1. Project Data

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Project ID</th>
<th>Project Name</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>P111470</td>
<td>GN-Education For All FTI Program (FY09)</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Practice Area(Lead)</th>
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<tr>
<td>Guinea</td>
<td>Education</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>L/C/TF Number(s)</th>
<th>Closing Date (Original)</th>
<th>Total Project Cost (USD)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TF-92364</td>
<td>30-Jun-2010</td>
<td>117,800,000.00</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Bank Approval Date</th>
<th>Closing Date (Actual)</th>
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<td>30-Jul-2008</td>
<td>31-Dec-2014</td>
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<tr>
<th>IBRD/IDA (USD)</th>
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<tr>
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<tr>
<td>117,800,000.00</td>
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<tr>
<td>Revisited Commitment</td>
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<td>40,000,000.00</td>
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<tr>
<td>Actual</td>
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<td>40,000,000.00</td>
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</table>

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Sector(s)</th>
<th>Theme(s)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Primary education (38%): Secondary education (26%): Public administration- Education (18%): Vocational training (12%): Adult literacy/non-formal education (6%)</td>
<td>Education for all (100%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2. Project Objectives and Components

a. Objectives

The original objective in the Grant Agreement co-signed on 13 August 2008, and the Project Appraisal Document (PAD, 22 July 2008, pg. 7), was as follows:

"The Project is part of the Recipient's Program, which contributes to enhancing equitable access to and quality in education at all levels, with focus on primary education and literacy training, while also strengthening central and deconcentrated management of the education system" (Grant Agreement, 13 August 2008, Grant No. TF092364, pg. 4).
The grant was restructured and the Grant Agreement was amended on 22 September, 2011, with the project development objective (PDO) defined as follows: "The objective of the Project, which is part of the Program, is to enhance equitable access to and quality of basic education while also strengthening decentralized management of the education system in the Recipient's territory (Grant Agreement, 22 September, 2011, Grant No. TF092364, pg. 7). It is important to note, however, that even though the word "central" is omitted from the restructured Grant Agreement, the subcomponents (summarized in section "c" below) clearly focus on building capacity at the central level as well. The revision at this first restructuring therefore made only the material change of dropping the objectives to improve access to and quality of literacy training. In addition, financing was reduced from $117M to $40M.

The grant was restructured twice again, first on 30 November, 2012 to extend the closing to 31 December, 2013 (Restructuring paper, pg. 13) with revised outcome targets (see section 4), and then again on 26 December, 2013, to extend the closing date to 31 December, 2014. Because of the change in objectives in the 2011 restructuring and change in targets in the 2012 restructuring, this ICRR provides split ratings.

b. Were the project objectives/key associated outcome targets revised during implementation?
Yes

Did the Board approve the revised objectives/key associated outcome targets?
Yes

Date of Board Approval
22-Sep-2011

c. Components

The components and subcomponents are described from the Project Appraisal Document (which is consistent with the Grant Agreement but contains more details).


This component originally aimed to promote equitable and regulated access to basic and non-formal education, to increase enrollment rates in pre-school, primary, and lower secondary levels, support specific measures for mentally and/or physically handicapped children, expand access to literacy training, support the creation of professional integration courses for primary and lower secondary leavers, and provide professional training specifically oriented toward the mining sector. Component 1 included the following five sub-components:

(i) improving pre-school, primary, and secondary level educational infrastructure by constructing/rehabilitating and furnishing 7,039 primary classrooms and 792 secondary classrooms; (ii) expanding educational access of primary-level students with special needs by facilitating the integration of students with special needs into 160 primary schools; (iii) expanding access to literacy training; (iv) establishing professional integration courses for primary and lower secondary leavers; and (v) increasing availability of skilled labor for the mining sector by creating a small number of targeted, short-term professional training courses.

2011 restructuring

Subcomponents i & ii: activities related to improving pre-school were dropped
Subcomponent iii: the original set of activities were dropped
Subcomponent iv: original activities dropped; new ones added, including developing strategies and establishing partnerships with the private sector, identifying sectors of growth and constructing, rehabilitating, and furnishing professional integration centers at selected sites
Subcomponent v: original activities dropped; promoting school demand by providing private tutoring for girls, teaching aids and training for teachers, school kits to children, and social mobilization

2012 restructuring

Subcomponents i & ii: reduction in number of classrooms constructed from 1,900 to 1,660
Subcomponent iv: cancellation of construction and rehabilitation of technical training centers, and adding new strategy linking vocational training to mining sector
Subcomponent v: campaigns for one year instead of two; increase in provision of private tutoring for girls

2013 restructuring

Subcomponent i & ii: cancellation of secondary school classrooms
Subcomponents iv, v: no change

2011 restructuring: Dropped Non-Formal Education (ICR pg. 5)

This component aimed to improve the quality and relevance of basic and non-formal education, with particular focus on the acquisition of pedagogical materials, provision of initial and continued teacher training, provision of block grants to Primary Education Delegations (Délegation Scolaire de l’Enseignement Élémentaire—DSEE) -- the Ministry of Pre-University and Civic Education (MEPU-CE) administrative level below the prefecture -- and student evaluations. The following six sub-components were supported under Component 2: (i) acquiring and supplying free textbooks and teachers’ guides for public and private primary and secondary schools; (ii) supporting initial training for primary and secondary teachers, including financing the final phase of the construction of eight teacher colleges; (iii) supporting continued training of primary and secondary teachers; (iv) providing block grants to schools (for school improvement projects) and DSEE; (v) conducting of nation-wide student learning assessments at the primary level (year 4 – 2008; year 6 – 2009; and year 2 – 2010) and the lower secondary level (2009); and (vi) implementing curriculum reform in higher education, in accordance with the Bologna framework approach.

