific fertility rate for each of the calendar years in which these women were of childbearing age. For example, the CCFR for women in the 1964 cohort when they were 15–25 years is calculated by summing the fertility rates for 15-year-olds in 1979, 16-year-olds in 1980, and so on, up to 25-year-olds in 1989. FAMILY POLICIES IN RUSSIA 6 constitute a high-fertility group with rates around replacement level (Figure 2). (See Box 1 for detailed discussion of the causes of low fertility in Europe). Figure 2. Parity Distribution and Achieved Fertility Rates, Selected Central and Eastern European Countries, 1965 or Latest Available Cohort of Women No child 1 child 2 children 3+ children cohort fertility rate 100 2.5 90 2.04 2.05 1.90 1.93 1.99 2.00 1.84 80 2.0 1.77 1.79 1.67 2.00 2.03 2.04 70 1.65 1.93 1.89 1.91 1.78 1.83 1.73 Fertility rate 60 1.65 1.5 Percent 1.51 50 40 1.0 24 30 24 37 27 17 29 28 25 17 12 18 18 25 32 22 18 13 13 20 18 16 15 0.5 19 10 0 0.0 Austria Romania Hungary* Denmark Australia* France Norway* Italy Poland Sweden* Russia Netherlands Bulgaria England & Wales* United States* Slovenia Slovak Republic Lithuania Greece* Portugal* Czech Republic Spain* Source: Frejka 2008 and Greulich, Thévenon, and Guergoat-Larivière 2014. Note: Cohort fertility rate refers to the number of children actually born per woman in a cohort of women by the end of their childbearing years. * Other than 1965 cohorts data: Australia (1962–1966); England and Wales, Sweden (1960); Greece, Portugal, and Spain (1963); Hungary (1964); Norway (1953); and United States (1953). While childlessness and delayed childbearing matter a great deal in European countries, they are not common in Russia. Whereas the share of childless women is high in countries like Italy, England, and Netherlands, the share in Russia is relatively low: according to the 2010 Census, only about 6 percent of women who completed their years of fertility had no biological children, down from 6.4 percent in the 2002 Census. Moreover, in Russia and other post-communist countries, the process of postponing childbearing started later than in Western Europe, and thus the average age at first birth is still lower than in many European countries. According to the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE), the average age at first birth in Russia was 24.6 in 2009 while in most Western European countries it exceeded 28. Childlessness and delayed childbearing do not seem to be fundamental causes of low fertility in Russia. FAMILY POLICIES IN RUSSIA 7 Box 1. Causes of Low Fertility in Europe While it is an important factor in some European countries, childlessness alone cannot explain falling fertility rates across Europe. Experts and policymakers concerned with the decline in fertility rates have been examining possible causes of the decline. Since reported fertility rates are averaged across all women of childbearing age (by period or by cohort), their decline can be explained by higher childlessness, fewer children per mother, or a combination of these factors. If the first explanation prevails, very low fertility should be associated with higher rates of childlessness. This is not the case for most countries; childlessness is found to be reasonably comparable among countries with different fertility rates and across time for the same country (Breton and Prioux 2009; Greulich et al. 2014). Even in very low-fertility countries “the biological, social and economic incentives for children are sufficiently strong that most women (or couples) desire to have at leas t one child” (Kohler et al. 2006). Delayed childbearing, fueled in part by uncertainty in young adulthood, is the most important force driving the fertility decline. Even though the share of childless women is high in some countries like Italy, the vast majority of women do decide to give birth. However, in countries with very low fertility, like Italy, it seems that the first (and often the only) child is born to mothers at an increasingly late age. Such delayed childbearing is generally attributed to (1) changes in attitudes toward family, the “second demographic transition”; (2) higher educational attainment of women; and (3) uncertainty among young adults about future prospects in terms of employment, housing, and other living conditions (Billari 2008). Smaller families are a distinguishing feature of low-fertility countries in Europe. Delayed childbearing is not a problem per se but it may prevent women from attaining the desired number of children, thus lowering fertility rates. If that is the case, countries where there is more postponement of childbearing would have families with fewer children and hence lower fertility rates. Indeed, countries where the mean age at first birth is higher than 28 (for example, Italy and Spain) have a relatively large proportion of families with at most two children. In general, countries with low fertility have lower shares of families with two or more children (Greulich et al. 2014). In Russia, the main factor contributing to low fertility is the high prevalence of one-child families. According to Frejka and Zakharov (2012), the main factor in the decline in fertility rates for women born in the 1960s and 1970s was the significant decrease in the number of second and subsequent births. By 2010, the share of larger families had declined: more than two-thirds of Russian families had only one child (67.5 percent of families, up from 50.8 percent in 2002); and two- child families represented just over 25 percent of families. When achieved fertility of the 1965 cohort is compared across countries, Russia has the highest share of one-child families (37 percent of all families) and its prevalence of multi-child families is the second-lowest (55 percent), above only Italy. As propensity for having a second and third child seems to distinguish low-fertility from high-fertility countries (Greulich et al. 2014), the low prevalence of multi-child families appears to be a driving force behind Russia’s low fertility rate. Yet for most Russians, the desired family size is two children; thus, policy can be directed to enabling Russian families to fulfill this aspiration. Even though many families have stopped at FAMILY POLICIES IN RUSSIA 8 one child, many Russians report wanting two. According to the survey conducted in 2012,4 only about 12 percent of women and men want to have a single child (Figure 3, panel A). Slightly more than half of women (51.7 percent) and 47.8 percent of men would like two children, provided conditions (housing, financial resources, and time) are adequate, and 24.9 percent of women and 23.3 percent of men want three children. However, when asked about the expected number of children, only 13.3 percent of women and 14.6 percent of men expect to end up with three; more than one-fifth (24.2 percent of women and 21.8 percent of men) think they will have only one child. The difference between the average number of children desired (2.29) and the average expected (1.92) defines the gap between actual and potential fertility in Russia (Figure 3, panel B). Compared to other countries, the gap between intended and realized children is relatively small, which leaves less scope for policy interventions to stimulate fertility (Figure 4). It also illustrates the point that, given the preferences of the majority of the population, striving to increase fertility beyond two children may be a difficult, if not impossible, task. Figure 3. Fertility Desires and Expectations of Russian Men and Women, 2012 A. Distribution of Desired and Expected B. Average Desired and Expected Number of Number of Children Children 100 2.4 90 Percent of respondents 80 31.6 16.3 18 2.3 32.5 70 Average # of children 60 2.2 50 50.3 47.9 40 51.7 47.8 2.1 30 20 2 24.2 21.8 10 12.3 12.5 0 1.9 Desired # of Expected # Desired # of Expected # children of children children of children 1.8 Women Men 1.7 Desired # of Expected # of 0 1 2 3+ difficult to say children children Source: Rosstat 2013. 