IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION AND RESULTS REPORT
(IDA-37200 AND IDA-37201)

ON A CREDIT

IN THE AMOUNT OF SDR 109 MILLION
(US$150 MILLION EQUIVALENT)

TO THE

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF NIGERIA

FOR A

LAGOS URBAN TRANSPORT PROJECT

JUNE 16, 2011

Sustainable Development Department
Abuja-Western Africa 2 (AFCW2)
Africa Region
CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS

(Exchange Rate Effective: December 31, 2010)

Currency Unit = Nigerian Naira
    US$1 = 125.15 Naira

FISCAL YEAR

January 1-December 31

ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

AF Additional Financing
BFS Bus Franchise Scheme
BRT Bus Rapid Transit
CO\textsubscript{2} Carbon dioxide
CPS Country Partnership Strategy
DRN Declared Road Network
EIA Environmental Impact Assessment
EMF Environmental Management Framework
EMP Environmental Management Plan
ERR Economic Rate of Return
FERMA Federal Road Maintenance Agency
FRSC Federal Road Safety Commission
HDM Highway Design and Maintenance Model
ICR Implementation Completion and Results Report
IDA International Development Association
IEC Information, Education and Communication
IFRs Interim Unaudited Financial Reports
KPIs Key Performance Indicators
LAMATA Lagos Metropolitan Area Transport Authority
LASEPA Lagos State Environmental Protection Agency
LASTMA Lagos State Traffic Management Authority
LGA Local Government Area
LRT Light Rail Transit
LSFSC Lagos State Ferry Services Company
LSG Lagos State Government
LUTP Lagos Urban Transport Project
LUTP2 Lagos Urban Transport Project 2
M&E Monitoring and Evaluation
MD Managing Director
MOT Ministry of Transport
MOW Ministry of Works
MVA Motor Vehicle Administration
NEEDS National Economic Empowerment and Development Strategy
Vice President: Obiageli Katryn Ezekwesili
Country Director: Onno Ruhl
Sector Manager: Supee Teravaninthorn
Project Team Leader: Ajay Kumar
ICR Team Leader: Olatunji Ahmed, Ajay Kumar
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### A. Basic Information

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country:</th>
<th>Nigeria</th>
<th>Project Name:</th>
<th>Lagos Urban Transport Project</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Project ID:</td>
<td>P074963</td>
<td>L/C/TF Number(s):</td>
<td>IDA-37200, IDA-37201</td>
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<tr>
<td>ICR Date:</td>
<td>04/28/2011</td>
<td>ICR Type:</td>
<td>Core ICR</td>
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<tr>
<td>Lending Instrument:</td>
<td>SIL</td>
<td>Borrower:</td>
<td>GOVERNMENT OF NIGERIA</td>
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<tr>
<td>Original Total Commitment:</td>
<td>XDR 75.5M</td>
<td>Disbursed Amount:</td>
<td>XDR 108.8M</td>
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<td>Revised Amount:</td>
<td>XDR 109.1M</td>
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**Environmental Category:** B

**Implementing Agencies:**
Lagos Metropolitan Area Transport Authority (LAMATA)

**Cofinanciers and Other External Partners:** None

### B. Key Dates

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Process</th>
<th>Original Date</th>
<th>Revised / Actual Date(s)</th>
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<tr>
<td>Concept Review:</td>
<td>10/30/2003</td>
<td>10/30/2003</td>
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<tr>
<td>Appraisal:</td>
<td>06/28/2005, 09/05/2005</td>
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<td>Approval:</td>
<td>12/31/2004, 07/20/2005</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mid-term Review:</td>
<td>06/30/2008, 12/31/2010</td>
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### C. Ratings Summary

**C.1 Performance Rating by ICR**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Outcomes:</th>
<th>Highly Satisfactory</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Risk to Development Outcome:</td>
<td>Low or Negligible</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bank Performance:</td>
<td>Highly Satisfactory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Borrower Performance:</td>
<td>Highly Satisfactory</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**C.2 Detailed Ratings of Bank and Borrower Performance (by ICR)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Bank</th>
<th>Ratings</th>
<th>Borrower</th>
<th>Ratings</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Quality at Entry:</td>
<td>Satisfactory</td>
<td>Government:</td>
<td>Highly Satisfactory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quality of Supervision:</td>
<td>Highly Satisfactory</td>
<td>Implementing Agency/Agencies:</td>
<td>Highly Satisfactory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overall Bank Performance:</td>
<td>Highly Satisfactory</td>
<td>Overall Borrower Performance:</td>
<td>Highly Satisfactory</td>
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</table>
C.3 Quality at Entry and Implementation Performance Indicators

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Implementation Performance</th>
<th>Indicators</th>
<th>QAG Assessments (if any)</th>
<th>Rating</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Potential Problem Project at any time (Yes/No):</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Quality at Entry (QEA):</td>
<td>Satisfactory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Problem Project at any time (Yes/No):</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Quality of Supervision (QSA):</td>
<td>None</td>
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<tr>
<td>DO rating before Closing/Inactive status:</td>
<td>Highly Satisfactory</td>
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D. Sector and Theme Codes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sector Code (as % of total Bank financing)</th>
<th>Original</th>
<th>Actual</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Central government administration</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General transportation sector</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ports, waterways and shipping</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sub-national government administration</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
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</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Theme Code (as % of total Bank financing)</th>
<th>Original</th>
<th>Actual</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Access to urban services and housing</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Injuries and non-communicable diseases</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other urban development</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regulation and competition policy</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
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E. Bank Staff

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Positions</th>
<th>At ICR</th>
<th>At Approval</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Vice President:</td>
<td>Obiageli Katryn Ezekwesili</td>
<td>Callisto Madavo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country Director:</td>
<td>Onno Ruhl</td>
<td>Mark D. Tomlinson</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sector Manager:</td>
<td>Supee Teravaninthorn</td>
<td>Maryvonne Plessis-Fraissard</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Project Team Leader:</td>
<td>Ajay Kumar</td>
<td>Dieter E. Schelling</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICR Team Leader:</td>
<td>Olatunji Ahmed</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICR Primary Author:</td>
<td>Olatunji Ahmed</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

F. Results Framework Analysis

Project Development Objectives (from Development Credit Agreement)
The project development objective of the Lagos Urban Transport Project was to: (a) improve the management of the Lagos metropolitan transport sector; (b) enhance the public transport road network in an environmentally, socially and financially sustainable
manner; (c) enhance bus services; (d) promote water and non-motorized transport; and (e) prepare future phases of the program.

Revised Project Development Objectives (as approved by original approving authority)
The objectives were not revised.

(a) PDO Indicator(s)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>Baseline Value</th>
<th>Original Target Values (from approval documents)</th>
<th>Formally Revised Target Values</th>
<th>Actual Value Achieved at Completion or Target Years</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Indicator 1</strong>: Time spent by poor households on travel along project corridor per trip (minutes)</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>Savings 20% (24)</td>
<td>Savings 20% (24)</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date achieved</td>
<td>07/20/2005</td>
<td>07/20/2005</td>
<td>04/15/2007</td>
<td>12/31/2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Comments (incl. % achievement)</td>
<td>Achieved 100%. For details, please see paragraph 66 (iv).</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Indicator 2 : Money spent by poor households on bus travel per trip along project corridor (share of income) | N108 (20%) | N 92 (15%) | N 92 (15%) | N 96 (12%) |
| Date achieved | 07/20/2005 | 07/20/2005 | 04/15/2007 | 12/31/2010 |
| Comments (incl. % achievement) | Achieved 100%. In real terms, considering the change in CPI, the target was fully achieved. For details, please see paragraph 66 (iii). |

| Indicator 3 : Length of daily bus-km franchised (km) | 10,000 | 15,000 | 15,000 | 45,000 |
| Date achieved | 07/20/2005 | 07/20/2005 | 04/15/2007 | 12/31/2010 |
| Comments (incl. % achievement) | Achieved 100%. For details, please see paragraph 66 (v). |

| Indicator 4 : Work days of labor created | 390,000 | 700,000 | 700,000 | 1,660,000 |
| Date achieved | 07/20/2005 | 07/20/2005 | 04/15/2007 | 12/31/2010 |
| Comments (incl. % achievement) | Achieved 100%. For details, please see paragraph 78. |
### (b) Intermediate Outcome Indicator(s)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>Baseline Value</th>
<th>Original Target Values (from approval documents)</th>
<th>Formally Revised Target Values</th>
<th>Actual Value Achieved at Completion or Target Years</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Indicator 1: LAMATA is fully functional</td>
<td>Established by law</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Comments (incl. % achievement)</td>
<td>Achieved 100%. LAMATA fully functional in June 2006 with all internal procedural manuals established.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indicator 2: Total annual contribution from user charges into the Transport Fund at the end-of-the-project (US$ million)</td>
<td></td>
<td>5 (EOP)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Comments (incl. % achievement)</td>
<td>Achieved 100%. The amount includes dedicated contribution from license fees and other user charges. For details see paragraph 56 (iii).</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indicator 3: Minimum annual amount expected as counterpart funding from LSG (US$ million)</td>
<td></td>
<td>7</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Comments (incl. % achievement)</td>
<td>Achieved 100%. For details, please see paragraph 56 (iii)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indicator 4: LAMATA's annual operating cost remain less than 6 percent of overall expenditure</td>
<td></td>
<td>&lt;6%</td>
<td>&lt;6%</td>
<td>&lt;6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Comments (incl. % achievement)</td>
<td>Achieved 100%. For details, please see paragraph 54.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indicator 5: Traffic Management Units set up and operational</td>
<td></td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
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<tr>
<td>Comments (incl. %)</td>
<td>Achieved 50%. During reprioritization of the available resources, the number of TMUs to be established was reduced from four to two, with a focus on areas</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indicator</td>
<td>Description</td>
<td>Value (quantitative or Qualitative)</td>
<td>Date achieved</td>
<td>Comments (incl. % achievement)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
<td>------------------------------------</td>
<td>---------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------</td>
</tr>
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</table>
| Indicator 6 | Total time saved in motorized travels per day on selected legs of the declared road network (in minutes) | 0, 10-12, 10-12, 7-12 | 11/22/2002, 04/15/2007, 04/15/2007, 12/31/2010 | Achieved 100%.
| Indicator 8 | Decrease in average waiting time on pilot bus route (minutes) | N/A, 10, 4, 4 | 11/22/2002, 04/15/2007, 04/15/2007, 12/31/2010 | Achieved 100%.
<p>| Indicator 11 | Jetties passenger per day (Ijegun Egba and Agboyi Ketu) | 0, 6,100, 7,200, 7,200 | 11/22/2002, 08/02/2005, 04/15/2007, 12/31/2010 |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Comments (incl. % achievement)</th>
<th>Achieved 100%.</th>
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</thead>
</table>

**Indicator 12:** Transport Master Plan prepared in a participatory manner and disclosed

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Value (quantitative or Qualitative)</th>
<th>0</th>
<th>To be disclosed</th>
<th>To be disclosed</th>
<th>Disclosed</th>
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<tr>
<td>Comments (incl. % achievement)</td>
<td>Transport Master Plan has been prepared and disclosed 2010.</td>
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**Indicator 13:** Length of road rehabilitated (km)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Value (quantitative or Qualitative)</th>
<th>0</th>
<th>25</th>
<th>25</th>
<th>47.8</th>
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<tr>
<td>Comments (incl. % achievement)</td>
<td>Achieved 100%.</td>
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<td></td>
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</table>

**Indicator 14:** Length of overlays placed (km)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Value (quantitative or Qualitative)</th>
<th>0</th>
<th>68</th>
<th>68</th>
<th>76</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Comments (incl. % achievement)</td>
<td>Achieved 100%.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
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</table>

**Indicator 15:** Number of junctions improved

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<th>Value (quantitative or Qualitative)</th>
<th>0</th>
<th>70</th>
<th>70</th>
<th>70</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Comments (incl. % achievement)</td>
<td>Achieved 100%.</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
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</table>

**Indicator 16:** Number of jetties improved/constructed for small boats

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Value (quantitative or Qualitative)</th>
<th>0</th>
<th>20</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>4</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Comments (incl. % achievement)</td>
<td>Achieved 100%. During restructuring, project components were redesigned and the number of jetties to be improved reduced from 20 to 4. The 4 jetties have been constructed and functional on the identified waterway routes.</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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### G. Ratings of Project Performance in ISRs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Date ISR Archived</th>
<th>DO</th>
<th>IP</th>
<th>Actual Disbursements (USD millions)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>12/13/2002</td>
<td>Satisfactory</td>
<td>Satisfactory</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>05/29/2003</td>
<td>Satisfactory</td>
<td>Satisfactory</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>11/20/2003</td>
<td>Satisfactory</td>
<td>Satisfactory</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>05/13/2004</td>
<td>Satisfactory</td>
<td>Satisfactory</td>
<td>4.24</td>
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<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>11/11/2004</td>
<td>Satisfactory</td>
<td>Satisfactory</td>
<td>11.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>04/22/2005</td>
<td>Moderately Unsatisfactory</td>
<td>Moderately Unsatisfactory</td>
<td>17.41</td>
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<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>10/24/2005</td>
<td>Moderately Unsatisfactory</td>
<td>Moderately Unsatisfactory</td>
<td>28.83</td>
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<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>02/17/2006</td>
<td>Satisfactory</td>
<td>Satisfactory</td>
<td>41.31</td>
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<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>12/17/2006</td>
<td>Satisfactory</td>
<td>Satisfactory</td>
<td>63.11</td>
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<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>06/05/2007</td>
<td>Satisfactory</td>
<td>Satisfactory</td>
<td>76.48</td>
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<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>12/23/2007</td>
<td>Satisfactory</td>
<td>Satisfactory</td>
<td>95.67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>06/23/2008</td>
<td>Satisfactory</td>
<td>Satisfactory</td>
<td>100.41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>12/12/2008</td>
<td>Satisfactory</td>
<td>Satisfactory</td>
<td>113.73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>06/20/2009</td>
<td>Satisfactory</td>
<td>Satisfactory</td>
<td>124.75</td>
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<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>12/02/2009</td>
<td>Satisfactory</td>
<td>Satisfactory</td>
<td>134.54</td>
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<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>05/25/2010</td>
<td>Satisfactory</td>
<td>Satisfactory</td>
<td>152.12</td>
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<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>11/15/2010</td>
<td>Highly Satisfactory</td>
<td>Highly Satisfactory</td>
<td>161.78</td>
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### H. Restructuring (if any)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Restructuring Date(s)</th>
<th>Board Approved PDO Change</th>
<th>ISR Ratings at Restructuring</th>
<th>Amount Disbursed at Restructuring in USD millions</th>
<th>Reason for Restructuring &amp; Key Changes Made</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>06/28/2005</td>
<td>MU</td>
<td>MU</td>
<td>20.30</td>
<td>See paragraph 15 in the main text of ICR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>09/05/2005</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>MU</td>
<td>27.95</td>
<td>Apply 100% IDA financing and reduce LSG’s annual commitment to the Transport Fund from US$7 million to US$2 million</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
I. Disbursement Profile
1. Project Context, Development Objectives and Design

1.1 Context at Appraisal

1. The Lagos Urban Transport Project (LUTP) was designed in challenging circumstances. The Lagos metropolitan area had a population estimated at over 10 million in 2000, and projected (conservatively) to grow to more than 25 million by 2025. However, transport infrastructure and services were at levels that supported a population of no more than six million. As a result, the level of efficiency and productivity in the metropolitan area had been adversely affected by a growing weakness in the physical infrastructure required to support basic needs of the population. The density of the road network at about 0.4 km/1000 population, for example, was quite low even by African standards. The provision of bus public transport was highly fragmented with multiple private operators, operating small buses of poor quality in an unregulated environment. Despite the large city size, there were no organized mass transit systems. Over the years, the quality of public transport in the metropolitan area had degenerated, especially after relocation of the federal capital from Lagos to Abuja. Like any other state in Nigeria, Lagos state lacked institutional capacity and adequate funding for the management of transport infrastructure to meet the demand of its growing population.

2. Public transport environment: The public transport operation in Lagos with a fleet of about 75,000 buses is almost entirely owned and managed by the private sector—principally individuals owning one or two second-hand vehicles that they rent out to drivers on a daily basis. The minibuses (danfos) make up the bulk of the fleet, and their numbers are rising as the number of midi-buses (molues) dwindles. Every danfo and molue is affiliated with one of several associations, the largest being the National Union of Road Transport Workers (NURTW). Buses carry bulk of the motorized person trips (82 percent) followed by taxis and private cars (13 percent) and the remaining five percent by motor cycles, locally known as okadas. Though public transport buses are very old, not roadworthy, and contribute heavily to pollution, they still are an integral part of the Lagos’s transport operations and most Lagosians still use them in absence of any alternatives. Almost 16 million person trips are made daily using buses. In addition, despite poor service conditions and low availability, such public transport is unaffordable especially for people in the lowest income quintile as it represents more than 20 percent of their disposable income.

3. Institutional and Regulatory Context: The Nigeria government structure has three levels: federal, state and local. At the federal level, the Ministry of Transport (MOT) makes national transport policy and the Ministry of Works (MOW) develops the federal road network. Urban transport was devolved to the states by the 1999 Constitution, and the states make their own laws on traffic and transport. Federal agencies with divisions in the states include the Nigeria Police – Lagos State Traffic Division, which includes Traffic Wardens, and the Federal Road Safety Commission (FRSC) which is responsible for traffic control and enforcement, primarily on federal roads.
4. At the Lagos State Government (LSG), the State Ministry of Transport is the primary agency for transport policy formulation and implementation. The state ministry comprises five functional divisions. The Motor Vehicle Administration (MVA) is the regulatory authority for public transport, responsible for vehicle licensing and registration. The local government councils are responsible for local traffic management schemes, parking control, and management of public transport terminals. In 2000, the Lagos metropolitan area consisted of 18 Local Government Areas (LGAs) out of 20 in the state, with their own elected governments. These local council development areas have a works department and a traffic management unit responsible for road maintenance and traffic management on local government roads. As a result, more than 100 agencies at local, state or federal government levels have a role in transport provision and/or services in the city. Often, most agencies develop and implement their own policies and programs in isolation, and without much regard for its effect on policies of other agencies.

5. Rail and water transport: (i) the National Railway Corporation currently operates a limited commuter service (typically, one train in each direction per day) in the Agege to Iddo corridor. There exists a branch line from this to the port in Apapa, which is hardly used. These rail corridors represent a major under-utilized asset; (ii) use of waterways in Lagos is regulated by the National Inland Waterways Authority, a federal agency. Both the federal and state governments provide ferry services and have built a number of jetties along the various waterways of Lagos. Rail and water transport together currently carry less than one percent of the overall traffic in Lagos, but have potential to play an important role.

6. Non-motorized transport: Infrastructure facilities for non-motorized transport are limited throughout the metropolitan area, and they receive little maintenance attention. Where provided, sidewalks have been taken over either by car parking or street trading activities that force pedestrians onto the roadway. The primary roads have very few pedestrian over-bridges and result in at-grade crossing at many places; secondary roads have virtually no protected pedestrian crossing facilities.

7. Key issues in the city transport system are: (i) poorly managed and regulated services and infrastructure; (ii) lack of clear and coherent policies; and (iii) weak and disorganized institutions. The central urban transport context can be described as follows: a growing urban population inadequately served by the transport system, declining standards of public transport, overlaps among agencies responsible for planning and implementing transport solutions, massive growth in the use of minibus services, growing dependence on private transport (cars and motorcycles), increasing congestion, inadequate and deteriorating transport infrastructure, and poor facilities for non-motorized transport (walking and bicycling).

8. Many of the observed shortcomings in the transportation system in Lagos stem from the sector’s management weaknesses. These include: (i) absence of a well articulated and adopted policy and strategic framework for the sector; (ii) fragmentation and duplication of institutional responsibilities among various agencies at the three levels of government; (iii) lack of inter-agency co-ordination among the various bodies; and (iv)
absence of standard procedures for the technical and economic evaluation of programs and projects.

9. Recognizing a need to improve the transport system in the Lagos metropolitan area, a number of studies were conducted in the 1990s to define appropriate solutions. The Lagos Mass Transit and Transport Systems Management Program study was undertaken in 1992. This work set out to identify actions necessary to address the complex transport situation in Lagos. The study had, as one of its recommendations, the creation of Lagos Metropolitan Area Transport Authority (LAMATA) to coordinate transport policies, programs and actions of all agencies at different tiers of government.

