

WORLD BANK HISTORY PROJECT

Brookings Institution

Transcript of interview with

E. PETER WRIGHT

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By: Devesh Kapur

FOREWORD

The following is a transcript of an oral interview conducted by the authors of the World Bank's fiftieth anniversary history: John P. Lewis, Richard Webb and Devesh Kapur, *The World Bank: Its First Half Century*, Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 1997. It is not a formal oral history, and it is not a systematic overview of the work of the person interviewed. At times the authors discussed the planned publication itself and the sources that should be consulted; at other times they talked about persons and publications extraneous to the Bank. Some interview tapes and transcripts begin and end abruptly. Nevertheless, the World Bank Group Archives believes that this transcript may be of interest to researchers and makes it available for public use.

E. Peter Wright
October 9, 1992 - Verbatim

[The volume of this recording is so low and there is so much interference that I can make out only bits and pieces most of the way through.--jgb]¹

[Begin Tape 1, Side A]

KAPUR: . . perhaps the one geographic area where the Bank's work has had the most, that's been Africa. I mean, that seems reasonable in some respects, I mean, *[inaudible]* and the story is still very messy. And I guess it started off from the late '60s as decolonization was occurring and so on and so forth. How do you see that episode? I mean, when you were there. That was mainly Francophone Africa?

WRIGHT: Well, now, I mean my nemesis in the Bank really was Nigeria, but Nigeria and the countries I was responsible for, which were the three Sahel countries (as it then was: Upper Volta, Niger, Mali) plus Nigeria, Ghana, Liberia, and Sierra Leone.

KAPUR: Oh, I see. Okay.

WRIGHT: *[inaudible]* French colonies to think about, countries.

KAPUR: Now, why do you say your nemesis was Nigeria?

WRIGHT: Well, that really doesn't make much significance. I think the Bank had a very difficult time with Nigeria after the--Nigeria had more money than it really knew what to do with, not particularly responsive to Bank advice. And, oh, I think this was purely accidental, my—you know, it was a very difficult country. It was the only country that I worked on at the Bank where I had what I would call uncomfortable country relations. And Ian Smith said one time, he said, "Non grata Nigeria"—I don't think I was, but really this was about something *[inaudible]* And it's always been a difficult area, and I got along quite decently without any problem with the Francophone countries. It shifted, you know, not accommodating enough to the French point of view and so on. But that's really by the way.

I mean, lending at the time when I was in charge of Nigeria was pretty frustrating because the government had more money than it knew what to do with. And this is when we launched--I mean, I was nominally program director for all those very elaborate, highly management-intensive roll-out projects in Nigeria, state projects, which I didn't particularly enjoy. I think *[inaudible]* taught me transferring British technologies from East Africa into Nigeria, and I don't know how those would come out in the end. They were much criticized. They were very heavily dependent on expatriates for technical assistance, huge numbers of Brits and others were hired to staff those projects. And I don't know to what extent—they certainly, I don't think, contributed much to relieving poverty, and how far I wouldn't know *[inaudible]* has any value added to the whole tribe of projects.

¹ Insertions by the Brookings project team are in []; additions by the World Bank Group Archives are in *italics* [].

KAPUR: Right, I mean the whole of the rural development process in Africa was . .

WRIGHT: Yes, I mean it was an East African model applied to West Africa, very much a British model.

KAPUR: Right, and I guess Nigeria also had a legacy of British . .

WRIGHT: Well, it did, yes, *[inaudible]* there was a project in the north of Ghana where we tried the same sort of approach, and Sierra Leone certainly. And, as I say, we were much criticized in Ghana, largely dependent on—and also *[inaudible]* expectations *[inaudible]* import substitution, putting in large quantities of fertilizers, seeds, *[inaudible]*, large farmers tend to take advantage of it. God knows who benefits. I think it was a question whether it was truly oriented to poverty alleviation.

KAPUR: What was the debate within the Bank between, say, the projects and the programs?

