




Taking Stock of the Caribbean Growth Forum





Taking Stock of the Caribbean
Growth Forum

January 2016



Note: Because of the limited information this note is based on, its conclusions should be treated as preliminary, subject to vetting by the more in-depth assessment. The report seeks to catalyze discussion among CGF stakeholders on the way forward for the forum and to identify issues the in-depth assessment should address.

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Mr. Inder Ruprah (Regional Economic Advisory, IADB), Desiree Mitchel (Caribbean Department, IADB) provided additional inputs. Government focal points from various CGF participating countries also gave feedback.

The team is grateful for this unparalleled support and feedback, particular from the assessment countries.

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Executive Summary

This Stocktaking Report assesses implementation and performance to date of the Caribbean Growth Forum (CGF) in the 12 participating countries,ⁱ determines the value it has added, and identifies areas to improve in this participatory policy reform process.

The World Bank Group initiated the CGF in partnership with the Inter-American Development Bank, the Caribbean Development Bank, and Compete Caribbean, with support from the United Kingdom Agency for International Development, the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the European Union, InfoDev, the Competitive Industries and Innovation Program, Caribbean Export, the Caribbean Community Secretariat, and the University of the West Indies.

In June 2012, as the CGF was launched, many Caribbean countries were grappling with difficult external, fiscal, and financial issues (See Box 1 for CGF milestones). Recession, or at least anemic gross domestic product growth, prevailed in most. The CGF was created in this context to provide the private sector and civil society a methodology for shaping national and regional reforms and to help track the implementation of actions launched to spur sustainable growth. To date, the CGF has engaged more than 2,500 representatives from business associations, civil society leaders, government, media, the private sector, and indigenous groups.

Together, these groups focused on three thematic areas: logistics and connectivity, investment climate, and skills and productivity, under which participating countries identified 495 reform actions in consultation with private sector representatives and civil society leaders. Governments prepared road maps for implementation that included milestones and time lines, taking their cue from the consultation outcomes. They were to act on recommendations and report implementation progress to national stakeholders through accountability workshops. To date, 6 of 12 countries have held their first accountability workshop, and 4 of these have held a second accountability workshop. Six countries remain in the preparatory phase.

While endorsement of the CGF appears strong, progress is mixed in hosting accountability workshops and in implementing recommendations, due to a variety of factors discussed further in this report. In addition, regional reforms were identified during the consultative phase, but it was more difficult during the first implementation phase to identify regional champions that could take action on these reforms.

Despite mixed results, preliminary data for 212ⁱⁱ recommended actions shows that 53 percent of these have been fully or partially completed. National chapters during the Third Regional CGF in June 2015 unanimously reiterated their interest in the exercise, either by using the CGF model in whole or leveraging its tools and monitoring mechanisms, and integrating them into existing national multi-stakeholder platforms. As the CGF embarks on Phase II of the implementation of reforms, the Stocktaking Report provides an overview of the progress, challenges, and opportunities each national chapter faces in implementing these recommendations.

Key Lessons Learned

The CGF is influencing the way governments conduct business. These include:

Positive impacts

- Generating and disseminating knowledge to support implementation of reforms.
- Helping governments prioritize and better focus the reform agenda.
- Converting objectives into time-bound actions.
- Strengthening government accountability.
- Giving the range of stakeholders a voice, particularly private sector and civil society representatives, helping to establish social capital.

Areas for improvement

- Better define reforms, set realistic time lines and associated performance indicators for each.
- Include structured feedback-loops to help assess reform implementation and achievement of objectives, and identify additional actions.
- Enhance continuity of stakeholder involvement throughout the process with more regular feedback.
- Scale up outreach and media engagement to better engage all stakeholders and solidify social capital.

I. Introduction

1. The Caribbean Growth Forum (CGF) was launched in 2012 amid growing concern about slow growth in the majority of Caribbean countries. After good growth and improvement in human development between the 1950s and the 1980s, the region began suffering the impact of the reduction in trade preferences among major trading partners in Europe and North America. As growth stagnated, unemployment and debt ratios rose substantially. The social fabric weakened, crime rates jumped, and vulnerability to external shocks and climate change increased. Past attempts to address these challenges through the articulation of development strategies and reform agendas bore little fruit as political issues, financial-resource constraints, and limited government focus on results inhibited implementation. Reforms driven by external players, such as donors, also suffered.

2. The CGF was conceived in this context as a platform to catalyze implementation of homegrown development agendas through stakeholder engagement, greater government focus on results, and a culture of transparency and accountability.

3. The forum draws strength from its diversity of stakeholders, but this also poses challenges.ⁱⁱⁱ It must align multiple agendas and interests, and prioritize, resource, and program a variety of reform actions with appropriate implementation time lines. The diverse economic structures, performance, governance, and political economies, as well as the role of crisis in triggering reform actions, also need to be taken into account. Similarly, the experience (or lack thereof) and effectiveness of existing mechanisms for public-private dialogue in each country has affected the implementation of the CGF methodology. This assessment does not go into all these issues in-depth, but a more detailed assessment at the end of Phase II may address them.

4. The CGF began as a regional public-private dialogue mechanism for member countries backed by a methodology to foster dialogue that (1) is operated through an institutional structure consisting of a Steering Committee to guide the overall strategic direction; (2) an Advisory Board to guide the development and implementation of the CGF's work program; and (3) a Coordination Secretariat to carry out day-to-day operations. Annex 6 illustrates the implementation framework.

5. It was intended to add value in a number of ways. The initial round of national stakeholder dialogues, spread over several weeks between November 2012 and July 2013, aimed to help articulate objectives and identify related actions. It was designed to generate social capital to build societal consensus around development agendas. A short, but formal list of objectives and broad recommendations for action—with action areas converted to specific, time-bound milestones—was expected to help governments focus on improvements under three broad themes: (1) investment climate, (2) logistics and connectivity, and (3) skills and productivity.^{iv} A requirement to report every six months through an accountability workshop, meanwhile, was intended to generate a stronger sense of accountability within government agencies than had existed. Indications discussed in later sections suggest that some of this is happening, but varies by country (see Box 1 for detail of the CGF organization, thematic focus and stocktaking).

6. Notwithstanding its mixed experience, endorsement of the CGF appears strong. Stakeholders feel that it is useful and can be a powerful catalyst for collective action involving multiple stakeholders, and drive homegrown reforms and regional collaboration. This assessment concludes nonetheless that several areas of the forum need improving to realize full potential.

7. Even in countries where the CGF has significantly advanced, such as the Dominican Republic, Grenada, and St. Lucia, several areas of improvement were identified. For example, many stakeholders who participated in the national dialogues have not been engaged in subsequent exercises, such as the accountability workshops. As a result, the social capital created early in the elaborate stakeholder dialogues risks dilution over time. Within government, different officers engaged in CGF-related activities at different times without a critical mass involved from the early stages. In many cases, this has thinned out the institutional memory of the CGF within governments. While the accountability workshops have proven useful, the lack of interaction between government and stakeholders during the implementation period risks sapping momentum between them.

8. Scope also exists to improve the programming of reform actions, in particular by better distinguishing between medium-term actions (that may be implemented within a year) and longer-term actions. Other factors, including the allocation of financial resources for the implementation of reforms and the concreteness of reform actions, also seem to have had impact on the implementation record.

9. Finally, stronger buy-in from governments could help overcome some of these weaknesses. Examples include a formal petition to request and assign implementation responsibility to high-level government representatives. In addition, a mechanism could be established to link CGF reform implementation to budget exercises in following years, as discussed in this note (see Section IX) for further discussion).

10. This note reviews the work of the CGF to date. It also (1) takes an inventory of recommended reforms, and (2) assesses preliminary reform performance as well as (3) the value the CGF has added in its member countries.^{v vi}

Box 1: Caribbean Growth Forum—Establishment and Focus

Establishment

- **Launch:** June 2012 at a regional event in Kingston, Jamaica.
- **Participating countries:** Antigua and Barbuda, Belize, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Grenada, Jamaica, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Suriname, The Bahamas, Trinidad and Tobago. Barbados, Guyana and Haiti participate as observers only.
- **Regional events:** Three held since launch, including in The Bahamas in June 2013, in St. Kitts and Nevis in June 2014, and in St. Lucia in June 2015.
- **Supporters:** World Bank Group initiated in partnership with the Inter-American Development Bank, the Caribbean Development Bank, and Compete Caribbean. Supporters from the United Kingdom Agency for International Development, the Canada Department for Foreign Aid, Trade and Development, the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the European Union, InfoDev, the Competitive Industries and Innovation Program, Caribbean Export, the Caribbean Community Secretariat, and the University of the West Indies.
- **Organization:** A Steering Committee, an Advisory Board, and a Coordination Secretariat.

Focus and Stocktaking

- **Thematic focus:** Actions focus on three broad themes: investment climate, logistics and connectivity, skills and productivity.
- **Recommendations:** Participating countries identified 495 recommendations under these, in consultation with private sector representatives and civil society leaders.
- **Accountability workshops:** In addition to the yearly national dialogues, countries are meant to hold biannual workshops to make recommendations and report implementation progress to national stakeholders.
- **Milestones:** Actions are deemed (1) “on track” if more than half of the milestones related to the action have been crossed, (2) “in progress” if less than half have been completed, (3) “delayed” if work has started but no milestone has been crossed, and (4) “not started” if no initiative has been taken. An action is “complete” when all milestones have been crossed.

II. Methodology

11. This stocktaking assesses the working of the CGF based on (1) a database of reforms recommended by stakeholders in several countries during the CGF deliberations; (2) a database of implementation progress on the recommended reforms in various countries; (3) face-to-face interviews

with stakeholders in Grenada and St. Lucia; (4) focus group discussions with key CGF participants, and (5) an online survey of a broader group of CGF participants.^{vii} The first data set covers policies, reforms, and other actions suggested and agreed by the government, civil society, and private sector representatives during the national consultations in the 12 countries. It comprises roughly 500 actions agreed and published on monitoring dashboards each government uses to report on progress.

12. The second set arises out of the monitoring mechanisms in the CGF countries, including the biannual accountability workshops, described in detail on page 18–19. As Box 1 notes, actions are deemed on track, in progress, delayed, not started, or completed, based on the passing of milestones. The analysis in this note is based on data provided by the CGF focal points.

13. CGF value added is assessed with guidance from an analytic framework (see Annex 2), with interviews in two countries with government officials, private sector representatives, academics and other civil society stakeholders, two focus-group discussions involving key CGF participants from the 12 CGF countries, and an online survey of a broader group of CGF participants carried out by the Inter-American Development Bank. The stocktaking aimed mainly to catalyze discussion among CGF stakeholders on the way forward drawing on experience so far.

III. CGF: Core Features and Expectations

14. The Caribbean Growth Forum is a multi-stakeholder platform launched in June 2012 at a regional event in Kingston, Jamaica, where policy makers, civil society and private sector representatives from 15 Caribbean countries discussed growth issues. Supported by several donors,^{viii} it has aimed to help identify, prioritize, and implement reforms and actions to better enable economic growth in the Caribbean. It aims to do this while promoting private sector, academic, and civil society participation in public policy making, and has regional and country-specific dimensions.

15. ***The CGF was not launched in a vacuum; it was expected to add value to existing processes by better engaging stakeholders in the development agenda.*** Clearly, participating countries had been implementing such agendas before the CGF. The forum was established on the premise that a stakeholder dialogue occurring in several countries simultaneously would benefit formulation and implementation of those agendas and enrich them with wide-ranging views, aspirations, and knowledge. It would enhance mutual understanding among government and nongovernmental stakeholders, generating broad buy-in and, in turn, signal stakeholder's expectations to government. The CGF was also meant to foster a culture of transparency in policy delivery, building on new knowledge gathered and disseminated throughout the initiative on key areas of focus.

16. Importantly, however, existing institutions or public-private dialogue mechanisms were either in place or being set up in some countries, and these were not sufficiently leveraged to avoid misalignment with similar initiatives.

17. ***The CGF process was expected to increase the implementation prospects of reform agendas.*** Stakeholder engagement in setting the agenda was expected to generate momentum for implementation. Stakeholders would remain engaged and, through a structured accountability mechanism, follow up with

the government to ensure implementation of recommended actions. Thus, in each country, the initial round of stakeholder meetings that led to the setting of priorities and recommended actions in each priority area were to be followed up by Accountability Workshops every six months. Here governments would report on the implementation status of each recommended action. Governments were expected to rate the implementation status of each action as well as “Civil Society Observatories”, generating an implementation scorecard, then further summarized in a “traffic lights” report. The observatories were established as part of the CGF methodology, but so far have only been set up in the Dominican Republic (the Grenada and St. Lucia observatories are underway).

18. ***Governments were expected to undertake a number of actions after the initial round of stakeholder meetings.*** They were to appoint focal points to coordinate implementation, allocate responsibilities and resources within government, and establish an implementation monitoring dashboard. Where stakeholder recommendations were not specific enough, governments were expected to translate broad recommendations into concrete actions with an implementation schedule. To generate momentum, a set of actions were identified that could be implemented within 12 months. But stakeholders were free to recommend other, more impactful, actions that could take longer.

19. ***The regional character of the forum was expected to further drive reforms.*** It would provide opportunity to do the following:

- Discuss regional issues whose resolution would require initiatives going beyond a single country.
- Create peer pressure that would generate learning that could motivate and help countries carry on the CGF reform initiatives.
- Disseminate policy research prepared by the World Bank Group, Inter-American Development Bank, Caribbean Development Bank, and Compete Caribbean.

Since the first event in 2012, three follow-up regional events have taken place: in The Bahamas in June 2013, in St. Kitts and Nevis in June 2014, and in St. Lucia in June 2015.

