

# The Cartagena Contribution to Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration

Cartagena, Colombia, June 2009



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Original Version in English

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This document was prepared by the International Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Congress (CIDDR) Content and Methods Technical Secretariat under the leadership of Nat J. Colletta, Content and Methods Director and Chair of Content and Methods Advisory Group (CMAG) and comprising Ben A. Oppenheim and Manuela Torre, Advisors to the CMAG; Alejandro Eder, Policy Advisor of the Colombian High Counselor for Reintegration (ACR) and Chair of the CIDDR Coordinating Committee, and Andrea Salazar and Andres Angel, Advisors to the Coordinating Committee; Juan Carlos Palou, Coordinator, Content and Methods Technical Secretariat (CMTS), Mariana Diaz Kraus, Advisor to the Technical Secretariat, and Johanna Calvo, Isabela Leao, Jimena Samper, and Maria Stella Sanabria, Lead Reporters for the Technical Secretariat. The authors take sole responsibility for the content of this document which does not necessarily reflect the views or policies of their permanent employers or of the co-organizers, partners and private sector sponsors of the CIDDR. The contents of this summary are open source: anyone is free to cite copy, distribute, and discuss them. However, you may not alter, edit, or claim this work as your own.

# Prologue

Álvaro Uribe Vélez, President  
of the Republic of Colombia

The ambitious initiative of organizing the First International Congress of Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (CIDDR) was an effort led by Colombia, in conjunction with various friendly governments and international organizations, who, like us, are convinced of the importance of dialogue, of the exchange of experiences and of the transfer of knowledge as an effective way of contributing to sustainable development and to the consolidation of peace worldwide.

This document, The Cartagena Contribution to Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (CCDDR), is a notable result of this effort. More than 1500 persons from 57 countries participated in the CIDDR, the majority of whom had experience working in peace processes of their own. This makes the Cartagena Contribution a unique document given that it is as reference tool borne from the discussions and debates carried out by international peacebuilding experts and technicians, academics and beneficiaries who have lived through these processes first hand.

Moreover, the Contribution is an original and important document insofar as it recognizes disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) as a process which should go beyond the renunciation of arms by members of an illegal armed group. In fact, these processes should be integrated into policies which seek to create social development, economic development, justice, visibility and reparation of victims and offer security to all citizens within a democratic framework.

Colombia can bear witness from its own experience that security through democracy, investor confidence and social cohesion are factors which in our country have made a massive phenomenon of reintegration and of peacebuilding possible. We understand investment as a social function that is connected to our social goals and results, and we understand social cohesion as being connected to security. Without security, there is no investment, and without investment we are left with the unwanted result of increasing poverty.


Investment is a necessary in a country of 45 million inhabitants such as Colombia so that reintegration can have the desired effect and bring an end of years of violence. Furthermore, effective social policies are fundamental in order to avoid recruitment of youngster to criminal life and so that we may demonstrate through actions that we are ready to overcome poverty and to build equity.

In Colombia, we opted for confronting violence without violating the principles of democracy in a way which has yielded important results. So far more than 51,000 persons from illegal armed groups have demobilized, albeit while not yet having achieved a cessation of hostilities with all the terrorist groups which are threatening our democracy. More than 31,000 of abovementioned demobilizations were the result of peace talks held with illegal paramilitary groups between 2003 and 2006. The remaining 20,000 have been the result of individual demobilizations through which members of groups who have not entered dialogues with the government take it upon themselves to return to civilian life; this despite the lack of will on the part of their leaders to work towards peace. More than 13,000 compatriots have already abandoned FARC narco-terrorist organization in this way and returned to society.

The peacebuilding process in Colombia has been accompanied by the Justice and Peace Law as an integral part of the reintegration process of demobilized persons. This regulation, product of an extensive and profound national and international debate, achieved a great balance between justice and peace; peace without impunity and justice without negation of peace and with the requirement of reparations. Its implementation has not been easy, but every day the Colombian government makes additional efforts to perfect it. On many occasions this effort has been carried out with the accompaniment of the international community which has lent us their experience and knowhow.

The CIDDR and the publication of the Contribution of Cartagena are clear demonstrations that mutual technical support in peace-related matters between countries with similar conditions of development and social order is an important cooperation tool. As a matter of fact, Colombia is currently implementing a technical cooperation strategy in DDR-related matters so as to fully commit itself to this means. Our strategy seeks to obtain concrete results whose impacts are real and measurable. We Colombians are seeking to effectively contribute in this way to achieving the desire of all our peoples for lasting peace.

I invite victims of violence, professionals, academics, demobilized persons, journalists, nongovernmental organizations, community leaders, different government officials, and all those of us who are fighting for peace, to join in this effort together and to take on the challenge of achieving lasting peace. I also invite those countries which have experienced situations similar to ours in their own lands to work together so that we give impetus to the preservation and exchange of our experiences in a way that benefits all of the peoples of the world. Those of us who are struggling against violence and terrorism in our lands have the keys to peace in our hands. It is our duty to share them.




# Cartagena Contribution to DDR

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## Acronyms

<b>ACR</b>	Colombian Office of the High Counselor for Reintegration
<b>AUC</b>	United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia
<b>CIDDR</b>	International Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration Congress
<b>CMAG</b>	Content and Method Advisory Group of the International Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration Congress
<b>CMTS</b>	Content and Method Technical Secretariat
<b>CNRR</b>	Colombian National Commission for Reparation and Reconciliation
<b>DDR</b>	Disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration
<b>DSP</b>	Government of Colombia's Democratic Security Policy
<b>FAR</b>	Armed Forces of Rwanda
<b>FARC</b>	Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia
<b>IDDRS</b>	United Nations Integrated Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration Standards
<b>IDP</b>	Internally displaced person
<b>IOM</b>	International Organization for Migration
<b>ISM</b>	Interim stabilization measure
<b>IRA</b>	Irish Republican Army
<b>KPC</b>	Kosovo Protection Corps
<b>MDGs</b>	United Nations Millennium Development Goals
<b>MDRP</b>	Multi-Country Demobilization and Reintegration Program
<b>MI</b>	Military integration
<b>MILF</b>	Moro Islamic Liberation Front
<b>NGO</b>	Non-governmental organization

<b>PTSD</b>	Post-traumatic stress disorder
<b>RDD</b>	Reintegration, demobilization, disarmament
<b>R2D2</b>	Reinsertion, reintegration, demobilization, disarmament
<b>SALW</b>	Small arms and light weapons
<b>SASC</b>	South Africa Service Corps
<b>SIDDR</b>	Stockholm Initiative on Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration
<b>SSR</b>	Security sector reform
<b>UN</b>	United Nations
<b>UNDP</b>	United Nations Development Program
<b>UNTAG</b>	United Nations Transitional Assistance Group

## Glossary

<b>Capacity-building</b>	Programs or program elements which attempt to increase the knowledge and skill base or improve the design of local institutions in conflict-affected countries. Capacity-building programs aim to increase the long-term ability of local institutions to efficiently and effectively provide services.
<b>Community-based reintegration</b>	Reintegration processes which emphasize the needs and perceptions of local communities. Community-based reintegration programs may involve greater coordination with or implementation by local governments; greater attention to victims rights through truth commissions, reparations, and other measures; and economic reintegration packages which focus on linking job-creation and livelihoods assistance programs for ex-combatants with the local economy.
<b>Demobilization*</b>	The formal and controlled discharge of active combatants from armed forces or other armed groups.
<b>Disarmament*</b>	The collection, documentation, control and disposal of small arms, ammunition, explosives and light and heavy weapons of combatants and often also of the civilian population. Disarmament also includes the development of responsible arms management programs.
<b>DDR</b>	Disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration. See individual entries.
<b>Human capital*</b>	The knowledge, skills, competencies and other attributes embodied in individuals that are relevant to economic activity.

<b>Interim stabilization measures (ISMs)</b>	Programs designed to create “holding patterns” in order to buy time and space for political dialogue amidst an ongoing war to peace transition. ISMs attempt to maintain the cohesion of former combatants in either military or civilian structures, such as civilian service corps, transitional security forces, and various forms of transitional autonomy.
<b>Local ownership</b>	Local political investment and engagement in the peace process and post-conflict reconstruction. Local ownership involves both political will on the part of local actors, as well as institutional capacity to take a role in the design and implementation of the various elements of the war to peace transition.
<b>Military integration</b>	The integration of former combatants into formal security institutions, such as national armed forces and armed police forces.
<b>Peacebuilding*</b>	A process designed to prevent the resurgence of conflict and to create the conditions necessary for a sustainable peace in war-torn societies. It is a holistic process that includes activities such as the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of armed forces and groups; the rehabilitation of basic national infrastructure; human rights and elections monitoring; monitoring or retraining of civil administrators and police; training in customs and border control procedures; advice or training in fiscal or macroeconomic stabilization policy and support for landmine removal.
<b>Psycho-social support</b>	Counseling and support services that focus on helping ex-combatants and victims of violence improve psychological well-being, and manage trauma and mental illness stemming from conflict.
<b>Reconciliation</b>	The re-knitting of social fabric through long-term processes of healing and forgiveness. Reconciliation is a deeply individual process, but is linked to the broader reconstruction of civic trust and communal association.

<b>Reinsertion*</b>	The assistance offered to ex-combatants during demobilization but prior to the longer-term process of reintegration. Reinsertion is a form of transitional assistance to help cover the basic needs of ex-combatants and their families and can include transitional safety allowances, food, clothes, shelter, medical services, short-term education, training, employment and tools.
<b>Reintegration*</b>	The process by which ex-combatants acquire civilian status and gain sustainable employment and income. Reintegration is essentially a social and economic process with an open time-frame, primarily taking place in communities at the local level.
<b>Security sector reform* (SSR)</b>	Increasingly referred to as “security system reform”, SSR is a dynamic concept involving the design and implementation of strategy for the management of security functions in a democratically accountable, efficient and effective manner to initiate and support reform of the national security infrastructure. The national security infrastructure includes appropriate national ministries, civil authorities, judicial systems, the armed forces, paramilitary forces, police, intelligence services, private–military companies (PMCs), correctional services and civil society ‘watch-dogs.’
<b>Small arms* (SALW)</b>	All lethal conventional weapons and ammunition that can be carried by an individual combatant or a light vehicle, that also do not require a substantial logistical and maintenance capability. Based on common practice, weapons and ammunition up to 100 mm in caliber are usually considered as SALW.
<b>Social capital</b>	Shared norms, values, and social expectations, which are expressed through both behavior (such as trust and social engagement) and both formal and informal organizations (such as civic associations and social networks). Social capital is often treated as a property of civil society, but also may also describe the health of the relationship between society and the State.
<b>Targeting</b>	The focusing of programs and resources on specific populations or social groups.

<p><b>Traditional justice systems</b></p>	<p>Communal mechanisms and practices for the investigation, adjudication, and resolution of disputes. Traditional justice systems may be religious or secular; informal or rooted in formalized communal structures; but as not part of the formal judicial systems of the State.</p>
<p><b>Transitional justice*</b></p>	<p>Transitional justice comprises the full range of processes and mechanisms associated with a society's attempts to come to terms with a legacy of large-scale past abuses, in order to ensure accountability, serve justice and achieve reconciliation. These may include both judicial and non-judicial mechanisms, with differing levels of international involvement, such as individual prosecutions, reparations, truth commissions, and institutional reform (such as the vetting and dismissal of state officials).</p>

Note: starred entries (\*) are adapted from or defined according to the United Nations Integrated Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration Standards

# Introduction

## CIDDR: The Seeds of an Idea

The International Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Congress (CIDDR) is an idea whose time has come. Although the dispensation of former combatants after a war has ended is a problem as old as war itself,<sup>2</sup> DDR first emerged as a coherent set of tools for managing war to peace transitions in the closing years of the Cold War. With the fall of the Berlin wall and the collapse of the Soviet Union, the numerous proxy wars of a bi-polar era continued to rage, and a host of other dormant conflicts surfaced as outright civil conflicts challenging various state regimes around the globe. The combination of fading proxy-wars and newly-ignited civil conflicts posed enormous risks to the stability and security of the global system. First employed by the U.N. to help support and implement negotiated settlements to civil conflicts, DDR rapidly assumed a central role in the management of war to peace transitions under the new founded United Nation's mandate of Peace Building<sup>3</sup>.

The first U.N. Security Council-mandated DDR process took place in Namibia in 1989, and was carried out with the support of the U.N. Transitional Assistance Group (UNTAG). This initial effort was quickly followed by similar missions in Cambodia, Central America and Mozambique. Since these first missions in the late 1980s and early 1990s, over 60 documented DDR processes have occurred worldwide. In 2007 there were approxima-

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2. Transitions from war to peace have always been diverse and contextually-specific. In Ancient Greece, combatants were typically free citizens who would return to their peacetime occupations with the end of conflict, in effect requiring no disarmament or reintegration. Under the Roman Empire, professional military forces were demobilized and used to create colonies intended to extend the Empire's demographic and governance foothold. During the late Middle Ages, many combatants were mercenaries, for whom the conclusion of war was the end of a contractual relationship. For much of the 20th century, DDR processes were largely conceived and implemented by national military establishments, and dealt mostly with force reductions following the cessation of interstate conflict.
  3. Boutros Boutros-Ghali, Agenda for Peace, United Nations Document A/477-277., October 3, 1992, New York.

tely 20 active processes, supporting over 1 million direct beneficiaries, with an annual aggregate budget of \$630 million USD.<sup>4</sup>

While DDR was first narrowly conceived as a mechanism to support peace processes through the internationally-managed restructuring of security forces, over time it has become clear that DDR programs cannot exclusively address military and security concerns while remaining detached from broader development and human security objectives. Though the core emphasis of DDR remains on reducing and reconfiguring the tools of war, the mechanisms through which DDR is accomplished have evolved to encompass capacity-building, local governance, job creation, post-conflict reconstruction, and reconciliation. In short, DDR processes and policies have progressively gravitated into the intersection of security and development, connecting the seemingly disparate worlds of peacekeeping mandates and the U.N.'s Millennium Development Goals.

After 30 years of implementation, it is clear that DDR is, at root, a political process. DDR programs no longer treat issues such as the configuration of cantonments, identification of program beneficiaries, and design of disarmament processes as strictly technical matters. Instead, DDR has been recognized as an important political inflection point in the transition from war to peace. Its structure and degree of success may have deep and long-lasting influences on the shape of local and national institutions, the alignment of political power in the post-conflict context, and the consolidation of peace and speed of recovery. These facts were clearly recognized in the First International DDR Congress (CIDDR), and will be further assessed below and summarized in the conclusions of the Contribution. The CIDDR consolidates the security and development nexus, bringing into sharper focus the need to address social justice, the rehabilitation of communities, and ensuring a more inclusive participation and equitable distribution of resources and opportunities to prevent conflict in the first instance.

The stakes for successful disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration are now higher than ever, both for the consolidation of peace processes and for broader regional and global security. The deep economic and political

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4. Robert Muggah, "Introduction: Emperor's clothes?" in Muggah, ed., *Security and Post-conflict Reconstruction: Dealing with Fighters in the Aftermath of War*, Routledge Global Security Studies 2009, pp. 5-6

interdependencies created by globalization have been accompanied by the rise of transnational crime, creating very real challenges for the consolidation of peace and development in many post-conflict countries. In such contexts, weak state institutions and porous borders allow for the formation of illicit economies, including the trafficking of high value commodities such as diamonds and narcotics, weapons, and human beings (new recruits, sex workers, illegal migrants, etc.), which may provide former combatants and spoilers with the means to reignite conflict or survive through predation. The failure to successfully reintegrate ex combatants and provide viable legal livelihoods can thus lead to continuing insecurity, crime and violence within post-conflict states, hampering post-war economic growth and development and intensifying transnational security threats.