4TheFederal Statistics Service conducted a Reproductive Assessment Survey in September–October 2012 (see Rosstat 2013. http://www.gks.ru/wps/wcm/connect/rosstat_main/rosstat/ru/statistics/population/demography. FAMILY POLICIES IN RUSSIA 9 Figure 4. Difference between Intended and Realized Number of Children, Women Aged 25– 39, 2006 Actual Intended 3.0 2.5 2.0 1.5 1.0 0.5 0.0 – Source: RLMS 2006 for Russia; Greulich et al. 2014 for the rest. Note: The intended number is calculated based on the following questions: “Do you want to have (another) child?” and “How many (more) children would you like to have?” (for Russia); “What wou ld be the ideal number of children you would like to have or would have liked to have?” (for other countries). IV. DETERMINANTS OF THE DECISION TO HAVE A SECOND CHILD Many factors may affect the propensity of a woman to have a second child. If more second-order births are necessary to increase fertility, it is important to understand what factors are associated with making that decision. These can be grouped into five categories: (1) Mother’s characteristics, such as age, labor market status, education, marital status, and the age of the first child. (2) Partner’s characteristics, in particular labor market status and earnings. (3) Household characteristics, such as monthly income, wealth, housing conditions (ownership, size, amenities), and presence of an informal childcare provider (such as a grandparent). (4) The social and economic environment, such as local unemployment rate, poverty level, etc. (5) Government policies that support families with children. Women face a trade-off between motherhood and work. Desire for a professional career or the need to contribute to the household income can raise the opportunity cost of children, especially where work and family are difficult to reconcile. A woman with one child has plenty of information about the time and costs involved in childcare and the extent of the motherhood penalty; hence, the FAMILY POLICIES IN RUSSIA 10 ability to combine work and family can have a significant effect on the desire and propensity to have a second child. Low fertility in some European countries is often linked to difficulties in reconciling work and family (Köppen 2006; Greulich et al. 2014). Whether such a tradeoff exists in Russia is analyzed below using household survey data; Box 2 gives details on the data and the methodology used in the analysis. Note that while this analysis can indicate significant associations between certain characteristics and behaviors, it cannot establish causal relationships. The desire to have a second child in Russia appears to be positively correlated with income and with having the first child in formal childcare. Based on bivariate associations, women who report wanting a second child are more likely to reside in richer households, particularly ones where the men earn higher wages compared to women who do not want a second child; on the other hand, women with second-child aspirations are less likely to be employed and, when they are, they earn lower wages than mothers of one child who do not report wanting additional children (Figure 5 and Appendix Table A.1). Also, highly-educated women and mothers of a boy are more likely to report wanting a second child. Interestingly, women with a first child who attends formal daycare are more likely to want a second child. Women who had a second child during the study period also differ from those who remained with one child. The same pattern of differences is observed between two groups of women of reproductive age (15–44 years)—those who had a second child between 2005 and 2012 and those who had only one child by the end of the period. Thus women who did not have a second child are more likely to currently be working full-time and have higher wages, although the propensity to work in stable employment, as defined by working in the same job for three years or more, is similar for the two groups (Figure 6 and Appendix Table A.2). Women who had the second child are more likely to have a partner and that partner earns more than partners of women who did not have a second child. Also, women who had a second child are more likely to have a boy first and to have the first child in formal daycare. The desire to have a second child is positively associated with use of childcare facilities for the first child. Having the first child in formal daycare (reported by 32 percent of the sample) 5 is associated with a 5.7 percent higher probability of wanting a second child. Married women and those whose first child is male are more likely to want a second child; women aged 30 and above and mothers with a school-age first child are less likely to want a second child (Figure 7, panel 1). As expected, availability of larger housing is positively associated with the desire to have a second child. 5 National coverage of childcare depends on children’s age (see Box 4). FAMILY POLICIES IN RUSSIA 11 Figure 5. Attributes of Women Wanting and Not Wanting a Second Child Want more children Do not want Woman currently working ** Woman in stable (3+ years) job *** Woman working full-time Woman's wage income *** Woman has advanced degree *** Partner present *** Partner currently working *** Partner's wage income *** Log housing size Total household expenditure *** First child is male *** First child attends (formal) childcare center *** Number of days first child attends (formal) childcare center *** % difference -150 -100 -50 0 50 100 Figure 6. Attributes of Women Who Had and Did Not Have a Second Child Had 2nd child Did not have Woman currently working * Woman in stable (3+ years) job Woman working full-time * Woman's wage income ** Woman has advanced degree Partner present *** Partner currently working *** Partner's wage income *** Log housing size *** Total household expenditure First child is male ** First child attends (formal) childcare center ** Number of days first child attends (formal) childcare center % difference -150 -100 -50 0 50 100 150 Note: The size of the bar is proportional to the difference in the given characteristic between the two groups, with women who do not want/did not have second child used for comparison. For example, 60 percent of mothers who do not want a second child have a partner, while 75 percent of mothers who want a second child are married or living with a partner, which implies a 25 percent difference in this characteristic between the two groups. Red bars indicate larger shares of women with these attributes among women who want/gave birth to a second child, while blue bars indicate larger shares among women who do not want/did not have a second child. The stars identify statistically-significant differences in means between the two groups: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. FAMILY POLICIES IN RUSSIA 12 Box 2. Empirical Analysis of Aspirations for and Arrival of a Second Child Data The analysis of intentions for and arrival of second children uses 2004–12 waves of the RLMS, which contain information on a representative sample of the Russian households. Since the intent is to analyze determinants of the desire and decision to have a second child, the sample was restricted to 3,292 women of reproductive age (15–44 years) who already had one child when they entered the sample. Since information on fertility aspirations is available only for the 2006–10 rounds, the initial sample for the analysis of desire to have a second child is 5,088 observations of 1,194 first-time mothers; in 45 percent of these observations, first-time mothers reported wanting a second child (59 percent of first-time mothers reporting wanting a second child in at least one of the waves). For analysis of decisions to have a second child, the panel aspect of the data was used to see if any of the first-time mothers had a second child by the next wave of the survey. The initial sample has 4,846 observations of 1,844 first-time mothers; 221 observations (4.5 percent of all observations, 12 percent of all first-time mothers) reported a second child at some point between 2005 and 2012. Notably, of first-time mothers who reported wanting a second child at any point between 2005 and 2012, only 11 percent realized this desire in the study period. The gap between intentions and realizations varies a lot across age groups, reaching its maximum for the 20–24 age group. Table B2.1. Gap between Intentions and Realizations 100 80 Percent 60 40 20 0 15-19 20-24 25-29 30-34 35-39 40-44 Age at entry in the sample Wanted a second child at any time in the 2006-2010 period Had a second child at any time in the 2004-2012 period Methodology The following probit model is estimated (with standard errors clustered by individual): = + + + + + + + where Y Binary variable (=1 if Yes):  Probability of desiring a second child  Probability of having second child by the next survey wave X Characteristics of the mother (age, education, labor market status) and her first-born child (age and gender). Following Greulich et al. (2014) and Adserà (2011), a proxy of ‘stable employment’ is included, which is defined as working at the same job for the last 3 years. Z Characteristics of the partner, including presence, education, and labor market status. H Housing characteristics: Given the findings of Brainerd (2007) and Chirkova (2013) on the potential importance of housing for fertility in Russia, log housing living space is included along with log of real household expenditures. W Family policy variables: The number of days the first-born