WPS8422


Policy Research Working Paper                    8422




                          One More Time
      What Are Institutions and How Do They Change?

                                 Roumeen Islam




Europe and Central Asia Region
April 2018
Policy Research Working Paper 8422


  Abstract
 This paper defines institutions, presents their basic char-                        It discusses forces for institutional change influencing all
 acteristics, and discusses forces for institutional change. It                     economies, ranging from external shocks (whether they
 draws on a wealth of research and study by scholars in                             be economic or weather-related shocks or driven by wars)
 different fields and follows from the flagship 2002 World                          to internal dynamics, such as those following population
 Development Report on this topic, including relevant                               growth or compositional changes, and those following tech-
 new research since then that illuminates key issues. The                           nological innovations. Many of these forces have a two-way
 definition of institutions includes rules and organizations                        relationship with institutions: they are affected by them
 (specifically rules guiding peoples’ actions). The paper                           and, in turn, influence whether and when they change. A
 emphasizes the diversity of institutions that can effectively                      special section is devoted to institutional transplants and
 perform similar functions, the arguments for and against                           their effectiveness. The paper concludes with a discussion
 standardization of institutions across specific transactions or                    of whether and under what conditions institutional change
 groups, and the implications of these choices. It highlights                       can be externally directed and the lessons for aid donors.
 the relationship between informal and formal institutions.



  This paper is a product of the Europe and Central Asia Region. It is part of a larger effort by the World Bank to provide
  open access to its research and make a contribution to development policy discussions around the world. Policy Research
  Working Papers are also posted on the Web at http://www.worldbank.org/research. The author may be contacted at
  rislam@worldbank.org.




         The Policy Research Working Paper Series disseminates the findings of work in progress to encourage the exchange of ideas about development
         issues. An objective of the series is to get the findings out quickly, even if the presentations are less than fully polished. The papers carry the
         names of the authors and should be cited accordingly. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely those
         of the authors. They do not necessarily represent the views of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/World Bank and
         its affiliated organizations, or those of the Executive Directors of the World Bank or the governments they represent.


                                                       Produced by the Research Support Team
              One More Time: What Are Institutions and How Do They Change? 


                                        Roumeen Islam 




JEL classification codes: H10, H13, O30, O43 


Keywords: Institutions, governance, aid effectiveness, public policy 
                                       Part 1. The Black Box of Institutions  


                             What they are (redux!) and why markets need them 


         In 2002, the World Bank published its flagship publication, the World Development Report, with 

the title “Building Institutions for Markets”, a report drawing on decades of research by scholars from 

the economics, legal, history and political science professions, and the experience and knowledge of 

practitioners around the world. It also assimilated the vast experience of the Bank in supporting 

institutional development over several decades. This paper, on institutions in economic development, 

draws on the principal messages of the WDR and representative pieces of related research that 

followed, to highlight some important lessons for donors supporting development. 


Defining Institutions 


         What are they? Institutions are the rules and enforcement mechanisms that govern1 economic, 

social and political interactions. Organizations or networks are a special type of institution: they have a 

set of rules guiding the interaction of the group and group members with each other and non‐group 

members. While much of this note refers to institutions broadly, the focus is on markets where people 

buy and sell things and the institutions that influence transactions in markets.2 




1
  Here “govern” reflects the dictionary definitions of (1) to exercise a directing or restraining influence over; (2) 
guide; (3) control or hold in check. The Oxford Dictionary definition: to control, influence or regulate a person, 
action or course of events. 
2
  In a later paper, (Hodgson, 2006) also draws together the views of scholars (North, Weingast, Greif, Hayek, 
Veblen, Williamson, and others) to provide a unified perspective. Not all scholars have treated organizations in 
their definition of institutions, viewing them as only “actors”. Hodgson explains differences among the views. By 
treating organizations in the category of institutions, some may argue that nations should be seen as large 
organizations and thus institutions too, as are supranational organizations, such as the WTO. While, this may be 
true, this note will not deal with the nation state as an organization, but rather, its constituent institutions. 



                                                                                                                         2 
              What forms do they come in? Rules governing market interactions come in various forms whose 

specificities are in turn influenced by economic, social and political factors (I will refer to the latter two 

categories as value systems). Sometimes they are “formal” (codified, laws, regulations, decrees, written 

and enforced by a public legal authority), or “informal”, such as societal norm‐based rules, religious and 

traditional codes of conduct that govern interactions (see passage from Chapter 9 in WDR 2002 

reproduced in Box 1 below).3,4 


Box 1: Informal institutions5 
Individuals, when deciding to comply with a contractual obligation or legal requirement, have three 
reasons to do so. First, because of an individual or “internalized”norm, such as honesty, which may be 
founded in a shared belief system, such as a religion or in a sense of obligation to one’s peers. Second, 
because deviant action will not be socially tolerated by others and this lack of acceptance will result in 
some form of social sanction. Third, because of an economic sanction associated with the deviation, 
such as a fine, imprisonment, or denial of future business, often with added social stigma attached to 
the economic punishment. 
 
Formal institutions focus on the third incentive and thus, can be ineffective if this economic sanction is 
weak. Norm‐based institutions can supplement or supplant laws and formal rules. They may substitute 
for formal institutions where the latter do not exist or are not accessible or where they fail to facilitate 
business transactions. In these cases, informal institutions allow those sharing norms or culture to 
behave predictably, lowering the risks in a transaction (chapter 1). Corrupt environments, for example, 
are often the result of ineffective formal institutions that coexist with weak social deterrence, 
sometimes called a “culture of corruption”(chapter 5).5 In such situations incentives for corruption rise 
as peers also become corrupt, leading to a vicious cycle of socially undesirable behavior. For 
geographically isolated and poor market participants, formal institutions are not easily accessible. These 
groups are more likely to use informal mechanisms to improve information flows and enforce 
contractual arrangements. For much of the world’s poor, informal institutions play a primary role in 
making business easier.But informal mechanisms are used not only by those in poorer environments. 
Social networks grounded in class, caste, tribe, and neighborhoods—as well as school background and 
membership in clubs—can be as important for cementing deals in corporate towers as in rural markets. 
In these markets informal institutions tend to complement formal ones. 


                                                            
3
  A standard or pattern, especially of social behavior, that is typical or expected (Oxford Dictionary).  It is also 
defined as an Informal guideline about what is considered normal (what is correct or incorrect) social behavior in a 
particular group or social unit. Norms form the basis of collective expectations that members of a community have 
from each other, and play a key part in social control and social order by exerting a pressure on the individual to 
conform. In short, "The way we do things around here." (BusinessDictionary. Com) 
4
  Some institutions fall in‐between: private clubs may have written rules of engagement, yet not be 
subject to public enforcement. These are considered to be informal. 
5
     Chapter 9, Norms and Networks: WDR 2002; pgs 171‐172. 
 


                                                                                                                    3 
 
        Formal institutions are needed as markets become complex‐ and partly replace informal ones. 

Peoples’ actions are governed simultaneously by formal and informal institutions. The more complex 

that transactions become, the more separated in time and space, and the greater the share of 

transactions between counterparts that are not known to each other through social or business 

networks, the higher will be the relative importance of formal institutions with third party enforcement 

mechanisms (see Box 2). For example, competitive, small scale, village markets where you buy daily 

provisions with cash have little need for formal rules to regulate behavior. Problems encountered with 

this simple transaction (e.g. poor quality or use of counterfeit money, for example) are generally dealt 

with through informal codes of conduct. However, engaging a financial institution or advisor to support 

your retirement accounts, or exporting goods to a country where the firm cannot use its connections to 

gain customers, will require more formal rules to facilitate transactions. An example of how formal 

institutions may replace informal ones is when court enforcement of contracts is preferred towards the 

use of arbitration through community leaders. It is easier to hold a firm to account through a court than 

through a community enforcement mechanism when the transaction relationship is “arms‐length” that 

is, outside the community. The WDR 2002 provides many examples of how increasing complexity in 

transactions (as described above) raises the demand for more formal institutions to complement or 

substitute for more informal ones. 