The Bahamas meeting, one year into the program, hosted by the Prime Minister with participation from a range of ministers, allowed about 400 national stakeholders to assess each other’s priorities and exchange ideas with technical specialists and peers on solutions to the challenges in different countries. Prominent private sector representatives and other attendees sent a strong signal about both ownership and the credibility of the initiative.

The June 2014 technical level event allowed knowledge sharing, stocktaking, and capacity building among CGF focal points, government officials, and private sector attendees to support reform implementation across national chapters. In St. Lucia this year, participants deliberated on future direction, including a discussion on cutting-edge topics in competitiveness that could get CGF attention.

The St. Lucia regional forum in June 2015, hosted by the Prime Minister with similar participation as in the Bahamas meeting, presented the lessons from the implementation of the CGF and explored innovative ways to enhance competitiveness, support pro-growth policies and create jobs by adopting new strategies around two key pillars: i) trade and competitiveness and ii) entrepreneurship and innovation.

20. ***If the regional gatherings can address regional issues, generating peer pressure, collective commitment, and learning among peers, then the CGF can add value beyond typical country-level stakeholder dialogue platforms.*** While the Bahamas Communiqué of June 2013 confirmed the commitment of all parties to inclusive and participatory policy making, accountability and transparency in policy implementation—as well as to the CGF initiative itself—further analysis is needed to determine how much this commitment on paper has translated into reform actions on the ground.

21. ***Development partners divided their share of support for the CGF agenda based on their level of engagement and activity in each country.*** On core CGF exercises, the World Bank Group facilitated follow-up on accountability mechanisms in the Dominican Republic and seven countries within the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States, while the Inter-American Development Bank and Compete Caribbean supported the process in The Bahamas, Belize, Jamaica, Suriname, and Trinidad and Tobago.

22. The core CGF exercise has support from Compete Caribbean,^x the Inter-American Development Bank, the Caribbean Development Bank, and the World Bank. For the Dominican Republic, the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States and regional events, the World Bank mobilized about \$1.3 million over three years from its own budget and grant funding from partners.^x Compete Caribbean allocated an additional \$500,000 for implementation of some of the reforms.

23. The World Bank amount helped conduct analytical work (67 percent) and convening work (33 percent), that is, the CGF national deliberations, regional events, and national accountability workshops in 7 countries. This was about \$350,000 for seven countries for three years, or 50,000 per country per year. This covered consultants' expenses (facilitators, integrators), preparatory missions, and the organization of 16 events. In the case of Compete Caribbean, the program spent \$447,500 for national consultations, the Bahamas event, and some of the accountability workshops. Compete Caribbean also established a \$500,000 CGF Facility after the June 2013 event, to support implementation. These funds supported 10 technical cooperation activities to help implement specific CGF actions throughout the Caribbean.

24. The CGF was not conceived as an initiative to develop a line of business for development partners (that is, from consultation to prioritization and funding). However, additional funding and targeted technical assistance from governments and development partners could have created important incentive for maintaining reform momentum. Funding—either in ongoing projects or in new ones—could have made reform implementation more satisfactory.

IV. The Working of the CGF: Varying Country Patterns and Commitment

Launching the national chapters

25. ***The follow-up to the June 2012 CGF launch has varied.*** Twelve countries formally joined, established national CGF chapters, and held multi-stakeholder consultations between November 2012 and June 2013. They did so at varying speeds and with a diverse record of achievements so far (Table 1 lists the countries and their achievements). Barbados, Guyana, and Haiti, while not opting-in, participated as observers.

26. ***Roughly 2,700 people participated in the first round of national level meetings in the 12 countries.*** These resulted in close to 500 recommendations (see Section V). Each country was then supposed to start acting on the recommendations and report implementation progress to the national stakeholders through Accountability Workshops at regular intervals in Phase I (ideally every six months). The provision for such accountability mechanisms is good practice, especially where civil society participates in the accountability process. Citizen Report Cards are one such mechanism of accountability. These citizen surveys enable assessment of the quality of public services and help steer government strategy and allocation of resources to meet public demand.^{xi} So far, good progress has been made with such mechanisms in only a few countries, with the Dominican Republic being the most advanced.

Follow-up to the national dialogues

27. ***Commitment to the CGF varies.*** The exercise has advanced in six countries (Dominican Republic, Grenada, Jamaica, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines). And six others completed the consultative phase but have not yet gone much further (Antigua and Barbuda, The Bahamas, Belize, Dominica, Suriname, Trinidad and Tobago). Accountability workshops have been held in the six advanced countries: once in two of them (St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Vincent and the Grenadines) and twice in the four others (Dominican Republic, Grenada, Jamaica^{xii}, and St. Lucia). St. Vincent and the Grenadines was ready to hold the Second Accountability Workshop in April 2015, but lack of funds and the approaching regional event postponed it. Altogether, 21 national events were held in the 12 countries, including Accountability Workshops. Roughly half of the participants in these events were government officials, 30 percent came from the private sector, and the rest from academia and civil society.

Table 1: Timeline of CGF Deliberations in Participating Countries

Country	Phase I: Formulation of Priority Actions through Participatory Processes	Phase II: Implementation Start September 2013–June 2015		
		1st Accountability Workshop	2nd Accountability Workshop	Lead facilitator
Dominican Republic	November 1, 2012 (launch)—February 28, 2013 (completion of working group deliberations)	December 3, 2013	October 25, 2014	World Bank Group
Jamaica	May 2, 2013 (launch)—June 6, 2013 (completion of working group deliberations)	February 20, 2014	July 2014	Inter-American Development Bank
St Lucia	January 22, 2013 (launch)—March 12, 2013 (completion of working group deliberations)	March 6, 2014	December 3, 2014	World Bank Group
St. Vincent and the Grenadines	January 17, 2013 (launch)—February 22, 2013 (completion of working group deliberations)	April 3 rd , 2014	TBD	World Bank Group
St. Kitts and Nevis	February 26, 2013 (launch)—May 17, 2013 (completion of working group deliberations)	June 11, 2014	TBD	World Bank Group
Grenada	December 11, 2012 (launch)—March 15, 2013 (completion of working group deliberations)	June 25, 2014	12 February 2015	World Bank Group
Antigua and Barbuda	November 19, 2012 (launch)—February 27, 2013 (completion of working groups deliberations)	Delay Due to Political Cycle (no date confirmed yet)	TBD	World Bank Group
Bahamas, The	April 4, 2013 (launch)—June 23, 2013 (completion of working group deliberations)	Delay due to tax reforms issues	TBD	Inter-American Development Bank
Dominica	March 22, 2013 (launch)—May 2, 2013 (completion of working group deliberations)	Preparation in progress	TBD	World Bank Group
Suriname	March 18, 2013 (launch)—April 19, 2013 (completion of working group deliberations)	Preparation in progress	TBD	Inter-American Development Bank
Belize	June 5, 2013 (launch)—July 18, 2013 (completion of working group deliberations). <i>No Final Report</i>	Delay due to conflicting leadership on CGF	TBD	Inter-American Development Bank
Trinidad and Tobago	May 8, 2013 (launch)—June 7, 2013 (completion of working group deliberation). <i>No Final Report</i>	Delay due to lack of buy into the accountability phase	TBD	Inter-American Development Bank

TBD = to be determined, green = done, red = not done.

28. Participating CGF countries may be divided into three categories based on progress: advanced CGF, moderate CGF, and early-stage CGF.^{xiii} The descriptions following are not a comprehensive account of the experience in these countries, and only illustrate broad differences between the country types. Importantly, the categorization is based merely on the number of accountability workshops held in each country and implementation record, as these workshops provided information on the degree of

implementation of reform actions. In Phase II, this categorization could be improved by assessing the resulting impact (macro, social, and institutional).

Advanced CGF countries: (*Dominican Republic, Grenada, St. Lucia*)

29. Strong accountability is an important feature in the *Dominican Republic*, driven by the observatory set up through the CGF. The country also has a long-standing Competitiveness Council, which served as the focal point for the CGF, and was key in mapping the reforms the CGF helped accelerate. The strong interest and high-level support at the Ministry for Industry and Commerce also contributed to the acceleration of reforms in the country. Hence, the accountability process allowed a rethink of reforms. It has helped identify more specific goals and gauge the needs of the private sector and contributed to more discipline in the collaboration between government and the private sector. Nonetheless, (1) the difficulty of carrying out legal reforms, and (2) limited funding has constrained reform implementation.

30. In *Grenada*, the CGF has been able to transcend political cycles and reforms identified through the CGF have become part of the National Strategy Plan 2030. The Social Partners committee, which is currently monitoring the International Monetary Fund (IMF) program, is set out to serve as the civil society observatory for the CGF, maintaining the same multi-stakeholder elements. A framework for reporting progress on CGF actions to the committee now needs to be implemented.

31. In *St. Lucia*, turn out was strong during the initial dialogue phase and the private sector participation in subsequent work was also strong. Stakeholder interest was bolstered by the involvement of the multilateral partners, which helped counter the perception that it could turn into another government-led talk shop. However, it is important to note that the first government focal point—the National Competitiveness and Productivity Council—was replaced, resulting in two parallel and independent public-private dialogue processes. It is important to ensure the two processes complement each other, to set up a civic observatory, and arrange more interaction between accountability workshops to pressure government to deliver. Although many reforms that came out of the initial consultations were already on the government’s agenda, the CGF helped prioritize them. CGF participants feel that it is critical to have a champion in government to keep agendas moving forward.

Moderate CGF countries (*Jamaica, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Vincent and the Grenadines*)

32. In *Jamaica*, when the CGF was introduced, the National Competitiveness Council was already in place. The CGF methodology helped better engage the private sector and streamline the thematic groups. The country was also beginning negotiations with the IMF over a new arrangement which would include selected elements of the Government’s Growth Agenda. The Growth Agenda Sub-Committee, informed by the CGF exercise, has been set up to advance the Government’s Growth Agenda. The eight-member committee meets regularly and uses a methodology for tracking implementation progress that is based on the CGF accountability framework.

33. *St. Kitts and Nevis* has no a homegrown public-private dialogue framework or platform. Ad hoc funding has handicapped the CGF exercise. Some had expected that, after the CGF process had generated

recommendations, funding for implementation from the donor community and government would follow, but this has not materialized.

34. The CGF in *St. Vincent and the Grenadines* has advanced significantly even as natural disasters have impeded or diverted attention away from reforms. Funding during implementation was a major constraint. But the country completed the first accountability workshop and is keen to undertake the second.

Early Stage CGF countries: (Antigua and Barbuda, The Bahamas, Belize, Dominica, Suriname, Trinidad and Tobago)

35. In the *Bahamas*, the CGF helped inform the National Development Plan: Vision 2040, which provides a roadmap for the future development of the country. Nevertheless, the actual CGF value added fell short of expectations. The country has no shortage of studies, but is deficient on implementation. Officials need to determine the role the CGF can play after the initial launch, for example, in supporting implementation of reforms, and possibly including as a delivery unit and as a rapid response facility to help fill knowledge gaps that impede reform implementation.

36. The Economic Development Council in *Belize*, meanwhile, used the CGF consultation process and broad themes, which are now part of the council. From the Belizean perspective, given institutional arrangements already in place, the CGF was not meant to be a standalone initiative or program, but to support other initiatives. According to stakeholders there, the next CGF phase could be used in a smaller set of countries where homegrown programs are nascent, and where the CGF value added could be adapted to the local public-private dialogue institutional arrangements.

37. In *Dominica*, the CGF process started off well and had stakeholder support, but lacked a champion within government and high-level commitment, the latter partly explaining the former.

38. In *Suriname*, initial momentum existed to implement the actions, as the country was quite advanced in identifying medium and long-term action plans for competitiveness and growth. But, as in Dominica, this was lost due to lack of high-level commitment and follow up from the government. The budget and government plans support some actions that are part of the government's action plan, but the CGF methodology has not been leveraged sufficiently to support reform implementation and stakeholder accountability. Appetite exists to use the CGF framework further, but the country needs more hands-on support to implement it.

39. The CGF exercise in *Trinidad and Tobago* did not identify concrete details for implementation using a particular framework, in that existing public-private dialogue mechanisms drove agreed reforms prior to the CGF launch. Instead, the CGF consultations identified general objectives and actions. Participants during the initial consultations for the three thematic groups also seemed to lack the knowledge and time to propose well-informed next steps or reform actions. The time lines were also difficult to meet due to varying levels of information on different themes.


Following the 2013 CGF meeting in the Bahamas, the Trinidad and Tobago chapter became relatively dormant, with little follow up given that an existing reform program under the Economic Development Board was already working on many of the issues identified through the CGF consultations. For the CGF methodology to have worked, more hands-on engagement from government was needed (a champion within government should have been identified). It should also have created a link between its own ongoing efforts and the CGF process. Without this, such exercises may turn into a talk shop with little interest for the private sector. Finally, as implementation was meant to start, Trinidad and Tobago was fully invested in preparations to host a regional business event. This appears to have distracted the government.

V. The Reform Agenda Recommended by the CGF

Thematic breakdown of actions recommended at national workshops

40. **The focus on the three broad themes—again, logistics and connectivity, investment climate, and skills and productivity—was decided at the initial CGF meeting in Jamaica in 2012.** The recommendations that emerged from the CGF national deliberations reflect these themes (Figure 1), with further break down of the three areas in Figure 2. The distribution of recommendations across these three themes do not reflect any strong preference.



Figure 1: Overall Distribution of CGF Recommendations by Major Theme




41. At the country level, the picture is different, with widely differing priorities, as judged by the number of recommendations (Figure 3). Logistics and connectivity comes out on top in and the Bahamas, Grenada, and Jamaica. For stakeholders in Belize, the Dominican Republic, and St. Vincent and the Grenadines, investment climate is by far the most important priority. It is also important in Antigua and

Barbuda, although here it competes with logistics and connectivity. Finally, skills and productivity is the top priority in Trinidad and Tobago (by far) and in Dominica.