child attends formal childcare facility is included. The model also includes round and region fixed effects ( Roundt and Regionj) as well as a stochastic idiosyncratic shock (ui). Notably, the results reflect correlations and not necessarily causation. FAMILY POLICIES IN RUSSIA 13 Propensity to have a second child is positively associated with the stability of women’s work. Following Greulich et al. (2014), who found that women with stable jobs are more likely to have a second child, the results for Russia confirm that, controlling for other factors, stable employment is associated with a significantly higher probability of having a second child (Figure 7, panel 2). The predicted probability of having a second child for stably-employed mothers is 1.68 percentage points higher than for first-time mothers not in stable employment (4.92 percent versus 3.24 percent). Larger housing space, higher household expenditures, and having a first child aged 3 years and above are all correlated with a higher likelihood of having a second child; having a newborn first child and being 35–39 years old is associated with a lower probability of having a second child. As with Chirkova (2013), a strong daughter preference is found for the second child: women whose first child is male are more likely to have a second child. In terms of fertility aspirations, better-educated mothers and those whose first children attend formal daycare more often are more likely to want a second child. The full estimation results are presented in Table A.3 in the Appendix. Figure 7: Fertility Aspirations and Realizations and Sociodemographic Characteristics Propensity to want a second child Propensity to have a second child Stable employment ​ * Mother info Years of education *** ​ Mother's age (base: 25-29) 15-19 ​ ​ 20-24 ​ ​ 30-34 * ​ 35-39 *** *** 40-44 *** ​ first Age of first child 0 years old ​ *** (base: 1-2) 3-6 years old ​ ** 7 or more years old ​ * child Sex of Male ** ** Married ​ ​ Partner info Partner's years of education ​ ​ Partner currently working ​ ​ Child Household Housing size *** ** info Real household expenditure (in log) ** * Number of days first child is in formal childcare care * ​ arrangement -0.5 -0.4 -0.3 -0.2 -0.1 0 0.1 0.2 -0.05 0 0.05 0.1 Note: The length of the bar represents the estimated marginal effect in the probit regression. The stars signify statistical significance of the relationship: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. FAMILY POLICIES IN RUSSIA 14 V. ANALYSIS OF CURRENT PRO-NATALIST POLICIES International evidence on the effectiveness of family policy measures is mixed. Confronted by an aging population, many national governments have implemented a wide range of pro-natalist policies. The majority of European countries have introduced various forms of support for families with children, including financial transfers, measures to balance work and motherhood, and legislation protecting women and children. Studies of different countries find mixed evidence on the extent to which such a policy can be effective in increasing birth rates and which policies are best suited to removing constraints to higher fertility in a given context (Gauthier 2007). The emerging evidence suggests that while childcare coverage and family-friendly workplace arrangements are conducive to births, the length of maternity leave does not seem to have an effect on the probability of having a second child (McDonald 2006; Greulich et al. 2014). While financial transfers are most popular with policymakers responding to low fertility, the effects on birth rates are often short-lived. Pro-natalist policy measures differ in the scope and timing of their effect. The first lever used by policymakers aiming to raise fertility is often child- related financial support, such as child allowances or birth-related transfers. If they are generous enough, such measures can have immediate effects on fertility; however, since these policies often affect only the timing of births, not their number, the increases in fertility fade out several years later (Gauthier 2007). The evolution of pro-natalist policies then usually progresses to more complex policy packages designed to improve the work-life balance, such as increased childcare coverage. For example, in 1972 Japan introduced child allowances for the third and fourth children, which did nothing to halt the decline in Japanese fertility (Ma 2010). Financial support was then extended to families with a second child (1986) and a first child (1992), again with almost no effect. Since the mid-1990s, the Japanese government has moved toward policies that increase coverage of daycare and family centers and promote greater involvement of fathers in child-rearing, which may have reversed the increasing trend toward childlessness among younger Japanese women. Similar evolution from a tight focus on financial support to multifaceted policy packages has been observed in countries as diverse as Sweden, countries in Central and Eastern Europe, and South Korea. Are Russia’s government policies helping to boost second-order births? The existence of the fertility gap between the desired and the realized number of children suggests that policies may help Russian families fulfill their family size aspirations. Given the importance of stimulating second births for raising fertility in Russia and in view of the findings on predictors of wanting and having a second child, are current pro-natalist policies likely to achieve their aims? The demographic crisis became a concern for Russia’s policymakers by 2006. A major change in demographic policies and measures to support families with children was announced in the Presidential Address to the Federal Assembly on May 10, 2006. The demographic crisis was called “the most acute problem of contemporary Russia” that required “effective support programs for mothers, children, and families.” President Putin named several reasons that discouraged young families from having a second or third child: low income, lack of adequate housing, doubts about the FAMILY POLICIES IN RUSSIA 15 ability to provide the child with decent health care and education, and sometimes doubts about having enough resources to feed the child. From the start, the emphasis was placed squarely on increasing the second-order birth rate. The 2006 address proposed specific measures to support young families and women and to stimulate second-order births: (1) increasing the amount of the childcare benefit (paid for up to 18 months after birth); (2) introducing subsidies for preschool education; (3) increasing the face value of maternity certificates;6 and (4) introducing maternal or family capital for the second child (see Box 3). The package of pro-natalist measures passed in 2006 and implemented in 2007 put Russia on the road to a more active demographic policy. In addition to the president’s proposals, measures designed to create better conditions for families to give birth and bring up children, maintaining and improving their health, were enacted in 2006. The law extended monthly child benefits to non- working women (previously, they were available only to working women on maternity leave), with payments differentiated by birth order (1,500 RUB a month for the first child, 3,000 RUB for the second and each subsequent child). Kindergarten subsidies were also differentiated by birth order: while the federal budget covered 20 percent of the preschool fee for the first child, the subsidy increased to 50 percent for the second and 70 percent for the third and subsequent children (Appendix Table A.4 summarizes policy measures, including their generosity relative to the minimum subsistence level for children). In 2008, ad hoc indexation of family support measures was replaced by an inflation indexation mechanism for social benefits and payments. Child-related tax deductions also became differentiated according to child birth order. Standard income tax deductions for children in the form of exemption from tax on the parents' taxable income depending on the number of dependent children were in effect before the major measures were introduced. The deductions were gradually increased from 300 RUB per child per month before 2005 to 1,000 RUB starting in January 2009. In 2012, the deduction became differentiated by birth order: 1,400 RUB for the first and second child and 3,000 RUB for the third and each subsequent child. The deduction is only valid until the month in which cumulative annual income reaches a certain cap. From 2005 to 2009, the maximum income was raised from 20,000 to 40,000 RUB. Starting in 2009, the maximum income was raised to RUB 280,000 (about US$7,800 at the current exchange rate). 