## Rationale for the CIDDR: global knowledge and experience sharing

In recent years, many national governments facing armed conflict have recognized the utility of DDR as a cornerstone for peace and as a complement to existing peace processes. Beginning in August 2002, Colombia began to undertake the demobilization and reintegration of members of illegally armed groups as an effective complement to the Government's Democratic Security Policy (DSP), which seeks to bring an end to the organized violence which has been raging for almost 50 years. The combination of a military approach and an open door for demobilization has yielded the disarmament and demobilization of over 50,000 persons from illegal armed groups.<sup>5</sup> In effect, DDR has provided Colombia with a new and powerful tool to reduce protracted violence by providing a community-based reintegration process for illegal groups that chose to demobilize collectively, while essentially negotiating peace on an individual basis with members

*We must adapt to the country context, strengthening democratic institutions, and justice and regional/local administration along with security. It is all part of the same chess game*

Francisco Santos,  
Vice President, Republic of Colombia

5. Of the 50,000 demobilized persons, 32,000 demobilized collectively after dialogues between the Government and the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC). However, it should be acknowledged that a number of demobilized AUC have allegedly regrouped and reorganized, or entered into illegal activities. The remaining 18,000 demobilized individually from groups such as the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and the ELN, which have refused to engage in formal peace talks.

of illegal groups whose leaderships refuse to enter talks but who are seeking a way out of violence. Since 2002, the Government of Colombia has sought to refine its approach to DDR so that it is better integrated with national security and development policies, advances the rights and needs of victims, and promotes the development of receptor communities.

The challenges of building a nationally-owned DDR program tailored to the specific context and challenges of Colombia revealed significant gaps in the global DDR knowledge pool, particularly around best practices and alternative program models. Over the years, the preservation of knowledge gained through DDR processes has been highly fragmented. With the exception of processes implemented under the auspices of the U.N. agencies, the World Bank, and other international and regional institutions, the exchange of information and experiences between different DDR theatres has been limited to national, bilateral, and regional meetings. While hundreds of articles have been written with regard to DDR practice and theory, only a relatively limited effort has been made to consolidate global knowledge and practical experiences with an eye toward advancing and improving DDR practice.

As a response to the lack of global reflection on DDR, coupled with a desire to continue to improve its own community-based reintegration strategy, the Government of Colombia sought to create a new space for South-South Technical Cooperation, where academics, policymakers, practitioners, demobilized persons and civil society groups from around the world – and particularly from those countries that are living or have lived DDR firsthand – could convene to exchange valuable DDR experiences and best practices. This forum of open dialogue on DDR, security, justice, and post-crisis reconstruction was explicitly built to generate practical recommendations that could contribute to the design and implementation of reintegration processes in the near term that link to sustainable development in the long run.

## **The CIDDR: Aims, participants, and partners**

The first International Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration Congress (CIDDR) was organized by the Colombian Office of the High Presidential Counselor for Reintegration (ACR) and the National Commission for Reparation and Reconciliation (CNRR), in conjunction with other

international and national governmental and non-governmental actors.<sup>6</sup> The main objectives of this Congress were to:

1. Provide a forum where experts, academics and practitioners from around the world could exchange practical knowledge, experiences and best practices in an objective manner that would contribute to the advancement of DDR;
2. Acknowledge, examine, and build upon the existing discussions of community-based reintegration;
3. Consolidate the knowledge emerging from the CIDDR in a report, The Cartagena Contribution to DDR (CCDDR). The Cartagena Contribution serves as the logical continuation of two notable international efforts at preserving DDR experience and knowledge thus far: The Stockholm Initiative on DDR (SIDDR) and the United Nations' Integrated DDR Standards (IDDRS);
4. Create a DDR reference center and practitioners network which could help to advance the quest for peace of different nations and regions around the world. This network is web-based at [www.cartagenaddr.org](http://www.cartagenaddr.org);
5. Promote South-South technical cooperation initiatives as an important mechanism through which countries undergoing DDR process, as well as cooperation agencies and international organizations that actively participate in DDR, can improve their work and consolidate knowledge in this and related fields.

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6. Including the Colombian Presidential Agency for Social Action and International Cooperation (Acción Social), the Colombian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the World Bank, the United Nations Development Programme's (UNDP) Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery (BCPR), the Kingdom of the Netherlands, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Sweden, the European Commission, the International Organization for Migrations (IOM), the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), the Peace Process Accompaniment Mission of the Organization of American States (MAPP-OEA), Fundación Ideas Para la Paz, and the Institute for Inclusive Security. Additionally, the CIDDR was supported by partner organizations including the United Nations Information Center (UNICs), Colombia es Pasión, the Embassy of France in Colombia, the French Development Agency, the Swiss Confederation and the Central American Economic Integration Bank. The CIDDR also received important funding from the private sector, with donors including the Federación Nacional de Cafeteros, Colombian-American Chamber of Commerce, Pacific Rubiales, Nestle, Coca-Cola Femsa, Coltabaco, Semana, and Asocoflores.

Furthermore, the CIDDR organizers sought to identify themes, guidelines and procedures that may facilitate the work of national and international practitioners in charge of designing and implementing DDR processes, as well as NGOs and community organizations around the globe that work in support of war to peace transitions.

The CIDDR gathered over 1,000 policymakers, academics, and practitioners from 57 countries from May 4 to 6, 2009 effectively resulting in the first global DDR forum where stakeholders convened to exchange valuable experiences gained through the course of DDR processes worldwide.

## Organization and process of the CIDDR

The academic and methodological component of the CIDDR was envisaged by the Content and Method Advisory Group (CMAG) of the CIDDR, which led the development of the issues and topics to be discussed through the CIDDR's various panels and roundtables. The CMAG was composed of prominent Colombian and international experts on peacebuilding, DDR, and post-crisis development, who advised and recommended potential panelists, moderators, and case study presenters to the organizers of the Congress.

Capitalizing on the opportunity of hosting a worldwide and representative group of stakeholders at the Congress, all panels and roundtables were designed to encourage debate and stimulate the sharing of theoretical and applied knowledge, best and failed practices, and lessons learned, and to capture the theoretical and practical knowledge generated throughout the discussions. To this end, the CIDDR was designed to maximize the exchange of knowledge through open discussion amongst those who have actually lived DDR in the field. The Congress consisted of a total of seven panels, each composed of four to six renowned academics, policymakers, practitioners, and former combatants. Additionally, each panel was moderated by policymakers or academics with substantial knowledge in the fields of DDR, peacebuilding and development.

Within the seven plenary panels, five focused on thematic issues ranging from critical issues in DDR, to the relationship between DDR and security, social and economic reintegration, and the words and perceptions of war veterans. Each of the four core thematic panels was divided into four roundtables, yielding 16 roundtables in total. Each of the roundtables

examined specific aspects of DDR from a more practical point of view, focusing on three to four pre-determined questions which guided debate and discussion. Each roundtable consisted of 30 practitioners selected from the CIDDR audience, a facilitator, and two to four presenters who briefly outlined a relevant country case or regional experience, setting the stage for broader debate. All roundtable participants were selected based on their applied and extensive knowledge on the issue under discussion.

Prior to the Congress, five Background Papers were commissioned to serve as technical overview materials, to inform and stimulate debates around key thematic issues, including community-based reintegration, social reintegration, and economic reintegration, critical issues in DDR, and security promotion and DDR.

## The Cartagena Contribution to DDR

The Cartagena Contribution to DDR is one of the main products resulting from the CIDDR. The discussions which occurred in the panels and roundtables throughout the CIDDR as well as the commissioned background papers provided the raw materials for this report. As such, the Cartagena Contribution is not merely a report of lessons learned, but a record of the key issues, debates, fresh ideas, and unanswered questions surfaced throughout multiple rounds of dialogue and discussion between experts, practitioners, academics, demobilized persons, community leaders, victims of violence, journalists, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and other interested parties that participated actively and openly at the CIDDR.

The Contribution builds upon and extends the work of the SIDDR and the IDDRS in that it captures voices from the full spectrum of DDR stakeholders, and highlights some of the concerns that span the globe with regards to DDR, victims' reparation and reconciliation and peacebuilding, as well as

some of the practical solutions to those concerns. It shifts the discourse on DDR from a more narrow focus on ex combatants, security promotion, and the reduction of military expenditure towards a broader emphasis on stabilization, peace building and development.

*“Community based reintegration seeks to promote justice and security, marshal investments to build capabilities in citizens and communities, and support a culture of peace.”*

Frank Pearl,  
Alto Comisionado para la Paz

The Contribution is novel in that it resulted from bottom-up process connecting field practitioners and combatants with policy makers and researchers, as well as a horizontal process of South-South exchanges and learning. The CIDDR pushed the frontiers of knowledge exchange beyond the narrow confines of bilateral dialogues or internal reflections within and between international organizations and government ministries.

Furthermore, the Contribution is the result of an initiative driven by a partnership between a country that is undergoing its own peacebuilding process and attempting to create a just path towards sustainable peace, and a host of international partners. The organizers and supporters of the CIDDR hope that the surfacing, discussion, documentation, and analysis of practical experiences in DDR drawn from the world over may contribute to the universal quest for peace. The preservation and exchange of knowledge and experiences amongst those who are living through conflict and violence may well prove to be one of the most valuable forms of international cooperation.

# Chapter I: DDR in Global Perspective

## The evolution of DDR

Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) programs emerged during the 1980s as a tool to manage war to peace transitions. Initially, DDR consisted of a set of activities, interventions and operations carried out primarily by international agencies, particularly the United Nations (from an emphasis on security issues) and the World Bank (from a predominantly development perspective). Those programs aimed to handle the needs of societies in a post-conflict context, yet initially lacked a theoretical framework, a body of principles or a set of technical recommendations for action. They were essentially developed by trial and error in response to crisis situations.

The past few years have seen an important accumulation of systematized knowledge regarding the technical components and political demands of DDR, including the Stockholm Initiative on DDR (SIDDR), and the United Nations' Integrated DDR Standards (IDDRS).

DDR has evolved from a country-level to a transnational activity. The recognition that regional conflicts may form interlocking political complexes and war economies has led to regionally-focused, multi-actor programs such as the Multi-Country Demobilization and Reintegration Program (MDRP) in the Great Lakes region of Africa which is led by the World Bank in partnership with the United Nations and several bi-lateral donors.

## Objectives and scope worldwide

Over time, DDR programs have expanded far beyond the original aims of disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration, and now frequently

encompass economic development, local governance, justice and reconciliation, security system reform, and capacity-building. In essence, it has shifted from concrete ‘minimalist’ aims of security and stabilization to broader ‘maximalist’ goals of justice and development.

DDR has undergone three critical evolutions. First, its programmatic objectives have expanded beyond its initially limited focus on near-term security issues; second, DDR is no longer a strictly post-conflict activity, and now takes place during ongoing violence; and third, DDR has moved from a scripted and sequenced movement from disarmament, to demobilization, to reintegration, to a more flexible and contextually-specific model, with programs ranging from RDD (reintegration, demobilization, disarmament), to R2D2 (reinsertion, reintegration, demobilization, disarmament).

While DDR has developed into a critical tool for enabling sustainable peace in post-conflict environments, it cannot substitute for social and economic development, or resolve underlying development and governance challenges, such as inequality, corruption, inefficient basic service delivery and pension systems, job creation, and inadequate local voice and participation in politics. DDR is a transitional set of activities, yet because it often takes place at moments of great political, social and economic openness, DDR can catalyze change through both direct program activities and linkages to complementary political processes and development initiatives. In effect, DDR can serve as a bridge between near to medium term security promotion and peacebuilding and longer term social and economic development.


## Geographic Distribution of DDR Operations (1989-2008)<sup>7</sup>

### Varying programmatic elements

Although DDR is commonly understood as a largely standardized and integrated package of activities, in practice DDR initiatives vary enormously. Often, reintegration is the only common denominator among DDR programs, as in some contexts demobilization and disarmament are re-sequenced or dropped all together. The diversity of DDR programs reflects

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7. Kingma and Robert Muggah. “Critical Issues in DDR: Context, Indicators, Targeting and Challenges”, (2009) Background Paper for CIDDR: Cartagena



the fact that the design, timing, and sequencing of DDR activities must be tailored to the specific needs of each country. In some contexts, some program elements may overlap or even be unnecessary.

Conventional disarmament and demobilization elements are typically short-run processes providing the near-term security and stabilization crucial to consolidating a negotiated settlement to conflict. Disarmament programs focus upon the collection or sequestering of small arms and light weapons from armed groups, and may also include ancillary programs to collect civilian-held weapons. They can be direct or indirect in nature depending upon the local culture and context.

Demobilization is the gateway to reintegration resources, a short-cycle process in which members of armed groups can be concentrated in cantonments, registered, approved for reintegration services, and discharged. DDR programs typically include a reinsertion phase between demobilization and reintegration. This interim period is often a moment of social and economic vulnerability for demobilized persons, who may lack adequate financial resources to travel to their reintegration site, and to secure food and shelter along the way. Reinsertion programs provide a social welfare-oriented ‘transitional safety-net’, designed to sustain demobilized persons after they have left cantonments, and before they can fully access reintegration-specific resources, productive assets, and social-psychological support if required.

The social and economic reintegration of former combatants is a more complex and extended process than disarmament and demobilization alone. In large part sustainable reintegration depends upon the social and economic recovery and development of receptor communities as well. To achieve sustainable reintegration, DDR programs must address both the social and economic challenges faced by former combatants seeking to create a civilian life and communities and victims seeking assistance to recover from the conflict. Demobilized persons face both near- and long-term economic challenges. In the near term, they may encounter difficulties in generating sufficient income and locating decent work; in the long-term, they often face daunting challenges in accessing productive assets and fulfilling their aspirations by obtaining a sustainable livelihood with opportunities for growth. In designing and planning economic reintegration programs, profiling the characteristics, needs, and aspirations of former combatants is a vital step, which must be accompanied by an assessment of both local community and regional market opportunities, as well as institutional capacity for program implementation. The reconciliation process may indeed depend upon the perceived and real balancing of individual reintegration into a productive civilian life and community recovery and development.

*Reconciliation may be an overly ambitious goal in the immediate aftermath of conflict. It may in fact be counter-productive to press for reconciliation when emotional and psychological wounds are still raw. In such cases, several more modest goals may be more appropriate: working towards peaceful coexistence in the near term, and helping victims come to terms with their loss and grief*

Andrew Rigby, Professor of Peace Studies, Coventry University

Social reintegration is at once the most difficult and important aspect of DDR. The social reintegration of combatants is linked to both individual healing and broader processes of identity transformation, justice, and communal reconciliation. In some contexts, reconciliation may be an unrealistic goal, too emotionally-charged to be realistically accomplished; here, true reintegration may be difficult, and more modest goals such as communal coexistence may be more appropriate.

Ultimately, disarmament, demobilization, and economic and social reintegration are all dependent upon trust between ex-combatants, communities, and program implementers (whether local or international): these programs are politically fragile, and require cooperation and political will at

all levels. The political will and desire to own the process was particularly expressed by the former combatants themselves in the Veteran's Voices Panel. In order to reduce uncertainty and help to foster an environment of trust, DDR programs must clearly establish the rights and responsibilities of all involved parties, so that the expectation of political leaders, former combatants, and the broader community are realistic.

An effective DDR strategy requires a corresponding commitment from the State and the international community to provide sufficient support and resources. Yet securing consistent financing for DDR programs remains a challenging issue. Funding remains haphazard, subject to political conditions and pressures, and is in many cases insufficient especially for Reintegration. Although some argue that Reintegration as such should be mainstreamed into normal poverty reduction programs and development budgets as soon as possible. The costs of DDR often escalates significantly throughout the program lifecycle, as new combatants emerge, program costs increase, and support to additional populations of concern—including receptor communities— becomes a vital ingredient for success. Additional attention must be paid to creating consistent funding channels and resource reservoirs for DDR programs worldwide.