        Formal and informal institutions also work together. Examples of formal and informal 

institutions complementing each other are many. For example, (i) when formal laws and regulations 

regulate property transfer, but, in cases of conflict, adjudicated decision rules favor one party over 

another due to social expectations as determined by religious or traditional practices; (ii) when public 

services, such as electricity connections are only delivered once informal systems of payment (a system 

of baksheesh or bribes) are added to the regulated formal system or when connections are prioritized 




                                                                                                            4 
 
according to societal rules or social hierarchy, not according to the officially regulated ordering of 

services. 


Box 2. Enforcement mechanisms 
Rules are supported by different enforcement mechanisms. Examples are police, jail, courts, 
reputational sanctions, and various community/ group sanctions. The first three elements of 
enforcement mechanisms may be categorized as “formal”. There may be private sector formulated 
formal mechanisms as well, such as rules governing membership or acceptable behavior in a private 
club.6  Formal enforcement mechanisms work properly when informal rules (e.g. social norms) are 
consistent with the formal rules.  For example, bank loans may not be repaid by borrowers that have the 
ability to pay. Even if creditors go to court, they may not succeed in getting repaid or in confiscating the 
collateral they are owed because courts will not adjudicate according to the law’s intent; for example, if 
the creditor is rich and the debtor is poor, and social codes of conduct favor more equity than the 
current legal system provides for, judges will not want to move against their community.  

              From beginning to end, several institutions govern any single transaction. The discussion above 

described how formal and informal rules work together. In each economic transaction, multiple (formal 

and informal) rules interact.  For example, in buying a house, rules governing property sale or resale, 

rules for title recording, realtor’s licensing requirements, banking rules governing lending and financial 

disclosure, social norms governing personal indebtedness (e.g. religious rules on paying and receiving 

interest), and laws of inheritance, rules regarding taxation of mortgage interest or property, among 

other things, are relevant.  Simply changing a single law may not affect outcomes as intended. It is the 

system of institutions governing each transaction that matters for how a transaction is done, if it is done 

at all, and who may benefit or lose from the transaction. For example, if a bankruptcy law is established, 

yet accounting regulations do not exist, or accounting rules vary from firm to firm, it will be hard to 

designate a firm as “bankrupt” in a consistent manner.7 


What are the main functions of institutions (what do they do)? 




                                                            
6
     However, these would be nested in the country’s legal system. 
7
     The WDR 2002 includes various examples of institutions in different market transactions.  

                                                                                                                 5 
 
              Following the institutional economics literature, institutions are needed to reduce the 

transactions costs of participating in markets.8 They do this by performing three important functions: (a) 

regulating information asymmetries (who knows what); (b) defining property rights; property rights is 

used in a broad sense here. It means the “right” to use or own assets, rights to income, (or other gains 

from a transaction) or the right to take an action that will constrain another’s gain from a transaction. In 

this sense, if the law allows the factory owner to pollute a river, it gives him a property right from which 

he gains, but constrains the value of the water to those who fish in or otherwise use the river; (c) 

determining the degree of competition (or its converse‐cooperation) in any activity. An institution may 

simultaneously do more than one function. For example, by directing information flows, they can affect 

the degree of competition.9 A corollary of the above, is that these rules provide structure to societal 

interactions, for example, by influencing peoples’ incentives and ability to behave a certain way. 


Information Asymmetries 


              Whenever a party to a transaction knows something relevant to the transaction that another 

party does not, there is an information asymmetry. For example, when you take out a loan, you have the 

most information on your assets and your willingness to repay the loan. The bank or moneylender uses 

the information at his/her disposal (credit registries and bureaus, your income level, title to your assets 

etc.,) to make an informed decision about your creditworthiness and whether to lend. There is 

asymmetric information in this transaction. At the same time, when you deposit your savings in the 

bank, you do not know whether the bank is truly safe or likely to fail. When you buy stock in a company, 

you do not have all the information on the company’s financial health. You make an informed 

judgement based on available information. Institutions determine how much information is available to 

each party: accounting standards, regulations on auditing, publication of accounts, credit bureaus and 

                                                            
8
     As distinct from actual production costs. 
9
     Thus, it is not always possible to categorize institutions according to a particular function. 

                                                                                                            6 
 
registries, property ownership registration requirements, the bank’s reputation, news media, and so on. 

When you buy an airplane ticket, you do not know how safe the airplane is to fly or what rights you have 

if the airline cancels your ticket. The government has regulations requiring airlines to provide this 

information. When one purchases a toy, clothing or food, the seller knows what are the constituent 

elements and the quality of the good or service. Today, government regulations and consumer 

preferences expressed in buying trends, govern the degree of information provided. News producing 

and distributing institutions are very important in this regard (WB 2002, WB 2008). Freedom of 

information laws govern the information asymmetry existing between people and the public sector. By 

influencing the stock and flow of information available to people, institutions influence interactions. 

Clearly, economic outcomes are affected as institutions are used to restrict or to enhance information 

flows.  


Property Rights 


              Laws, regulations and customs of all kinds determine who has what “ownership” rights in 

markets. Some common examples might be the right or title to a piece of land, or a car, the right to 

pollute a river, the rights of workers versus equity holders in a company,10 the right to build commercial 

property on a piece of land, or the government’s right to your property through taxation or direct 

appropriation. Without formal and informal rules that determine the limits of individual 

ownership/rights to gain from a particular economic transaction, there could be no community as each 

would aim to maximize his/her own self‐interest.11  Government’s main role is to capture resources 



                                                            
10
    For example, from each market transaction, shareholders earn profit, but workers have a right to the firm’s 
income stream, an amount that is determined partly by government legislation and partly by the firm’s internal 
rules and regulations and contracts it makes with employees (minimum wages/ overtime pay, severance pay, 
pensions, insurance, expenses to ensure safety equipment). For the worker, these rules determined their rights to 
the income earned using their labor. 
11
    Note that even when self‐interest dictates cooperation, unless there are rules to guide cooperation, it becomes 
moot. 

                                                                                                                   7 
 
from individuals/businesses in order to use/redistribute them for the benefit of the economy and 

society. Thus, rules delineating government responsibilities and rights over resources and the 

mechanisms by which it enforces or conducts these responsibilities (such as taxes and customs duties) 

fall in this category.12 


Degrees of Competition (and therefore, its flip‐side, cooperation) 


              Institutions also define the degree of competition in markets. For example, predatory pricing, 

capture of market share and mergers and acquisitions that give firms monopoly power in markets are 

actions governed by institutions. Institutions may granting a company monopoly rights to explore 

national oil resources, or may require competition. Collusion among firms (or people or public officials in 

their professional capacity) is also regulated.  Banks face rules against collusion in setting lending rates.13 

Use of common property is regulated by various rules as is evident from anyone visiting public parks, 

rivers or the oceans so that communities can collectively benefit from a resource, rather than engaging 

in potentially destructive (and in the long run, self‐defeating) competition aimed at maximizing own gain 

relative to others’. Rules may be designed to either prevent or facilitate competition. 