6 Maternity certificates, financed by the federal budget and introduced in 2006, provide additional incentives for the public health care system to deliver quality medical care both to women during pregnancy and childbirth and to infants during the first year of life. The initial value of the certificates was 7,000 RUB (2,000 for pregnancy and 5,000 for childbirth). In 2007, the nominal value of the certificate was increased to 10,000 RUB (3,000 for pregnancy, 6,000 rubles for childbirth, and 1,000 rubles for infant care). FAMILY POLICIES IN RUSSIA 16 Box 3. Maternity (Family) Capital Maternity (family) capital is administered in the form of a certificate issued upon birth or adoption of a second or subsequent child. Who is eligible?  Woman, citizen of the Russian Federation, who gave birth or adopted a second or subsequent child after January 1, 2007  Man, citizen of the Russian Federation, sole adopter of the second or subsequent child after January 1, 2007  Father/adoptive parent of the second or subsequent child, regardless of nationality, upon termination of the right to state support for the woman, who gave birth to or adopted this child, as a result of termination of parental rights, crimes against children, and so on  Minor (as well as an individual up to age 23 enrolled in university full-time)/Children entitled to shares if a certificate cannot be obtained by parents/adoptive parents (due to their death or termination of parental rights/guardianship, etc.) How much is it? Maternity capital is by far the most generous family support measure in Russia, starting in 2007 with 250,000 RUB (over US$9,500). Over time, the amount was continuously raised, more than compensating for inflation. By 2014, maternity capital reached 429,400 RUB (over US$12,000 or equivalent to almost 5 years of the minimum monthly living cost for children, as defined by the government of Russia). 500 429.4 25.0 387.6 409.0 400 343.4 365.7 20.0 312.2 250.0 276.3 thousands USD 300 15.0 thousands RUB 200 10.0 100 Dollar equivalent 5.0 0 0.0 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 What can it be used for? (1) Housing improvement: buy housing, pay off mortgage loan, or build a new house (2) Children’s education: preschool, secondary school, tertiary institutions, and postgraduate course fees and room and board (3) Mother’s future funded pension In 2009, as a crisis measure, the government allowed families to use a portion of their maternity capital (12,000 RUB) for immediate needs; this measure ended in May 2011. When can it be used? Three years after the child is born or adopted; although in 2009, a provision was added to allow maternity capital to be used for mortgage payments before the child’s third birthday . The amount of the maternity capital is determined as of the year of certificate redemption. The program is in place until December 31, 2016. On average, 700,000 thousand certificates are issued every year. As of the beginning of 2013, 37.4 percent of certificate holders used the funds either partially or fully, and only around 24 percent used it in full. In the vast majority of cases (96.3 percent) the maternity capital was used to improve housing conditions. Source: Materials produced by the Pension Fund of the Russian Federation, www.pfrf.ru. FAMILY POLICIES IN RUSSIA 17 Regional family support policies complement federal programs. All regions now offer additional support measures for families with children, but their scale and coverage vary significantly. For example, regional maternity capital ranges from as low as 25,000 RUB in the Nizhny Novgorod region to 350,000 RUB in Yamal-Nenets Autonomous District. Other forms of monetary support are available to young families, such as lump-sum payment at the child’s birth (often differentiated by birth order) and childcare benefits for children not attending daycare. Many regions also have programs to help young parents acquire their own homes by paying off some part of the mortgage. In 2012, the federal government advised regions to introduce monthly benefits for families that give birth to a third and subsequent child until the child reaches the age of 3. The generosity of regional family support programs usually depends on the regional budget rather than the severity of the demographic crisis. However, in 2013, 50 regions with unfavorable demographic characteristics and total fertility rates below the Russian average received up to 90 percent cofinancing from the federal budget; the cofinancing is to be reduced to 50 percent by 2018. Although motherhood-work balance issues are covered in normative documents on supporting Russian families, there have been few real achievements. The empirical analysis for this study has demonstrated that formal childcare and stable employment of women are positively correlated with wanting and having second children. Moreover, flexible work arrangements and childcare availability have been found to be more important than cash transfers and maternity leave length for stimulating second births in European Union (EU) countries (Greulich et al. 2014; Box 4). In Russia, many normative documents (such as the Concept of Demographic Policy of Russian Federation up to 2025) incorporate the aim of supporting women in reconciling work and family responsibilities. Federal policies to create favorable work-family balance have experienced varying degrees of success: 1) Extension of childcare benefits to fathers. The 1996 Decree on the Main Directions of State Family Policy extended fathers’ rights to workplace benefits related to childcare. Fathers are also entitled to maternal (family) capital if the mother is not available due to death, illness, or revocation of maternal rights. 2) Working conditions and protection of working mothers. The Russian laws protect the employment rights of pregnant women and women with young children, but these laws are rarely enforced, and courts often dismiss claims of unfair treatment (World Bank 2014). 3) Economic incentives for employers to hire those who have large families. These measures are intended to motivate employers to give working mothers flexible schedules, part-time employment, or opportunities to work from home. 4) Training opportunities for mothers returning to work. Professional training and skills are offered free to women who have been inactive due to childbirth and childcare. In 2012–13, about 23,000 took advantage of these opportunities. 5) Better access to preschool facilities. Although there is extensive queuing for spaces in public kindergartens, in Russia private preschools are few: only 2 percent of children in childcare were in nongovernmental facilities (Volosovets 2014). 6) Other out-of-school facilities for children. The extensive system of extracurricular activities for children that existed in the Soviet Union, such as summer camps and clubs, was to a large extent destroyed in the 1990s. FAMILY POLICIES IN RUSSIA 18 Generous maternity leave policies keep young mothers out of the labor force for extended periods. Women’s participation in the labor force, which in many countries went up during the 20th century, is an important factor in fertility decisions. Russia had inherited from the Soviet Union high rates of female labor force participation; since 1990 about 60 percent of working-age women have been in the labor force (World Bank, World Development Indicators [WDI]). However, employment of mothers with children aged 3 or under is lower in Russia today than it was in the Soviet Union. While the transition from planned to market economy can explain some of the decrease, more generous maternity and childcare leave is also partly responsible. Childcare leave was substantially increased in the early 1980s and currently extends to the child’s third birthday, with the first 18 months paid (at 100 percent of salary for the first 20 weeks and 40 percent thereafter), and job retention guaranteed for the next 18 months. In other countries, such as France, the duration of leave is shorter but the mother’s salary is covered for the whole period. Cross-country studies have demonstrated that the length of maternity leave does not seem to be correlated with the probability of having a second child (McDonald 2006; Greulich et al. 2014). However, Greulich et al. (2014) show that a long maternity leave can attenuate the positive correlation between stable employment for the mother and the probability of a second child. Long waiting lists in public preschools make it harder for mothers to return to work earlier. Another reason why the Soviet Union might have been able to sustain high fertility rates alongside high female labor force participation is more state-provided childcare. In 1990 more than 65 percent of children aged 1–6 attended preschools, but in the 1990s many preschools were closed and either leased or sold