10. The government’s focus is on improving the provision of transport services in the Lagos metropolitan area, in particular for the public transport users and poor. The project was designed to improve delivery of public transport infrastructure and services and also to set the basic framework for inter-modal integration through development of a long-term strategy for the state. Some investments in water transport and non-motorized facilities were also proposed to provide the basis for long-term interventions.

1.2 Original Project Development Objectives (PDO) and Key Indicators

11. The project development objective of the LUTP was to: (i) improve the management of the Lagos metropolitan transport sector; (ii) enhance the public transport road network in an environmentally, socially and financially sustainable manner; (iii) enhance bus services; (iv) promote water and non-motorized transport; and (v) prepare future phases of the program.

12. Key outcome/impact indicators: The detailed key indicators used to measure the PDO are in Table 1. About 95 percent of the credit financed investments to support the first three objectives focusing on institutional strengthening and improvements in public transport infrastructure and services. The balance five percent is to develop a framework for future interventions and set up a basis for enhanced provision and use of water transport by the private sector. As a result, focus of the original key outcome/impact indicators is on measurement of the first three development objectives, as given below:

   (i) LAMATA is fully functional;
   (ii) Total annual contribution from user charges into Transport Fund at the end of project (US$ million);
   (iii) Average time saved in motorized travels per day on selected legs of the declared road network (minutes);
   (iv) Money spent by poor households on travel along project corridor;
   (v) Length of daily bus-km franchised (km);
   (vi) Work days labor created (by the road rehabilitation and maintenance program);

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1 The description of the PDO in PAD is different from that in the Credit Agreement. The description in Credit Agreement is more comprehensive, hence it is used in this implementation completion and results report (ICR).
(vii) Pilot bus route passage satisfaction (percentage satisfied);
(viii) Privatization of Lagos State Ferry Services Company (LSFSC);
(ix) Increase in jetties passengers per day; and
(x) Transport sector institutional reform plan prepared.

1.3 Revised PDO (as approved by original approving authority) and Key Indicators, and reasons/justification

13. The project was restructured twice, in June 2005 and August 2005. The project also received additional financing (AF) in April 2007 for an amount of SDR 33.6 million (US$50 million equivalent).

14. However, the PDOs did not change as a result of restructuring and additional financing. Nevertheless, the changes resulted in reallocation of credit proceeds and modification of result indicators as shown in Table 1.

Project Restructuring

15. The first restructuring was undertaken in June 2005 (Board document dated June 28, 2005) for the following reasons:

(i) One of the components to be financed in this project was maintenance of the declared road network, which includes federal, state, and local roads. During preparation, there were no clear agreements at different levels of government on the works to be carried out by the implementing agency. In 2004, the Federal Ministry of Works decided to carry out itself, using federal budget resources, the necessary rehabilitation and maintenance of the federal roads in the Lagos metropolitan area. As a result, the project focus was limited to rehabilitating and maintaining state and local roads. With this change, the credit was reallocated from federal to state and local roads;
(ii) The covenant in section 2.05 (a) of the Project Agreement requires that LSG contribute no less than the equivalent of US$7 million each fiscal year, commencing in 2003. However, due to delays in effectiveness, implementation did not begin until November 2003. For that reason, government requested to reschedule the related obligation of Lagos state and to begin contributions in November 2004;
(iii) The government requested cancellation of section 2.05 (b) of the Project Agreement which specified the amount to be directly transferred from user charges in the Transport Fund starting 2003. The covenant’s objective was to ensure that direct transfers from user charges gradually reach the amount of US$7 million annually required to maintain the road network. It was expected that these transfers would progressively replace the US$7 million expected as contribution from LSG. As part of restructuring, it was agreed that direct transfers to the

2 The declared road network is the 632 km of the main road network that serves as the backbone of the bus system.
Transport Fund will start later than expected but will reach the US$7 million requirement by the end of the project. It was also agreed that the target would be kept as a performance indicator; and

(iv) The government requested deletion of the performance indicator on the number of pedestrian traffic accidents as the data are not accurate enough to be relevant to the assessment of the project’s performance.

16. In August 2005, the project was again restructured through an Office Memorandum (dated August 2, 2005) to introduce the following changes:

(i) Apply 100 percent International Development Association (IDA) financing to all expenditures (including taxes) on IDA part of the project; and
(ii) Reduce LSG’s annual contractual commitment in the Transport Fund from US$7 million to US$2 million due to financial constraint faced by the LSG.

Additional financing

17. Additional financing for the project was approved on April 10, 2007 for an amount of SDR 33.6 million (US$50 million equivalent). The justification for additional financing was to:

(i) Finance the increase in the cost of road works resulting from an increase in the price of diesel and premium motor spirit\(^3\), depreciation of Naira\(^4\), and further deterioration in the condition of the road network due to delay between design and construction time; and
(ii) Scale-up the bus services enhancement component, with a focus on implementing a pilot bus franchise scheme along Iyana Ipaja-Ikotun/Igando corridor. Financing was to be provided for infrastructure such as bus shelters, terminals, lay-byes, street lights, traffic lights and other facilities necessary for bus franchise operation. As a result, the project investments were more closely aligned with the development objectives.

18. The credit proceeds were reallocated and result indicators modified to reflect changes in the project design. The closing date was extended by one year from June 30, 2008 to June 30, 2009.

\(^3\) The price of diesel increased from N21/liter to N85/liter and of premium motor spirit from N22 to N65/liter over the period 2003 and 2006

\(^4\) The value of Naira against dollar depreciated from N117 in 2002 to N128 in 2006
Table 1: Key Result Indicators (Original and Revised)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Original Indicators</th>
<th>Revised Indicators</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Key Outcome Indicators</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| 1. Reduction of time and money spent by poor households for travel | - Time spent by poor households on travel along project corridors  
- Money spent by poor households as a share of income along project corridor |
| 2. Reduction of accidents | Dropped |
| 3. Number of person-days of labor created | Same |
| 4. Additional Indicator | Length of bus-km franchise per day |

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Intermediary Outcomes</strong></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(i) <strong>Capacity Building</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. LAMATA is fully functional</td>
<td>Same</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Total financial contribution of LSG annually is at least US$7 million</td>
<td>Total financial contribution of LSG annually is at least US$2 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. LAMATA’s operating costs remain less than six percent</td>
<td>Same</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Road user charges directly transferred to Transport Fund annually increased from US$1 million in 2003 to US$5 million in 2007</td>
<td>Total road user charges directly transferred to Transport Fund annually is US$5 million by the end-of-project</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. TMUs operational in priority LGAs</td>
<td>Same</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| (ii) **Road Network Efficiency** | Reduction in travel time by motorized modes on the Declared Road Network |
| (iii) **Bus Services Enhanced** |                     |
| 1. Percentage of bus operations governed by new regulatory framework | Amended as in outcome indicator 4 above |
| 2. Implementation of the bus pilot project | - Decrease in average waiting time on pilot bus route  
- Increase in passenger satisfaction along pilot bus route |

| (iv) **Water Transport Promotion** |                     |
| 1. Privatization of LSFSC | Same |
| 2. First ferry concession operational | Same |
| 3. | Increase in jetties passengers per day |

| (v) **Preparation of Future Phases** |                     |
| 1. Transport sector institutional reform plan prepared | Same |

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Output Indicators</strong></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Length of roads rehabilitated</td>
<td>Same</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Length of overlays placed</td>
<td>Same</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>Number of junctions improved</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Improvement/construction of jetties for small boats</td>
<td>Same</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Transport master plan produced</td>
<td>Same</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Project Schedule

19. The original project closing date was June 30, 2008. With the additional financing, the closing date was extended for the first time to June 30, 2009. The closing date was extended a second time to August 31, 2010 in order to complete implementation of the ongoing activities. The closing date was extended a third time to December 31, 2010 to allow completion of the on-going contracts and also to maintain a dialogue with government while the follow-on project was awaiting effectiveness.

1.4 Main Beneficiaries

20. The primary beneficiaries of the project are the people of Lagos metropolitan area who are expected to benefit from improved road network and organized public transport system. The project investments have resulted in a decline in transport expenditure and travel time, and improvements in road safety. On average, cost to bus users per trip along the project corridor has reduced from N108 in 2005 to N96 in 2010, and considerable savings in time have been realized both in terms of travel time and waiting time. Moreover, over 1.6 million work-days were created during the project. The individuals and organizations benefitting from the project are diverse as brought out in stakeholder analysis conducted as part of the project impact monitoring and is presented in Table 2 below.

Table 2: Stakeholder Analysis

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>S.N</th>
<th>Beneficiary</th>
<th>Primary Benefits</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>State government</td>
<td>- Reduced need for subsidy&lt;br&gt;- Enhanced productivity&lt;br&gt;- Increase in employment opportunities&lt;br&gt;- Capacity building for staff of LSG Agencies/Ministries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>Public transport users</td>
<td>- Reduced travel time&lt;br&gt;- Reduced travel costs&lt;br&gt;- Improved quality of life&lt;br&gt;- Improved transport facilities for women and physically challenged</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>General traffic</td>
<td>- Reduced congestion in corridor, allowing time and cost savings&lt;br&gt;- Reduced accident rate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>Population along corridor</td>
<td>- Improved quality of life&lt;br&gt;- Improved public transport access opportunities&lt;br&gt;- Reduced pollution, as a result of reduced congestion and lower vehicle kilometer travelled</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
5. Bus transport operators/associations - Improved access to finance

6. Bus drivers/owners
- Better work environment
- Better organized
- Improved revenue

7. Vendors and commerce along corridors
- Improved business opportunities
- Higher land values

8. Bus suppliers
- Opportunity for sales and service support, including supply of higher specification vehicles
- Development of contract maintenance

9. Pedestrians
- Improved quality of life
- Safe walking environment
- Improved access to physically challenged, old and young people

10. Commercial banks
- Opportunities for productive investment outside the usual sectors
- Development of innovative finance mechanisms for the informal sector that has wider development implications

1.5 Original Components

21. The project consisted of five components as follows:

**Component 1: Capacity Building** (Total US$27.59 million, of which US$13.32 million to be financed by IDA)

22. This component comprised three sub-components: (i) institutional strengthening to bring LAMATA into operational effectiveness including establishment of units responsible for procurement, financial management and safeguards, creation of a dedicated Transport Fund, and construction of an office building for LAMATA; (ii) strengthening the capacity of existing transport sector agencies, in particular the Lagos State Ministry of Transportation, the Lagos State Ministry of Works, the Lagos State Ministry for Women Affairs and Poverty Alleviation, the Nigeria Traffic Police Traffic Unit, and the establishment of Traffic Management Units (TMUs) in key LGAs; and (iii) the operating cost of LAMATA including external audits and carrying out of other activities consistent with the sector policy and strategy.

**Component 2: Road Network Efficiency Improvement** (Total US$98.53 million, of which US$78.91 million to be financed by IDA)

23. This component comprised three sub-components: (i) maintenance and rehabilitation measures on a priority 400 km of the 632 km of the declared road network (including bridges) in the Lagos metropolitan area; (ii) rehabilitation and improvement of major junctions on the road network using low cost traffic system management measures;
and (iii) preparation and implementation of traffic management systems measures to improve traffic flow in Lagos Island and Ikeja.

**Component 3: Bus Service Enhancement** (Total US$0.73 million, of which US$0.66 million to be financed by IDA)

24. This component comprised two sub-components: (i) establishment of an effective regulatory framework for bus service provision by the private sector; and (ii) preparation of pilot demonstration project for the provision and financing by the private sector to improve bus services.

**Component 4: Water Transport Promotion** (Total US$2.90 million, of which US$2.39 million to be financed by IDA)

25. This component comprised four sub-components: (i) development and implementation of a detailed strategic plan for improving use of the waterways of Metropolitan Lagos for transport services, including establishment of an appropriate regulatory framework; (ii) privatization of the Lagos State Ferry Services Corporation and disposal of existing state owned ferries; (iii) encouragement of private sector participation in the provision of water transport services; and (iv) rehabilitation and addition to existing terminal facilities.

**Component 5: Preparation of Follow-on Phases** (Total US$5.25 million, of which US$4.73 million to be financed by IDA)

26. This component comprised four sub-components: (i) preparation of a transport master plan for Lagos metropolitan area; (ii) preparation of an institutional reform plan for the transport sector, in particular reform of the MVA; (iii) preparation of a strategy for the enhanced use of intermediate means of transport; and (iv) necessary studies and preparatory activities for the next phase of the implementation of the policy and strategy, including preparation of resettlement plans for the implementation of rail mass transit in the Agege to Iddo corridor.

### 1.6 Revised Components

27. The components were not revised during the two restructurings. However, there was a reallocation of credit proceeds due to a reduction in the counterpart funding from US$35 million to US$15 million⁵, and the corresponding reduction in project cost from US$135 million to US$115 million (IDA share of US$100 million remained the same). Nevertheless, in the Restructuring Paper, IDA financing is reflected as US$110.8 million (which includes US$10.8 million exchange rate gains; the SDR amount remained the same).

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⁵ The counterpart funding was reduced due to a decision by government to finance federal roads using its own resources.
same). The co-financing from LSG was reduced from US$7 million annually to US$2 million starting 2005.6

28. The project component allocations were further revised as part of additional financing in 2007. In addition to addressing the increase in the cost of works due to an increase in input prices, the allocations were revised with a focus on scaling-up bus services component to implement a pilot bus franchise scheme along Iyana Ipaja-Ikotun/Igando corridor with investments in bus shelters, terminals, lay-bys, street lights, traffic lights and other facilities necessary for bus operation. The objective was two-fold: (i) to realign the project focus from making investments mainly in road construction and maintenance to also finance public transport infrastructure components to improve public transport services; and (ii) to develop a comprehensive integrated program of complimentary improvements which combines public transport, non-motorized transport and roadway infrastructure, operations management and public transport service improvements by focusing on a specific corridor to increase over-all travel speed, reliability and safety. The changes were designed to align investments with the development objectives in an attempt to enhance public transport in an environmentally, socially, and financially sustainable manner. The changes in design were also consistent with comments received from the peer reviewers.

Table 3: Project Costs by component (US$ million)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Component</th>
<th>Appraisal estimates</th>
<th>Estimates at Additional Financing (AF)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>IDA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capacity building</td>
<td>27.6</td>
<td>13.32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Road network efficiency improvement</td>
<td>98.5</td>
<td>78.91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bus service enhancement</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>0.66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Water transport promotion</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>2.39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Preparation of follow-up phases</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>4.73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>135.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: * The total includes US$10.8 million exchange rate gains.

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6 As a result, total LSG contribution was to be US$15 million (US$7 million in 2004 and US$2 million each in years 2005, 2006, 2007, and 2008).
1.7 Other significant changes

29. There were no other changes in design, scope and scale, and implementation arrangements.

2. Key Factors Affecting Implementation and Outcomes

Delays at federal and state level:
- Lack of a clear agreement on the ability of LAMATA to carry out maintenance on the federal roads led to delays in project start-up. The project had to be restructured to clarify the roles;
- Challenges faced by the state in initial years to raise counterpart funding led to delays and restructuring; and
- Delays in setting up the transport fund and making direct transfers. However, while these issues led to delays in project take-off, in the long term they were addressed satisfactorily and the outcomes were fully achieved.

Institution building, regulatory framework, enforcement:
- Delays in getting suitable professional staff in LAMATA: To meet its objectives and goals, LAMATA needed to have in its employment qualified and experienced staff in transport planning, management, and engineering departments. It took a few years to recruit the required professional staff in LAMATA, which initially slowed project implementation;
- Delays in clarifying roles and functions across multiple agencies: Resistance to change by the multiple agencies and organizations involved in transport operations and management has been one of the key challenges in implementation. As an example, it took some time for some state agencies and institutions to appreciate the role and functions of LAMATA as the agency responsible for bus regulations and enter into concessional contracts with bus operators. In 2007, LAMATA law had to be amended to clarify the functions and assign it as the agency responsible for entering into regulatory contracts with the bus operators; and
- Delays in setting up the regulatory framework: Getting a full understanding and agreements on the way forward in developing a regulatory framework and enforcing it across multiple agencies resulted in initial delays. The regulations governing the operation of road transport need to be in compliance with the relevant federal legislation. For example, standards for the use and operation of motor vehicles are set out in the National Road Traffic Regulations of 1997, empowered under the FRSC Act. These regulations also established the federal office of the State Director of Motor Vehicle Administration with powers, inter alia, to set the maximum and minimum fares that may be charged for stage carriage (local bus services). In addition, effective enforcement of regulations ultimately rests with the powers granted to the Nigeria Police Force, which is a federal body even though it is organized on a state basis. While officers of the state agencies do have a limited enforcement capability, they don’t hold the power of arrest and some of their actions require accompaniment by a police officer.
Access to credit:
- The project was designed as a public-private partnership (PPP) with the public sector financing the infrastructure and the private sector financing bus procurement and operations. While the credit was not financing bus purchase, the success of the project nevertheless depended on the ability of the private sector to obtain financing for buses. The biggest challenge was the purchase price of a regular size bus—about US$100,000 each, which is much more than the price of a second-hand bus (less than US$10,000) which is what the bus operators were used to financing mainly from personal savings. The commercial banks were unwilling to lend on long-term (the typical lending term was two to three years against a bus life of over 10 years) and required some form of security of repayment, which was often difficult for the private bus operators to secure. As part of implementation, discussions were held with the commercial banks, bus operators, bus association, and bus suppliers, to develop a scheme to enable financing of buses by the private sector. The key elements of the scheme were:

(i) Providing the bank the initial lien on revenues collected from bus operations; only the balance (after the deduction of financing costs) was passed on to the operator. The bank also was given the right to act as ticket distributor and security monitor.

(ii) Requiring the participating operators to accept collective liability for all the obligations into which they enter. Any individual default, whether by embezzlement of revenues or through vehicle unavailability (perhaps as a result of an accident or mechanical failure), was to be met by an additional charge on all the remaining members. Getting these agreements in place took a long time and initially delayed bus operations on the Bus Rapid Transit (BRT) lane. Though eventually the scheme has proved to be a big success.

2.1 Project Preparation, Design and Quality at Entry

30. Project Preparation: The project was prepared as a first phase of interventions to address the issues related to a lack of institutional capacity for sector management, low cost recovery, poor quality of public transport coupled with adverse environmental and social impacts, and inadequate involvement of stakeholders. Taking forward the concepts from earlier studies, the LUTP was prepared on the basis of building capacity to manage and coordinate the transport system, and identifying priority actions, investments and enabling measures for its improvement. An Adaptable Programmatic Lending was considered a more appropriate instrument to address the long term support required to implement the transport sector policy and strategy though the project was designed as a Specific Investment Lending because of the unsatisfactory macro-economic performance of Nigeria. From the outset, enhanced provision of bus services was a core component of the project design and included development of bus-way priority—though primarily as a complementary measure to the mass-transit railway proposal. Consideration was given to providing financial support for bus renewal to demonstrate financial viability of the bus operations in Lagos. However, the introduction of regulatory reforms to reward efficient
bus service coupled with improvements to the road network was expected to provide sufficient incentive to the private sector for enhanced provision of bus services.

31. **Project Design:** A multi-modal transport approach was taken, recognizing the potential for developing rail and inland waterway mass-transit integrated with the core road passenger transport network. The project focused on fast-return investments, such as road maintenance, rehabilitation, and junction improvements. It also included preparation of technical, environmental, and social measures for possible future mass transit development for possible support in a private-public financing framework.

32. As part of additional financing the project design focused on: (i) increasing the investments to improve public transport infrastructure (depots, terminals, stops); and (ii) investing in comprehensive, integrated program of complimentary improvements along a specific route or corridor. In addition, outcome indicators were better aligned with the project objectives and base line data collected during preparation of additional financing.

33. **Involvement of key stakeholders was critical to successful implementation:** Conception to implementation of the BRT scheme was achieved in a record time of 15 months (as compared to four to five years in most other countries). A key success factor for the project was the active involvement of key stakeholders in the scheme; the local transport union was incorporated into the scheme. It successfully established a cooperative that was able to attract commercial funds for the purchase and operation of 100 high capacity buses and further lease of 120 high capacity buses. There is no government subsidy for operating the scheme; notwithstanding the scheme is financially successful. To deliver this scheme, the Governor of the state demonstrated strong political leadership in the face of fierce opposition by other interest groups. The traveling public has since greatly acclaimed the introduction of the scheme.

