91778 Social Protection & Labor Systems Social Protection & Labor Technical Note June 2014 | Number 1 Why Are Flexibility and Scalability Important? Building Flexible and Scalable The adverse impacts Social Protection Programs of natural disasters and climate change That Can Respond to Disasters constitute a major risk to Mirey Ovadiya the poor and near-poor. Experience has shown that the faster support can reach the poor and vulnerable following a Poor men and women disaster, the less likely they are to resort to harmful negative coping strategies. Governments face disproportionately therefore need to have social protection tools available to deploy swiftly in the face of a di- saster. Social protection programs can provide a buffer that allows households to meet basic higher risks from these needs while reestablishing livelihoods. They also ensure the delivery of basic social services. events because of their Safety net programs have been successfully used in many settings to deliver post- limited ability to cope disaster relief and recovery assistance. Recent evaluations suggest that countries that with shocks. Therefore, have established regular social protection programs or institutions are better prepared they require more to respond to shocks and to absorb dedicated donor funding. Countries whose social protection programs include specific disaster response mechanisms, including support from social administrative systems and coordination mechanisms, are better positioned to respond protection programs to shocks and disasters, particularly to scale up and extend programming as illustrated by in order to protect Turkey’s response to the 1999 earthquake (Box 1). their livelihoods. The Social protection programs can buffer regular beneficiaries of social assistance from the increasing frequency impacts of disasters. They can also temporarily expand coverage to a wider group of vulnerable people, preventing significant increases in the number of people needing such and intensity of assistance over the medium to long term. natural disasters make it imperative Box 1. Turkey’s emergency earthquake recovery project that governments be On August 17, 1999, a 7.6 magnitude earthquake struck the Marmara region of northwestern Turkey, killing prepared to respond. more than 17,000 people, injuring nearly 44,000, and leaving about half a million people homeless. The earthquake also caused considerable damage in Istanbul, about 70 kilometers from the earthquake’s epicenter. The World Bank’s $252.5 million Emergency Recovery Loan helped the government respond quickly to the disaster by providing cash assistance to victims for accommodations (75 percent of total benefits); home repairs (13 percent); death and disability benefits (10 percent); and death benefit, survivor, and disability pensions (1.5 percent). Affected business owners also received lump-sum payments. A beneficiary assessment of cash transfers reported that 85 percent of people who received rent support believed it had saved them from total devastation. Implementation was possible largely because the distribution infrastructure already existed and was functioning relatively well. The primary distribution agency, for example, was already set up to disburse payments through its network of more than 900 offices. — Source: IEG 2011. Technical Note June 2014 | Number 1 In several successful social safety net programs, a national warning system triggers built-in disaster response mechanisms. A Box 2. key feature of most of these mechanisms is the ability to scale up Figure 1. One-Stop Shop Registration and assistance beyond the core target group, usually the chronically poor, to include people who are impoverished transitionally. Payment Process in Pakistan’s Citizen Damage The cost of identifying additional beneficiaries and expanding Compensation Programme coverage of a social protection program can be minimal. Key Considerations for Creating a Scalable and Flexible Social Protection Program Scaling up is critical following a disaster. To avoid problems associated with outreach and communication, coverage, and quality controls, practitioners needs to take the following steps: • Create an enabling environment that facilitates institutional coordination between actors as well as partnerships between the public and private sectors. • Manage and allocate resources so that they can be rapidly and effectively deployed. Identify and reach out to target groups using existing data sources, periodic reassessments, and mobile facilities. based modalities to make payments to beneficiaries depending on the volume of transactions and the connectivity of the locality Facilitating Institutional Coordination to intermediary institutions. In some rural and isolated localities, payments are made through community committees, which Institutional capacity determines the speed, effectiveness, and receive the case from the central agency. In other places, cash is efficiency with which social protections operate following disbursed through post offices or local bank branches. a disaster. Response mechanisms can be centralized or decentralized, depending on the relative strength of public, Three tasks are critical to establishing an institutional private, and civil society organizations. The key is to have the coordination mechanism: groundwork laid so that existing institutional capacity can be fully exploited. • creating formal communication channels and linkages among social protection, disaster management and other Case studies of Mexico’s Program de Empleo Temporal (PET) sectoral ministries/agencies, including those responsible and Ethiopia’s Productive Safety Net Program (PSNP) suggest for