Figure 2: Distribution of CGF Recommendations by Subtheme




ICT = information and communications technology.



SME = small and medium enterprise.

Figure 3: Distribution of CGF Recommendations by Major Theme and Country (% share)



42. **Numbers alone do not provide a full picture.** Of course, analysis based solely on number of recommendations is fraught, since numbers do not necessarily reflect the potential impact of the recommendations. For example, a reform to an important law may count as a single recommendation, but may carry profound impact. Stakeholders may have also refrained from making recommendations in some cases in areas where ongoing programs existed. For example, education quality, skills, and productivity issues are of utmost importance to the competitiveness of the Dominican Republic. That they were not highly prioritized in the CGF may be because the government was implementing the parallel Dominican Initiative for Education Quality, using the same methodology and with the support of the World Bank Group, other development partners, and broad-based civil society participation.

43. Assessing whether a strong thematic preference exists in the recommendations in individual countries therefore requires analysis of the nature of the recommendations. If the priorities as indicated in the figures stand this scrutiny, and if the CGF country-level deliberations were inclusive and participatory, then the above data do indeed reveal societal priorities.

Concreteness of the recommendations at the country level

44. **CGF recommendations vary in concreteness.** A range of participants typically attend CGF deliberations—sometimes even students, or the indigenous community (as in Dominica)—with advantages and disadvantages. On one hand, it provides broad perspectives, knowledge, and insight, improving support for the recommendations. But this can produce a heterogeneous mix of

recommendations, some pitched in very general terms and that cannot be acted upon, and others more solid. The effectiveness of the CGF exercise in balancing the need for broad support, yet substance in its recommendations is therefore important. Table 2 lists three types of recommendations emanating from the CGF process in the various countries: very general, partly concrete, and concrete recommendations.

Table 2: Examples of Recommendations by Concreteness

Nature of Recommendation	Example
Very general	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Increase participation in education and training (<i>Antigua and Barbuda</i>) • Improve governance, accountability and sustainability (<i>Belize</i>) • Strengthen the relationship between the private sector and the trade unions to improve productivity (<i>Dominica</i>)
Partly concrete	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Examine the feasibility of creating a “single sea space” within the Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States (<i>Antigua and Barbuda</i>) • Create an initiative for micro-insurance (<i>Dominican Republic</i>) • Enhance legislation to facilitate enforcement of contracts (<i>St. Lucia</i>)
Concrete	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Introduce flat fee to register businesses (<i>Dominican Republic</i>) • Enact a small business development act (<i>Grenada</i>) • Create a national productivity council (<i>St. Kitts and Nevis</i>)

45. Table 3 summarizes the grading of the concreteness of the recommendations for each country. Roughly 28 percent of the recommendations were concrete, with 51 percent partly concrete. But countries differed significantly, with the proportion of concrete recommendations ranging from a low of 3 percent (Trinidad and Tobago) to a high of 67 percent (Jamaica).

Table 3: Breakdown of Recommendations by Degree of Concreteness

Country	Total Number of Recommendations	Concreteness Ranking of Recommendation			Percent of Concrete Recommendations
		1 = general	2 = partly concrete	3 = concrete	
Antigua and Barbuda	48	5	31	12	26
Belize	46	24	19	3	7
Dominica	40	0	23	17	43
Dominican Republic	60	2	35	23	38
Grenada	45	14	23	8	18
Jamaica	46	0	15	31	67
St. Kitts and Nevis	33	8	18	7	21
St. Lucia	52	8	25	19	37
St. Vincent and the Grenadines	28	7	17	4	14
Suriname	44	4	27	13	30
Bahamas, The	17	7	7	3	18
Trinidad and Tobago	36	21	14	1	3
TOTAL	495	100	254	141	28

46. This assessment of concreteness relates to the recommendations made by the participants during the first phase, which included representatives from government, private sector and civil society. Governments, in their follow-up, may further solidify actions by specifying implementation milestones for these. Grenada’s example illustrates this point below. A “golden rule” of the CGF was that government would not modify the results of the national deliberations in subsequent stages. To support the governments in preparing road maps for implementation, the CGF Secretariat facilitated a “CGF

integrator” to help public officials define concrete enough milestones that could be tracked during implementation. This exercise sometimes resulted in more concrete reform dashboards, while in other cases the stakeholders’ proposals remained very general.

47. **The implementation record for degree of concreteness of recommended actions:** Are more concretely defined actions likely to have a better implementation record? This hypothesis was tested for Grenada. In addition to the assessment of concreteness, data were collected on the state of implementation of the 44 recommended actions. The data are as reported by the government at the 2nd National Accountability Workshop (February 12, 2015). The scores are binary with 1 indicating completed action and zero not completed. The scores on these two dimensions for each of the 44 actions are provided in Annex 3. Table 4 provides the average implementation score for each category of recommended action.

Table 4: Relationship between Concreteness of Recommendations and their Implementation

Concreteness Category	Number of Recommended Actions	Number Implemented (by February 2015)	Average Implementation Score (% implemented)
1	14	10	72
2	23	11	48
3	7	4	57

Note: Score 1 to 3 in increasing concreteness.

48. The results are counterintuitive, since it appears that the least concrete recommendations have the best implementation record. There is at least one explanation for this. As mentioned, our measure of concreteness is based on the way in which the action was phrased at the end of the national stakeholder workshops. In many cases, the government subsequently identified more specific actions within each category, and the implementation record relates to these. Thus, for example, action 2.3 under the Investment Climate pillar—*Train and empower public servants and statutory employees*—which scored only 1 on the concreteness definition, was later specified as a series of workshops on topics such as performance management skills, customer relations, and communications. It appears that since a number of such workshops were organized, the action has been shown as “implemented”.

49. In this case, implementation may have been rendered easier because the more general action was subsequently defined more concretely. But this raises the question whether the mere organization of a few workshops truly satisfies the spirit of the original stakeholder recommendation. It may be argued that the organization of some skills-building workshops are low-hanging fruit that build momentum, but that more in-depth and medium- and long-term actions (such as ensuring on-the-job application of the training received in the workshops) are required to achieve impact. This points to a couple of larger issues. These include, (1) the appropriate programming of actions to satisfy a CGF recommendation (this includes the distinction between short-term actions, such as workshops, which get the momentum going, and the medium and long-term actions that lead to impact) and (2) the need to evaluate to what extent the more specific government actions lead to the outcomes and impact expected from stakeholders original formulations. Given the short time since national workshops were held, it is still too early to evaluate the impact of the reform outcomes.

50. A different example, but with similar implications, is action 1.4 under the Investment Climate pillar—*Enact a Small Business Development Act*. This is a fairly concrete action, but it has not yet been implemented. This reflects the lengthy procedures usually involved in legislative actions. In this case, the sponsoring agency, the Grenada Industrial Development Agency, drafted the Act, held stakeholder consultations on the draft, got approval from its board, and sent it to the Legal Affairs Ministry for vetting. In other words, while implementation has progressed, it may have been too ambitious to expect this to be completed within 12 months, again raising the issue of realistic programming of actions.^{xiv}

51. It would also be useful to assess reform implementation status for its intensity and whether reform benefits are for the few or the many. This issue may be taken up in a more in-depth assessment of the CGF.

Recommendations at the regional level

52. **Regional proposals have come out of national deliberations.** Some national CGF chapters noted the importance of regional reforms (Table 5). Implementation of regional actions is not the responsibility of a single country, however, even though regional treaties are frequently stalled due to ratification delays in national governments.

Table 5: Some CGF Recommendations with Regional Character

CGF Chapter	Activities with a Regional Dimension
Antigua and Barbuda	Facilitate free movement of people within the Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS)
	Establish a “single air space” within the OECS
Dominica	Establish a Maritime Transport Regulatory Agency to monitor rates and charges by shipping lines
	Eliminate the cartel of the international shipping lines
Dominican Republic	Improve regional cultural and transport links
	Increase Caribbean-markets-related knowledge
Grenada	Improve air connectivity—regional and international
	Conduct public awareness campaigns on regional opportunities/initiatives
Jamaica	Prepare a national master plan for development of a logistics hub
St. Kitts and Nevis	Improve access to trade and logistics information available for islands of the region
	Provide incentive and facilitate the expansion of services offered by cruise liners in St Vincent, Grenada, St. Lucia, and Dominica to include the rest of the islands
	Expand Port Zante to serve as a subregional hub
St. Lucia	Establish an online, one-stop shop for standardized information on trade and transport
	Review all studies on the rationalization of airports and seaports
The Bahamas	Improve knowledge of regional trade opportunities

53. **Results in this area are particularly limited.** The CGF has involved regional actors (CARICOM, Secretariat for the Caribbean States, the Caribbean Development Bank) and other development partners with regional offices (United Nations Development Programme, European Union) in the regional events, including in concrete discussions on how to find solutions to these regional challenges. This has yielded limited results, however, and a deeper analysis of this dimension would aid understanding of the complexity of a regional agenda.

VI. The Reform Implementation Record^{xv}


54. **Preliminary data suggests mixed progress in implementing recommendations in the six countries where CGF implementation has been stronger.** Of the 495 recommendations made so far in the 12 CGF countries, 173 were in logistics and connectivity, 189 in investment climate, and 133 under skills and connectivity. Preliminary data on implementation progress is available for 212 recommendations. Of those, 58 are fully completed, 54 partially completed, 82 are delayed and 18 have not started.

55. As noted earlier, the data distinguish between reforms based on the milestones that have been crossed: thus a reform is (1) on track if more than half of the milestones have been crossed, (2) in progress if less than half have been completed, (3) delayed if work has started but no milestone has been crossed, and (4) not started if no initiative has been taken yet on a recommendation. An action is considered “complete” when all milestones have been crossed. This adds a degree of rigor to the initiative. Government reporting on milestones is based on their provision of concrete evidence to the CGF Secretariat. The following discusses implementation in more detail.

56. Data on implementation progress at the six-month point (the first accountability workshops roughly six months after recommendations were finalized) and the 12-month (the second accountability workshops) are available for four countries: Dominican Republic, Grenada, Jamaica, and St. Lucia, summarized in Figure 4.^{xvi}

57. These findings reveal important country differences. For example, implementation appears to have taken off fairly quickly in the Dominican Republic, with 55 percent of actions reported on track by the 6-month point. By contrast, only 5 percent of recommended actions in Grenada and 11 percent in Jamaica were on track at that point. Implementation subsequently picked up in Grenada, with 57 percent of actions implemented at the 12-month point. But it continued to move slowly in Jamaica, with 26 percent of the actions implemented at the 12-month point. In St. Lucia, initial momentum appears to have slowed. The country’s implementation record was reasonably impressive at the 6-month point (33 percent on track), but improved only marginally by the 12-month period (37 percent). A large proportion of reforms previously listed as in progress have now slipped into the delayed category. The Dominican Republic remained the top performer, with a 70 percent implementation record at the 12-month point.

Figure 4: Reform Implementation Record at 6- and 12-Month Points in Four Countries



58. Some reforms are complex and past attempts have been unsuccessful—they may have stalled for years or not even got off the ground. The Insolvency Law in the Dominican Republic is one such; it was stalled for seven years, but after resubmission, has passed the lower chamber of congress.^{xvii} The CGF is addressing several other complex reforms with an extended time frame. These include the following:

- Tax reforms in the Dominican Republic
- Electricity sector reforms in the Dominican Republic
- Infrastructure development in St. Lucia
- Customs in St. Lucia
- Vocational and professional training curriculum reforms in various Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States countries
- Reforms of tax incentives for the private sector in Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States countries


A closer look at the implementation record: Grenada and St. Lucia

59. The data for Grenada and St. Lucia reveal interesting findings with potentially important implications. As mentioned before, St. Lucia had early momentum, with 33 percent of the 51 recommended actions on track at the six-month point, and another 20 percent in progress. Roughly half (47 percent) had delayed implementation. No actions fell in the “not started” category. In Grenada, by contrast, only 4.5 percent (2 of 44 recommended actions) were on track, with 55 percent in progress and 21 percent delayed. Moreover, no work had been initiated on as many as 1 of 5 (21 percent) recommended actions.

60. **Implementation progress may not follow a linear path.** Patterns reversed after the 1st Accountability Workshop, with implementation picking up momentum in Grenada,^{xviii} and slowing down in St. Lucia. It was reported at the 2nd Accountability Workshops that 57 percent of the recommendations had been completed in Grenada, compared to 37 percent in St. Lucia. Within each country, the degree of implementation progress across the three thematic areas varies (Figure 5). In St. Lucia, logistics and connectivity stands out as an area with a relatively poor implementation record, the other two thematic areas being close to the average picture. Only 5 of 19 recommended actions (26 percent) related to logistics and connectivity were completed, compared to the average of 37 percent for all recommendations. In Grenada, skills and productivity stands out for the opposite reason—a substantially above-average implementation performance at the 12-month point, with 4 of 5 (80 percent) recommended actions implemented compared with the average of 57 percent.


61. **The early implementation performance (at the 6-month point) and subsequent performance (12-month point) appears have an interesting relationship.** Figure 6 relates the 12-month completion rate to the implementation status at the 6-month point. In both countries, early momentum (or its lack) affects future performance. Thus, in St. Lucia, only 17 percent of actions classified as delayed at the 6-month point, were completed by the 12-month point, while 70 percent of actions assessed as in progress at 6 months were judged as completed at 12 months.

