Document of The World Bank Report No: ICR1708 IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION AND RESULTS REPORT (TF-57072) ON A GRANT IN THE AMOUNT OF US$8.5 MILLION TO THE REPUBLIC OF LIBERIA FOR AN INFRASTRUCTURE REHABILITATION PROJECT February 25, 2013 Transport Sector Country Department AFCW1 Africa Region CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS (Exchange Rate Effective September 29, 2006) Currency Unit = LRD 59.50 LRD = US$1 0.6760 SDR = US$1 US$1.4773 = SDR1 FISCAL YEAR July 1 – June 30 ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS AGL Airfield Ground Lighting AIDP Agriculture and Infrastructure Development Project CAA Civil Aviation Authority CD Channel Depth DME Distance Measuring Equipment DVOR Doppler VHF Omnidirectional Radio dwt Deadweight Tonnage EC European Commission EIP Emergency Infrastructure Project EMP Environmental Mitigation Plan FM Financial Management GOL Government of Liberia IBRD International Bank for Reconstruction and Development ICAO International Civil Aviation Organization ICB International Competitive Bidding IDA International Development Association IIU Infrastructure Implementation Unit ILS Instrumental Landing System ISR Implementation Status Report LIBRAMP Liberia Road Asset Management Project LIRP Liberia Infrastructure Rehabilitation Project LPRC Liberia Petroleum and Refinery Corporation LRTF Liberia Reconstruction Trust Fund M&E Monitoring and Evaluation MOF Ministry of Finance MPW Ministry of Public Works NPA National Ports Authority PAD Project Appraisal Document PDO Project Development Objective pEIA Preliminary Environmental Impact Assessment PFMU Project Financial Management Unit PMU Project Management Unit PPF Project Preparation Facility PPP Public-Private-Partnership TEU Twenty-foot Equivalent Unit REOI Request for Expression of Interest RIA Roberts International Airport ROM Rough-Order-Magnitude RPM Regional Procurement Management SIU Special Implementation Unit SOEs State Owned Entities TA Technical Assistance TFLIB Trust Fund for Liberia UN United Nations URIRP Urban and Rural Infrastructure Rehabilitation Project US United States VHF Very High Frequency Vice President: Makhtar Diop Country Director Yusupha B. Crookes Country Manager: Inguna Dobraja Sector Director Jamal Saghir Sector Manager: Supee Teravaninthorn Project Team Leader: Kulwinder Singh Rao ICR Team Leader: Muhammad Zulfiqar Ahmed REPUBLIC OF LIBERIA Liberia Infrastructure Rehabilitation Project CONTENTS Data Sheet A. Basic Information B. Key Dates C. Ratings Summary D. Sector and Theme Codes E. Bank Staff F. Results Framework Analysis G. Ratings of Project Performance in ISRs H. Restructuring I. Disbursement Graph 1.   Project Context, Development Objectives and Design ............................................ 1 2.  Key Factors Affecting Implementation and Outcomes ............................................ 8 3.  Assessment of Outcomes........................................................................................ 14 4.  Assessment of Risk to Development Outcome ...................................................... 21 5.  Assessment of Bank and Borrower Performance ................................................... 22 6.  Lessons Learned ..................................................................................................... 24 7.  Comments on Issues Raised by Borrower/Implementing Agencies/Partners ........ 27 Annex 1: Project Costs and Financing .............................................................................. 28 Annex 2: Outputs by Component ..................................................................................... 29 Annex 3: Economic and Financial Analysis ..................................................................... 31 Annex 4: Bank Lending and Implementation Support/Supervision Processes ................ 34 Annex 5: Beneficiary Survey Results ............................................................................... 35 Annex 6: Stakeholder Workshop Report and Results....................................................... 36 Annex 7: Summary of Borrower's ICR and/or Comments on Draft ICR ......................... 37 Annex 8: Comments of Co-financiers and Other Partners/Stakeholders.......................... 43 Annex 9: List of Supporting Documents on File .............................................................. 44 MAP DATASHEET A. Basic Information Liberia Infrastructure Country: Liberia Project Name: Rehabilitation Project Project ID: P101456 L/C/TF Number(s): TF-57072 ICR Date: 07/06/2012 ICR Type: Core ICR GOVERNMENT OF Lending Instrument: ERL Borrower: LIBERIA Original Total USD 8.50M Disbursed Amount: USD 8.50M Commitment: Revised Amount: USD 8.50M Environmental Category: B Implementing Agencies: Special Implementation Unit Cofinanciers and Other External Partners: B. Key Dates Revised / Actual Process Date Process Original Date Date(s) Concept Review: 05/09/2006 Effectiveness: 11/28/2006 11/28/2006 Appraisal: 05/15/2006 Restructuring(s): Approval: 11/13/2006 Mid-term Review: 11/30/2007 10/17/2008 Closing: 09/30/2010 09/30/2010 C. Ratings Summary C.1 Performance Rating by ICR Outcomes: Moderately Satisfactory Risk to Development Outcome: Moderate Bank Performance: Moderately Satisfactory Borrower Performance: Moderately Satisfactory C.2 Detailed Ratings of Bank and Borrower Performance (by ICR) Bank Ratings Borrower Ratings Moderately Quality at Entry: Moderately Satisfactory Government: Unsatisfactory Implementing Quality of Supervision: Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory Agency/Agencies: Overall Bank Overall Borrower Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory Performance: Performance: i C.3 Quality at Entry and Implementation Performance Indicators Implementation QAG Assessments Indicators Rating Performance (if any) Potential Problem Project Quality at Entry No None at any time (Yes/No): (QEA): Problem Project at any Quality of No None time (Yes/No): Supervision (QSA): DO rating before Satisfactory Closing/Inactive status: D. Sector and Theme Codes Original Actual Sector Code (as % of total Bank financing) Aviation 7 7 Central government administration 9 9 Ports, waterways and shipping 84 84 Theme Code (as % of total Bank financing) Conflict prevention and post-conflict reconstruction 40 40 Infrastructure services for private sector development 40 40 Pollution management and environmental health 20 20 E. Bank Staff Positions At ICR At Approval Vice President: Makhtar Diop Gobind T. Nankani Country Director: Yusupha B. Crookes Mats Karlsson Sector Manager: Supee Teravaninthorn C. Sanjivi Rajasingham Project Team Leader: Kulwinder Singh Rao Gylfi Palsson ICR Team Leader: Muhammad Zulfiqar Ahmed ICR Primary Author: Muhammad Zulfiqar Ahmed F. Results Framework Analysis Project Development Objectives (from Project Appraisal Document) To provide government with emergency support to restore priority infrastructure in the port of Monrovia and at Roberts International Airport and assist the government in developing medium term strategic framework for efficient and productive port and aviation sectors. Revised Project Development Objectives (as approved by original approving authority) ii (a) PDO Indicator(s) Original Target Formally Actual Value Values (from Revised Achieved at Indicator Baseline Value approval Target Completion or documents) Values Target Years Access to the Port of Monrovia is preserved: vessels with 10.5 meter draft or less Indicator 1 : can enter the port. Value Rapid channel silting Rapid channel Fully achieved. quantitative or threatens closure of silting threatens Dredging Qualitative) channel. closure of channel. completed. Date achieved 11/07/2006 12/01/2006 09/30/2010 Comments (incl. % achievement) Oil jetty strengthened, fully operational and safe with vessel discharging capacity Indicator 2 : of up to 30,000 dwt. Value Oil jetty is Oil jetty is deteriorated quantitative or deteriorated and Dropped and can collapse. Qualitative) can collapse. Date achieved 11/07/2006 12/01/2006 04/22/2008 This activity was dropped as the bids for dredging works - highest priority of the Comments project - came in much higher (almost 92 percent of the Grant funds). This (incl. % component is now being implemented under the Urban and Rural Infrastructure achievement) Rehabilitation Project and Agriculture and Infrastructure Development Project. The re-allocation of grant proceeds were approved in April 2008. Indicator 3 : Firefighting capacity at the Port of Monrovia established. Value Firefighting Firefighting capacity does quantitative or capacity does not Dropped not exist. Qualitative) exist. Date achieved 11/07/2006 12/01/2006 04/22/2008 Comments This activity was dropped due to cost overruns in the port dredging contract and (incl. % the grant proceeds were re-allocated in April 2008 achievement) Efficient and reliable container handling service: a minimum of 10 moves per Indicator 4 : hour and 10 days or less dwell time. Achieved through Value Private concession quantitative or 3 moves per hour. 3 moves per hour. in place since Qualitative) February 2011. Date achieved 11/07/2006 12/01/2006 09/30/2010 Comments Container terminal contract in place: Average annual crane productivity of 10 (incl. % TEUs/hour and 10 days dwell time or less achievement) Indicator 5 : Minimum ICAO air navigation safety international standards met. Value ICAO standards are not ICAO standards quantitative or Fully achieved. met. are not met. Qualitative) iii Date achieved 11/07/2006 12/01/2006 09/30/2010 Comments (incl. % achievement) Indicator 6 : Strategic port and aviation framework formulated. Value No comprehensive sector No comprehensive quantitative or Dropped strategies. sector strategies. Qualitative) Date achieved 11/07/2006 12/01/2006 04/22/2008 Development of strategic framework for the two sub-sectors became redundant Comments as the Government, under Bank funding through the Bank supported AIDP (incl. % started developing a comprehensive National Transport Policy comprising of achievement) strategies, action plans and an investment framework. (b) Intermediate Outcome Indicator(s) Original Target Formally Actual Value Values (from Revised Achieved at Indicator Baseline Value approval Target Completion or documents) Values Target Years The port entrance and basin are brought to the required depth for the vessels Indicator 1 : calling without risk of grounding: channel width of 150 meters; channel depth of Channel Depth of 11 meters Value Rapid channel silting Rapid channel Fully achieved. quantitative or threatens closure of silting threatens Dredging Qualitative) channel. closure of channel. completed. Date achieved 11/07/2006 12/01/2006 09/30/2010 Comments Activity quantum increased due to additional dredging volumes resulting in cost (incl. % overrun. achievement) The import of the basic fuel categories (heavy oil, gas oil, gasoline and jet fuel) is Indicator 2 : taking place under safe and secure conditions: oil jetty structure refurbished including construction of new off-load station, mooring dolphins, walkways Value Oil jetty is Oil jetty is deteriorated quantitative or deteriorated and Dropped and can collapse. Qualitative) can collapse. Date achieved 11/07/2006 12/01/2006 04/22/2008 Comments This activity was dropped due to project cost overrun The re-allocation of grant (incl. % proceeds were approved in April 2008. achievement) Indicator 3 : Capacity to combat large fires restored (at the Port of Monrovia). Value Firefighting Firefighting capacity does quantitative or capacity does not Dropped not exist. Qualitative) exist. Date achieved 11/07/2006 12/01/2006 04/22/2008 Comments This activity was dropped due to cost overruns in the port dredging contract. The (incl. % grant proceeds were re-allocated in April 2008 achievement) iv Container terminal contract in place: Average annual crane productivity of 10 Indicator 4 : TEUs/hour and 10 days dwell time or less Achieved through Value Private concession quantitative or 3 moves per hour. 3 moves per hour. in place since Qualitative) February 2011. Date achieved 11/07/2006 12/01/2006 09/30/2010 Comments Container terminal contract in place: Average annual crane productivity of 10 (incl. % TEUs/hour and 10 days dwell time or less achievement) Airfield Ground Lighting (AGL) for runway and taxiway in place and Indicator 5 : Instrumental Landing System (ILS) for instrumental and precision approach is fully calibrated and operational Value ICAO standards are not ICAO standards quantitative or Fully achieved. met. are not met. Qualitative) Date achieved 11/07/2006 12/01/2006 09/30/2010 Comments (incl. % achievement) Improved technical capacity by a core of SIU/MPW, NPA and RIA senior staff Indicator 6 : and understanding of principal Bank policies and procedures Value quantitative or \No information. Partially acheived. Qualitative) Date achieved 11/07/2006 12/01/2006 09/30/2010 Comments (incl. % Hiring of Environment and Port Engineers did not materialize achievement) Government decision on strategic direction and reform of port and aviation Indicator 7 : sectors Value quantitative or Dropped Qualitative) Date achieved 04/22/2008 Comments (incl. % This activity was undertaken under IDA funded AIDP. achievement) Indicator 8 : Fully staffed and operational SIU at MPW and PFMU at MOF Value quantitative or N/A Achieved. Qualitative) Date achieved 11/07/2006 04/22/08 Comments (incl. % achievement) Indicator 9 : The SIU manages LIRP activities in conformance with legal and fiduciary v requirements, as stated in the Grant Agreement Value quantitative or N/A Partially achieved. Qualitative) Date achieved 11/07/06 09/30/2010 Comments (incl. % Compliance to Project covenant on aircraft liability insurance was not successful. achievement) G. Ratings of Project Performance in ISRs Actual Date ISR No. DO IP Disbursements Archived (USD millions) 1 12/22/2006 Satisfactory Satisfactory 0.00 2 03/25/2007 Satisfactory Satisfactory 0.50 3 11/29/2007 Satisfactory Satisfactory 8.21 4 05/29/2008 Satisfactory Satisfactory 8.36 5 12/16/2008 Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 8.50 6 06/24/2009 Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 8.50 7 12/08/2009 Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 8.50 8 06/10/2010 Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 8.50 H. Restructuring (if any) There was no formal restructuring of the Project done, except for the re-allocation of categories in April 2008, and the final figures after the closing on September 30, 2010. I. Disbursement Profile . vi 1. Project Context, Development Objectives and Design 1. Post conflict Bank’s re-engagement plan in Liberia focused on three priority areas: economic management; infrastructure rehabilitation; and community-based development. The Bank’s strategy envisaged financing from both the Low Income Countries under Stress (LICUS) Trust Fund and a grant from the Bank’s surplus. Subsequently, the Board of Governors of the Bank approved the transfer from surplus to a Trust Fund for Liberia (TFLIB) in the amount of US$25 million as a grant to be administered by IDA. Out of the $25 million, an amount of $8.5 million was allocated towards this project. 