## **Contextual factors shaping DDR design**

Post-conflict situations are complex and challenging environments. They are often characterized by fragile governance systems with limited political legitimacy, communal distrust, economic stagnation and poverty, destroyed physical infrastructure, and high or rising criminal and inter-personal violence. Within these challenging circumstances, ex-combatants, refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs) must be integrated back into society, while war-affected citizens who remained in receptor communities often plead for justice to be rendered and the rule of law restored. Each post-conflict context is unique, and its characteristics need to be analyzed and understood as a precondition for designing DDR programs. The main contextual factors that should be taken into account are:

## Contextual Factors Shaping DDR Design and Implementation

<p><b>The nature of the conflict and the peace</b></p>	<p>The nature, causes and history of the conflict</p>
	<p>The manner in which conflict ended (victory, negotiated settlement, imposed settlement, etc.)</p>
	<p>The security situation</p>
	<p>Illicit use of legal and illegal natural resources or other criminal activities to finance violence</p>
<p><b>The political will and social characteristics of the relevant stakeholders</b></p>	<p>The political will, level of political representation, and internal organization of the parties to the conflict (armed groups, state institutions, political parties, communities)</p>
	<p>The levels of trust and confidence among and within the parties to conflict</p>
	<p>The needs and interests of local, national and regional stakeholders</p>
	<p>The degree of social cohesion</p>
	<p>The degree of support for transitional justice</p>
<p><b>Institutional capacity and quality of governance</b></p>	<p>The reach and institutional capacity of the State</p>
	<p>The condition of formal justice institutions</p>
	<p>Extent and equity of local political participation</p>
	<p>Bureaucratic integrity and degree of corruption</p>

<b>Economic Conditions</b>	Logistical, infrastructural and market constraints
	Natural resource endowments
	The state of the economy, in particular unemployment, currency stability, and the integration of regional and national markets The investment of the domestic and international private sector The political and financial engagement of donors
<b>Cultural Context</b>	'Cultural identities' including race; ethnicity; customs, norms and values; language; gender roles, etc.

In addition to these factors, DDR programs must be conceived, designed, and implemented with regional and geopolitical interests and pressures in mind. Neighboring conflicts, highly-developed illicit economies and criminal networks, or regional inflows of arms can form dangerous positive feedback loops, making DDR programs more difficult to implement, and less likely to succeed.

Finally, DDR programs should take the interests and needs of participants, beneficiaries, and the broader community into account. Combatants have widely varying needs and aspirations, and receptor communities may adopt a range of stances towards persons attempting to reintegrate into their social fabric. Effectively designing and implementing DDR programs requires that practitioners engage in a participatory, open-ended dialogue with former combatants and communities, both to elicit information vital to the appropriate design of the intervention, and to provide information, as the scope and objectives of the DDR process can be misunderstood by the communities and combatants. Receiving communities should be publicly informed of the aims, implementation and meaning of the process. On the one hand this can increase acceptance and on the other hand it can decrease possible resentment.

## Critical issues and crosscutting themes

There are a number of critical issues and cross-cutting themes as follows:

### a. Local ownership

In order to make a contribution to sustainable peace, DDR must be anchored at the local level. For local ownership to be meaningful, communities

must clearly own problems as well as solutions: enhanced local control over policies and programs may add little value in the absence of open political dialogue. In addition, special attention must be paid to the risks of decentralization where local governance is weak. In such cases, the benefits of local ownership may be diminished by corruption or political capture. Donors and national governments have a shared responsibility to ensure transparency and legitimacy, particularly where the State's reach and capacity are limited.

**b. Clarity on goals and expectations**

Communities and combatants alike may misunderstand DDR processes, benefits, and limitations. Misunderstandings can raise expectations that will be unmet, and generate anxieties and concerns that could be mitigated with two-way information campaigns that clearly explain DDR programs, as well as ascertain local needs, expectations, and perceptions. For instance, combatants may worry that DDR is linked to punitive judicial measures, and avoid registering for benefits; receiving communities may fear that ex-combatants will be re-injected into their space without their approval, and reject the resettlement of demobilized persons.

**c. Addressing the multifaceted capital deficits of former combatants**

Economic reintegration is not simply a matter of providing ex-combatants with sufficient capital or in-kind support. Ex-combatants typically suffer from a variety of capital deficits: lower levels of human capital (formal education, civilian vocational and life skills, and work experience) insufficient productive assets, and eroded social capital and cohesion (broken links between ex-combatants and the broader community and the state). Economic reintegration programs must address each of these deficits in an integrated manner in order to provide sustainable livelihoods and they must not be detached from social reintegration programs and initiatives.

**d. Better addressing the needs of groups of special concern**

DDR experts have long-recognized the importance of focusing on groups of special concern, and targeting resources on those with specific, elevated needs. However, groups of special concern remain underserved and under-protected in many contexts. Women, children, the disabled, and internally displaced persons— whether civilian or associated with military forces— should receive special attention in the design and implementation of DDR programs. Better supporting these groups may require additional effort to map needs and opportunities, as their voices often go unsolicited,

or are actively silenced. This way, DDR processes can make visible issues of discrimination and violence against women and children, and use the opportunities for social change embedded in the post-conflict phase to challenge patterns of violence or discrimination.

Women in particular can play multiple roles, from combatants to supporters, from widows to caretakers, from activists to allies, and from passive participants to empowered decision-makers. Children also face the duality of moving between the roles of victim and perpetrator, especially when they have been forcibly recruited to bear arms. Both groups will require special forms of economic and psychosocial assistance, but must be treated not just as passive targets for specialized assistance, but as active agents in social recovery.

**e. Justice and reparations for victims**

Victims' rights are not typically considered as a dimension of DDR. However, the social reintegration of former combatants may be impossible without the individual and communal healing provided by justice and reparation, whether reached through formal or traditional mechanisms. In considering whether to anchor reconciliation processes in formal or informal mechanisms, careful attention must be paid to the stigmatizing language as well as the efficiency, effectiveness, and transparency of the country's formal legal and judicial system, and the degree of adherence to international human rights standards and forms of bias inherent to traditional justice systems.

*There are no winners, losers, victims and perpetrators. They are all stakeholders*  
Frank Rusagara, Director, Department of Information, Documentation, and Military History, Rwandan Defense Forces.

**f. State capacity**

DDR programs— even those designed and implemented by international organizations— cannot function absent sufficient state capacity, participation, and good governance. Weak state capacity may lead to increased corruption and financial leakage from DDR programs, while poor governance and weak participation may lead to resentment and alienation, increasing the likelihood of conflict relapse. Where feasible, external actors should seek to build on and strengthen State capacity where it exists.

**g. Linkages with broader security promotion efforts**

DDR programs are tightly linked to ISMs (interim stabilization measures) and SSR (security sector reform), and planning for these and related peacebuilding activities must be linked as well. ISMs— or short-term “holding patterns”— may take place between DDR and the broader restructuring of security forces, or may even be inserted between the various phases of DDR itself. SSR— or the restructuring, re-sizing, and (often) re-training of security forces— may offer opportunities to integrate participants in DDR programs back into the state’s security apparatus, and may also generate new “clients” for DDR programs as members of the formal armed forces are released from duty. Overlaps among ISMs, DDR, and SSR may also have the positive effect of providing additional flexibility in the design, pacing, and mid-term adaptation of programs in response to new challenges or opportunities.

**h. Coordination, Phasing and Sequencing**

DDR requires the engagement of a wide and diverse range of national and international actors. Although this diversity is necessary, it may often heighten programmatic ambiguity. Efforts to coordinate may increase the ambiguity of program objectives, and complicate implementation plans. Partners may fail to fully articulate their needs and concerns, as they focus and stop at points of agreement rather than probing divergences. Coordination is a transitive verb the object of which few desire to be. Functional program integration as the field level often results in better coordination than distant committees in the center. Perhaps integral to coordination of actors as such is the necessity to phase and sequence interventions in the DDR process and broader social and economic recovering.

## **Measuring impact and success**

As DDR has evolved, so too have the metrics and indicators used to assess its impact and effectiveness. However, despite increasing attention to program learning and efforts to expand and improve evaluation, there are still fundamental disagreements over when and how to assess the impacts of DDR programs.

Evaluation is rarely the first priority in DDR programs. DDR processes are typically designed and implemented under crisis conditions— hu-

manitarian risk, political volatility, economic stagnation, institutional weakness, and scarce time and funding. Given these demanding conditions, it is perhaps unsurprising that practitioners prioritize the design of programs for maximum speed and impact rather than rigorous evaluation.

One must also take into account the fact that as DDR programs unfold over time, they become progressively harder to evaluate, particularly as both the intermediate and long-term goals of interventions may shift in response to contextual changes. While metrics for understanding the impact of disarmament and demobilization programs have been relatively refined, measuring the effectiveness of reintegration is far more difficult. There is a lack of effective indicators for quantitative assessment, as well as appropriate research designs for capturing both project-level data along with more generalizable findings.

When and how to evaluate DDR programs is a matter of continuing debate. Some argue that DDR programs have to be designed with evaluation in mind, and precise indicators and methodologies selected before programming begins. Others argue that it is difficult or impossible to understand what questions have to be asked, let alone how to answer them, at the outset of a program. Where evaluations are built into basic program design, quantitative and both quasi- and fully experimental evaluations are becoming increasingly common, but their external validity and effectiveness in providing data for the refinement of programs elsewhere is unclear.

## **Dilemmas, trade-offs, and challenges**

Although DDR programs vary widely, the CIDDR identified a number of shared dilemmas, trade-offs, and challenges which cut across contexts.

### **a. Engaging communities**

DDR practitioners must learn to listen better and find new ways to understand local needs, aspirations, and fears, throughout the life cycle of DDR programs from design, to implementation, to evaluation. Listening should include those with special needs and excluded groups, program beneficiaries, and the wider community. It is crucial

that communities are not seen as passive pools of support for DDR and peace-building programs, but involved participants in their own narratives. Communities must be sensitized, convinced, and supported in engaging in the design and implementation of peace and reconstruction programs.

**b. Dual targeting**

There is an ongoing debate over the efficacy of targeting specific social groups (e.g., former combatants) with distinct packages of benefits and the broader conflict-affected receptor communities. This is a false dichotomy. A more practical approach is often overlooked, such as balancing between the needs of specific groups and those of the general population, and the potential to phase or limit the extent of targeted interventions. To target or not to target specific populations is not the question. The issue is not whether programs should target specific social groups, but when, to what extent, and how to balance resources between specific and general needs and populations. Targeting should not be seen as an all or nothing proposition, but instead as yet another tool to manage risk or improve the impact of programs on groups of special concern. Careful timing and sequencing of targeting may be a viable strategy in many instances, where programs can initially focus resources on groups of special concern, and subsequently shift to a more equitable distribution of benefits.

**c. Shifting goals and adaptive change**

While the goals of DDR programs may initially seem clear and unambiguous, they frequently shift in response to emerging opportunities and challenges. Moreover, the real political and social implications of DDR operations may only begin to surface over time. Effective coordination with broader peacebuilding efforts may require the flexible adaptation of programs. It is both difficult and important to achieve a balance between the necessity of working flexibly, and maintaining a coherent program rooted in local knowledge and adaptive best practices. Overly flexible programs may be seen as arbitrary, inconsistent, or easy targets for political pressure, while inflexible programs may simply fail by not taking contextual changes into account. DDR practitioners should attempt to establish mechanisms to tap stakeholder opinions regarding the necessity and appropriate

strategy for adapting to change.

d. **Breaking command and maintaining control**

Conventional wisdom has it that the command and control of former combatants should be broken and DDR can play an instrumental role in achieving this aim. However, a trade-off emerges when one takes into account the support network that maintaining the cohesion of the combatants as a group might have in helping ease their transition into civilian life. In Northern Ireland, mainly because they were part of the community as such (an important contextual factor), armed groups were not disbanded and instead functioned as peace keepers and development agents of sorts employing a “self help” model during the peace process. Excombatants do not necessarily represent a threat to peace building and can instead be active peace makers. The lesson here is that while breaking the command structure (especially if nefarious in nature) may be necessary, retaining the former combatant cohesion and social control may be a desirable goal at least during the fragile stabilization period in the transition from war to peace.

e. **Former combatants—passive objects of DDR or subjective actors in peacebuilding?**

DDR is far from being merely a technical measure to be applied mechanistically to former combatants. It is, on the contrary, a political and social process. For this reason it is more likely to succeed if it is ‘owned’ and perceived as legitimate by the relevant stakeholders. It will fail without the support of political leadership, donors, and other involved agencies, combatants and communities.

*In Mozambique ex-combatants were effective in personally taking over the reintegration process. Through education programs and building on the discipline of former fighters, they were able to form leadership within demobilized populations and became a legitimate tool to rebuild the social fabric of communities*

Armando Fulane, Program Officer,  
Propaz, Mozambique

Ex-combatants are not just threats, risks, or passive objects benefiting from training, credit, and other resources. On the contrary, they should be considered as active agents and critical resources in the process of (re)building a peaceful society, and driving social reconciliation. They can be involved and even lead in recovery and reconstruction proces-

ses. In addition, former combatants can have specialized skills which can be employed in police and military forces as part of reform of the security system.

**f. The governance of DDR programs**

Addressing corruption is vital, as the high levels of corruption – by both national and international actors – afflicting DDR programs dramatically reduce their political legitimacy. However, the appropriate mechanisms for managing corruption often remain unclear, in part because the simplest solutions, e.g., such as greater third-party oversight, be it domestic or international, over implementation accountability and speed, confront the need to engage local actors and build capacity in local governmental and non-governmental counterparts. In cases where local institutions are weak, budget planning, execution, and monitoring may be particularly weak, and vulnerable to both errors and abuse.

**g. Improving research, learning, and planning**

More research is needed on all aspects of DDR and related peacebuilding and development issues. Given the continuing, rapid evolution of DDR programs and practice, research must be fast-paced and applied in order to help practitioners and policymakers better understand the comparative advantages of DDR strategies and available tools, and their impact on societies moving from war to peace.

**h. Managing tensions between justice and peace**

Justice and peace are often cast in antagonistic terms, with the implication that for DDR programs to be negotiated and implemented, justice for victims of conflict must be delayed or even sometimes suppressed. Tensions between justice and peace should be squarely addressed during the negotiation of peace accords and the design of war to peace transitions. In many contexts, a strict tradeoff between justice, peace and reconciliation can be avoided through the use of a variety of transitional justice tools, including the formal justice sector for select prosecutions, the use of truth commissions to provide information and a source of closure to victims, and the use of traditional mechanisms (where available) for intra-communal healing. The use of multiple “tracks” for post-conflict justice acknowledges the fact that various parties to conflict, e.g., ordinary citizens, ex-combatants, and

outsiders) may have distinct narratives of grievance and justice, each of which may have an important role to play in the effort for justice, truth, and reconciliation.

While the wide range of possible permutations among formal, international, and traditional justice mechanisms provides for a range of options that stretches far beyond a dichotomous choice between total justice and total amnesty, overly complex transitional justice mechanisms do carry some risks. In particular, complex transitional justice schemes that rely on a mixture of coercion and inducement may generate confusion, doubt, and fear among potential demobilized persons and local communities, reducing entrance into the transitional justice system. Further research is needed on the interactions and incentive systems created by complex, multi-track transitional justice systems.

Finally, the rising salience of international jurisdictions in war to peace transitions may heighten legal uncertainty for peace negotiations and complicate the design of appropriate transitional justice systems. The potential for additional prosecutions by international courts, as well as the possibility of indictment and trial by third country courts and jurists, may weaken legal arrangements and guarantees related to amnesty or security from persecution. The threat of international legal sanction may pressure leaders to come to the bargaining table, or may raise fears about their safety after the peace is concluded, or harden their opposition to “intrusions” by the international community. The impact of international legal pressure will depend upon the legal instrument employed and the political and military context in which it is used. Regardless of context, balancing restorative and retributive justice with peace and security remains a challenging dilemma.

**i. Reconciliation as a long-term social process**

The end of conflict is often met with calls for reconciliation, frequently voiced by international actors. While transitional justice mechanisms may provide some measure of catharsis and social repair which can aid in near-term healing, reconciliation is a long-run, deeply individual process, which can neither be rushed, imposed nor legislated from above or without. The frequently narrow focus on reconcilia-

tion should be expanded to include other, more realistic short term objectives, such as the search for truth and closure and dealing with loss and grief.