Figure 5: Implementation at 12-Month Point: St. Lucia and Grenada



The differences are less stark for Grenada, but the same pattern holds: 71 percent of the actions in progress at the 6-month point were completed at the 12-month point. The completion record for actions initially delayed (44 percent) is better than in St. Lucia. However, it is a little puzzling that in both countries, actions that were fairly advanced (on track) at the 6-month point were not as well advanced as one would expect. The completion rates at the 12-month point for this category is 47 percent in St. Lucia and 50 percent in Grenada, significantly less than for the actions earlier classified as in progress, but not on track.

Figure 6: Early Momentum and Subsequent Implementation Performance



What does implementation mean?

62. Table 6 provides examples of milestones associated with three recommended actions, two for St. Lucia and one for Grenada. Two of these recommended actions were in progress at the time of the 1st Accountability Workshop and graded as complete at the 2nd Accountability Workshop.

63. In St. Lucia, for example, a recommended action to “increase levels of connectivity and ICT [information and communication technology] in the island” had four milestones associated with it for the first six-month period. Of these, three had been crossed by the time of the 1st Workshop. These included formulation of a national ICT policy, cabinet approval of the policy and establishment of a framework and structure to manage its implementation. Additional milestones were identified for the next 6 months (not listed in Table 6) and assessed by the 2nd Accountability Workshop as having been completed. It is important to note here that the Caribbean Communications Infrastructure Program was in place and supporting the reforms either directly or indirectly.

Table 6: Examples of Milestones Associated with CGF Recommendations

St. Lucia		Grenada
<i>In-progress at 6-month point, completed at 12-month point</i>	<i>On track at 6-month point, but incomplete at 12-month point</i>	<i>In progress at 6-month point, completed at 12-month point</i>
<u>Recommended action</u> Increase levels of connectivity and information and communication (ICT) in the island (<i>logistics and connectivity theme</i>)	<u>Recommended action</u> Develop public-private partnership (PPP) arrangements (<i>investment climate theme</i>)	<u>Recommended action</u> Create structural links between agriculture and tourism, agro-processing and the wider economy (<i>investment climate theme</i>)
<u>Milestones (examples)</u> • ICT Policy 2013–2018 formulated • Cabinet approves ICT Policy	<u>Milestones (examples)</u> • Request made for technical assistance funding for the PPP	<u>Milestones (examples)</u> • Grenada Tourism Authority trains 21 artisans

<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Framework and structure established to manage the implementation of the National ICT Strategy • Hotspots established in key locations in St. Lucia 	<p>Policy framework (<i>only milestone for 6-month point—achieved</i>)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Public-private partnership policy completed (<i>milestone for 12-month point—not achieved</i>) • PPP Framework consultation, dissemination and awareness building held (<i>milestone for 12-month point—not achieved</i>) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • GHTA carries out a survey of its membership to determine the purchase of food locally • MAREP constructs 5 farm access roads • MAREP launches a Youth in Agriculture campaign to attract youth to agriculture • GHTA organizes nutmeg festival to link tourism and agriculture sectors • MAREP implemented the rural investment fund for community investment projects
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GHTA = Grenada Hotel and Tourism Association, MAREP = Market Access and Rural Enterprise Development Programme.

64. One of the recommended actions for the investment climate theme in Grenada was “Create structural links between agriculture and tourism, agro-processing and the wider economy”. This is a rather general recommendation, but it was translated into specific milestones, several of which are listed in Table 6. These milestones, and some others, were completed by the time of the 2nd Accountability Workshop and the recommended action was deemed completed. A third example in Table 6, a recommendation for St. Lucia under the investment climate theme—Development of Public-Private Partnerships Arrangements—milestones were not completed and the action was deemed incomplete.

65. An assessment of the “completeness” of reforms supported by the World Bank was also conducted. This does not refer to the wealth of support the organization provides the Caribbean region as technical assistance and lending. Instead, it takes a snapshot of how much World Bank projects and programs support specific reforms under the 3 themes in the 12 CGF countries, irrespective of its active programs in these countries.^{xix}

66. In the 12 countries, the World Bank Group supports 20 percent of total reforms (or 106), although with an uneven breakdown under the themes: it supports 33 percent of logistics and connectivity reforms (62 reforms), 20 percent of investment climate reforms (40 reforms), but only 3 percent (4 reforms) of skills and productivity reforms (see Table 7 below for details).

Table 7: Number of CGF Country Reforms Supported by World Bank Group

Thematic Area	Investment Climate	Logistics and Connectivity	Skills and Productivity	Total
Number of reform actions	189	173	133	495
Number of bank supported reform actions	40	61	4	105
Percent of reforms bank supported	21 percent	35 percent	3 percent	21 percent

Key Messages

- Logistics and connectivity gets the most World Bank support (35 percent of reforms) followed by investment climate (21 percent).
- With the exception of Grenada, World Bank support is almost systematically absent from the skills and productivity thematic area (3 percent of supported reforms).
- The three most supported countries are Jamaica (46 percent), Grenada (33 percent) and the Dominican Republic (32 percent). World Bank has very active programs in all three countries.
- The three least-supported countries are Suriname (2 percent), Trinidad and Tobago (11 percent) and The Bahamas (12 percent). These are also 3 of the 6 identified as “lagging CGF countries”, which have not gone beyond completing the consultative phase in the CGF process. The World Bank programs in these three are, respectively, nascent, provided on a reimbursable advisory services basis, or nonexistent.
- This analysis concluded, counterintuitively, that there was no correlation between the level of completeness of actions and World Bank support.

VII. Assessing the Value Added of the CGF

67. The value added of the CGF is assessed using an analytic framework, summarized in Annex 3, looking at Grenada and St. Lucia based on a mission to the two countries in April 2015. It involved consultations with stakeholders in government, the private sector, and civil society. It asks the following questions:

- Was the CGF inclusive and did it succeed in generating broad-based participation in the process?^{xx}
- Was the CGF able to create reform momentum and broad buy-in for reforms?
- Was the CGF effective in translating general aspirations to specific recommendations that are appropriate and actionable?
- Did the CGF have any role in ensuring governments put in place mechanisms to follow up on the recommendations?
- To what extent did the governments implement the reforms and did the CGF make any difference to the implementation record?

68. Grenada and St. Lucia were chosen because the CGF exercise has advanced relatively further there than in most CGF participating countries. This indicates (1) where the value-added can be if other countries advance the agenda; and (2) what the more advanced countries will need to do to consolidate their exercises.

69. The CGF has added value in a variety of ways in the two countries:

- It helped identify and prioritize actions relevant to the growth agenda.
- It increased government focus on the development agenda.
- It enhanced the accountability of public authorities to the private sector and civil society, and the results-orientation of government for the reform agenda.
- It increased government willingness to engage stakeholders in participatory policy making.

- It created the beginnings of social capital by deepening the relationship and dialogue between public officials, the private sector, and civil society

70. In Grenada, for example, government officials, from ministers to agency heads felt that the CGF exercise had engendered a degree of positive change in the way government and public officials operate. CGF participants found the convening of a diverse group of stakeholders to discuss development challenges and identify reform actions to be a useful exercise. All stakeholders, including government, private sector, and civil society representatives, welcomed the inclusiveness of the process.

71. At the same time, both governmental and nongovernmental actors in the two countries identified a number of weaknesses in the exercise. This note recommends several ways the CGF exercise can address these weaknesses and better leverage its strengths.

Setting a focused reform agenda

72. The CGF exercise has helped set a focused reform agenda in Grenada and St. Lucia, at least for the three thematic areas. Having common themes across all countries allows them to learn from each other and gives them clearly articulated objectives provided a sense of direction. On average, 3–4 recommendations were made for each theme,^{xxi} and 4–5 specific actions for each recommendation, giving each country a manageable set of 9–12 high-level objectives broken down into specific actions. Several government officials in Grenada commented that having a short, 2–3 page cascading list of themes, objectives, recommendations, and actions helped it focus on actions.

73. The recommended actions can be grouped into three categories: (1) those already part of government programs and plans, (2) those not part of a government program but embraced by government during the consultations, and (3) actions either introduced or modified by governments after the consultations. In the latter, public authorities were attempting to refine reform actions identified during the consultations, while ensuring consistency with the higher-level recommendations and objectives.

74. The CGF exercise has helped government officials in the advanced CGF countries focus more on the development agenda, linking actions more clearly to specific objectives. Development strategies and plans in the past were often merely aspirational statements and long lists of vague objectives with little sense of prioritization or clustering around common themes. Officials in Grenada and St. Lucia indicated that these strategies and plans often did not lead to focused action. Even where objectives were clearly laid down, the exercises were not results-oriented and government officials did not feel a strong sense of accountability.

75. As mentioned earlier, the experience of Grenada and St. Lucia are somewhat atypical since they are among the most advanced of the CGF countries. A broader set of information paints a more pessimistic picture. Thus, according to the majority of respondents to the Inter-American Development Bank online survey, the CGF made no difference in unlocking the implementation deficit at the national or regional level compared to previous existing participatory (public-private dialogue) mechanisms. Indeed, two-thirds of the respondents said that the CGF did not make a difference in unlocking the implementation

deficit at the national or regional level compared to previous existing participatory (public-private dialogue) mechanisms, while one-third said it did.^{xxii}

76. However, even in the advanced countries, no large cohort of people inside or outside government exists that has been continuously engaged with the CGF. Several people have got involved more recently and are unaware of the dynamics and thought processes that led to the choice of objectives and recommended actions. Many government officials, as well as nongovernmental stakeholders, appeared to be unaware, or vaguely aware, of the CGF exercise. In Grenada, for example, some officials indicated that they first came to hear about the CGF when they were invited to the meetings with the assessment mission. This is also true of some ministers. On the nongovernmental side, too, important stakeholders were unaware of the CGF, but agreed that the broad objectives were relevant for their constituency. It was clear, though, that had more people been involved from the beginning, they could have enriched the discussions and helped identify a more appropriate set of actions.

77. Nonetheless, even a small number of actors in government and private sector embarking on such processes is valuable, in that the results achieved in countries where the CGF process contributed to the implementation of reforms can have a demonstration effect for others. Reform champions do not appear overnight. They need to be nurtured. Often there are latent reformers whose reform commitment is triggered by others. Also important, despite the work of the CGF, the lack of inter-institutional coordination in the Caribbean is a major weakness. The CGF should focus on ways to strengthen the delivery capacity of the center of government and to ensure sustained engagement of the private sector. In both cases a little investment can have substantial results through a multiplier effect.

Enhancing the accountability of public authorities to the private sector and civil society

78. The accountability workshops have made government officials where these have occurred more results-oriented in the agendas they have agreed to at the stakeholder consultations, and engendered a sense of accountability. In Grenada, the lead-up to the 2nd Accountability Workshop led to an improvement in the implementation record. In St. Lucia, as we saw above, the implementation record was reasonably good prior to the first Accountability Workshop, but slowed somewhat after that. CGF participants interviewed in both countries support the biannual monitoring exercise, through which the government is required to report on progress toward completion of reform actions. Government officials say the need to report on implementation progress has generated pressure to show results. Even though public sector stakeholders confessed that the reporting process may not always be palatable, especially when things are not going well, they felt that it provided a needed reality check.

79. The monitoring dashboard generates both focus and accountability. The traffic light system's green light for actions considered sufficient and a red light if otherwise, has pressured officials to justify the adequacy of actions, going beyond the mere reporting of actions. The accountability framework is deemed appropriate by stakeholders as it is action oriented, but they suggest it could be improved by introducing more interaction between participants during the implementation period (in between the biannual accountability workshops).

80. Weaknesses exist in the accountability process nonetheless. Ideally, stakeholder deliberations that generated an agreed set of objectives, recommendations, and action, should be immediately followed by an identification of the specific actions to be implemented within a certain time period (say, 12 months), with intermediate milestones to be crossed in the intervening period. The choice of such specific actions and milestones would be based on a judgment of the feasibility of such actions (something government agencies charged with implementation will be most concerned about) and the adequacy of actions in meeting objectives (something stakeholders should be most concerned about).

81. In some cases, a small number of specific actions, undertaken over 12 months, may be sufficient to meet a stakeholder objective. In others, where objectives are broader or longer term, a set of actions implemented in a year may help advance the agenda, but not fully meet the objective. In such cases, implementation should be treated as ongoing, with a new set of specific actions identified each year to keep the agenda moving until the objective is substantially achieved. In either case, it is good practice to have up-front agreement on a 12-month action plan (with specific actions) soon after setting objectives. Government officials will then know exactly what is expected and gather the resources to start implementation.

82. In reality, the CGF process has not always worked like this, even in the advanced countries. In Grenada, for example, although focal points were appointed in different ministries and agencies for each broad thematic area, the actions required were not identified beforehand, at least not for all themes. Rather, just before the first Accountability Workshop, the CGF integrator and/or main focal point in government, asked different ministries to identify ongoing actions that were independent of the CGF exercise, but happened to be related to the CGF objectives. The aim was to use these actions to show implementation progress in the various CGF action areas. Thus, the Grenada monitoring dashboard, developed in May 2014 just before the first Accountability Workshop in June 2014, identified a set of actions already taken and a set of expected actions in coming months. Based on these, the Accountability Workshop categorized each action area (that is, not started, partly implemented, or completed). In this case, it is hard to assess whether the government took the actions to meet the CGF objectives or if these were already part of its plans. Hence, an attribution issue exists and identifying the impact of the CGF process would require a closer evaluation of each reform completed during implementation.

83. This ex-post approach has a major drawback in the lack of up-front agreement and clarification on the specific actions expected of the government in each action area, resulting in scrambling at the end to find actions. This suboptimal approach makes it difficult to assess progress. It also means that the exercise to judge implementation becomes more subjective than it should be.^{xxiii} Notwithstanding this initial deficiency, the programming of actions improved in Grenada after the first Accountability Workshop, with specific milestones identified well in advance of the second workshop.