2011 restructuring
Subcomponent i: dropped basic learning supplies for pre-school
Subcomponent ii: dropped construction of 8 teacher colleges. Added rehabilitation of selected teacher colleges; strengthened teacher training curriculum through technical assistance; development of performance contracts with the Teacher Training Institutes; and support to teacher training pursuant to the performance contracts
Subcomponent iii: dropped training for secondary school directors
Subcomponent iv: provision of block grants to primary schools and DSEE in support of their school improvement plans (amended wording)
Subcomponent v: added piloting of early literacy assessments
Subcomponent vi: added supporting newly certified teachers with provisional stipends

2012 restructuring
Subcomponent i: cancelled secondary level textbooks and acquisition of storage space for textbooks
Subcomponent ii: modified pre-service teacher training activities by cancelling civil works at teacher training institutes and removal of performance contracts
Subcomponent iii: teacher training target reduced from 5,000 to 3,000;
Subcomponent iv & v: unchanged
Subcomponent vi: Completion of the public expenditure review of higher education was the only study remaining in the sub-sector; training of trainers dropped; stipends dropped

2013 restructuring
Subcomponent i, ii, iv, & v: no further changes
Subcomponent iii: teacher training target increased by 1,000
Subcomponent vi: a study of higher education scholarships and transfers was financed to supplement the full education sector public expenditure review (PER) study


This component aimed to strengthen the central and de-concentrated management of the sector, including its infrastructure services. Component 3 was comprised of the following four sub-components: (i) Enhancing the National Service for Educational Infrastructure and Equipment (Service National des Infrastructures et Equipements Scolaires—SNIES) capacity to monitor civil works; (ii) Construction and rehabilitation of regional and prefectural administrative education offices by financing civil works on one Inspection Regionale de l’Education (IRE) and six DPE that had sustained serious physical damage during the January-February 2007 civil strife; (iii) Strengthening planning and monitoring capacity at the regional and prefectural level; and (iv) Strengthening the MEPU-EC at the central level.

2011 restructuring
Subcomponent i: strengthened the CN-PSE’s capacity at the central and deconcentrated levels to monitor civil works – increased emphasis
Subcomponent ii: dropped construction and rehabilitation of education offices;
Subcomponent iii: strengthened the MEPU-EC’s human resources management – increased emphasis; strengthened the MEPU-EC’s planning and monitoring capacity at the central, regional, and prefectural levels - added
Subcomponent iv: strengthened the overall management and coordination capacity of the MEPU-EC – increased emphasis (overall}
d. Comments on Project Cost, Financing, Borrower Contribution, and Dates
The project was approved on 30 July, 2008. It was part of a pooled fund of US $160 million with three contributing partners: the Education for All - Fast Track Initiative (FTI) Catalytic Fund Grant ($117.8M) at the World Bank; the French Development Agency (Agence Francais de developpement - AFD) (USD $15.2M), and German Development Cooperation (Kreditanstalt fur Wiederaufbau - KfW) (US$27M). The project was to support the government's education sector plan, but no specific borrower contribution is noted for the project. The project became effective on 1 January, 2009, but a coup de etat prevented the project from becoming effective and led to the suspension of the Bank's support from the grant. When the Bank was able to re-engage with the country in June 2011, the project was restructured, and the Fast Track Initiative reduced the allocation to $65M, of which $24M was to be managed by the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) as the implementing agency and the remaining $40M managed by the World Bank as the supervising entity.

No disbursements took place between 30 July, 2008 and 22 September, 2011, when Level 1 restructuring took place on 22 September, 2011. The scope of the project was reduced as described in sections 2 and 4 and the Bank was to supervise $40M. Between 25 August, 2011 and 10 December, 2012, $25.56M was disbursed, representing 64% of the total grant. The project was again restructured in December 2012 to take into account the decision by KfW to withdraw its funding of US$27M. Between 10 December, 2012, and 25 December, 2013, the disbursement amounted to $38.67M, representing 97% of the total grant of $40M. Finally, a third restructuring was completed on 26 December, 2013, to cancel the building of secondary schools and to enable a final set of activities to take place (as briefly summarized in section 4) and the full amount of $40M was disbursed by the end of 31 December, 2014.