34. The project design focused on the following:

(i) The project design is driven by consideration of local requirements and what is most appropriate at the local level and it combines institutional and regulatory reform together with specific investments;

(ii) The design represents a local response to adapt an expensive design. Drawing from good practices from Bogota (Colombia) and Curitiba (Brazil), the system was adapted to a Nigerian context, as BRT ‘Lite’ (i.e. a high-quality public bus service system that is affordable, reliable and safe, while retaining the most desirable BRT engineering characteristics). The services were designed to respond to the demands of various stakeholders: politicians, transport unions, public transport users and road users. It was delivered at very low cost per kilometer as compared to BRT projects in other parts of the world, making it easier to replicate along other corridors and other low-income countries in sub-Saharan Africa;

(iii) It encompasses all elements of public-private partnership, with the State financing infrastructure and the private sector financing buses, depots and maintenance facilities. The union is operating the buses and will be able to pay back the credit
within two years. Fares are not subsidized and are lower than those charged earlier by the mini buses; and
(iv) The project is being implemented in full partnership and cooperation of bus unions and other local interests.

35. **Quality at Entry Assessment**: The quality at entry is rated satisfactory due to the strategic choice made in identification of project components, championing the establishment of a strong independent transport authority as the only effective way to address the sector’s institutional weaknesses, and the sequencing of long term planning efforts in the urban transport sector. The background studies to define the institutional context were initiated in mid-90s and considerable work had been done to support the project design.

36. Preparation studies were completed before the project was taken to the Board. The bidding documents for all the major investment were also prepared. The bye-law for establishment of LAMATA had also been passed by the Lagos state parliament. Consequently, it was a good basis to put in place a sustainable implementation unit, LAMATA.

37. The project was subjected to a two stage review at the Sixth Quality at Entry assessment. At the second stage review, the quality at entry was upgraded to satisfactory (rating 2). Both panels were of the view that the project implementation will face challenges because of difficult country context and complex design. The identification of specific risk factors and the proposed mitigation measures were seen to be adequate.

### 2.2 Implementation

38. The implementation status report rating and disbursement profile of the project is presented in Figure 1. Based on implementation progress, three distinct phases can be identified as:

(i) **first phase** lasting from December 2002 to July 2005. This phase of the project focused on strengthening the first objective which is to strengthen LAMATA’s capacity in management and planning of the transport sector. Getting the right professionals in key positions took longer than expected but the Bank team worked closely with LAMATA in its support during the initial phase. Physical implementation was slow due to lack of clarity on the approach to maintain the federal road network. Therefore, the period was characterized by slow disbursement and moderately unsatisfactory rating for both development objectives and implementation progress towards the end of this phase.

(ii) **second phase** was during the period July 2005 to April 2007. During this phase, the project was restructured twice to introduce a more flexible fund transfer requirement and clarify the issue of LAMATA’s responsibility in management of the road network (for details, please see paragraphs 15 and 16). The efforts to strengthen LAMATA capacity were continued which resulted in formalizing systems and procedures into manuals, setting up acceptable financial management
arrangements (including migration to report based disbursement method), ensuring efficiency and effectiveness in procurement management and improving project’s safeguard compliance. With an improvement in disbursement ratio and LAMATA functioning effectively, the development objectives and implementation progress ratings were upgraded to satisfactory; and

(iii) **third phase** commenced in May 2007 and lasted till the close of the project. With an improvement in the disbursement ratio and over 85 percent of the credit disbursed, this phase focused on better aligning investments with the development objectives in an attempt to enhance public transport operations. During this phase, additional financing of US$50 million was provided to support investments in public transport improvements in a focused and comprehensive manner.

Figure 1: LUTP – Implementation Status Report (ISR) Rating and Disbursement Profile, 2002 - 2010

39. After surmounting the initial difficulties encountered in phase 1, the project maintained a satisfactory rating both for development outcomes and implementation progress throughout the project period and was rated as highly satisfactory in development objectives and implementation progress in the last ISR. The closing date was extended three times, *first* from June 2008 to June 2009 (as part of additional financing); *second* from June 2009 to August 2010 (to complete implementation of on-going activities); and *last* from August 2010 to December 2010 to allow completion of activities and also to
maintain a dialogue with government while the follow-on project was awaiting effectiveness.

2.3 Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) Design, Implementation and Utilization

40. The M&E was rated as unsatisfactory initially during the project. During the course of implementation, however, considerable attention was given to improving the monitoring framework as a basis for measuring and building on the base case. A detailed M&E framework was developed as part of additional financing based on qualitative and quantitative performance indicators for each sub-component, with a specific focus on transport, social, environmental, and capacity development aspects. The M&E unit in LAMATA was strengthened. The transport and social impact monitoring were conducted by the M&E unit in LAMATA on an annual basis. A number of studies were conducted to monitor the impact of project investments. The specific output of studies is the identification of attributes of adequate public transport, which were utilized to develop design of the BRT and Bus Franchise Scheme (BFS) corridors. The analytical scope of attributes evolved around four main attributes as listed in Table 4 below.

Table 4: Monitoring and Evaluation Framework

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Attributes</th>
<th>Dimensions</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Affordability</td>
<td>- Monthly spending on transport/users income</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Price or fare; Offer of benefits for public transport (e.g. bus-passes) or subsidies on fares; “Opportunistic cost of service”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Availability</td>
<td>- Routes desired by users v/s available services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Length of wait, Traveling time, Reliability</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Availability of services at night and at weekends</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accessibility</td>
<td>- Walking distance to terminal or station</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Availability of information</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Access roads to allow vehicles in neighborhood</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Social environment (mugging and violence)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Vehicles and bus stops adapted to vulnerable users (children, pregnant women, elderly, disable)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acceptability</td>
<td>- Safety inside vehicle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Crew member’s attitudes (drivers and aides)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Conditions of bus stops and shelters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Cleanliness and conservation of vehicles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Comfort and capacity</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
41. Progress towards the project objectives was measured on a regular basis through the following actions:

(i) Design and validation of the monitoring system in cooperation with the implementing agency and all stakeholders;
(ii) Implementation of an automated data processing system that generates the relevant M&E information periodically;
(iii) Periodic field data collection for input into the data processing system to generate the appropriate indicators;
(iv) Collation of monthly and quarterly reports by LAMATA; and
(v) Publication and circulation of quarterly progress reports by LAMATA to all project stakeholders.

42. The M&E tools and framework developed in the project are now being used by LSG on government financed projects. This is helping the state get value for money in its projects. Furthermore, LAMATA on its own also uses the M&E tools to monitor all other state government projects it executes.

2.4 Safeguard and Fiduciary Compliance

Safeguards:

43. The ISR rating was satisfactory during the project. The safeguard policies triggered are the Bank’s Environmental Assessment (OP/BP 4.01) and Involuntary Resettlement (OP/BP 4.12). An Environmental Management Framework (EMF) was prepared with consultation with stakeholders and disclosed nationwide. LAMATA has created a safeguard unit which is responsible for the implementation of environmental and social issues arising from the implementation of the project. The unit prepared procedural manuals on environmental and social assessment which were well implemented during the project. The unit developed information, education, and communication (IEC) strategy to gain support of the people and foster engagement of the project affected persons during implementation. The social impact of improved bus services and roads maintenance was mitigated by the creation of thousands of jobs on construction sites and integration of displaced drivers in the new bus scheme.

44. In particular, all sub-components were screened using the safeguard checklist to ensure conformity to the rules and social and environmental soundness. The environmental and social management plans were well implemented, and closely monitored to ensure compliance. As part of safeguards due diligence, an environmental audit was conducted with a view to evaluating the project’s safeguard performance. The report of the environmental audit rated the project’s overall safeguards compliance to be satisfactory.

Fiduciary

45. Procurement: During the initial phase, LAMATA engaged services of a consultant to carry out procurement activities and build capacity of its procurement unit. In addition,
LAMATA staff participated in workshops and clinics organized by the Bank and took part in procurement training within and outside the country. This provided the required skill mix needed for good project preparation and implementation. The design of the procurement scope, procedures, review thresholds and frequency of supervision was based on analysis of Country Procurement Assessment, Country Performance Portfolio Review, and procurement capacity assessment of the procurement unit in LAMATA. The strengthening of procurement capacity was an attempt to mitigate the risks identified in the capacity assessment. Overall, in terms of procurement, clear issues were identified and sound steps undertaken to ensure efficiency and effectiveness of procurement contributing to the achievement of the project development objectives.

46. The key factor contributing to the satisfactory performance in procurement function included the presence of competent and highly skilled staff in LAMATA. Over the years the procurement unit developed expertise in preparation of specifications and terms of reference for procurement needs, good project planning and implementation, good tools for monitoring and evaluation of projects, good contract management tools, and good communication arrangements. It was able to quickly adopt and follow World Bank’s guidelines and procurement procedures. Post procurement reviews were conducted in line with the provision of design and procurement performance is rated as satisfactory.

47. **Financial Management:** Acceptable financial management arrangements were maintained during project implementation. The project commenced with transaction-based disbursement method and migrated to report-based disbursement method in 2005 after the review undertaken by the Bank project team found the project eligible for report-based disbursement method. It is one of only three implementing entities in the country portfolio which availed the report-based disbursement method. The Interim Unaudited Financial Reports (IFRs) were rendered timely and of satisfactory quality. In May 2009, the project won a Certificate of Excellence given by the Financial Management Unit of the Bank for achieving 100 percent compliance in IFR submission during the period January 1, 2008 to December 31, 2008. All through the period of project implementation, annual financial statements were submitted timely and had unqualified opinion. The implementing entity maintains a very robust computerized accounting system, migrated from SUN Accounts to enterprise resource planning using Oracle software. This has facilitated preparation of timely and reliable financial statements. Payment processing progressed to electronic processing (using Remita payment platform) from manual at inception. Consequently, the processing time was reduced from 21 to 15 days.

### 2.5 Post-completion Operation/Next Phase

48. While the BRT project has been a success, it has also raised expectations among city residents to scale-up the reform and investment program and extend BRT system to other parts of Lagos metropolis. LAMATA with support from LSG has prepared a transport sector policy and a strategic plan to address mobility needs of the population in a clean, safe, and affordable manner. The objective is to create an integrated multi-modal transport system. Some of the key elements of the plan are: (i) extension of BRT to other corridors, including Oshodi-Mile 12-Ikorodu and Oshodi-Mile 2-Obalende. The rationale
behind selection of these corridors is based on a comprehensive network analysis, traffic flows and ease of implementation; and (ii) the construction of two commuter rail lines—Agbado to Marina (Red line on an existing railroad right-of-way) and Okokomaiko to Marina (Blue line). The LSG has requested Bank’s support for extension of the BRT corridors while the commuter lines are being constructed using a PPP model, with infrastructure being funded by the LSG under a design/build contract (at a cost of over US$1 billion) and the actual railway operations being funded and managed by the private sector under a concession agreement. The Bank is financing extension of the BRT corridor as part of the follow-on project, Lagos Urban Transport Project 2 (LUTP 2). The project became effective in May 2011. The French Development Agency (Agence Française de Développement) is also co-financing LUTP 2.

3. Assessment of Outcomes

3.1 Relevance of Objectives, Design and Implementation

Rating: High Overall Relevance

49. The objectives and activities designed under the proposed project are consistent with the government’s overall strategy for non-oil dependent growth as stipulated in the National Economic Empowerment and Development Strategy (NEEDS) and Lagos State Economic Empowerment and Development Strategy. The Federal Government of Nigeria is keen to propagate the concept of sustainable urban transport that calls for inclusion of parameters such as safety, cleanliness, and reliability in transport systems for Nigerian cities. The project is also successful in supporting the Nigeria Vision 2020 developmental blueprint adopted by the federal government, with a specific focus on development of an efficient and affordable multi-modal transportation network plan for major cities (p. 132).

50. Additionally, the World Bank, United States Agency for International Development, African Development Bank, and the United Kingdom’s Department for International Development have jointly developed the Country Partnership Strategy (CPS), which was approved by the Bank on July 28, 2009. The CPS is aligned with the pillars of both the NEEDS and State Economic Empowerment and Development Strategy, especially the second pillar that focuses on improved environment and services for non-oil growth. The transportation strategic priority for Lagos identified in the CPS is to, “put in place an integrated mass transit program with emphasis on road, rail, and water transportation services through LAMATA, and public-private partnership by strengthening traffic management mechanisms…” (p. 92). The project has successfully removed some of the key bottlenecks to sustainable transport by facilitating market transformation, strengthening institutional capacity and laying the basis for acceptability of the reform program.

51. The project activities are strategically aligned with all three pillars of the NEEDS. On empowering people and improving social service, the project components were identified based on broad consultation, involving users and community residents. The project supports development of an information, education, and communication strategy not only to guide the involvement of transport users and beneficiary communities in the
planning and implementation of project elements, but also for use as a monitoring and evaluation tool to provide feedback on the project’s impact. On **fostering economic growth**, the project has a strong focus on developing an enabling environment for increased private sector participation in the transport sector and improving delivery of services. On **improving governance**, a key element of the project is to strengthen LAMATA, increase its budgetary accountability and improve its sector planning and programming capacity. This strengthening is likely to have ripple effects, since within Nigeria, LAMATA is already held up as a model of public sector governance.

3.2 **Achievement of Project Development Objectives**

**Overall Rating:** **Highly Satisfactory**

**Objective 1: Improve management of the Lagos metropolitan transport sector, including institutional, regulatory and policy aspects.**

**Rating:** **Highly Satisfactory**

52. The achievements surpassed the target, mainly as LAMATA has become a model for other state governments in Nigeria and other countries in terms of efficiency and effectiveness in planning, management, and coordination of urban transport functions in a city. The most common problem confronting cities especially in developing countries is an absence of an institution with the authority and the capacity to promote public transportation in an integrated fashion. LAMATA is able to fill that gap by its ability to reach across agencies at local, state, and federal levels and across multiple functions including planning, management, and implementation.

53. A semi-autonomous authority (LAMATA) responsible for the planning and management of the transport sector in Lagos state has been established and is now fully functional. Procurement procedures, financial management procedures and safeguards policy has been developed and fully operational. The use of these instruments has been extended to projects financed by the state government. A regulatory framework has been established to franchise bus services both the corridor financed by the project as well as government financed bus corridors. Sustainable financial arrangements have been put in place for road maintenance. In particular the project supported the following:

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7 The assessment of outcomes is based on a number of survey instruments developed as part of the completion report. The focus of the survey instrument was on: (a) adequacy of the legal instruments setting up LAMATA and the Transport Fund; (b) operational effectiveness of LAMATA; (c) experience with bus service enhancement; (d) impact of improvements to the road network; (e) cross cutting issues—environmental, safeguards, gender, disabled persons, community, and non-governmental organizations (NGO) relations; (f) capacity assessment and performance of safeguard applications; and (g) assessment of social impact.
Strengthening capacity of LAMATA is expected to be the most enduring impact of the project. The effectiveness of LAMATA was driven by its structure as an independent legal entity, separate from the line ministry with strong leadership, and competent and highly motivated staff. Some of the key factors driving the success of LAMATA include:

- Established as an independent Authority along the lines of a private sector organization;
- Operated as a business unit, observing best practices and acting as agents of change;
- Strong leadership supported by competent staff;
- Management by a Board of Directors, with a non-executive Chairman and a broad based membership drawn from amongst stakeholders, including the private sector;
- Staff remuneration based on private sector benefits;
- Corporate governance, social responsibility, corporate credibility were high on its agenda; and
- System of continuous engagement with the public and system users to allow acceptance, cooperation, and collaboration.

Since its establishment, LAMATA has succeeded in contributing to increased awareness for traffic management, transparency and discipline in procurement processes and involving the users in decision-making processes. LAMATA activities are now widely recognized by government, participating communities and development partners as an efficient and high-performing initiative that has significantly contributed to the city’s poverty reduction goals notably by improving accessibility in low-income areas, involving communities in identification of priority programs and improving sector management. LAMATA’s annual operating cost remains less than six percent of the overall expenditure. The annual expenditure includes total expenditure by LAMATA in construction, maintenance and planning. In addition, LAMATA is also responsible for developing long range plans, maintaining data base, and developing PPP models for transport investments in rail and road. The operating cost includes management cost, research and development cost, consultants, training and operating cost.

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8 LAMATA has received multiple awards over the past few years for its spearheading best practices in transport management and planning, including:
- International Union of Public Transport (UITP) award (both regional and international) in Dubai for political commitment to improvements in public transport (2011)
- Award for Excellence, World Bank Africa Region (2010)
- Transport Planner of the Year 2009 award to Managing Director (MD) by Transport Planning Society (UK) (2009)
- World Bank award of Certificate of Excellence for 100 percent compliance on IFR submissions (2008)
- Award as the Most Supportive Government Agency by Busworld, Lagos (2007)
- Award of recognition by National Association of the Blind (2010)
- Merit Award from the Department of Transport Planning and Management, Olabisi Onabanjo University, Ogun State (2007)
- Award as Best Transport Administrator to the MD by Nigeria Auto Media Awards (2009)
- Corporate award by Yolas Consultants
55. The project supported strengthening the capacity of LAMATA in a number of areas, including:

- Developing a transport sector strategy;
- Creating organizational and institutional capacity for the planning and management of the State’s transport system;
- Supporting studies to raise the level of cost recovery in the transport sector;
- Strengthening capacity in safeguards management, procurement and financial management; and
- Developing a PPP framework for public sector bus operations.

56. In effect, LAMATA has become a model for other state governments in Nigeria and other countries in terms of efficiency, capability, data repository and expertise in project financing and implementation.

(i) Developing role of LAMATA as regulator: One of the key outcomes was establishment of an effective bus regulatory framework for bus services provision, which supported implementation of a pilot bus franchising scheme. The original powers granted to LAMATA in the domain of passenger transport had been limited to its planning and co-ordination and not to its actual regulation. However the revised LAMATA Law, passed by the House in late 2006, defined its function *inter alia* to ‘plan, regulate and co-ordinate the supply of adequate and effective public transport in all travel modes and supporting infrastructure within metropolitan Lagos’ and granted specific powers to make regulations (with the approval of the Governor) with respect to its functions. This has made the role of LAMATA as the sector regulator unambiguous. The Law also granted powers to the Authority *inter alia* to ‘prepare plans for the management and development of transportation in metropolitan Lagos’ and, in conjunction with the Ministry of Works, to ‘construct, re-construct, maintain and manage transport infrastructure and facilities’ necessary for the discharge of its functions. This legislation thus empowered LAMATA to act as the sponsor and promoter of mass-transit schemes in Lagos, and hence to develop the BRT-Lite system.

(ii) Sustainability of Funding: The original Project Agreement required that LSG contribute no less than the equivalent of US$7 million annually to finance the road maintenance requirements. It was also agreed that LSG will set up a Transport Fund with direct transfers from user charges which would gradually reach the amount of US$7 million annually required to maintain the road network. It was expected that these user charges will progressively replace the US$7 million expected as contribution from LSG. As part of restructuring on August 2, 2005, it was agreed that the contractual commitment for LSG to contribute US$7 million annually was reduced to US$2 million.

During 2005-2006, government carried out a number of studies, including evaluation of the MVA and held consultations with the civil society and other
interested parties to examine arrangements to set up a Transport Fund and identify financing sources. The Fund was set up in 2006, with dedicated funding from: (a) Lagos State budget provision; (b) license fees (hackney permit, road taxes, license plate registration, and vehicle registration);\(^9\) (c) bus concession fees; (d) other road user charges (tolls). In discussions with the representatives of the 36 states, LAMATA has successfully made a case with the Joint Tax Board at the Federal Government level to increase road user charges, to be shared between LAMATA (50 percent), state treasury office (40 percent), Motor Vehicle Authority (five percent), and state MOT (five percent). The Transport Fund has shown a steady increase since its inception in 2006.

Since its inception in 2006, over US$100 million have been allocated to the Transport Fund, which is many-fold higher than the initial Project Agreement. The LSG contribution for road maintenance has been over US$65 million while dedicated user charges contribution to the Fund is over US$35 million.

(iii) The project financed creation of (TMUs) responsible for effective traffic management on local government roads and to develop the capacity to be able to define functional road hierarchy and the preparation and implementation of appropriate traffic management plans for the area. During project restructuring, the number of TMUs to be created were reduced to four, Eti-Osa, Surulere, Mushin, and Ikeja. Eventually, during reprioritization of the available resources, the number of TMUs to be established was reduced to two, with a focus on Alimosho (the area in which BFS is situated) and Oshodi, the local government area at the hub of the BRT scheme where BRT scheme (Obalende to Ikorodu) is located. The TMUs performed the following key tasks:

- Development of a Local Area Traffic Plan;
- Development of a Parking Policy and Implementation Plan;
- Development of traffic solutions to identified traffic and accident black spots;
- Action on remedial works and planned maintenance on priority local roads; and
- Provision of equipment and training.