84. Reform actions need to be clearly linked to measurable outcome and performance indicators and baselines. However, some of these features were missing in the methodology during the first phase of implementation. This would have facilitated the reporting exercise, in that defining when actions are completed makes the process much clearer, and strengthens the focus on the impact of each reform. Government stakeholders suggest that in the current scenario the goal posts were not clearly defined and

many delayed activities were reported during the accountability workshops despite the significant work done to achieve the objectives.

Building social capital through inclusive stakeholder engagement

85. Government, private sector, and civil society stakeholders appreciate that, under the CGF, a diverse set of stakeholders came together to discuss development issues, set objectives, and identify actions. It is possible that the selection of objectives and actions was not optimal in the first round, but it was useful that the stakeholders generated recommendations within a particular framework, rather than just talking.

86. Even in the countries advanced on the CGF agenda, stakeholders, especially in the private sector, worried the CGF could become a talk-shop—they wanted a process focused on implementation. Here, the monitoring dashboards and accountability workshops helped focus attention on results and ensured continued participation and engagement of stakeholders.

87. Stakeholder engagement triggered by the CGF can spill over into the participating countries. The CGF exercise started just before the 2013 national elections in Grenada, for example, and the new government, partly because it won all seats in the legislature, reached out to diverse stakeholders as part of a more inclusive form of governing. A Social Partners Network was formed, with a Steering Committee headed by the prime minister, to meet once a month. It also formed the Home-Grown Monitoring Committee to monitor the implementation and implications of the IMF program in the country. Potential exists for these exercises each to leverage the strengths of the other. The Social Partners Network can benefit from the CGF experience and framework, and the Home-Grown Monitoring Committee can work with the CGF on Accountability Workshops and Civil Society Observatories. Indeed, this has started to happen; the second accountability workshop in February 2015, the private sector observatory jointly prepared presentations and coordinated messages with the Social Partners Network. The CGF may thus get more traction with government in implementing its actions (see below).

Implementation phase coordination and monitoring

88. In Grenada, government officials suggest the CGF is narrowing the implementation gap in some areas and is moving in the right direction. But private sector and civil society groups feel that implementation has been slow and engagement and coordination with stakeholder groups limited in the period between the accountability workshops.

89. Coordination among government agencies appears to pose a challenge to the implementation of reforms. In most cases, while only one government agency has been assigned responsibility for the implementation of reform actions, coordination, and participation, it is also needed with other public bodies and the private sector. While the appointment of one lead agency is necessary, the division of responsibilities among the various players should be clear, otherwise responsible agencies may not take needed actions, leading to implementation delays.

90. Private sector and civil society stakeholders say that government consultation with them during implementation is very limited, in particular the six-month period between accountability workshops. One exception is the investment climate theme in St. Lucia, the reform actions of which fall mostly under the responsibility of the Ministry of Commerce. The ministry in turn has set up two task forces (outside the CGF process), namely the Ease of Doing Business Task-Force and the Trade Logistics Task-Force. These comprise government representatives, the private sector, and civil society. The former task force, by virtue of its mandate, monitors implementation of select CGF reform actions under the investment climate theme.

91. In St. Lucia, the private sector has also taken it upon itself to conduct an evaluation of the quality of key reforms through surveys (such as the import licensing issuance system). This could be replicated across the other two thematic areas. In addition, the private sector, represented by the Chamber of Commerce, the Manufacturer's Association, and the Coalition of Service Industries, has set out to jointly serve as the Private Sector Observatory. The group has requested support from the World Bank to build its capacity to undertake this role.

92. In Grenada, the establishment of the Social Partners Network can improve coordination and consultation. It is getting more and more involved in the implementation and monitoring of CGF reform actions. In particular, the monitoring committee for the Homegrown Monitoring Committee was recently tasked to serve as the CGF civil observatory. This is a significant and positive development, particularly as stakeholders feel that implementation thus far has not been sufficiently participatory or inclusive. The committee meets monthly and will support the removal of obstacles to implementation. Representatives of the committee say capacity building is needed to ensure it effectively meets its mandate. The trend in St. Lucia is similar, though more embryonic. The Chamber of Commerce, the Manufacturer's Association, and the Coalition of Service Industries are jointly serving as the Private Sector Observatory.

Sustaining institutional memory of the CGF exercise

93. Typically, participation of individual stakeholders varied during implementation. Three distinct groups of participants exist: (1) those involved from the start (from initial consultations to identify reform objectives, recommendations, and actions) and who remain involved; (2) those initially engaged but no longer involved; and (3) those not involved in the beginning, but brought in during later stages (either in the first or second biannual accountability workshops).

94. The first category is small, diluting institutional memory. Many stakeholders who helped prepare the reform recommendations were absent from the accountability workshop. No continuous engagement of stakeholders existed once the process of consultations was over. The output of deliberations was provided to the government, which then prepared the dashboard and defined and redefined actions. Social capital was created, but later somewhat depleted as the relationship was not maintained.

95. It is important to highlight the need for a cohort of people, especially from government, to stay engaged at all times and support the monitoring and convening of participants to work together in the implementation of reform actions. Similarly, while having a focal point is necessary, the ability of this

person(s) to convene and leverage participation of other groups and ensure sustained consultation and participation is key to the implementation of reforms.

Assessing the complexity and feasibility of reforms

96. Although the consultations involved a wide range of stakeholders, key participants, particularly technical staff from the government, were missing. This led to the premature inclusion of reform actions without the required prior analysis and earmarked financing, according to the government agencies responsible for implementation. In St. Lucia, for example, government officials with technical expertise and responsibility for the implementation of key reform actions were not present in the Logistics and Connectivity Working Group. This resulted in suboptimal sequencing of reform actions (prioritizing) with inadequate time lines for implementation (overly ambitious, especially for reforms that require longer-term implementation arrangements). It is important to ensure that government technical staff who understand the specific constraints to implementing different reform actions are part of the next round of discussions. This would ensure that stakeholders from the private sector and civil society are better informed of implementation challenges and can appreciate the complexity and limitations involved.

Timing of implementation

97. Both public and private sector stakeholders recognize that the time lines for completion of reform actions were not clearly specified or thoroughly discussed among stakeholders. Although the CGF's suggested methodology called for two accountability workshops per year (at 6 and 12 months), it was unclear whether actions needed to be completed by the end of the year or if progress towards completion was sufficient (for example, in the case of longer-term reforms). The reporting framework would have to be adapted to introduce the longer-term nature of many actions. A potential next step would be to convene stakeholders to agree on new time lines that more accurately reflect the effort required and account for implementation constraints.

Implementation constraints

98. Chief among these, limited financial resources affect progress toward completion of reform actions under all themes. In particular, government agencies highlighted that many CGF actions were not part of financial planning for the previous fiscal year. It is not clear, however, to what extent these reforms made it into the reform agenda and budgeting process of the various agencies in the current fiscal year. It may not always be possible for governments to commit the funding up front, during stakeholder consultations. Nonetheless, an argument could be made for respecting the priorities of stakeholders and including actions whose funding is not assured up front. The government should then make an honest attempt to secure funding and, if it fails, give the accountability workshop the reason. This would help increase credibility with stakeholders.

99. Limited analytical backing and feasibility assessments are another constraint to meeting the one-year implementation targets for a wide range of reforms. Limited capacity in government, the private sector, and civil society are highlighted as impediments to timely implementation.

Regional collaboration

100. Public sector stakeholders pointed to the need to look at regional issues separately and organize a coordination mechanism for regional peers to advance issues that require cooperation (such as transport and regional connectivity). They suggested that while the CGF is a regional public-private dialogue platform, regional reforms have not been a great focus in the national chapters, as noted earlier. Stakeholders suggested, nonetheless, that the regional event creates a positive sense of competition among members.

VIII. Experience with Stakeholder Dialogue across Countries

101. Several countries have set up public-private dialogue mechanisms that bring government and businesses together to identify issues constraining business and jointly agree on development priorities and the design of solutions. Often, the platforms also provide feedback on progress in implementing agreed actions. Given the broad similarity in their objectives, the rich experience of public-private dialogues provides useful lessons for operating the CGF. Some of the most important, along with examples of how specific challenges were addressed by public-private dialogues in particular countries, include the following:

- The success of public-private dialogues depends on the political will of governments to implement meaningful reforms. Businesses lose interest in dialogue if they do not see their recommendations translated into action (see Bosnia example in Box 2).
- Good secretarial facilities (not necessarily a separate secretariat) are needed to formulate agendas for meetings, ensure good participation and high quality of discussion, document discussions and recommendations, monitor progress in implementing recommended actions, and to be a depository of institutional memory.
- Dialogue mechanisms usually work best when they are not stand-alone initiatives but facilitate, accelerate, or cement other ongoing initiatives, which require stakeholder support for success.
- A good monitoring and evaluation mechanism helps keep the focus on results by assessing both the quality of work of the public-private dialogue platform and government responsiveness in implementing recommended actions (see Romania example in Box 2).
- Nongovernmental stakeholders can play wide-ranging roles in the functioning of the dialogue mechanisms. In some countries, the private sector has taken the lead in setting up dialogue platforms, which have then forged links with the government (see Bangladesh example in paragraphs 102 and 103).

The literature on public-private dialogue also confirms important elements of the needed framework.^{xxiv} Experts categorize the capacities effective public-private dialogue mechanisms should have, including for agenda definition, public coordination, technical and professional, budget influence, compliance

evaluation ability, legitimacy, officials with high status, adequate representation, and capacity to generate consensus, to name several.

Box 2: Case Studies from Bosnia and Romania

Bosnia: Public-private dialogue generating political commitment to reform

Bosnia's "Bulldozer Initiative" is an example of a public-private dialogue that successfully enhanced political will and capacity to act at the government level through a bottom-up approach. Using an innovative grassroots and public awareness methodology, the initiative mobilized the local business community (across sectors) to "bulldoze" barriers by identifying concrete legislative changes and advocating for their adoption and implementation. By delivering fast results, the initiative won the confidence of entrepreneurs, empowering them to institutionalize permanent grassroots reform committees. The force of this lobby group, the Bulldozer Committee, created political consensus by emphasizing the need to implement reforms. Most importantly, it carried investment climate reforms the last mile by delivering concrete recommendation that led to quantifiable results in all sectors of the economy. Politicians were provided with a mechanism whereby they gained credit for enacting reforms after much of the detailed drafting and canvassing had been done by others, in this case businesspeople. It was a win-win situation. Over time, the initiative established a dynamics of reform and public-private partnerships that facilitated the tackling of more complicated structural issues in the economy.

Romania: Evaluating the effectiveness of dialogue mechanisms

The government of Romania used a tool called the "Evaluation Wheel" to visually evaluate different aspects of the public-private dialogue mechanism. This tool is a widely known evaluation instrument, which addresses the essential components of an effective public-private dialogue process and measures how well the secretariat is performing tasks along the various components (such as the political will of government to implement reforms, the efficiency and effectiveness of the secretariat as the dialogue's "engine", and ensuring that the right people—those genuinely committed to reform—populate the working groups). This approach can help instantly spot possible problem areas or aspects of a public-private dialogue which can be strengthened. The Evaluation Wheel also allows for quick comparisons between public-private dialogues, and for the public-private dialogue community as a whole to be a valuable aid in tracking public-private dialogue dynamics over time. The Evaluation Wheels emphasize on process, structure, and outcome-orientation. Now a "classic" model of public-private dialogue, this approach includes a combination of technical working groups, a secretariat, and a high-level governance or oversight structure.

Additional evaluation tools

Other technological tools aimed at real-time connections may be used for monitoring and tracking. They include early warning systems for compliance with agreed commitments. For example, the well-known Smartsheet or Microsoft Project. The purpose here is not to be reactive, but proactive on implementation of the agendas and, at the same time, facilitate monitoring activities. These can also guide current expenditure items and multilateral source resources allocation to the development of specific activities or reforms.

102. Dialogue mechanisms take time to become effective, particularly in countries with a weak tradition of structured, results-oriented dialogue between government and stakeholders. Thus, while some quick wins can and should be achieved to establish the credibility of dialogue, it usually takes at least 3–5 years for substantial results to materialize. Bangladesh is a good example. Business associations have existed for many years there and, from time to time, have lobbied government for business-friendly policies. However, these were ad hoc efforts and, until 2008, there did not exist a structured platform which could ensure regular, and results-oriented, dialogue between the two parties. An interim, technocratic government established the Bangladesh Better Business Forum in 2008 and, by ensuring action on the recommendations, quickly established credibility for this structured dialogue mechanism. Unfortunately, the forum did not survive transition from a technocratic to a political government in 2009.

103. However, the private sector, having seen the benefits of a structured public-private dialogue platform, got together and, in 2011, established a private-sector led Business Initiative Leading Development (BUILD) platform. Government established the PSD Policy Coordination Committee within

the Prime Minister's Office. It is chaired by the principal secretary to the prime minister and composed of the secretaries of the various private-sector-development-related ministries and agencies, and private sector representation from BUILD and the key private sector associations. Being anchored at a senior level within the government, but within the bureaucracy instead of within the political government, has meant not only sufficiently high-level championship, but also sustainability—it has already sustained three changes at the level of the Principal Secretary, and has continued to meet actively. More importantly, the PSD Policy Coordination Committee has integrated BUILD as the primary source of reform recommendations for its deliberations. The government's responsiveness to BUILD recommendations has led to an impressive record of reform implementation and a robust dialogue process. The results are impressive. However, it has taken about six years to reach this point since the first attempt was made in 2008 to initiate a structured dialogue process in Bangladesh.

IX. Suggestions for Improving CGF Effectiveness

104. Based on the above assessment of the work of the CGF thus far, and informed by the cross-country experience with public-private dialogues, this section recommends ways to make the CGF more effective in the next phase.