3. Relevance of Objectives & Design

a. Relevance of Objectives
The main objectives were largely consistent with the 2004-2006 Country Assistance Strategy (Report No: 25925 GUI), which noted serious disparities and management weakness in education which would impact achievement of the having all children complete primary education by 2015 (pg. 6), as well as with the Interim Country Strategy (FY11-12), which outlined the Bank's re-engagement with the country and reemphasized education as part of the Bank's traditional work (Interim Strategy Note, report no. 59671-GN, pg. 17,24,27).

At the time of project closing, the World Bank Group's country partnership strategy (CPS) for Guinea for the period FY14-17 stated its priority for being a "...key partner in building systems to improve lagging human development indicators for absolute poverty reduction through more efficient and transparent allocation of resources, and to build shared prosperity by aligning the business environment and education system with Guinea's economy" (Report number 76230-GN, pg. 1). More specifically, the strategy noted that overall and gender equality related gains had been made in primary education over the past decade, and between 1999 and 2010, the net primary enrollment rate increased from 43 percent to 77 percent. The ratio of female to male enrollment rates increased from 0.64 to 0.84. However, a learning assessment conducted in 2012 in grades 2, 3, and 4 suggested that additional efforts were needed to increase primary completion rates, achieve gender parity, improve learning outcomes, and make education more relevant to the needs of the labor market.

The CPS noted that less than 3 percent of the GDP was geared towards education, with intra-sector allocations misaligned with the improvement needs in the sector and the millennium development goals (pg. 14; no specific year is noted for the GDP). The CPS affirmed that "...to strengthen the lagging human development indicators in Guinea, the Bank will continue to be the leading partner in basic education, social protection and health. In basic education, the Bank will start the preparation of a new Basic Education project, funded by the Global Partnership for Education for which the Bank has been elected as the supervising entity“ (pg. 30).

Thus, most of the project's original objectives were relevant at the time of project closing on December 31, 2014. The original objectives of
"improving access" and "improving quality" were quite broad and included activities on pre-school as well as non-formal education, which are broadly relevant but not directly related to the Bank's strategy related to primary and secondary education.

The objectives were revised under the 2011 restructuring and the focus on non-formal and pre-school education was dropped, thus concentrating only on basic education, bringing the project in closer alignment with the Bank’s strategy.

b. Relevance of Design

The stated objective of the original project was to promote equitable access to and quality in education at all levels, with a focus on primary education and literacy training while also strengthening central and deconcentrated management of the education system (Grant Agreement, pg. 4). The three specific objectives focused on improving access, improving quality, and improving management. As originally designed, there was a plausible link between the stated outcomes of increasing access and the outputs and activities planned, mainly through the provision of needed infrastructure, training, and activities to boost the demand for education, especially for girls (e.g., private tutoring for girls). The project was also to focus on mentally and/or physically handicapped children and primary access for children with special needs as part of the first component, for which it included targeted activities covering additional teacher training, educational materials, and civil works. Equity with respect to poverty was addressed by focusing the first component only on nine poorest prefectures (the precise level of poverty not defined in the ICR) and therefore targeting underserved populations. Similarly, there was a plausible case for improving quality, with activities and outputs for achieving this objective encompassing infrastructure development for teacher training (thereby developing a larger and higher quality workforce), training of teachers, provision of textbooks and teaching materials, provision of block grants to schools and prefectural education departments to develop improvement plans, conducting learning assessments, and reforming higher education.

A number of activities and outputs were planned to achieve improved management, with the expected outcome of a higher proportion of government funding allocated for basic education. However, the link between improved infrastructure and management capacity to higher budget allocations for education was tenuous at best, although a case could have been made for more efficient use of resources. Finally, the project noted gender disparities both in access to and the quality of education outcomes for girls. However, the design did not address how such disparities would be addressed comprehensively across the grades in basic education, although it included private tutoring for girls in Grade 6 in selected schools with the highest dropout rates. Although the project was designed to respond to the government’s Education Sector Plan and address it broadly, as the ICR notes, the design was complex and ambitious, given the fragile political environment at the time (ICR pg. 11) and the high level of coordination that would be required across government agencies and levels, and among the development partners (ICR pg. 12). Relevance of the project’s original design is therefore rated Modest.

The scope of the project was subsequently reduced with the 2011 (Level 1), 2012, and 2013 restructurings, and the design was commensurately simplified and narrowed to cover basic education, with activities plausibly addressing the key drivers of outcomes in this subsector. To fit within the reduced funding envelope, the number of activities was reduced and refocused (e.g., promoting school demand through social mobilization and private tutoring for girls, and establishing partnerships with the private sector), and the results framework was adjusted to capture more succinctly the outputs and outcomes expected for access (enrollment ratios), quality (learning outcomes) and management (implementation of the annual budgeted plans).

The expenditure-related outcome linked to improved management was appropriately dropped, and the project identified several aspects of capacity under “Improving Management,” to be built through specific activities.

4. Achievement of Objectives (Efficacy)
**Objective 1**

**Objective**
Improving equitable access to literacy training

**Rationale**
Due to non-payment of arrears, the Bank formally disengaged from the country; relations normalized only in 2011, which led to a project restructuring in August 2011. The grant did not disburse during this period. This objective was dropped as part of the 2011 restructuring, and no outputs or outcomes are noted under this objective.