2. The strategic goal for the Bank’s engagement under this project was to assist in the process of peaceful economic recovery of Liberia. The project contributed by rebuilding shattered infrastructure in two high priority sub-sectors; port and air transport. Improved safety of operations and refurbished facilities at the Port of Monrovia and Roberts International Airport (RIA) helped safeguard the fragile peace and order, and assisted in attracting private operators for business in Liberia. 3. This project built on the work carried out under the Infrastructure Rehabilitation Technical Assistance (TA) Project financed under the TFLIB. The TA financed the technical assessment of the Port of Monrovia with the aim of identifying emergency works and actions to bring operations to acceptable levels. The assessment concluded that immediate intervention was needed to rehabilitate the infrastructure in order to keep the port operational. Identified emergency works were in the range of US$40 million, of which this project proposed to support critical repairs at about US$7.0 million in the Port and Airport sub- sectors with an overall project cost of US$8.5 million. 1.1 Context at Appraisal 4. Liberia was close to middle-income threshold before the economic collapse and the start of civil strife in the 1980s. During the years of conflict, the country experienced a significant decline in living standards and is currently one of Africa's poorest nations. The peace agreement and the subsequent stability, resulting in the successful inauguration of a newly elected Government in January 2006, offered Liberia a unique opportunity to rebuild its shattered economy and to establish a stable and democratic society. The new administration was assured continued support of the United Nations and other development partners in maintaining security and assisting the Government of Liberia (GOL) in the restoration of basic services, infrastructure and good governance. However, the challenges were immense. 5. The case for the Bank involvement in Liberia at that time was compelling. Following nearly three years of peace and with a newly democratically-elected Government in place, the ground had been prepared for reconstruction and recovery. To build a functioning economy and to restore the livelihood of the country's population, Liberia's new Government relied on an adequate response from the donor community both in terms of expertise and finance. In addition, peace provided a window of opportunity for the Bank to rebuild its 1 knowledge base and understanding of national partner institutions, both of which were essential to increase readiness for a Bank lending program when that became possible. 6. The activities completed under the project built on the TFLIB-financed infrastructure feasibility studies that provided technical assessments of the Port of Monrovia and the RIA in Monrovia. The studies identified emergency works and developed bidding documents which were shared with donors. The project helped the GOL both to mobilize resources from other donors and to coordinate various inputs and contributions. Such coordination was essential in assisting the Government while they established and coherently managed the overall reconstruction program. 7. Immediate emergency investments at the Port of Monrovia and RIA were critical. Given the dilapidated condition of the port structures, it was reasonable to expect system, facility or equipment failures or collapse to occur at any given time. The port being the supply line of the country both in terms of food and fuel, any disruption in the port services would have led to increased commodity prices (especially of rice and fuel) and, thus, jeopardized stability. The great urgency of refurbishment and repair at the airport stemmed from the fact that safety standards were so heavily compromised that passenger safety was at risk. 8. The project also incorporated the lessons learned by engaging the Government in a sector policy dialogue (TA component). The objective was to initiate a longer-term process of policy formulation for the transport sector following review of the institutional framework, supporting legal instruments, sources of funding for capital investments and financing of recurrent costs. The project also drew on lessons learned in recent post-conflict countries, namely that harnessing and developing a concentration of implementation competencies through a consolidated Project Management Unit (PMU) for multiple projects could be highly effective. 9. Given the Bank's comparative advantage in the infrastructure sector and the fact that no other major donor had immediate plans to invest significant funds in the repair of the port and the airport, the Bank's involvement was timely. The funds had enormous and immediate impact and helped prevent further social and economic destruction. 1.2 Original Project Development Objectives (PDO) and Key Indicators 10. The objective of the project as presented in the Project Appraisal Document (PAD) was to provide Government with emergency support to restore priority infrastructure in the Port of Monrovia and at Roberts International Airport and assist the Government in developing a medium-term strategic framework for rehabilitating the port and aviation sectors. 11. The successful implementation of the project was to be evidenced by: (a) Identified civil works implemented, (b) Institutional capacity strengthened, and 2 (c) Government has developed a strategic framework for port and aviation sector. 12. The key indicators for achievement of the Project development objectives, were defined in the results framework for the project as follows: (a) Continued, safe and reliable service provision via the target infrastructure: (i) Access to the Port of Monrovia was preserved: vessels with 10.5 meters draft or less could enter port; (ii) Oil jetty strengthened, fully operational and safe with vessel discharging capacity of up to 30,000 dwt; (iii) Firefighting capacity at the Port of Monrovia established; (iv) Efficient and reliable containers handling service: Minimum 10 moves per hour and 10 days dwell time or less; and (v) Minimum International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) air navigation safety international standards met. (b) Strategic port and aviation framework formulated. 13. To fulfill achievement of the project components, the following intermediate results indicators were defined for each component. Component A: Infrastructure Rehabilitation (a) Port: The port entrance and basin are brought to the required depth for the vessels calling without risk of grounding; channel width of 150 meters; Channel Depth (CD) of 11 meters. (b) The import of the basic fuel categories (heavy oil, gas oil, and gasoline and jet fuel) is taking place under safe and secure conditions: oil jetty structure refurbished including construction of new off-load station, mooring dolphins, and walkways. (c) Capacity to combat large fires restored. (d) Container terminal contract in place: Average annual crane productivity of 10 twenty- foot equivalent units (TEUs) per hour and 10 days dwell time or less. (e) Airport: Airfield Ground Lighting (AGL) for runway and taxiway in place and Instrumental Landing System (ILS) for instrumental and precision approach are fully calibrated and operational. Component B: Technical Assistance and Capacity Building (a) Improved technical capacity by a core of Special Implementation Unit/Ministry of Public Works (SIU/MPW), National Ports Authority (NPA) and RIA senior staff and understanding of principal Bank policies and procedures. (b) Government decision on strategic direction and reform of port and aviation sectors. Component C: Project Management (a) Fully staffed and operational SIU at MPW and Project Financial Management Unit (PFMU) at Ministry of Finance (MOF). (b) The SIU manages the Liberia Infrastructure Rehabilitation Project (LIRP) activities in conformance with legal and fiduciary requirements, as stated in the Grant Agreement. 3 1.3 Revised Project Development Objectives and Key Performance Indicators 14. The original objectives remained unchanged throughout the project's duration. During implementation, some project activities were dropped on account of budget constraints. No formal restructuring of the project was attempted while such dropped components were immediately brought under other projects under preparation. Apparently, common interpretation by all stakeholders of the applicable procedures governing IDA funded Recipient Executed Trust Fund informed team’s choice to reallocate funds across categories in April 2008 as sufficient measure. However, key Performance Indicators remain unchanged. 1.4 Main Beneficiaries 15. The project beneficiaries (as envisaged under the Project) may be categorized into two distinct groups (direct and indirect) in the subsectors of marine transport and civil aviation that infringed on issues of safety, security, and stability in a country that was characterized as a fragile post-conflict environment. 16. Direct Beneficiaries. Direct beneficiaries groups who participated directly in the project, and thus benefit from its existence were: (i) Maritime sub-sector vis-à-vis the dredging at the Port of Monrovia; (ii) civil aviation sub-sector in relation to the safety equipment at RIA; and (iii) the sector Institutions with regard to the capacity building of the SIU (MPW), NPA, and RIA. Thus all persons who were employed by the Project, supplied with raw materials or other goods and services, or who used in some way the output of the Project were direct beneficiaries in the above three groups. 17. Indirect Beneficiaries. Indirect beneficiaries were the people of Liberia invariably as the strategic goal for the Bank’s engagement was to assist in the process of peaceful economic recovery. The project support in improving safety of operations at the Port of Monrovia and RIA helped the Government safeguard peace and order, and further assisted in attracting private operators for business in Liberia. 18. During the war, all ministries and Government agencies had lost official data and documentation. The offices were looted bare and there was no equipment left. The Government capacity to function was dependent on supply of basic office equipment and vehicles, and training for its staff. The project contributed, therefore, in helping to rebuild some lost institutional capacity in post-conflict Liberia. 1.5 Original Components 19. The project built upon the work carried out under the Infrastructure Rehabilitation Technical Assistance Project financed by Trust Fund for Liberia (TFLIB), which identified critical emergency works in the transport sector in the amount exceeding US$40 million. The proposed activities under this project included the most critical emergency works so identified in the port and airport sub-sectors in the amount of US$8.5 million. 4 20. The project was structured into the following three major components which were further subdivided as per the details below. Component A: Infrastructure Rehabilitation (US$7.70 million) 21. Component A provided financing for rehabilitating the infrastructure at the port of Monrovia through: (a) dredging the entrance channel to the Port; (b) upgrading the oil jetty and introducing safety measures; and (c) strengthening the NPA’s firefighting capacity. 22. The port works for the project were selected in consultation with NPA and later at a workshop with stakeholders. The guiding principle for the selection of work at the port was that: (a) ships would be able to call at the port under minimal conditions of safety; and (b) major commodities required by the country (food and fuel) could continue to be handled. 23. The component also provided financing for rehabilitating the infrastructure at the RIA, through the supply and installation of navigational, aeronautical, meteorological and security equipment. The airport emergency needs were based on the findings and recommendations of the TFLIB Technical Assessment Report. This report had examined the existing safety and security equipment at RIA – the air gateway to Liberia to bring it up to the ICAO’s minimum operational standards for airports. 24. Cost estimates of civil works at the port were formulated and presented as low and high range on the basis of Rough-Order-Magnitude (ROM), and on the basis of those estimates, it was decided that the following sub-projects could be tendered under the Component A. (a) A1 - Monrovia Port: Dredging (US$2.20 million) (b) A2 - Monrovia Port: Upgrading Oil Jetty (US$2.75 million) (c) A3 - Monrovia Port: Providing Fire Fighting Capacity at NPA Yard (US$2.15 million) (d) A4 - Roberts International Airport: Navigational, aeronautical, meteorological and security equipment (US$0.60 million) 25. The bid prices from the tendering of these works and goods, particularly the port dredging, came in far higher than estimates envisioned. This can partly be attributed to the uncertain nature of operations in a post-conflict environment and consequential high degree of variability about cost estimates. In addition, the dredging capacity in West and Central Africa by the time of tendering had tightened considerably because of the loss of a dredger in Nigeria. As dredging was the top priority of the NPA at the time, eventual contracting was undertaken for components A1 and A4 only, while upgrading of oil jetty was eventually captured under a follow on project (Urban and Rural Infrastructure Rehabilitation Project - URIRP). Provision of firefighting capacity at NPA yard was folded into eventual Public- Private-Partnership (PPP) transaction at the port. 5 Component B: Technical Assistance and Capacity Building (US$0.15 million) 26. This component envisaged provision of a selective and ad-hoc technical assistance to the Government, including support to develop a medium term strategic framework for the port and aviation sectors, as well as targeted training in NPA and RIA to complement normalization of operations. The Project proposed to assist NPA in bringing about a container terminal/handling concession and also to support NPA for tendering a marine or towage service contract, if required. Component C: Project Management (US$0.65 million) 27. This component was designed to support implementation capacity augmentation through a SIU at the MPW to provide coordination, procurement, monitoring and evaluation, and safeguards management. Financial management was supported under this component through a separate Project Financial Management Unit (PFMU) residing at the MOF. These arrangements were made jointly with another Bank project, the Emergency Infrastructure Project (EIP) that was approved by Bank prior to the LIRP and was in parallel implementation. 