The over-emphasis on reconciliation is problematic on a number of levels. Communities may not seek reconciliation in pace with the international community's expectations; there are no clear ways to measure reconciliation at the group level, or establish when it has been achieved. The inclusion of other concepts such as closure may open up new areas for programming and psychosocial support, aimed at, for instance, satiating the desire for answers and the rejection of ambiguities.

Truth commissions and traditional restorative justice mechanisms may prove highly effective, and should be supported with increased investment in individual psychosocial support to victims, war-affected communities, and ex-combatants. It is important that truth commissions move beyond providing a catalogue of sins by 'memory entrepreneurs'. Individual and collective acts of violence should be put in context, through the construction of a shared narrative of the causes, dynamics, and impacts of the conflict, drawn from the perceptions of all. Given the divides engendered by conflict, this may be a politically challenging task.

Lastly, social reintegration and reconciliation are not merely long-run processes from the perspective of conflict-affected civilians. Demobilized persons may need significant time to acclimate to civilian life and carve out roles and identities within the community. To be successful, demobilized persons need patience from both DDR practitioners and the broader community.

**j. Addressing the Root Causes of Conflict and Insecurity**

As of today, an alternative to military downsizing and demilitarization of society as a means of achieving sustainable security and stabilization in the aftermath of conflict is yet to be found. However, sustainable security cannot be achieved without addressing the causes of conflict embedded in post-war societies. DDR alone cannot deal with this issue which has to be at the core of political negotiations and wider post-conflict peace-building processes. DDR is part of these processes and can contribute to the overarching goal of peace-building

and development programs by balanced targeting, through the use of specific social, economic and political policy and programmatic measures among former combatants and other societal groups (families, recipient communities, etc.). However, in cases where DDR is undertaken during conflict (e.g., Colombia, Iraq, Afghanistan and the Philippines, it should not only be integrated within social and economic development policies and programs that address the underlying causes of conflict, but also into security policies which prioritize respect for human rights and democratic values.



## **Chapter II: DDR and Security Promotion: Linkages to Security System Reform and Interim Stabilization Measures**

### **Positioning DDR within the broader processes of security promotion, peacebuilding and development**

DDR is one of the key mechanisms used by international, regional and national actors to promote security in post-conflict contexts and to reinforce the State's legitimacy and monopoly over the use of force. The overall goal of DDR processes is to contribute to the re-establishment of security, stability, and the rule of law, and to help create the basis for a sustainable peace. DDR programs can therefore be placed within the broader context of security promotion and peace-building, and are thus linked to social and economic reconstruction and development processes usually implemented in the aftermath of violent conflicts. These processes and DDR activities have become increasingly more intertwined, complex and ambitious over time.

The experience of recent conflicts indicates that the line between war and its aftermath is often blurred. The adoption of a ceasefire or the signing of a peace agreement cannot be considered to be definitive turning points, as they often do not mark the end of armed violence. Moreover, while a formal peace may be declared, both organized and disorganized violence may continue, and the structures of power, profit, and politics that form the underlying causes of conflict remain intact. In addition, violence may be fuelled by stocks of weapons accumulated during conflict and by inflows

of arms as well as resource streams such as drugs, precious commodities and human trafficking to finance arms purchases. Some post-conflict countries experience higher levels of violence in the aftermath of war than those registered during the conflict. In other contexts, the conditions for peace are so fragile that the risk that the country will relapse into conflict can be considerable.

DDR operations are increasingly undertaken to manage malignant rather than malevolent threats, where there is no clear “enemy” agent or group. In several countries, DDR is being employed as a tool to reduce the rising threat of crime and public insecurity. Since there is no bargaining partner, DDR interventions must be designed to attract individuals through carefully calibrated benefits. The dominant tasks in such cases are disarmament/small arms control, the creation of alternative, licit, livelihoods, and the reduction of the potential pool of [typically young male] recruits

When combatants lay down their arms they typically expect something in exchange, a reinsertion package that can encourage them to take part in the disarmament program as well as social support (such as a transitional safety net) to help in the delicate phase between disarmament, demobilization and the start of the reintegration. However, there is still disagreement over how to best design reinsertion packages or transitional safety nets. The duration and options vary from cash, in kind, and mixed packages. The choice between these options depends on a number of contextual factors, especially the manner in which the conflict ended, the absorptive capacity of labor markets, and the resource position and institutional capacity of the state to implement such safety net programs in an efficient and transparent manner.

DDR is not just a technical intervention to promote security, nor merely a symbolic set of activities capped by a transitional safety net. It has a strong political significance. DDR cannot, in fact, succeed without the political commitment of the relevant stakeholders in the peace process. It has to be anchored in both political will and institutional capability as it can contribute to dramatically altering the balance of power in the transition from war to peace. Security promotion as such includes a number of instruments ranging from Interim Stabilization Measures (ISMs) to DDR to SSR. The specific timing and sequencing of these interventions during peacebuilding and post-conflict recovery depends to a large extent upon the contextual factors in

any given conflict.

## Types of Disarmament Programs <sup>8</sup>

DDR processes explicitly aim to strengthen state, community, and individual security through the downsizing of armed forces and the demilitarization of society. Many DDR programs incorporate strategies to address the widespread diffusion of weapons in post-conflict settings, by placing arms and ammunition beyond use through their collection, disposal and destruction. The destruction of weapons and ammunition can have a high symbolic value, depending on the specific cultural and social context in which it takes place. For example, the decommissioning of weapons in Northern Ireland and Nepal, may indeed have been more symbolic than real with many weapons still remaining at large.

The success of disarmament activities depends on several contextual factors such as: i) the perception of security of both combatants and communities; ii) the engagement of the political leadership and leveraging of disarmament in the negotiations process; iii) the presence of a firearm culture; iv) the use of firearms as means for sustenance (for instance, to protect livestock); v) the existence of arms and ammunition regional markets (legal and illicit); iv) the security of weapons and ammunition stockpiles, among others .<sup>9</sup>

Disarmament programs can be directed (compulsory) or cooperative. Compulsory programs use legal or official instruments, military operations and punitive measures; they are usually carried out by national governments. This approach has attracted some criticisms by human rights activists as in some cases, such as Uganda and South Sudan, these programs resulted in abuses such as murder, rape, community displacement and looting. National governments also developed other mechanisms to promote disarmament of combatants and societies such as ‘firearms amnesties’. In such a situation disarmament can be linked to the small arms control legislation. In South Africa in 2005 the population could surrender those arms which had become illegal under the firearms control legislation. A similar process was carried out in Angola where, in 2008, weapons were surrendered as part of the ‘Na-

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
8. Ibid, p.14

9. Cfr. Lamb, G., Dye, D.; (2009) Security Promotion and DDR: Linkages between ISMs, DDR, and SSR within a Broader Peacebuilding Framework, CIDDR Background Paper, May 2009, p. 13.

10. Ibid., p. 12

tional Campaign of Disarming People in Illegal Possession of Firearms'.<sup>10</sup> Voluntary or cooperative disarmament programs require incentives in order to convince former combatants to hand over their weapons. The 'weapons in exchange for development' programs which have been implemented in Bosnia, Albania, Mali and Niger are examples of cooperative programs. The use of development as an incentive to disarm is meant also to involve the recipient communities and to foster the creation of a climate of cooperation between combatants, communities and implementing agencies. In Liberia, for instance, when a community is declared 'arms free' by the Liberian National Police, the community will choose which kind of development project to be implemented.<sup>11</sup>

Weapons lotteries are another example of cooperative or 'second generation' programs. They have been carried out in Haiti, Mozambique, Republic of Congo and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYRM), but they have not been immune to criticisms. Some analysts said, in fact, that these programs can be wrongly perceived by the communities as a rewarding system for criminals. In addition, they seem to be ineffective in contexts where there is a widespread gun culture.<sup>12</sup>



Cash can be another incentive in voluntary programs. However, "buy-back" programs can produce several negative market effects. Cash can in

11. Ibidem, p. 13.

12. Idem.

fact encourage forms of illicit trade in arms, weapons can be stolen from stockpiles in order to get some profit from them and combatants may be induced to move from one DDR program to the other in order to get more profit depending on the amount of cash exchanged for weapon.

## **Interim stabilization measures: Buying time and space**

Over the past decade, it has become clear that each post-conflict context is unique even if some dynamics are often quite similar. In order to manage the unique demands posed by each post-war context, practitioners have evolved new security promotion activities which are distinct from (yet complementary to) DDR and SSR programs. As the demobilization of combatants exposes both former fighters and the peace process to particularly significant risks, in some contexts Interim Stabilization Measures have been put in place in order to buy time and political space for negotiations to advance, social dialogue toward reconciliation to get under way, and labor absorption in the economy and state capacity, especially in the provision of security and other public goods (e.g., education and health) to improve.

Interim Stabilization Measures are short-term, preparatory measures complementing (rather than substituting for) DDR and SSR programs, and are meant to reduce security gaps and risks, to promote human security and to build confidence and overcome mistrust and uncertainty between parties and communities. As inferred above, the implementation of ISMs depends on several contextual factors, such as the nature and duration of the conflict; the nature of the peace; the institutional capacity of the state; the state of the economy; and the character of communities and combatants. These factors must also be taken into account in the design of broader SSR, DDR and peace-building measures.

The conventional wisdom in war to peace transitions holds that armed groups must be dismantled as quickly as possible, so that they cannot re-emerge as spoilers, or leverage their organization to demand concessions at critical inflection points in the peace and recovery process. However, the evidence strongly suggests in that in some contexts, ISMs can in fact play an important role by retaining cohesion and control within armed groups. Properly designed ISMs can break or reconfigure the command structures of armed groups, but help to retain former combatants' cohe-

siveness and social support networks. Retaining the cohesion of armed groups can ease the difficult transition from military to civilian life, and can additionally help consolidate security by reducing the available space for spoilers or new flare-ups.

Some ISMs carefully link military organizational structures with civilian activities, for instance using armed groups to undertake civilian policing and disaster relief, or to aid in the reconstruction of shattered infrastructure. ISMs have been applied in a range of different contexts, from South Africa with the South African Service Corps (SASC) to Kosovo with the Kosovo Protection Corps (KPC). In Northern Ireland the structure of armed groups continued intact throughout the peace process. Most notably, the Irish Republican Army (IRA) retained its cohesiveness and control, even continuing to recruit new members as the peace process advanced. The combination of the IRA's organizational cohesion and commitment to peace allowed it to limit political fragmentation through its strong legitimacy, and soak up potential recruits for new armed groups, essentially denying air to emergent spoilers.

The benefits and risks of the continued cohesion of armed groups will depend strongly upon context. However, ISMs can offer a mechanism by which armed groups integrate or deepen ties to the community, becoming vehicles of self-transformation and development while undertaking work in service to the broader community. Here agency and social cohesion become important elements for the social-psychological transformation from combatant to civilian identity. Legitimacy and livelihoods round out the key elements required for a smooth transition of former combatants to a productive civilian life.

These experiences have shown the need to involve the community and other stake-holders into the peace process in order to create some levels of ownership and mechanisms for a better reintegration of former combatants. Another strategy is the creation of 'transitional security forces' to address security issues by

*ISMs can be considered the core around which DDR and SSR processes are developed and consolidated*

Jens Samuelsson, Founding Partner,  
Stockholm Policy Group

*Ex-combatants can be agents of conflict transformation, not simply passive security problems to be managed*

Kieran McEvoy, Director, Institute of  
Criminology and Criminal Justice,  
Queen's University, Ireland

providing employment opportunities to ex-combatants while more stable political conditions were reached. This mechanism was implemented in Afghanistan with the Afghan Militia Forces and in Iraq with the Sunni Awakening Movements.<sup>13</sup>

Military Integration (MI) arrangements are another example of ISMs. They include the integration of former combatants into the national army as implemented in DRC, Burundi, and Angola. These measures are sometimes chosen as means to share power and create basic security conditions when the State's capacity is weak. Dialogue and sensitization programs with the community and former combatants also have been applied as ISMs. An example of this kind of measures are the Ingando programs, a Rwandan traditional conflict-resolution method that created spaces where some ex-combatants - members of the FAR (Armed Forces of Rwanda) - could be screened, sensitized and consulted and at the same time engage in a constructive dialogue with members of the Rwandan Patriotic Army and civil society.<sup>14</sup>

### **Linkages between ISM, DDR and SSR: timing and sequencing**

As mentioned above, there can be reasons to postpone the implementation of a DDR program, depending on the country-specific context. In this case, provisional measures meant to buy time and to achieve a certain degree of transitional security can be undertaken. However, ISMs are by definition temporary activities and need to be linked to wider and more complex security promotion processes such as DDR and SSR. Security Sector Reform's objective is to re-shape the existent national security, justice and penal system and to make it adherent to international standards of democracy, efficiency and effectiveness by restoring civilian oversight over military power. SSR entails a wide range of activities and it can lay the ground for the implementation of DDR programs. However, attention should be paid to the transparent vetting of candidates for incorporation in security forces and government especially regarding prior human rights violations or criminal records to increase legitimacy and avoid corruption

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
13. Cfr. Nat J. Colletta, Jens Samuelsson Schjorlien, Hannes, Berts, Interim Stabilization. Balancing Security and Development in Post-Conflict Peacebuilding, (2009) Sthlm Policy Group and Folke Bernadotte Academy, p. 29: Sweden.

14. Ibid. p. 30.

or perceived negligence by the State.

ISM, DDR and SSR cannot be conceived as isolated security promotion instruments and processes. They interact among each other and their design, planning and implementation depends on the context in which they are undertaken. Taking into account the significant overlapping and blending among these activities, it can be argued that they should be part of the same designing and planning process. DDR and SSR can be carried out as parallel processes (two sides of the same coin); in some cases SSR can precede DDR especially in the case where police and justice reform are integral processes to addressing human rights abuses and establishing civilian security; and yet in other situations DDR programs are undertaken before the planning and implementation of SSR. The exact sequencing of these processes depends again on contextual factors referred to earlier - as well as infrastructural and budgeting constraints and the specific political circumstances of each conflict situation or country. ISMs, DDR and SSR contribute, in fact, to re-shaping the balance of power in post-conflict settings. The interests and needs of the relevant stakeholders and the parties' bargaining power during the related negotiations are factors that can influence these processes.

The discourse to DDR in general and security promotion in particular may also be unique to every situation. For example, in the context of Mindanao, the Philippines, the Moors (Moro Islamic Liberation Front, MILF) reject the conventional language on DDR. For them, giving up their arms is tantamount to surrender. Bearing arms is a part of their cultural heritage and achieving 'shared security' is a more relevant goal and discourse. Demobilization also does not apply as their combatants are citizen sol-



diers, living and working as fishermen and farmers in communities, and are mobilized for combat actions. Thus, reintegration also is a cumbersome term as they are already a part of their community and really require economic enhancement and market connectivity rather than reintegration assistance per se. In this case, negotiating in terms of shared security and economic mainstreaming may be a more meaningful discourse for them.

Furthermore, interim stabilization measures such as the creation of autonomy zones can provide some form of local control and stability while there is no agreement with MILF on conventional DDR. The situation is somewhat similar for the Maoists in Nepal where the language of choice is “the management of arms and armies” and not DDR, which for them implies surrender and disrespect.

It is clear that finding a coherent and effective way of sequencing and linking ISMs, DDR and SSR remains a challenge. Context-sensitivity and a certain degree of flexibility are essential. Furthermore, all these activities are more likely to be effective within a functioning and legitimate state and legal system. Therefore, also the linkages between these processes and state-building and good governance measures should not be overlooked.

