



1. Project Data:		Date Posted : 08/13/2003	
PROJ ID: P056419		Appraisal	Actual
Project Name: Ex-combatants Reintegration Pilot Project	Project Costs (US\$M)	3.18	2.84
Country: Djibouti	Loan/Credit (US\$M)	2.73	2.50
Sector(s): Board: SP - Other social services (72%), Health (12%), Central government administration (8%), Sub-national government administration (8%)	Cofinancing (US\$M)		
L/C Number: C3154			
	Board Approval (FY)		99
Partners involved :	Closing Date	09/30/2000	06/30/2002
Prepared by :	Reviewed by :	Group Manager :	Group:
Roy Gilbert	Jorge Garcia-Garcia	Alain A. Barbu	OEDST
2. Project Objectives and Components			
a. Objectives			
To assist the Borrower in preparing and implementing innovative pilot programs designed to facilitate the reintegration of ex-combatants into civilian life (leading, if successful, to a follow-up operation).			
b. Components			
(i) Social mobilization : informing and sensitizing the general public about the reintegration program via radio, television, information brochures, seminars, meetings and field visits .			
(ii) Economic and social reintegration fund : preparing, supervising and financing pilot activities for reintegrating ex-combatants such as formal and informal training, income generating micro -projects, promotion of private sector employment, community infrastructure, and adult literacy .			
(iii) Assistance to disabled ex -combatants : medical services, rehabilitation and equipment for Djibouti city rehabilitation center, training programs, and adapting housing of disabled to improve accessibility .			
(iv) Capacity building : of project executing agency; provision of training programs for local community groups, NGOs and veterans associations that work with ex-combatants; social and economic assessment studies . (final component costs unreported)			
c. Comments on Project Cost, Financing and Dates			
According to the ICR, fewer Bank resources were mobilized for identification through to appraisal (US\$27,400) than for the ICR (US\$32,400), raising concerns about whether sufficient Bank resources were mobilized for project preparation. Actual implementation took more than three years, more than twice the appraisal estimate . Completion in June 2002 was nearly two years behind schedule .			
3. Achievement of Relevant Objectives:			
As demonstrated by the lack of a follow-up operation--the project's own indicator of success--this operation did not achieve its objective. While assistance was provided to 3,000 ex-combatants--half learned to drive, for instance--no more than 400 obtained employment as taxi and truck drivers, according to the borrower . Very few disabled ex-combatants were helped. Former rebels were not given assistance, that was directed mainly to former government soldiers. A positive feature of project design, but which was implemented on a very small scale only, was the emphasis upon targeting ex-combatant households for assistance, rather than just the demobilized soldier himself.			
4. Significant Outcomes/Impacts:			
none			
5. Significant Shortcomings (including non-compliance with safeguard policies):			
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> As a Learning and Innovation Credit (LIC) project design lacked a clear learning objective, and did not feature intensive monitoring and evaluation (M&E) necessary to understand the effectiveness of the approach being tried. Instead, the project focused upon an unusually ambitious development objective --similarly without M&E--while having inadequate resources and a very weak implementation capacity to achieve this objective . 			

- As designed into the project, the micro-enterprise support grants were perceived as handout, rather than as means to generate business activity and sustained employment . Micro-enterprises were selected on a first-come-first-served basis rather than from a pool of applications based on disclosed criteria, and only part of the demand was met. Some of those excluded launched a violent attack upon project staff .
- Violent antagonism provoked by the a priori exclusion of 75% of the target group of ex-combatants by a project financed by a very small credit of US\$2.5 million--itself just half the lending ceiling allowed for a LIC .

6. Ratings :	ICR	OED Review	Reason for Disagreement /Comments
Outcome :	Unsatisfactory	Unsatisfactory	
Institutional Dev .:	Negligible	Negligible	
Sustainability :	Unlikely	Highly Unlikely	Volatile refugee flows into and out of Djibouti owing to sub-regional political and military instability. Continuing lack of post-conflict political consensus within Djibouti. Violent antagonism toward the project itself by those who felt entitled to assistance, but excluded.
Bank Performance :	Unsatisfactory	Unsatisfactory	
Borrower Perf .:	Unsatisfactory	Unsatisfactory	
Quality of ICR :		Unsatisfactory	

NOTE: ICR rating values flagged with '*' don't comply with OP/BP 13.55, but are listed for completeness.

7. Lessons of Broad Applicability:

- A LICs or LIL can be an important instrument for small-scale Bank assistance in risky environments, but it needs to focus primarily upon *learning* with designs that incorporate monitoring targets of *learning* by the Bank itself, borrower agencies and other parties to the project .
- Project assistance of this kind should come sooner than five years after the end of a conflict (the moment when this credit became effective). As widely recognized (including by this project's PAD) lack of reintegration of demobilized soldiers can be most critical from economic and psycho-social perspectives in the first few post-conflict years.
- Economic and social reintegration of ex-combatants will only succeed when it is clearly a top priority for the borrower, and designed in partnership with local communities . Reintegration cannot be imposed by outsiders .
- When ex-combatants cannot be easily distinguished from the rest of society, support for reintegration may be better delivered to local communities which contain veterans, than to individuals - who are difficult to identify or to monitor. In this way, the project can have a wider impact on poverty and reach other vulnerable groups in society .
- When it is known that a project, a priori, cannot cover all the eligible target group, its design must incorporate selection criteria for those that will be chosen that should be as transparent and equitable as possible .

8. Assessment Recommended? Yes No

9. Comments on Quality of ICR:

Although the ICR candidly recognizes the shortcomings of this project performance, it does not cover some important points. For instance, it does not report data pertaining to project performance indicators called for in the project's log frame matrix. There is little information about the implementation of the social mobilization component, with its intended multi-dimensional communication channels with project beneficiaries . Similarly, the ICR does not systematically address the results of the planned evaluation of project performance . The ICR reports project cost, financing and procurement data inconsistently, raising doubts about the accuracy and coverage of the data provided .