What do good institutions look like? 


              Each set of institutions, has specific functions with the design varying from community to 

community, though their ultimate objectives and functions may be similar. The specific design or form of 

the institution that is effective in a given place depends upon societal preferences (historical and 

current), and political and economic conditions. Accepting that one size does not fit all, means that 

there is no “best practice”, and the form an institution takes matters only to the extent that it is 

effective in achieving the intended function. As soon as entities from different groups (communities, 

                                                            
12
    By extension, the organization of government is necessary to play this role (independent agencies, decentralized 
public sector, are institutions).  
13
    To take a political example, election rules may be designed to effectively limit competition for votes. 

                                                                                                                   8 
 
states, countries) engage in transactions there is a question about whose institutions (or which mix of 

institutions) are relevant for the transaction. Sometimes, altogether new institutions are created for 

specific types of interactions. For example, there are international arbitration courts or the Basel 

financial standards.  In order to simplify transacting, some argue for standardization in institutional 

design. All other things equal, it is easier to do business in a country if its legal system and customs are 

similar to one’s own. Proponents may argue for a “standard” institutional design to be followed 

everywhere. Increasing cross border flows of finance and knowledge have called for rule standardization 

in various areas, for example in the design or strength of Intellectual Property Regimes.  Trade 

agreements of various kinds aim to standardize at‐the‐border as well as behind‐the‐border rules on 

goods and services production and processes. Another area where calls for regulatory standardization 

have increased is in cross‐border banking regulations; clearly applying the same financial regulation may 

produce better regulation in many cases or for certain kinds of transactions. However, countries differ in 

their capacities to supervise, in the nature of their financial systems, in the risks they are exposed to and 

other factors that will support more diversity in regulation.  


              Standardization can carry benefits in transactions between groups, but it is not necessary to 

standardize in order to promote market transactions, or a group’s welfare.14 As discussed above, 

institutions that are “best practice” for one context, may not be so in others and the acceptable 

standardized solution, may be “best” for no party.15 In addition, other barriers may be far more 

important than institutional standardization in promoting efficient transactions. For example, labor 

mobility may be hindered by language, education, growth in output, or housing scarcity rather than 

labor market institutions.  


                                                            
14
  Islam and Reshef (2006) discuss institutional standardization in the context of international trade transactions.  
15
  This is not to say that standardization may not lower transactions costs even further if all else (capacity, 
endowments, etc.) were equal, but there may be significant costs associated with standardization in a dynamic 
context. Usually, lack of standardization is not the binding obstacle to market growth in most countries. 

                                                                                                                        9 
 
         Countries have advanced to the technological frontier with institutional diversity within them‐ 

as witnessed by the experience of the USA with its constituent states. The institutional differences of the 

states within the federal union reflect their varied histories and endowments (rural, agricultural America 

versus high‐tech America for example). This diversity has been critical in ensuring federal stability and 

economic growth and prosperity for decades. For example, the US unemployment support program 

today allows for substantial differences in state rules and eligibility requirements (Kirkegaard and Posen, 

2018). Other countries, such as China and India, to pick two large ones, may similarly thrive with 

institutional diversity. The EU countries have a common goal of economic prosperity and stability, yet 

France, Germany, the UK and Poland (for example) all have different legal frameworks and cultures.  


         Today, regulation of the digital industry is under discussion. The Beneficial Artificial Intelligence 

conference held in January 2017 proposed 23 principles on which to base AI development and AI 

regulation. One of the principal reasons why it has been difficult for countries to agree on what type of 

international regulation of AI is appropriate is the existence of multiple value systems and institutional 

histories. Just to take the US and the EU as examples, their views on how information obtained through 

the internet/social media should be regulated, and rules on genetic modification and testing among 

other things, differ substantially, yet both parties are aware that institutions governing the use of new 

technology are needed.16  


         Then, can rules adopted from other contexts work in a given country? Generally, to be effective, 

their design or form will need to be modified because one size does not fit all. Direct transplants can 

often fail.17 Changes in legal structure that are adopted with a view to modernizing economies need to 


                                                            
16
    Uber is facing much more stringent regulations in Europe than it faces in the USA today. 
17
   Rodrik (2008) contends that the World Bank and other similar institutions are misguided in being heavily biased 
towards a notion of best‐practice in institutional design. Andrews et al (2017) pick up on the WDR 2002’s message 
on not conflating form and function when considering institutional effectiveness as many forms can do similar 
functions. 

                                                                                                                10 
 
complement existing conditions in a country. For example, the Federal Trade Commission’s Antitrust 

Division uses a complex regulatory interface and rules to determine anti‐competitive behavior. This 

institutional framework may not be the best‐ suited to enhance competition in a small, open, developing 

country with limited government capacity, less sophisticated economic structure, lower literacy, higher 

initial mis‐governance (including corruption), different societal rules and political histories, or 

widespread poverty. As another example, an excessive emphasis on written procedures in courts and 

requiring representation by fully trained lawyers will limit access to justice in poor countries.  Since one 

size does not fit all, institutions doing similar things look different across groups, will look different, or 

have different forms.  


        In conclusion, as long as institutions perform their functions well, the objectives and the rules are 

known to all parties and predictably enforced, diversity in form is consistent with market development 

and growth, and even desirable. Even when rules are standardized, for example to facilitate trade, there 

will be a constant push for change and innovation because countries develop at different rates and from 

different initial conditions. Forcing all groups to adopt the same rules may hinder institutional innovation 

in a dynamic context; how will better ways to regulate an activity be found if there is no change or 

experimentation with which to compare the status quo? To some extent, there will always be some 

tension between the two forces of standardization and innovation. The WDR 2002 provides an in‐depth 

discussion of these issues. 


Policies and Institutions 


        Very often, the terms “policies” and “institutions” are used interchangeably and sometimes 

together, without there being clarity on their differences. For the WDR 2002, and in this note, policies 

are defined as goals or desired outcomes/directions a country wants to take and institutions the rules 




                                                                                                                  11 
 
that direct actions to achieve (or not) these goals or outcomes.18 For example, countries may have 

similar institutional backgrounds, yet, adopt different macroeconomic policies and have different 

development outcomes. As another example, a policy goal may be to have stable inflation and another 

to raise corporate tax payments. In the first case, examples of relevant institutions would be the Central 

Bank and the rules defining its mode of operation, while in the second case, among the relevant 

institutions would be the  rules that govern information sharing (what accounting systems are used, 

audits of company accounts and disclosure, disclosure of personal income and property etc.), property 

rights (what taxes can be levied on and by how much, how ownership of taxable assets is determined, 

how shared assets are treated, who can collect the taxes etc.).19 


Relationship to Governance 


              Institutions govern economic, social and policy interactions. These may be interactions between 

individuals or groups (e.g. firms and other organizations, clubs, religious communities) or nations (such 

as the WTO and the rules governing trade or the WIPO and rules governing intellectual property, or the 

Basel rules for financial institutions), or the organs of the state and the rules by which they conduct 

themselves. Thus, countries are well governed‐a normative concept‐ when they have institutions that 

support such governance (or have good institutions), however defined. Like “policies”, “governance” is 

often used together with institutions and sometimes, in lieu of them.  




                                               Part 2. How and When Do Institutions Change? 20




                                                            
18
    This definition may still leave ambiguity in some cases. 
19
    Henry and Miller (2009) provide an interesting comparison of two countries with similar institutions following 
different macroeconomic policies. 
20
    Drawing on the WDR 2002 and some representative studies/research conducted since then, this section addresses
institutional change. The attached list of references is not comprehensive, but illustrative. 