## **The risks of failed DDR and the rise of organized crime and delinquency**

*Thanks to globalization and the economic conditions in Haiti, organized crime and illegal activities represent a good option for young people*

General Mario Andresol, Director,  
Haiti National Police

Post-conflict countries are often ideal settings for crime to flourish. Fragile state institutions, weak public security, and a lack of viable economic opportunities combine to create powerful incentives for civilians and former combatants to enter into organized crime, to engage in illegal activities, or to fall into delinquency. Furthermore, some actors may attempt to foment violence, particularly if their criminal enterprises (such as trafficking in goods and persons) might benefit from instability in the post-conflict period.<sup>15</sup>

Organized criminality is often paralleled by the rise of diffuse, disorgani-

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15. Rausch, C., ed. 2006. *Combating Serious Crimes in Post-Conflict Societies*. Washington DC: USIP.

zed violence. Post-conflict countries often register an increase in domestic and gender-based violence; many experience significant spikes in street violence, petty crime, and murder. These forms of violence flourish where policing and justice institutions are weak or fragmented; where the existence of a gun culture valorizes and socially protects the bearing of arms, and where the presence of traumatized ex-combatants lacking economic opportunities and social connections may fall back on the tools of violence.

*States in post conflict situations are potential targets for international organized criminal networks due to weak capacity, poor regulation, scarcity of goods and services, and unequal distribution and access*

William Gardner, Chief, Communal Violence Reduction Unit, DPKO, MIN-USTAH, Haiti

Both organized and disorganized crime can undermine peace processes and DDR programs. Criminal networks can in fact attract ex-combatants, especially if there have been delays in the reinsertion and reintegration process and participants have become disillusioned with the program and or the material and financial incentives exceed those provided in various reintegration programs.<sup>16</sup> Young demobilized male combatants are particularly at risk of joining criminal groups. They often lack marketable skills and can turn to criminal activities as a means for make a living. Breaking the recruitment cycle becomes paramount to preventing the rise in violence, criminality and armed conflict. The Colombian government has especially focused on addressing recruitment through the provision of incentives, social marketing, providing personal and family security guarantees, and reducing the stigma associated with demobilized persons, endeavoring to stem the problem at its source.

Some of these problems are currently being addressed by the DDR program in Haiti. In 2006, the Security Council re-oriented the DDR efforts towards a comprehensive Community Violence Reduction (CVR) program. This program included initiatives to strengthen local governance and the rule of law and to provide employment opportunities to former gang members and youth at-risk. In 2006 and 2007, however, the gangs' activities escalated and a robust military operation was put in place in order to restore the levels of security. In such situations, community violence

16. Cfr. Lamb, G., Dye, D.; (2009) Security Promotion and DDR: Linkages between ISMs, DDR, and SSR within a Broader Peacebuilding Framework, CIDDR Background Paper, May 2009, p. 16.

reduction programs which enhance “citizen security” and involve both the ex-combatants and the communities - El Salvador, Guatemala - can be constructive ways of addressing the problem. Haiti is currently undertaking the ‘Bel Air campaign’. The main objective of this campaign is to control the weapons’ proliferation and the increase in the number of deaths perpetrated by armed groups. Up to now, the campaign has demonstrated a certain success with a decrease in gang violence.

The above mentioned community violence reduction programs aim at reducing levels of insecurity through processes of development and social inclusion. Furthermore, it is worth stressing that addressing organized crime and delinquency in post-conflict settings means also strengthening the activities of police forces through capacity building and better governance. Once again, it is that DDR activities and Security System Reform are often two sides of the same coin. It should also be mentioned that risk of acts of revenge against returning ex-combatants might also be a police or public security issue as well as potential retaliation against those communities which accept returned combatants.

Finally, DDR programs must be conceived, designed, and implemented with regional geopolitical interests and pressures in mind. Neighboring conflicts can form dangerous positive feedback loops, making DDR programs more difficult to implement, and less likely to succeed.



# Chapter III: DDR and Social Reintegration: From Civil War to Civil Society

## Rebuilding state legitimacy, civic trust, and social cohesion

Armed conflict, particularly sustained civil war, can be highly divisive, leading to eroding trust, deep social rifts, and lasting alienation. In the wake of war, social reintegration emerges as the essential building block of social justice, economic development, and sustainable peace. It is a complex process anchored both in individual psychological healing and the reconstitution of civic trust and shared identity and social cohesion within a post-conflict society. It underpins the deconstruction and reconstruction of the social compact between the State and its citizens. Although social reintegration is tightly linked with other aspects of war to peace transitions— in particular, the establishment of basic security and the economic reintegration of former combatants into society— it is a distinct process, and vital to the creation of sustainable peace. Absent some measure of social reintegration, lingering fear and distrust, unresolved individual and communal trauma, and feelings of injustice may spark new violence. Ultimately, social reintegration is the foundation of all other forms of reintegration (economic and political). If it is mishandled or fails, all other forms of reintegration will be endangered as state legitimacy, civic trust, and social cohesion will be undermined.

*It is important that DDR efforts are approached from an institutional state framework. DDR's potential is completely tied to the state's capacity to construct citizenship. Citizenship inside a democratic context guarantees the protection of minority rights*

Jehan Perera, Director, National Peace Council, Sri Lanka

Like other aspects of DDR, social reintegration is deeply shaped by the socio-political context in which it takes place. The barriers to reintegration, prospects for individual and communal healing, and appropriate program interventions in each war to peace transition depend to a large extent

upon the nature of the preceding conflict and peace settlement, the extent of social cohesion prior to violence, and the relationship of both armed groups and the state to the community.

## **Balancing security, justice, and peace**

DDR processes are closely linked with the creation of security, justice and peace. All too often, the relationship between these processes is perceived as antagonistic, under the presumption that peace requires subsuming the need for security and the demands for justice, and that dispensation of justice itself may further constitute a political impediment to the negotiation of peace. As is often conventional wisdom, justice delayed often results in justice denied.

These perceived dichotomies— especially between justice and peace— are both problematic and false. Transitional justice has emerged as a means of restoring civic trust and balancing the needs for some form of justice and the achievement of peace and security. Justice need not focus solely on retribution for the harms of perpetrators. Instead of narrowly focusing on how perpetrators are handled transitional justice may be configured to meet the multifaceted needs of victims, by promoting historical clarification, the admission of guilt and establishment of truth regarding violence and crimes that took place under conflict, restitution or reparation of harms, and social reconciliation. These tasks are quite distinct from the military and security-related issues that tend to dominate discussions of DDR, yet they are no less vital to the rebuilding of civic trust, the transformation of social relationships within and across conflict-affected communities and between the state and its citizenry, and the achievement of sustainable security, peace and reconciliation.

Transitional justice systems may require the use of traditional justice mechanisms that are often well-configured to promote reconciliation and communal coexistence. In contrast to formal justice systems, which tend to focus on investigation, judgment, and punishment for crimes, many traditional systems are more community-oriented and restorative in nature, focusing instead on re-knitting the social fabric by establishing truth, openness and dialogue, and achieving reparation and forgiveness for harms. However, both traditional and formal justice systems carry risks. Traditional justice systems may privilege some interests and actors over

others, may force socially-sanctioned reconciliation before individual healing is complete, or even clash with fundamental human rights; formal justice systems' strong biases towards individually-focused, retributive justice may inadvertently reinforce binary identities of victim and perpetrator, leaving aside much more complex identities, substituting revenge for reconciliation, and failing to resolve conflict.

Attention must be paid to the implementation of both formal and traditional judicial systems. Justice is never value-neutral or totally objective. To keep the focus of communal justice and healing from reflecting the needs of dominant groups (i.e., a victor's justice), outsiders, victims, ordinary citizens, and ex-combatants, all sides of the conflict, given that they may have different narratives of grievance and justice seeking, should be recognized by the justice system.

Justice, amnesty and impunity are often juxtaposed as competing options, a zero sum game. The approach of transitional justice seeks to navigate the extremes of either total justice or total amnesty and impunity. Instead, the range of choices stretches beyond such potentially divisive options, endeavoring to restore civic trust and state legitimacy as essential elements of social reintegration within a broader framework of peace building. One of the most common impediments to an effective social reintegration process is the stigma attributed by the receptor communities towards the demobilized persons. Mechanisms of transitional justice may help reduce stigmatization and hate by promoting processes that help clarify truth, and therefore, promote a sense of justice and acceptance (if not forgiveness) among receptor communities. However, more complex justice schemes that pit distributive justice of the International Criminal Court against the traditional justice system of, for example, the Acholi peoples in Northern Uganda and or the sovereign right of a special National Court to try its own citizens, create a mixture of coercion and inducement and may generate confusion, doubt, and fear among potential demobilized persons and local communities alike. This can act as a barrier to peacemaking and peacebuilding. Striking between maintaining international standards of human rights and justice, yet achieving stabilization, peace and normal development is sometimes difficult.

In some circumstances where post-conflict justice is limited by incarceration capacity, severely weakened human, institutional and administrative capacity resulting in the inability to provide a fair, accurate and efficient

judicial process, traditional or informal justice systems such as the Gacaca in Rwanda may offer an imperfect but effective transitional substitute pending the full restoration of judicial capacity.

On the other hand, the use of legal instruments from international law to generate justice and prosecute the leaders of armed groups can be useful in those contexts where the state capability is weak. Nevertheless, the threat of international legal sanction may pressure leaders to come to negotiate or may raise fears about security and their safety after the agreement is concluded. Hence, the impact of the international legal pressure will depend upon the legal instrument employed, the judicial system used and the political and military contexts in which is used.

*DDR should not just undercut the possibility of justice. A DDR program that focuses on community targeting may actually disadvantage communities when victim communities need resources, and cannot refuse the benefits being offered by the program. It is in effect a resource transfer, which requires that victims sacrifice their individual rights to the needs of the community and the former combatants.*


Pablo de Greiff, Director, Research Unit, International Center for Transitional Justice

## Justice and the healing of social and psychological wounds

Individual psychological healing is closely linked to justice, truth, and social reconciliation. Survey research has shown that a very small percentage of victims believe in justice as the sole means to reparation, suggesting that formalized judicial proceedings alone are unlikely to resolve victims' needs. Individual psychological healing requires a combination of factors: the pursuit of broader social justice; the creation of closure through public admission of truth; and personal and communal processes of grieving. In combination, these factors help people come to terms with their loss, helping them to heal and to form constructive, meaningful relationships.

Various approaches have been designed to try to deal with the specific psychological challenges facing demobilized individuals, victims of violence, and society at large. Psychosocial approaches to healing may focus on a variety of issues, including dysfunctions and violence within family relationships, preparation for entering into the labor market, anxiety and

post-traumatic stress disorder, drug and alcohol addiction, and the relationship between victims and perpetrators. However, in the end a multi-layer approach appears most desirable.<sup>17</sup>



While it is vital to attend to the psychological wounds and support the mental health of all groups in post-conflict settings, there is a lack of solid empirical research on the specific psychological needs of perpetrators, victims, and vulnerable social groups, the overall magnitude of the psycho-social challenges facing each group, the range of possible strategies for psychological healing and the amelioration of harms, and the efficacy and impact of psychological interventions across differing groups and social contexts.

Transcending the singular focus on post-traumatic stress disorder may be desirable. Post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) has been the primary model for understanding the trauma suffered by individuals and societies emerging from war, and the frequent presumption is that the majority of former combatants are traumatized by their experiences in conflict. While ex-combatants are at risk of depression, substance abuse, anxiety, and elevated aggression, only a minority are traumatized. The varying needs

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17. Ana Patel and Jeanie Anan (2009). *Critical Issues and Lessons in social Reintegration: Balancing Justice, Psychological Well Being, and Community Reconciliation*. CIDDR. Cartagena.

of former combatants call for a multilayered approach to psychosocial support, with differing forms of interventions provided depending upon the type and intensity of psychological trauma.

Beyond adapting psychological interventions, there is an urgent need for better research on trauma in non-Western contexts, and modalities of healing. To date, there is little clear evidence of the success of post-traumatic interventions and whether interventions that treat PTSD lead to improvements in quality of life. Part of the problem lies in the Western-centric models of psychological trauma and healing. We know too little about the definition, meaning, and manifestations of psychological distress in non-Western cultures, and about the appropriateness and effectiveness of local and traditional mechanisms for healing.

Finally, it is important to remember that psychosocial support, whatever its form, must not focus solely on victims and former combatants. Extended violent conflict, particularly civil war, can leave deep psychological scars on societies, often time legitimating or altering norms towards the use of violence. Reversing such changes requires individual healing and attitudinal change, as well as broader shifts in social norms.

## **Transcending static identities: moving beyond victims and perpetrators**

Conventional models of transitional justice and social reintegration are built upon a clear dichotomy between perpetrator and victim: one who did harm, and one who suffered it. These intuitive labels mask what is often a far more complex reality, and can undercut progress towards social reconciliation.

Particularly in contemporary conflicts, perpetrators of violence are frequently victims as well, before, during, and after conflict. Child soldiers may have been abducted; members of armed groups may have suffered from inequality or discrimination prior to conflict, or from abuse during war. While the suffering of perpetrators does not excuse their acts, obscuring their victimhood denies their own rights to demand truth, to grant forgiveness, and to seek closure. Victimhood, by contrast, may in fact have a seductive appeal in that it displaces responsibility to others. Victims are not considered to be the authors of their own pain, but they may nonetheless share a role in the conflict, either directly or indirectly.

It is important to recognize that both victims and perpetrators alike are stakeholders in peace. Although perpetrators should be called to answer for their acts and victims have the right to demand truth and recompense, these labels must not become permanent, nor must they obscure the fact that rebuilding society's social fabric requires shared purpose and effort.

## **Attending to groups with special needs and assisting the most vulnerable**

Regardless of context, the specific needs, capacities, and risks faced by groups of social concern, such as women, children, the disabled, internally displaced persons, and ethnic minorities must be taken into account.

Women face elevated risks for a range of harms both during and after armed conflict, and during and following reintegration. Female ex-combatants and civilians alike may suffer from violence, enforced servitude, sexual abuse, and displacement. In addition, women who have suffered from sexual abuse or unplanned pregnancy may face severe difficulty reintegrating into their home communities because of social stigma. Despite these challenges, women can play a much more active role in the DDR program because of their special position in society, skills, and knowledge of the community situation and needs. Both the risks to and potential of women should drive DDR programs to offer special services to female ex-combatants that address the negative psychological and physical consequences of violence experienced during war. Healing may require more than psychological services: women with elevated social vulnerability should be supported in building new livelihoods through targeted financial support, educational programs, and vocational training. Finally, it is important to incorporate women into planning and decision-making despite the cultural and other hurdles often involved. Ensuring equal female participation may require robust outreach efforts, such as mentoring programs for women leaders.

Children, particularly youth combatants, also require special psychological, educational, and vocational support. Children who committed acts of violence should be treated as victims as well as perpetrators, and clearly require attention and assistance in sorting out the complex emotions generated by their conflict-related experiences, through specialized counseling and psychological services. Youth combatants and displaced children may

need significant help in recovering from lost years of education, work, and social integration within their communities. Restarting education is a key step. While every effort should be made to reintegrate youths into their age group, those who have missed significant amounts of schooling may require alternative educational systems. Children who cannot be reintegrated into family structures and financial support should be provided with enhanced social welfare, or at minimum, specialized vocational training, to prevent their movement out of school and into the criminal economy.

Disabled ex-combatants and civilians victims of conflict may face additional difficulties in economic reintegration and the creation of a sustainable livelihood. Where disabilities stemming from violence may prevent demobilized persons and victims from working in their former occupation, targeted vocational training and credit schemes should be provided. Both disabled ex-combatants and civilians may also require counseling and psychological care, as they may face additional difficulties in adjusting to civil life and fulfilling their social roles.

While disabled persons may require targeted forms of assistance, it is important that these programs do not separate them from the economic and social reintegration programs and processes of the broader community. Persons with moderate disabilities should be mainstreamed into conventional reintegration programs, albeit with added support; where possible, persons with more severe disabilities should be referred to national support systems.

Ethnic, religious, and linguistic minority groups may also require specific support in the reintegration and recovery process. In cases where violence has been driven by identity-based conflict, minority groups may have been disproportionately impacted by conflict, and suffer from greater capital deficits, lost income, and seized or destroyed assets. The increased impact of conflict may further magnify pre-existing economic and social inequality. Minority groups may also face continuing economic and political discrimination in the post-conflict phase. In such cases, minorities may require additional access to credit and vocational training resources, as well as investments to increase access to productive assets and markets.