early warning systems that coordinating safety net support through a single central agency, which works closely with other national agencies and • defining the roles and responsibilities of different subnational authorities, is more effective than putting multiple ministries/agencies and other implementing partners agencies in charge. Ensuring adequate numbers of trained staff at each level to implement scaled up is also critical, as is an ongoing • establishing linkages or information-sharing arrangements program of capacity development, including training and with the broader humanitarian response system. refurbishment of equipment and materials. Mexico’s PET uses an institutional coordination model that Successful scale up also involves partnerships and coordination is grounded in a clear legal framework (Box 2 and Figure 1). among private/public service providers, agencies, ministries Legislation spells out the responsibilities of each party and and development partners. Partnership agreements must be in even names coordination mechanisms. Data from the early place between agencies/actors and the service providers best warning system data are disseminated among the implementing positioned to perform outreach and deliver benefits and services. ministries, allowing them to prepare their response, scale up Governments that have partnered innovatively with banks, cell PET, or use other channels to meet the social protection needs of phone companies, and other members of the private sector have affected localities. Every ministry collaborating under the PET had much success in responding to disasters. must fund and implement its individual portion of the program. Scaled-up programs should be able to use a combination of Mobilizing Financial and Human Resources methods of delivery and outreach, relying on community structures and mobile program offices to adjust to the specific Disaster-prone countries that have developed disaster response characteristics, locations, and needs of the population (Box 4). In mechanisms linked to social protection systems in advance have Mexico, the PET program uses public, private, and community- been largely successful in mounting large, effective, coordinated, Social Protection & Labor | World Bank Group Box 3. Institutional coordination in Mexico’s Programa de Empleyo Temporal Mexico Programa de Empleyo Temporal (PET) is an interagency program overseen by the Ministry of Social Welfare (SEDESOL) and implemented by several sector ministries and agencies. The Ministry of the Interior (SEGOB) oversees the coordinated institutional response to natural disasters and manages the Natural Disasters Fund (FONDEN). The General Directorate for Attention to Priority Groups (DGAGP) of SEDESOL is a cosignatory to a parliamentary act with SEGOB’s General Directory for Civil Protection, the department in charge of the national government’s emergency and recovery response to natural disasters. A PET technical commission is tasked with strengthening institutional coordination in the planning, implementation, monitoring, and evaluation of the program, as well as coordinating resources to maximize socioeconomic impact. The commission comprises the heads of the following undersecretariats: Human and Social Development; SEDESOL; Environmental Policy and Planning; Environment and Natural Resources; Infrastructure, Communications and Transport; Employment and Labor Productivity; and Labor and Social Security. A PET Permanent Working Group conducts research activities in support of the commission. Figure 2. Organizational Chart for Mexico’s Programa de Empleyo Temporal (PET) at the Federal Level and rapid responses. Experience from various countries Braunholz 2011). Such a plan also serves as a platform for suggests that establishing early warning systems, contingency collaboration between stakeholders. financing, contingency plans and institutional capacity ahead of the crisis can significantly compress the typical timeline for • Build response capacity and train personnel. After a humanitarian response. disaster, trained personnel should be rapidly deployed to assess damage, establish temporary registration/ The following steps are needed to put such a mechanism in place: information centers, enroll or certify beneficiaries for claims and benefits, make payments, and audit • Establish contingency budgets. The timeliness and accounts. Mexico’s PET and Pakistan’s Citizen Damage effectiveness of a response depends on the availability of Compensation Programme (CDCP) rely on mobile local financing to scale up existing programs. A policy framework information centers/desks to enroll beneficiaries, make is needed that identifies the sources of financing and payments, and accept grievance reports. In Mexico, once allocates financing to programs to be triggered under the early warning information on the probable impact specific circumstances. Under such a mechanism, relevant of the disaster is made public, PET emergency response institutions and implementing agencies get access to funding teams set up information/registration desks within each instantaneously when an emergency is declared. municipality to perform visual assessments and interview household heads. These teams are recruited and trained • Provide guidelines on the administration of the contingency by the PET administration. financing. The national disaster preparedness plan must detail systems and procedures; assign roles and responsibilities to different agencies; allocate funding for post disaster activities; and rely on existing systems of targeting, delivery, and reporting (Pelham, Clay, and Technical Note June 2014 | Number 1 Box 4. Making funds