1.6 Revised Components 28. The project components were revised through re-allocation by scaling-up/down and dropping the sub-activities due to cost overruns. No formal restructuring of the project was undertaken. Apparently, this was done following an advice received by the team that the project, being funded by TFLIB, may not require a formal restructuring. Table 1: Revised Components Component A: Infrastructure Rehabilitation Re-allocated A1. Monrovia Port: Dredging Scaled-up A2. Monrovia Port: Upgrading Oil Jetty Dropped A3. Monrovia Port: Providing Fire Fighting Capacity at NPA Yard Dropped A4. Roberts International Airport: Navigational, aeronautical, No change meteorological and security equipment Component B: Technical Assistance and Capacity Building Re-allocated Component C: Project Management Re-allocated 29. Component A. Changes had to be made in the works identified under Component A above as envisaged during Project preparation when estimates were adopted on the basis of Rough-Order-Magnitude (ROM) [which has relatively large margin of error of approximately 30-35 percent]. Consequently, when the actual bids came in for the dredging works (sub-component A1), almost 92 percent of the Grant funds had to be directed to cover the contract sum of the highest priority, the dredging needs in the entrance channel to the Port of Monrovia. 30. Component A successfully addressed the first priority intervention in the airport sub- sector at RIA with provision for supply and installation of various navigational, aeronautical, 6 meteorological and security equipment, including grounding and lightning protection system, runway and taxiway edge lighting, provision for calibrating, and aeronautical and meteorological equipment. 31. The significantly higher than expected costs of dredging and unavailability at the time of additional funding, resulted in need to drop other activities, namely: Component B (TA and Capacity Building) and two subcomponents of A (Upgrading Oil Jetty and Providing Firefighting capacity in NPA yard). 32. Component B. The development of a strategic framework under component B for the two sub-sectors became redundant as the Government, under separate Bank funding through the Agriculture Infrastructure Development Project (AIDP), started developing a comprehensive National Transport Policy comprising of strategies, action plans and an investment framework. 33. Component C. Activities under Component C were also scaled down as the proposed selection of a port and an environmental engineer did not materialize and they were deferred to the next Bank supported project, AIDP, due to shortage of funding. Furthermore, the proposed hiring of a consultant for supervision of the installation works at RIA did not materialize because the selection processes for firms and later for individual specialist consultants both failed in terms of an effective response. 1.7 Other significant changes 34. Resulting Reallocation in Payment Categories. The resulting changes due to above variations led to a reallocation in payment categories under this project that are summarized in Table 2 below. Table 2: Project Costs by Categories Original Reallocation Actual Percentage Allocation (04/22/08) Disbursed of revised Category Category Description US$ US$ US$ allocation (A) Consultant Services 1,435,000.00 182,000.00 215,618.27 118.5% (B) Training 40,000.00 0 0 (C) Goods 150,000.00 511,000.00 479,492.08 93.8% (D) Works 6,700,000.00 7,787,000.00 7,784,571.45 100.0% (E) Operating costs 175,000.00 20,000.00 20,274.72 101.4% Cancelled as on Jan 31,2011 - - -43.48 Total 8,500,000.00 8,500,000.00 8,499,913.04 100.0% 7 2. Key Factors Affecting Implementation and Outcomes 2.1 Project Preparation, Design and Quality at Entry 35. The project design was moderately ambitious and implementation was affected due to the low level of capacity and post-conflict environment. This was one of the first projects after Bank’s re-engagement in Liberia. The project used the prioritized list of emergency works in the transport sector (of about US$ 70 million), developed under Infrastructure Rehabilitation Technical Assistance Project financed TFLIB) The cost estimates were formulated as low and high range on the basis of Rough-Order-Magnitude (ROM). The three cost estimates for port works used in the project were the average cost estimate for each. PAD specifically noted that as a result of high degree of uncertainty, the plan was to determine during procurement for the works whether the Grant is actually sufficient for all activities and, if not, what specific scaling-down will be needed. However, there was no contingency provision for contingency for cost overrun during bidding. Nevertheless, in view of limited available funding and by already having recognized a potential for cost-overruns during Project design, the Bank team could have avoided over commitment in Project component design, such as the upgrading of the Oil Jetty and Fire-fighting capacity sub- components. 36. This project was prepared simultaneously with another project- Emergency Infrastructure Project. Both projects sought to rehabilitate only most critical priority infrastructure (identified in TFLIB funded technical assessment study) to ensure that minimum levels of operations of basic services continue uninterrupted. Though, underlying risks of operating in a post conflict fragile state are not easy to be fully mitigated, the project did reasonably well to complete the activities to the extent of available funding and left out activities were immediately brought under successive Bank financed projects (AIDP and URIRP) in Liberia. 37. At the time of preparation of this project, the Bank along with other donors was supporting the Governance and Economic Management Assistance Program (GEMAP), which aimed at restoring government’s basic financial management and to address long-term governance problems. The project leveraged the technical assistance provided under GEMAP to the port (an external CFO and later port operational specialist) .The LIRP had a longer term horizon development of a port strategic framework (later overtaken by more radical IDA support to comprehensively reform the port sector). 38. Instead of attempting third party execution through United Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS), the project chose to build institutional and client capacity to handle major infrastructure works by utilizing the emerging capacity at the MPW. The setups so created under this project (SIU and PFMU) were later used by successive IDA projects. This also potentially ended up in significant direct project implementation cost savings. 39. Quality at Entry: No quality at entry assessment of the project was carried out by the Quality Assurance Group. 8 2.2 Implementation 40. Analysis of the Dredging Works Contract, Component A1. Due to cost overruns, the only main infrastructure works undertaken in the port were for the dredging of the entrance channel to the Port of Monrovia. The cost of this contract had been affected by: (a) cost overruns- almost three-times above the estimate prices, (b) increased volume of dredging work which had to be done to ensure a successful clearance of the port channel, and, (c) the declining value of the US dollar against the Euro, which was the currency of payment as per the contract. On the other hand, supervision services cost for the works were only a fraction of the original allocation due to faster completion against the initially estimated dredging completion time. 41. From a navigational safety point of view, it was absolutely necessary to maintain an entrance channel width of 150 meters with an 11 meter draft. Based on bathymetric survey results, this requirement was not met at the time of intervention; the channel width was less than 100 meters at that draft. The estimated dredging quantity associated with this navigational requirement was in the order of 500,000 m3, including dredging of part of the port basin. During the procurement of this work, only two bids were received and one was late (and hence had to be rejected). The bid was priced at almost three-times higher than the original estimates. The design consultant had estimated rate of US$4.0 per m3 while lowest evaluated bidder’s price was US$ 7.24 per m3 for dredging and disposing at a distance of 5 km. 42. There were several possible reasons for such high bid(s) and overall low participation in tender: (a) limited number of qualified and specialized dredging contractors, especially those working in Africa at the time, which could bid for the dredging contract, and execute the works within the specified time frame. During tendering, a major dredger sank in Nigeria thus creating in the region a sudden demand spike for dredging capacity in the region that exceeded supply, (b) more importantly, the bidders priced the perceived risk and uncertainties of working in a post conflict state very high; (c) engineering design unit rates for a post-conflict country environment were under-estimated. These unit rates lacked appreciation, recognition and accommodation of the influence of perceived risks and uncertainties; 43. The Bank team sought review and clearance of the one evaluated bid by the Bank’s Regional Procurement Management (RPM) on the premise that those were emergency works (the port entry channel was close to silting up) and that there was a need to rapidly dredge. Upon clearance of the RPM, contract was awarded at a base value of US$6,091,127 and was signed on April 9, 2007. During contract negotiations a five percent discount was agreed on unit rate for quantities exceeding 500,000m3 on the bid rate of US$7.24 per m3 for a disposal distance of 5 km. There was then a variation in the actual volume dredged (637,663 m3 – an increase of 28 percent) based on the design and to a dredging depth of 11 meters which led to a 16 percent increase in the final contract value paid US$7,064,787.14. The net increase in cost due to dredging quantity variation and currency fluctuation under this contract was to the tune of almost 27 percent when compared to the original bid price. This final status of payments made under this contract is presented in Table 3. 9 44. The commencement date of the contract was May 14, 2007. The initial time of completion was 120-days, but the contract was actually satisfactorily completed on July 3, 2007 almost two months ahead of schedule. As a result, most of disbursement against the project was completed in 2007. Table 3: Final Status of Payments on Dredging Works Contract - Component A1 Equivalent US$ based on the fixed Exchange US$ equivalent based Amount paid in WA Ref Value Date rate on the ex- rate as on Euro date of transaction* (1 US$ = 0.78 Euro) IRP-MOF-2 14-May-07 950,215.80 1,218,225.38 1,285,641.98 IRP-MOF-3 18-Jul-07 1,660,436.00 2,128,764.10 2,288,578.94 IRP-MOF-4 17-Oct-07 2,641,412.95 3,386,426.86 3,757,938.20 IRP-MOF-5 9-Nov-07 258,469.22 331,370.79 380,466.69 Total 5,510,533.97 7,064,787.14 7,712,625.81 [*] – Figures taken from client connection 45. Supply and Installation Works for the RIA, Goods and Equipment contract: This contract comprised six components1: On April 20, 2007, one single bid was received. After evaluation, a seven-month duration contract was signed on July 10, 2007 at a contract value of US$493,968.64, which was delivered on May 19, 2008 (delayed by three months). A technical audit of the contract, conducted in August 2010, found that though equipment was delivered – but that, base plates for the runway lights, did not match specifications. In summary, all except one element (Runway Lighting) of the contract were successfully completed. 46. The implementation of project management component yielded mixed results. The SIU and PFMU (which was set up in parallel under EIP) were operationlised. The project did well to separate financial management responsibility on to separate unit; an arrangement that continues to perform satisfactorily to date. The proposed works supervision for the upgrading of the Free Port Oil Jetty did not materialize as procurement of works failed. Furthermore, the proposed selection of a port and an environmental engineer did not materialize because they were deferred to the next Bank supported AIDP due to a shortage of funding. In addition, the selection of the consultant for the supply and installation of the RIA works also 1 Six components were: (i) an Automated Weather Observation System; (ii) a voice recorder; (iii) a hold luggage and a hand baggage x-ray scanner, two walk-through metal detectors; (iv) taxiway markers; (v) airfield lighting (runway threshold/end and runway edge lights); and (vi) the calibration of the already existing ILS/Distance Measuring Equipment (DME) and Doppler VHF Omnidirectional Radio (DVOR) 10 produced significant delays because of the difficulties the Project encountered in accessing the services of a firm with the right qualifications to undertake the supervision of the installation works. 47. The significantly higher than expected costs of dredging resulted in need to drop other activities, namely: Component B (TA and Capacity Building) and two subcomponents of A (Upgrading Oil Jetty and Providing Firefighting capacity in NPA yard). With few activities under the project, choices were limited in light of unanticipated cost escalation. Nevertheless, Component B was dropped because at the time there were strong indications (which eventually became reality) that IDA and the team would through other, newer projects, be able to achieve substantial restructuring of the port sector, thus supersede the objectives of component B; also, provision of firefighting capacity in the NPA yard became included as part of a IDA assisted PPP terminal concession. Thus, two activities dropped were actually pursued and achieved, but under other IDA funded project being implemented at the time. Upgrading of oil facility, another urgent activity, was later picked up under URIRP. 