105. The CGF may consider two broad agendas: (1) consolidating the CGF instrument/approach, by establishing proof of the CGF concept in additional countries (beyond the three advanced CGF countries, Dominican Republic, Grenada, and St. Lucia) and further refining the CGF instrument; and (2) aligning the CGF instrument and approach with other dialogue processes in the participating countries, recognizing their complementarities and establishing appropriate alignment.

106. *Refining the CGF instrument:* This would imply action on three fronts. First, the agenda setting process may be improved by generating more specific recommendations during the multi-stakeholder consultations and better addressing the regional dimensions of the CGF. Second, the governments may get better organized by setting up good coordinating mechanisms and allocating responsibilities more clearly within government, ensuring that a critical mass of government officials is involved throughout, and establishing permanent working groups for the various themes and delivery units (new or within existing institutions). Third, monitoring and accountability may be enhanced by maintaining regular monitoring and discussions with stakeholders and developing a monitoring capacity in the various government agencies and strengthening the results framework. Specific recommendations along these lines include the following:

- Make recommendations more specific during the multi-stakeholder consultative process to avoid ambiguity or conflict of interest in defining actions by individual stakeholders at later stages.
- Ensure that technical staff from the government, who understand the specific constraints to implementing different reform actions, are involved in setting the reform agenda.
- Strengthen the results framework with measurable performance indicators to better target interventions and facilitate assessment of progress. Indicators should be linked to the intended impact so that reforms yield tangible results.

- Better link CGF reform implementation to budget exercises in following years.
- Have a critical mass of governmental and nongovernmental people permanently engaged through all stages of the CGF exercise is important (that is, through setting of objectives, and identification and implementation of actions) and have the needed institutional memory. A critical mass of people is also required, especially in government, which is familiar with the CGF and strongly committed. Permanent working groups for each of the three broad themes would also be good.
- Have regular monitoring and discussions with stakeholders, more frequent than the half-yearly workshops. The various government agencies involved in implementation need monitoring capacity. Pockets of good monitoring and evaluation practice may exist in government, and these should be leveraged. More quantitative feedback from stakeholders on actions to be implemented will be useful.
- Set up good coordinating mechanisms within government, since many actions require involvement of multiple agencies. A leader (a delivery unit) to coordinate the implementation of actions, especially in cases where it requires different ministries and stakeholder groups, is also needed. Defining what is expected of each person is important and currently missing in the framework.
- Private sector observatories can possibly make decision-making more participatory by giving the private sector a voice and generate data on reform implementation, in between accountability workshops. This could raise government accountability. No guarantee exists that the mere existence of private sector observatories will make the process participatory or enhance government accountability. It will be important therefore to assess the monitoring capacity of these, under which conditions they can perform, and to what extent that potential is being reached.
- Filling knowledge gaps to influence policy and growth strategies appears to be an important subject. Stakeholders expressed interest in continuing work on the three existing themes, but also welcomed the prospect of including a sectoral and value-chain approach to promoting growth and employment. Sectors that may be considered are energy (reducing energy costs and identifying diversified energy sources, including renewable energy), agriculture (food security, agro-processing), tourism, including medical tourism, and transport (regional connectivity).
- Better address the regional dimensions of the CGF and get stronger commitment from regional partners.

107. One important area is media engagement in the CGF process, which has not been continuous. Media has only been engaged before events. More is needed, and that is informed by a good communications strategy.

108. Among its benefits, if handled correctly, the media can provide information about societal aspirations and concerns, development challenges and opportunities, which can help CGF participants set development objectives and identify priority action areas. It can communicate CGF activities, boosting awareness of the issues it is addressing and helping create consensus and buzz around its objectives. Media can also play an important watch-dog function, especially in the inclusivity of the dialogue process and the implementation of the agreed actions. Regular media reporting on stalled or slow-moving actions will complement the pressures created by the six-monthly accountability workshops and any internal monitoring and evaluation system the government may set up. A well thought-out communication strategy is thus crucial. Media capacity in the CGF countries therefore needs to be assessed before engaging it.

109. *Positioning CGF within the broader dialogue:* Multi-stakeholder dialogue is a core feature of the CGF. But it exists alongside other dialogue platforms in its countries, some established before and some after the CGF. These exercises vary in their coverage (some focus on government-business dialogue; others include a wider range of stakeholders) and degree of activity (some fairly active, others less so) (Box 3).

Box 3: Multi-Stakeholder Dialogue Platforms Independent of the CGF

In *Grenada*, a Social Partners Network was formed after the 2013 elections, with a Steering Committee headed by the prime minister and meeting once a month. A subgroup, called the Home-Grown Monitoring Committee, was formed to monitor the implementation and implications of the IMF program.

In *St. Lucia*, the Ministry of Commerce has set up two task forces (outside the CGF process): the Ease of Doing Business Task-Force and the Trade Logistics Task-Force, which comprise government representatives, private sector, and civil society. The former task force has been tasked, by virtue of its mandate, to monitor implementation progress of select CGF reform actions under the investment climate theme.

In *Jamaica*, the Inter-American Development Bank, as part of its program on competitiveness, catalyzed the establishment of the National Competitiveness Council, a public-private dialogue platform aimed at driving reforms to enhance competitiveness. The council forms part of the Partnership for Transformation, a broader dialogue forum that covers other issues and includes a broader set of stakeholders. This follows the Social Partnership Consultative Committee aimed at creating a forum for dialogue on issues geared toward improving the social and economic environment in this country between the government and key social partners.

In *Suriname*, the Suriname Business Forum was created with support from the European Union. It includes several ministries, industry and trade associations (including the Women's Business Group), academics, and civil society institutions. The forum is associated with the Competitiveness Unit Suriname, a government agency charged with analyzing and monitoring competitiveness issues and recommending actions to improve it. The broader stakeholder engagement platform, the Suriname Economic and Social Council (SESC) established in 2004 through a presidential decree, also exists and may complement the dialogue on competitiveness. It is intended to be a structured dialogue between government and various societal actors on a variety of social issues (publications of the SESC cover a wide range of issues such as social security, health care, community development and public housing).

In *The Bahamas*, Parliament passed the National Tripartite Council Bill this year. The proposed council will be a broad-based dialogue platform comprising the government, employers, and workers, and be aimed at promoting the practice of tripartism in the formulation of social and economic policies and programs. The council is also expected to cover private-sector-related subjects such as labor, productivity, and competition.

In *Trinidad and Tobago*, the government established the Economic Development Board in 2011. Comprising both private and public sector representatives, the board advises the Minister of Planning and Sustainable Development on economic diversification and sustainability. It is also mandated to help develop business clusters with a focus on financial services, tourism, food sustainability, downstream energy, creative industries, maritime and information and communications

technology. The government established another structure in 2011, the Council for Competitiveness and Innovation. Also associated with the Ministry of Planning and Sustainable Development, its mandate is to help enhance competitiveness and innovation in the economy.

^a World Bank Group. 2015. "Communicating Public-Private Dialogue." Module 3 of the Quick Guide to Integrating Public-Private Dialogue. Washington, DC.


110. The CGF initiative thus needs to be aligned with such exercises to prevent dialogue fatigue and avoid duplication, and because there are potentially powerful synergies between these initiatives. This can be explored at two levels. First, there are complementarities between CGF and the competitiveness-related platforms, such as the Competitiveness Councils, that address similar issues and bring together government and the private sector. Second, business issues cannot be seen in isolation from broader social and economic issues. Thus, the presence of broader platforms, such as the Social Partners Network (Grenada), the Partnership for Transformation (Jamaica), or the Economic and Social Council (Suriname) provide an opportunity to build additional buy-in for the CGF-triggered recommendations and provide additional drivers for their implementation.

111. The potential is evident in Grenada, where the CGF and the Social Partners Network can leverage each other's strengths. The functioning of the Social Partners Network can benefit from the experience and modus operandi of the CGF. The Home-Grown Monitoring Committee can synergize with the CGF work on Accountability Workshops and Civil Society Observatories. Indeed, this has started to happen; for example, at the second accountability workshop in February 2015, the private sector observatory jointly prepared presentations and coordinated messages with the Social Partners Network.

112. Another example is Belize, a country where the CGF exercise has not yet advanced much. Even here, however, the initial dialogue catalyzed by the CGF spilled into the existing dialogue platform, the Economic Development Council. The council had prepared an agenda of reforms, but was having difficulty attracting the attention of policy makers and stakeholders to the agenda. The CGF national dialogue discussed many of the same issues, but its high profile helped throw the spotlight on the issues. This helped the EDC to advance its agenda, which it did using some of the CGF modalities. Thus, while the CGF exercise itself has not advanced much beyond the initial dialogue it has added some value to an existing dialogue structure and helped enhance its effectiveness.

113. Figure 7 summarizes the two-pronged agenda for the next phase of the CGF as recommended above. The typology presented in the chart categorizes the CGF countries along two dimensions: (1) the degree to which the CGF exercise has progressed in a country (horizontal axis in the chart), and (2) how active the other dialogue processes in a country (vertical axis) are. This yields four categories of countries with corresponding areas of emphasis.

Figure 7: Strategy for the Next Phase of the CGF Based on Country Typology



114. In countries such as the Dominican Republic, Grenada, and Jamaica, where the CGF exercise is reasonably advanced (albeit a little less so in Jamaica) and other dialogue processes are fairly active, the main focus can be on leveraging existing public-private dialogue structures. In other countries where the CGF exercise is reasonably advanced, but other dialogue processes are still nascent (such as St. Lucia, St. Kitts and Nevis, and St. Vincent and the Grenadines), the focus may be on further refining the CGF instrument (for example by redefining actions that were too broadly conceptualized, revising implementation time lines, creating an action plan to support the implementation of reforms, identifying key performance indicators for each reform action, setting up civil observatories, and so on. This can be done until other dialogue platforms become active, at which time the refined CGF instrument may be institutionalized through these platforms.

115. In countries on the left quadrants of the chart—where the CGF exercise is still in a relatively early stage—the focus should be on establishing the proof of concept of the CGF, that is, proving its usefulness and relevance. This agenda appears most relevant for Antigua and Barbuda, Dominica, and Trinidad and Tobago. In the Bahamas, Belize, and Suriname, where other dialogue platforms are reasonably active (such as the Economic Development Council in Belize and the Suriname Business Forum) or promises to be so (such as the National Tripartite Council in the Bahamas), the CGF may provide a platform for a more broad-based mobilization of stakeholders around the agenda of the existing dialogue platforms. As the experience of the Belize Economic Development Council demonstrates, such dialogue platforms may benefit from the high-profile attention, as well as broader stakeholder buy-in, that the CGF-type dialogues generate.

116. Finally, it is important to note that implementing this agenda will require clarity on the role of the CGF. As Box 4 shows, there is a wide range of stakeholder views (with associated expectations) about the roles the CGF can play. All these can be legitimate roles for a CGF-type exercise. However, greater clarity is needed on whether the CGF will play all these roles and, if so, will it do so in every country, or select a subset for each country.

Box 4: Which Roles Should the CGF Take On?

- Mobilize a wide range of stakeholders (in particular, the private sector) to create awareness and excitement around development issues.
- Generate broad-based ownership of solutions and send strong signals to government.
- Help translate broad societal aspirations to specific, actionable recommendations.
- Develop the capacity of governmental and nongovernmental stakeholders to analyze issues, engage in dialogue, and monitor implementation progress.
- Help mobilize resources from other players to implement actions.
- Directly support implementation of some actions.
- Help transfer knowledge, within and across countries: peer to peer.
- Better define reforms, set realistic time lines, and associate performance indicators for each one.
- Include structured feedback loop mechanisms to help assess reform implementation and achievement of objectives, and identify additional actions.
- Enhance continuity of stakeholder involvement throughout the process with more regular feedback.
- Scale up outreach activities and media engagement to better engage all stakeholders and solidify the social capital.

Annex 1: Risks and Mitigation Measures Identified by the CGF

RISK	MITIGATION
Resistance to change	The Caribbean Growth Forum (CGF) will set clear guidelines and objectives, with specific time frames, and communicate them to all stakeholders. Transparency of process and decision making in the adoption of action plans will also help manage expectations, while reinforcing the idea that the CGF is not a talk shop. As for Phase I, all documents will continue to be published online to ensure transparency and legitimacy of outcomes. During Phase II, the CGF Secretariat will facilitate fine-tuning of the Action Plans, limiting the risk of “capture” and derailment of the efforts.
Accountability on reforms	Clear lines of accountability have been drawn between the various stakeholders involved to avoid dilution of effort. This methodology has been agreed with Prime Ministers or Ministers of Finance and puts the government fully “owning” the reform agenda and in the drivers seats, with a clear role for development partners as facilitators, and the private sector as contributor to the discussion and “responsible to ensure that implementation is effective” by means of continuous and sustained engagement throughout the process. In addition, regarding the support in the implementation of the reforms, the World Bank and other development partners have clearly stated that their financial support will be selective and depend on the instruments available.
Participation fatigue	The high number of workshops and consultations taking place in the region has led to a shared sense that meetings are useless. Broadening the list of participants to the event and then the working groups, meaning to go beyond the usual suspects and engage the nontraditional actors (youth, small entrepreneurs, and indigenous people), on the one hand, and moving quickly into implementation, on the other, could mitigate this fatigue by showing that the process is truly action oriented. A strong focus on concrete actions as well as the design of an accountability mechanism should create the right incentives to push the reform agendas that have been already discussed.
Lack of representation	In a context marked by high distrust and skepticism between public and private sectors, CGF facilitators will be particularly sensitive and will reach out to potential stakeholders on a regular basis, opening up the dialogue as often as possible. Transparency will also be critical in this process and all possible channels will be used to reach out to CGF stakeholders. Finally, the involvement of private sector and civil society in Phase II independent monitoring is also conceived to increase the incentives to open up the process to a broader range of actors.
Politicization of the process	Mitigation measures consist of: clearly communicating the practical benefits of the process for the whole society, and concentrating on outreach activities (during the events and beyond) that explain in a simple way that reforms are universal. Outreach to stakeholders engaged across the whole of the political spectrum is key to ensure sustainability and political acceptance. The role of facilitators is also important in the dialogues to moderate the discussions and help people with opposite interests to find consensus around the proposed reforms by focusing on actions that have universal benefits.
Institutional misalignment	Initiatives such as CGF can duplicate efforts and pose an extra burden on already stretched institutions and overloaded public servants. The CGF focuses on prioritizing measures that have already been identified in existing action plans and strategic papers. Yet, it does naturally aim to fill the institutional gap in implementation. Therefore, to avoid any misperception, the CGF is organized to use the technical expertise already in institutions, identifying government reform champions that need the initiative’s support to move the government agenda forward, and to fit into the existing strategies. The CGF also aims to map ongoing dialogues to coordinate with

government, the private sector, and other partners to avoid duplication. Where reparation of national development plans and poverty reduction strategies is parallel to the CGF, dialogue outputs will be included in overall strategies. In some cases, the CGF will piggy back on existing initiatives that are sector-specific (such as the Suriname Competitiveness Partnership of the Inter-American Development Bank, and International Finance Corporation credit guarantee reforms in Belize) and broaden the dialogue to include CGF themes.