**Rating**
Negligible

**Revised Objective**
Not applicable because this objective was dropped.

**Revised Rationale**
Not applicable because this objective was dropped.

**Revised Rating**
Not Rated/Not Applicable

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**Objective 2**

**Objective**
Improving equitable access to basic education

**Rationale**
Three outcomes were measured as part of this broad objective: access to first grade, Gross Enrollment Rate (GER), and total number of beneficiaries reached.

Access rate in first grade increased from a baseline of 82.4% in 2009 to 86% in 2014. The rate fell short of the original target of 88% but exceeded the revised targets of 85% set in 2011 and 84% set in 2012.

For girls, access rate increased from 77.9% in 2009 to 81.2% in 2014. The achievement fell slightly short of the target of 82% set in 2011, but exceeded the target of 80% set in 2012.

GER improved from 47% in 2009 to 57% in 2014 in the 9 targeted prefectures. It exceeded both sets of revised targets of 55% set in 2011 and 51% set in 2012. For girls, the rate improved from 43% in 2009 to 53% in 2014, and exceeded the revised targets of 51% set in 2011 and 46% set in 2012.

A total of 1.87 million beneficiaries were reached, including students and teachers, exceeding the original target of 1.55 set in 2011 and the revised target of 1.82 set in 2012. Forty-eight percent of the beneficiaries were female.

**Improving Access: Indicators Status – Rate for Girls in Brackets (from results framework, section F, and ICRR pages 20-25)**

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<tr>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>Baseline</th>
<th>Original/Revised</th>
<th>Revised</th>
<th>Revised</th>
<th>Closing</th>
<th>Comments</th>
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</thead>
</table>

---
### Access rate in first grade (% girls in brackets)

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<th>Revised Target - 2011</th>
<th>Target – 2012</th>
<th>Target – 2013</th>
<th>Status</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>77% (2007)</td>
<td>88% original (TBD)</td>
<td>84% (80%) Revised</td>
<td>No revisions</td>
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<tr>
<td>82.4% (77.7%) (2009)</td>
<td>85% (82%) Revised</td>
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ICR section F notes 40% as the target for girls for 2013 (much lower than in Annex 10 – 80%). Annex 10 also provides the target but Section F notes no target for end-2012.

### GER primary (% girls in brackets)

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<th>Revised and refocused only for 9 targeted prefectures</th>
<th>Target – 2012</th>
<th>Target – 2013</th>
<th>Status</th>
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<tbody>
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<td>79% (2007)</td>
<td>90% original</td>
<td>51% (46%) Revised</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>47% (43%) (2009)</td>
<td>55% (51%) Revised</td>
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</table>

### Total project beneficiaries (of which % are female)

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<tr>
<th>Revised Target - 2011</th>
<th>Target – 2012</th>
<th>Target – 2013</th>
<th>Status</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0 (2009)</td>
<td>No original target</td>
<td>1,819,763</td>
<td>1,870,408 (48%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1,548,282 (48%) New indicator</td>
<td></td>
<td>Discrepancy with Annex, which states 1,819,763 as new target for 12/31/2014, and 1,727,700 as the target for end of 2013</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In terms of key outputs, by 31 December, 2014, 1,698 classrooms had been constructed and furnished (exceeding the revised target of 1,660 in 2011). Although private tutoring for girls was included under objective one, it is discussed under objective 2, as it was related to the indicator for girls' success rate at the 7th grade entrance exam (see objective 2, below).

Overall, the ICR findings show that the end-of-project access-related outcomes and outputs fell short of the original targets, but largely met or exceeded the final, revised targets in terms of improving access. However, the ICR provides no information on the access rates for children with special needs, although this was an integral part of the broad access objective. In addition, it is important to note that the ICR does not discuss how factors other than the specific activities and outputs might have affected this project outcome. Although the availability of infrastructure (and other project inputs) is highly likely to have contributed to improved access, a discussion of whether or not other factors played a role would have been useful to substantiate the underlying contributing factors.

Based on current information, therefore, achievement of this objective is rated modest under the original targets, and substantial under the revised targets of 2011 and 2012.

### Rating

Modest

### Revised Objective

This objective itself was not changed. However, key outcome targets were changed.

### Revised Rationale

This objective itself was not changed. However, key outcome targets were changed. See the discussion above. Achievement of this objective was rated modest under the original targets, and substantial under the revised targets.
Objective 3

Objective
Improving quality of literacy training

Rationale
Due to non-payment of arrears, the Bank formally disengaged from the country, with relations normalizing only in 2011, which led to a project restructuring in August 2011. The grant did not disburse during this period, and this objective was dropped as part of the 2011 restructuring. Not outputs and outcomes are noted for this objective.

Rating
Negligible

Revised Objective
Not applicable because this objective was dropped.

Revised Rationale
Not applicable because this objective was dropped.

Revised Rating
Not Rated/Not Applicable

Objective 4

Objective
Improving quality of basic education

Rationale
Two outcomes were measured as part of this broad objective: the pass rate for grade 3 French and girls' success rate at 7th grade entrance examination.