**Objective 2: Enhance the public transport road network in an environmentally, socially, and financially sustainable manner.**

57. Rating: **Highly Satisfactory.** The achievements surpass the target.

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\(^9\) LAMATA is responsible for regulating traffic along the pilot bus franchise and BRT corridor and enforcing and monitoring franchise agreement. For providing this technical assistance, LAMATA charges an annual franchise fee which has provided an additional funding source for LAMATA activities and helps to achieve cost recovery.
58. The investments in road network efficiency improvements have resulted in:

- Reduced delays at major intersections;
- Person days of employment created; and
- Improved quality of road network resulting from: (i) setting up a procurement management system to carry out road condition surveys, (ii) setting up a geographic information system, and (iii) adoption of maintenance manual.

59. LAMATA has started, for the first time in the country, the design and execution of maintenance work with participation of the private sector through awarding contracts to local consultants and contractors. Experience has shown that the output of maintenance works through contracts is more efficient, cost effective and better in quality compared with the traditional methods of using force accounts procedures. This has contributed to enhancing efficiency of the existing road space, thereby reducing vehicle operating cost and improving road safety.

60. The works to improve junctions comprised better physical design of roundabouts, dedicated right and left turning lanes, introduction of other relatively simple improvements and measures like repair of existing traffic lights, introduction of traffic light regulated measures, pedestrian safety measures such as zebra crossing, road signs at junctions, road bumps and drop curbs. Ex-post assessment of the “as is” condition of the 57 junctions suggest that at least 71 percent are in efficient conditions meaning that the TSM measure is functioning to reduce traffic congestion. A site inspection of 21 roads rehabilitated under the program reveals that they are still structurally intact after over three years of usage. However, there is a need to continue the maintenance regime if the gains are to be sustained.

61. Environmental impact: The project has contributed to monitoring and reducing greenhouse gas emissions from public transport. Specifically, pollution levels have fallen in Lagos as a result of replacing old and small buses with new buses. The new BRT vehicles not only carry a far greater number of passengers per vehicle, but the vehicles meet Euro 1 standards meaning lower emissions level of the key pollutants. Furthermore, operating in segregated running ways for much of the route, these vehicles can bypass traffic meaning less time spent inefficiently in stationary traffic. There has also been a modal shift from private cars to buses to the tune of about five to 10 percent. The implementation of a BRT system can lead to a reduction in greenhouse gas emissions in two main ways; firstly by changing volume and make-up of vehicles travelling and secondly by reducing the level of emissions produced by these vehicles as they travel. This has resulted in carbon dioxide (CO₂) reduction of 24,677 tons in 2009. Similar reduction in particulates present in the atmosphere was recorded at about -33. The data (first in Lagos) will serve as baseline to measure project impacts. This shows that

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10 Evaluation and Documentation of Lagos BRT-Lite, LAMATA, April 2009.
11 Lagos CO₂ Emissions Assessment Handbook, June 2010, LAMATA.
environmental and transport objectives can both be met when addressed as a problem of management and planning, not simply of hardware and technology.

62. **Social Impact:** The project contributed to poverty alleviation, improved access for women and children, reduced cost of travel, and made public transport more affordable especially for users in the lowest income quintile. The share of expenditure on transport by the lowest quintile has reduced from 20 percent in 2005 to 12 percent in 2010 (for details please see paragraph 66 (iii), Section 3.5 (a) and 3.6)

63. **Financial Impact:** The project contributed to financial sustainability by helping set up a Transport Fund with dedicated funding from user charges (for details please see paragraph 56 (ii)). By financing investments in public transport infrastructure and creating a conducive environment for private sector participation in bus operations, the project has successfully demonstrated viability of a PPP model.

**Objective 3: Enhance bus services.**

Rating: **Highly Satisfactory.** The achievements surpass the target.

64. LAMATA targeted 15,000 bus-km for the pilot bus franchise but achieved 45,000 bus-km on Iyana-Ipaja-Ikotun and Mile2-CMS corridors. This is a significant leap over the targeted value.

65. The investments in bus service enhancement resulted in:

- Implementation of pilot bus franchise scheme along Iyana-Ipaja-Ikotun corridor (operations started in June 2009);
- Development of bus terminals, bus stops, bus shelters, lay-byes, and traffic system management measures along the corridor and regulation of ticketing activities;
- Implementation of BRT system along Mile 2 to CMS corridor (operations started in March 2008\(^\text{12}\)); and
- Successful demonstration of a PPP scheme, with the private sector providing services and public sector providing infrastructure and regulatory framework.

66. The pilot bus franchise scheme and the BRT-Lite scheme has positively affected travel along the corridors in a number of key ways.\(^\text{13}\)

(i) The bus scheme along Iyana-Ipaja-Ikotun corridor carries over 100,000 persons per day;

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\(^{12}\) The financing for construction of the BRT was provided by the LSG; Bank financed feasibility studies, exposure to good practices through study tours, participation in international seminars and knowledge sharing.

\(^{13}\) The empirical data in this section is based on multiple user surveys (both qualitative and quantitative) and focus group discussions carried out as part of the completion report between November 2010 and February 2011.
(ii) The BRT scheme along Mile 2 to CMS corridor carries over 200,000 persons per day;

(iii) Money spent by poor households on travel has reduced from N108/trip in 2005 to N96/trip in 2010\(^{14}\) while the income share of expenditure on transport by the lowest quintile has reduced from 20 percent to 12 percent during this period. In nominal terms, savings are less than the 15 percent reduction forecast at preparation (15 percent reduction from N108 translates to N92). However, in real terms, the N96 travel expense in 2010 is a reduction of over 45 percent considering the change in CPI (the CPI changed by 63 percent between 2005 and 2010);

(iv) Average one-way trip time along the corridors has reduced from 30 minutes in 2005 to 20 minutes in 2010\(^{15}\). This saving in travel time excludes time saved in waiting at the bus stop resulting from higher bus frequency and better scheduling.

(v) The length of bus-km franchised has increased from a target of 15,000 bus-km in 2010 to 45,000 bus-km;\(^{16}\)

(vi) User surveys reveal an improvement in passenger satisfaction from 40 percent to 80 percent over the project period;

(vii) The bus scheme has created direct employment for over 1,500 people, mostly graduates, and indirect employment for over 500,000 people in Lagos;\(^{17}\)

(viii) The bus scheme has empowered local operators to successfully run public transport services, and enticed local banks, financiers and vehicle suppliers for other planned BRT schemes;

(ix) The bus scheme has demonstrated and confirmed the strategic role of public transportation in Lagos to the extent that planned State investments in the sub-sector have risen 50-fold; and

(x) Ambient concentrations of pollutants which pose health hazards have been reduced along the BRT corridor.

Please check out a 3-minute video on Lagos BRT on the following web link:

http://streaming3.worldbank.org/ramgen/ext/media/LagosTransportMIX.rm

\(^{14}\) The reduction in travel cost resulted from improvements in bus productivity and the savings were passed on to the bus users. The estimates are based on travel surveys conducted as part of the completion report. For details on survey methodology, please see the Implementation Completion Report prepared by the client (March 2011).

\(^{15}\) The reduction in travel time resulted from improvements in traffic management and dedicated lanes for buses. The estimates are based on travel surveys conducted as part of the completion report. For details on survey methodology, please see the Implementation Completion Report prepared by the client (March 2011).

\(^{16}\) This is computed on the basis of about 250 buses operating daily on Iyana-Ipaja-Ikotun and Mile 2 to CMS corridors, of about 30 kms and making six round trips every day.

\(^{17}\) The direct employment has been created in bus depot, terminals, additional bus fare collectors, inspectors, etc. The indirect employment has been created by improved access to job opportunities for people living along the corridors, improved maintenance requirements, additional employment in commercial banks financing bus purchase, increased business opportunities along the corridor and setting in place a multiplier impact. The estimates are based on the completion report prepared by the client (March 2011).
Objective 4: *Promote water and non-motorized transport.*

Rating: **Satisfactory**

67. The achievements meet the target.

68. The Lagos ferry services corporation was fully privatized while concession of ferry service became operationalized. This resulted in four more jetties to be constructed. Subsequently the passengers per day for ferry services increased to over 7,200 in 2007. Furthermore, there is greater use of water transport system in Lagos State. Some motor owners now park at jetties’ park to take water transport from the mainland to Lagos Island.

69. The investments in water transport promotion resulted in:

- Development and implementation of a detailed strategic plan for improving the use of the waterways of Metropolitan Lagos for transport services, including establishing an appropriate regulatory framework;
- Repairs of the jetties and the privatization of the ferry services resulted in commencement of water transport, with the Ebute Ipakodo Metro Ferry Service running from Ikorodu to Lagos;
- Encouragement of private sector participation in the provision of water transport services; and
- Rehabilitation and addition to existing terminal facilities.

Objective 5: *Prepare future phases of the program.*

Rating: **Highly Satisfactory**

70. The achievements exceed the target as the government has not only completed the studies as planned but has committed substantial resources to implement study recommendations. The study recommendations of the MVA reform study have been implemented resulting in a secure funding basis for LAMATA operations.

71. Under the project the preparatory studies for the follow-on phases were completed. These include:
- Transport Master Plan for metropolitan Lagos;
- Institutional reform plan for the transport sector, in particular on reform of the MVA system;
- Strategy for the enhanced use of intermediate means of transport in metropolitan Lagos; and
- All the necessary studies and activities for the next phase for the implementation of the policy and strategy, including the resettlement plans for the implementation of rail mass transit in the Agege to Iddo corridor.
72. The government has commenced construction of the urban rail in Lagos and begun expansion of the BRT system to other corridors in the city as part of the recommendations of the master plan.

3.3 Efficiency

Rating: High

73. Economic rate of return: An ex-post economic analysis was carried out for routine maintenance, rehabilitation, bridge repairs, and traffic management components. The overall rate of return is 67 percent as compared to 56 percent at appraisal, suggesting that greater economic benefits were realized ex-post as compared to ex-ante. The bus service enhancement component financed by the project resulted in an ERR of 45 percent as compared to ex-ante estimates of between 28 percent and 37 percent. The main benefits are savings in travel time and reduction in bus operating cost resulting from improved bus services. The calculations do not take into account a number of other benefits resulting from a reduction in CO₂ emissions, reduced accidents, and improved accessibility.

74. Holding suppliers, contractors, and consultants accountable: Reversing the prevailing culture whereby suppliers, contractors, and consultants paid little attention to quality, timeliness, and cost of services was a key challenge faced by LAMATA. In response, LAMATA designed terms of reference and product specifications clearly and precisely, leaving little room for ambiguity. The expectations are made clear and a rigorous selection procedure is followed to ensure that suppliers that are best able to deliver are appointed. Once appointed, further discussions and monitoring are initiated to reinforce LAMATA expectations and performance guarantees exercised if necessary.

75. Cost efficiency in civil work rates per kilometer: The procurement process followed by LAMATA with its competitive bidding requirements, among other factors, has ensured greater efficiency in terms of delivery of road works at relatively lower cost per km compared to output from other Ministries and agencies. Other factors resulting in this cost-effectiveness of LAMATA contracts include:

(i) Regularity of payment, which reduces built-in costs of funds;
(ii) Professional culture within the organization;
(iii) Efficient monitoring and management of contracts;
(iv) Strict penalty for non-performance; and
(v) General atmosphere in the contracting industry towards improved accountability and delivery.

76. In response to the above, empirical data confirms that the average cost per kilometer of road contracts in Lagos and Nigeria are about two times the cost of works executed by LAMATA. Although some caution must be exercised because of the

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18 The cost per kilometer of road works carried out by LAMATA is about US$500-600,000 as compared to US$800-900,000 per km for the road works carried out by the state. The project had a cost overrun due to
changes in the general price level and exchange rates over the time period. In addition, there are likely to be differences in composite road designs by different agencies (e.g., a standard LAMATA road will have pedestrian walkways, TSM measures etc). The above nevertheless provide a reasonable guide as to cost-effectiveness of LAMATA road contracts.

77. **Technical, Financial, and Institutional Audits:** Independent technical and financial audits of the road works are built into the monitoring framework. The civil works have been audited by the Authority’s external auditors and an expatriate consultant. The reports of audits have been most favorable and underline the Authority’s commitment to quality standards in its civil works implementation.

**3.4 Justification of Overall Outcome Rating**

Rating: **Highly Satisfactory**

78. The rating is based on high relevance, achievement of key performance indicators, development of organized and efficient bus transport system, and achievement of sustainable institutional and financial arrangement in the Lagos metropolitan area. Lagos state now has BRT system that provides Lagos commuters, with a clean, safe, affordable and reliable means of getting around the city. This system essentially emulates the performance and amenity characteristics of a modern rail-based transit system, but at a fraction of the cost and creates a demand for gas which is currently being flared-off. In a city such as Lagos with 17 million people, this is no small feat. The BRT is a bus-based mass transit system that delivers fast, comfortable and cost-effective service. Through the provision of exclusive right-of-way lanes and excellence in customer service, BRT essentially emulates the performance and amenity characteristics of a modern rail based transit system, but at a fraction of the cost.

79. **Employment Generation:** A total of 1.66 million work-days of labor were created during the project life. This represents number of labor days employed by contractors on routine maintenance. The data was collected from time/labor sheets submitted to LAMATA by the contractors. The contractors employed laborers mostly from the localities and communities in which routine maintenance was being carried out. In addition, implementation of the bus scheme has created direct employment for over 1,500 people (for details please see paragraph 66 (vii)).

increase in input prices (diesel, motor spirit, cement, steel, sand, etc) and also deterioration in the road condition due to two years delay between design and implementation.
3.5 Overarching Themes, Other Outcomes and Impacts

(a) Poverty Impacts, Gender Aspects, and Social Development

80. The beneficiaries and stakeholders are in agreement with the substantial reduction in time and money spent by poor household in the state on transportation since the introduction of BRT system in Lagos State. There has been a reduction of over 30 percent in time and more than 40 percent in real term on money spent by poor household on transportation. This is most likely to impact on reduction of poverty level in the state.

81. Following the tremendous impact of the scheme, the public requested for more coverage of BRT scheme to other parts of the state. Furthermore, many parents now use BRT buses to take their children to school because it is cheaper, efficient in time and safer than other public transport system in the metropolis. The elderly and the physically challenged, on the other hand, requested for buses that provide for easy access to embark and disembark; and the same time reserve seats for them as well as pregnant women.

82. Market women also requested for some form of concession in which special BRT/BFS cargo buses are introduced into the fleet to ply the routes at some specific times so that the women could have access to cheaper fares to ease the transportation of wares from the market depot at Mile 12 along the corridor. LAMATA is considering these requests with the objective of reducing poverty among women and encouraging business growth of this category of users.

83. The impact of the BRT on the lives of children has been significant. Children that were interviewed during the implementation completion and results report (ICR) survey were full of appreciation for the service free transportation that they enjoy with the BRT buses. In the past, parents had the extra burden of first ensuring that their kids were safely transported to school every morning before going to their respective places of work. Respondents confirmed that they are relatively confident in the safety of the BRT buses that they leave their children to board and dismount the buses at the stops close to their schools. This is an unexpected positive result from the BRT which should be developed further in future phases such that a system of having some designated number of buses in the franchisee’s fleet to be dedicated to school runs in the mornings and afternoon during normal school closing periods should be examined.

84. The BRT scheme also has been able to win over professionals with motor cars who have transferred to the BRT or those other commuters who ordinarily would not, as a result of their social standing commuted with the former public transports plying the BRT corridor (molues and danfos). A growing number of high income people are beginning to use the BRT buses.

(b) Other Unintended Outcomes and Impacts (positive or negative)

85. General image and citizen perception: The general image and public perception of the reforms and resulting improvement in bus operations was obtained through analysis of media reports, websites, user group interviews, chat forums, focus group transcripts,
and from directly observing and talking to users. Provision of organized public transport system is seen as a significant departure from previous operations and the level of service is seen as unequivocally superior. There is notable pride in the BRT which is seen as symbolic of the city’s ability to deliver and compete in an international context.

86. BRT has prompted action and development of the overall city plan as well as offer an opportunity to address issues along a specific corridor. Driven by the success of the initial efforts, the city has prepared a Lagos Transport Master Plan, which includes for more widely adopted regulation within public transport provision, an extended network of BRT and development of a complementary feeder services network, with the objective of increasing efficiency of the system.

87. Businesses within the catchment area of BRT stated that the system has a positive influence effect upon recruitment and are proud to state their location in relation to BRT stations. Many more are likely to join if the future phases of planning takes care to create feeder networks from many passenger hubs around Lagos connecting to the BRT corridor and when a fully integrated inter modal transport system is in place.

88. The overall positive response from users has been seen to have political influence with BRT forming part of the 2011 election manifesto in Lagos.

89. Improvements have raised user expectations and a demand for better services for a wider population. In Lagos there are calls to address public transport capacity issues and a need to expand the organized bus system to other corridors not yet served by the BRT. Areas not currently served wish to be connected. There is a need to manage the concerns of non-users, in particular car drivers who have seen some highway capacity removed in favor of BRT lanes. In addition, it is recognized that many informal sector workers with roadside activities may be affected by the development of the pilot bus franchise scheme. The early activities under the Resettlement Action Plan initiatives are very relevant to the bus pilot and it is important that these activities are continued and actions implemented.

90. Development of Lagos CO₂ Emissions Assessment Handbook: This handbook provides the reader with a straightforward and comprehensive guide to calculating the impact on carbon emissions from the implementation of a new transport scheme, including the collection of the necessary data required for this task. The objective of the manual is to set out the monitoring and evaluation framework for the estimation of carbon emissions savings through the implementation of new BRT lines in Lagos.

91. This document gives practical instructions on the collection of the data required for the calculation of emissions estimates, including specifications for each of the different surveys required, advice on choice of survey location and a schedule for survey timings.

3.6 Summary of Findings of Beneficiary Survey and/or Stakeholder Workshops

92. During project implementation, a number of workshops were held which involved a broad section of stakeholders and these helped considerably in defining the project and
achieving its public acceptance. Existing and prospective bus operators have been closely involved in the definition of the bus services enhancement component of the project. During project implementation, stakeholder involvement was principally through the Safeguards and the External Relations Units of LAMATA. The latter has the mandate to follow up on issues raised by the public, and chairs an internal user’s services group which meets regularly to consider matters brought before it or required to be addressed. The minutes of this group were usually forwarded to the Managing Director (MD) and the Corporate and Legal Secretary.

93. The needs of the traveler were determined using the following methods:

(i) *Ethnographic observation.* This method consisted of discreet observation of travelers’ access to transport, their contacts and relationships with the various actors involved in transport, and their demeanors and actions.
(ii) *Quantitative/qualitative surveys.* Surveys were conducted to establish formal data such as fare elasticity and value of time, but also to gather details on the relative importance of walk, wait, and travel times, transport choice issues, and the most important obstacles to the ideal use of transport.
(iii) *Focus groups.* A series of focus groups were held to explore in detail the issues related to travel in Lagos by different demographic groups, as well as to test the features that may or may not be applied within a BRT system.

94. In order to continue to foster scheme support, take on board and improve services and further increase knowledge of BRT-Lite, the following initiatives were launched to support the operations phase:

(i) **BRT Parliament:** When BRT-Lite was 100 days old a BRT parliament was established in order to assess and debate performance and issues. The parliament consists of senior LAMATA officers, the lending bank, State Government representatives, user representatives (including the physically challenged and commuters). It is moderated independently by a senior academic from the University of Lagos. It is attended by approximately 1,500 people and televised.

(ii) **A Customer relations management line** was established whereby those with comments and/or questions could ring or text twenty-four hours a day, seven days per week. The line is manned by two operators. The nature of comment is logged and summarized in a Customer Relations Managers report and complaint tracking sheet.

(iii) **BRT Half-hour TV.** From May 2008 a live television program shown on Sunday (repeated Tuesday) was established to examine BRT issues. The program often consists of an interview with someone involved with BRT-Lite and/or someone who has an opinion on it or its operation. The program has a weekly audience of approximately five million.
4. **Assessment of Risk to Development Outcome**

Rating: **Low**

95. Key risks identified at appraisal were:

- Inability of LAMATA to operate independently due to political interference;
- Insufficient counterpart funding;
- Inability to generate user charges;
- Road network efficiency gains are used up by traffic growth;
- Inability to gain broad acceptance of regulatory reforms from the private sector;
- Unwillingness of private bus operators to take advantage of opportunities provided by introduction of franchise services;
- Water transport fails to take a significant share of the overall transport system; and
- Lack of interest in the private sector to invest into the railway.