2.3 Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) Design, Implementation and Utilization 48. The M&E was rated as unsatisfactory during the project. 49. M&E Design. The Project defined the PDO and key indicators separately for all three components with baseline status for each result indicator documented in the PAD. The SIU was given the responsibility for developing the M&E system for the Project. This consisted of preparation of the results framework and the subsequent monitoring and reporting of Project results and performance, based on the framework. However, no baseline surveys were designed or completed for results monitoring. The M&E requirements were thus expected to be met by selecting necessary Project indicators and baselines from the TFLIB financed feasibility studies. The arrangements made for results monitoring are presented in Table 4. 50. M&E Implementation. The SIU continued to struggle during the implementation of the Project to provide adequate reporting on indicators as outlined in the results framework. This was mainly due to lack of adequate and formalized coordination mechanism between the Implementing Agency (the SIU) and counterpart Government entities managing or responsible in the Port and RIA. The rescaling of activities under the project (due to cost overruns) also resulted in setbacks to formalize any effective system for M&E Implementation. 51. M&E Utilization. At Project completion, the M&E system could not be established due to inability to hire adequate staff at SIU, and lack of SIU oversight on some activities. Project monitoring in the port sector remained supported by regular reporting from the supervision consultant; however, it remained an ad hoc for airport activities. Nevertheless, the framework developed in the project facilitated downstream Bank Project preparation and capacity development initiatives for the SIU (now the Infrastructure Implementation Unit (IIU)). 11 2.4 Safeguard and Fiduciary Compliance 52. Environmental Safeguards. Safeguard policies triggered by the Project included only OP/BP/GP 4.01 – Environmental Assessment. The Project was in Category B for environmental assessment. The Provisional Environmental Impact Assessment (pEIA) and an Environmental Management Plan (EMP) were prepared as parts of the technical assessment report and subsequently disclosed as a free-standing document. Table 4: Arrangements for Results Monitoring at Project Start Outcome Indicators Baseline/Cu Frequency of Monitoring Frequency Data Responsibi rrent Status and Collection lity for 2007 2008 2009 2010 Reports Instruments Data Collection Continued, safe and reliable service provision via the target infrastructure: a) Access to the Port of Rapid X X X X Annual Bathymetric NPA Monrovia is preserved: channel Reports survey vessels with 10.5 m silting and end-of draft or less can enter threatens Project port closure of Report channel b) Oil jetty structure is Oil jetty is - X X X End-of Certificate of NPA/ strengthened, fully deteriorated project works LPRC operational and safe: and can report tankers up to 30,000 collapse dwt can discharge c) Firefighting capacity Firefighting - - X X End-of Hydrants and NPA at the Port of Monrovia: capacity project system established. does not report performance exist tests d) Efficient and reliable 3 moves/ - X X X Yearly As per NPA containers handling hour NPA Contract service: Minimum 10 reports provisions moves per hour and 10 days dwell time or less e) Minimum ICAO air navigation safety ICAO X X X X End-of ICAO audit SIU international standards standards project when due – met. not met report f) Strategic port and No - X X X End-of Collaboration SIU aviation framework comprehensi project with IDA formulated ve sector report strategies 12 53. The project provided substantial positive environmental impacts. At the airport, refurbishment and replacement of equipment for navigation, safety and security had a positive impact on safety for the airport workforce, airline personnel, passengers, and nearby residents. No adverse impacts were anticipated or reported on investments at the airport. Within the port, the works to improve access to the harbor contributed to reduced risk of accidents (including ship groundings) and spills. 54. The pEIA included in the technical assessment for the port had identified potential adverse impacts and categorized them as minor, moderate, and major, based on magnitude, probability of occurrence, and sensitivity of receptor or affected area. An EMP was included in the assessment, and the impacts were re-rated assuming EMP implementation. Following that analysis, the only major impact was diversion of land for dredge spoil disposal if a land- based disposal method were to be chosen. The pEIA recommended a more detailed impact assessment for dredge spoil disposal prior to selection of a disposal site and method, and this was carried out in two steps. The first was analysis of the material to be dredged in order to determine whether it was suitable for sea disposal or would have to be impounded on land. Samples were collected at three depths at each of 20 locations and analyzed in the Netherlands at a laboratory certified to conform to European Union standard EN 4500. Concentrations of metals and other substances potentially harmful to marine life were found to be within the limits, for safe disposal at sea, promulgated by the Government of the Netherlands (there being no appropriate standards in effect in Liberia). Two potential sea disposal sites were then identified; depth and distance from the port were the main criteria used in their identification. 55. Both sites were surveyed for depth and contour using side-looking sonar equipment and then inspected visually and photographically by divers. The survey did not reveal any sensitive environmental features at either site, such as coral reefs and sea grass beds, shellfish beds, and fish spawning grounds. Bidding documents for the dredging required the contractor to conduct a more detailed physical and biological survey of the disposal site and to prepare a detailed Health, Safety, Environment and Social (HSES) Plan prior to commencement of work. The HSES Plan was reviewed and approved by the supervising engineer. The contractor’s selection of one of the two pre-surveyed disposal sites was approved by the engineer and GOL, the detailed surveys were performed, and the dredging and disposal proceeded with no significant environmental problems. 56. Other potentially moderate impacts of work at the port, such as improper solid waste disposal, disturbance of surrounding commercial activities, water pollution due to fuel spills and turbidity from dredging or soil erosion, and occupational health and safety hazards to the workforce were managed well through the contractor’s HSES Plan. 57. Financial Management. The PFMU was staffed with a combination of competent MOF staff and selected technical assistance and managed by a competent full-time manager. The PFMU was responsible for: (a) ensuring that financial and accounting records were maintained to a satisfactory manner; and (b) ensuring that financial statements and reports 13 were prepared in timely manner for management and audit purposes. There was full compliance of these requirements throughout the Project. 58. Procurement. Given the urgent nature of the Project and the need to start construction works as soon as feasible, some preliminary procurement steps concerning the procurement of design consultant for the dredging contract commenced prior to the planned approval of the Project. The Government had very limited capacity to undertake those initial tasks even though the SIU completed hiring of technical staff from the MPW and selected technical assistance. As such, the SIU was supported by the task team during the initial process. 59. Legal Covenants. There were two legal covenants under the Project: (a) the Government with support from the Bank would tender through a competitive and transparent process a Container Terminal Contract in the Port of Monrovia no later than by end of April 2007; and (b) the Government would ensure that RIA carries third party liability/aircraft insurance. Procurement for the benefit of RIA was contingent on the insurance being in place. Later on, the Bank's Audit identified that there was no evidence in support of the aircraft liability insurance coverage though the contractor was paid for it (more details in section 3.3 of this report). 2.5 Post-completion Operation/Next Phase 60. Lessons learned from LIRP have already been used both in the design of new Bank transport sector projects and also to further strengthen the capacity of PFMU and the SIU. The later was transitioned into an IIU in 2009 and will eventually evolve into an autonomous Roads Authority for Liberia. The AIDP and the URIRP were prepared as Bank Grants with co-financing by the European Commission (EC) and the Liberia Reconstruction Trust Fund (LRTF) in 2007 and 2009 respectively, and the Liberia Road Asset Management Project (LIBRAMP) was prepared and approved in June 2011 as an International Development Association (IDA) credit co-financed by the LRTF grant. The civil works component for upgrading the Oil Jetty that could not be delivered under LIRP was subsequently picked up under the URIRP as new Fuel Unloading Facility2. 3. Assessment of Outcomes 3.1 Relevance of Objectives, Design and Implementation Rating: High for Overall Relevance 61. Strategic country relevance of the Project. The project was designed in line with the Bank's re-engagement strategy articulated in the Country Re-engagement Note for Liberia3, 2 The contract, based on design and build methodology, was signed on October 29, 2012. 3 IDA/R2004-0046, Liberia: Country Re-Engagement Note and Additional Activities, March 3, 2004. 14 which outlined a leadership role for the Bank in the infrastructure sector. The project was also in line with the expressed request of the then newly and democratically elected Government for Bank’s support in the emergency rehabilitation of critical infrastructure nodes. The Project further built upon the work financed by the TFLIB – the preparation of technical feasibility studies which had prioritized emergency works in key infrastructure sub- sectors – the existence of these studies greatly facilitated the preparation of this operation. 62. Activities under this Project focused on the most critical emergency works in the port and aviation sub-sectors in the amount of US$8.5 million. Though small in magnitude, the Project impact allowed a programmatic approach to take shape in the Bank’s infrastructure portfolio in Liberia. It was further expected that other partners would come together to provide financing for the remaining priority infrastructure needs. This was realized through EC co-financing of Euros 10 million in the next Bank Project under AIDP, and the establishment of the LRTF, which continues to co-finance major road sector improvements in Liberia; the LRTF is administered by the World Bank. 63. Relevance to Bank sector strategies. The Project objectives, design and implementation proved relevant to current country priorities and the Bank’s sector strategy as this Project addressed the strategic goal to assist in the process of peaceful economic recovery, and contributed by rebuilding shattered infrastructure in two high priority transport sub-sectors for improved facilitation of freight and services. Improving safety of operations and refurbishing facilities at the Port of Monrovia and airport supported the peace and stability initiatives, and assisted in attracting private sector operators for business in Liberia. In principle, the Project triggered the two state owned enterprises namely, National Port Authority and the Civil Aviation Authority (CAA) to advance their potential financial position and to attract private sector once their technical and commercial performance improve over time. 64. The two transport sub-sectors, marine transport and civil aviation, infringe on issues of safety, security, and stability in a country still characterized as a fragile post-conflict environment. As such, repair of critical infrastructure at the port and the airport were declared a top priority of the new Government due to its direct impact on safety (airport), stability and long-term peace (port). Civil war and international sanctions had severely disrupted port operations while extensive looting had rendered most of the facilities useless. Nearly 100 percent of the dry-bulk and containers trade was being handled through the Port of Monrovia. In addition, the fuel jetty was responsible for 100 percent of fuel (oil, gasoline and jet fuel) imports. Given the above needs, the Port of Monrovia remains the key supply /economic life-line of Liberia, handling nearly all imports and exports from the country. In preparation of the LIRP and as part of the TFLIB-supported Infrastructure TA, the Bank had financed technical assessment of the Port of Monrovia with the aim of identifying emergency works and actions to bring operations to acceptable levels. The assessment concluded that immediate intervention was needed to rehabilitate the infrastructure in order to keep the port operational. Identified emergency works were in the range of US$40 million, of which this Project proposed to support critical repairs at a cost of about US$7 million. A long-term Port Master Plan including an assessment of the different management options to support long 15 term sustainability had been separately developed for review and discussion with the Government. 65. The LIRP was designed to engage the Government in a sector policy dialogue. The objective was to initiate a long-term process of deciding on policy choices for the sector to be made after reviewing the institutional framework, supporting legal instruments, sources of funding for capital investments and financing of recurrent costs. The project made an attempt to draw on lessons learned in recent post-conflict countries, which supported creation of consolidated PMUs for multiple projects as highly effective means to harness and develop a concentration of implementation competencies in such countries. 