Pass rate for grade 3 French improved from a baseline of 14.25% in mid-2012 to 15.36% by the end of the project in 2014. However, it fell slightly short of the 15.5% target set in 2013.

Girls' success rate at 7th grade exam increased from 49% in 2009 to 71% in 2014, and exceeded both the original (63% in 2011) and revised (55% in 2013) targets. It was also higher than the national figures of 63% (public and private) and 58% (public only) (ICR, pg. 28).

An evaluation of school grants (for school improvement) found that the grants were disbursed in accordance with the procedures manual and contributed to reduced repetition rates, increased school participation rates, and improved grade 6 completion and success rates for grade 7 examination, also indicating improvements in quality. However, no data substantiating the improvements in these outcomes are provided (ICR pg. 24) except for the information on girls' success rate for grade 7 entrance in 100 targeted schools.
In terms of key outputs, 7,162,393 textbooks were provided to students (exceeding targets of 1,500,000 in 2011, 6,600,000 in 2012, and 6,726,933 in 2013). In addition, 3,000 teachers underwent in-service training, and “...80 percent ...showed improved results over baseline” (ICR, pg. 24). (However, the annex, pg. 75, shows the number of teachers trained as 3,400, not 3,000). This number was less than the target set at 4,282 in 2011 but met the revised target of 3,000 set in 2012. In addition, 554 teachers were provided rewards to incentivize improvements in teaching quality.

With regard to the focus on girls, 125 schools were selected and 250 teachers were trained in French, reading, and student-centered pedagogy, and 3,750 girls were provided private tutoring in French, math, and sexual education (ICR, pg. 42). (The ICR notes 100 schools in the results framework.)

A system for learning assessment was established at the primary level. Seventy-nine schools were implementing Reading Assessments, far less than the original target of 500 set in 2011 but exceeding the revised target of 60 set in 2012. The program also supported 20 new programs set up for primary school dropouts in four skills centers with training linked to labor market demand. A cohort of teacher trainers completed training in the TVET teacher training institute.

The outcome indicators provided show significant progress with respect to girls’ education in 6th grade, which prepared them for the entrance exam into the 7th grade, and the achievement of students on grade 3 French exam fell very slightly short of the target. However, other than private tutoring for girls, the contribution of project activities to broad-based improvement in the quality of basic education is much less obvious. A number of other important indicators related indirectly or directly to quality were dropped due to various reasons (i.e., completion, math learning outcomes in grade 4), which makes it difficult to assess how well the project performed with respect to this objective broadly across basic education. Student assessments were introduced, but the data are not analyzed and presented in the ICR. The ICR highlights teacher improvement over baseline, attributed to teacher training, but provides no information on the criteria used to define teacher improvement (although, according to the project team, pre- and post-tests were conducted based on both content and pedagogy of the in-service training materials, no specific data are provided in the ICR). For girls’ tutoring, the schools were selected on the basis of their dropout rates (information provided by project team), and data on how these rates changed and may have affected the number of girls taking the exam would have provided more contextual information regarding the efficacy of the inputs.

For lack of stronger evidence, this objective is rated Modest under original and revised targets.

Rating
Modest

Revised Objective
Not applicable because this objective was not changed, although some key outcome targets were changed.

Revised Rationale
This objective was not changed, although some key outcome targets were changed. See discussion above. Achievement of this objective is rated modest under original and revised targets.

Revised Rating
Modest
Objective 5

Objective
Strengthening management of education sector

Rationale
The main outcome measured for this component was the implementation of the Annual Budgeted Action Plans at all decentralized levels. Two other outcomes, expected increases in the "portion of recurrent state expenditures for education" and "portion of education expenditures for primary", were dropped, as they were not directly related to the project.

By the end of the project, 100% of the Annual Budgeted Action Plans were being implemented, exceeding the original target of 90% and the revised target of 95% set in 2013.

A number of training programs were implemented under the first component in support of the Plans, including workshop for construction supervisors and the development of a reference manual (ICR, pg. 21). In addition, training was also provided to build monitoring and management capacity at the regional and prefectural levels (but the precise number of trainings is not noted). The ICR also documents a number of key management-related actions (pp. 24): education statistics data were made available before the start of the subsequent school year; sector directorates were made responsible for executing their own budgets; and a manual of procedures was expanded to spell out the government execution of the budget within a medium-term expenditure approach.

However, the ICR presents little qualitative information how well the statistical information and the manual of procedures are being used, and how well the decentralized planning and implementation processes are working.

Nonetheless, achievement of the objective of strengthening education sector management is rated substantial, as the implementation of the annual budgeted plans is a major accomplishment, as are the processes put in place to ensure data availability and budget execution.

Rating
Substantial

Revised Objective
Not applicable because objective was not changed, although key outcome targets were changed.

Revised Rationale
The objective was not changed, but key outcome targets were changed. See discussion above.