96. While there were initial challenges in project implementation, both in terms of institutional support and public acceptance, gradually the risks were mitigated through good planning, government’s commitment, consensus building among diverse stakeholders, and effective monitoring and evaluation.

5. **Assessment of Bank and Borrower Performance**

5.1 **Bank Performance**

(a) **Bank Performance in Ensuring Quality at Entry**

Rating: **Satisfactory**

97. Bank’s performance in ensuring quality at entry is rated satisfactory based on adequate project preparation, identification of the right project components, ensuring readiness of engineering designs and procurement documents for immediate take off of project as well as aligning the PDOs with the overall country’s strategy. The Bank had been very supportive of the state government in various studies which led to the promulgation of law establishing LAMATA in 2002. This process took over three years and could have been a stumbling block if not achieved before final conceptualization of the project. This is an excellent foresight which enabled the establishment of a strong independent transport authority as the only effective way to address the sector’s institutional weaknesses. Further to this, all the preparatory studies, engineering design and procurement documents for the first year activities were completed. In addition, before the commencement of the project, the Environment Mitigation Plan was prepared and disclosed. All other safeguards studies such as EMF consisting of the Environmental Assessments/Social Assessments, action plan for implementation for safeguards, and Resettlement Policy Framework (RPF) were completed. Therefore, the critical challenge
was to ensure that the focus on institutional and policy objectives is maintained during implementation.

(b) Quality of Supervision

Rating: Highly Satisfactory

98. The quality of supervision is rated highly satisfactory based on the task team’s proactivity during project implementation, success in achieving project objectives, and ability to demonstrate the value of the Bank not just in providing financing but also expose the client to global knowledge and good practices. The project received the World Bank Africa Region Award for Excellence in 2010.

99. The supervision team is a mix of international and national experts with excellent skills in urban transport, M&E, safeguards and fiduciary. The team improved excellently on using its skills to proactively identify urban transport management issues and treat them accordingly. Supervision was very regular and constructive. Detailed aid memoires was produced for every mission. This was used to provide candid ISR ratings for the project. During implementation of the project, the Bank prepared 17 ISRs that were very detailed and informative. All communications from the Bank to the clients were clear and most helpful. Therefore supervision contributed significantly to the successful achievement of the development objectives.

100. Extensive monitoring surveys were conducted during the mission and a number of stakeholder workshops were held. Working closely with the implementing agency and other stakeholders, the feedback from consultations and group discussions was utilized to strengthen project design and ensure timely response. In partnership with LAMATA management, a number of workshops and training sessions were organized to build the capacity of LAMATA staff and other state agencies in transport planning and management.

101. Some of the key contributions of the supervision missions are the following:

- The Bank acted as a stakeholder in the real sense of the word throughout the implementation process, listening to the Borrower and seeking ways to resolve all issues in a collaborative manner.
- Technical assistance has been useful and at par with the real needs of the project components. Assistance with the planning and feasibility study on the BRT and in embarking on study tours for the BRT abroad made the conception and implementation of the BRT successful.
- Bank processes and procedures especially on procurement and financial management set the project on a sound footing and gave credibility to LAMATA as a transparent organization.
- The Bank was proactive in discharging its obligations, such that there was little or at worst there were only minimal delays in no objection.
• The Bank’s relationship with LAMATA was one of mutual respect and LAMATA was accorded with much respect when it was obvious that operations as regards financial management and procurement were credible, the reporting system to the Bank was upgraded.

102. The Bank played a key role in ensuring that the necessary tools and understanding for implementation through efficient procurement management was put in place by conducting a thorough training for the procurement unit and the project management team in LAMATA. The Bank also undertook regular supervision missions culminating in extensive discussions on the way forward with the borrower.

(c) Justification of Rating for Overall Bank Performance

Rating: Highly Satisfactory

103. The rating for overall Bank performance as highly satisfactory takes into account the pro-activity in supervision. The success of the project is attributed to enabling environment provided by the Bank to:

• Connect solution ideas with actions;
• Bring international experience, understanding of what works and what does not in different contexts; assistance in benchmarking to international standards;
• Assist in development of a multi-sectoral and a holistic approach, with linkages to cross-cutting issues (social, environment, economic, climate change);
• Act as an honest broker and facilitator for achieving consensus among disparate actors at all levels of government; and
• Provide a mechanism for knowledge sharing—use Bank’s extensive in-house expertise and external networks and ability to reach out to a wider audience with similar issues.

104. The bulk of the financing for implementation of the BRT system was provided by the state and the private sector (local banks, bus operator, bus supplier) but it was all made possible by the Bank playing a critical role in bringing international knowledge and providing a platform for open and transparent discussions. A number of study tours were organized to expose key stakeholders, including the private sector to good practices in bus planning and reform and BRT designs, to countries in Latin America and Europe. The Bank’s presence was seen as a risk mitigation factor by the private sector and provided them confidence in the knowledge that Bank’s procurement and financial management processes were being followed by the implementing agency.
5.2 Borrower Performance

(a) Government Performance

Rating: Highly Satisfactory

105. The state government’s commitment to successful implementation of the project accounted for a great part of the success. One of the key lessons in urban transport is that to bring about reforms in the urban transport sector requires a strong champion to provide political support at the highest level and a willingness to take risks. The project had full support of the state governor across two administrations.

106. The bus improvement scheme was initiated in 2006 during the administration of the previous LSG. The government’s commitment to an integrated transport system with BRT as a first point of delivery gave context and support to improving the urban transport system and the vision was articulated by the then Commissioner of Transport. The Commissioner led the delegation to view BRT systems in South America and was appointed to chair the BRT Steering Committee providing knowledge and experience. He was able to display political commitment to the technical development team and take back knowledge to the Governor. With a change in administration in May 2007, the new Governor continued to provide the leadership. The momentum created by the implementation of BRT-Lite at that time, and the positive public perception, together with the subscription by the new Governor to the previous Governor’s commitment to the development of an integrated transport network, ensured that momentum was not lost, and continuity maintained. By the close of the project, the LSG had financed over US$100 million from the state budget and transport fund towards project activities.

107. **Bold Project Ownership and Management:** At the institutional level, the focus is on developing a single agency responsible for urban transport planning and regulation at the state and local levels, with dedicated funding arrangements. The government established, empowered and resourced a transport authority, LAMATA, to plan and deliver the scheme. The government successfully gained the buy-in of different agencies, especially those responsible for traffic control and enforcement and environmental management. The government sought and took advantage of the technical expertise of the World Bank transport team. The government also arranged to provide 100 buses to the bus operator to support operations along the BRT corridor at a critical time when the private sector was not able to mobilize enough financing for bus procurement and the passenger demand exceeded bus supply. The project has received a number of awards (please see footnote 7 on page 20 for a listing of the awards received) in the past few years including the latest in April 2011 from the International Union of Public Transport (UITP) (both regional and international) in Dubai for political commitment to improvements in public transport.

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19 There were considerable delays in project effectiveness and initial start-up due to a lack of common understanding between the state and federal governments. The “government” performance rated here relates to support from the state government.
(b) Implementing Agency Performance

Rating: Highly Satisfactory

108. Presence of a dedicated and competent technical team is critical to the successful implementation of a project, especially as complex and multi-disciplinary as urban transport. LAMATA was set up as the key agency responsible for implementing the project but over the years evolved as an institution responsible for planning and regulating the overall urban transport sector in the city.

109. LAMATA was a new agency that was expected to face teething problems associated with start-up, as well as potential opposition from other agencies concerned with protecting their turf. While there were some initial delays in getting the professional staff to support LAMATA, it has evolved into a competent body, with capacity in wide ranging functions in planning, management, engineering, forecasting, regulation, and environment and social management. It has been able to build rapport and partnership with other organizations necessary to support its activities. For example, the power for primary traffic management and enforcement in the state lies with the Lagos State Traffic Management Authority (LASTMA), a body that reports to the Commissioner of Transportation. Co-operation between LAMATA and LASTMA was necessary to ensure that the project outcomes are met. Over the years, relation between the two authorities has improved markedly and LASTMA has committed significant resources to the BRT-Lite scheme required to protect the exclusive use of the BRT lanes for buses and to manage traffic conflicts in the box junctions at the various highway merges and demerges.

110. Another example of cooperation was establishment of the initiative ‘Kick Against Indiscipline’ to help with public management within the BRT-Lite system, particularly at the stations and terminals. This covered aspects such as trading and hawking on the walkways / sidewalks, and orderly queuing at the bus stops and vehicle parks (terminals).

111. The strength, professionalism and the leadership style of the LAMATA management contributed to the success of the project, including:

- Recognition of the importance of hiring competent people to LAMATA and giving the people an opportunity to do their work without interference;
- A democratic leadership style that listens to the views of others, brainstorms with the senior staff and allows superiority of arguments to prevail;
- Enforcing a culture of dedication, focus and integrity and exhibiting these qualities as example for others. The work environment is kept strictly official and staffs are made to reflect on daily achievements;
- Team work was a culture in LAMATA. It was the norm rather than the exception and this brought tremendous progress to the organization. To foster closer team relations, strategic retreats were held for all staff of LAMATA;
- Goal oriented and so, corporate goals are disseminated to all staff, departmental objectives, goals and key performance indicators are set and from the department
individual goals and key performance indicators (KPIs) are also set thereby achieving a job-centric organization; and

- Staff is made to be part of the achievement of LAMATA and so enjoy ownership of LAMATA and identify with the project success.

(c) Justification of Rating for Overall Borrower Performance

Rating: Highly Satisfactory

6. Lessons Learned

112. Setting up a strong institutional basis for coordinated planning and regulation is critical to the success of urban transport projects. The Bank urban transport policy paper “Cities on the Move” (2002) identifies institutional weaknesses as the source of many observed failures in urban transport in developing countries. Strengthening urban transport institutions often requires legislative, institutional, and management changes at the national, state, and municipal level to minimize jurisdictional and functional impediments to efficient and effective service delivery. Strengthening transport also requires setting up dedicated institutional bodies for urban transport planning and regulation, with commitment from the highest levels of government and a champion to further the cause of good management. The establishment of LAMATA with the overall responsibility for transport planning and coordination in the Lagos metropolitan area was central to bringing about reforms in the sector. The key lesson: developing capacity at the local level is central to sustainability.

113. Interactions with the borrower and beneficiaries should take place in a context of their choosing. The impact of ongoing changes in policy, governance, and institutional frameworks in countries like Nigeria should not be underestimated. Where the requirements bring about changes in roles, responsibilities, and relationships, there is a need to understand the impact on the culture and values of the societies, sectors, and institutions for which the change is proposed. It is critical to understand the broader country-specific context. Experience shows that best results are achieved through long-term relationships where new ideas can be introduced indirectly and gradually, in pursuit of a shared vision and road map. The design of this project was driven by consideration of city requirements and what is most appropriate in the national context. Development of a communications strategy, with the participation of key stakeholders was central to involving all interest groups in the design and implementation. The key lesson: look for the best fit, not best practice (recognize that there is no single BRT system prescription).

114. Allow a measure of flexibility in the design and set reasonable targets. The growing problem of urban mobility is the result of a complex interplay of factors, cutting across multiple disciplines and involves many stakeholders. There are no easy or quick fix solutions and any design requires adaptation to local context. It is important to build flexibility in project design and be willing to make changes in design as new lessons are learnt during implementation. This project was restructured twice together with one additional financing to align more closely with objectives and improve project impact. The
key lesson: A good project monitoring system is necessary for effective management—close monitoring combined with extensive consultations allows for timely adjustments.

115. **Implementation of BRT is a big challenge and requires considerable up-front discussions and consensus building.** BRT is a “system” and requires extensive up-front planning and discussions that consider all the relevant issues as a package, including the design of the bus-way; design of the stops and junctions; design of the ticketing systems, fare levels, and structures; regulation and ownership of the buses; safety; and enforcement of the regulations. A successful system requires ownership by existing operators, drivers, and users and incorporation of their specific concerns in the design. The project clearly demonstrated that investments in BRT “hardware” will come about only after an understanding and acceptance of the broader reform program and an appreciation of the complexity of issues involved. The key lesson: *Use transportation planning to sort out BRT and other alternatives which include:*

- Begin with market analysis
- Match markets with service plans, plan for running ways, vehicles, stations, etc.
- Focus on system integration

116. **Demonstration of good results is essential to gain support for implementing a reform program.** The urban transport environment in many cities is characterized by multiple shortcomings at institutional, regulatory, management, planning and implementation, and financial levels. Lagos is no exception. Addressing these multiple dimensions requires tackling all issues simultaneously rather than in a segmented piece-meal fashion. Focusing only on road improvements or bus fleet renewal or traffic management or institutional development by itself, for example, while desirable, may not produce measurable outcomes. What is required is a comprehensive integrated program of complimentary improvements which combines public transport, non-motorized transport and roadway infrastructure, operations management and public transport service improvements to increase over-all travel speed, reliability and safety. Such a comprehensive approach can best be implemented at a corridor level rather than across the whole city. This is exactly the approach followed in this project and with documented good results and public appreciation of the project investments it has now become much easier to scale-up the reform program more widely across the city. Key lesson: *Implement a comprehensive integrated corridor based approach to get quick results. The key to a successful project design is based on an approach which is:*

- **comprehensive** (covers multiple administrative boundaries, is multi-modal);
- **continuous** (plans, planning data and tools are updated on a regular basis);
- **cooperative** (all stakeholders participate, develop communications plan and stakeholder analysis);
- **connected** (capital projects are consistent with adopted long range plans);
- **championed** (support at the highest political level, ownership); and
- **change incrementally** (scale-up interventions in an incremental fashion and allow flexibility in design).
117. **Need for a strong political and technical commitment.** Bringing about reforms in the urban transport sector requires a strong political champion and a dedicated and competent technical team. There are a number of entrenched interests in this sector who often control the market through self-regulation. In Lagos, union control is enforced by contracted youths (area boys) who extract payment from the operators and can resort to violence should this be withheld. These payments pass through the Union chain of command and used to “manage” the operations by seeking favors from politicians and police. To change this atomized system to an organized and disciplined operation requires political support at the highest level and a willingness to take risks. The relationship between technical development and political will is clear in Lagos with the vision and determination of political leaders supported by a dependable and committed technical team. Without this synergy and trust, it may be difficult to bring about the fundamental change as seen in Lagos. The key lesson: **Charismatic leadership, political will, and project ownership is central to effective implementation; stability and continuity in the project team is critical to success.**

7. **Comments on Issues Raised by Borrower/Implementing Agencies/Partners**

(a) **Borrower/implementing agencies**

118. The report prepared by government is included in Annex 7. The government especially found Bank performance highly satisfactory throughout the course of LUTP implementation.

119. The enduring legacy of the Bank’s procurement and financial management systems created an enabling environment of credibility, transparency and accountability for LAMATA’s business processes during project implementation.

120. The Bank was proactive in discharging its obligation, providing technical support and credit approvals on requests with very minimal delays. The Bank’s bi-annual supervision missions also provided an effective M&E framework for tracking the progress of project KPIs, ensuring conformity with project plans and design.

121. The Bank led by example as a key stakeholder in the real sense of the word throughout implementation, effectively communicating and listening to Borrower concerns while consistently seeking ways to resolve issues in a collaborative manner.

(b) **Co-financiers**

None
Annex 1: Project Cost and Financing

(a) Project Cost by Component

(US$ million) Figures in parentheses show IDA financing

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Component</th>
<th>Appraisal estimate</th>
<th>Estimates at restructuring</th>
<th>Estimates at Additional Financing (AF)</th>
<th>Actual/ latest estimates</th>
<th>Percentage of estimates at AF</th>
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<tr>
<td>Capacity building</td>
<td>27.6 (13.3)</td>
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<td>20.8 (18.4)</td>
<td>44.2** (8.9)</td>
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<td>improvement</td>
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<td>Bus service enhancement</td>
<td>0.7 (0.7)</td>
<td>1.9 (1.7)</td>
<td>11.2 (11.0)</td>
<td>50.7** (8.6)</td>
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<td>Water transport promotion</td>
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<td>4.1 (3.8)</td>
<td>5.3 (2.4)</td>
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<td>Preparation of follow-up</td>
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<td>6.4 (5.7)</td>
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<td>6.8 (3.8)</td>
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<td>phases</td>
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<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>135.0 (100.0)</td>
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<td>175.8 (160.8)</td>
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(b) Financing

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<th>Estimates at restructuring</th>
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<td>-Transport Fund</td>
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<td>Sub-total</td>
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<td>15.0</td>
<td>15.0</td>
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<td>IDA</td>
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<td>100.0</td>
<td>150.0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Exchange gains</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>10.8</td>
<td>10.8</td>
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<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>135.0</td>
<td>125.8</td>
<td>175.8</td>
<td>265.8</td>
<td>151.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

20 The substantial increase in financing by the LSG for capacity building component is because: (i) the closing date was extended three times from June 30, 2008 to December 31, 2010. Therefore the cost incurred during these additional two-and-a-half years was not part of the original estimates; and (ii) over the years, LAMATA is not only responsible for LUTP implementation but a much broader scope of planning and regulation activities assigned by the LSG. These include BRT planning and regulation, design and planning of blue and red rail lines, among others. This increase in activities has resulted in an increase in operating cost and staff size.

21 This amount includes US$42 million contribution from LSG for BRT construction and service lane improvements.

22 This includes LSG financing for: (i) US$15 million for LAMATA capacity building; (ii) US$8.2 million for routine maintenance; and (iii) US$42 million contribution for BRT construction and service lane improvements.

23 Includes: (i) US$24.1 million from license fees (hackney permit, road taxes, license plate registration, auto registration); and (ii) US$11.1 million from other user charges, including income from sale of bidding documents, sale of maps from the geographic information systems, income from advertisement along BRT route, franchise fee from BRT operations and lease income from bus depots.
Annex 2: Outputs by Component

1. **Component 1: Capacity building:** The credit financed the following activities:

**Table 1: Key Capacity Building Outputs**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sub-components</th>
<th>Details</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 LAMATA</td>
<td>Technical assistance for LAMATA to develop the capacity to effectively discharge its duties</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.1 Technical assistance</td>
<td>Provide technical assistance in areas such as road management, traffic management, public transport planning, financial management, procurement, environmental and social assessment, traffic law enforcement, transport economics, general management, etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.2 Training</td>
<td>Training of LAMATA staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.3 Information, Education and Communication</td>
<td>Provide technical assistance to LAMATA to design and implement a communication policy, strategy, and action plan to promote dialogue and consensus partnerships toward achieving its objectives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.4 Sectoral environmental and social assessment</td>
<td>Consultancy support to prepare detailed Resettlement Policy Framework</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.5 Elaboration of a cost recovery strategy and implementation plan.</td>
<td>Technical assistance to develop a road map for moving towards full cost recovery by the sector in the long term.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.6 A traffic enforcement strategy and plan</td>
<td>Technical assistance for developing the traffic enforcement framework and implement the critical elements of the plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.7 LAMATA building</td>
<td>Preparation of building design and bidding documents</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.8 Other Activities</td>
<td>Technical assistance to develop transport sector policy and strategy of Lagos State Government for five years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.9 Lagos State Ministry of Transport</td>
<td>Technical assistance to strengthen policy-making and sector performance monitoring and evaluation functions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.10 Lagos State Ministry of Works</td>
<td>Technical assistance to improve planning for road investments</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.11 Lagos State Ministry of Women's Affairs and Poverty Alleviation</td>
<td>Technical assistance to strengthen poverty and gender impact monitoring capacity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.12 Nigerian Police Traffic Unit</td>
<td>Technical assistance to enhance traffic enforcement capacity in Lagos.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.13 Traffic Management Units</td>
<td>Technical assistance for the creation of Traffic Management Units in local government areas</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
2. **Component 2: Road network efficiency improvement**: The credit financed works, goods and consultancy services for the following activities:

- 76 kilometers of road overlay;
- 567 kilometers of routine and recurrent maintenance;
- 50 kilometer of roads rehabilitated; and
- 70 junctions improved.

3. **Component 3: Bus services enhancement**: The credit financed works, goods and consultancy services for the following activities:

- Implementation of a pilot bus franchise scheme on the Iyana-Ipaja corridor and the credit financed consultancy support for developing:
  - a conceptual framework for the scheme;
  - Bus route and terminal survey;
  - Bus franchise implementation strategy;
  - Topographical surveys of bus terminals along the corridor;
  - Infrastructure design to complement franchise scheme;
  - Formation of associations/companies by small operators; and
  - Bus regulatory framework.
- Works and goods to support implementation of the bus franchise scheme, including:
  - Depot, terminals, bus stops; and
  - Road surface overlays.
- Improvements to Bus Rapid Transit (BRT) corridor, including
  - Road surface improvements;
  - Bus stops, terminals; and
  - Communications.