WRIGHT: Well, I don't think there was much of a debate. I mean, you had a lending target, in the case of IDA [*International Development Association*], IDA allocation, and you looked for things to lend for. The guiding principle was that you had to achieve, you know, fulfill your quotas on that. And depending a little on the--if you had enthusiastic project types, as we did certainly in agriculture in East Africa at that time, they tended to, you know, push the lending program. But I don't know whether--at the time they seemed to be well-designed primary *[inaudible]* basis for the projects, but they seemed technically to be well designed. I mean, I just don't know how—I mean, they came under a lot of criticism later on, in '77-'80, as being too country-intensive. As I say *[inaudible]* resistance *[inaudible]*

But West Africa generally, I don't think it was a—I think that phase of the Bank—when I look at it, I'd say about the Bank, from the point of view of somebody who was then in middle management, it was grossly over-managed. I think it was a mistake, myself, to set up two Africa regions in '72 because--certainly it was *[inaudible]* I don't think for so many layers of management really there was enough work to go round. Maybe—it's hard to say *[inaudible]*, but I think people were sort of tripping over each other and generally clearly as the Bank grew it became more and more bureaucratic, more and more staff time was really spent on coping with the institution's own requirements, talking to ourselves *[inaudible]* It helps in some ways. Less and less time was spent . . .

One of the big (and I think an issue that certainly it will address at some stage) is the overseas representation of the Bank because I've always argued very strongly that the Bank is simply not equipped to manage, particularly as they move more and more into management-intensive projects, to supervise technical assistance, supervise management to keep it properly. To travel all over with a lending program you really needed more people in the field. Missions coming out every six months to look at projects are simply not enough, particularly in the circumstances in Africa where government's pretty

unstable or where you've got a lot of hanky-panky going on probably on some of the projects and where the whole government apparatus should never be.

We didn't--one of the few things I succeeded in doing in West Africa was getting—against [Robert S.] McNamara's opposition, to be sure; he was very loath to assign staff to overseas posts for budgetary reasons. It costs twice as much to put a person in, say . .

KAPUR: So was Burke Knapp, I believe.

WRIGHT: Well, McNamara—I mean, I had a lot of opposition.

KAPUR: I see.

WRIGHT: I'm not suggesting that I had any great impact on this, but I did eventually get resident representatives in Mali and Ouagadougou in Upper Volta, and I think eventually one in Niger, too. But that was an ugly fight, and the primary objection was budgetary cost.

KAPUR: And that included the cost of flying in there and so on and so forth?

WRIGHT: Yeah, I mean, the sort of figures used to show that—I mean, they were calculated by P and B [*Planning and Budgeting*]-a staff member in post abroad costs [*inaudible*] four or five times what it costs at home, so they were seen as expensive luxuries. But certainly more and more the Bank got involved, particularly in the sort of areas of managing technical assistance, highly complex people in terms of projects, I think it was peculiar to manage those projects from Washington. There was not much question.

KAPUR: And in Nigeria, for example, in '73 with all the oil money rolling in, they also, I guess, were going in for large infrastructure-type projects.

WRIGHT: Yeah, well, we very—I mean the project I had problems with [*inaudible*] was the Lagos-Sudan road, because the Bank insisted that there was no justification for a four-lane highway, tried to cancel it and stop. The Nigerians were insistent that they would have a four-lane highway going from there. So we never financed the project, but then--you know, there was some people in Nigeria [*inaudible*] long vacation, which landed on my head [*inaudible*] In fact, as it was then, not committing to the four-lane highway was probably kind of a marginal case, and rather [*inaudible*] government go ahead with four lanes at once. But we did put, apart [*inaudible*] certainly the Nigerian government put, we could have [*inaudible*] I would have to refresh my memory on a particular program [*inaudible*] projects, but we also put money into highways, we put money into education [*inaudible*] And certainly the government [*inaudible*] Extremely expensive construction projects [*inaudible*]

KAPUR: Right. Now, the point which, you know, people make all the time is that the Bank's projects, even if they are well-designed but, look, in a lot of the countries is only

one of so many projects going on in the country, so what if one *[inaudible]* approve of the whole set of projects. And that becomes the rationale why a policy *[inaudible]* country. At that time were these things being debated in that region?

WRIGHT: I don't think there was much debate about—I mean, the problem really was to find viable projects to absorb the Bank's money or the IDA money, and I don't think there was much beyond that. The government had a broad projects initiate, initiated principally by governments, practical *[inaudible]* Lagos-Sudan road, I mean, was a project the government wanted, and so that the investment program . . .

I think in some of the smaller African countries which were very short on capital, probably the Bank did have a significant influence on shaping the investment program.

KAPUR: Were you looking at this carefully at public, when you were doing public investment reviews in the countries?

WRIGHT: No, I don't think in those days we had—an economist assigned, Ed Lim, who is now program director or country director for West Africa, I think he was the economist who went out *[inaudible]*

Then it seemed evident in the case of Nigeria was that they had more money than they really knew what to do with; they seemed *[inaudible]* things to do with it.