to private owners or converted into government offices (for, e.g., the local tax administration). This meant that by 2003 this indicator had decreased to 57 percent because of a lack of childcare spaces. The number of children awaiting spaces in available preschools soon went up more than sixfold: from 193,000 in 1999 to 1,238,000 in 2006 (Pailhé and Sinyavskaya 2010). According to the most recent Rosstat statistics, from January 2013 almost 2.5 million children were on waiting lists for state-run kindergarten.7 Moreover, there is evidence that the quality of services in preschool institutions has declined since Soviet times (Savitskaya 2004). The unavailability of quality options for childcare provides a partial explanation for high agreement with the statement, “A preschool child is likely to suffer if his/her mother works” in Russia; the Generations and Gender Survey, conducted in 2004, demonstrated that almost three-quarters of Russians (71.7 percent) agreed or strongly agreed with this statement, second only to Georgia and much higher than in Western European countries like France, where less than half of the respondents agreed with it. Care obligations figure prominently in the ability of Russian women to combine family and career. There is considerable pressure in Russia for women to put their families first. According to the 2008 European Social Survey, about 66 percent of women and almost 70 percent of men agreed or strongly agreed with the statement: “Women should be prepared to cut down on paid work for the sake of family” (Figure 8a). This is a much higher share than in EU-15/EFTA (European Free Trade Area) or ECA (Europe and Central Asia) countries in the study: in the former only a third of respondents agreed and in the latter just over half did. Given shortages of accessible childcare options, many employed Russian women—between a quarter and a third, depending on the age 7 http://www.gks.ru/free_doc/new_site/population/obraz/d-obr1.htm. FAMILY POLICIES IN RUSSIA 19 group—work less than they would prefer due to family care obligations—a much higher share than in the EU-15/EFTA countries and higher than the ECA average for women over 35 (see Figure 8b). Indeed, the high share of older women expecting to leave employment for care-related reasons supports the findings of a study of grandparental childcare across Europe, which based on the Generations and Gender Survey found that among all the countries studied, Russian grandparents are most likely to provide childcare (Buber-Ennser 2014). Figure 8. Care Obligation Norms in Russia a) Agreement with the statement: “Women b) Reported likelihood of spending less time should be prepared to cut down on paid work in paid work for care-related reasons for the sake of family” 80 35 Percent of employed women who are likely or very likely Percent of respondents who agree / strongly agree 70 30 to spend less time in paid work 60 25 50 20 40 15 30 10 20 5 10 0 20-34 years old35-49 years old50-64 years old 0 Male Female Russian Federation ECA average Russian Federation ECA average EU-15, EFTA average EU-15, EFTA average Source: Data from the European Social Survey (2008). In Russia, many women return to work because they need to earn money to provide for their children. Nevertheless, for the majority of Russians, work-related or career-related issues (no work, excessive work load, desire to achieve success in their work, and difficulties in combining work and housework) do not seem to be critical to the decision of whether to have another child. In a 2012 Rosstat opinion poll, the most important factors preventing respondents from having another child were financial difficulties (75.4 percent) and uncertainty about the future (71.3 percent). Asked about specific policy measures, women assigned more importance to financial support measures than to measures for improving the motherhood-work balance. This reveals a more general attitude: in assessing the importance of personal goals in life, women assigned a rather low 3.5 (on a 1–5 scale) to “career.” This might be explained by gender inequalities in the workplace, manifested in significant pay gaps between men and women and reduced opportunities for women to climb the career ladder, especially women with children; this is known as the “motherhood penalty”). FAMILY POLICIES IN RUSSIA 20 Box 4. Motherhood-work Balance: Russia and France European countries with very low fertility are characterized by low compatibility between work and family —in other words, by high opportunity costs for childbearing (Billari 2008). France is often cited as an example of a country where women can reconcile motherhood and work. In comparing Russia and France on this dimension, Pailhé and Sinyavskaya (2010) found that French women enjoy a more flexible labor market. For example, part-time employment is much more common in France, where 30 percent of working women have part-time jobs, than in Russia, where the figure is only 8 percent (Table B4.1). Fully employed French women, on average, also work fewer hours than Russian women—35 hours versus 41. However, part-time work by itself cannot explain differences in fertility rates; for instance, part-time employment in Germany is much higher than in France but the German fertility rate (1.36) is far lower than the French (2.03). Greater gender parity in France in terms of pay (that is, a smaller pay gap) may also help to explain the fertility rate difference; Russian women may feel disempowered and uncertain about being able to provide for future children on their own. The main difference between the two countries is the labor market participation of women with young children: while, in Russia only 25 percent of women whose youngest child is not yet 3 are employed, in France, 57 percent of such women work. The difference is even more pronounced for women with children younger than 18 months. Relatedly, coverage of formal childcare in Russia is more than 25 percent less than in France (and below Germany for ages 3–5 years). The availability of childcare can be the binding constraint on the labor force participation of Russian mothers, and may also figure prominently in the intention to have a second child. Table B4.1. Working Conditions for Women in Russia, France, and Germany Russia France Germany Total fertility rate 1.69 2.03 1.36 * Female employment rate (age 20–64 years) 72.3 65 71.5 Part-time as % of total employment (women aged 20 –64)* 8 30 45 Full-time as % of total employment (women aged 20–64)* 85.5 70 55 § Usual average number of weekly hours for all employees 37 34.6 30.5 (female, aged 20–64 years)** Employment impact of parenthood (percentage point 10 -5 -18 difference between employment rate of women and men aged 20–49—without and with a child) Children cared for by formal arrangements, full- and part time (% of the population of each age group and by weekly time spent in care) Ages 0–2 for Europe, 1–3 for Russia 32.5 45 25 Ages 3–6 for Europe, 3–5 for Russia 71.8 97 90 Gender pay gap for paid employees (difference between 26 14.7 22.2 men's and women's average gross hourly earnings as percentage of men's average gross hourly earnings) Gender gap in pension (%), pensioners aged over 65 12 39 44 £ Women at risk of poverty or social exclusion (percentage 24 17 22 of total population, 55 years or over) Sources: For Russia: Country Gender Profile (World Bank 2014); Rosstat; Volosovets (2014). For France and Germany: Greulich et al. (2014). Note: * Given lower retirement age in Russia, the age group is 20–54 years; ** 20–59 years age group. § Estimates of income-based relative poverty (below 60 percent of the median income) using the RLMS 2009 data and methodology from Denisova (2012). FAMILY POLICIES IN RUSSIA 21 Russia’s pro-natalist policy package is not sufficiently comprehensive to achieve its objectives of financial support for young children. Russia’s family policies have focused on financial assistance for families with children up to 18 months old) and on securing mothers’ jobs through a generous maternity leave mandate (Figure 9). Unlike France, which supports mothers’ return to the labor force through a well-developed network of state-run childcare centers, tax breaks for nannies, and unpaid parental leave that can be taken by fathers, in Russia many mothers of 18-month-olds have to remain on unpaid maternity leave after joining a long queue for a space in a public kindergarten. By focusing on cash transfers and incentivizing mothers to stay at home to take care of their children, Russia risks following Germany, which struggles with a very low fertility rate despite a heavy investment in lump-sum grants and tax incentives for married couples (Greulich et al. 2014). On the other hand, Nordic countries have directed their family