                                                                                                                 12 
 
Introduction Two


              As discussed in Part One, institutions exhibit substantial diversity in form, even though they may

support similar transactions in different countries. Part One also discusses the complex, two-way

relationship between economic, social and political factors on the one hand, and institutions, on the other.

As a result of these influences, a defining characteristic of institutions is their persistence over time. They

generally tend to change slowly. For example, it takes a long while to design a new law, have community

agreement on it, change it formally, and enforce it effectively. Related to the idea of persistence is the

concept of threshold effects or tipping points. For example, institutions governing social benefits for the

poor may only change when inequality or poverty rise above a certain level at which the peoples’ support

for change is stronger than is their support for maintenance of the status quo. Other threshold effects may

be political- such as the degree of political repression in a country, or economic, such as the magnitude of

a price change or change in information. The implication of a threshold effect is that people will seek

change only at intervals or be able to effect change only at (sometimes long) intervals. Another fact of

institutional change is that it usually requires collective action of some sort even if the initial impetus for

change is due to individual initiative. The rest of the note discusses a variety of factors that affect

institutions and promote change. The forces for change discussed below are (a) not necessarily

independent of each other implying that (b) more than one force may be present simultaneously and (c)

many are themselves influenced by existing institutions: for example, existing institutions may prevent or

discourage innovation, which is the first force for change discussed below.21


Institutional Change Factors


              Change factors are those events or developments that change the distribution and size of

economic gains (or losses) or expectations of such for individuals and communities.22 These factors may

                                                            
21
   This endogeneity or two‐way relationship is not discussed in great detail here. 
22
   I focus on transactions in economic markets, though much of the discussion is also relevant for interactions 
affecting social or political interactions. It is important to note that social and political institutions affect economic 
transactions. 

                                                                                                                        13 
 
influence government, political leaders, business leaders/groups or households/communities to lead or

support institutional change.


Innovation


              Discoveries – new products, new ways of producing etc., bring economic gains to innovators and

others in society. With each such invention, new rules demanded by inventors and producers, consumers,

government or others in society, develop to oversee the use and spread of the invention. Inventors usually

wish to capture as much as possible of the gains associated with their discoveries or creations.23 It is this

desire, combined with the desire of rulers to support innovation and capture some of the gains associated

with it that, historically, led to the development of patent law in its various forms. As Abraham Lincoln

once put it, “The Patent System added the fuel of interest to the fire of genius.”24 The first such law was

adopted in 500 BCE where chefs in Sybaris, Greece had the monopolized right (and associated profits) to

produce a unique dish they had created. The Republic of Venice was the first to grant a patent for a

technological invention in 1416.25 Over time, in different contexts, and as innovations proliferated,

different variations of these laws were adopted, reflecting the preferences and situations of countries.

Even in the United States, which receives the second largest number of patents per year, the value and

“philosophical basis” underpinning the patent system has been debated since its inception, leading to

various changes in the system over time.26 While inventors have sought to guard their profits, societal

preferences reflected in public policy, have also effected change. However, many other types of

legislation, not just patent law are affected by innovation: rules on drug testing and provision, rules on

electricity pricing and provision, regulations restricting materials that can be used in home construction or

airplane construction, regulations in financial markets, e-commerce and e-banking laws and so on.



                                                            
23
    By inventors, I am referring to the person or persons that discover a thing and also develop it for commercial 
use. 
24
    https://ladas.com/education‐center/a‐brief‐history‐of‐the‐patent‐law‐of‐the‐united‐states‐2/ 
25
    At least according to Western history. https://onlinellm.usc.edu/resources/infographics/history‐of‐patent‐law/ 
26
    https://ladas.com/education‐center/a‐brief‐history‐of‐the‐patent‐law‐of‐the‐united‐states‐2/ 

                                                                                                                 14 
 
Generally, innovation and discoveries engender deep and long-lasting institutional change or set in

motion a series of institutional changes as pervasive as their impact on economic growth and

distribution.


Economic shocks and crises


        Economic shocks and crises can lead countries to undertake institutional change by dramatically

changing the incentives and endowments of those with existing political or economic power. Both

historical and more recent examples abound. The global financial crisis of 2008-09 provides a recent

example of how shocks to capital flows engendered a series of institutional changes in financial sector

(and other) regulations across countries, such as in the euro zone institutions overseeing the financial

sector. Negative shocks to fiscal systems encouraged governments to make changes in public sector wage

legislation and pension systems. Dramatically lower oil and other commodity prices have led countries to

revisit their fiscal rules. Changes in energy prices have also affected the incentives of commodity

exporters to revise energy-saving regulations; very high oil prices in 2008, led many countries to revisit

legislation designed to protect the poor or vulnerable. There is a large literature on how endowments,

whether they be in the form of land or waterways or something else, affected institutional development

throughout history. Natural disasters are like an endowment shock and these have evidenced the

establishment of various public institutions to deal with these types of crises. Weather-related shocks

have spawned various institutional mechanisms to support farmers (insurance, special mechanisms for

income support). The list is long.

        Whether or not crises have an impact on institutional development depends to a large extent on

how “deep’ they are, depth being a function of both the magnitude of the economic and social change,

and its duration. Cohen-Sotten and Vallee (2018) discuss how the Great Depression in the wake of the

banking crisis in the US, led to the Federal Reserve being transformed. While the Great Depression

provided the impetus for a substantial transformation, it takes time, and sometimes, experimentation to

get the “right” system, Gelperon and Veron (2018) recount how the Federal Reserve and the federal


                                                                                                             15 
 
deposit insurance institution required repeated adaptation and even “radical reconstruction” at times to

account for “unforeseen problems and account for market and political pressures and arbitrage”. Koo and

Kiser (2001) find that Korean labor markets were not flexible at the onset of the Asian financial crisis, but

they became more flexible and efficient due to legal and institutional changes.

Institutional changes wrought during and in the wake of economic shocks may or may not have

durable and broad effects. The impact will depend on the depth and duration of the shock, as these will

determine the magnitude of the impact on economic, social or political gains. Institutions adopted in

response to crises will tend to be adjusted over time.


Domestic political and social turmoil/ Change in leadership


        Throughout history, large institutional changes have been preceded by indigenous social and

political turmoil and/or the emergence of “leaders”. The communist, and then “transition” countries of

Eastern Europe and Asia are examples of countries that have undergone this type of institutional

transformation. The move into communism and subsequent move out of it were essentially social and

political responses to economic and political inequality. In other words, a threshold or tipping point had

been reached and people were ready for change. At the same time, “leaders” were available to organize

the movement and establish vast policy and institutional changes. On a more recent note, Brexit reflects a

threshold effect in social and economic effects reflecting changes that had been occurring over a long

period of time. Disaffection with income and job status over the years enhanced support for change in

trading and immigration rules among others. Knowledge and information flow between countries affects

these movements- by either moving people to form coalitions in support of or against similar movements

in their own countries.


        Sometimes, countries get rulers whose goal is to create their personal futures through change; and

sometimes they get visionary leaders for their country, who are benevolent, and charismatic. The rise of

certain rulers is sometimes obviously rooted in social and economic distress, and sometimes the reasons

are not so obvious (though history books may make it look like they were all obvious occurrences).

                                                                                                             16 
 
Leaders are not necessarily in public office or in political positions. In any case, often leaders emerge that

change how people think and organize collectively and therefore have an impact on institutions. Various

“leaders” have sought to “modernize”, “socialize”, “Westernize”, establish religious governing

institutions or establish more secular institutional frameworks, among other things.