4. **Component 4: Water transport promotion**: The credit financed works, goods and consultancy services for the following activities:

- Consultancy services to support:
  - Development of a detailed strategic plan for improving the use of waterways;
  - Studies to support privatization of the Lagos State Ferry Services Corporation; and
  - Studies to define role of the private sector.
- Works and goods to support:
  - Repair of four terminals (Agboyi Ketu, Ijegun Egba, Iya Afin, and Epeme)

5. **Component 5: Preparation of future phases**: The credit financed goods and consultancy services for the following activities:

- Report of the Lagos BRT Feasibility Studies;
- Detailed designs of BRT infrastructure along Oshodi-Mile 2-Obalende and Oshodi-Mile 12-Ikorodu corridors;
- 2020 Strategic Transport Master Plan;
- Identification and selection of mass rapid transit network, comprising seven light rail transit corridors, nine BRT and 10 water commuter routes;
- Blue Line and Red Line – public-private-partnership (PPP) transaction advisory services in progress;
- Operations/maintenance concessions; and
- Future plans to develop and implement full multimode mass rapid transit network.
Annex 3: Economic and Financial Analysis

1. **Introduction:** An ex-post economic analysis was carried out for routine maintenance, rehabilitation, bridge repairs, and traffic management components.

2. The project integrates components that complement each other, and hence aims to deliver significant benefits to economic activities and quality of life in the State. Many of these benefits cannot be quantified, and are consequently not captured in the analysis. Nonetheless, traffic accidents are expected to reduce substantially in the project areas where traffic management and non-motorized transport (pedestrian walkways) modes are to be improved.

3. Although there are no specific mechanisms for estimating and quantifying the impact of road investment on socio-economic developments specifically, cost-benefit analysis was applied to evaluate the economic rate of return. The impact of road investments can be measured in terms of direct benefits, indirect benefits, and induced benefits. Direct benefits refer to those benefits that have direct positive impact on the road user and include savings in vehicle operating costs (VOCs), travel time savings, reduced accident costs due to the upgrade of the roads, and possible savings in road maintenance costs. Direct benefits are usually quantifiable and can be expressed in monetary terms. It is therefore easier to establish these benefits accurately to a certain extent. Indirect benefits refer to those benefits that do not impact directly on the road user and have a wider impact, such as employment opportunities that are related to road investments. Induced benefits refer to those benefits that can be attributed to local economic development as a result of road investments. These include enhanced self-sufficiency, increased production and efficiency as a result of, among other things, improved access to markets for agriculture produce, improved access to social services such as healthcare and educational facilities, and an increase in household income and subsequently, a more equal distribution of income.

4. **Economic and Financial Analysis:** The economic analysis was completed for about 567 km of roads excluding the length of bridges that was considered separately. The total cost of US$118.87 million was estimated for the implementation of road and junction improvement program over the five-year period.

5. The cost estimates were made for following type of works:
   - Routine and recurrent maintenance US$47.01 million
   - Overlay and rehabilitation US$59.26 million
   - Bridge repairs US$6.48 million
   - Traffic system management US$6.12 million

6. **Demand analysis:** Traffic count surveys were conducted in 2009 at 30 selected roads for three days on each of the roads and the average was calculated to obtain an average daily traffic figure. The average daily traffic volume of 30 selected roads in Lagos metropolis was estimated at 8,981. The traffic volume by type of vehicle is
presented in Table 1 below. Average growth rates of three percent for cars, 4.5 percent for public transport vehicles, and five percent for trucks assumed in the project appraisal document were considered to be an underestimate of the true traffic growth rate. Following previous studies, annual growth rates of five percent for trucks and seven percent for other vehicles were assumed to be reasonable for road traffic and were applied in the analysis.

Table 1: Traffic volume and average daily traffic of some selected roads in Lagos metropolis

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Vehicle type</th>
<th>Average daily traffic volume/road</th>
<th>Total %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cars</td>
<td>3104</td>
<td>34.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minibus</td>
<td>1354</td>
<td>15.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taxi</td>
<td>333</td>
<td>3.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Motorcycles</td>
<td>3533</td>
<td>39.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heavy duty vehicles</td>
<td>204</td>
<td>2.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Keke</td>
<td>453</td>
<td>5.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>8981</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.0</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

7. **User Benefits**: The quantification of road user benefits was computed on the basis of savings in travel time and vehicle operating cost. The project would result in considerable benefits in terms of improved traffic safety, environmental benefits, carbon dioxide emissions reduction, air quality improvement, non-motorized transport improvement, and improved travel reliability, which were not quantified. Therefore, the economic benefits obtained in the analysis represent the low-end of total realizable benefits.

8. **Cost**: Unit costs for various items of maintenance and rehabilitation operations were obtained from selected executed contract documents, and subjected to further verification by consulting appropriate contractors. The unit costs for individual intervention strategies were provided into the highway design and maintenance model (HDM) to perform economic analysis for the defined road work options. The various costs and prices obtained were computed in both financial and economic terms. While financial costs were composed of current market prices, taxes and duties; economic costs represented the real cost to the economy of the resources actually used in providing the materials and services.

9. **Economic Analysis**: The economic analysis was carried out so as help in evaluating the feasibility on improving the roads under Lagos Urban Transport Project (LUTP). The road condition data, the appropriate unit costs for rehabilitation and maintenance operations, and the appropriate costs for vehicle operation parameters were fed into the HDM program to determine the economic returns of investments on each of the roads. The analysis period was carried out using a discount rate of 12 percent.

10. The HDM program was used to calculate economic rate of return (ERR) and net present value (NPV) for each of the proposed road works. The ex-post rate of return for
investments in routine and recurrent maintenance of 567 km of roads is less than ex-ante (44% as compared to 48%) but still much above the discount rate of 12 percent. The ex-post rate of return for bridge repair is much above the estimated return. The NPV of road and junction improvement program was estimated to be US$170 million with aggregate ERR of 67 percent.

Table 2: Economic Analysis

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Economic Cost (US$ Million)</th>
<th>Benefits (US$ Million)</th>
<th>ERR (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>At appraisal</td>
<td>Ex-post</td>
<td>At appraisal</td>
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<tr>
<td>Routine and recurrent maintenance</td>
<td>45.5</td>
<td>47.0</td>
<td>62.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overlay and rehabilitation</td>
<td>46.2</td>
<td>59.3</td>
<td>134.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bridge repair</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>10.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Traffic system management</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>43.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>102.8</strong></td>
<td><strong>118.9</strong></td>
<td><strong>250.9</strong></td>
</tr>
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</table>
Annex 4: Bank Lending and Implementation Support/Supervision Processes

(a) Task Team members

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Names</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>Responsibility/ Specialty</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Lending</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adenike Sherifat Oyeyiola</td>
<td>Sr. Financial Management Specialist</td>
<td>AFTFM</td>
<td>FMS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Akintola Fatoyinbo</td>
<td>Sr. Communications Specialist</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anthony Hegarty</td>
<td>Lead Financial Management Specialist</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>FMS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bayo Awosemusi</td>
<td>Lead Procurement Specialist</td>
<td>AFTPC</td>
<td>Procurement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Benjamin Vannier</td>
<td>Project Assistant</td>
<td>AFTTR</td>
<td>Assistant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clementine du Payrat</td>
<td>Project Assistant</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Assistant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dan Aronson</td>
<td>Lead Social Scientist</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Safeguards</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dieter Schelling</td>
<td>Team Leader</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Team Leader</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Edward Olowo-Okere</td>
<td>Sr. Financial Management Specialist</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>FMS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>George Banjo</td>
<td>Sr. Transport Specialist</td>
<td>ECSS5</td>
<td>Technical</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hubert Nove-Josserand</td>
<td>Sr. Urban Transport Specialist</td>
<td>SACIN</td>
<td>TTL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jocelyne do Sacramento</td>
<td>Language Program Assistant</td>
<td>AFTTR</td>
<td>Prog. Support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Karen Hudes</td>
<td>Sr. Counsel</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Legal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kristine Drike</td>
<td>Economist</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Economist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scott Sinclair</td>
<td>Lead Financial Specialist</td>
<td>AFTEG</td>
<td>Disbursement</td>
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<tr>
<td>Subhash C. Seth</td>
<td>Consultant</td>
<td>AFTTR</td>
<td>Engineering</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mark Walker</td>
<td>Lead Counsel</td>
<td>LEGES</td>
<td>Legal</td>
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<tr>
<td>Melanie Jaya</td>
<td>Program Assistant</td>
<td>AFCS1</td>
<td>Prog. Support</td>
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<tr>
<td>Nina Chee</td>
<td>Environmental Specialist</td>
<td>MIGEP</td>
<td>Safeguards</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ntombie Siwale</td>
<td>Team Assistant</td>
<td>AFTTR</td>
<td>Prog. Support</td>
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<td><strong>Supervision/ICR</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Ajay Kumar</td>
<td>Lead Transport Economist</td>
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<tr>
<td>Amos Abu</td>
<td>Sr. Environmental Specialist</td>
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<td>Safeguards</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sameer Akbar</td>
<td>Sr. Environmental Specialist</td>
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<td>Technical</td>
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<td>Roger Gorham</td>
<td>Transport Economist</td>
<td>AFTTR</td>
<td>Environmental management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aisha D.A. Kaga</td>
<td>Program Assistant</td>
<td>AFCW2</td>
<td>Assistant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Antoine V. Lema</td>
<td>Sr. Social Development Specialist</td>
<td>AFTCS</td>
<td>Safeguards</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regina Oritshetemeyin Nesiamia</td>
<td>Program Assistant</td>
<td>ECSHD</td>
<td>Assistant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anne Njuguna</td>
<td>Program Assistant</td>
<td>AFTTR</td>
<td>Assistant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hubert Nove-Josserand</td>
<td>Operations Advisor</td>
<td>SACIN</td>
<td>TTL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Comfort Onyeje Olatunji</td>
<td>Program Assistant</td>
<td>SASDO</td>
<td>Assistant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Africa Eshogba Olojoba</td>
<td>Sr. Environmental Specialist</td>
<td>AFTEN</td>
<td>Safeguards</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Olatunji Ahmed</td>
<td>Transport Specialist</td>
<td>AFTTR</td>
<td>Engineering</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adenike Sherifat Oyeyiola</td>
<td>Sr. Financial Management Specialist</td>
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<td>FMS</td>
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<tr>
<td>Justin Runji</td>
<td>Sr. Transport Specialist</td>
<td>AFTTR</td>
<td>Engineering</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subhash C. Seth</td>
<td>Consultant</td>
<td>AFTTR</td>
<td>Engineering</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thomas Kwasi Siaw Anang</td>
<td>Procurement Specialist</td>
<td>AFTPC</td>
<td>Procurement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rajiv Sondhi</td>
<td>Sr. Finance Officer</td>
<td>CTRFC</td>
<td>FMS</td>
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<tr>
<td>Samuel L. Zimmerman</td>
<td>Consultant</td>
<td>MNSSD</td>
<td>Technical</td>
</tr>
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</table>

(b) **Staff Time and Cost**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Stage of Project Cycle</th>
<th>Staff Time and Cost (Bank Budget Only)</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No. of staff weeks</td>
<td>USD Thousands (including travel and consultant costs)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Lending</strong></td>
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<td>FY06</td>
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<td>FY08</td>
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<td><strong>Total:</strong></td>
<td><strong>87</strong></td>
<td><strong>546.42</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Supervision/ICR</strong></td>
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<td>FY02</td>
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<td>FY03</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>86.53</td>
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<td>FY04</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>176.48</td>
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<td>FY05</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>228.77</td>
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<td>FY06</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>310.38</td>
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<td>FY07</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>186.21</td>
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<td>FY08</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>180.66</td>
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<td>FY09</td>
<td>30</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Total:</strong></td>
<td><strong>262</strong></td>
<td><strong>1169.03</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Annex 5: Beneficiary Survey Results

1. The project was developed within a city with little public knowledge of Lagos Metropolitan Area Transport Authority (LAMATA), what organized public transport might be like, a history of poor delivery of transport improvements and systems that sought to ensure that profit was directed to the entrenched interests. As such, the potential for skepticism and suspicion of motives and intentions was rife. Therefore, the objective of the community engagement strategy launched by LAMATA at project commencement was aimed at developing a similar level of ownership of the project within the citizens of Lagos that exists with the delivery orientated stakeholders.

2. A number of surveys were planned, designed, and implemented at various stages of project implementation to assess the impact of project interventions on multiple beneficiaries. The intended beneficiaries are local communities situated within and around project interventions, public transport users and the urban poor in general.

3. Methodology: Two evidence based approaches were employed: desk reviews and field surveys in gathering reliable data needed to prepare an ex-post evaluation of project interventions on key stakeholder beneficiaries.

4. Desk reviews: LAMATA conducted economic analysis of roads maintained in the declared road network (DRN) and consistently tracked progress of key outcome and output indicators by facilitating conduct of baseline/follow-on studies on different project components, including pilot bus rapid transit (BRT) scheme. Copious data provided a rich and available source of secondary information for evaluation.

5. Field surveys: Field investigations were carried out primarily to clarify and update secondary sources of information obtained during desk reviews. They include data collection instruments such as questionnaire administration, focus group discussions, field observations and key informant interviews. These instruments were designed to elicit both qualitative and quantitative information on socio-economic, transport and environment impact of project interventions on beneficiaries. By random sampling, 500 households in the DRN were selected for user beneficiary responses on time and money spent on transport activities. A total of 900 respondents including commuters and transport operators were interviewed to evaluate BRT scheme on service quality, waiting, loading, travel time, cost savings, etc.

6. Validity of Survey Instruments: Survey instruments were pre-tested to ascertain suitability for respondents. The pre-test exercise afforded an opportunity to train enumerators, modify vague questions and improve quality of instruments used. For robustness and validity, instruments were scrutinized to ensure adequate collation of all relevant field information.

7. Data Analysis: Quantitative tools such as traffic data frequency tables, charts and sensitivity analysis were used to analyze baseline information and impact on beneficiaries after project interventions. The economic rate of returns (ERRs) were used to conduct
economic evaluation of road investments in the DRN, including user benefits on vehicle operating costs, time and income savings. Qualitative information, administered questionnaires, and key informant interviews were also used in evaluating performance of project beneficiaries.

8. **Cross section of respondents:** The table below shows a cross section of user and other key stakeholder beneficiary respondents interviewed during the course of the implementation completion and results report (ICR) field investigations.

**Table 1: Cross Section of Respondents**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Typical Respondents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Institutional</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• LAMATA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• LASTMA</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td>• Road Safety</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• Nigerian Police</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• LSG MOT</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• LSG MOW</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• LSG Ministry of Women Affairs</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• LGA (ALIMOSHO, IKEJA)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• FERMA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• LASEPA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Contractors /Road Rehabilitation and Maintenance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Road rehabilitation and routine maintenance contractors.</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Routine maintenance laborers</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Communities around TSM junctions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Commuters on the nine selected roads of the DRN for KPI survey</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Bus Transport Service Providers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1st BRT Cooperative (NURTW)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Igbatuntun City Bus Cooperative (NURTW)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Danfo owners</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Other transport providers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Beneficiaries –Users</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Commuters on BRT and BFS Corridors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>School children</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Marketers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Women</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Disabled</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Gender and Disadvantaged groups</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Women groups and NGOs</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Market women associations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>NGOs and other Civil Society Organisations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Environmental scientists and NGOs</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Surveys carried out at the BRT Design Phase

9. The BRT component of the project was defined according to the needs of the users and as such design was based upon an understanding of current difficulties experienced in using existing public transport. A series of structured focus group discussions were held in order to understand existing problems and test design concepts. Separate groups were held for younger and older citizens, as well as males and females. The needs of women were noted to be quite different to that of men, whereby women often felt intimidated by the competition for entry on arriving buses and overcrowding in vehicles. Younger men were best able to compete for entry but were often put off by the threat of violence and intimidation. All were dissatisfied by the overall cost of travel and long and variable journey times.

10. To understand the views of citizens and users following implementation, it is important to briefly explore their views of public transport services before implementation in order to put those comments in context. The focus groups undertaken with public transport users highlighted four key issues with services:

- Safety
- Comfort
- Fare differential
- Long journey times

11. Personal safety was a particular concern on board dafos with robberies being a genuine risk along with drivers not stopping for passengers to board and alight. On board molues, which were perceived to be safer than dafos due to increased numbers of passengers on board, female participants highlighted incidents of sexual harassment.

12. Comfort was also an issue with overcrowding and a lack of an individual seat for every passenger cited as key issues. Journey times were also cited as issues in the surveys. Journey times are affected by both long journey distances and more importantly congestion of routes. The lack of alternative modes necessitated the use of public transport services and there was a level of acceptance with what was available.

Pre-delivery phase

13. There were approximately six million people within the catchment corridor of the project and within this catchment three target groups were identified:

(i) Those that have no vehicles and are captive to public transport who will be the primary beneficiaries of BRT (approximately 65 percent of total catchment);
(ii) Those that have cars but are reluctant users. Given the right set of conditions they would use BRT (approximately 25 percent); and
(iii) The upper quantile population who may not be BRT users but have a strong voice and are able to exert influence (approximately 10 percent).
14. Contact with each of these parties in order to develop knowledge of BRT and the benefits to users were essential. The approach was to build upon the same principles that gave birth to the project concept, that of developing engagement from receiving and not giving information. As such each group was consulted upon and the scheme explained as a means of solving their own problems; not those identified by others and not imposing alien solutions upon users. Through this approach, a sense of local ownership was developed resulting in the project being seen as a user project and not one of technocrats or bureaucrats. The influence of such an approach spread to the often skeptical press whose reports both during and after construction, whilst sometimes pointing out problems, where not overtly negative and were quick to emphasize the positives.

15. The public relations strategy through development and construction consisted of advertising within the corridor, in newspapers, radio and on television. The television commercials included a 90 second demonstration on how to use BRT, getting and paying for a ticket, how to wait, board and alight. Billboards were set up along the corridor and third party advocacy was applied where those with a voice in the community (local government chairman, local chiefs and community leaders) were welcomed to discussions on BRT; how it would operate and how people might benefit. Road shows were held at which handbills were distributed in a range of languages that explained the project.

16. Community meetings were endorsed by local community leaders through the prior discussions and were attended by senior LAMATA officers. The intention was to ensure that LAMATA was not a faceless organization, allow access to real decision makers and show accountability. The effect was to raise LAMATA’s profile in general but also develop as an organization that listens and delivers.

17. In parallel, meetings continued to be held with bus association and its members at a local level as well as taxi drivers and haulage operators. Through the consultation process, it became clearer that all users had the potential to benefit from the project and that the key objective was to ‘Return life back to the citizens of Lagos’.

18. The approach to consultation as a means of gathering information made a genuine and meaningful contribution to scheme development. The project was not just about BRT-Lite but about facilitating movement within the corridor. As such works encompassed:

(i) Segregated BRT running way for the majority of the corridor to ensure better and more reliable run times achieved largely by part removal of the median between main and service roads. This offered significant improvements to journey time and journey time reliability of direct benefit to the primary target group and gives a realistic alternative to the secondary target group;

(ii) Narrowing of the median to ensure main carriageway widths remained, largely, unaltered. This ensured the support of the super rich together with haulers; and
(iii) Banning of *molue* and *danfo* from the main carriageway. Increasing capacity of main carriageway and ensuring that travelers have an option of using BRT or other forms of public transport. This form of self balancing ‘partial regulation’ ensured that the limited capacity of BRT-Lite in early operation had a release valve but also allowed some freedom of choice for captive users.

“Though there are still traffic jams on Ikorodu Road, especially during the rush hours, anyone caught in such traffic snarls is in such a situation by his choice because they have the option of keeping their vehicles at home and using the BRT buses, which are clean and safe.”

A commuter (The Punch, March 23, 2008).

19. Key to both stakeholder engagement and wider marketing was the engagement of the bus union. Whilst the union had become convinced that it was appropriate for the city to move to a more regulated form of public transport provision, its many members needed convincing and developing into ambassadors of the new transport mode. A sense of status was created for BRT personnel whereby the best *molue* drivers were encouraged to re-train to become BRT ‘pilots’ of which their status amongst peers was greater and there was a feeling that they were engaged in the transport revolution that was sweeping across Lagos. It was also a case that there was now a need for more drivers than before and a change in working conditions; the previous tense, and often violent, atmosphere within vehicles and at stop was being replaced by a more ordered humane set of service-users. This new relationship is perceived as more synergistic as more respectful drivers lead to a more compliant population which in turn leads to more and further respectful drivers. BRT was seen as the catalyst for change.