Revised Rating
Substantial

5. Efficiency

The project was originally envisaged to close in 3 years, in 2011, but did not become operational until August 2011, when it was formally restructured. At this time, only $64M of the original $117 was allocated, of which $40M was to be supervised by the Bank. The project underwent two additional restructurings to extend the closing date to allow sufficient time for project completion (and to account for further reduction in funding from KfW in 2012). With smaller funding, US$40M from the Bank, the project still took three years to implement. The ICR also notes delays in project implementation, such as construction and assessment of learning outcomes, after the first restructuring (pg. 14), as well as delays in other activities (not specifically noted in the ICR) in 2013, again requiring an extension of the closing date to 2014, which potentially affected the achievement of PDOs adversely. Data show that several of the access and quality targets set during the first
restructuring in 2011 for project closure at the end of 2012 were not met (potentially due to the withdrawal of KfW financing), leading to the extension of the project closing date to 2013.

The PAD noted an economic rate of return (ERR) of 14.1%, but cautioned that even under good macroeconomic performance and tax collection efforts, the financing gaps foreseen for primary education in particular would disrupt the achievements unless efforts similar to the current project continue (pg. 22). The ICR provides no ERR calculations.

The ICR however, does provide some efficiency-related data. It states that the average cost per classroom built under the Pooled Fund arrangement was between $13,104 - $17,136 and compares these figures with the average costs for a classroom in Ghana at ($16,651) and Sudan at $30,000 (pg. 25). Similarly, average unit cost per textbook ranged from $.65 to $1.4, comparing favorably with unit costs from projects implemented in Ivory Coast, Niger, and Burundi (between $1.1 and $1.4) at about the same time period.

The project exceeded the revised access targets and the number of beneficiaries. However, whether these investments resulted in broad-based improved quality of basic education is not readily evident.

The project efficiency is rated as modest given the three extensions for project completion and the lack of robust data that would allow for determining whether the project funds were used as efficiently as they could have been.

### Efficiency Rating

**Modest**

**a. If available, enter the Economic Rate of Return (ERR) and/or Financial Rate of Return (FRR) at appraisal and the re-estimated value at evaluation:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rate Available?</th>
<th>Point value (%)</th>
<th>Coverage/Scope (%)</th>
</tr>
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<tr>
<td>Appraisal</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICR Estimate</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Refers to percent of total project cost for which ERR/FRR was calculated.

### 6. Outcome

The project ratings are calculated over the original and revised set of objectives and targets as shown in the tables below.

Taken together, ratings under the original set of objectives are indicative of significant shortcomings in the project’s preparation and achievement, and therefore result in an outcome rating of Unsatisfactory.

Ratings under the revised objectives of the 2011 restructuring and 2012/2013 revised targets yield an overall outcome rating of Moderately Satisfactory.

### Ratings by Restructuring Periods

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<tr>
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<tr>
<td>Relevance of design</td>
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<td>Substantial</td>
<td>Substantial</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Achievement of Access</td>
<td>Negligible</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[Literacy Training]</td>
<td></td>
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</table>
All Bank funds were disbursed under the revised objectives, leading to a final outcome rating of Moderately Satisfactory, indicative of moderate shortcomings in the project's preparation and implementation.

a. Outcome Rating
   Moderately Satisfactory

7. Rationale for Risk to Development Outcome Rating

The project was designed to support the national education sector plan and contributed to ongoing reforms and strengthened aspects of education management, such as the availability of annual statistics. The ICR states that another Bank-financed operation that was prepared in mid-2015 for US$37.8M will also support the government’s 2015-2017 education sector plan and continue the reforms (pg. 26). It will continue promoting decentralization and focus on quality and equitable access.

The risk to development outcome is likely to be modest, due to the key financing issue initially noted in the project appraisal document (at 36.2% in 2007, the share of domestic financing allocated for primary education was much less than desirable [pg. 5]), and which continues to be of concern presently. The ICR states that the government has pledged to increase this share to 46.3% by 2017 (pg. 29), required for gains sector-wide and for financing recurrent costs, but at the time of project closing, the government was facing fiscal constraints and was struggling with managing the consequences of the Ebola virus breakout. Schools were closed for several months and could result in the reversal of gains in learning due to loss of instructional time.

a. Risk to Development Outcome Rating
   Modest

8. Assessment of Bank Performance

a. Quality-at-Entry
   No Quality-at-Entry Review was formally completed. However, as noted in the ICR, the initial design was ambitious and complex, covering a wide range of activities across the entire education sector (pg. 11), including non-formal and pre-school education. The design drew on lessons from previous similar operations and experience in Guinea, and the project was in support of the country’s education sector plan. However, elements of the project required strong institutional and operational capacity of the government and coordination across a range of partners, including, for example, KfW, with their own constraints. The PAD in fact noted that elements of the proposed project had been
implemented before, but with some difficulty, and in most cases it was not possible to carry out an evaluation to assess their impact (Project Appraisal Document, pg. 4). The PAD had also noted a substantial risk of weak implementation capacity at the central level and low capacity at the decentralized level (pg. 21).

The results framework too was overly complex, but without adequate attention to putting in place systems to track and measure the core aspects of outcomes expected (e.g., education quality more broadly; and qualitative assessments of the changes in management capacity at the decentralized levels), as discussed in section 4.