Annex 2: CGF Value Added: Questions for the Next Stage of this Assessment

Aspects of Value-Addition of CGF	Specific Questions
<i>Was the CGF inclusive and did it succeed in generating broad-based buy-in for the reforms?</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • To what extent did the CGF provide a voice to different stakeholders in the countries, in particular those who would normally find it difficult to speak up? • Is this reflected in the reform priorities chosen? • To what extent was the CGF able to generate buy-in for the reform recommendations?
<i>Was the CGF able to create reform momentum?</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Did it make governments sit up and think seriously about reforms? • Did it revive stalled reform efforts? • Did it create a sense of urgency and purpose in governments about undertaking reforms? • If reforms were already happening in a country, what was the value-addition of the CGF creating reform momentum? • Did it generate interest in more reforms or in more difficult reforms?
<i>Was the CGF effective in translating general aspirations to specific recommendations that are appropriate and actionable?</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • At what level were the reform recommendations pitched? Were these too general? What is the balance between general and specific recommendations? • If the initial recommendations made by CGF participants were too general, did the CGF succeed in making them specific and actionable?
<i>Did the CGF have any role in ensuring governments put in place mechanisms to follow up on the recommendations?</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Did the governments develop concrete action plans to implement the recommendations? • Did the governments put in place good mechanisms to ensure the actions plans were implemented (such as assigning clear responsibilities for different reforms, ensuring adequate coordination, mobilizing financial resources, including donor support, leveraging good-practice knowledge and put in place monitoring mechanisms and stakeholder feedback mechanisms)? • Did the CGF have any role in ensuring this happened?
<i>To what extent did the governments implement the reforms and did the CGF make any difference to the implementation record?</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • What has been the implementation record so far? What proportion of the recommended actions has been implemented on time? What proportion has been delayed? What proportion is ongoing and there is a good probability of them being implemented on time? • Are there any patterns in terms of types of actions/reforms that have been implemented on time and that have been delayed? • What are the determinants of good implementation? • Does the record differ by countries? If so, what explains the differences? • What is the role of donor, esp. World Bank Group involvement, in explaining the implementation record? • Did CGF make any difference in the implementation record? If so, in what way? Does the value-addition of CGF differ by countries?

Annex 3 Grenada: Concreteness of Recommended Actions versus Implementation Record

CGF Pillars, Objectives and Individual Action and Reform	Degree of Concreteness (Score 1 to 3 in increasing concreteness)	Implemented (Yes = 1; No = 0)
Investment Climate		
<i>Objective 1: Broaden and implement the new broad policy framework that addresses private sector issues and impacts investment capabilities</i>		
1.1 Reduce energy cost by investing in renewable energy technology such as tidal. Geothermal and solar photovoltaic and explore grid interconnectivity with neighboring countries	2	0
1.2 Revise Investment Promotion Act (2009) to address sector and international treaty obligation deficiencies.	3	1
1.3 Complete the revision of the new proposed Investment Incentives regime	3	1
1.4 Enact a Small Business Development Act.	3	0
1.5 Identify or establish an agency to proactively monitor and evaluate implementation progress with respect to the new broad policy framework	2	0
<i>Objective 2: Streamline processes and procedures related to the establishment and operation of a business</i>		
2.1 Improve Grenada's performance with respect to the 10 quantitative "Doing Business" Indicators.	3	0
2.2 Integrate and synchronize the modernization of Grenada's e-government infrastructure	2	0
2.3 Train and empower public servants and statutory employees	1	1
<i>Objective 3: Create better linkages between agriculture and tourism, agro-processing and the wider economy</i>		
3.1 Create structural linkages between Agriculture and Tourism Agro Processing & the wider economy.	1	1
3.2 Link guided tourism tours to working agricultural farms/estates.	1	1
3.3 Redefine role or mandate of the Marketing & National Importing Board (MNIB) to focus on the export of local produce.	2	1
3.4 Stricter enforcement of praedial larceny and phytosanitary import requirements.	1	1
3.5 Increase the production of agricultural value-added products.	2	1
<i>Objective 4: Reduce operating and financing costs and improve access to finance</i>		
4.1 Reduce specific Port charges	3	0
4.2 Reduce specific Real Estate transaction costs	2	0
4.3 Reduce financing costs for small businesses	2	1
4.4 Increase access to financing for small businesses	2	1
Logistics and Connectivity		
<i>Objective 1: Reduce energy cost</i>		

CGF Pillars, Objectives and Individual Action and Reform	Degree of Concreteness (Score 1 to 3 in increasing concreteness)	Implemented (Yes = 1; No = 0)
1.1 Create economic & fiscal incentives for the use and development of renewable energy	2	0
1.2 Develop energy efficient standards for all buildings.	3	1
1.3 Promote and build capacity to undertake energy audits.	2	0
1.4 Develop “waste to energy” initiatives.	2	0
1.5 Develop awareness programs to sensitize and educate the population	1	1
Objective 2: Improve trade and business logistics services		
2.1 Improve Air & Maritime Services	1	1
2.2 Strengthen National Agricultural Produce value chain to reduce trade imbalance and to improve value chain logistics to increase competitiveness	2	1
2.3 Establish export strategy implementation through an export agency	1	0
2.4 Improve port efficiency	1	0
2.5 Strengthen regulatory & monitoring framework	1	0
2.6 Improve doing business climate—Permits	2	0
2.7 Improve air connectivity-regional and international.	2	1
Objective 3: Harness the transformative power of information communications technology		
3.1 Development of ICT (Establish ICT Backbone, E-government Services)	2	0
3.2 Review and update current national ICT policy and strategy and create an implementation plan.	2	0
3.3 Promote opportunities for PPP in ICT infrastructure and services.	2	1
3.4 Promote lifelong training in ICT	1	1
3.5 Reduce cost of ICT services to consumers	2	1
3.6 Implement and enforce service quality and standards	1	0
Objective 4 : Strengthen regional collaboration		
4.1 Activate the national procurement authority to interface with regional countries.	2	0
4.2 Review and update mandate of the macro planning unit to include the monitoring of all national /regional projects.	2	1
4.3 Establish Trade Policies and Agreements Co-ordination and Implementation unit	3	1
4.4 Conduct public awareness campaign to sensitize and educate the population on regional opportunities/initiatives	2	1
Skills and Productivity		
Objective 1: Develop a policy framework for skills and productivity that impact positively on private sector development and expansion in the context of the “new economy” of Grenada		

CGF Pillars, Objectives and Individual Action and Reform	Degree of Concreteness (Score 1 to 3 in increasing concreteness)	Implemented (Yes = 1; No = 0)
1.1 Tourism: Development of a comprehensive training program from nursery to tertiary, and among Industry Stakeholders, to ensure that the Tourism and Hospitality Sector has a cadre of qualified professionals	2	1
1.2 Agriculture: Make Agriculture a major Economic Sector, while forging strategic linkages with other sectors of Grenada's "New Economy", while contributing to food and nutrition security, exports, employment especially for young people and foreign exchange earnings.	1	1
1.3 Education: The development of an efficient education system that provides for uninhibited access, quality education that will produce a well-educated workforce	1	1
1.4 Health: Provision of an efficient and the highest standard of health care throughout the State through an improved public health system and health care facilities. This can be best achieved through a structured program of disease prevention and healthy lifestyle promotion, while facilitating continuing medical/preventative health care education for all levels of health care practitioners	1	1
1.5 Information communication technology (ICT) Develop ICT capacity that will maximize the use of technology for communication and adoption of relevant software to meet Grenada's developmental needs and enhance competitiveness. In this regard, emphasis would be placed in the use of hardware and software to maximize productivity in both the private and public sectors	2	0

Annex 4 Mapping World Bank Support to CGF Reforms in 12 Countries

Antigua and Barbuda

A total of 48 reform actions were identified in the three thematic areas of which 10 (or 21 percent) are supported by the World Bank. Although almost half (22 reform actions) fall under the investment climate category, the World Bank supports none of them. The World Bank is primarily active in the Logistics and Connectivity area, with 53 percent of actions supported (9 of 17 reforms). Finally, one of 9 reform actions in the skills and productivity area is supported by the World Bank. Note: The World Bank's program in Antigua and Barbuda is very small.

Antigua and Barbuda				
Thematic Area	Investment Climate	Logistics and Connectivity	Skills and Productivity	Total
Number of CGF reform actions	22	17	9	48
Number of bank-supported reform actions	0	9	1	10
Percentage bank-supported reforms	0 percent	53 percent	11 percent	21 percent

Belize

In Belize a total of 47 reform actions across the three areas were identified, of which 8 or 17 percent are supported by the World Bank. Nearly half of the reforms (22) fall into the investment climate thematic area and 5 of those are supported by the World Bank. The World Bank is also active in the Logistics and Connectivity area through the support of 3 of their 12 reform actions, i.e., a 25 percent involvement. As in the case of Antigua and Barbuda, the World Bank has no active support in the skills and productivity area although 27 percent of Belize's reform actions fall into this category. Note: The World Bank's engagement with Belize is small but growing.

Belize				
Thematic Area	Investment Climate	Logistics	Skills and Productivity	Total
Number of CGF reform actions	22	11	13	46
Number of bank-supported reform actions	5	3	0	8
Percentage bank-supported reforms	23 percent	27 percent	0 percent	17 percent

Dominica

Of the 40 reform actions across the three thematic areas, only 7, or 11 percent, are supported by the World Bank. Although nearly half of the reform actions identified fall into the skills and productivity area, the World Bank provides no active support in this area. The Bank is most present in the Logistics and Connectivity sector where it lends supports to 4 of the 12 reforms (33 percent) and in the investment climate sector with support to 3 of the 10 reforms (30 percent).

Dominica				
Thematic area	Investment Climate	Logistics	Skills and Productivity	Total
Number of CGF reform actions	10	12	18	40
Number of bank-supported reform actions	3	4	0	7
Percentage bank-supported reforms	30 percent	33 percent	0 percent	18 percent

Dominican Republic

The Dominican Republic is the most populated Caribbean country in the CGF (population: 10.3M) and has the highest number of reforms (60 reform actions). Over half of the reforms fall into the investment climate area, with the World Bank supporting 30 percent of these (11 of 37). The Bank is also very active in the Logistics and Connectivity area, supporting 47 percent, or 8 of 17 identified reforms. As in the case of Dominica and Belize, the World Bank is, at present, not lending any support to reforms in the skills and productivity thematic area (6 reforms identified).

Dominican Republic				
Thematic Area	Investment Climate	Logistics	Skills and Productivity	Total
Number of CGF reform actions	37	17	6	60
Number of bank-supported reform actions	11	8	0	19
Percentage of bank-supported reforms	30 percent	47 percent	0 percent	32 percent

Grenada

World Bank involvement in Grenada is, on average, higher than in CGF countries as a whole, with 33 percent of reforms supported by the Bank. Half of the 45 reforms identified are in the Logistics and Connectivity area, which benefit from 30 percent World Bank support. The World Bank

also offers substantial support to reforms in the investment climate sector (35 percent or 6 of 17 reforms). Finally, unlike in other CGF countries, the Bank supports 2 of the 5 reforms in the skills and productivity thematic area.

Grenada				
Thematic Area	Investment Climate	Logistics	Skills and Productivity	Total
Number of CGF reform actions	17	23	5	45
Number of bank-supported reform actions	6	7	2	15
Percentage of bank-supported reforms	35 percent	30 percent	40 percent	33 percent

Jamaica

Within the CGF context, World Bank involvement is highest in Jamaica, where 46 percent of identified reform actions are supported by the Bank. This involvement benefits exclusively the investment climate and logistics areas, with 58 percent of reforms in each area being supported by the Bank. Like in many other CGF countries, there is no active World Bank support in the skills and productivity reform actions.

Jamaica				
Thematic Area	Investment Climate	Logistics	Skills and Productivity	Total
Number of CGF reform actions	12	24	10	46
Number of bank-supported reform actions	7	14	0	21
Percentage of bank-supported reforms	58 percent	58 percent	0 percent	46 percent

St. Kitts and Nevis

Of the 33 reform actions identified in St. Kitts, 6 are being supported by the World Bank. All 6 fall into the Logistics and Connectivity thematic area. The World Bank is not supporting any of the 20 reforms in the investment climate and skills and productivity areas.