Finally, internally displaced persons may require additional support in both economic reinsertion and recovery, while large-scale displacement

may complicate efforts at reintegrating former combatants. The internally displaced typically lose access to real assets (land, tools, personal possessions), and frequently expend what financial resources they possess to secure food and shelter during displacement. Upon the cessation of conflict, they may require additional financial support to build a home and secure productive assets. Large-scale displacement may complicate both the social and economic reintegration of former combatants, as the uprooting of populations can shatter social networks, creating new communities that lack the bonds of shared identity and trust necessary for the creation of a new social fabric. Where there is no community for former combatants to reintegrate into, extra attention must be paid to crafting mechanisms for local participation, communal integration, and healing.

In the near term, these vulnerable groups may require additional resources across a wide spectrum of needs, including psychosocial support for psychological well-being, employability and job creation, generation and vocational education. While DDR programs cannot provide solutions to long-term discrimination or social vulnerability, they should be sensitive to the particular risk factors facing vulnerable populations, and where possible provide opportunities for their active participation

## **Reintegration and reconciliation: finding a place in society**

Reconciliation is not a programmatic objective, but rather a complex process that unfolds over time through the provision of justice, individual healing, the removal of stigmatizing labels, the enmeshing of ex-combatants and victims in broader society, the (re)-establishment of social networks and the rebuilding of civic trust and state legitimacy. Collectively, these processes aim to re-establish bridging social capital, the bonds of trust, social cohesion, and connectivity which link disparate groups together.

Social reintegration programs focus upon assisting demobilized combatants in creating new lives within legal civil society. The prospects for successful reintegration will depend

*Our focus should not just be on bringing people together after conflict, but on helping people come to terms with loss. If people are going to be able to form constructive, meaningful relationships, they must be able to come to terms with what they've lost.*

Andrew Rigby, Professor of Peace Studies, Coventry University

heavily on the social acceptability of the demobilized. Former combatants are frequently viewed with fear and suspicion by the very communities they seek to join.

Demobilized persons bear both rights and responsibilities in the reintegration process. They must be assured the opportunity to find a new place in communal life, and supported in creating a peaceful livelihood. In return, they must in turn commit to non-recidivism, truth telling, submission to justice, and, where relevant, reparations.

The establishment of civic trust is at the core of successful reintegration. In some contexts, former combatants are formally returned to communal life through traditional ceremonies, which provide a familiar and institutionalized mechanism for reconciliation by publicly re-enmeshing the former combatant in the social fabric and expectations of the community.

*If the community-based approach is state-centric, and results in patrimonial imposition especially if it does not recognize its responsibility in the conflict, it will hinder the possibility of building a positive perception of the very community-based initiative it hopes to promote*

Solomon Mugai, Co-Founder, Propaz,

Even where such mechanisms exist, ex-combatants may build trust and a role in the community through both tangible means, such as assisting in reconstructing public works or making reparations, and intangible means, such as providing information.

Is reconciliation an achievable goal in the immediate wake of conflict? In many cases, reconciliation may be an overly ambitious goal. It may in fact be counterproductive to press for reconciliation when emotional and psychological wounds are still raw. A desire for peace may not necessarily indicate a readiness for the establishment of deep ties between alienated communities. In such cases, modest goals may be more appropriate: working towards peaceful coexistence in the near-term, and helping victims come to terms with loss and grief. This is especially so in cases where social cohesion prior to conflict was weak or non-existent, as ties of dependence and trust must be built from the ground up.

Working to achieve “shallow” coexistence, e.g., the absence of violence in the near-term may be an appropriate goal, which does not preclude seeking reconciliation over the long-term. Following the cessation of vio-

lence, coexistence may steadily deepen as sustained peace helps to foster trust, and economic recovery helps to develop mutual ties cutting across society. Reconciliation must be built on peaceful coexistence: at minimum, victims and perpetrators must be willing to live together, without fear of new cycles of retribution.

Communities may not seek reconciliation in pace with the international community's expectations. Reintegration and reconciliation are long-term processes. While external support to post-conflict societies is necessarily limited by scarce resources, new crises, and donor fatigue, the re-establishment of trust and social ties takes time. Some estimate that reconciliation requires at least 12 to 15 years of sustained effort; others suggest that it is in fact a multi-generational project. Whatever its duration, the re-knitting of communal ties is certain to outlast the presence of external supporters, who can at best help to support the first, uncertain steps toward healing.

Where immediate reconciliation is untenable, transitional justice efforts may do well to focus on other objectives such as closure. Unresolved events— unexplained disappearances, crimes with no identified perpetrator or motive, violence with no apology— are deeply unsettling to human beings. Regardless of culture, people who have suffered through conflict evidence a strong desire to have answers and explanations for what they have experienced. The achievement of closure by no means implies psychological healing or reconciliation, but it is a vital first step, and one that should be supported through appropriately designed transitional justice and psychosocial support systems.

## **Reconstructing the social compact between state and citizens**

In many instances the conventional model of social reintegration— that of former combatants struggling to find a place in post-conflict society— may not apply. In some contexts, armed groups are considered freedom fighters rather than dangerous outcasts, and as citizen-soldiers, they are already integrated into their communities. In effect, it is the State that may need to be re-linked with citizens through the reformulation of the social compact binding the State and its citizenry. In other cases, where societies are divided by ethnicity, social class, ideology and or religion, it is the cross-cutting bonds and social bridges of among citizens themselves

which need to be repaired and strengthened. It is the unique combination of cross-cutting social capital and effective institutions of governance that ensure the social cohesion required to peacefully mediate normal social and economic conflict through dialogue before it metastasizes into violent armed conflict.

While reconciliation focuses on re-establishing bonds of trust within society, in some cases the key relationship requiring transformation is that between state and society. When the state is seen as predatory in nature, methods used to prosecute the war often may lead to fear and distrust of state institutions, as well as the unwillingness of some citizens and groups to engage in political participation. Rebuilding vertical social capital— the linkages of trust, participation, and compliance between state and society— typically requires political or institutional reform, which may take the shape of democratization, demilitarization, addressing citizen security and justice, bureaucratic reform, transparent and accountable governance, and institutionalized mechanisms to ensure compliance with human rights obligations towards citizens.

The expansion of DDR from post-conflict stabilization and reconstruction missions to “live” conflicts poses special problems for efforts to the reconstruct the social compact between the State and its citizenry. In the absence of a comprehensive peace settlement, those holding political power are often reluctant to renegotiate the international structure of the state, or the balance of power between state and society. External support for DDR programs can have an unintended dysfunctional effect on this process by further strengthening the hand of political leaders, through financial support and the conferral of international legitimacy.

The core task in reconstructing the social compact is the strengthening of state legitimacy. Legitimacy can be rebuilt through changes in the identity of the state through institutional reform, the creation of new governance structures, or public apologies and policy changes by state leaders, as well as through concrete action, such as the cultivation of public participation in governance, and the extension of critical social services and public goods (medical care, educational systems, anti-poverty programs) that extend to all strata and groups within society. Community based initiatives must not be state controlled. Other civil society organizations must promote such initiatives.

Democratization alone may not suffice. While war to peace transitions taking place under the auspices of the United Nations often feature efforts to rebuild or construct democratic institutions. While important to long-term political inclusiveness and good governance, the electoral competition pressures unleashed by early democratization may create dangerous social pressures. What matters is that ordinary citizens are enfranchised through both democratic governance at the political center, as well as local mechanisms for meaningful participation and engagement in governance. The core objective of such efforts should be to foster a shared and active identity as citizens, within democratic structures that promote participation and ensure the protection of minority rights.

Reconciliation will be fragile if the causes of conflict are not addressed. Social reconciliation will be thin and brittle, at best, if the factors that drove violence in the first place are not addressed. Conflict drivers vary widely, but may include inequality of access to productive assets and basic services, limited political participation, social inequality, and the denial of cultural or linguistic rights. Although reconciliation efforts are typically focused on the damages inflicted by conflict itself rather than root causes, the political, social, or economic grievances that impelled violence will simply re-surface if they are not managed, risking the re-ignition of conflict. The long-term, nearly generational cycles of violence in many long-running conflicts should serve as a powerful reminder that sustainable peacebuilding may require deep political change.



## **Chapter IV: DDR and Economic Reintegration: Closing Capital Deficits and Managing the Risk of Recurrent Conflict.**

### **From war economy to peace economy**

Illegal economic activities, either developed or deepened during the conflict in order to sustain it, may remain one of the most viable income-generation opportunities during peacetime. In some cases, the illicit economy may even become the basis of a weaker post-war state. Thus, if sufficient opportunities are not created, or if illicit economies persist after the war, ex-combatants (particularly youths) will be at higher risk of recruitment by war entrepreneurs and may rejoin old or nascent criminal networks, armed groups, or revert to the coercive skills they have acquired or developed during wartime (drug and arm trafficking, arm robbery, prostitution). As such, transforming war economy to a peace economy represents one of the biggest challenges in a peace-building process.

Conflict-induced migration and depopulation can make economic reconstruction more difficult. Even prior to conflict, rural areas in poor countries are often characterized by isolation from markets and a lack of economic opportunity. When conflict strikes such regions, populations may leave, and those who stay are likelier to join the illicit economy. Thus, it is of great importance in both, short and longer-term, conflict situations that economic reintegration and recovery take place within a sufficiently sized market. Care must be taken to repair transportation infrastructure in order to integrate local markets into regional and national markets. If such integration does not occur, growth may be stagnant, and if export-oriented illicit economies

are present, their power may be magnified. Engaging the private sector for a successful reintegration of ex-combatants into the peace economy is fundamental as well, nonetheless, legal entrepreneurs face restrictions due to the failure of legitimate markets, e.g., labor, credit, land, knowledge, technology and information as well as local demands of goods and services (and ability to purchase them), the absence of physical infrastructure, and the lack of productive factors to develop local economies prevail. Therefore, it is necessary to re-establish the access to productive factors and functioning efficient markets for goods, services and labor.

In the above context, DDR programs may create losers as well as winners – if those who lose have the economic power, they might become potential spoilers of the economic reintegration process. It is also important to take into consideration that in some contexts the war economy has been more significant and economically viable than the peace economy. Thus, it may be necessary to generate competitive incentives be they tangible (e.g., security, income, etc.) or intangible (e.g., legitimacy, agency and social support) to ex-combatants and unemployed civilians, who tend to find illegal activities more economically attractive than programs of vocational and skills training. Very often illegal activities are more lucrative than under-employment opportunities. However, although DDR programs should offer greater economic benefits and incentives to gain ex-combatants' interest in participating in the reintegration process, it should also focus greater attention on post conflict-affected populations' modest consumptive goals such as satisfying their basic needs. Otherwise, a failed inclusion of such needs ends up by creating an emergent civilian population as potential participants in the illicit economy.

## **Closing capital deficits and managing the risks of recurrent violent conflict**

Successful economic reintegration of ex-combatants has become crucial to improve security and stability, ensure peace, and promote sustainable development in post-war contexts. Yet, the economic reintegration process remains one of the most complex and challenging aspects of DDR programs worldwide. The failure of creating economic opportunities for ex-combatants elevates the risk of countries emerging from conflict fall back into violence, given that grievances (marginalization, poverty, and inequality) which initially drove the conflict can go unaddressed. Thus, there

is an increased need of more rigorous research on the factors controlling for success or failure in the economic reintegration process. Moreover, the lack of economic opportunities and attendant failed reintegration can lead not only ex-combatants, but civilians as well, to participate in organized crime and illegal activities. As a result, employment opportunities and the related technical and life skills are key ingredients in post conflict economic reintegration.

Frequently, DDR programs tend to overlook the nature of the conflict and its root causes. The issue, however, is not just severe inequality and lack of access to productive resources in general, but among particular societal groups, that can fuel conflicts. Job opportunities for many people (as well as being discriminatory in nature) across large parts of a war torn country are either non-existent or minimal – in such contexts, armed groups can provide counter economic incentives and life opportunities. Moreover, DDR programs in the past tended to ignore, to a certain extent, realities of local labor markets and ex-combatants' specific preferences. Thus, the importance of not simply focusing on providing opportunities for subsistence during the short-term transition, but also taking longer-term individual aspirations into account, in order to identify and design suitable training and employment programs and brokering attendant job opportunities through enhancing access to information, counseling and referral services – are necessary.

In the wake of a conflict, ex-combatants may suffer from a range of capital deficits, each of which must be addressed. These may include: low access to capital; the loss of social networks; insufficient human capital, including education and marketable skills. Societies may also suffer from a range of capital deficits, including: the destruction of infrastructure; capital flight; damage to the export-oriented sectors; and, eroded social capital. Therefore, when promoting economic growth and employment opportunities through the implementation of DDR programs one should remember that in comparison with civilians, ex-combatants face different economic challenges after the war, including: human capital, productive assets, and social capital. First, human capital – “once the war is over, the skills that helped the former combatant survive in war-time may not help them thrive economically in peacetime.” Second, productive assets – “after wars come to an end, to the extent that their possessions and families have been targeted, former combatants may have fewer assets to draw upon if

their possessions have been damaged or destroyed more acutely than those of civilians.” And third, social capital – “in some cases, wars can weaken social ties and networks, and in other cases, strengthen them.”<sup>18</sup>

Reintegration funds should be fast-flowing as well as flexible to support consumption and stimulate a supply response, as it can help to overcome a lack of absorptive capacity in the local economy, and revitalize local productivity. Moreover, for ex-combatants who have entered the DDR process, close and individualized services should be applied across the traditional menu of training and skills-development programs, as it can ensure an informed decision-making, and help create realistic expectations of their livelihoods, income, and risks.

The planning process for economic reintegration should be sensitive to the drivers, length, and intensity of the conflict. We should distinguish between at least two broad types of conflict situations. First, contexts of short-term conflicts – in such cases, private institutions can still create opportunities for development, thus contributing to the economic reintegration process. Second, contexts of long-term conflicts, which weakens private-sector institutions, destroys infrastructure, and degrades the local economy – in such, economic reintegration is more challenging because development opportunities are scarce and poverty levels might be extreme. In both cases, conflict and damage to the private sector may be uneven across the territory, and pockets of productivity may remain.

Independent of the type of conflict, creating short and medium-term job opportunities should be linked (where possible) to longer-term training or economic opportunities so that ex-combatants have real incentives and opportunities to fully engage in the local civilian economy. In addition, income generation can help ex-combatants feel that they are supporting the local economic recovery and development, thus building up a greater feeling of worth and legitimacy within their communities. The

*If a reintegration process is to succeed it is essential that it is supported on a broader national strategic plan for reconciliation, reconstruction and development which includes networking with the private sector, national governments, and actors at local level*

Alfredo Lazarte Hoyle, Director Crisis Response Reconstruction Program, ILO

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18. Yuhki Tajima, Background Paper on Economic Reintegration, 2009. CIDDR

importance of developing the basis for employment and livelihood sustainability in post-conflict contexts is the fact that war generates its own economy dynamics as it represents an opportunity to create particular markets – in special those based on the consumption of goods. These dynamics are usually based on illegal activities, such as drug trafficking and arm trade, and represent an attractive economic opportunity for unemployed ex-combatants who are “rent-seeking at the barrel of a gun.”

## **From stabilization to recovery and development: creating jobs and rebuilding livelihoods**

Creating jobs is of vital importance for ensuring peace, and consolidating security and stability. Employment generation plays an important role in the successful reintegration of ex-combatants, and in the recovery and development of the local economy. It is important to remember that demobilized persons have elevated risk for engaging in criminal activity – many have little marketable skills outside of coercion, and may have severe anxieties about their capacity to earn a living and survive in the civilian environment. These anxieties are frequently deepened by the challenges demobilized fighters face in securing sustainable employment, and by discrimination and the denial of economic opportunities because of their past identity. During the initial phase of stabilization, it is particularly important that demobilized combatants have sufficient opportunities to generate income and to find decent work. These initial, often short-term employment opportunities serve several functions. They provide demobilized fighters with sufficient income through the transitional phase, and provide evidence that they can survive within the civilian economy; they can stimulate the development of new skills; and they reduce the risk that demobilized persons will relapse into armed groups, or use their skills to generate income through crime or involvement in the illicit economy.