*Construction Phase*

20. Whilst expectations and consciousness was being raised, there were specific issues to address during the construction phase relating to safety of personnel and the drivers’ reaction to the works being undertaken. New street lights were erected to ensure that work on the road was visible and newspaper and radio adverts reinforced the purpose of the works and the need to take into account the delay and the safety issues associated with construction works.

*Operation Phase*

21. Before official opening of the BRT system, shadow runs were undertaken to test the infrastructure and for familiarization of the BRT-Pilots. A free service was also offered to passengers to test the system at operational loading.

22. The official launch of BRT-Lite was preceded with the national anthem and the national pledge. The program of events started at 10:00 am and was overseen by the Executive and Deputy State Governors. The event was televised and a launch booklet produced; it was portrayed as a major step forward in the development of the city.
23. Opening of BRT-Lite saw almost immediate acceptance with eager customers waiting in line to buy tickets and board vehicles reducing the passenger ramp-up period often observed with new public transport schemes. In order to continue to foster scheme support, take on board and improve services and further increase knowledge of BRT-Lite, the following initiatives were launched to support the operations phase:

(i) **BRT Parliament**: When BRT-Lite was 100 days old a BRT parliament was established in order to assess and debate performance and issues. The parliament consists of senior LAMATA officers, the lending bank, State Government representatives, user representatives (including the physically challenged and commuters). It is moderated independently by a senior academic from the University of Lagos. It is attended by approximately 1,500 people and televised.

(ii) **A Customer relations management line** is established whereby those with comments and/or questions could ring or text twenty-four hours a day, seven days per week. The line is manned by two operators. The nature of comments is logged and summarized in a Customer Relations Manager’s report and complaint tracking sheet.

(iii) **BRT Half hour TV**: From May 2008, a live television program shown on Sunday (repeated Tuesday) was established to examine BRT issues. The program often consists of an interview with someone involved with BRT-Lite and/or someone who has an opinion on it or its operation. The program has a weekly audience of approximately five million.

24. BRT and LAMATA branding was used prior to implementation and intensified post implementation with all BRT related staff, and many others, issued with BRT-Lite polo shirts and baseball caps. This has ensured that BRT and LAMATA are brands that have a high awareness throughout the city.

25. A series of focus groups were carried out with BRT users, and it was evident that the vast majority of participants believed BRT-Lite to be the best means of public transport available to Lagosians. In comparison to other bus services it was described as the safest, fastest, cheapest most convenient, most comfortable and reliable service in the city and overall the quality of service provided was felt to be far superior to that provided by other commercial services. Journey times were considered to be one of the greatest benefits of BRT particularly when compared to other modes. Examples were given where journey times using BRT were around half the length of other services that did not have priority along the corridor.

26. The length of time that users generally have to wait at the BRT bus stop is an area that could be improved according to users. From 7.00 am-11.00 am queuing for a bus is common place at stops and people generally wait for between five and 30 minutes for a bus unless there are particular issues along the route such as road works or a vehicle breakdown. In the reverse direction, queuing occurs on a regular basis between 4.00 pm and 8.00 pm. At other times of day, passengers may only wait for a short period of time or not at all.
“Around 9.00 am-10.00 am, you will still meet passengers but around 12.00 pm you can just walk in and go. You don’t have to wait at all.”

27. In addition to the length of queues at certain times, inadequate shelters are a concern for some users who are forced to wait without a shelter and exposed to (potentially) harsh weather conditions.

“Not too comfortable. Especially at Ojota Station, the numbers of people that always stay away from the cover are much because of the queue. You have to wait under the Sun.”

28. Despite the length of the queues and inadequate shelter at some stops, users generally tend to queue automatically in an orderly manner without any need for security staff to keep order. Indeed the civilized nature of the queue at bus stops and the lack of intimidation when waiting for the bus were seen as major benefits of BRT in comparison to other bus services.

29. The BRT service was praised in enabling passengers to alight more easily than when travelling by smaller buses. In particular, the use of the bell to alert the driver of the need to stop and the attitude of the drivers themselves were seen to contribute in this way to a superior service to the danfo and molue buses.

30. Although most users prefer to sit whilst travelling on the bus, they often find themselves standing at peak times. The need to stand is accepted on the basis that this happens on many bus services around the world, although requests were made for more BRT buses on the route. Overall, the standing experience on the BRT bus was acknowledged as being safer and more comfortable than on molue services.

31. There were mixed opinions of the BRT bus drivers in terms of their driving style. Some people felt that the drivers were good while others had experienced instances of reckless or aggressive driving and insisted that the drivers be trained, monitored and dismissed if they fail to provide a minimum level of service. However, the overall view was that the BRT-Lite drivers were safer than their danfo/molue counterparts.

“Some of the drivers they drive rough, reckless.”
“BRT drivers doesn’t smoke and make call while driving compare to other commercial drivers, which causes distraction.”

32. The reliability of the BRT service in terms of both overall journey time and number of breakdowns experienced was rated as being very good and superior to that of the danfo and molue services.

33. Finally, in October 2010 the Lagos Governor quoted a response from a BRT user which sums up well the public image of BRT in Lagos.
"I have to make special mention of the BRT project – I am always pleased to tell anyone that would listen that in my 39 years, this is the first policy project that I have experienced from any government in any era of the country’s history to give the poor man advantage which the rich do not enjoy. Today Lagosians who used to take four buses in perilous condition over three and half hours to get from Ikorodu to CMS between 4.30 am and 8.00 am now leave Ikorodu at 6.30am and arrive at work before 8.00 am. A reading culture is being enhanced by the BRT phenomenon alone. The orderly queues have also proven that when any people (Nigerians also) are given value for money they will maintain requisite order and decorum.”

Performance Survey:

34. Surveys were set up to monitor the performance and assess the benefits realized one year after starting operation. The evaluation included comprehensive qualitative and quantitative surveys within the corridor as well as focus groups involving users. At this time it was carrying over 150,000 people per day and over 10,000 persons one way during the morning peak hour, although recent reports have shown that this might have increased significantly.

35. This passenger volume is accommodated by a peak service of 150 buses per hour. BRT usage equates to over one quarter of all trips within the corridor despite BRT-Lite vehicles representing just four percent of all vehicles on the route. Only 31 percent of all trips are BRT showing the multimodal nature of the majority of trips in Lagos.

Box 1: Articles from newspaper clippings

The Punch, April 16, 2007
Residents Laud Introduction of Metro Buses
“The introduction of Bus Rapid Transit (BRT) buses has been lauded by Lagos Island workers for adding value, respect and dignity to their livelihood apart from easing their means of transportation from the Lagos Mainland judging by the way they were been treated with respect by the operators of the scheme.”

The Guardian, 18 March, 2008
“It has taken a long time for something so exciting and full of promise to happen in Lagos...We reached CMS within 45 minutes (against the normal 90 minutes).”

“I am happy for my children to use BRT to go to school. There used to be too much risk with danfo.” —A mother

“My husband drops me at TBS and I get BRT to work most days.” —A commuting lawyer

“I live in Ikorodu but work in Marina. When I closed from work by 5.00 pm, I decided to try this BRT because people had been talking about it. I boarded the bus at CMS and there was no problem at all. But it was from Fadeyi that I began to appreciate the advantages of the BRT. When I looked out of the window, all the other vehicles were caught in the go-slow and the BRT bus was just moving smoothly. From CMS to Mile 12, it took me just about one hour. Before the BRT, I sometimes spent more than four hours in the Ikorodu Road traffic jam. I pray to God that they can sustain it.” —A commuter
36. Based on basic generalized cost characteristics, compared with other travel options, BRT-Lite is likely to be the most preferable choice for the average user.

37. The reasons for choosing BRT-Lite were stated by users as:

- Quicker journey time (35 percent of respondents)
- Comfort (20 percent)
- Cheaper (18 percent)
- Safety/security (13 percent)
- Reliability (five percent)

38. Emissions were calculated before and after the introduction of BRT-Lite, these are reported in Table 2 below.

39. The significant decrease in particulates is attributed to the reduction in the number of smaller vehicles (danfo) in the corridor. The increase in carbon monoxide is due to the increased numbers of cars and taxis in the corridor attracted by the smoother traffic flow.

40. A survey of users found:

   (i) 85 percent previously took danfo (minibuses);
   (ii) Eight percent used molue (larger buses);
   (iii) Four percent car users; and
   (iv) Two percent taxi users.

41. BRT-Lite ran at a loss during the first three months of operation before turning a profit in month four. Thereafter system revenue has been able to cover all operating costs and vehicle repayment. Current activities alongside the expansion of the BRT network centre upon mechanisms to secure profit for the further development of the system and maintenance of its infrastructure.

The Needs of the Traveler

42. The needs of the traveler were determined using the following methods:

- *Ethnographic observation.* This method consisted of discreet observation of travelers’ access to transport, their contacts and relationships with the various actors involved in transport, and their demeanors and actions.
- *Qualitative/qualitative surveys.* Surveys were conducted to establish formal data such as fare elasticity and value of time, but also to gather details on the relative importance of walk, wait, and travel times, transport choice issues, and the most important obstacles to the ideal use of transport.
- *Focus groups.* A series of focus groups were held to explore in detail the issues related to travel in Lagos by different demographic groups, as well as to test the features that may or may not be applied within a BRT system.
43. The following concerns were identified as very important to travelers:

- **Safety.** The incidence of crime on vehicles and while waiting for vehicles to arrive was high. The crimes ranged from theft to physical abuse. The disorder and chaos surrounding public transport was viewed as an opportunity for criminals, and, where crime was not present, the almost constant intimidation and general chaos led to undue stress on travelers.
- **Fare levels.** Public transport fare levels often varied according to demand, weather conditions, and the whim of the conductor. A significant proportion of the traveling public is highly fare sensitive, with some making daily decisions about whether to travel based on available funds.
- **Long and unreliable journey times.** The practice of vehicles not leaving until full, of short services that required transferring to another vehicle, and the lack of transport penetration into residential areas, together with the widespread and variable congestion ranging from high to intolerable, meant that public transport journeys were both long and uncertain.
- **Comfort.** The state of many buses was very bad. Lack of upholstery on seats and the rusted metal edges that ripped clothing or caused injury were common. Therefore, travelers placed value on a basic level of comfort that would avoid these problems.

44. In satisfying traveler user needs the BRT system had to, above all else, have the following attributes:

- **Safe,** both on the vehicle and accessing it;
- **Affordable,** with constant and easily understandable fares; and
- **Reliable,** offering improved and reliable journey times.

**What is the mode share for the BRT-Lite system?**

45. The BRT-Lite system currently carries over a quarter of all the trips recorded along its corridor (or 37 percent of public transport trips), even though BRT-Lite vehicles represent just four percent of vehicles on the route. The system carries nearly a tenth of all trips inbound to Lagos Island, the commercial heartland of Lagos and a main destination on the route. The level of demand is currently constrained by the capacity in peak periods. Thus by increasing its capacity, the BRT-Lite system could tap the demand currently being served by other transport modes.
46. Analysis of the occupations of BRT-Lite users demonstrates that a broad range of travelers use the system. A large majority are self-employed, reflecting the local prevalence of entrepreneurs running their own businesses. Civil servants and students also constitute a significant proportion of the BRT-Lite ridership. And there is evidence of ridership among the higher-ranking employment categories, including management, professionals, and directors.

**What were passengers riding before the BRT-Lite system opened?**

47. The majority of BRT-Lite passengers were using the existing public transport:

- Eight-five percent were taking *danfo*, the small commuter buses.
- Eight percent were using the larger *molue* or commercial buses.
- Four percent of passengers were traveling by car, and a further two percent were traveling by taxi, *okada* (motorcycle taxis), or *kabu kabu* (shared taxis).

48. The modal shift from private transport appeared to be relatively low. However, evidence that even a small proportion of previous car users have been willing to use the new system is testimony to a change in thinking in a society, in which car ownership is an aspiration, marking a change in status from which people rarely retreat.
What is the main travel purpose of BRT-Lite users?

49. Survey data show that during the morning (6.00 am - 10.00 am) and evening (4.00 pm - 7.00 pm) peak hours the majority of travelers are commuting to or from their places of work. Business customers account for over a quarter of all trips, and this proportion remains fairly consistent throughout the day. The majority of shopping trips occur during the inter-peak hours, accounting for a quarter of the trips during this period compared with fewer than 10 percent during the morning peak hour and 13 percent in the evening. Education-related trips account for about 10 percent of trips across the day, with a slight bias toward morning and inter-peak periods—that is, the main portion of return school trips are likely to take place before the evening peak period.

Figure 2: Journey Purpose of BRT-Lite Passengers by Time of Day

What do BRT-Lite users think of the new system?

50. User opinion of the new system is strongly positive in comparison with opinion on the alternative modes of transport. A majority strongly agreed that the BRT-Lite system is better than other modes in all the journey attributes mentioned. In particular, respondents found the BRT-Lite system to be faster and more comfortable than the alternatives. In all attributes, over 90 percent of respondents agreed or strongly agreed that the BRT-Lite system is better than the previous mode of travel. The system is, then, clearly considered to be superior to other modes by the vast majority of users.

How does the BRT-Lite journey compare to alternative travel options?

51. The reasons for the popularity of the BRT-Lite service became clear when respondents compared the relative journey attributes of the system with those of the alternative modes of transport. Because the other public transport vehicles are now limited to the service lanes, those that still ply the route tend to focus on the shorter journeys, thereby attracting passengers who are traveling shorter distances or from intermediate stops where the BRT-Lite capacity is limited. It is therefore necessary to transfer from one transport to another to make an end-to-end journey from Mile 12 to CMS (central
city on the Island) if traveling on other public transport modes. An example would be a two-stage trip from Mile 12 to Ojuelegba, and then on to CMS. The alternative from Mile 12 is to access the island via the Third Mainland Bridge, although the majority of services using this route terminate at Obalende from which a further short stage is required to reach CMS. The journey attributes for the two alternative journey options compared with the BRT journey are as follows:

Table 2: Travel times from Mile 12 to CMS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mile 12 to CMS</th>
<th>Other public transport on corridor</th>
<th>Via Third Mainland Bridge</th>
<th>BRT-Lite</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total in-vehicle journey time</td>
<td>78 minutes</td>
<td>64 minutes</td>
<td>55 minutes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fare (Nigerian naira)</td>
<td>230</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interchange</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total wait time</td>
<td>45 minutes</td>
<td>10 minutes</td>
<td>15 minutes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

52. For end-to-end journeys, the advantages of traveling by BRT-Lite are clear. The journey is faster than that using the other route options; passengers save about 10-20 minutes in vehicle time. Journey time advantages are further increased compared with other in-corridor trips by avoiding the need to change transport to access the central business district. The BRT-Lite offers a premium service in terms of both run time and vehicle quality, but its fares are actually lower than those for other travel options. The BRT-Lite fare is particularly preferential to competing modes along the corridor, where the requirement to transfer from one vehicle to another and the high fares for shorter journeys lead to a significantly higher fare for the full journey. There is evidence that other operators are attempting to profit from the demand that does not choose the BRT-Lite service, primarily because of the capacity constraints of the system.

53. So, with every aspect of the BRT-Lite journey comparing favorably against the competitive modes, what do BRT-Lite users point to the most important factor behind their choosing to use the system?

- Quicker journey time: 35 percent of respondents
- Comfort: 20 percent of respondents
- Cheaper than alternatives: just under 20 percent of respondents
- Safety or the improved security of the system: 13 percent of respondents
- More reliable: five percent of respondents.
Has the BRT-Lite system changed passengers’ travel patterns?

54. The introduction of the BRT-Lite service has influenced some travelers to change their travel patterns. Nearly a quarter of travelers questioned said that their use of the service had led to a change in the time of day that they traveled. Eighty percent of these said that the greater speed or reliability of the BRT-Lite service allowed them to travel at the time they wanted rather than having to leave early to ensure reaching their destinations in time. Just six percent changed their time of travel for the negative reason of avoiding the queues for the service.

55. Fifteen percent of travelers stated that they changed the number of trips they made, of which four-fifths made more trips using the BRT-Lite system for positive reasons such as the reduced journey time, cost, comfort, or improved accessibility. Of the respondents who said they made fewer trips, some of these were attributed to the reduced requirement to transfer to another vehicles, which again is positive, if not strictly constituting a change in the number of trips (as opposed to trip stages).

56. Eighteen percent of travelers had changed their destinations, mainly to those served by the BRT-Lite route, although a couple of respondents mentioned that the BRT-Lite service allows them to travel to locations farther out than was practical previously. This is a clear indicator of the potential of the BRT-Lite service to influence land use decisions.

How does the BRT-Lite system fit into the full journey pattern of travelers?

57. Analysis of trip-making patterns has shown how the BRT-Lite system occupies part of a series of travel modes between origin and destination. Only around a third of travelers use the BRT-Lite service as the sole means of making a journey.

58. A large proportion of BRT-Lite users take danfo for a leg of their journeys, and okada is a popular mode as well, used as a means of access to the transport network and the BRT-Lite corridor. On average, the number of stages needed for BRT-Lite passengers to make a single trip for is 1.96.

| Table 3: Modes of Transport in the BRT-Lite Corridor |
|----------------|-------------------|
| **Mode taken** | **Percentage of travelers** |
| BRT only        | 31                |
| BRT, danfo      | 41                |
| BRT, okada      | 17                |
| BRT, danfo, okada | 7             |
| BRT, taxi       | 1                 |

63
Annex 6: Stakeholder Workshop Report and Results

1. During project implementation, a number of workshops were held which involved a broad section of stakeholders and these helped considerably in defining the project and achieving its public acceptance. Existing and prospective bus operators have been closely involved in the definition of the bus services enhancement component of the project. During project implementation, stakeholder involvement was principally through the Safeguards and the External Relations Units of Lagos Metropolitan Area Authority (LAMATA). The latter has the mandate to follow up on issues raised by the public, and chairs an internal user’s services group which meets regularly to consider matters brought before it or required to be addressed. Minutes of this group were usually forwarded to the Managing Director (MD) and the Corporate and Legal Secretary.

2. The External Relations unit generated a list of stakeholders envisaged at inception of Lagos Urban Transport Project (LUTP) and this was updated from time to time to reflect organizational changes. Additionally, a Stakeholders’ forum was held in respect of the Strategic Transport Master Plan. Below are excerpts in respect of a few of the forums:

A. LAMATA stakeholders’ workshop on Environmental and Social challenges confronting transport reforms in Lagos

3. A number of workshops were held in Lagos between 2005 and 2009 to present the findings of the Sectoral Environment and Social Assessment as well as to engage stakeholders in the process of defining the next steps for implementation of the Lagos Urban Transport Project and LAMATA’s role in it. The following are the highlights of the workshop:

- There are many agencies e.g. the Lagos State Traffic Management Authority (LASTMA), Federal Road Safety Commission (FRSC), LAMATA, local government, Ministry of Transport (MOT), etc., and issues of overarching responsibilities arose. It was recommended that authorities should address them to remove overlap, rivalry, redundancy, and bottlenecks. The issue of outdated baseline information needs attention through close work with regulatory institutions and academic institutions.

- Operational power issues can be resolved through agency cooperation e.g., LAMATA with LASTMA. The weak compliance with environmental regulations can be resolved through the energizing of environmental impact assessments (EIAs) to their responsibilities under the ambit of the Environmental Impact Assessment Act.

- There are positive social and environmental impacts of the scheme on commuter time, poverty alleviation, economy, road safety, accident rates etc. There could also be negative impacts such as effect on air quality, public health, loss of natural habitats, social networks etc. The panacea lies in ecological transformation and efficient operational techniques and/or strategies.
B. Minutes of the LAMATA/NURTW/Triple E' Stakeholders’ meetings on Resettlement Action Plan along Pilot Bus Route (Iyana Ipaja/Ikotun Rd.)

Date: 2006-2008

Venue: National Union of Road Transport Workers (NURTW)-Iyana Ipaja Branch

Purpose of meetings: Resettlement Action Plan (RAP) issues vis-à-vis distribution of identification cards to Project Affected Persons (PAP).