St. Kitts and Nevis				
Thematic Area	Investment Climate	Logistics	Skills and Productivity	Total
Number of CGF reform actions	8	13	12	33

Number of bank-supported reform actions	0	6	0	6
Percentage of bank-supported reforms	0 percent	46 percent	0 percent	18 percent

St. Lucia

Despite its small size (population: 163,000) St. Lucia has 52 reforms across the three thematic areas. The World Bank lends support to 15 percent of these reforms, of which 5 are in Logistics, 2 in investment climate and 1 in skills and productivity.

St. Lucia				
Thematic Area	Investment Climate	Logistics	Skills and Productivity	Total
Number of CGF reform actions	16	20	16	52
Number of bank supported reform actions	2	5	1	8
Percentage of bank-supported reforms	13 percent	25 percent	6 percent	15 percent

St. Vincent and the Grenadines

St Vincent and the Grenadines has listed 28 reforms of which just over half are in the investment climate sector. The World Bank is involved in supporting 14 percent of all reforms identified. Like in many other CGF countries, the World Bank is lending support to 29 percent of the Logistics reforms and 13 percent of the investment climate reforms. It is not active in the skills and productivity area.

St. Vincent and the Grenadines				
Thematic Area	Investment Climate	Logistics	Skills and Productivity	Total
Number of CGF reform actions	15	7	6	28
Number of bank supported reform actions	2	2	0	4
Percentage of bank-supported reforms	13 percent	29 percent	0 percent	14 percent

Suriname

Suriname has identified 44 reforms of which 18 are in investment climate, 11 in Logistics and 15 in skills and productivity. The World Bank is absent across the board with the exception of one investment climate reform “establishing a credit bureau”, which is it and Canada’s Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development.

Suriname				
Thematic Area	Investment Climate	Logistics	Skills and Productivity	Total
Number of CGF reform actions	18	11	15	44
Number of bank supported reform actions	1	0	0	1
Percentage of bank-supported reforms	6 percent	0 percent	0 percent	2 percent

The Bahamas

The Bahamas, like Suriname and Trinidad and Tobago, enjoys less World Bank supports than other CGF members. It has identified 17 reform actions of which more than half are in the Logistics area. The World Bank supports 2 reforms, one in investment climate (Increase availability/access to capital and financing) and one in Logistics (Improve knowledge of regional trade opportunities). In total, World Bank support amounts to 12 percent of identified reform actions.

The Bahamas				
Thematic Area	Investment Climate	Logistics	Skills and Productivity	Total
Number of CGF reform actions	3	11	3	17
Number of bank supported reform actions	1	1	0	2
Percentage of bank-supported reforms	33 percent	9 percent	0 percent	12 percent

Trinidad and Tobago

After Suriname, Trinidad and Tobago is the country where the World Bank is least present in terms of support to CGF reform actions (with 11 percent of support). The World Bank is lending support to 4 of the 36 identified reforms (2 in investment climate and 2 in Logistics). Despite the fact that 55 percent of reforms fall into the skills and productivity area, the World Bank is not yet present in this sector.

Trinidad and Tobago				
Thematic Area	Investment Climate	Logistics	Skills and Productivity	Total
Number of CGF reform actions	9	7	20	36
Number of bank supported reform actions	2	2	0	4
Percentage of bank-supported reforms	22 percent	29 percent	0 percent	11 percent

Annex 5 Updated List of CGF Analytical Work Produced

World Bank

Making Reforms Work in the Caribbean. A Collective Action Approach to Growth

<http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2014/01/19886878/making-reforms-work-caribbean-collective-action-approach-growth>

Connectivity for Caribbean Countries. An Initial Assessment

<http://www->

[wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2014/07/24/000470435_20140724102013/Rendered/PDF/896920WP0CGF0L0Box0385289B00PUBLIC0.pdf](http://www-)

Youth Unemployment in the Caribbean

<http://www->

[wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2014/05/29/000350881_20140529120809/Rendered/PDF/883620WP0Box385224B00PUBLIC00April02014.pdf](http://www-)

The New Trade Environment and Trade Performance in the Caribbean

<http://www->

[wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2014/07/17/000470435_20140717110916/Rendered/PDF/895320WP0The0N00Box385285B00PUBLIC0.pdf](http://www-)

Trade and Shared Prosperity in the Caribbean Region

<http://www->

[wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2014/07/15/000456286_20140715094311/Rendered/PDF/894240WP0Trade00Box385279B00PUBLIC0.pdf](http://www-)

ICT for Development in the Caribbean

<http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2013/06/17894020/customized-ict-solutions-caribbean-growth>

Resilience cities in coastal areas: Best practice - Summary agenda

<http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2013/06/17900011/resilient-coastal-cities-economic-social-environmental-dimensions-risk>

Developing Geothermal Energy in Small island states

<http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2013/06/17900017/got-steam-geothermal-opportunity-growth-caribbean>

Flying Solo: Air Connectivity in OECS

<http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2013/06/17900367/air-transport-oecs-flying-solo>

Oil price volatility

<http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2013/06/17900370/mitigating-vulnerability-high-volatile-oil-prices-caribbean>

Agricultural Risk Management in the Caribbean

<http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2013/06/17900369/market-based-agricultural-risk-management-caribbean>

Education, Skills, and Productivity in the Caribbean: A Primer

<http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2013/06/17893756/quality-education-counts-skills-growth>

NCD prevalence and policy options

<http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2013/06/17893706/non-communicable-diseases-caribbean-new-challenge-productivity-growth-non-communicable-diseases-caribbean-new-challenge-productivity-growth>

Feasibility and potential for a regional framework for Public-Private Partnerships

<http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2013/06/17886508/public-private-partnerships-caribbean-bridging-financing-gap>

A review of tax incentives and their impact on growth and productivity

<http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2013/06/17886462/promoting-growth-caribbean-tax-incentives-theory-practice>

Trade Facilitation in the Caribbean: the case of customs performance

<http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2013/06/17886452/trade-facilitation-caribbean-case-customs-performance>

Diaspora Investments

<http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2013/06/17893727/caribbean-diaspora-source-venture-investment>

The challenges to small Caribbean ports: Are there lessons to be learned from recent port reforms in Africa?

<http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2013/06/17900368/challenges-small-caribbean-ports-lessons-learned-recent-port-reforms-africa>

Compete Caribbean publications

Report on Regional Investment Climate Thematic Area

http://www.competecaribbean.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/01/Merged-Final-CGF_Report_-_Investment_Climate_prepared_by_Prof_Alvin_Wint.pdf

Report on Regional Logistics and Connectivity Thematic Area

http://www.competecaribbean.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/01/Merged-final-CGF_Report_-_Logistics_and_Connectivity_prepared_by_Mr_John_Lewis.pdf

Report on Regional skills and productivity Thematic Area

http://www.competecaribbean.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/01/Merged-Final-CGF_Report_-_Skills_and_productivity_prepared_by_Prof_Keith_Nurse.pdf

Compete Caribbean Private Sector Assessments

PSARs - <http://www.competecaribbean.org/studies-reports/surveys/psars>

Enterprise Surveys - <http://www.competecaribbean.org/studies-reports/surveys>

Donor Matrices work in the Caribbean - <http://www.competecaribbean.org/studies-reports/donor-matrices>

Inter-American Development Bank Caribbean Policy Briefs

Does Size Matter? Yes, If You are Caribbean! (IDB-PB-201) <http://www.iadb.org/en/publications/publication-detail,7101.html?id=70876>

Don't Talk to Me about Debt. Talk to Me about Growth (IDB-PB-202) <http://www.iadb.org/en/publications/publication-detail,7101.html?id=70937>

The Question is Not Whether "To Devalue or Not to Devalue?" But Rather "What to Devalue?"


(IDB-PB-204) <http://www.iadb.org/en/publications/publication-detail,7101.html?id=71151>


Laments of the Caribbean Businessperson are Based on Facts? (IDB-PB-205) <http://www.iadb.org/en/publications/publication-detail,7101.html?id=71284>

Spillovers of Global Shocks Over Caribbean Countries: So Large That There Is Little Room to Maneuver. An Impulse Response Analysis (IDB-PB-206)

<http://www.iadb.org/en/publications/publication-detail,7101.html?id=71417>

Annex 6 CGF Framework and Implementation Plan





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- ⁱ Participating countries include Antigua and Barbuda, Belize, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Grenada, Jamaica, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Suriname, The Bahamas, and Trinidad and Tobago. Barbados, Guyana, and Haiti are participating as observers only.
- ⁱⁱ Out of the 495 reforms actions, implementation data is available for 212 reforms for countries where accountability workshops were held.
- ⁱⁱⁱ In addition to the 12 countries, several hundred stakeholders, 3 multilateral banks, and various donors help drive the CGF agenda.
- ^{iv} It was decided from the outset to keep the focus on the three broad thematic areas, instead of having a sector-specific approach to reform, so that a broad range of stakeholder priorities could be accommodated while maintaining focus. The choice was based on the need to stimulate a broad-based discussion on the growth agenda, considering the situation at conception in 2010–11, which demanded actions across the board.
- ^v The note is based on desk research, a set of data for items (1) and (2), and an assessment mission to Grenada and St. Lucia. It also draws from two focus group discussions with key CGF focal points in the 12 CGF countries, including one also attended by private sector representatives. These focus group discussions were carried out during the 3rd CGF Regional Meetings in St. Lucia in June 2015.
- ^{vi} The report benefitted from a Compete Caribbean and Inter-American Development Bank assessment of the CGF exercise in four countries. *Assessing the Caribbean Growth Forum Implementation in Participating Countries*, July 2015 (draft consultant report by IDB). The countries covered are The Bahamas, Jamaica, Suriname, and Trinidad and Tobago.
- ^{vii} The online survey was carried out in June–July 2015 by the Inter-American Development Bank as part of its assessment of the CGF. The survey, which looked at the value added of the CGF, was mailed to 200 participants, 30 of whom responded. Although the response rate is low, the survey did reveal interesting insights into the working of the CGF as viewed by the participants. For details of the questions and the findings, see *Assessing the Caribbean Growth Forum Implementation in Participating Countries*, July 2015 (draft consultant report to Inter-American Development Bank).
- ^{viii} The initiative is facilitated by the World Bank Group, the Inter-American Development Bank, Compete Caribbean, and the Caribbean Development Bank in collaboration with the United Kingdom Agency for International Development, and the Canada Department for Foreign Aid, Trade and Development.
- ^{ix} Compete Caribbean in turn is funded by the Inter-American Development Bank, the Government of Canada, and the United Kingdom’s Department for International Development
- ^x The largest funder of the CGF was the Canada Department for Foreign Aid, Trade and Development (DFTAD).
- ^{xi} S. Agarwal, D. Post, and V. Venugopal. “Citizen Report Cards: Monitoring Citizen Perspectives to Improve Service Delivery.” How-To Notes prepared by the authors for the World Bank. See the experience in Karachi, Pakistan and Accra, Ghana on pages 4 and 11.
- ^{xii} Jamaica’s second accountability workshop consisted in a series of three Progress Review Meetings with stakeholders. Each meeting focused on one thematic area.
- ^{xiii} Information taken from a discussion with the CGF Focal Points on the sidelines of the 3rd Regional Meeting of the CGF in St. Lucia on June 15, 2015.
- ^{xiv} It appears that the agreed CGF methodology is that the stakeholders may agree on reforms that need more than 12 months. But if so, they may put them in the action plan and monitor implementation for the first 12 months. This way, at least the reform is on the agenda, even though, realistically, it is impossible to complete in 12 months.
- ^{xv} This section reports on *de jure* implementation. The next version of this note will analyze *de facto* implementation and the reasons for a gap between the two, if any.
- ^{xvi} The 6-month points range between December 2013 (Dominican Republic) to June 2014 (Grenada, St. Kitts and Nevis). The 12-month points are October 2014 (Dominican Republic), November 2014 (St. Lucia) and February 2015 (Grenada).
- ^{xvii} The next stage of this assessment will go deeper into the dynamics of this reform.
- ^{xviii} Factors beyond the CGF may have boosted the pace of reform implementation. For example, Grenada is supported by an active IMF program.

^{xix} This analysis is based on information and feedback provided by a group of World Bank and International Finance Corporation Task Team Leaders and program leaders working in the three thematic areas in the 12 CGF countries. The actual percentage of actions supported by the World Bank are larger than represented in the regional summary analysis, because the World Bank does not have an active program in some CGF countries (The Bahamas), very small programs (Antigua and Barbuda), or programs in place through limited Reimbursable Advisory Services (Trinidad and Tobago).

^{xx} For both the consultative phase (that identifies priorities and recommendations for action) and the national accountability workshops (intended to assess implementation), a tracking tool has been used to monitor participation. The data the tool produced are being processed and will enable a disaggregated analysis of participation—by sector: public, private, academia, and so on; and by gender.

^{xxi} Stakeholders were asked to limit the priorities to 3–4 to focus on the top challenges and try to meet expectations in the implementation phase.

^{xxii} Alberto Mestas. 2015. *Assessing the Caribbean Growth Forum Implementation in Participating Countries*. Draft consultant report for the Inter-American Development Bank. July 2015.

^{xxiii} This scenario may have varied by action area. For example, where a donor was actively involved in an area (not necessarily due to the CGF but for other reasons), the actions may have been identified fairly well up front, implemented well, and have been adequate to meet objectives.

^{xxiv} R. Devlin and G. Moguillansky. 2011. *Breeding Latin American Tigers: Operational Principles for Rehabilitating Industrial Policies* and R. Hausman, D. Rodrik and C. Sabel. 2007. *Reconfiguring Industrial Policy: A Framework with an Application to South Africa*.