           Even when domestic economic, social and political conditions are such that wide-ranging

institutional changes are imminent and desired by citizens, the pace at which these occur and the degree

of simultaneity of the changes have varied substantially. For example, countries in Eastern Europe chose

different transition paths to market economies (Wolf, 1999). Poland’s process was a big-bang approach to

institutional reform: along with price liberalization, several rules were changed at once, with the

philosophy that “radical” reforms created “safeguards” so that the process became irreversible

(Balcerowiz, 1993). Proponents of gradual reform contended that because institutions needed time to be

established, “effective” reform tended to lag behind de jure legal reform strengthening the case for a step-

wise, rather than radical approach. For example, the legal abolition of entry restrictions for new firms

(Wolf, 1999) would not increase competition if new firms could not enter due to lack of bank credit,

effective protections, competitive distribution networks and so on. The Czech Republic, Estonia and

Poland with fast privatization and liberalization are identified as more radical reformers; Bulgaria,

Moldova and Romania as slower reformers. There are even slower reformers among the transition

economies of Eastern Europe and those where change has been so slow that it has yielded no positive

results.


Many institutional changes occur in response to domestic social evolution. These forces develop over

time, though their manifestation may be perceived as “sudden”. These may be characterized as taking

place when a tipping point is reached, for example, a degree of inequality, or poverty, religious

repression or political repression, which when reached, generate forces for change. Once this point is

reached, institutional change will happen; it may be either all-encompassing and fast or step-by-step

and slower.


                                                                                                            17 
 
Knowledge, information (transparency), demonstration effects, and preferences


              People’s preferences are influenced by knowledge and information-and these changes in

preferences are another source of institutional change. Sharing knowledge with stakeholders, is often

referred to as increasing transparency.27 When people have more information about the effects of

particular institutional states, their support for a given structure changes.28 For example, knowledge that

unregulated food labeling can lead to mislabeling of food content has induced consumer groups to

demand better regulation of food (and drugs) labeling. Knowledge that countries with a better regulatory

framework will be likely to receive more foreign investment has led some countries to change their

regulations. Knowledge that producers have mistreated workers or used child labor has led to calls for

more regulation of labor markets and restraints on employers. Knowledge about the effects of climate

change is slowly encouraging countries to adopt laws and regulations governing carbon emission and

citizens to support them.

              There is a large literature on how “demonstration” produces change, including institutional

change. Peoples’ preferences and behavior may be influenced when there is demonstration that a specific

set of institutions has achieved desirable outcomes in another context. Demonstration effects have

influenced the behavior and expectations of women around the world and (admittedly, after a long period

of time) has raised support for regulatory change supporting women’s role in many spheres. Showing how

it can be done is as important as showing that it works. Bangladesh’s Grameen Bank is a good example.

As it demonstrated its methods and successes in bringing poor women into financial activities, demand

for similar ventures developed in other countries, including parts of the USA. Lankes et al (1999)

considering institutional transformation of transition economies, contend that demonstrating successful

processes and institutions to support corporate restructuring was important in motivating countries to

adapt. Abir (1996) discusses how the success of the United States in curbing anti-competitive behavior


                                                            
27
  As an example of the two‐way interaction, the degree of transparency is influenced by certain institutions itself. 
28
  Note that while the discussion is focused on the one‐way effect of transparency on the demand for institutional 
change, current institutions themselves influence the degree of transparency. 

                                                                                                                  18 
 
led the Republic of Korea to adopt antitrust laws similar to those of the United States. However, he also

notes that while consistent enforcement of antitrust laws in the United States has been effective in

breaking existing monopolies and preventing their creation, Korea's preference was to have a selective

approach to enforcement of these antitrust laws in order to facilitate the growth of Korean industries and

increase their international competitiveness.

          An important source of all knowledge is the media industry (Djankov et al., 2002, Islam 2006,

Islam 2008). Therefore, not only are they important players in effecting institutional change, but also,

industry and regulatory structure in the media industry are of critical importance for how subsequent

institutions develop.29 Technological innovation has created the need for new institutions to

support/regulate the media industry; regulating the industry in the digital age is complicated. For example,

whether Facebook is accepted as simply a “platform” or whether it is considered a news provider, will

determine how it should be regulated. In this sphere as in others, innovation constantly puts pressure on

institutions. For example, even while certain countries restrict access to certain types of news, new

technology and knowledge allows circumvention of regulation and fosters competition in the news

market.


Knowledge (one form of which is transparency) can be a strong force for institutional change,

particularly knowledge that demonstrates the impact of institutions on outcomes that people care

about.


Conflict and conquest: Forced transplants


          History is replete with instances of conquests, following which, new rulers have imposed new

rules on the conquered. Several historical studies (legal, economic, political or social) examine the impact

of transplants by conquest. Some of these insights are summarized later in the paper. Many of the new

                                                            
29
    Since the WDR 2002 was written, the structure of the media industry and the ways in which people obtain
knowledge has been changing fast, though the issues addressed remain similar: reach and access to information,
competition in the industry, market segmentation and pricing, and the impact on society.  


                                                                                                                 19 
 
institutions are direct transplants of existing institutions in the home country of the colonizer, while others

are unique to the conquered country and aimed at regulating transactions there. British colonial rule in

Asia, America and Africa, Spanish and French rule in South America and Africa, Japanese rule in Korea,

Russian rule in much of Asia and Europe, reconstruction after World Wars I and II, Ottoman conquests,

other Islamic and Christian conquests, Jewish settlements… the list is seemingly endless. What is striking

is that institutional frameworks brought in by the same ruler after conquest, have since developed very

differently across countries, their paths being influenced by existing conditions at the time, the degree of

conversion by rulers, economic developments and other factors.


              Conquests often involve quite radical institutional changes. In a study that has relevance for many

conquests, Acemoglu et al (2011) study the extensive and radical institutional changes imposed by the

French in the wake of the French Revolution in certain parts of Germany. Of particular interest to them is

the transformation of the Rhineland and other areas from an oligarchy-dominated area to one open to new

businesses and new entrants. For example, the abolition of guilds, breaking feudal labor relations, made

entry freer in many industries. At the same time, taxation structures were changed.30 The authors contend

that reforming economic (and political) institutions simultaneously and substantially in many dimensions

weakened the powers of local elites and changed the political equilibrium irreversibly.31


Much of human history reflects institutional change imposed by the new rulers on the conquered.

Often these rules were “direct transplants”-replicas of laws in the rulers’ countries applied to the

conquered community and usually modified over time. When new rulers systematically erode the old

distribution of power reflected in property rights, or set conditions in motion that will do so over time,

the new institutions tend to be more effective and durable. All countries today, retain aspects of their

historical conquests in their institutional frameworks, reflecting the persistence of institutions.



                                                            
30
    They go on to investigate the impact of these changes on growth, finding that they were generally positive in the 
long run, after the countries recovered from the effects of war. 
31
    They concede that these issues need to be researched more extensively. 

                                                                                                                   20 
 
Competition (or cooperation)


              The desire to out-do others provides a strong motivation to support institutional change (see

below on trade). A good example of the impact of competition on institutional change is the

improvements in institutions wrought by governments seeking to increase a country’s performance on

global rankings. (e.g., Worldwide Governance Indicators, Doing Business Indicators). Competition

among local governments to get more resources from the federal government has been a motivation for

improving institutions at subnational levels. Competition to retain skilled labor has led to change in

institutions at the firm and country levels. The flip-side of competition is cooperation. Institutions

supporting cooperation may evolve when groups (or individuals) are exposed to competition and they

find that they can capture gains that are greater or more sustainable, by cooperation (thus the rise of

oligopolies), and the cost of cooperation is low.32 Usually, increasing scarcity of a resource, rents or

profits will lead to institutional change.