It's worth looking, I think, at the early, probably 1973 report on Nigeria which *[inaudible]* the idea that Nigeria would solve all its problems quickly. I mean, we greatly underestimated the country's capacity to spend money. By a number of years later, the country probably *[inaudible]*

Some of the others you should talk to who were involved later with Nigeria were—the area of ag specialization was a very good one.

KAPUR: Right. Actually, we have spoken with, but at that time it wasn't really-- systematic public investment reviews or public expenditure reviews were not mandated?

WRIGHT: No, I don't think they were, and *[inaudible]* But as far as the pattern of the Bank's lending was concerned, I think it was largely sort of looking around for viable projects which then suited the Nigerians which can be funded.

And we had the drought relief projects in 1973 which were put together for Sahelian countries *[inaudible]* projects, basic package that could be used for *[inaudible]* That was response to the drought, again *[inaudible]* They were really drought relief, huge drought relief projects.

KAPUR: Right. What was at that time in places like Mali and Upper Volta—I guess there must have been a potential or very limited capacity to implement. There must have

been a sense of very poor human resources. What were the sort of long-term issues of development with that kind?

WRIGHT: Well, I don't--my recollection of that time was there was nothing very systematic about the approach. They were desperately poor. They usually had some white elephants [*inaudible*] project. Upper Volta had one; spent a certain amount of time resisting.

KAPUR: Was that a Bank-financed?

WRIGHT: No, it wasn't, but they wanted the Bank to finance it and it clearly was not economic.

The—outside my own particular area, Congo's Gabon railroad [*inaudible*] insisted on going ahead with a project with the World Bank, demonstrated by the [*inaudible*] It was totally uneconomic.

KAPUR: And the Bank did not finance it.

WRIGHT: The Bank did not finance it.

The Transgabonais was [*inaudible*] quite a lot of management tensions for resisting. It was out of the government to pursue [*inaudible*] It was obviously not going to justify itself.

And we had [*inaudible*] in Sierra Leone—I think we eventually did make a loan for that.

But nearly always government was pushing for the type of projects which involved large foreign contracts and payoff to the people concerned.

KAPUR: Was corruption, I mean, at that time it isn't—I mean, it's an issue which we intend to look at. How has the Bank dealt with corruption?

WRIGHT: Well, the Bank was very innocent, wasn't it, about corruption. Gunnar Myrdal came, I remember, way, way back—must have been late '50s, early '60s--and gave a lecture in the Bank on essentially corruption and saying how the Bank was rather sheltered against this because its procurement policies provided fairly significant safeguards, particularly to the extent that we paid contractors direct rather than through governments. And I think the Bank was less heavily involved with fraud until it got into local council expenditures, schools and things like that. Obviously quite a lot of money must have been misappropriated, but I don't know that it was on a massive scale. But, again, I think the Bank's procurement policies which rely on [*inaudible*] guard against, you know, [*inaudible*] and that sort of thing. So I think the Bank [*inaudible*] I am not in position to judge; the public leaders should have known. But it was not seen as an issue on Bank lending in my time.

KAPUR: But it was not particularly an issue where, say, if one had a sense that there was corruption in the leadership more generally that, “Look, why should the Bank be lending to that country because there’s a lack of commitment toward development, actually?”

WRIGHT: Well, one of the things which always seemed to me frankly shocking—I was not; it was really after my time—Siaka Stevens is the president of Sierra Leone, which, as you know, had the governor of the central bank murdered largely for opposing his corruption and *[inaudible]* with funding directives. Now, it seemed to me immoral that the Bank should continue to lend to Sierra Leone; I don’t think that actually deterred the Bank from doing so. I mean Sierra Leone for other reasons became--that was a case where there was notorious corruption at the presidential level. And that always did seem to me to be rather shocking. I mean *[inaudible]*

KAPUR: Now, how was—I mean, I guess the—that’s what we’ve been discovering, here you have what is to an extent common knowledge; whereas, there’s a sense that, “Look, you have a person who has all these characteristics.” Presumably at some level in the Bank this gets then discussed . .

WRIGHT: Well . .

KAPUR: “Should we or should we not?”

WRIGHT: I don’t know. 