available immediately following crises Programs in Bangladesh, Ethiopia, Mexico, and Pakistan all have disaster In 2011, the PSNP extended the duration of its regular support for 6.5 million contingency plans that quickly make resources available during emergencies. beneficiaries and provided an extra three months of assistance to an additional 3.1 million people living in PSNP areas. The process from triggering the RFF Bangladesh’s National Disaster Management Strategy to payment of benefits took less than two months on average—a much faster Despite weaknesses, the National Disaster Management Strategy in response than the humanitarian assistance system, which took several months Bangladesh made it possible to respond to Cyclone Sidr in 2007 and to assess the crisis, mobilize funding, and respond to needs. evacuate and reaccommodate 4.5 million citizens within five days) Mexico Programa de Empleyo Temporal (PET) Ethiopia’s Productive Safety Net Programme The Programa de Empleyo Temporal (PET) is part of the Mexican The annual budget of Ethiopia’s Productive Safety Net Programme government’s annual budgeting and financing process. The “emergency” (PSNP) includes a contingency budget equivalent to 20 percent of the PET (PETi), an emergency response mechanism and contingency base program cost and a risk financing facility designed to respond to financing, was added as a subcomponent in 2003 to ensure timely and transitory needs in chronically food-insecure districts (woredas) when efficient response to shock-affected people. The mechanism operates inside larger shocks occur. Of the contingency budget, 15 percent is held at the the broader PET framework but has modified systems and procedures for regional level and 5 percent at the woreda (district) level. Both are used a postdisaster context. These procedures were designed based on PET’s to address unexpected needs of chronically food-insecure households experience of working with poor and marginalized people to protect and as well as transitory food insecurity among PSNP and non–PSNP restore their assets. At least 20 percent of its program budget is reserved households in PSNP–supported woredas. If these funds are not used for responding to emergency situations. This figure is deemed sufficient to during the fiscal year, they are rolled over. respond to higher-frequency events (such as hurricanes, flooding) of low to medium impact. If this funding is not adequate, Mexico’s Fund for Natural If a shock is too large to be handled by the contingency fund, the Risk Disasters (FONDEN) can provide supplementary resources. Financing Facility (RFF), established in 2009, responds. The RFF is based Pakistan’s Citizen Damage Compensation Programme on four principles: contingent emergency grant financing from an external partner; the use of the government’s early warning system, which triggers Based on its experience with the Citizen Damage Compensation a response; contingency planning in woredas; and adequate institutional Programme, in 2012 the government of Pakistan developed an Action capacity at all levels. Plan for Early Recovery in Future Disasters. The plan details the roles and responsibilities of several collaborating agencies during emergencies. Managing Fiduciary Risks programs in Bangladesh, Ethiopia, Mexico, and Pakistan illustrate effective use of various feedback mechanisms One of the challenges of providing social protection after disasters including grievance systems. is the need to balance a timely with response with ensuring accountability and avoiding waster. Disaster preparedness plans • Establish transparent audit and accountability mechanisms. should include emergency guidelines that for existing financial Disaster preparedness guidelines should detail how each management and procurement procedures and emphasize internal implementing agency should report its activities and and external communication on program guidelines. expenditures to a coordination/administration unit. Independent auditors and spot checks should be used. Roving Three steps are particularly important in managing fiduciary risks: teams should verify accounts and facilitate disbursements. • Establish transparent and standardized administrative processes Using a Management Information System to Identify, for selecting beneficiaries and disbursing benefits. In disaster- Register, and Track Beneficiaries prone areas, advance planning on administrative processes for beneficiary selection and allocation of resources is key A management information system that is accessible to several for ensuring transparent and sound business practices. agencies and contains basic poverty and geographic location data Guidelines that articulate these processes should be made on social protection program beneficiaries is an essential asset available to all implementing partners and beneficiaries for ensuring a rapid response. It should allow implementers to using the communication methods most widely used and identify poor and vulnerable populations at greatest risk from a accessible to the affected population. These methods include slow-onset event, giving responders a head-start in implementing operational manuals, posters, radio or TV announcements, the program. and community assemblies in local languages. • Establish community-based feedback mechanisms that A beneficiary database also provides a baseline for the target invite community members to report on program population and serves as a platform for periodic retargeting to implementation and any fraud, corruption, or malpractice. correct inclusion and exclusion errors and respond to changes in Feedback can be collected through various means, such the relative