Competition for profits, resources or power is a potent force for institutional change or innovation.

International trade is a source of competition, but the presence of any scarce resource will engender

competition (or cooperation) for it and tend to bring about institutional change that grants rights to

particular parties or establishes rules for resource use or market access.


Trade in goods, services, information, capital


              Trade between communities has been a strong catalyst for institutional change. Sometimes

institutional change is encouraged by the possibility of doing more trade and sometimes trading erodes

the effectiveness of old institutions (for example, by creating new sources of income or wealth or new

knowledge and preferences). The pressure for change may come from any of a variety of interest groups.

Businesses seeking to reduce risk and raise profits will support the development of financial markets, or

corporate law, or producers seeking foreign direct investment will support legislation making FDI easier.


                                                            
32
      There is an extensive literature on group cooperation, its likelihood and feasibility , which is not covered here.  

                                                                                                                         21 
 
Change may be promoted by governments seeking to protect the national (or their) interest. Trade in

information (know-how, discoveries) influences institutional design, trade in technology accompanied by

rules governing its use (e.g., IPRs) being an obvious example. The EU custom union’s rules were

developed to encourage trade; and in turn the formation of the union spawned a further set of legislative

initiatives aiming to foster collaboration among the member nations. Examples are common product and

process standards, regulations on food safety, and the use of additives in food, to name a few.


         It is not only institutions that govern cross-border movement that are changed. For example, the

export of pharmaceuticals requires both exporting and importing countries to consider implications for

domestic consumers and accordingly, to consider new legislation protecting their interests. Apart from the

obvious effect of trade agreements on labor, environmental, and patent laws (among other things), the

simple act of engaging in commerce with partners separated across space, time, language and abilities- to

name a few factors- creates pressure for institutional change. To support firms to enter global value chains

governments have their own legislative agendas on the domestic front. Most recently, cross border

operations of multinationals have spurred governments to devise new legislation aimed at maximizing

own-country benefits (for example, tax legislation), whereas, the information industry’s expansion- for

example, from their US bases to China or the EU- have launched a flurry of activity regarding new

legislation and regulation governing privacy or data-sharing. To take a historical example, Acemoglu et al

(2002), document the substantial institutional changes catalyzed by international trade, that occurred in

Western Europe during three centuries (1500-1850). World Bank (2002) discusses this factor of change in

depth.


         Exchange with people outside one’s community increases business demand for institutions to

support trade, spurring institutional change that enhances their comparative advantage vis-a-vis other

nations. Leaders/ government may be induced to adopt new institutions supporting trade in order to

excel vis-a-vis other countries, raise domestic production or by the prospect of personal gain.

Households may also influence change in institutions as their preferences, influenced by trade,


                                                                                                            22 
 
change. Trade influences institutions by changing relative prices and profits, enhancing competition,

increasing knowledge and influencing preferences.


Population: Growth and demographic change


              As human populations grow and fall, and change in composition, policies and institutions will

change (McMillan et al 2016, Cincotta and Engelman, 1997).33 Total changes in population will affect the

strain on resources and exacerbate conflicts or require cooperative behavior. Access and rights to property

are affected. Population composition also affects preferences. As an obvious example, older populations

will tend to demand different services to those demanded by younger ones (such as better and more

extensive child care versus cheaper elder care, or health insurance for the elderly). Policies and

institutions will generally tend to change gradually as this happens. Similarly, changes in ethnic

composition may lead to new legislation that address ethnicity-specific issues (for example, whether

businesses must provide bi-lingual services or not, or anti-discrimination legislation, or legislation

affecting temporary foreign workers). As populations increase, resources become scarcer per person. At

some point, people will demand change in the rules overseeing the management and use of these

resources. Natural resources are a good case in point: increasingly scarce water resources will cause

conflict, competition for resources or cooperation. Immigration/migration is an important source of

population size and composition and will be a strong force for institutional change.


Changes in population size and in composition (demographic, ethnic, religious, education-related) will

affect the relative supply of and/or demand for change in the rules governing the economy.




                                                            
33
   McMillan et al find that higher local population densities are associated with more collective services and a 
transition from open‐access to regulated land use. The authors find that villages’ variance in population is closely 
correlated with higher levels of public services, infrastructure, religious facilities, and markets; in addition, 
villagers’ land is more often governed through individual as opposed to familial rights, with more land‐market 
transactions and stronger regulation of villagers’ forest use. Responding to population growth with improved 
public services and more private property rights is consistent with both scale effects in public good provision, and 
changes in the scarcity of land. Cincotta and Engelman have a good discussion of the two‐way relationship. 

                                                                                                                   23 
 
              Finally, institutional change involves either redoing rules governing transactions between private

parties, within the public sector (for example, government and public enterprises), or between private and

public parties. For example, governments may decide to privatize and then regulate firms, rather than run

them as state-owned enterprises, in the hope that it will increase efficiency of the sector. How the new

system functions will depend on whether the government is a better regulator than it is a producer in that

specific activity.34


Aid: Transplants, knowledge transfer, information provision, demonstration, change in

endowments


       There is some research on the impact of aid in effecting institutional change, yet this literature

remains to be developed and the conclusions to date differ between studies. Research has discussed

several ways in which aid may either improve or weaken institutional quality either by affecting formal

rules or informal ones, or by supporting incomplete institutional reform (for example, eliminating old

institutions, but not replacing them with new ones).35 However, it has been difficult to find systematic

evidence of overall improvements in institutions as a result of aid flows. The difficulty with translating

the impact of aid onto changes in institutions is manifold, not the least of which being to precisely

identify the impact of aid versus other factors on institutional change in empirical analysis. There are also

issues with the timeframe over which the impact of aid is assessed. The time for a particular institutional

change to become effective often extends far beyond the timeframe of the aid intervention and the related

assessment. For example, when laws are changed and expected to be enforced through the courts, they

may be enforced only slowly at first. There may be a period during which traditional rules and norms

dominate outcomes. Over time, traditional rules are also affected and formal laws are better understood

and capacity better developed. In addition, indicators of institutional change that are available to assess


                                                            
34
   The famous phrase “who monitors the monitor?” comes to mind. 
35
   For example, aid may render governments less accountable to their citizens, as they will rely less on taxation for 
resources. Aid changes the implicit rules (and sometimes formal ones) governing public expenditure patterns and 
resource use. 

                                                                                                                   24 
 
impact may not be appropriate measures of the intended effect. Finally, effectiveness of a particular

institutional change may depend on other supporting institutional changes having been made (see Part

One). With these caveats in mind, I present some conclusions. The literature that examines institutional

development over long periods is the most promising because institutions exhibit persistence. Also, the

more specific is the change reviewed, the greater is the likelihood of learning for policy purposes.


    Multi- and bilateral donors of foreign aid often attempt to influence institutions of the country to

which they donate funds or other assistance. These may be aid projects explicitly designed to improve

“governance” in which particular institutions are directly changed or transplanted (e.g. changing the legal

framework for company registration or investments), or they may fund investments or other support in

various sectors of the economy (for example, agriculture sector investments) where governments

undertake to reform policies and institutions over a period of time. In addition, there are projects where

the goal is to induce institutional change by affecting preferences (for example in projects enhancing

information flows-transparency- between market players, training programs, technology provision,

infrastructure provision and policy advice, or projects that build skills or education).