KAPUR: Yet McNamara did do—and I’ve seen several cases like, for example, *[Zulfikar Ali]* Bhutto or, you know, in Pakistan, where paradoxically Bhutto was going in for all sort of populist social sector programs, which were, which seemed ostensibly in tune with Bank’s own, with what McNamara was pushing then. But whether McNamara was just really still harboring a great deal of anger over that whole East Pakistan-Bangladesh *[inaudible]*, he just said, you know, “No. The country follows the programs *[inaudible]*”

WRIGHT: Yes, well, I don’t think McNamara had much—I don’t think he had been involved in the problems in what was going on in Sierra Leone . .

KAPUR: Right, but that could have been more at the level of *[Roger A.]* Chaufournier and Burke Knapp.

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WRIGHT: Yes. Well, Chaufournier certainly was quite stalwart, I think, in resisting the Transgabonais. I think he caught a lot of pressure from the companies on this *[inaudible]* Pressure, again, I know from the *[inaudible]* I suspect that the French probably *[inaudible]*

Then there was the whole--I was involved with, which was *[inaudible]* in Ghana where *[inaudible]* credit risk. I mean, if you're interested, this is very mini stuff as far as the Bank was concerned. Organizing international support for Ghana back in the 1970s was difficult under the overall debt. Institutions *[inaudible]*

KAPUR: How did—I guess it might be a good story for how in those days the Bank dealt with debt.

WRIGHT: Well, there I think we were patiently trying to work with the government to re-establish its credit, acting to some extent as an advocate on the government's case vis-à-vis the lenders. And, as I say, not always successfully. *[inaudible]* negotiations suspended.

I went with McNamara on a trip to West Africa. We went, I think, to Sierra Leone, Liberia. And so then in Liberia, I guess, we took *[inaudible]* We used to send a helicopter out with *[inaudible]* standard procedure was *[inaudible]* turn around. McNamara was still following that logic. Long lists of technical assistance *[inaudible]* projects, swept around and asked some pointed questions and flew out again. *[inaudible]* He was, I think, very good at dealing with governments. He had a presence. He was also *[inaudible]* sense of humor outside the Bank, particularly when his wife was with him. I traveled with him *[inaudible]*

KAPUR: Right. His wife seems to have had a very . . .

WRIGHT: She had a softening influence; she was . . .

KAPUR: A real anchor.

WRIGHT: . . . very warm person, receptive.

You could get McNamara together with two martinis and, you know, he would relax and you could talk to him about anything imaginable that you wanted to. But he was *[inaudible]*

I remember when we were in Sierra Leone, actually. McNamara was *[inaudible]* stay on his timetable. We were going to get to the airport at whatever time it was the plane was supposed to arrive; the plane was due to arrive at 9:30 or whatever. Word came through that the plane was delayed by several hours, but McNamara was determined to get to the airport at 9:30 and he did, you know, so he'd sat around the airport waiting for several hours until the plane arrived in Sierra Leone to fly us to Liberia. It was the time that was programmed.

KAPUR: At that time were you still in--I would imagine that the ex-colonial influence was still a little bit there in both parts of West Africa, the British and the French.

WRIGHT: Yes.

KAPUR: Did that influence affect the Bank's program?

WRIGHT: I'd say the French colonial influence was much more present than the British. I mean, *[inaudible]* the Nigerian civil service and all that had a long British tradition behind them, but the presence of the British was much less evident than the presence of the French at that time. In the Ivory Coast and Guinea *[inaudible]* in government *[inaudible]*

KAPUR: Right. But did that in any way influence the Bank policy for lending?

WRIGHT: No, I think possibly--well, I think the French have always been much more protective of the Franc area and all that, but they have much closer links with Francophone countries of West Africa than the British did with their former colonies. I frankly don't remember there ever being either in Ghana or in Nigeria any great British pressures for the Bank to do this or that. I think they were more likely to get involved in *[inaudible]*

KAPUR: But you didn't particularly remember any times when the Bank actually changed.

WRIGHT: No, I don't think it changed. I think—well, we did a lot of joint financing. Well, we did a lot of financing of *[inaudible]*

In general, just you met many more Frenchmen in the Francophone countries than you met British in the British countries. The British *[inaudible]* other policy. *[inaudible]*

KAPUR: Oh, I see. [both speaking at once]

I have no idea what happened to Professor *[John P.]* Lewis.

WRIGHT: It doesn't matter.

KAPUR: No, he'd be extremely embarrassed, something must have--he actually has moved to a new place and doesn't have a car, so he has to get to the bus and get across. Something must have happened.

WRIGHT: Yes, well, it must be true.

KAPUR: No, I'm sure he would be . .

WRIGHT: If any of the things I've talked about that are of particular interest to you, I will—and I've got a lot of papers I can . . .