welfare of the households. The administrator of the as telephone hotlines, SMSs, community focal points, database needs access to resources to field follow-up assessments and local program offices, as well as through standard in affected areas, to ensure that potential beneficiaries are not monitoring and evaluation (M&E) tools, such as social missed and that undeserving individuals/households do not audits and beneficiary assessments. Social protection continue to receive benefits. Social Protection & Labor | World Bank Group Tips for Practitioners: Principles and Box 5. Pakistan’s National Database Good Practice to Follow to Scale up Social Registration Authority (NADRA) Protection Programs to Respond to Disasters Pakistan’s Citizen Damage Compensation Programme (CDCP) benefitted The following tips can help practitioners scale up social greatly from the National Database Registration Authority (NADRA). It maintains civil registration data on more than 96 million citizens protection programs’ efforts to respond to disaster and climate in Pakistan and abroad, as well as a database of the beneficiaries of an risks: ongoing national social safety net program. The CDCP made use of both databases to identify its beneficiary pool. 1. Put in place contingency funds, disaster preparedness NADRA also helped CDCP refine its eligibility criteria by triangulating plans, and disaster response mechanisms to protect the household data with other disaster specific eligibility criteria to verify assets of existing beneficiaries and expand coverage to other beneficiary eligibility. Over the two phases of the CDCP, NADRA helped vulnerable people affected by the event. identify, verify, and register more than 2 million beneficiary households, issuing ID cards or automatic payment cards (Watan cards). NADRA was established in 2000, with a mandate to develop a system 2. In countries at higher risk of disaster impacts, create for reregistering 150 million citizens. It started the task in March 2000, disaster response structures and procedures within social quickly establishing all essential support systems to more than 96 million protection programs. citizens in Pakistan and abroad. It also issued secure computerized national identity cards. NADRA also provides data management services 3. Have in place a legislative and/or policy framework that to other government departments. It works with the Benazir Income identifies the key institutional actors in disaster response Support Program, for example, to develop and populate the database for and assigns roles, responsibilities, and financing. the nationwide household poverty survey. 4. Build physical, technical, and surge capacity for disaster response in countries at risk. 8. Take into consideration cultural sensitivities, mobility 5. Be able to conduct needs assessments and reassessments constraints, and related issues in registering beneficiaries, in of affected populations, by establishing partnership order to avoid perpetuating the discriminatory or exclusive agreements with service providers that can be modified practices of existing programs. Establish a database for according to needs in the aftermath of a disaster. identifying and tracking beneficiaries that can be used by agencies at all levels. A central agency should be charged 6. Establish a beneficiary outreach mechanism that ensures with administering and updating a program beneficiary that populations in isolated locations and socially database. Ideally, this database should have links to other marginalized groups have information and access to post- safety net program databases and a larger population disaster program benefits. database, such as a civil registry. 7. Set up user-friendly registration systems. Forms and 9. Maintain financial control, through audit and accountability information should be clear, simple, and easy to use; they mechanisms that reduce the fiduciary risks associated with should be provided in multiple languages if necessary scaling up. Rely on flexible mechanisms, such as mobile and possible. Post-disaster registration centers should be teams, spot audits, and community structures that can be established as close to the disaster sites as possible. Mobile mobilized rapidly. Feed data to program administrators to registration and community facilitation teams should also adjust program implementation. ensure outreach to people who cannot come to registration centers, in order to identify households that may have been missed. Technical Note June 2014 | Number 1 References Beesley, J. 2011. The Hunger Safety Nets Programme in Kenya: A Social Protection Case Study. Oxfam, London. IEG (Independent Evaluation Group). 2011. An Evaluation of World Bank Group Support, 2000–2010 Social Safety Nets. World Bank, Washington, DC. Pelham, Clay, and Braunholz .2011. Natural Disasters: What is the Role for Safety Nets? Social Protection Discussion Paper 1102, World Bank, Washington, DC. UNISDR (United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction). 2011. Disaster Risk Reduction in the United Nations 2011. New York: UNISDR. World Bank. 2009. Building Resilient Communities: Risk Management and Response to Natural Disasters through Social Funds and Community-Driven Development Programs. Washington, DC: World Bank. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed herein are those of the author(s), and do not necessarily reflect the views of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/The World Bank and its affiliated organizations, or those of the Executive Directors of The World Bank or the governments they represent. The World Bank does not guarantee the accuracy of the data included in this work.