policies to supporting working parents of small children through expansion of childcare facilities and reliance on short but generously paid parental leave, including quotas to encourage fathers to share childcare duties (Thévenon 2011). These countries have seen a resurgence of fertility since the mid-1980s (Ronsen 2004). Figure 9. Russia’s Family Policies by Type and Child’s Age FAMILY POLICIES IN RUSSIA 22 VI. IS THE RECENT INCREASE IN BIRTH RATES LIKELY TO CONTINUE? Four major factors are driving future birth rates in Russia. The increase in births in the early 2000s was mainly due to the favorable age structure, which was a result of high fertility rates in the mid-1980s. In addition, major social and economic transformation in the 1990s changed family- related norms and attitudes, including the timing of having children. Currently, demographers expect the number of births to again start declining after 2015 (Figure 10). Figure 10. Russian Women in Peak Reproductive Ages, by Age Group 20 18 16 14 12 20-34 Million women 10 20-29 8 25-29 6 20-24 4 30-34 2 0 Source: Demographic Forecast through 2030: http://www.gks.ru/wps/wcm/connect/rosstat_main/rosstat/ru/statistics/population/demography/#. The first factor expected to bring down Russian birth rates is the imminent decrease in the number of women of peak reproductive age. As already noted, one reason for the recent increase in the number of births was that the large 1980s female cohort was entering the peak reproductive years of 20–29. This age group, which is characterized by a high birth rate (90–110 births per 1,000 women), accounted for 61–62 percent of all births in 2010–12.8 The number of women in this age group peaked in 2009–10 at 12.1 million and has already begun to fall (Figure 10). By 2020 this group will be down to 7.5 million, and by 2025 it will have been almost halved from the 2010 level. This factor has already been contributing to a gradual decline in the number of births annually since 2011. Within the 20–29 age group, those aged 25–29 have the highest birth rates (more than 100 births per 1,000 women per year). This age group peaked at 6.23 million in 2013 and is projected to drop to 3.4 million by 2027, 9 which will substantially reduce the number of births in the intervening period. While in 2009–12 mothers aged 20–29 had more than 1.1 million births per year, 8 Rosstat (2013), The Demographic Yearbook of Russia, Table 4.1. 9 Demographic forecast through 2030, http://www.gks.ru/free_doc/new_site/population/demo/progn3.htm. FAMILY POLICIES IN RUSSIA 23 at current levels of age-specific fertility rates, by 2023 this number will fall by about 0.5 million. This decline will not be compensated for by women aged 30–34, even though the birth rate for that group has increased recently, because their number will also start declining after 2018. The dynamics of marriage frequency aggravate the influence of age structure on future births. The number of marriages for brides aged 18–24 peaked at 643,000 in 2007 and by 2012 had declined by almost a quarter, to 496,000. Moreover, according to Rosstat, since 2012 the number of marriages of women aged 25–34 has also begun to decline. Even though the share of extramarital births had increased from 13 percent in 1988 to 28 percent in 2000 in the 2000s, it stabilized and by 2013 it too had decreased, to 23.8 percent. Given the impending age structure dynamics and trends in extramarital births, fewer marriages signal a coming reduction in the number of first births per year and eventually second births. To preserve the current level of births, a substantial increase in age- specific fertility rates must be achieved. The second factor driving declining birth projections is the end of the fertility transformation. Between 2008 and 2012, the age group with the highest birth rates shifted from 20–24 to 25–29, and the gap in birth rates between the age groups is growing. The maximum age-specific fertility rate has shifted from ages 22–23 to 25, and it is expected to shift further to 26–27 (though no further). In rural areas, women aged 20–24 still have the highest birth rate, but even there, the gap with the second- highest group (25–29) has narrowed dramatically, from 78 percent in 1990 to 21 percent in 2012. There has been little recovery of births postponed during the 1990s transition. The evidence clearly demonstrates the women’s attitudes toward family have changed, and particularly toward postponement of childbearing. According to Frejka and Zakharov (2012), postponement began in the 1960s female cohort who entered the most reproductive age in the late 1980s and early 1990s, when Russia was undergoing major social and economic transformation. The combination of economic hardship, increased information, and access to contraceptives altered women’s attitudes toward family and children. While the fertility rate has been growing since hitting bottom in 1992, only 20 percent of postponed births have been recovered (Frejka and Zakharov 2012). The third factor that suggests a decline in future birth rates is the expected fading of the impact of the new pro-natalist policies. The beginning of the 21st century was characterized by an increase in age-specific birth rates among women older than 25 due to increases in second and higher-order births. The growth in the fertility rate of women above 30 significantly exceeded the growth rate for those aged 25–29. Growth in the fertility rates of older women continued in 2007–2012, probably influenced by the pro-natalist measures introduced in 2007. With older women more likely to have second or higher-order births, the share of second births rose from 30 percent in 2007 to 36.6 percent in 2012 and of third and higher-order births from 7.6 percent in 2007 to 10.8 percent in 2012. Yet, although fertility rates surged immediately after the new measures were introduced in 2007, the year-on-year growth rate has gradually slipped, confirming a fadeout of the new policies (Figure 11). FAMILY POLICIES IN RUSSIA 24 Figure 11. Annual Changes in Age-specific Fertility Rates, Year-on-year Percentage 30 25 20 Percent 15 10 5 0 -5 -10 Below 20 20-24 25-29 30-34 35-39 40-44 Source: Russian Demographics Yearly data. The new policy measures seem to have had only modest influence on families’ decisions to have a child; they have primarily affected the timing of already-planned births. According to the 2013 survey on reproductive intentions, of people who had children after the 2006 pro-natalist measures took effect, the majority (57 percent) did not believe those measures had a decisive influence on either their decision to have a child or the timing of it. For those who thought that the measures did have an effect, almost 75 percent thought the measures brought forward the timing of postponed births. Only about 6 percent felt that the measures motivated them to have a child they could not otherwise afford. At the same time, the distribution of the answers differed by child birth order. The degree of the perceived effect of the policy measures clearly increases with birth order: while only 9 percent of the respondents who gave birth to the first child after 2006 reported that government support affected the timing of the child’s birth, the percentage more than doubles for births of the second and third child (Figure 12). Still, the effect on timing always dominates that of motivation for new births. FAMILY POLICIES IN RUSSIA 25 Figure 12. Pro-natalist Policies and Russian Families’ Decision to Have a Child (By birth order, percent of respondents with children born after 2006) 16.2 HELPED to decide on earlier 9 Total postponed child birth 22.1 27.3 1st child 2nd child 6.4 HELPED to decide on child birth 2.9 3rd child not otherwise affordable 9 11.9 56.9 did NOT help 66.6 48.4 46.2 20.4 Difficult to say 21.4 20.5 14.6 0.0 20.0 40.0 60.0 80.0 Percent of respondents with children born after 2006 Source: Rosstat 2013. The fourth factor that may affect future birth rate dynamics is the completion of fertility by the 1980s cohort, most of whom come from families with two or more children. Having grown up in multi-child families may have affected the fertility intentions of the 1980s cohort, making them more responsive to the pro-natalist incentives. According to the 2010 census, of women who were in their peak reproductive years in the 1980s (the 50–64-year-old mothers of the 1980s birth cohort), 61–67 percent had two or more children (Figure 13). Introduction of the new pro-natalist measures in 2007 coincided with the 1980s cohort reaching peak reproductive age. Women born in 1982–87 (a period characterized by high fertility and a high proportion of second- and third-order births) celebrated their 25th birthday (the age of maximum fertility) in 2007–12, just