KAPUR: Right. After this I think the ones . .

WRIGHT: Public administration I think [both speaking at once]

KAPUR: Yes, that was one which would be very good, and the other was the ones on Mexico and India in '78 . .

WRIGHT: Yes, I'll dig those out.

KAPUR: . . the impact of Bank policies on economic . . .

WRIGHT: Those, as I say, [*inaudible*]

KAPUR: No, no. In fact it might have left an imprint on that, but it helps us to see how you felt at that point in time.

WRIGHT: Yes, these would have, as I say, two of the [*inaudible*] reports we did on the countries [*inaudible*] I'll dig them out and send them to you.

KAPUR: Right, right. That would be—and, you know, I'll just Xerox those and send them back to you.

After you left—you said you'd been sort of off and on doing work for the Bank or . .

WRIGHT: Well, the only mission I went on—I mean, I did, I went with a mission to Paraguay [*inaudible*] I've done that also in Egypt [*inaudible*] pretty well all the work I've done since retirement. A lot of editorial [*inaudible*] for public [*inaudible*] papers.

KAPUR: I see, I see. Have you, reading through that since you sort of in a sense set the Bank in that direction in the '80s, essentially as you continue to read their reports, have you seen any change?

WRIGHT: Well, I think--I mean there are certain areas which—at the moment a lot of their work is on—I think that the most enterprising member of the group is Mary Shirley [*inaudible*] work on public enterprises [*inaudible*] dig out a paper which I think must have been circulated or published recently in a series on privatization [*inaudible*] Geoff [*Geoffrey B.*] Lamb, he was also [*inaudible*] retirement. I helped Mary Shirley to evaluate some of the other projects in places and some of the [*inaudible*]

KAPUR: Was it your sense that the Bank had the expertise to get into these?

WRIGHT: Well, I don't know about--yes, I think the Bank has always some [*inaudible*] and that's true I suppose is it's relatively objective and detached [*inaudible*] area, hired on

outside consultants for projects and so on. I think we *[inaudible]* a lot of the big accounting firms had people who actually designed systems on projects rather than the Bank itself *[inaudible]*

KAPUR: Have—in a sense, if one gets Arthur Anderson to design for Sierra Leone, isn't there the same danger as in the rural development department, as well designed and .

..

WRIGHT: Well, I think there possibly is. I mean, it depends what you are asking consultants to do. If you're asking them to set up systems, accounting systems or whatever, I think they—I mean, it's a question of transfer of technology, in a sense. *[inaudible]* Where there's very little capacity in the country itself, there's no real option but to bring in outside consultants or outside experts to resolve that problem. *[inaudible]* systems which don't grow naturally. *[inaudible]*

KAPUR: I guess all this--do you have a sense of changing appreciation, of being a, of having greater political savvy . .

WRIGHT: In the Bank?

KAPUR: . . because of Upper Volta.

WRIGHT: No, I don't because, well, I mean a theme I suppose which runs through the whole history of the Bank is country specialization. The Bank has not, on the whole, in its personnel policies, encouraged country specialization. And it's my impression now, much more than early days, people have moved around so much there's virtually no *[inaudible]* so it's quite difficult to find people who really know their countries. And much of my *[inaudible]* work experience in the Bank was working on India because I was continuously involved in India for a period of eight or nine years approximately *[inaudible]* was accepted on the other side as somebody who's . .

KAPUR: Trust.

WRIGHT: . . who's somewhat sympathetic to their *[inaudible]* and so forth.

The Bank, partly, I mean, like foreign services, is reluctant to let people become too knowledgeable about countries, I suppose *[inaudible]*

KAPUR: The danger of becoming native.

WRIGHT: That's right. And I suppose I was considered a native in India *[inaudible]* essentially fair enough.

But it's my impression that *[long inaudible section]* that this has become more and more a problem in successive years *[inaudible]* shopping around the Bank. I don't--I'm not

close enough to the Bank to know how this latest management set up works, but certainly to find people who are experts in that, a country rather than in particular . .

KAPUR: Sectors.

WRIGHT: . . sectors [inaudible] I think it was a weakness of the Bank to have shopping around too much. And as I say, [inaudible] But I think people who—well, Bernie [Bernard R.] Bell in Indonesia was a good example to some extent, I suppose . .

KAPUR: You mean . . .

WRIGHT: Native, although I think that was a productive period of the Bank's relationship with Indonesia. I think [inaudible] after that. There have been one or two other cases, I suppose, where the Bank has protected the resident mission, at times in India [long inaudible section] South America.