4. Issues discussed are:

- Chairman, NURTW (Ipaja Branch) said that the consultant consulted with the union before embarking on the RAP census and the union gave its support by detailing two of its members to work with the consultant to prevent any form of embarrassment.
- Having concluded the census, the consultant did not come back to inform the union on the outcome of the job.
- That market women prevented the consultant from distributing the identity cards to Project Affected Persons due to lack of information on the identification card. Some of the market women and their heads gave negative meanings to the identification card and called on the union Chairman for explanation.
- External Relations Specialist, LAMATA blamed the consultant for not contacting LAMATA before commencement of the distribution of the identification cards. He said LAMATA has established good working relationship with NURTW both at state and branch levels and has always informed the union on its activities on the project. He thanked the Chairman and the union for their support to the project right from its inception.
- The Chairman responded that RAP consultant (Triple E) should contact him at his office, when he must have contacted the market heads and resolved issues with them. He confirmed that the identification card would be issued to the affected people.

C. The Strategic Transport Master Plan Stakeholders’ Technical Session

The Strategic Transport Master Plan Stakeholders’ technical review session was held on June 25-26, 2009 at the Lekki Peninsula Resort, Ajah, Lagos.

5. The objectives of the review were as follows:

- To ensure that key transport and economic inputs from all government ministries and agencies are incorporated in the Transport Master Plan;
- To ensure that there are no gaps in the planning process; and
- To get buy in from key stakeholders.
6. The final resolutions as a result of the forum were as follows:

- Increase travel and transport choices;
- Introduce integrated transport system;
- Making transit attractive, convenient and affordable;
- To make transport less polluting and less dependent on non-renewable energy;
- Optimize use of roads, intersections and facilities;
- Transport infrastructural maintenance is imperative in Strategic Transport Master Plan (STMP);
- The STMP should come up with a bus-feeder route network that will be linked to the residential areas; and
- A proper framework should be developed for safety, funding and renewal before going into the actual implementation.

(i) **Road Sector**

- Need to enforce existing law on regulation of okada;
- Integration and sharing of traffic data among the stakeholders i.e., LAMATA, LASTMA, MOT, LAGBUS, etc.; and
- Provision of road infrastructure.

(ii) **Water**

- Improvement in jetties construction;
- Dredging of ferry routes;
- Enforcing use of life jackets especially on open boats; and
- Provision of communication gadgets, control centres and effective emergency services.

(iii) **Rail**

- The need to link airport and seaport with rail system;
- The need for more consultation and collaboration on granting of level crossing especially within the urban centers;
- The need for an effective traffic management plan and strategies;
- Non-motorized transport (NMT) should be encouraged by providing adequate facilities in the STMP;
- The ‘walking distance’ should be specific and should be between one to two kilometers maximum;
- Okadas should be restricted to the inner roads by banning them from the major roads; and
- Parking policy should be implemented.
(iv) Institutional/General

- Develop Integrated multi-modal transport system;
- Upgrade LAMATA to full scale Transport Authority;
- Construct full high standard ring road and complimentary roads;
- Clear all road encroachment including bus parks and markets;
- Introduce common ticketing system;
- Establish transit information centres;
- Introduce traffic control centre;
- Introduce mandatory traffic impact assessment;
- Develop Investment strategy;
- The vision of the Lagos State Government (LSG) is to have a modern multi-modal transport system that will make Lagos a world class city;
- A central transport authority with all modes of transportation under its responsibility and coordination;
- The new structure as proposed by the STMP was adopted with modifications to the effect that Licensing and enforcement should be ceded to the central Transport Authority, as against the Lagos State Ministry of Transportation;
- For a seamless linkage with the MOT, the State Commissioner for Transport should be the Chairman of the Board of the Transportation Authority;
- The Transport Authority should report directly to the State Governor;
- Transport authority organogram to include department of corporate planning and monitoring with responsibility for corporate planning, procurement, monitoring and evaluation, reporting, external relations and inter-relationship with other states’ transport agencies;
- Promotion of NMT should be brought forward for immediate implementation. The provision of infrastructure for segregated corridors as well as pedestrian walkways and bicycle lanes should be adopted as state policy and fully implemented;
- The possibility of implementing congestion charges mid-way to 2020 should be considered as against post 2020 option;
- Low emission zones and electric vehicles should be as a matter of urgency; and
- Extrapolations on other transport issues and developments post 2020, with strategies to address them should be considered in the plan.
Annex 7: Summary of Borrower's ICR and Comments on Draft ICR

1. INTRODUCTION

1. The population of Lagos has been growing at an unprecedented rate of six percent per annum, pressurizing existing public transport infrastructure to almost breaking point. Through the phased implementation of Lagos Urban Transport Project (LUTP), the Lagos State Government (LSG) has instituted a long-term strategy that defines policies relating value and needs of the urban public transport sector to macroeconomic considerations.

2. The Lagos Metropolitan Area Transport Authority (LAMATA) was established by the LSG as a semi-autonomous implementing institution for LUTP. LAMATA is envisioned to provide a strategic planning platform for addressing long-neglected transport needs of the metropolis, and to provide a common and consistent basis for implementing urban transport policies and programs in Lagos. With World Bank support, LSG conceived and implemented LUTP from inception in October 2003 to closure in December 2010. The overall objective of LUTP is to provide public transport infrastructure and services for the urban poor at least cost with measurable reduction of time and money spent by poor households on transport activities.

3. At project completion, LAMATA needed to assess overall impact of LUTP interventions made under the International Development Association (IDA) funded project components by preparing a project Implementation Completion and Results Report (ICR) to provide key stakeholders with reasonable justification for continuity and future LUTP implementation. This involves an ex post evaluation of LUTP objectives measured by key performance indicators (KPIs) defined in the inception project appraisal document. The ICR also examines salient lessons relevant for improving future LUTP implementation.

2. PROJECT DESIGN AND OBJECTIVES

2.1 Project Objectives

4. The project development objective (PDO) of LUTP is to “ensure that capacity to manage the transport sector in the Lagos metropolitan area is sustainably improved and efficiency of the public transport network enhanced such that it contributes measurable to poverty reduction”. Baseline surveys for socio-economic and transport impact KPIs were established within six months of project effectiveness.

5. Key outcome indicators measure achievement of the PDO while key output indicators measure success of LUTP implementation, in particular progress made under the IDA funded project components. The objectives remained unchanged throughout project implementation, which is an indication that the PDO and component objectives were properly conceived during project preparation. In line with project restructuring and redesign, planned LUTP interventions including timelines agreed during project preparation were modified at mid-term in 2005. Key outcome and output indicators were
tracked consistently during the course of LUTP implementation. The project has therefore benefited from advantages of proper planning, monitoring and evaluation.

2.2 Project Components

6. LUTP is made up of five major project components as follows:

(i) **Institutional Capacity Building** for firmly establishing LAMATA and other transport related departments and agencies for effective coordination, management and financing of the transport system in LMA;

(ii) **Road Network Efficiency** involving full rehabilitation of the 632 km declared road network (DRN) to reduce vehicle operating costs and improve road safety;

(iii) **Bus Services Enhancement** relating to preparation of a regulatory framework and enabling environment for the organized private sector provision of bus services;

(iv) **Water Transport Promotion** for the improvement of modal diversity within an integrated public transport system by promoting the enhanced provision and use of water transport by the private sector; and

(v) **Preparation for Future Phases**: Preparation of Strategic Transport Master Plan (STMP), and other studies for next phase implementation of LSG transport sector policy and strategy, including follow-on projects such as bus rapid transit (BRT), light rail transit (LRT), intelligent transport systems, etc.

7. The major project components funded by IDA comprise subcomponents with specific details on inputs, processes, outputs (plus coverage or “reach” across beneficiary groups), outcomes and impact, leading to identification of KPIs at each stage in the project log frame results chain, as well as associated risks which might impede the attainment of objectives.

3. PROJECT OUTCOMES AND ACHIEVEMENT OF OBJECTIVES

3.1 Overall Project Performance

8. The basis for measuring LUTP performance involves a monitoring and evaluation (M&E) assessment of project KPIs. The ICR has adjudged project performance highly satisfactory due to successful implementation of LUTP interventions by LAMATA. The ICR findings show that LUTP achieved reasonable success in its contribution to poverty reduction. The M&E survey and assessment showed a reduction of time and cost savings by poor households and general improvement in social-economic status of the urban poor, especially communities located within and around LUTP interventions. The outcome indicators show that time spent by poor households on transport activities had reduced to 19.64 minutes at project end from 29.5 minutes at mid-term review and money spent by poor households on transport activities had reduced by 26 percent at project completion compared to baseline.
9. Overall efficiency of the project is deemed **satisfactory**. The M&E findings show that inputs committed in terms of money, time, equipment and quality staff members were optimally utilized. The average economic rate of return (ERR) calculated in the project appraisal document was about 56 percent and on completion ERR is about 67 percent.

10. Economic analysis was undertaken to evaluate viability of investments for road rehabilitation based on a comparison of “with” and “without project” scenarios. Without the project, traffic becomes increasingly congested and average traffic speed remains low, resulting in higher vehicle operating costs (VOCs). With the project, average traffic speed increases thereby reducing VOCs. The ICR cost-benefit analysis covers a 15-year period using 2010 domestic prices.

### 3.2 Project Performance by Component

11. With implementation of LUTP’s five major components, LAMATA achieved considerable success on all key outcome and output indicators, justifying a highly satisfactory ICR rating.

12. **Capacity Building**: LAMATA is now fully functional in terms of sustainable capacity to manage the transport sector in Lagos and all necessary procedures and processes are in place, with effective planning and project management functions.

13. **Road Network Efficiency**: LAMATA has maintained, upgraded and rehabilitated the 632 DRN thereby reducing vehicle operating costs and improving road safety.

14. **Bus Services Enhancement**: With adoption of franchise regulation and licensing reforms, LSG has created an enabling environment for organized private sector provision of bus services. LAMATA’s bus services reforms consist of two sub-components namely, BRT and bus franchise scheme (BFS). The pilot BRT “Lite” scheme (Mile 12-TBS) has been highly successful and widely acclaimed as the first example of a comprehensive and integrated approach to improving public transport in sub-Saharan Africa.

15. **Water Transport Promotion**: LAMATA has successfully rehabilitated four jetties essential for rural water transportation of riverside dwellers and conducted comprehensive feasibility studies for developing ferry services in LMA. However, responsibility for developing water transportation has been ceded by law to the newly established Lagos State Waterways Authority.

16. **Preparation for Future Phases**: LAMATA has successfully prepared the 2020 STMP for LMA and systematically identified an MRT network comprising BRT, LRT and ferry transit routes. Plans are underway to expand BRT to other corridors while implementation of the Blue Line LRT (Okokomaiko-Marina) is already in progress.
4. Project Benefits and Overarching Themes

17. The project impacted positively on both direct and indirect beneficiaries including vulnerable groups consisting of women, children and the physically disadvantaged. LAMATA’s effective information, education and communication (IEC) strategy ensured stakeholder awareness and support for LUTP interventions. The BRT “Lite” scheme has considerably generated immense benefits and positively affected the metropolis.

18. First, patronage has exceeded expectations. The average weekday ridership is twice projected estimates. Second, passengers now pay on average 30 percent less in fares and enjoy a greater degree of fare stability, even though fuel costs have risen by over 100 percent in the past few years. Third, the scheme has created direct employment for over 1,500 people, mostly graduates and, indirect employment for over 500,000 people in the state. Fourth, the scheme has demonstrated the capacity of local operators to successfully run formal public transport operations and has subsequently generated intense interest from local banks and financiers.

19. Through the Safeguards Unit, LAMATA has successfully incorporated environmental and social issues into the planning, design and implementation of public transport projects. LUTP has facilitated conduct of the following: (i) Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) along five corridors; (ii) Resettlement Action Plan (RAP) along four corridors; (iii) Lagos Vehicular Emission (Air Quality) Monitoring Study and Oshodi/Obalende Baseline Emission Study; and (iv) Socio-Economic Baseline Survey for LMA and three follow-on surveys. LAMATA has effectively demonstrated the importance of environmental and social safeguards as key elements of an integrated urban transport development strategy. LAMATA is locally and internationally acknowledged for best practice safeguards standards and has received several commendations from the World Bank.

20. Effective leadership is one of the critical success factors responsible for successful implementation of LUTP interventions. LAMATA’s creditable performance is largely due to effective leadership of the Managing Director (MD) who recognized the importance of employing competent professionals. Exemplary leadership encouraged a culture of dedication and professional integrity within LAMATA.

21. At project completion, sustainability appears highly probable. The rationalization of motor vehicle administration (MVA) has made the Transport Fund a veritable source of sector financial sustainability. It is highly critical that LAMATA remains a single autonomous legal entity with adequate and reliable sources of funding and financing for effective coordination of urban transport policies and programs.
5. **LESSONS LEARNED**

- Strict adherence to guidelines, procedures and processes were critical factors responsible for successful project implementation.
- Institutional capacity building is another critical success factor for LUTP because it produces knowledgeable professional staffs that are fully committed to the organization’s vision and mission.
- A private sector model works well within government setting. Governments should incorporate public-private-partnership (PPP) in Bank financed projects.
- Project success can be facilitated by a credible financial management system, a competent and credible financial department and procurement unit.
- Projects benefit immensely from stakeholder involvement in the design, planning and implementation life cycle and this should be vigorously encouraged.
- Environmental and social safeguards must be incorporated into the design, planning and implementation of all transport projects.
Annex 8: List of Supporting Documents

1. Aide Memoire - LUTP Identification Mission, June 2001
2. Project Appraisal Document (PAD) for LUTP October, 2002
3. Development Credit Agreement LUTP, 2002
4. Project Information Document (PID), October 2002
5. Aide Memoires, 2002 – 2010
6. Project Status/Implementation Report (ISR), 2002-2010
8. Additional financing Agreement December, 2005
10. Restructuring report, 2005
11. LAMATA Socio-Economic Baseline Survey on Transportation in Lagos Metropolis
12. Follow-up Assessment to the Baseline Survey on all LAMATA Road Maintenance and Periodic Contract, 2009
13. LAMATA- LUTP Mid-Term Review Report
15. LUTP- Institutional Audit Report, December 2009
17. LUTP- Technical Audit Report, 2005
18. LUTP- Technical Audit Report, 2006
19. LAMATA - Five Year Strategy and Investment Plan (2006-2010), October 2005
20. Topographical Survey from Oshodi to Obalende via Mile 2 and Oshodi to Ikorodu via Mile 12 by Adeyemi Fajobi & Co, July 20, 2010
22. Consultancy Services for the Detailed Design and Construction Supervision of Roadway, Bridge and Building Infrastructure for the Proposed Oshodi by Advanced Engineering Consultants, October 2010
23. Detailed Design of the Rehabilitation Contract for the second year road network (Lot 4) by Aim Consultants, April 2005
25. Detailed Design of the Rehabilitation Contract for the second year road network (Lot 5) by Allot/Roughton JV, April 2005
27. Consultancy Services for the Detailed Engineering Design for Road Network Improvement towards Preparation of LUTP II by AOP Consult Limited in association with Landmark, January 2010
28. Detailed Design of the Rehabilitation Contract for the second year road network (Lot 1) by Badafash-Titwal JV, April 2005
29. Detailed Design of Traffic System Management (TSM) Measures for 14 major junctions in Lagos (Groups B & D) by BKS/AAW JV, January 2007
33. Consultancy Services on Topographic Survey on Bus Depot Station Igando/Ikotun Local Government Secretariat by Daimler Geographics, December 2006
34. Consultancy Services for mapping/survey of junctions along Iyana-Ipaja/Ikotun/Igando Pilot Bus Corridor by Daimler Geographics, June 2004
35. Consultancy Services for the Detailed Design and Construction Supervision of Roadway, Bridge and Building Infrastructure for the Proposed Oshodi to Obalende by Dar al-Handasar Shar & Partners, December 2010
38. Detailed Design of TSM Measures by Encon International, September 2004
39. Detailed Design of majidun-Ipakodo Road by Encon International, August 2004
40. Consultancy Services on Condition Survey of 20 LGA Roads in Lagos State by Encon International, August 2004
41. Study on Sectoral Environmental and Social Assessment by Environmental Resources Mgt/Jawura, January 17, 2007
42. Consultancy Services for the Institutional Audit in Lagos State Ministry of Transportation by FCI Consulting Ltd, January 31. 2006
43. Environmental Impact Assessment for 7 km Road Rehabilitation by Geo-Eco Strategy, July 2009
44. Transportation Survey of Pilot Bus Route (Iyana-Ipaja-Ikotun Road) by Geo-Trans Associates Ltd, October 2005
45. Consultancy Services on the Follow-up Study on Baseline Survey (Addendum) by Geo-Trans Associates Ltd, May 2008
46. Consultancy Services for Environmental Impact Assessment Expertise for Road Rehabilitation under LUTP II by Geo-Trans Associates Ltd, August 2010
47. Consultancy Services for 2009 Follow-up assessment to the baseline Survey on all LAMATA Road Rehabilitation by Geo-Trans Associates Ltd, September 2009
48. Detailed Design of the Rehabilitation Contract for the second year road network (Lot 3) by Giradet/Blue Eagle JV, April 2005
49. Consultancy Contract for the Provision of Short Term Technical Audit of LAMATA road projects by G.M.K. Opoku, August 2006
50. Study on Involuntary Resettlement and Rehabilitation by Gordon Appleby, September 2004
51. Consultancy Services for Rapid Assessment of Urban Transport Needs of Kano and Abuja by Harisu Jane Halle, November 2010
52. Supervision Consultancy for the Feasibility Studies for the Development of Ferry Services by Haskoning, October 2007
53. Consultancy Services for Establishment of Traffic Management Unit (TMU) in Ikeja area of Lagos State by HEO, April 2007
54. Consultancy Services for Establishment of Traffic Management Unit (TMU) in Alimosho area of Lagos State by HEO, April 2007
55. Consultancy Services for the Design and Implementation of a Unified Communication System for LAMATA by Ha-Shem Networks Services Limited, January 2010
56. Survey and Economic Analysis of Selected Additional Roads for the second year Program and Analysis of Unit Rates of Bids for Periodic Maintenance and Rehabilitation Works by IAA Associates Ltd, March 2004
57. Consultancy Service to Evaluate the comparative merits of different types of buses by IBIS Transport Consultants, December 2009
58. Consultancy Services to undertake Pre-feasibility Study towards planning and implementation of Bus Rapid Transit System between Oshodi and Obalende (via Mile 2) by Integrated Transport Planning Limited, November 2009
60. Consultancy Services to support the Detail Design of Bus Rapid Transit in Lagos by KPMG, 2002
61. Detailed Design of the Period Maintenance Contract for the second year road network (Lot 2) by Landmark/CPMS Ltd, April 2005
62. Consultancy Services on Junction Performance Surveys and Supervision of Traffic System Management (TSM) Group F & H Junctions by Loricamp Engineers, September 2007
63. Consultancy Services for LAMATA Technical Audit by MOAT Consortium, December 2008
64. Lagos Vehicular Emission (Air Quality) Monitoring Study by Multiple Development Services Ltd, March 2008
65. Consultancy Services for the Implementation of RAP for Iyana-Ipaja Pilot Bus Franchise Scheme by Multiple Development Services Ltd, September 2007
66. Consultancy Services for Environmental and Social Management Framework towards preparation of LUTP II by Multiple Development Services Ltd, September 2007
67. RAP for the Oshodi to Obalende via Mile 12 BRT Scheme by Multiple Development Services Ltd, December 2007
68. Preparation of an Environmental Impact Assessment for the Oshodi to Apapa North BTR corridor by Multiple Development Services Ltd, December 2010
69. Consultancy Services for the Study of the current impact of motorcycle growth in Lagos by Nigerian Institute of Transport Technology, September 2007
70. Baseline Survey from Oshodi-Obalende (via Mile 2) BRT Scheme by Nigerian Institute of Transport Technology, September 2009
71. Consultancy Service for the Examination and Quantification of challenges faced by vulnerable groups in accessing public transport services in Lagos by New Nigeria Foundation, July 2009
73. Consultancy Services for the Socio-Economic and Demographic Baseline Survey from Oshodi to Obalende by Nigerian Institute of Transport Technology, September 2009
74. Study on Corporate Management by PriceWaterhouseCoopers Ltd, November 2005
75. Implementation Completion Report for LUTP by Sages, December 2010
76. Study on Review of Vehicle Administration in Lagos State Ministry of Transportation by Simplex Automation Systems Ltd, August 2005
77. Road and Bridge Maintenance Needs Assessment and Junction improvement Study on the public transport priority network in the Lagos Metropolitan Area by SNC-Lavalin International, November 2001
78. Environmental Impact Assessment for Mile 12 to Ikorodu BRT Scheme by Sustainability Limited, December 2010
79. Detailed Design of the Periodic Maintenance Contract for the second year road network (Lot 3) by Techjob Associates, April 2005
80. Detailed Design of the Rehabilitation Contract for the second year road network (Lot 2) by Yolas Consultants, April 2005