as the new pro-natalist policy measures took effect. Although a fifth of the women in this cohort have already given birth to more than one child (Figure 13), it is unlikely that the share of women with two and more will exceed 60 percent. The fertility rate for subsequent cohorts is expected to be even lower given the smaller share of multi-child families in the turbulent times of the late 1980s and early 1990s. FAMILY POLICIES IN RUSSIA 26 Figure 13. Women by Age and Number of Children, Percent of Total in Age Group, and Average Number of Children per 1,000 Women, 2010 Census 100 2,000 90 16.5 1,800 80 30.3 1,600 # of children per 1000 70 36.9 women 1,400 34.4 40.6 46.7 60 1,200 # children 45.0 49.6 48.8 47.5 Percent 50 1,000 44.1 40 800 31.2 30 41.1 600 38.7 20 32.1 30.1 400 27.3 27.3 10 200 0 0 Age group No child 1 child 2 children 3 children 4+ children Source: Official statistics of 2010 Census, Т.10.Fertility. Table 1. http://www.gks.ru/free_doc/new_site/perepis2010/croc/perepis_itogi1612.htm. VII. MORE EFFECTIVE FAMILY POLICIES FOR RUSSIA Although pro-natalist policies cannot reverse the population aging trend, they can create a supportive environment for people to start and expand their families. The structural factors that account for the current Russian age structure are likely to continue shaping future fertility dynamics. Policy measures currently in place to stimulate births are likely to have only marginal and short-lived effects, mostly bringing forward the timing of intended births rather than generating new births; they are unlikely to have a long-term impact on fertility. Still, there is scope for public policy to create an environment in which families can achieve their fertility intentions without sacrificing their living standards or exacerbating their vulnerability to idiosyncratic or systemic shocks. Given the fertility intentions of most Russians, policies that focus on the decision to have a second child might be most effective. According to the 2012 survey of reproductive health, about half of women with one child wanted to have another, though only 15 percent of women with two children wanted a third. These preferences suggest that spending public resources on the promotion FAMILY POLICIES IN RUSSIA 27 of large families (those with three and more children) may not be effective. Instead, prioritizing support and encouragement of second-order births can raise fertility rates without requiring a major change in reproductive norms. The greatest impact on fertility can be achieved with a comprehensive approach directed to enabling families to attain their desired family size without exposing themselves to immediate or future economic vulnerability. Experience of other countries suggests that more effective policies aim not only to increase the fertility rate but also to ensure that high fertility rates are maintained; therefore “a broad based comprehensive long-term approach is needed” (Frejka and Zakharov 2012, emphasis in the original text). Financial transfers would most effectively support the living standards of low-income families with children by reducing their vulnerability. For other families, fertility can perhaps be best stimulated by measures that promote greater gender equity within families and in workplaces and help improve women’s ability to balance work and motherhood (Billari 2008). Such policies might include parental leave for fathers to encourage their involvement in childcare, and reduction of the gender pay gap by enhancing women’s work-related skills, removing legal and normative obstacles to women entering occupations traditionally reserved for men, introducing quotas to help women break through the glass ceiling, and sponsoring public awareness campaigns to reduce gender stereotypes (World Bank 2014). Moreover, given the positive association between GDP growth and growth in births observed in recent decades, policies that ensure macroeconomic stability can provide Russians with favorable conditions to start and expand their families. Supporting stable employment for both mothers and fathers is important for encouraging fertility. The most efficient role for benefits and other forms of financial support for families with children is as a safety net that protects families with children from the potentially catastrophic effects of income shocks. Also, policies to improve labor market conditions for young parents or potential parents can reduce uncertainty and instability, which are anathema to transforming fertility intentions into reality. High unemployment rates seem to contribute to postponement and ultimately to a reduction in second-order births (Adserà 2011). Providing opportunities for skills updating and retraining can improve the employability and earnings of both parents, not only relaxing the immediate financial constraint on having additional children but also reducing the family’s future vulnerability to shocks. Child-related income tax deductions can also be an effective instrument for both encouraging mothers’ return to the workforce and enhancing family disposable income. Tax exemptions have had a positive impact in the United States (Georgellis and Wall 1992), Canada (Zhang, Quan, and van Meerbergen1994), and Taiwan (Huang 2002). To make these deductions more effective in stimulating fertility and female labor force participation, their coverage can be expanded by switching from the current ceilings on individual salary to a higher household-level threshold, which would make more households eligible to take advantage of the policy. Moreover, awareness of the policy could be raised through information campaigns, and tax preparation assistance could be provided to families with two or more children. Finally, optimization of the length of maternity leave can be considered; excessively long leave can have negative repercussions on mothers’ return to the labor market due to human capital depreciation. FAMILY POLICIES IN RUSSIA 28 Besides being important for investment in the human capital of future generations, increased availability and affordability of quality childcare would also make it easier for women to combine motherhood and work. There is robust evidence that greater access to childcare can have a positive effect on the probability of first and higher-order births—see, for example, Baizán 2009 for Spain; Del Boca et al. 2003 for Denmark, Italy, Netherlands, and Spain; and Bauernschuster et al. 2013 for Germany. The last study found that a 10 percent increase in German public childcare coverage by itself was associated with a 3.2 percent rise in the fertility rate. Long waiting lists for public kindergartens in Russia and lack of private options for childcare create major obstacles for the return of mothers with young children to work. Better utilization of demographic projections by regional governments would allow for more appropriate planning of kindergarten facilities, such as construction of new spaces or expansion of existing facilities. Innovative approaches to building design and use and regulatory reform can both support the creation of more efficient multi-use facilities that could also enable the preschool system to adapt to future demographic fluctuations. Increased support of alternative forms of early childhood development (ECD) centers, such as home- based groups under the care of a trained parent and affiliated with an ECD, and part-day education- only groups in existing ECD centers and primary schools can relieve the excess demand for quality childcare and enable mothers to return to work without sacrificing their children’s development. A concrete measure that can support the livelihood of young parents and improve utilization of pro-natalist policies is to relax the constraints on how maternity (family) capital is spent. Some Russian regions are experimenting with expanding eligible spending for regional maternity (family) capital to housing maintenance, payment of gas connection fees, purchase of a country house plot, acquisition of durables, or even unrestricted lump-sum payments. These regional initiatives can be evaluated in considering whether to expand eligible spending categories for the federal benefit, which could make the program more effective in protecting Russian families in difficult times. Examples of worthwhile eligible spending are coverage of fees for treatment of children in medical emergencies and payment of premiums for voluntary medical insurance for children, as well as expenses for the cost of work-related education (training, retraining, or advanced training) for young parents. The effectiveness of any planned future family policies can best be enhanced by the availability of supporting data, rigorous demographic research, and timely monitoring and evaluation. No policy can be designed well without timely and high-quality data. Currently, many important statistics—such as distribution of newborns by birth order, number of children in divorced families, and data on parents who marry and separate—are not collected. Promotion and utilization of demographic research and monitoring of the effectiveness of current family policies can generate valuable policy design lessons. The planned 2015 nationally representative household survey is expected to provide such information. Finally, a deeper awareness and appreciation of the current demographic situation at all levels of government can promote better policy design and more effective implementation. 