    Often aid donors support some sort of transplant of institutions from developed or aid-giving

countries. Laws, rules, or regulations may or may not be adapted in the aid-receiving country. As

explained in this review, the impact of the new rules will depend on how well they are enforced and how

well complementary rules function. For example, not only may an effective judiciary (or arbitration

system) and/or police be necessary for rules on collateral to take effect, but institutions allowing for

ownership verification (property registration) and transfer, institutions allowing for verification of the

value of the property, etc., will also need to be in place and to “work”. At the same time, these rules and

regulations must be compatible with social norms and capacity. Competition law will only have its

intended effect if accompanying institutions are in place (Tay-Cheng Ma, 2013) and there is local

capacity. Yet donors have supported what might be called “piecemeal” institutional change, meaning

reform where the necessary complementary factors are not in place. Apart from requiring aid recipients to

                                                                                                             25 
 
adopt legislation and regulation (or reform courts), donors have used other instruments of change. Policy

advice, demonstration of what works, technology provision, infrastructure provision with regulatory

advice, are different ways in which donors have also worked to change extant institutional frameworks.

The impact of each of these interventions has not been thoroughly studied.


    A number of existing studies that link aid to broad institutional change generally do not find a

significant relationship. Svennsson (2000), Knack (2001) and Brautigam and Knack (2004) find that aid

may have a negative impact on how institutions function (by increasing corruption and reducing

accountability). Another conclusion is that if the people for whom the legal change is intended, prefer the

traditional way of doing business, then it is likely that a variety of measures will exist to delay the law

from taking effect in a given country. Shirley (2005) finds foreign aid to be a poor tool for institutional

reform, citing the “fundamental mismatch” between the characteristics of institutions and those of aid, the

former exhibiting durability or persistence and reflecting existing power structures. She also points to the

multiple objectives of aid agencies. However, she acknowledges that change is possible over time in

response to market competition and when there is adaptation to local circumstances. Islam and Coviello

(2006), find that, on average, aid has had no impact on the quality of economic institutions- in other

words, even if institutions were transplanted, overall, they were not effective.


    Young et al (2014), using a panel of up to 116 countries from 1970 to 2010 estimate the

effects of foreign aid flows on a variety of measures of institutional quality and find that aid

flows are associated with the deterioration of both political and economic institutions. Askarov et

al (2015) find that aid has no effect on governance in transitional economies. Deaton (2013)

finds that aid can affect institutions negatively when foreign aid is a large proportion of the

budget relative to domestic resources, while Jones and Tarp (2015) do not find such evidence,

finding that aid directed towards improving governance improves institutions in recipient

countries. World Bank (2008) finds that support to the public sector did not always result in

                                                                                                              26 
 
successful institutional reform with “success” varying across different types of initiatives. For

example, institutional change supported by the Bank was more successful in reforming tax

administration, an area where there was a strong “leader” (the finance minister) and a specific

and well-defined outcome, and with a clear distribution of gains (and losses). Support to anti-

corruption laws and commissions rarely succeeded, mainly because they lacked support from

“political elites” and the judicial system. Complementary institutions (for example, an

independent and effective judiciary, independent media, data and evidence and so on)36 are

critical to the success of these initiatives. The report also recommends focusing on basic reforms

and accepting that significant results will only show after a long time. Islam (2003) examines the

judicial system reform for commercial transactions and concludes that rules within and external

to the judiciary matter for effective courts, that different types of dispute resolution will co-exist

in any system so that it is important to understand their interactions, and that many legal scholars

have found comparative legal study to be an indispensable tool to design effective courts.

Acemoglu and Jackson (2016) show that laws that are in strong conflict with prevailing social

norms may backfire; they contend that gradual tightening of laws can be more effective than

large changes in influencing social norms and behavior. Aldashev et al (2009), examining the

judicial system, argue that even where the “modern” law and court system is little used, there may be an

indirect impact exerted on the informal rulings of customary authorities. They highlight various factors

impinging on this effect, and illustrate their operation with a number of examples drawn from the existing

literature, as well as from the authors’ own field experience.


       When local populations or governments understand and change the transplanted law as needed and

are part of the movement for change, it is more effective. Chen (2009) contends for example, that legal


                                                            
36
      WDR 2002 provides a good discussion of complementarity in institutions.  

                                                                                                           27 
 
institutions, principles and terminologies in the contemporary legal system in China were transplanted

by the Chinese from foreign countries in the name of modernization, though they were modified in order

to implement them according to local needs. He and Li (2003) contend that foreign laws are now an

indispensable part of the main body of modern Chinese law. However, enforcement may not happen as

in the original scenario without appropriate modification. In China for example, local legislators

responsible for enforcement may have different motivations from federal ones. Transplanting legislation

that works in more centralized systems would be an incomplete institutional change, unless the

transplanted legislation is adapted for the supporting domestic institutional system. Modification may

also entail redefining the situations under which the legislation is binding. Chen (2014) finds that both

reasons explain “incomplete” transplantation. Berkowitz et al (2001) studying 49 countries find that

countries where populations are more “familiar” with the adopted legal system, are those where laws are

transplanted more effectively.37 Xu et al (2016) looking at the impact of Chinese aid to Africa in the

agriculture sector discusses how the transplantation of Chinese systems with their own rules - a system

where state-backed science, a close link between the state and business united by a common aim, seeking

technological solutions to development- did not transfer well to the African context (Mozambique and

Zimbabwe, for example). The Chinese approach was to demonstrate their success, and transfer their

technology and systems intact. In the African context, with different history and norms, and expectations

of behavior the approach did not translate well.


       As the literature above indicates, the story of aid and institutional development is a complex one and

much remains to be studied. This is partly because it is difficult to precisely identify the effect of aid

versus other factors, such as host country initial conditions. It is also because these studies have often

tended to look at broad measures of institutions and institutional change which may not have been




                                                            
37
      Familiarity may derive from similar religious backgrounds, for example. 

                                                                                                             28 
 
appropriate to the context, the desired outcome may not have been sufficiently clarified, the complete set

of institutional reforms may not have been adopted, and change takes a long time to happen.


What does this mean for development policy: Can institutions be changed as policies can?

        Institutional change is happening all the time; but an important question is whether it can be

externally directed, that is influenced by donors (working with government). The short answer is that

history shows that leaders (external/internal), governments and people working together can change

institutions. Donors, if they are humble, learn from history, and understand the forces for change, may

help move the process in the right direction, remembering that all change takes time and the time it takes

is often underestimated.

What are some of the lessons?

1. Is the institutional change, especially if it is an addition to existing institutions, really needed?

Countries are sometimes asked to adopt certain institutions, without due consideration of whether such

change is needed. For example, when market competition is low, the right answer may not be to establish

a competition authority (but to reduce land use restrictions, develop financial markets or change trade

policy), or when corruption is high, establishing an anti-corruption authority may not be a useful move.

2. If the change is necessary, the first actions are to identify the forces for change in the economy (as

discussed in this paper), assess how strong they are, form an informed judgement regarding whether these

forces for change will pick up momentum and how they might be strengthened (and in some cases,

created) and thus, design interventions that are most likely to bear fruit in the given context.

3. Related to this is the next step, identifying who benefits and who loses from the institutional change

and in what timeframe? How will the forces for change influence their incentives? Answering this

question will not automatically provide a solution, but will at least inject realism regarding the

magnitude/speed of change possible.


Clearly if a consideration of (2) and (3) leads to the judgement that the original reform will not be

effective or sustainable, then a modification is recommended.