Given the scarcity of employment opportunities in most conflict-affected countries, it is also necessary that job opportunities for former combatants are not seen as a reward for violence, but rather as a tool for building peace, sustainable livelihoods, and broad economic develo-

*At the time of reconstruction, the private sector becomes a key actor in the economic reintegration process, contributing new investments and employment generation to the development of affected communities*

Juan Jose Daboub, Managing  
Director, the World Bank

ment. In short, economic reintegration programs should not just avoid doing harm, but benefit the broader population and avoid the appearance of gross favoritism. This is a difficult to balance to strike, and doing so requires that programs be built on a firm understanding of the roots of the original conflict; a coherent and comprehensive view of the role of the private sector in development and attendant status of private and public markets; and the tenor of relations between former combatants and the broader community.

The United Nations Policy on Post-Conflict Employment Creation has established a range of guiding principles that should be taken into reflection as a precondition for effective employment creation, income generation, and reintegration in post-conflict contexts, including: coherence and comprehensiveness; “do no harm;” conflict sensitiveness; aim for sustainability; and, promotion of gender equality. Moreover, as part of the UN Policy’s efforts to promote job creation, employment has been placed in the center of its policy, in order to support conflict-affected people, ensure sustainable reintegration, bring peace dividend to conflict-affected communities, and prepare the ground for development; employment conditions have been addressed, in order to tackle social disparity which is part of the root causes of violent conflicts; and, social dialogue has been promoted, in order to contribute to a national reconciliation.<sup>19</sup>



19. United Nations Policy for Post-Conflict Employment Creation, Income Generation and Reintegration, May 2008

20. Adapted from the U.N. Policy on Post-Conflict Employment Creation, Income Generation, and Reintegration, 2009

## Phased Policy from Stabilization, to Reintegration, to Development <sup>20</sup>

Reintegration, reconciliation and long-term recovery should also be supported during the initial transition from conflict to peace, by creating and promoting opportunities at the local level for wage employment and self-employment, and by rebuilding communities and reactivating the local economy. When communities are involved in the economic reintegration process, root causes of conflicts and long-term reconciliation are being addressed as well.<sup>21</sup> Before moving into a more developmental approach, it is necessary to ensure that the peace process and reintegration have been consolidated. Yet, it is important to pay attention to local power relations. Experiences in community-based development programs have demonstrated that community leaders and their family members may disproportionately benefit from interventions through the top-down manipulation of village governance structures, which may finish up by managing or shaping development and reconstruction projects.

Once the initial stabilization phase has been concluded and economic recovery is underway, a national enabling environment for job opportunities is vital to sustain employment and the economic reintegration process. Solutions should not necessarily be centrally planned, and efforts should be made to engage local communities in the planning process. Although ex-combatants may have fewer assets than civilians to draw upon after the war, it is of great importance that receptor communities are also included in the economic reintegration process, and provided with a similar range of productive assets. Although many interventions – particularly the refurbishment of local infrastructure – are public goods which significantly benefit communities, failure to do so can cause resentment and increase the risks of future conflict. Assisting receptor communities – particularly where they were badly damaged by conflict – may increase their capacity to absorb and assist former combatants.

Sustained and effective employment and economic growth through the provision of productive assets may require a range of interventions at the national level, these may include: natural capital (land), financial capital (credit), training and technology markets, and access to markets.

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21. *Idem.*

**a. Natural capital (land)**

Inequality in land ownership and access remains one of the most common root causes of conflict worldwide. Moreover, conflicts tend to drastically alter ownership and access to land, through conflict-induced displacement, the seizure of land by individuals and armed groups, and the mining or intense grazing of vacant agricultural properties. Thus, addressing access to land and creating an environment conducive to rural development is a high priority. Relevant interventions may include the provision of farm inputs, agricultural extension services (transportation infrastructure, access to markets, and, credit and financial services). Ex-combatants may benefit from “start-up” kits of seeds, fertilizers, and tools, along with proper training. It is important to focus rural recovery efforts on farm resettlement and on off-farm activities as an opportunity to integrate ex-combatants in the communities.

**b. Financial capital (credit)<sup>22</sup>**

In post-conflict settings, ex-combatants, IDPs, refugees, and the broader population, often lack access to capital. Capital constraints vastly increase the difficulty of starting or maintaining a business; therefore, it is important that microfinance programs are built into longer-term economic reintegration plans and programs. In the medium-term, savings and credit schemes, money transfer services, and micro-insurance programs can also provide important support those lacking access to formal financial markets.

Microfinance programs cannot be effectively implemented in all circumstances. War can degrade and destroy trust in some communities, while increasing community solidarity in others, yielding more or less conducive conditions for microfinance, respectively. The efficiency and impact of microfinance institutions may also be greatly reduced absent functioning commercial banks macroeconomic stability. Finally, it is important to remember that microfinance is not a panacea. Many small entrepreneurs require training and market linkages as much as access to credit. Moreover, not all members of society are entrepreneurs whose aspirations and ambitions can be served by access to credit; microfinance must be one component among a broad array of job creation and economic reconstruction activities.

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22. Idem.

**c. Training markets**

Vocational training for voluntary participation in the post-conflict reconstruction and recovery should also be made available as a form of socio-economically reintegrating not only ex-combatants, but civilians who have been marginalized in a pre-conflict context as well. Technical skills training must be offered by different programs, and supported by the private sector in order to create economic opportunities (jobs for those who are qualified, for example). However, it is important to remember that although the training of ex-combatants in different areas must bear in mind the populations' wishes, freedom to choose must not be romanticized – their wishes do not necessarily fit in the real context's labor market, needs, infrastructure, etc. Also, in the end, training does not automatically result in jobs. Job creation requires investment in the productive sectors and the connectivity to domestic and foreign consumer markets.

**d. Leveraging technology for improved growth**

Dissemination of improved technology, and diversification of industries, may represent the driving-force behind a successful longer-term economic development and decent job creation within post-conflict settings. Appropriateness of information, technology and techniques (through trainings, for example) represent, today, a powerful tool for the (re)ignition of a strong economic engine. At the national level, the technology market creates and sustains employment, skills workers, promotes local integration and sustainability, supports internally generated revenue, etc. At the international level, it encourages integration in the world economy, thus attracting international investment.

**e. Access to consumer markets**

Limited access to markets is a major problem in post-conflict settings. Ex-combatants and civilians, either employed or self-employed, who become involved into small businesses might suffer from the inability to obtain fair prices for their products and services. Thus, it is important that economic reintegration processes also provide information on prices, increase access to formal credit and loans programs.

Effective program learning depends on carefully examining and considering successes as well as failures. Any health business environment will in-

clude failures, and the failure of individual businesses, and even of whole projects in post-conflict settings, is normal. However, as addressed in the UN Policy on Post-Conflict Employment Creation, post-conflict settings must be seen as windows of opportunity to the establishment of new economic activities and value adding income generation, such as high-value crops, agro-business, food processing, renewable energy technologies, Information and Communication Technologies (ICTs), public-private enterprise, funds to support skill based self-employment, tourism, and exports.<sup>23</sup>

## **Training and employment creation: connecting technical skills, life skills, investment and market opportunities**

One of the biggest obstacles when trying to find productive and decent employment for ex-combatants is their low educational levels and lack of vocational skills. In many conflicts, ex-combatants are disproportionately drawn from poor socio-economic backgrounds. Many are also young, often joining the armed groups before reaching the age of eighteen; in many contexts, the vast majority of ex-combatants have missed many years of formal education; many are functionally illiterate. Although the ability of ex-combatants to compete in the labor market can be greatly increased by furthering their education, depending upon the age at which combatants join as well as leave the conflict, different types of education may be appropriate. Younger cohorts may still benefit from formal schooling, whereas older cohorts may benefit more from the specific and targeted vocational training that the labor market demands. Emergency employment programs and short-term vocational trainings are useful tools in the short-term, but it is imperative to design sustainable long-term employment opportunities and decent work that guarantees the long-term sustainable economic reintegration of ex-

*Key issues in planning for economic reintegration revolve around (i) how to improve employability; (ii) how to increase economic absorption capacity of people and money; (iii) how to mobilize the private sector; (iv) how to mobilize, work with and build related capacity; and (v) how to ensure transparency, and accountability in all transactions*

Roberto Pizarro, Chief Executive,  
Cravajal Foundation, Colombia

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23. Idem.

combatants.

Training and skills development must emphasize individual development and skills acquisition. Too often, ex-combatants receive a certificate or technical diploma, but do not actually leave with the skills necessary to thrive in the marketplace. This may call for tighter monitoring and longer training programs. Profiling ex-combatants, in terms of their skills and work experience can facilitate the design of employment and income generation schemes. Training should also emphasize both technical as well broader business and “life” skills – training must assist ex-combatants in navigating civilian life and employment structures, which they may have little or no exposure to. Vocational education and the acquisition of technical skills must be supported by the development of tacit and supporting skills: business planning, market analysis and pricing, networking, etc - apprenticeship programs can meet many of these needs. Academic and vocational training programs must be offered as well, both to ex-combatants and the community if economic and social reintegration is intertwined, they are more likely to succeed.

Social reintegration is a vital component of employability. Social networks – linkages with contacts obtained through referrals from friends and family – are essential in finding work. Reintegration programs should emphasize building social networks, and in linking participants together. Finally, preparation for entering into the labor market, labor information, counseling and referral services, and micro-finance services are key to offer the demobilized with the necessary skills so that they can find their jobs by their own, and guarantee in that way a sustainable economic reintegration.

## **Beyond reintegration: steps toward community stability, growth, and sustainable development**

“Reintegration is the process by which ex-combatants acquire civilian status and gain sustainable livelihoods.”<sup>24</sup> It is essentially a process which focuses on social and economic aspects of this transitional phase. Yet, over the past decade, the economic reintegration element of DDR programs has developed into a more comprehensive and complex process, involving not

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24. *Idem*, p.50..

only those who have fought in the wars and conflicts, but communities at the local level as well. In its purpose of employment creation and income generation, the economic reintegration process is transformed into a strategic tool for ensuring peace and consolidating security and stability. Along with social reintegration, economic reintegration is a milestone for successful DDR programs, and consequently, a necessary bridge for the sustainability of community stability, growth, and development.

It became clear that context matters, and understanding the contextual factors and uniqueness of each conflict is necessary for properly addressing growth and development. By providing support for stabilizing, recovering and developing local economies, reintegration processes are also contributing to re-knitting the community's social fabric by promoting human development, ensuring justice and reparation to address grievances, and improving security by deterring future violence. It is necessary to emphasize that economic, social and political aspects of the reintegration process are inextricably linked, thus it is a long-term process that requires the support of various systems to address critical issues.

Yet, DDR programs are part of a broader practice, and cannot be considered as an isolated process. DDR must be accompanied by parallel processes such as ISMs and SSR (as well as socio-economic and political development policies) – in order to ensure its effectiveness and efficiency – as all involve changing the balance of power within a given country, and must be viewed as political rather than strictly technical challenges. Nonetheless, as there are substantial overlaps and complementarities between these activities, their implementation should be carefully coordinated. Overlaps between DDR, ISMs, and SSR may also allow for greater flexibility in adapting program interventions by altering pacing or discrete linkages between each program.

## Chapter V: Summary and Conclusions

### Evolving Scope, Social and Political Nature of DDR

Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) has expanded far beyond its original stabilization-oriented aims and technical approach. It now frequently encompasses broader socio-economic development, governance, justice and re-

conciliation, security system reform, and capacity-building. As such, it has shifted from a more narrow focus on supporting the transition of former combatants to a normal civilian life, security promotion (military and policing reform), and re demilitarization (i.e., reducing military expenditure and freeing up resources for recovery) to a broader emphasis on improving governance and the rule of law, balancing the social and economic needs and aspirations of the individual with those of the community in particular, and, more generally facilitating peace building and sustainable social and economic development.

*The shift in this Congress to social issues and community-based approaches is definitely progress.*

Marion Kappenye Van de Copelo,  
Ambassador of the Netherlands to  
Colombia

This trend is driven by both linkages between and among these activities, and significant donor funding. In 2007, 1.6 billion dollars were spent, and over one million former combatants participated in some 20 formal DDR programs with some 90% of them in Africa (Muggah and Kingma, 2009).

DDR is a pivotal instrument in peacebuilding which is now widely considered as a set of activities undertaken in order to promote and institutionalize a peace which is not intended as the mere absence of war. Peacebuilding encompasses elements of political and governance improvements; socio-economic recovery, and security system reforms. At the same time, DDR

has been linked to medium to longer term reconstruction and development programs, starting from the assumption that it is not possible to achieve sustainable development without security and vice versa. DDR is therefore a tool meant to promote an environment conducive to the implementation of complex state-building, peace-building and social and economic reconstruction activities by not only responding to the fallout of violent conflict, but also reducing the underlying threats and the risks of conflict reoccurrence.

DDR is no longer confined to transitional and post-conflict phases, and is increasingly undertaken during “live conflicts.” In such contexts, DDR can serve as both a platform for longer-term peace-building processes, as well as an implicit component of counterinsurgency and anti-terror campaigns. Within the backdrop of globalization, DDR has also taken on a “second generation” form in the fight against global crime.

Combating Hidden Threats. Destroyed infrastructure, economic stagnation, and fragile state structures can provide an environment conducive to the growing threat of transnational crime. In these contexts, crime is likely to take two forms: predatory (theft, assault), and more complex and extended criminal networks focused on, for instance, trafficking in drugs or human beings. While some crime will always result from the “pull factor” exerted by opportunities for illicit wealth, in post-conflict settings the “push factor” created by the lack of legitimate economic opportunities is of greater concern.

Although inherently a political process often involving power sharing arrangements especially in the security sector, DDR is not a substitute for overall peace building and development. We need to be humble in our aims. We should not expect DDR to do or be everything to everyone. Our reach should not exceed our grasp. When attempting to allocate scarce resources among its security (disarmament), social welfare (demobilization), and development (reintegration) related functions, the strategic prioritizing, timing, sequencing, and coordinated integration of interventions is essential.

In many post-conflict situations, DDR and related programs of Interim stabilization (ISM) and Security Sector Reform (SSR) programs may be closely connected with the reconstruction of state institutions. As such, these programs may result in the realignment of political power within the state, and related processes of deconstructing and reconstructing the

social compact between the state and its' citizens. Therefore, DDR must be anchored in political will, local ownership, and institutional capability. It should optimally be established as a part of a broader peace building process bridging to development and legitimized by members of the community and enshrined in a legal framework.

## Context Matters

The drivers and character of war determine the nature and sustainability of peace. If the conflict is driven by greed, grievance or a mixture of both and is inter or intra state in nature, it will typically determine the duration and outcome. If it ends in a clear victory by one side or the other, through a negotiated settlement, or through third party mediation may also shape the nature of power sharing, the possibilities for transformation (i.e., addressing underlying structural causes), and the subsequent design and implementation of DDR and attendant peace and development programs. Thus, understanding and taking into account the history, local and regional context of the conflict in the design of any DDR program matters especially. This is especially so if the society is divided and the social fabric torn; the economy is in the doldrums with low labor absorption; and the reach and capacity of the state is weak creating a potential security vacuum. While heeding best practices, failures, and lessons learned, old worn DDR templates, conventional wisdom and pre-conceived assumptions should be held in abeyance. Seeking to engage actors, listen, understand and assess the local context in a non-judgmental manner is the first order of business. It would be helpful to use community focus groups, interviews with political and social leaders and surveys applied to representative sample of the population as means of consulting and better understanding the factors shaping the conflict and potential for peace and development. Program designers should pay attention to cross-border issues, including crime, migration flows, and human trafficking, and always take into account the cultural, historical, political, regional and local situation. It should form the basis for planning and designing, and eventually monitoring and evaluating any DDR program.