3.2 Achievement of Project Development Objectives 66. Despite delays at the beginning of the project and challenges encountered during implementation, the Project went a long way towards meeting its objective, resulting in an overall Moderately Satisfactory (MS) rating. The following represents the extent to which the Trust Fund development objectives have been met. A. Continued, safe and reliable service provision via the target infrastructure: Moderately Satisfactory (MS) (i) Access to the Port of Monrovia was preserved: vessels with 10.5 meters draft or less could enter port. The port entrance and basin were brought to the required channel width (150 meters) and channel depth (11 meters) without risk of vessels grounding. Rated - Highly Satisfactory (HS). (ii) Oil jetty strengthened, fully operational and safe with vessel discharging capacity of up to 30,000 dwt. Due to the cost overruns, the oil jetty sub- component was dropped. It was stated in Project design that rehabilitation of the oil jetty civil works was of a nature that did not allow any scaling down of inputs to cut costs. Effectively, to ensure a functioning oil jetty, these works needed to take place in their entirety. As such, the sub- component was adopted under two later projects the AIDP, and the URIRP. The Oil Jetty refurbishment was first planned under AIDP and then later under URIRP. The procurement of contract for building new jetty is expected to be signed by end November 2012. (iii) Firefighting capacity at the Port of Monrovia established - due to the cost overruns, this sub-component was dropped. It was stated in Project design that in case of overall civil work costs being higher than anticipated, this work would be scaled down – or in extreme case, cut - to fit the budget and funding. (iv) Efficient and reliable containers handling service: Minimum 10 moves per hour and 10 days dwell time or less. This activity was directly linked with the Container Terminal Contract award and subsequent changes. As a result of successful completion of dredging works, positive signals went 16 out to the international private sector about the new environment evolving in Liberia. The productivity has already increased to 15 moves/hr and it is expected that the productivity might increase to 17 moves/hr or higher once the mobile cranes are installed next year. In April 2012, the Average Dwell Time (ADT) was about 15 days. In the beginning of 2013, the Free Dwell Time (FDT) will be reduced from 7 to 3 days and the storage charges will also increase. Worldwide experience shows that once these planned measures have been taken, the ADT will decrease drastically. Moderately Satisfactory (MS). (v) Minimum ICAO air navigation safety international standards met – Airport; The AGL for runway and taxiway were put in place and the ILS for precision to the approach of the runway was fully calibrated and became operational. Rated - Satisfactory (S). B. Strategic port and aviation framework formulated: Development of strategic framework for the two sub-sectors became redundant as the Government, under Bank funding of the AIDP, began developing a comprehensive National Transport Policy comprising of strategies, action plans and an investment framework. 3.3 Efficiency 67. No directly related financial or economic analyses were carried out during project preparation and appraisal. However, the trust fund activities have been efficiently implemented as evidenced by successful and timely accomplishment of key development objectives. . The dredging was accomplished (almost 2-months ahead of schedule) and the essential safety equipment was installed at the airport (no adverse impacts were reported). Hence, the emergency support to restore critical infrastructure in the Port of Monrovia and at Roberts International Airport (RIA) was delivered. In terms of associated costs, the initial budgets were under-estimated for which reallocation became necessary. The economic and financial returns are now being seen under downstream projects. 68. This section can be best described in terms of analyzing the procurement and supervision activities delivered under the LIRP. These activities covered three areas: goods, works, and services as follows: (a) Goods - activities under the project consisted of the supply of computers, printers, and accessories. It also included photocopiers, specialized software, vehicles, office furniture and furnishing. These may be considered as normal goods and equipment requirements to meet the project needs and facilitate project start-up. In terms of implementation, these items were procured reasonably well using Bank’s shopping procedures and served to strengthen the capacity building initiative as envisioned. (b) Works - activities included the emergency investments at the Port of Monrovia and the RIA which were considered as critical to the entire economy of Liberia. 17 These were captured as follows; (i) Dredging of the Monrovia Freeport, (ii) Upgrading of the Freeport Oil Jetty, (iii) Firefighting Capacity Works, and (iv) Supply and Installation Works for the Roberts Airport Goods and Equipment. (i) The Implementation estimate for the Dredging Works on the procurement plan was US$1.86 million, and was later revised to US$2.2 million. The procurement process started on August 28, 2006 and the contract was signed about nine months later on April 9, 2007. Following this, the contract was completed and accepted within two months on June 30 and handed-over on July 3, 2007. The implementation of this critical contract cost the Project at least three times the original estimate, in the amount of US$6,091,127.00, which increased to a final cost of US$7,064,787.14 upon acceptance of completed works. The reasons for high cost of dredging works and reasons for increased final contract price are explained in detail in paragraph 40 and 41. The net final impact on Project cost was to the tune of 27 percent. (ii) Following this and with funds limited, it was decided to drop, and to restart the procurement for the Upgrading of the Free Port Oil Jetty using Limited International Bidding process under separate IDA supported AIDP. And again this was because two earlier international competitive bidding (ICB) processes for the procurement of works for the Upgrading of the Freeport Oil Jetty had failed for lack of effective response. (iii) Further to above, the works activities for Fire Fighting Capacity were dropped from the Project for lack of funds. The Project however allowed for a policy dialogue which eventually led to a PPP for a concession in the port completed in early 2011, which addressed the requirements of firefighting capacities. (iv) Supply and Installation Works for the RIA, Goods and Equipment contract On April 20, 2007 one single bid was submitted. After evaluation, a seven- month duration contract was signed on July 10, 2007 at a contract value of US$493,968.64, and completed on May 19, 2008 (delayed by three months). Extensive attempts were made to get supervision for this assignment but to no avail. After extensive procurement attempts, the Bank team provided SIU with names of several individual consultants, but there was no response. Given that at the time it was proving exceedingly difficult to get consultants (and for that matter contractors) interested in working in Liberia, the project was faced with the possibility of protracted delays in installing the equipment at the airport at the cost of urgently needed improvements in the safety, security and operational reliability of RIA. In light of above, the Bank agreed that RIA itself would undertake the supervision, including reporting on progress and preparation of final supervision report. However, no reports were provided in spite of Bank’s numerous requests as recorded in aide memoires. The Bank never received a project completion report from the SIU/RIA, and eventually advised SIU that a technical audit would be 18 undertaken by the Bank. A technical audit of the contract was conducted in August 2010, and a final report was prepared. The Audit found that the equipment was delivered – but that, base plates for the runway lights, did not match specifications. The Bank’s Audit further identified following key shortcomings during implementation as a result of the weak supervision:  There was no evidence in support of the aircraft liability insurance coverage though the contractor was paid for it. The relevant insurance policy should have been to the benefit of RIA such as to cover RIA’s Base Support personnel against any claim for damage to aircraft which might have occurred during installation of the runway lighting and taxiway markers. It is also important to note that due to the failure of purchasing the aircraft liability insurance, the works were carried out in violation of the covenants of the Project which stated that “procurement for the benefit of RIA is contingent on this insurance being in place�.  Payments were made for all insurance costs invoiced even though no evidence for the purchase of the same (as required by contract specifications) was submitted by the contractor.  The base plates supplied for the runway lights did not match the specifications. They were not exchanged for the proper plates and consequently the lights have not been installed leading to infructuous expenditure.  All payments except the advance payment were made after long delays. The interest payments were not made for any delayed payments nor were liquidated damages applied to the completion time overrun. And finally, no retention money was withheld from the regular payments for the defects liability period.  The payments for the contract had to be split between the LIRP and the AIDP. Source for the advance payment and the first two interim payments – US$408,382.60 or some 83 percent of the total contract value – was paid through the LIRP, whereas the remainder of US$85,586.40 (17 percent) had to be paid from the subsequent AIDP that became effective while LIRP funds had been completely exhausted. (c) Consulting Services - mainly works supervision proposed to be delivered by firms came off well with the supervision of the dredging works. However, the proposed works supervision for the upgrading of the Free Port Oil Jetty did not materialize as procurement of works failed and was dropped. Several attempts were made to engage individual consultants. The Bank team also provided SIU with a list of several consultants but to no avail. Perhaps, it was still too close to the actual peace agreement to instill general confidence in contracts in post- conflict Liberia. Therefore, when consultants received a “yahoo account� emails (as government email system did not exist at the time) offering consulting opportunities, there was not much interest shown. As such, the proposed selection of a port and an environmental engineer also did not materialize. These were then deferred to the next Bank supported AIDP in view of funding 19 shortfall in the project. In addition, the selection of consultant for the supply and installation of the RIA works also produced significant delays because of the difficulties the Project encountered in accessing the services of a firm with the right qualifications to undertake the supervision of the installation works. Because of these difficulties, selection of a qualified individual consultant was considered; but the two selection processes in this area also failed. As a result of this, the supervision of the RIA works was carried out by two RIA staff that had some related experience. 3.4 Justification of Overall Outcome Rating 69. The overall rating is Moderately Satisfactory (MS). Despite a slow start, moderately ambitious project design, and truncated project components, the project has successfully created an enabling environment in the port and the aviation sectors in very difficult in- country circumstances. The interventions, especially in port, helped maintain uninterrupted flow of goods into the country and mitigate the risk of food shortages. Successful implementation of civil works in the port and airport indirectly helped prevent violence and added much needed stability to post conflict fragile environment The outcome rating takes into account the Project’s relevant achievement of each development objective, efficiency in a post conflict environment, and development impact of the emergency support to restore priority infrastructure in the Port of Monrovia and the RIA as well as long term development impact in creating enabling environment for future projects. 70. The project did succeed in adequately planning for the major cost-overrun scenario that occurred in the dredging contract. The cost escalation on Component A1- Dredging works and lack of additional funding limited the initially identified project interventions . However, as the portfolio followed a programmatic approach, these left out activities were soon covered under subsequent projects (AIDP and then URIRP).The project outcome therefore remained overshadowed by one under-estimated Component A1 – Dredging Works. 71. Overall rating (MS) is weighted on the basis that, while significant achievement were made in keeping the critical infrastructure operational in the port and airport, all planned activities could not be achieved under this project though these activities were subsequently picked up and successfully realized under other projects. 3.5 Overarching Themes, Other Outcomes and Impacts (a) Poverty Impacts, Gender Aspects, and Social Development 72. The project made significant milestones towards achievement of set targets but did not collect any empirical data to verify impacts on reducing poverty. It has been acknowledged however that the dredging of the port resulted in ships being able to call on the port of Monrovia with imported food and fuel benefitting the people and facilitated the UN peacekeeping operations. Similarly, there was no evidence of gender mainstreaming in Project activities because results were not gender sensitive and data collection was not gender disaggregated. As a result it could not be assessed how the completed infrastructure 20 benefited men, women and children of Liberia other than to record broader benefits to the country by helping to sustain the port and airport operations safely. (b) Other Unintended Outcomes and Impacts (positive or negative) 73. The project’s objectives, design and implementation proved relevant to current global/regional/country priorities and the Bank’s sector strategy because this project did address the emergency needs of Liberia and the Bank’s strategic goals. The strategic goal for Liberia and the Bank was to assist in the process of peaceful economic recovery, to which this Project contributed well by improving facilitation of freight and services. Improved safety of operations at the Port of Monrovia and the RIA ensured safeguarding of peace and stability and assisted in attracting private sector operators for business in Liberia. 