Quality-at-Entry Rating
Unsatisfactory

b. Quality of supervision

The Bank team was proactive and moved swiftly to restructure the project once the Bank re-engaged with the Government in 2011. Missions were carried out on a regular basis, and the ICR notes that the team diligently supervised for the portion of the funding administered by the Bank (ICR, pg. 29). The Bank also played an important role in supporting donor coordination. The ICR notes that the M&E utilization improved over time and that the Bank exercised due diligence with respect to its fiduciary and safeguard responsibilities (ICR, pg. 29).

The question does arise, however, as to why the project needed the final restructuring in 2013 within one year of the previous one and whether the Bank could have anticipated the delays and perhaps been more proactive in helping to set realistic timelines. Taken together, these observations are considered indicative of moderate shortcomings in the proactive identification of opportunities and resolution of issues, and therefore quality of supervision is rated moderately satisfactory.

Quality of Supervision Rating
Moderately Satisfactory

Overall Bank Performance Rating
Moderately Satisfactory

9. Assessment of Borrower Performance

a. Government Performance

The coup in 2008 undermined the government’s ability to implement the project as originally planned. Subsequently, after the operation was effective, the government participated in missions and joint annual sector reviews and prepared the documentation required to review progress, including financial audits and procurement plans (ICR, pg. 31). Nonetheless, its level of resources to the sector did not remain consistent, and it underestimated the capacities of the various institutions on which it relied for effective implementation (ICR, 31). As noted previously, the government, too, did not anticipate project restructuring for the third time.

Government Performance Rating
Moderately Satisfactory

b. Implementing Agency Performance

During the initial period, from 2009 – 2011, the project coordination unit (PCU) in the Ministry of Education continued to function with support from the AFD and UNICEF. The ICR documents that soon after the Bank’s formal re-engagement, the PCU began work to adjust the project’s scope and design to fit the funding available. The Ministry coordinated the project with decentralized levels and also maintained strong dialog with the Bank (ICR pg. 31). However, the ICR also notes implementation challenges and delays that led to subsequent restructurings, including assessment of learning outcomes and construction.
Implementing Agency Performance Rating
Moderately Satisfactory

Overall Borrower Performance Rating
Moderately Satisfactory

10. M&E Design, Implementation, & Utilization

a. M&E Design

According to the ICR, the results framework (RF) used several of the government’s education sector program indicators for PDO-level indicators (pg. 3). Although the original RF contained 10 indicators linked with the three main objectives, they did not sufficiently cover the full extent of the program. For example, there were no indicators linked with literacy training and pre-school education, which were also part of the original program. In addition, the indicators articulated for the improved education management component were not directly relevant to the specified objective of the component. The RF also contained 29 output-focused indicators (called intermediate indicators), which were designed to track project implementation progress. After the project was restructured in 2011, the RF was modified with indicators focused more narrowly and appropriately on the project outcomes (e.g., gross enrollment rate for the 9 prefectures targeted through the project). The RF was again modified with revisions to the targets to reflect available resources after the funding of $27M from KfW was withdrawn in 2012, but the number of beneficiaries was increased, without an explanation regarding the apparent inconsistency between the two. The project is to be commended for having established baseline values for the outcome indicators.

The RF PDO level indicators by the end of the program were largely appropriate for access, capturing data disaggregated by gender. It should be noted however, that data disaggregated by children with special needs is not provided, although this was an explicit part of the first component with respect to equity. The indicators on quality could have also been more robust, and it is not entirely clear from the ICR why only grade 3 French assessment was used (rather than also using both French and Math as originally planned). Data on girls’ success rate for grade 7 exams is insufficiently contextualized, with insufficient information on the variable used for selecting the schools where the inputs were provided. In addition, national student evaluation took place for grades 2, 4, and 6, but data from these are not discussed in the ICR (see pg. 79). Similarly, the indicators for improving management were mostly output-focused, whereas information on how management was improving (e.g., use of the statistics collected and improvements in budgeting and so on) could also have been included and supported with qualitative data. The ICR mentions some key achievements (e.g., preparation of the medium-term expenditure framework, pg. 44), but much less is explained, for example, about how statistics were used in conjunction with the decentralized budgeted action plans. Overall, the ICR does not articulate clearly how the improvement of capacity is reflected through the activities undertaken (e.g., how the annual budgeted plans improved school management and how such improvements were identified).