Also it is important not to forget that not all demobilized soldiers are criminals, and not all rebel groups are unwanted and unsupported. Some are considered freedom fighters, and are looked upon like heroes, which are accepted easily into society based on their constituencies. In other

contexts, populations may view former fighters with a complex mixture of respect, acceptance, and fear or total rejection.

Thus far it is clear that DDR involves social change. The disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration of armed groups marks a transition into a different society, but deep social change addressing the root causes of conflict may go beyond, and in the majority of cases it does go beyond the scope of DDR programs.

## Ensuring Local Ownership through Inclusive Dialogue

The local and regional context must be carefully assessed in order to identify the strategic priorities driving DDR planning, design and implementation. We must learn to listen better. Understanding the contextual factors unique to each environment— including the unique characteristics, needs and aspirations of the community— requires engaging in a dialogue with local stakeholders.

*You have to fight against invisible things... it is necessary to become part of the policymaking process. We cannot be relegated to oblivion. We need ownership.*

Sisneri Sanchez, former combatants,  
Colombia

Local ownership is critical if DDR is to make a meaningful and sustainable contribution to peace. However, having a legal framework can enhance transparency and accountability of all actors. International and national donors and implementing agencies must also share responsibility for ensuring that local ownership is real and meaningful, that is to say, characterized by good governance and democratic participation. Carefully designed DDR programs seek to understand local fears, needs, and aspirations, do not over design rigid interventions, retain flexibility and openness to learning, and build on local capacity and knowledge through an additive, not a substitution process.

In order to achieve a successful reintegration it is necessary to create real job opportunities and active social interaction and involvement. One possibility that cannot be overlooked is taking into account the diverse virtues and experiences that ex-combatants have from their “past life”. For example, some former combatants should be included in security system reform,

considering that several demobilized combatants lived outside the law and society for a significant length of time, and for them a demobilization process is in effect giving up their primary marketable skills and survival strategy. Ideally, some fraction of ex-combatants should be drawn back

into the security sector, especially where their experiences can be drawn upon. With this ownership over their process can also be enhanced. DDR programs are most likely to be effective if ex-combatants feel that they have both a stake in and some degree of control over the process. Participant ownership can also serve to legitimate the process. Ownership is a goal that should be obtained by all actors involved in the DDR process in two dimensions: political and programmatic. The first one refers to the participation in the policy determination of the process. The second one refers to the active participation in the design and implementation of the program.

*Striking the right balance between supporting national ownership and strengthening national capacities with the pressure to ensure the rapid implementation of DDR program remains a challenge*

Jordan Ryan, Director, Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery, UNDP

## Promoting Security, Development and Democratic Governance

The relationship between security, development and democratic governance is interactive, forming the key pillars of a 'holistic' framework for achieving sustainable peace and development. DDR should be viewed in relationship to this broader constellation. Such pillars of peace building and development should be conceived and implemented in an integrated and cohesive manner. When addressing the security component, DDR, ISM, and SSR instruments are tightly linked activities. The mix, timing and sequencing of ISM, DDR, and SSR must be tailored to each unique conflict situation. Depending upon the context, some of these instruments and related activities may overlap, be sequenced differently, or even be unnecessary. Interim stabilization measures may be especially useful to buy time and space in ongoing peace processes for parties to build trust, or where the absorptive capacity of the economy is low (risking the return of demobilized to rent seeking at the barrel of a gun), or where the risk of a security vacuum is evident.

Disarmament can be a particularly difficult and uncertain process depending upon the context. In some cases retaining arms is the only leverage a

group has in the negotiation process. In others, a culture of arms bearing (even legally sanctioned in some societies) suggests that possessing arms is not the real issue but their registration, monitoring and use is what matters most. For sure, the context will shape the management and outcome of disarmament. It should be noted that the discourse utilized to discuss such matters as disarmament, demobilization and reintegration may also be contextually specific. The preference to talk in terms of managing arms and armies; the “decommissioning” of weapons; or shared security and economic mainstreaming, may be more acceptable to some whereby disarmament is tantamount to surrender, and demobilization is an irrelevant term where combatants are citizen soldiers, farmers and fishermen, mobilized to fight as required. Finally, reintegration may be nebulous to those already living and working in their communities. However, if those communities or individuals are economically marginalized, then mainstreaming and improving their economic conditions may be a more appropriate discourse.

DDR programs must be conceived, designed, and implemented with local, national, and regional geopolitical interests and pressures in mind. Neighboring conflicts can form dangerous positive feedback loops, making DDR programs more difficult to implement, and less likely to succeed. With the acceleration of globalization spawned by the information technology revolution, DDR and related security promotion activities are increasingly being undertaken to manage malignant rather than malevolent threats. In several countries, DDR is being employed as a “second generation” tool to reduce the rising threat of domestic and international crime and public insecurity. Since there may often be no clear bargaining partner as such, DDR interventions must be designed to attract individuals (i.e., gang members) through carefully calibrated incentives and sanctions. The dominant task in such cases is the disarmament (small arms control), the creation of alternative, licit livelihoods, and the reduction of the potential pool of recruits (e.g., unemployed young males).

The CIDDR process has brought to the fore new and creative approaches across DDR processes such as “Interim Stabilization Measures” and “Second Generation”. As the act of sequestering weapons has an enormous impact on society and on the combatants perceptions of their own security as well as the meaning of arms within society (e.g., the presence of an “arms-bearing” culture) and the level of small arms proliferation, the

capacity of the state to provide security is critical to the DDR process. An example of these second generation tools can be disarmament programs which collect weapons for destruction through arms for cash, arms for development, and other such incentives. These new strategies overcome the limited results obtained through conventional DDR, which concentrated on compulsory measures to achieve disarmament. In fact, as mentioned earlier, it may be preferable to reconfigure the DDR process to begin with economic incentives of reintegration and only end with some form of disarmament or arms control dependent upon the context (i.e., from DDR to RDD to R2D2).

## **Economic Reintegration as a Bridge to Sustainable Development**

Reintegration requires addressing various forms of capital loss and access in an integrated fashion as well as the transparent and equitable distribution of such benefits (peace dividend). In designing social and economic reintegration programs, we must address the following capital deficits facing ex-combatants: lower levels of human capital (education, skills, working experience), insufficient productive assets (access to capital, land, technology and markets), and eroded social capital and cohesion (broken links between ex-combatants and the broader community). As this is typically a long term process requiring institutional capacity building and resource mobilization, Reinsertion (sometimes referred to as early reintegration) or the provision of a transitional safety net of basic goods and services for a fixed period of time may be required to ease the transition of former combatants into a productive civilian life. Debates range on the content, mix, timing and use of reinsertion assistance, be it in-kind, cash or some mixture. However there is general agreement that some form of transitional assistance during this critical and immediate adjustment period is required.

Targeting reinsertion and reintegration benefits to individual combatants and their families can also inadvertently create resentment among other receptor community members who feel victimized and left out of the equation. However, this tends to be a false dichotomy as in reality; it is possible to focus programs on both, through careful planning, timing, and sequencing. Information and sensitization campaigns both endeavoring to understand community needs as well as inform them of the various

programs of reintegration and recovery available to all are essential to manage resentment, fear and expectations in general.

There are inherent limitations of economic incentives to economic incentives. We must recognize that while necessary, monetary and material incentives may not be sufficient to attract potential participants towards DDR programs. Potential participants must believe that the DDR process is legitimate and fair. Also it is vital that economic incentives do not send the wrong message and achieve an opposite result, creating dependency and not encouraging self-sufficiency. In many cases, DDR is an inherently unfair process, because it cannot offer the same level of support to the whole community. Even community- or area-based approaches cannot offer identical benefits to all groups or persons needing support. A broad understanding of the long-term rationale for uneven benefits cannot be taken for granted. Perceived and or actual unfairness must be discussed, explained, and where possible mitigated.

## Social Reintegration as the Handmaiden of All Other Forms of Reintegration

Social reintegration is a foundational element of any peace process, upon which other forms of reintegration (economic and political) are built. If social reintegration is mishandled or fails, no other forms of reintegration can be expected to stick. Economic benefits are necessary but not sufficient incentives for potential participants in DDR programs. DDR must also be perceived as just and legitimate.

*Yes, we did wrong. We don't need to build infrastructure or bridges; we need to build social fabric. Despite all our flaws, we would like to help construct the new country.*

Sisneri Sanchez, former combatant,  
Colombia

First and foremost, we must move beyond stigmatizing and divisive language. When we talk about spoilers, winners, and losers, we are probably already on the wrong foot. Instead, we should be talking about stakeholders, and how they may best meet their collective needs. As a general principle, we must avoid becoming trapped in false dichotomies. Moving beyond stereotypical terms such as perpetrators and victims, we should avoid reinforcing such binary labels when the reality may be much more complex. Justice and peace are not

necessarily alternatives. Without some form of transitional justice, we cannot get to sustainable peace. We must to be inclusive, recognizing and better addressing the complex risks faced by groups with special needs, including women, children, and the disabled. Among other things, we must give more attention to the economic and social-psychological challenges they face.

Reconciliation is a long-term process. It may, indeed, be an overly ambitious goal in the immediate aftermath of conflict. In fact, it may be counterproductive to press for reconciliation when emotional and psychological wounds are still raw. In such cases, several more modest goals may be more appropriate: working towards peaceful coexistence in the near term, and helping victims come to terms with loss and grief. Former combatants are often treated as risks rather than resources, when they have the potential to play a vital role in rebuilding the state and society. Former combatants need opportunities to repair their image in the eyes of their community. They can become effective peacemakers. They are typically the first to reconcile and can have an important demonstration effect for other community members. Several contexts demobilized combatants have received conflict transformation training, finding useful roles in negotiations, facilitating dialogue, and conflict resolution in their communities of return.

The War to Peace Transition includes the transformation of identity. The DDR process in general and the social reintegration process in particular, essentially involve the transformation of identity. Former combatants need opportunities to internalize their changed roles and repair their image in the eyes of their community, as many suffer from stigma and isolation upon their return home. They must be given mechanisms to publicly cleanse their image. Traditional justice and reconciliation mechanisms can offer such opportunities. Demobilized persons can also take on concrete tasks that improve the well being of the community. To that end, the war to peace transition period can create opportunities for joint initiatives among receiving communities and returning ex-combatants toward social and economic reintegration. Environmental peacemaking activities, such as demining, reforestation, community cleaning etc. can build social cohesion among demobilized soldiers and community members on various levels. They can foster a sense of shared responsibility for the community and the environment, create trust and reconstruct identities, while providing economic opportunities to former combatants and the community as a whole.

Additionally it is significant to address concerns of special populations, like children, women and handicapped and acknowledge that they aren't a homogenous group either. Social reintegration and reconciliation is a very long-term goal, requiring at many years of sustainable effort and even a generation in some instances. This contrasts unfavorably with typical donor time horizons. It is crucial to achieve consensus between demobilized persons, other key groups, and society at large, on the goals and model for reintegration programs, and to secure the patience and long term support of external actors during the entire length of the process.

Ex-combatants as peacebuilders. Once committed to peace, armed groups might play a vital role in preventing new conflict; they can be vehicles for conflict prevention and transformation. They have greater credibility as they have gone through

*There cannot be sustainable development without peace and peace without security, nor security without justice .*

Francis Musoni, DDR Commission,  
Rwanda

similar processes. For example throughout the peace process, the IRA in Ireland, maintained its organizational structure, and continued to recruit and train new members, with a goal of “soaking up” new recruits who might otherwise join other dissident groups hostile to peace. Moreover demobilized fighters may play a powerful symbolic role in driving social reconciliation, if formerly opposed combatants are able to build trust and cooperate, the broader community might have less pretext and perceived claim in continuing to stigmatize former enemies.

## **Addressing the Root Causes of Conflict is a Necessary Condition for Sustainable Peace**

Reconciliation will be fragile if the causes of conflict are not addressed. Social reconciliation will be thin and brittle, at best, if the factors that drove violence in the first place are not addressed. Conflict drivers vary widely, but may include inequality of access to productive assets and basic services, limited political participation, social inequality, and the denial of cultural or linguistic rights. Although reconciliation efforts are typically focused on the damages inflicted by conflict itself rather than root causes, the political, social, or economic grievances that impelled violence will simply re-surface if they are not managed, risking the re ignition of conflict. The long-term, nearly generational cycles

of violence in many long-running conflicts should serve as a powerful reminder that sustainable peace building may require deeper social and political change.

## Planning for, Defining, and Measuring Success

Planning and Assessment is fundamental. In order to achieve short-term and long-term objectives, planning is crucial. Good planning is rooted in accurate conflict analysis, which must carefully “map” out the concerns, interests, and fears which structure the rationale, incentives, and interaction among various local actors. The voices of victims and local communities must be heard, but it is also important to take the experiences of ex-combatants into account. Effective participation requires the active listening to all actors, in order to incorporate and address their needs across all of the stages of the DDR cycle. Planning will also entail a careful assessment of the timing, sequencing and integrated-ness of interventions given the unique context.

*In the final analysis, we must always ask the fundamental questions: Will DDR help to reduce fear, will it foster trust, and will it provide grounds for hope?*

Andrew Rigby, Professor of Peace Studies, Coventry University

Defining and Measuring Success under Shifting Circumstances. While there is a clear need to better monitor and evaluate DDR programs, it is inherently difficult to measure goals and achievements, as each tend to shift over the DDR life cycle. Perhaps what is required are more comprehensive indicators and metrics that allow not only for the measurement of tactical short term goals (e.g., number of arms or combatants decommissioned) but also longer term strategic goals such as socio economic progress of the conflict affected population including the demobilized itself. We must always remember that while central to peace building and development, DDR is no substitute for addressing the underlying or structural causes of conflict, which may include inequality of access to productive assets and basic services, limited political participation, and social inequality. Addressing such causes is vital if peace is to be sustained. If nothing else this Congress has consolidated the shift in aim and discourse from DDR as an essential element in building a safer world per se to the broader goal of achieving democratic security, justice and development for all.



# Epilogue: A Call to Action-From International Congress to Global South-South Network

## Networking for peace – facilitating South-South Dialogue.

The audiovisual and written memoirs of the CIDDR will be published, accompanied by The Cartagena Contribution to DDR. This document will seek to contribute to the extant body of DDR knowledge and to complement existing documents on DDR, security, peace building, and development. All of these publications and materials will be available for reference at [www.cartagenaddr.org](http://www.cartagenaddr.org). The website will serve as a global forum, reference center and a virtual DDR community for DDR and peacebuilding practitioners, policymakers, and academics worldwide. A clarion call was made for the direct South-South exchange amongst those living DDR and peacebuilding process firsthand – governments, communities, victims and former combatants alike.

*The Congress achieved an important goal of facilitating and deepening South-South collaboration, where different contexts and perspectives shaped and generated new knowledge*

Juan Jose Daboub, Managing Director, the World Bank

*As the CIDDR demonstrated, the work is never completed; however the Congress certainly pushed the borders of what was known*

Karel Kovanda, Director-General, External Relations, the European Commission

## Priorities for the International Community.

Four main priorities emerged for the International Community: (i) improving employment opportunities and development programs in general; (ii) increasing financial assistance through external and local sources; (iii) involving women in the whole process, specifically developing programs to meet their needs and aspirations; and (iv) strengthening monitoring and evaluation processes— through increased funding and emphasis, and where possible through the explicit articulation of concrete, measurable program goals— to know whether we are achieving what we set out to achieve.

## **Unfinished Agenda: Key Challenges to National Governments.**

Three main challenges emerged for national governments: (i) taking a strong role in articulating local needs, perceptions, and capabilities to the international community; (ii) taking local ownership, not merely by asserting sovereignty or domestic priority, but by taking an active role in policy formation, drawing on local democratic participation and good governance; and (iii) owning problems as well as solutions, and approaching peacebuilding and recovery with a desire to meaningfully address the root causes of conflict and prevent the scourge of conflict forever.

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