                                                                                                            29 
 
4. Design a multi-pronged strategy/ employ more than one source of change: Any endeavor to change

institutions directly (such as by transplants) should be accompanied by knowledge transfer, data and

estimates of the distribution of gains, benchmarking against relevant countries, and demonstration.

Sometimes transparency is promoted with a view to imposing reputational penalties that enforce change

in debtor behavior.38 Attempts to change institutions by increasing information (transparency) or

knowledge, should be designed with an understanding of how they may affect people’s incentives, and

the demand for change ((for example, will citizens care enough to act) but also, what else is needed for

actions to change. For example, transparency regarding connected lending in the banking sector will have

no effect unless supervisory and regulatory institutions are changed with a view to incentivizing

supervisors and supervisors can enforce appropriate behavior in bank managers without undue penalties.

In the same vein, transparency regarding wealth and conflict of interest in government may not reduce

conflict of interest unless there are penalties, such as being voted out of power or the payment of punitive

fines, in case of inappropriate behavior.39 Moreover, the timeframe for change may be very long.


5. There is no “best” solution for all cases; one size does not fit all. Direct transplants do not generally

work, particularly where the recipient country differs dramatically in economic, social or political

conditions from the transplant country. Adjustment should be made accounting for differences in factors

such as capacity and norms. For example, enforcement of intellectual property rights requires

considerable knowledge of the relevant industry, the economics of the issue, the distributional

consequences of IPR protection, of the state of technology, among other things. Systems, when adopted,

need to be modified accordingly. At the same time, it is important to note that prevailing views of what

degree of market power is “acceptable” will differ across countries, influencing how the systems are

designed and implemented.




                                                            
38
  Unfortunately, reputational penalties have been very weak enforcement mechanisms in this regard.  
39
  These penalties may be in many forms. For example, fines, relinquishing of assets, loss in elections or in position 
and so on. 

                                                                                                                   30 
 
6. Have measures of success and make sure there is some evidence of impact before leaving the field: It

is important to form clear and shared (with stakeholders) expectations of the timeframe required to

achieve effective institutional change – i.e., a change in desired outcomes. Intermediate goals should be

set and institutional design adjusted as needed. It is often hard to get the right design in the first try, but it

is also hard to change it once adopted, unless the goal is directly linked to the institutional change

adopted. Establishing objective measures of impact will make it easier to adjust design as needed and help

maintain momentum for the reform.


7. Value of experimentation: In order to attain effective institutional design, experimentation may be

very useful. For example, different health care provision systems, or different types of social assistance

systems may be designed in the same country in order to “test” the best design. Experiments that yield

desired outcomes can be expanded. For this process of institutional reform to be effective, there must be

clear (observable, measurable) evaluation criteria and the ability to end the pilots that do not yield results.

Experimentation allows countries to learn from their own past experience and other-country experience at

relatively low cost. Failing designs are easy to drop when the scope is smaller and innovations may be

easier to handle at a small scale (many NGOs, such as Grameen Bank start this way).


8. Identify the set of complementary institutions: More than one rule may need to be changed to achieve

a certain outcome. Changing a rule in isolation of others that influence the same transaction may have

unintended consequences (or none at all). For example, regulating the use of a pesticide will not be

effective unless there are systems of enforcement. Improper use of medicinal drugs through the adoption

of a legal framework will not be effective unless there are penalties for non-compliance, and systems to

check compliance and collect penalties. However, overly burdensome systems to check-compliance could

have side effects in terms of reducing drug use, or raising mortality rates due to delays, or facilitating

corruption opportunities when regulation is complex or cumbersome and regulatory agents are hard to

monitor. Unless the set of complementary institutions can be changed and adapted together, it may be

better to rethink the approach. This consideration leads to the next “lesson”.


                                                                                                                31 
 
9. Systemic versus narrow institutional reform. Sometimes countries will undertake systemic reform of

the economy and sometimes they will choose particular areas to reform. Categorizing broadly,

governments may reform institutions that (a) directly impinge on a number of sectors (for example,

business entry and exit regulations, judicial sector reform), while simultaneously doing sector-specific

change (for example, agricultural land use regulations); (b) are broad (such as adopting a competition

law), but do not have the necessary complementarities in place (such as enforcement agencies and

qualified evaluation officers) or sectoral depth; (c) that are “narrower” in scope (such as energy

production or distribution reform), but are not accompanied by economy-wide reforms and (d) that are

“narrow” and do not require immediate change in performance (such as requiring publication of accounts

of firms in a country without requiring additional measures to change performance). By choosing which

type of reform they are willing to adopt and how fast they will adopt each one, governments influence

whether institutional reform is sustained or effective.


        History has several examples of different types of reform as discussed in the pages above. The

evidence indicates that whether directed institutional change takes root may depend on how substantial

the change is and what forces are put in motion to ensure that the initial momentum for change is picked

up as time progresses. In cases where the change is narrower in scope, but substantial within the scope

selected, the eventual impact will depend on whether the initial change fosters further reform. Change is

unlikely to be sustained unless these forces are in motion and success outcomes defined. The short run

negative consequences of economy-wide and deep changes may be large and sudden on the economy.

For example, fearing a spike in unemployment, reform may be undertaken in small steps over a longer

period of time. However, a slower or narrower reform process may not be sustained, may be too small to

have any impact on outcomes, or may simply create so much uncertainty (or disruption) that economic

processes are stalled. Many countries have unfortunately exhibited these outcomes, when a more

deliberate and substantial approach may have borne fruit. The diversity in initial conditions, such as the

political economy, the extent of distortions prevailing, growth and income distribution, may argue for


                                                                                                             32 
 
diversity in approach, Yet, even if the reform process is limited to a limited segment of the economy (for

example, the energy sector), it should be complete, with a well-defined sequence of steps, force for

change, conditions for sustainability and desired internal and external outcomes clearly defined.

Piecemeal, incomplete reform in numerous sectors, particularly if critical constraints are not modified,

while giving the impression that large steps are being taken, will result in no change in outcomes. Under

either type of reform, change imposes costs on the economy, some of which may be persistent.

Embarking on reform without due consideration of these costs could jeopardize the viability of

institutional reform?40


Conclusions

              This paper covers two questions: (1) what are institutions and (2) how do they change? This paper

presents a widely accepted and workable (for policy purposes) definition drawn from the academic and

policy literature, and focuses mostly on institutions that are relevant for market transactions. It then

discusses the many forces influencing institutional change. Some important features of institutions are

highlighted: (a) they exhibit diversity in form for similar functions and objectives; (b) any market

transaction is supported by more than one (formal and informal) institution; (c) they exhibit persistence,

but are dynamic. They are persistent because those that benefit from extant systems have an interest in

preserving them. They are dynamic because these benefits change as a result of external shocks, directed

interventions or endogenous domestic forces, or a combination of all three; (d) there are several sources

of change, and these are discussed in this note. However, the direction of influence is not one-way. For

example, trade changes institutions, but institutions also influence how much you can trade; (e) when

institutional change is to be influenced, the important thing is to harness the forces for change discussed

in this paper.




                                                            
40
   These costs may be in terms of economic, or social terms. Administrative costs, increased corruption, or physical 
dislocation costs are examples of such costs. 

                                                                                                                  33 
 
        Finally, a policy maker or policy advisor seeking to improve economic or social outcomes, will

necessarily aim to reform certain institutions. This note builds on studies conducted across a variety of

fields, and points to some important lessons in this area. It also highlights the need to do much more

detailed research and study on institutional reform and how external agents may be drivers of such

reforms.

                                  




                                                                                                            34 
 
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