74. Both interventions subsequently have proven their value to the overall development of the sector in Liberia. Even though the Component B (Technical Assistance and Capacity Building) was dropped due to cost overruns, the outcome envisaged assistance to NPA in bringing about a container terminal/handling concession materialized, with support under subsequent Bank funded projects (AIDP). In terms of sector reform, the Bank supported ambitious but successful Government efforts to reform the inefficient port sector and to create a Landlord Port system. The concessioning of the Monrovia Port, (handed-over on February 1, 2011) general cargo and container operations, to APM Terminals is a remarkable achievement for any country much more so for a fragile and post conflict state. The RIA is also undergoing a test operation under a private firm; this has also resulted in major operational improvements at the RIA. 4. Assessment of Risk to Development Outcome Rating: “Moderate� 75. Under the project, two critical subcomponents of the Component A: Infrastructure Rehabilitation, were successfully delivered (A1 and A2 as defined in Table 1). Dredging works facilitated to transform Freeport into a landlord port. Successful concessioning of the Port has helped increase productivity significantly (nearly 80% increase in throughput from 2008).The national government and the MPW leadership at the time of this writing have continued to be strongly supportive of the concept of rehabilitation, maintenance and modernization of the core transport infrastructure. 76. The overall risks to Development Outcome are assessed as follows: (a) The handed-over Container Terminal Concession may collapse during implementation; (b) Limited government experience and capacity to prepare and manage the projects; (c) Labor resistance at the port; and (d) RIA safety equipment maintenance and upgrading not sustained through future investments in the airport. 21 77. In the light of above risks, the risk to development outcome has been rated as “moderate�. 5. Assessment of Bank and Borrower Performance 5.1 Bank Performance Overall Rating: Moderately Satisfactory (MS) (a) Bank Performance in Ensuring Quality at Entry Rating: Moderately Satisfactory 78. Project design was moderately ambitious and could not succeed fully as designed given the low level of capacity and post-conflict environment; this being among the first projects after Bank’s re-engagement in Liberia. While recognizing a potential for cost- overrun during the design stage and developing a contingency plan in such scenario, the project could not anticipate the scale of that margin as it happened in reality. Consequently, the upgrading of the Oil Jetty and Fire-fighting capacity sub-components could not be implemented as designed. It is also recognized that if the dredging contract had come in at cost, and if these two sub-components had not been part of the project design, then there would have been funds available without any identified sub-projects. 79. The institutional capacity strengthening objectives envisaged under Component B and C also could not be fully accomplished as defined in project design. Here there were two considerations: (i) SIU and PFMU capacity building and strengthening were being supported financially by other IDA projects, thus pre-empting the need to charge any significant amounts to this smallest IDA project in the transport portfolio, (ii) a more comprehensive strategic work commenced under the separate AIDP which included the envisioned work under this Project and thus made it redundant. These issues were reported in the Implementation Status Reports (ISR) for the project; the ISRs for all the IDA projects recognized that while each was an individual project, they were being managed as a portfolio of projects. In the absence of that approach, the Bank team would have had some port strategic work done solely to fulfill the project design (and thus being redundant on activities as that port strategic work was already part of a broader Transport Strategy work). 80. The proposed works supervision for the upgrading of the Free Port Oil Jetty did not materialize as procurement of works failed. Furthermore, the proposed selection of a port and an environmental engineer did not materialize because they were deferred to the next Bank supported AIDP due to shortage of funding. In addition, the selection of consultant for the supply and installation of the RIA works also produced significant delays because of the difficulties the Project encountered in accessing the services of a firm with the right qualifications to undertake the supervision of the installation works. This issue has been comprehensively explained under Section 3.3, para 68 (b)(iv) and (c) of this Report. (b) Quality of Supervision Rating: Moderately Satisfactory 22 81. Nonetheless, Bank interventions during implementation were timely and provided appropriate – in terms of scale and practicality – advice, with some areas of notable achievement. Critical risks, such as cost-overruns, were appropriately flagged and addressed in a timely manner through relevant channels, even if resolution was not always immediately forthcoming. The Bank team made regular visits to the Project sites and the relevant agency in the port sector, and followed each visit with detailed Aide-Memoires that flagged actions for follow-up. 82. The task team, in general, brought to bear all the relevant skills in a cost-effective way. The team effectively raised issues affecting the project to management’s attention and management responded actively and speedily to issues raised. 83. Fiduciary. The Bank’s financial management (FM) oversight remained weak as compliance to the Project covenant on the aircraft liability insurance related to RIA contract was not successful. After initial problems in communications, interaction improved with the Recipient resulting in: (a) putting in place effective systems that would allow the Project to disburse efficiently and accurately account for its expenditures; (b) providing training to build capacity in both procurement and financial management; and (c) making themselves available in a timely manner to trouble-shoot as questions arose. 5.2 Borrower Performance Overall Rating: Moderately Satisfactory (MS) (a) Government Performance Rating: Moderately Unsatisfactory 84. The Government demonstrated a fair level of commitment and ownership towards the project design, preparation and its implementation. LIRP initiated policy dialogue to revamp port management in Monrovia. The Government action in concessioning Monrovia Port and rightsizing port staff clearly showed its strong resolve to pursue and implement reformist measures. 85. The Government was not able to comply with one of the two Project Covenants. Compliance to the project covenant on the aircraft liability insurance was not successful. Due to the failure of purchasing the aircraft liability insurance, the works were carried out in violation of the covenants of the Project which stated "procurement for the benefit of RIA is contingent on this insurance being in place." There was no evidence in support of the aircraft liability insurance coverage though the contractor was paid for it. The relevant insurance policy should have been to the benefit of RIA such as to cover RIA's Base Support personnel against any claim for damage to aircraft which might have occurred during installation of the runway lighting and taxiway markers. (b) Implementing Agency or Agencies Performance Rating: Moderately Satisfactory 86. The Recipient team expressed ownership and commitment to achieving development objectives, and worked diligently and succeeded despite very difficult political, institutional 23 and field conditions. Implementation readiness, arrangements, capacity, and appointment of key staff remained an ongoing challenge. The SIUs partners, the NPA and the CAA lacked the experience or systems to buttress SIU’s role, thereby frequently missing opportunities for coordination and timely resolution of issues. The SIU worked well with the Bank, and through their Project Manager, sought Bank’s assistance as required to flag issues and prevent the Project from suffering unnecessary delays, or allowing issues to get out of hand. The grant was almost fully utilized by the end of the second project year out of the four years duration. 87. Procurement and Financial Management. Between years 1 and 2, the project faced some challenges with delays in funds flow, and accuracy of key procurement documents in following the Bank’s standard guidelines and procedures. 88. The Recipient carried out its financial management responsibilities, as it now does for all infrastructure projects, through the PFMU hosted in MOF. The unit maintained satisfactory staffing, budgeting, funds flow, disbursement, internal controls, financial reporting and external auditing arrangements through the implementation of the Project. Some minor financial management responsibilities such as record keeping of invoices were carried out within the SIU by an assigned finance officer. The coordination between SIU and PFMU however, remained an ongoing issue frequently resulting in delayed payments to the contracted entities. The SIU continued to face challenges in the management of airport contract due to weak coordination with RIA. 6. Lessons Learned 89. Procurement of Works and Services in Post-conflict States. Transport infrastructure has to be in a satisfactory operational state because it serves as a catalyst for necessary development and growth. The intervention though small, helped improve Liberia's import and export potential. The following are very useful procurement lessons learned in the ICB for works and large value consulting contracts for post-conflict environments: (a) General. Following prolonged war, finding interested contractors and consultants with adequate capacity and experience to work in a fragile state is a major challenge. Because of security risks, limitations in the availability of materials and human capacity, and the unreliable logistics, the costs are unpredictable; often end up being significantly higher than estimates. Estimating costs can therefore be challenging. (b) Works. Engineering estimates for critical works and installations in post-conflict countries, especially those to be bid under ICB, should appreciate, recognize and accommodate the influence of potential bidders' perceived risks and uncertainties in the post-conflict environment, in order to provide realistic working estimates for critical post conflict infrastructure to facilitate effective budgeting. This will enable other supplementary works investments to be funded as intended in order to achieve the stated project objectives. 24 (c) Services. There is need for early identification of qualified firms in the market, relative to required specialized and/or critical services and engage their interest. The same can be done for the identification of qualified individuals so that required consultant competence is sought as a contingency measure, in order to avoid or limit the danger of not getting very competent and qualified consultants to respond to REOIs. 90. Replication. Dredging works and safety equipment installation accomplished under this Project were important to open opportunities that could be assimilated by the Government for future works in other sub-sectors of transport. The project however was limited because of financial constraints under the trust fund. Meanwhile, in parallel to this project another Bank financed project was in preparation (the Emergency Infrastructure Project, EIP). It may have been prudent to combine the two initiatives though it is recognized that the pressures to deliver in a post-conflict emergency scenario were intense, and possibly did not permit such an approach. Keeping this in context and the resulting outcome of the operational model, any future replication should account for limited financing and, wherever possible, consider an amalgamation of resources into one sizeable project while still taking a programmatic approach to infrastructure building. 91. Project Design. (a) Components. It is important not to design projects that are overambitious in scope, since this may lead to critical activities not being implemented by others and increasing risks in a fragile situation. (b) Institutional Collaboration and Activity Coordination. The challenge is in achieving proper sequencing and coordination of all aspects of project activities to assure flow, efficient use of resources and better outcomes. A well laid out structure for institutional collaboration in a well-coordinated manner for all project activities is fundamental to effective implementation of such projects, especially where there are multiple stakeholders. The SIU and the Bank team adopted a programmatic approach for the Bank funded infrastructure projects in an interactive fashion, to ensure a coordinated support to the Government for the implementation of its infrastructure program. This approach has worked well. (c) Specialized Assignment Supervision. Even in case of exceptional circumstances, supervision of specialist assignments (the RIA equipment installation) should not be entrusted to a governmental unit until it has demonstrated previously that it is capable of handling the task. (d) Roadshows: to In post-war contexts, extraordinary efforts need to be made to attract contractors and consultants to a country during the project preparation phase. This can potentially reduce costs at later stages and has positive conflict impacts overall. One approach is to hold national and international roadshow(s) 25 during preparation as well as implementation phase with a view to invoke attention of the market and diaspora towards the project components. This was successfully practiced in Liberia in October 2009 under a subsequent project (URIRP). (e) Improved Oversight Mechanism. Timely oversight mechanism and support is extremely necessary in a post-conflict environment where the circumstances are fast changing and evolving, particularly, on problems identification and early reporting by the technical staff during implementation. Failure to do so may result in untimely mitigation and may lead to downstream problems in completed projects not providing the value for money as envisioned in design. Simple M&E systems can be put in place during the design phase that can make it easier to rate the project objectively during execution phase. If the government is found not to have the capacity to carry out these activities, alternative arrangements (such as hiring a consultant) can be considered. (f) Counterpart Capacity, Knowledge and Skills Development. The project did well to build counterpart capacity by discarding a more expedient option of using third party executions in a post conflict and fragile environment. The provided ample opportunity for national staff to develop skills throughout the project implementation phase. However, tt is necessary to ensure that the implementing unit identifies and dedicates sufficient resources and attention to the build capacity. Effective skills and knowledge transfer is fundamental to sustainability of project outputs and outcomes. A systematic and conscious effort is needed to this effect in day-to-day capacity transfer to project counterparts, and in formalized training settings. Training components should be well designed, sufficiently resourced with adequate provisions for implementing agency staff to obtain on-the-job training by working with the contractors, suppliers and consultants hired on different project components. 