Finally, the ICR mentions an evaluation of the school grants and how it improved several school-level statistics (e.g., pg. 25), but the specific data on improvement are not presented and the evaluation report is not documented. Information on teacher improvement due to training is also partial, as the ICR does not document how teacher improvement is measured (although, according to the project team, pre- and post-tests were conducted on both content and pedagogy of the in-service training materials, no specific data are provided in the ICR). It is unclear how this evaluation and the other review reports mentioned in the ICR (e.g., page 14) attempted to assess the contribution of the project activities/outputs to intermediate outcomes. Some of the 29 intermediate-level indicators mentioned could indeed be interpreted to measure intermediate outcomes, but others were simply outputs which could have had little intended contribution to the outcomes intended (e.g., textbooks purchased and distributed) due to a variety of reasons (e.g., nonuse by teachers, poor quality of materials).

b. M&E Implementation

The ICR notes that a unit in the CN/PSE (national coordination office of the education sector plan) was responsible for implementing M&E (pg. 15). An inter-sectoral M&E commission was established and a manual was developed for M&E. Data were collected through annual surveys (for information not collected as part of the annual statistical survey) and collated into a single database. The information was reviewed regularly and used during supervision missions as well. The Results Framework analysis in the ICR provides interim measurements for most indicators, indicating that monitoring was taking place regularly.
c. M&E Utilization

Information from the results framework appears to have been utilized regularly, as the indicator values were updated/changed based on availability and on changes to the project. The ICR states that data were used for decision-making on an ongoing basis (pg. 17) through joint reviews with donors. However, as noted under the design section, the evaluation aspect of the M&E system could have been stronger in order to assess the relative contribution of the various components to the outcomes expected (e.g., tutoring of girls and training of teachers) and used for robust planning and changes to the project.

M&E Quality Rating

Modest

11. Other Issues

a. Safeguards

Due to construction, the project was classified as an environmental category B project. Environmental Assessment (OP4.01) and Involuntary Assessment (OP4.12) applied, and an Environmental and Social Impact Assessment (ESIA) was carried out. The ICR notes that the provisions and guidelines of the Environmental and Social Impact Framework and Resettlement Policy Framework (RPF) had not been followed after the first restructuring in 2012. An environmental and social safeguards audit in January 2014 discovered that some clauses were not adhered to in some areas, but that these were minor and that there were no significant negative impacts and did not result in environmental and safeguard breaches (pg. 17). The precise nature of the issues is not recorded in the ICR.

b. Fiduciary Compliance

The ICR notes that financial management arrangements were deemed to be adequate and that proper procedures were followed through project implementation and all supporting documents maintained. Interim Financial Reports were prepared and submitted in a timely manner and were deemed satisfactory (pg. 18). Regular audits were carried out by the Ministry’s Internal Audit Office, and all of the audit reports were unqualified. The ICR further notes that the procurement practices were adequate and taken forward in a timely manner, and the bidding documents were generally of good quality (pg. 18).

c. Unintended impacts (Positive or Negative)

No unintended impacts were noted.

d. Other

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12. Ratings
### 13. Lessons

The ICR provides the following key lessons (summarized and paraphrased) based on project experience (pp. 31-32) that will be useful for future projects:

**Project designs benefit from taking into consideration the fragility of the economic and political environment.** The FC-PSE was designed in a politically, socially and institutionally fragile setting. The Pooled Fund approach to supporting the Government in achieving its sector objectives was appropriate in light of the 2005 Paris Declaration and efforts to promote sustainability of investments in the sector. The complex design of the FC-PSE, which supported activities across the sector, was reliant on strong institutional capacity and inter-ministerial coordination. Though the project was significantly reduced in terms of scope and implementation needs in response to reduced funding in 2011 and 2012, it may have been useful at either of these times to reduce the scope even further in order to better ensure the timely and effective implementation of project-supported activities and effective M&E.

**Pooled funding can be an effective mechanism for providing support to achievement of the Government’s strategic objectives in the education sector.** This project’s strong alignment with Government strategies and support from other DPs active in the sector including AFD, KfW and UNICEF promoted harmonization of efforts, reduced duplication of activities, and promoted continued support to the education sector during a period in which the Bank was only able to provide informal technical support to the Government.

**The Bank’s swift engagement following periods of crisis can be instrumental in ensuring that governments have the necessary financial and technical support to continue to implement their sector strategies and to provide services at a time when their own resources and capacity are more limited.** The timely reengagement of the Bank under this Project was possible, in large part, due to the proactivity demonstrated by the Project team in maintaining technical dialogue with the government (?) and with the DPs that were active on the ground throughout the period following the coup d’etat.

**The establishment of a robust M&E system is instrumental in ensuring that the outputs and outcomes of an operation are properly documented.** Through the M&E system established and used in the context of the Project required input from various decentralized levels, the information provided by this system was critical for undertaking joint annual sector reviews and for adequately documenting and reporting on achievements under this operation.

### 14. Assessment Recommended?

No

### 15. Comments on Quality of ICR

Note

When insufficient information is provided by the Bank for IEG to arrive at a clear rating, IEG will downgrade the relevant ratings as warranted beginning July 1, 2006.

The "Reason for Disagreement/Comments" column could cross-reference other sections of the ICR Review, as appropriate.
The ICR is to be commended for organizing and presenting fairly comprehensive and voluminous information on the various changes to the project through the three different and complex restructurings. However, it does not present some key evaluation-related information it refers to regarding outcomes (e.g., teacher improvement) and could be strengthened in its analysis of the contribution of the project and its various activities to the outcomes. In addition, some of the data are inconsistent between the results framework and the annexes.

a. Quality of ICR Rating
   Substantial