KAPUR: I guess in some--the only one I can think of is the director for Mexico has had a long since about the '80s is Rainer Steckhan.

WRIGHT: Yes, he has been.

KAPUR: He is one of the rare cases.

WRIGHT: He is, he has, but a lot of people consider moving [inaudible] particular.

KAPUR: And now with people sensing the brownie points in East Europe have been moving there.

WRIGHT: Yeah. But, as I say, I [inaudible]

KAPUR: Yes, no, there is no . . .

WRIGHT: [inaudible] Now, let me look up those things and refurbish my memory a little bit. I know that [inaudible]

KAPUR: Right, okay. So in that case if you could send us that and then we'll have a chance to look at it, and then we'll Xerox it and send it to you back and then we can chat with you a little more on the paper because that is often . .

WRIGHT: I'll leave you to look after the one on Bank and the administration. If you don't find it, let me know. I think you have my telephone numbers [both speaking at once]

KAPUR: Okay. Right. Absolutely.

WRIGHT: And I'll be around here. If I can help, commenting on papers or . .

KAPUR: Yes, we would, I mean Richard would—I mean, we would be just delighted.

WRIGHT: I have a reputation to keep as the best sub-editor in the Bank. *[inaudible]*

KAPUR: Oh, there's a real difference between papers of earlier years and now in terms of knowledge in the earlier *[inaudible]*

WRIGHT: Well, I mean that's another theme, I think. I suppose it's been coming into prominence again. Has the Bank just has set up a study of the role of the Board *[of Executive Directors]*?

KAPUR: Yeah.

WRIGHT: *[inaudible]*

KAPUR: In fact, you know, it's been substantially changed, the role of the Board, because of a couple of Board members are no longer going to review projects, individual projects.

WRIGHT: Certainly--I'm over time. I will send you a copy of the letter I wrote to *[Alden W.]* Clausen when I left because *[inaudible]* express two things that seemed to me important were this *[inaudible]* what advice would you give to the *[inaudible]* One, the legacy of representation on the Board *[inaudible]* adequate to establish its presence in the country, and the other was just the volume of words. I mean, which is partly a function of the Board's position, the everything *[inaudible]* Board's, pass under the existing Board *[inaudible]* for avoiding error. I mean, if you agree with your papers and—that was certainly true under McNamara *[inaudible]* people in attendance. You know, people were scared of being found out, having a wrong figure or wrong statement, petty inaccuracies, at a very high cost held against them.

KAPUR: *[both speaking at once]* The trees for the forest sort of.

WRIGHT: Yeah, just simply being found out in error, you know, was apparently seen to be--just getting a little note to the Board on time was a brownie point. If you went back *[inaudible]* trigger or some inaccuracy would be picked up at the Board, able to . . .

So the Bank, I mean, the cost to the Bank of avoiding error in that sense was very high.

KAPUR: Which meant that he spent more and more time with *[inaudible]*

WRIGHT: Well, yeah, he would use an assistant, probably, reading papers, commenting on papers. Again, I read something recently *[inaudible]*

You are in principle, as I gather from Richard *[Webb]*, telling the history of the Bank from the beginning.

KAPUR: The beginning, absolutely. Because I think—I mean, I think we will touch the early years with a lighter touch without a doubt. The Bank has become a different creature, its sheer size and volume, since McNamara's . . .

WRIGHT: And become much more politicized [*inaudible*] this concept of UNESCO on the Potomac.

Have you worked in the Bank yourself?

KAPUR: No. No, I'm afraid not.

WRIGHT: Where do you . . .

KAPUR: I have been finishing a Ph.D. under John, and so he got me.

WRIGHT: You come from India or Pakistan?

KAPUR: Yes, from India.

WRIGHT: Whereabouts?

KAPUR: From Calcutta.

WRIGHT: Uh-huh. CMPO [*Calcutta Metropolitan Planning Organization*]. Well, that's another thing that's--I remember writing a report on India in 1960. We had a great blast about the appalling conditions in [*inaudible*] and I think that led to the setting up of the CMPO.

KAPUR: Yes, exactly, CMPO and then this led to the CMDA [*Calcutta Metropolitan Development Authority*].

WRIGHT: We gave a lot of space in that report on the horrors of Calcutta, Hoogly and all this, that, and the other.

KAPUR: It's not that bad.

[End Tape 1, Side B]

[End of interview]