92. Supervision. In view of the fact that the PFMU was located outside the MPW where the Implementation unit was located, coordination between the two units on financial management issues was sometimes difficult. For example, payments to some contractors suffered delays either because invoices could not be brought to the attention of PFMU on a timely basis or PFMU failed to track the invoices that were submitted by the SIU Finance Officer. There were also communication bottlenecks in terms of PFMU notifying SIU of payments made to contractors. The separate homes for PFMU (MOF) and the SIU (MPW) were agreed on at the insistence and requirement of the Minister of Finance at the time, who deemed that the budgetary and auditing systems and procedures at the time were too weak to allow the technical work and FM to sit under same roof. This was an important consideration given the fact that the Project was being designed in the months immediately after the first post-conflict elected Government that had taken over after elections from a transitional Government under which financial management had been unreliable. The following key recommendations are provided for future improvements: 26 (a) Project covenants to be included in project agreements should be carefully considered. Careful and continuous monitoring by all stakeholders is necessary for compliance during implementation. (b) Communication between PFMU and IIU needs to be improved through regular weekly meetings to discuss outstanding FM issues. (c) Steps towards financial management capacity building within the Implementation Unit to undertake full financial management responsibilities of its projects should be accelerated. This will eliminate the administrative and processing bottlenecks inherent in the current arrangement. 7. Comments on Issues Raised by Borrower/Implementing Agencies/Partners (a) Borrower/implementing agencies None (b) Cofinanciers None (c) Other partners and stakeholders None 27 Annex 1: Project Costs and Financing (a) Project Cost by Component (in US$ Million equivalent) Actual/Latest Appraisal Estimate Percentage of Components Estimate (US$ millions) Appraisal (US$ millions) Infrastructure Rehabilitation 7.70 8.2640 107.32% Technical Assistance 0.15 0.2156 143.74% Project Management 0.65 0.0202 3.1% Total Baseline Cost 8.50 8.4999 Physical Contingencies 0.00 0.00 0.00 Price Contingencies 0.00 0.00 0.00 Total Project Costs 8.50 8.4999 Front-end fee PPF 0.00 0.00 .00 Front-end fee IBRD 0.00 0.00 .00 Total Financing Required 8.50 8.4999 (b) Financing Appraisal Actual/Latest Type of Co- Percentage of Source of Funds Estimate Estimate financing Appraisal (US$ millions) (US$ millions) Borrower 0.00 0.00 .00 Special Financing 8.50 8.4999 100% 28 Annex 2: Outputs by Component PDO/Results per Outcome Indicators as listed in Project Appraisal Remarks Component Document/Achievements At Design Actual Project Development Objective Provide Government Continued, safe and reliable service provision via the target infrastructure: with emergency i) Access to the Port of Monrovia is preserved: Fully Major project cost- support to restore vessels with 10.5 m draft or less can enter port achieved; overrun priority infrastructure all in the Port of activities Monrovia and at completed Roberts International ii) Oil jetty strengthened, fully operational and Dropped The activity was later Airport and assist the safe with vessel discharging capacity of up to planned under Bank Government in 30,000 dwt financed AIDP; and developing medium then transferred to term strategic URIRP where it is framework for under implementation efficient and iii) Firefighting capacity at the Port of Dropped productive port and Monrovia established aviation sectors iv) Efficient and reliable container handling In-progress Under Concession service: Minimum of10 moves per hour and 10 Contract days dwell time or less v) Minimum ICAO air navigation safety Fully international standards: met achieved; all activities completed Strategic port and aviation framework formulated Development of strategic framework for the two sub- sectors became redundant as the Government, under Bank funding through the Bank supported AIDP, started developing a comprehensive National Transport Policy comprising of strategies, action plans and an investment framework. Intermediate Results One per Components 29 Component A: Infrastructure Rehabilitation Rehabilitate selected Port: i) The port entrance and basin are Fully Activity quantum and prioritized brought to the required depth for the vessels achieved; increased due to infrastructure calling without risk of grounding: channel all additional dredging width of 150 meters; channel depth of Channel activities volumes resulting in Depth of 11 meters completed cost overrun ii) The import of the basic fuel categories Dropped Due to project cost (heavy oil, gas oil, gasoline and jet fuel) is overrun taking place under safe and secure conditions: oil jetty structure refurbished including construction of new off-load station, mooring dolphins, walkways iii) Capacity to combat large fires restored Dropped Due to project cost overrun iv) Container terminal contract in place: In- Private concession in Average annual crane productivity of 10 progress place since Feb 2011 TEUs/hour and 10 days dwell time or less Airport: v) Airfield Ground Lighting (AGL) Fully for runway and taxiway in place and achieved; Instrumental Landing System (ILS) for all instrumental and precision approach is fully activities calibrated and operational completed Component B: Technical Assistance and Capacity Building Long-term vision for Improved technical capacity by a core of Partially Hiring of the operation and SIU/MPW, NPA and RIA senior staff and achieved Environment and Port development of the understanding of principal Bank policies and Engineers did not two sectors and state procedures materialize owned entities (SOEs) – developed and discussed Strengthen capacity Government decision on strategic direction and Dropped Undertaken under at MPW and both reform of port and aviation sectors Bank funded AIDP SOEs Component C: Project Management Project Management Fully staffed and operational SIU at MPW and Achieved PFMU at MOF The SIU manages LIRP activities in Partially Compliance to conformance with legal and fiduciary Achieved project covenant on requirements, as stated in the Grant Agreement aircraft liability insurance was not successful 30 Annex 3: Economic and Financial Analysis 1. No directly related financial or economic analyses were carried out during project preparation and appraisal. However, prior studies had been undertaken for the port and airport [as well as roads, telecom, power, water and sewage – not subject to direct investment support under the Liberia Infrastructure Rehabilitation Project (LIRP)] with the aim of identifying emergency works and actions, prioritized under acceptable approach, to bring the operations to acceptable levels. Following is a summary of those priorities that were employed in the preparation and justification of the project. 2. Port. For identifying prioritized order of works and actions for investments in seaports, the traditional method is the use of a multi-criteria-analysis applied and leading to decisions based on the added value of a certain measure to safety and efficiency of port operations based on a variety of criteria and weighing factors. 3. The extreme situation in the Port of Monrovia necessitated a different approach to prioritization. The risk of not implementing a particular measure to port operations and more broadly the supply line/economic life line of Liberia was used as guideline for prioritizing the emergency works. 4. Technical assessment of the port resulted in a long list of 25 works and activities to be undertaken utilized the following categorization and characteristics to prioritize these. 5. Based on the categorization, a prioritized short list of eight works and activities was selected. National Ports Authority (NPA) confirmed both the identified long and short list as basis for support. The tables below show the short list and comments on the status or actions of each activity at the time of project preparation. Table 1: Short list Type Category Characteristics Works absolutely critical for maintaining / assuring current level Critical EMERGENCY of economic activity and social / political stability in the country. WORKS Works essential for safety of port workers and for maintaining / Highest assuring current level of port activity. High Works essential for improving port effectiveness and efficiency. Works strongly advisable for improving port effectiveness and LONGER Medium WORKS efficiency. TERM Low Works desirable for improving port effectiveness and efficiency. 31 Table 2: Status of Actions for Each Activity for Port Priority Emergency Works Category Note 1 Dredging critical LIRP Planned 2 Tugboat overhaul/marine service critical NPA intended to procure a tug 3 Upgrading Oil Jetty critical LIRP Planned Providing firefighting capacity at NPA 4 critical LIRP Planned yard Marking unsafe areas on deck 5 highest NPA Action Marginal Quay Demolition and Reconstruction Not addressed due to unavailability 6 highest Marginal Wharf of funds NPA Immediate Action - many of 7 Port Security high proposed actions can be implemented with limited funds Improvement container handling Capital cost avoided with WB 8 equipment, container yard and high support in bringing about container operations Container Concession 6. With a combination of NPA actions and support from the Project, seven of the eight shortlisted priorities were planned to be addressed through the Project. 7. Priorities 1, 3 and 4 were to benefit from LIRP investment funds. In order to maximize impact of investment funds, it was agreed that container concession (inherent in priority 8 be granted for short term period. NPA on its own account and initiative had implemented priority 5 and agreed to advance on priority 7. On priority 2, (as of July 2012) NPA is in the process of procuring two tug boats. 8. The most expensive investment, demolition and reconstruction of Marginal Wharf (identified as priority 6), was estimated to cost US$20 million at that time, and needed to be addressed through other means. 9. Airport. The International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) developed the principles and techniques of international air navigation and promotes the planning and development of international air transport (non-military aviation, both private and commercial) to ensure safe and orderly growth of airports. It provides standards and recommended practices, amongst others, for safety, security and operational procedures, and for airport planning and designing. Compliance with ICAO standards is therefore the international benchmark for three basic requirements: (a) safety; (b) security and (c) aircraft and passenger handling. 10. On the basis of ICAO, RIA emergency needs were assessed and prioritized in following order based on interventions needed to reinstate safe and efficient operation at the RIA in short-and medium-term. Those were: (a) air safety; (b) ground safety; (c) airside pavement conditions; (d) security; (e) airside operations; (f) terminal building area and landside facilities; (g) utilities; and (h) environmental conditions. 