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Rosstat. 2013. “Analytical Report on the Results of a Survey on Population’s Reproductive Intentions.” Available at http://www.gks.ru/ wps/wcm/connect/rosstat_main/rosstat/ru/statistics/population/demography. Rosstat. 2013. “The Demographic Yearbook of Russia.” Available at http://www.gks.ru/bgd/regl/B13_16/Main.htm. Savitskaya, Y. 2004. “Nekotorye Itogi Issledovaniya Sistemy Detskogo Doshkolnogo Obrazovaniya (Some Conclusions based on the Study of the Preschool Education System).” Statistika i Sotsiologiya Obrazovaniya (Statistics and Sociology of Education) 4: 261–77. Thévenon, O. 2011. “Family Policies in OECD Countries: A Comparative Analysis.” Population and Development Review 37 (1): 57–87. Volosovets, T. 2014. “Prerequisites for a Key Transition from Kindergarten to Primary School.” Presentation, 7th World Bank ECA Education Conference, Bucharest, Romania, April 7–8. World Bank. 2014. Russian Federation: Country Gender Profile. Report No: 58819-RU. World Economic Forum. 2011. Global Population Ageing: Peril or Promise, edited by John R. Beard, Simon Biggs, David E. Bloom, Linda P. Fried, Paul Hogan, Alexandre Kalache, and S. Jay Olshansky. Geneva Zhang, J., J. Quan, and P. van Meerbergen. 1994. “The Effect of Tax-Transfer Policies on Fertility in Canada, 1921-88.” Journal of Human Resources 29 (1): 181–201. FAMILY POLICIES IN RUSSIA 32 APPENDIX. DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS Table A.1 Mothers Aged 15–44, One-child Families, by Intentions for Additional Children Does not want Wants second second child child Sig. diff? Stability in the Labor Market Currently working 0.815 0.757 ** Currently working in stable job (more than 3 years) 0.626 0.515 *** Working full-Time 0.609 0.593 (Log) Wage income (last 30 days) 6.598 5.878 *** Education Attainment No schooling to general schooling 1-9 0.067 0.065 Incomplete secondary 0.036 0.025 Secondary diploma 0.123 0.106 Post-secondary incomplete VET 0.192 0.164 VET diploma 0.298 0.237 ** Higher education or advanced 0.284 0.402 Partner Information Partner present 0.598 0.749 *** Married partner 0.579 0.736 *** Partner currently working 0.512 0.664 *** Partner working full-time 0.458 0.613 *** Partner (log) wage income (last 30 days) 4.864 6.151 *** Household Well-being (Log of) Housing size 3.473 3.452 (Log of) Total household expenditure 9.270 9.600 *** Age 15-19 0.013 0.021 * 20-24 0.073 0.189 *** 25-29 0.135 0.316 *** 30-34 0.179 0.274 *** 35-39 0.303 0.157 *** 40-44 0.298 0.043 *** Age of First Child 0 years old 0.042 0.089 *** 1-2 years old 0.079 0.197 *** 3-6 years old 0.145 0.304 *** 7 or more years old 0.735 0.409 *** First Child Sex: Male 0.453 0.543 *** Child care arrangement for first child Non-parental outside house (relatives and centers) 0.171 0.377 *** Relative living outside house 0.092 0.242 *** Child care center or formal center 0.108 0.229 *** Number of days in child care center or formal center 1.124 1.466 *** Source: Russia Longitudinal Monitoring Survey (RLMS), 2004-2012 waves. Notes: The following question to analyze the desire for a second child: “Do you want to have (one more) baby?” Differences in group means: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. FAMILY POLICIES IN RUSSIA 33 Table A.2: Mothers Aged 15–44, One-child Families, By Fertility Realizations in the Next Wave No 2nd Child 2nd Child Sig. diff? Stability in the labor market Currently working 0.800 0.716 * Currently working in stable job (more than 3 years) 0.582 0.540 Working full-Time 0.601 0.502 * (Log) Wage income (last 30 days) 6.132 5.196 ** Education Attainment No schooling to ceneral schooling 1-9 0.059 0.094 Incomplete secondary 0.031 0.037 Secondary diploma 0.110 0.109 Post-secondary incomplete VET 0.196 0.250 ** VET diploma 0.283 0.204 ** Higher education or advanced 0.322 0.306 Partner Information Partner present 0.656 0.820 *** Married partner 0.648 0.802 *** Partner currently working 0.570 0.687 *** Partner working full-Time 0.512 0.588 * Partner (log) wage income (last 30 days) 5.247 6.320 *** Household Well-being (Log of) Housing size 3.453 3.575 *** (Log of) Total household expenditure 9.250 9.254 Age 15-19 0.016 0.025 20-24 0.118 0.152 25-29 0.222 0.346 *** 30-34 0.231 0.318 * 35-39 0.232 0.093 *** 40-44 0.181 0.065 *** Age of First Child 0 years old 0.059 0.039 1-2 years old 0.126 0.131 3-6 years old 0.202 0.329 *** 7 or more years old 0.614 0.501 *** First Child Sex: Male 0.489 0.600 ** Child Care Arrangement for First Child Non-parental outside house (relatives and centers) 0.263 0.294 Relative living outside house 0.160 0.157 Child care center or formal center 0.150 0.229 ** Number of days in child care center or formal center 1.252 1.309 Source: Russia Longitudinal Monitoring Survey (RLMS), 2004-2012 waves. Notes: Differences in group means: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. FAMILY POLICIES IN RUSSIA 34 Table A.3: Correlates of the Propensity to Want/to Have a Second Child Propensity to want a second Propensity to have a second child child Mother information Stable employment -0.046 0.011* (0.032) (0.007) Years of education 0.018*** 0.001 (0.007) (0.001) Age groups (ref. group: 25-29) 15-19 -0.110 0.089 (0.176) (0.110) 20-24 0.004 -0.006 (0.047) (0.009) 30-34 -0.065* 0.004 (0.038) (0.009) 35-39 -0.186*** -0.025*** (0.051) (0.007) 40-44 -0.400*** -0.003 (0.057) (0.017) Age of first child (ref. group: 1-2 years old) 0 years old -0.059 -0.026*** (0.060) (0.006) 3-6 years old -0.020 0.034** (0.046) (0.014) 7 or more years old -0.052 0.026* (0.052) (0.014) Sex of first child (ref group: female) First child is male 0.080** 0.016** (0.034) -0.007 Partner Information Married 0.032 0.013 (0.064) (0.014) Partner's years of education 0.009 0.002 (0.006) (0.001) Partner currently working -0.012 -0.006 (0.064) (0.013) Household Information Housing size 0.103*** 0.019** (0.039) (0.008) Real household expenditure (in log) 0.052** 0.009* (0.022) (0.005) Child care Number of days first child is in formal child care arrangement 0.014* -0.001 (0.007) (0.002) Rounds fixed effects Yes Settlement type fixed effects Yes Regions fixed effects Yes Pseudo R2 0.146 0.144 N 1,706 1,810 FAMILY POLICIES IN RUSSIA 35 Table A.4: Pro-natalist Policy Measures in Place after January 1, 2007 Amount (rubles) Time at Minimum Change Type of payment/benefit Monthly Living from 2007 Cost for Children to 2014 2007 2011 2012 2013 2014 2014 Maternity allowance (100% Monthly ceiling Monthly Monthly Monthly Monthly Monthly ceiling ≈280% of average earnings for the ceiling ceiling ceiling ceiling two years preceding the year 16,125 6 months of leave but not exceeding the 34,564.38 36,563.29 40,602.74 44,975.34 specified ceiling) Lump-sum payment at birth 8,000 11,703.13 12,405.32 13,087.61 13,741.99 1.8 months ≈72% Lump-sum payment to women 300 438.87 465.20 490.79 515.33 2 days ≈72% who registered with the medical institution early in pregnancy (before 12 weeks) Monthly childcare benefits to mothers (or other caregivers) until the child reaches age of eighteen months Non-working mothers 1,500 2,194.34 2,326.00 2,453.93 2,576.63 11 days ≈72% with first child Non-working mothers 3,000 4,388.67 4,651.99 4,907.85 5,153.24 3 weeks ≈72% with second or subsequent child Working mothers (40 % of Maximum Maximum Maximum Maximum Maximum Maximum ≈300% salary before maternity 6,000 13,825.75 14,625.32 16,241.10 17,990.14 2.4 months leave , but not less than the benefit to non-working and not more than the maximum) Maternity (family) capital 250,000 365,698.4 387,640.3 408,960.5 429,408.5 4.8 years ≈72% Maternity certificate 10,000 11,000 11,000 11,000 11,000 1.5 months 10% (3+6+0.5+0.5) (3+6+1+1) (3+6+1+1) (3+6+1+1) (3+6+1+1) Indexation 6.5% 6.0% 5.5% 5.0% Maximum possible income 463,000 512,000 568,000 612,000 from which the average earnings (for the preceding two years) are calculated Monthly minimum living cost 3,679 6,157 6,259 7,022 7,452ii ≈203% for children (under 15)i Exchange rate, rubles/USD, 25.6 29.4 31.1 31.9 35.2iv ≈38% annual average iii FAMILY POLICIES IN RUSSIA 36