32 Table 3: Status of actions for each activity for Airport Priority Emergency Works Note air safety/ Supply and installation of 1 ground LIRP Planned navigational equipment, etc. safety First choice for financing if bid Refurbishment of RIA R&FF ground 2 savings realized in agreed LIRP trucks, ambulance, etc. safety package Supply of materials for airside and Not addressed due to current 3 terminal repairs airport buildings unavailability of funds Supply and maintenance of airport Not addressed due to current 4 landside equipment unavailability of funds Not addressed due to current 5 Improvements of utilities landside unavailability of funds 11. Only the first priority identified was funded by LIRP. 33 Annex 4: Bank Lending and Implementation Support/Supervision Processes (a) Task Team members Names Title Unit Lending Supervision/ICR Gylfi Palsson Lead Transport Specialist LCSTR Baba Imoru Abdulai Procurement Specialist AFTPC Owusu Mensah Agyei Consultant AFTFM Muhammad Zulfiqar Ahmed Sr. Transport. Engr. AFTTR Yao Badjo Senior Infrastructure Specialist AFTUW Samuel Bruce-Smith Consultant AFCW1 Thillainath Chelliah Senior Highway Specialist TWITR Callista Chen Consultant AFCS1 Robert Wallace DeGraft-Hanson Financial Management Specialist AFTFM Florence Geegbae Dukuly Team Assistant AFMLR Joseph A. Gadek Sr. Sanitary Engineer TWIEA Kremena Ionkova Urban Specialist AFTUW Christopher Paul Jackson Senior Economist AFTAR Yitzhak A. Kamhi Consultant AFTTR David Hope Kanu E T Consultant AFTFM Paul Kriss Lead Urban Specialist EASCS Cornelis Kruk Consultant AFTTR Antoine V. Lema Senior Social Development Spec AFTCS Anthony Mensa-Bonsu Consultant AFTPC Ntombie Siwale Sr. Program Assistant AFTTR Anne Njuguna Program Assistant AFTTR Jonathan Nyamukapa Sr Financial Management Specialist AFTFM Wycliffe Okoth Temporary AFTTR Thomas E. Walton Consultant EASNS (b) Staff Time and Cost Staff Time and Cost (Bank Budget Only) Stage of Project Cycle USD Thousands (including No. of staff weeks travel and consultant costs) Lending was prepared under TF030807 and no Bank Budget was used. Total: 0.00 Supervision/ICR FY07 – FY11 35.48 273.11 Total: 35.48 273.11 34 Annex 5: Beneficiary Survey Results N/A 35 Annex 6: Stakeholder Workshop Report and Results N/A 36 Annex 7: Summary of Borrower's ICR and/or Comments on Draft ICR A. BASIC TRUST FUND INFORMATION Project Name: Liberia Infrastructure Rehabilitation Project Grant Number: 57072 TF Number: P101456 Task Team Leader/TF Managing Unit: Gylfi Palsson and Emmanuel James / IDA TF Amount: US$8,500,000.00 Recipient of TF funds: Recipient is Liberia and Implementing Agencies was Special Implementation Unit (SIU), now Infrastructure Implementation Unit (IIU) Purpose of TF: The purposes of the Grant are to: (a) provide the Recipient with emergency support to Rehabilitate priority infrastructure in the Port of Monrovia and at Roberts International Airport; and (b) assist the Recipient in developing a medium term strategic framework for efficient and productive port and aviation sectors. TF Approval/IBTF Clearance Date: November 10, 2006 TF Activation Date: December 1, 2006 TF Closing Date(s): September 30, 2010 Table 1: Cost and Financing Original Reallocation Actual Percentage Allocation (04/22/08) Disbursed of revised Category Category Description US$ US$ US$ allocation (A) Consultant Services 1,435,000.00 182,000.00 215,618.27 118.5% (B) Training 40,000.00 0 0 (C) Goods 150,000.00 511,000.00 479,492.08 93.8% (D) Works 6,700,000.00 7,787,000.00 7,784,571.45 100.0% (E) Operating costs 175,000.00 20,000.00 20,274.72 101.4% Cancelled as on Jan 31,2011 - - -43.48 Total 8,500,000.00 8,500,000.00 8,499,913.04 100.0% B. TRUST FUND DEVELOPMENT OBJECTIVES AND DESIGN 1. Original (and Revised) Trust Fund Development Objectives: The Development Objective was to provide Government of Liberia with emergency support to restore priority infrastructure in the Port of Monrovia and at Roberts International Airport (RIA) and assist the Government in developing a medium-term strategic framework for rehabilitating the port and aviation sectors. However due to inadequate budgetary allocation the original components for the restoration of priority infrastructure in the Port of Monrovia 37 and RIA were scaled down with the approval and authorization by the Liberia Government and World Bank. 2. Original (and Revised) Trust Fund Activities/Components: The Grant of US$8.5 million started addressing the prioritized emergency works and Activities in the Port of Monrovia and at RIA, and started to provide targeted support to Government in achieving basic organizational capacity for efficient management of the respective sectors. The project also supported the Government in formulating a strategic framework for the sectors. Implementation period of four years. 3. Outcome Indicators: a) Access to the Port of Monrovia is preserved: vessels with 10.5 m draft or less can enter port; b) Oil jetty strengthened, fully operational and safe with vessel discharging capacity of up to 30,000 dwt; c) Firefighting capacity at the Port of Monrovia established; d) Efficient and reliable containers handling service Minimum 10 moves per hour and 10 days dwell time or less; and e) Minimum ICAO air navigation safety international standards met and Strategic port and aviation framework formulated. 4. Other Significant Change in Trust Fund Design: An appropriate response is considered from the following perspective: As per TF-Design: The TFLIB-funded technical assessments underpinning the project have been carried out during the transitional period that followed the armed conflict. Most development assistance during the period was designed to allow employment of low-skilled ex-combatants and Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) with the objective to preserve stability by keeping former fighters away from their fighting routine. (Refer to B.4, Item 60, Page 10 of PAD) Actual Situation: Not achieved as per TF-Design, employment data (basically information obtained during observation of workforce during site visits & inspections – as no information on local labor was presented in contractor’s invoices or progress reports) shows that during the projects implementation the intended impact was not significant or not achieved at all. (For the Dredging of the Entrance Channel at the Freeport, only expatriates were observed on the Hopper, during implementation.) (For the RIA Supply & Installation Contract, a minimal, not significant local labor force was observed during the implementation.) As per TF-Design: By the same token, longer term sector reforms which would have inevitably involved down-sizing of the SOEs, were left outside of the immediate Development agenda. (Refer to Minutes of site Meeting participation of NPA Management and Staff) 38 Actual Situation: The above is not entirely the case. For the Freeport of Monrovia, the Dredging of the Entrance Channel. The National Port Authority (NPA) – consultations and Interaction with the NPA Technical Staff and Management, during the project’s execution did take place – which again, to sound the note, were essentially in the realm of a very immediate development agenda. Actual Situation: For the Roberts International Airport (RIA), (in contrast to the NPA, RIA has not been incorporated and technically, it is public budgetary entity, functioning as a State Owned Enterprise (SOE), again this was not entirely the case, the entity was not left out of the immediate development agenda, RIA Management, under exceptional circumstances, was given the task to provide supervision during the implementation of the Supply and Installation Contract for the Navigational, Meteorological and Security Equipment. Not as per TF-Design: (Extraneous Circumstances) A significant variance between the Rough Order Magnitude (ROM) for estimates of the Dredging of the Entrance Channel of the Freeport of Monrovia (US$2.2million) (Refer to (i) Line Item 49, page 9, of the PAD) as against actual cost of works (US$7.7million). (Refer to Actual Expenditures from IIU’s Financial Managementt Division) (1) A cost Over-run, which essentially was allowed due to the very rapid narrowing of the entrance Channel and reduction of the Port basin draft, due to littoral drift and siltation of the single major Port in Liberia, for all imports and exports. A situation, which left unaddressed, was tantamount to a catastrophe, meaning a complete blockage/closure to the Freeport of Monrovia- no shipping vessel would be able to enter or leave the Freeport of Monrovia. (2) A cost over-run which, given the extreme urgency, coupled with the fact a very low response to the Bidding process, sole eligible Bidder at the time of Bid Opening – with time not being on the side of the GOL & World Bank (WB), to have the option to re-launch the procurement process or go to next ineligible Bidder, barred/rejected as a result of procurement rules – all late bids are to be received and Noted “LATE�, remained un-opened and returned to bidder subsequently. The particular late bid was marked with the following scenario and to capture the circumstances an extract is culled from the minutes prepared at the time. OFFICIAL WITHDRAWALS (Refer to Minutes of Bid Opening) Messrs. Boskalis and JAN DE NUL procured tender documents, but officially withdrew from making offer. RESPONSES Only two firms tendered for the dredging works: Dredging International of Belgium; and VAN OORD of the Netherlands REMARKS AND RESPONSES 39 Dredging International submitted their bid in five (5) copies and one (1) original. A bid security of US$50,000.00, and a bid form were included in their bid. Bid was received fully sealed, at the price of US$ 6,091,127.00 VAN OORD’s bid came unsealed and in one copy. However, SIU was informed, that the Sealed bid was DHLed on December 8, but that DHL was encountering customs difficulties at RIA. Bid opening was December 13th, while the sealed bid reached SIU on the 14th. Neither bid security, nor bid form was included; but there was a bid price indication of US$5,850,890.00 in the unsealed bid.� The GOL & WB therefore permitted the cost over-run with the initial acceptance of the sole eligible Bidder, Dredging International of Belgium, Bid Price and a further cost over-run when it was established, during implementation that the total material required to be dredged exceeded, the planned 500,000m3. (3) As a result of the above cost over-run re-allocation of funds ensued. This is also captured in the face of the fact that project(s) were dropped, in the case of the provision of Fire Fighting Facilities and also because procurement efforts were unsuccessful after several attempts, i.e. in the procurement of works for the Oil Jetty Rehabilitation at the NPA. C. OUTCOME (Note: Source is Annex 2 of PAD) 1. Relevance of TF Objectives, Design and Implementation: The Trust Fund objectives, design and implementation proved relevant to current global/regional/country priorities and the Bank’s sector strategy because this project did address the emergency needs of Liberia and the Bank strategic goal. The strategic goal for Liberia and Bank to assist in the process of peaceful economic recovery, to which this project contributes by rebuilding shattered infrastructure in two high priority transport sub-sectors for improved facilitation of freight and services globally. Improved safety of operations and refurbished facilities at the Port of Monrovia and Roberts International Airport will safeguard peace and stability, and assist in attracting private operators for business. In fact, being two of the revenue-generating agencies in Liberia, the State Owned Enterprise has the potential to advance their financial position and attract private sector involvement should their technical and commercial performance improve. 2. Achievement of TF Development Objective: The following represents the extent to which the Trust Fund development objectives have been met: Port: i) The port entrance and basin have been brought to the required channel width (150 m) and channel depth (11 m) without risk of vessels grounding. 40 Airport: ii) Airfield Ground Lighting (AGL) for runway and taxiway is in place. Also Instrumental Landing System (ILS) for precision to the approach of the runway is fully calibrated and operational. 3. Efficiency To correctly describe the degree to which the Trust Fund activities have been efficiently implemented, in terms of their associated costs, implementation times and economic and financial returns, we must accept that these sectors were with dilapidated infrastructure since Liberia was emerging from 15 years of civil war. The Trust Fund activities have been efficiently implemented due to the fact that the critical Development Objectives were met, in terms of their associated costs, the initial goal was under estimated for which reallocation was necessary, and with regards to efficient implementation times, implementation was completed before the closing date of the Project therefore implementation times were efficient; and economic and financial returns are now higher than before. While it is understood for projects of this nature that there are unintended/unrelated developmental impacts, there is no available data to show positive and/or negative unintended/unrelated impacts during the implementation of this project. 4. Overall TF Outcome: The overall TF outcome is Satisfactory (S). The justification for the overall outcome rating, takes into account the Trust Fund’s relevant achievement of each TF development objective, efficiency and development impact of the emergency support to restore priority infrastructure in the Port of Monrovia and the Roberts International Airport. However, the following were not achieved: 1. Oil jetty strengthened, fully operational and safe with vessel discharging capacity of up to 30,000 dwt; 2. Firefighting capacity at the Port of Monrovia established; D. PERFORMANCE 1. Bank The performance of the bank is rated as Highly Satisfactory (HS), and that assertion is justified by the fact that the Bank did assist as a partner to drive the process of financing and implementation. One instant is that when it was realized that cost estimates was too optimistic and/or private sector interest in civil works limited except at high premium, the Bank assisted by funds reallocation to address critical components. 2. Government of Liberia (GOL) The performance of the Recipient is rated as Satisfactory (S), and the justification is that the Recipient did all of that which was expected to drive the process of implementation. The 41 grant was fully utilized by the closing date of the Project. The quality of both civil works and services contracts funded under by the grant were satisfactory E. LESSONS LEARNED / RECOMMENDATIONS  Conduct of detailed assessment should form the basis for budgetary allocation  Contract packaging should be sufficient to attract serious competitors  Enhance local capability for efficient contract management/administration 42 Annex 8: Comments of Co-financiers and Other Partners/Stakeholders N/A 43 Annex 9: List of Supporting Documents on File LIBERIA INFRASTRUCTURE REHABILITATION PROJECT 1. Detailed Assessment of Emergency and Longer-term Actions required to Re-establish Efficient Port Operations in the Port of Monrovia – January 31, 2006 (Royal Haskoning) 2. Emergency Works Report – March 2006 (NACO Airport Consultants/Steward Scott) 3. Assessment of Emergency Repairs and Feasibility and Design Studies for Urban Supply, Sanitation, Storm-water Drainage and Solid Waste Management in Liberia – February 2006 4. Report of the Underwater Inspection at the Freetown of Monrovia, Liberia – The Oil Jetty - June-July 2005 (Royal Haskoning) 5. Pavement Assessment – November 2005 (NACO Airport Consultants/Steward Scott) 6. Environmental Scan of the Port of Monrovia – July 2005 (Royal Haskoning) 7. Draft Airport Master Plan Report – September 2005 (NACO Airport Consultants/Steward Scott) 8. Detailed Assessment of Emergency and Longer-term Actions required to Re-establish Efficient Port Operations Draft Master Plan Report – August 31, 2005 (Royal Haskoning) 9. Inception Report: Robert International Airport – July 2005 (NACO Airport Consultants/Steward Scott) 10. World Bank, LIRP, Emergency Project Paper, November 07, 2006. 11. Detailed Assessment of Emergency and Longer-term Actions required to Re-establish Efficient Port Operations in the Port of Monrovia: Technical Report – Final, March 20, 2006 (Royal Haskoning). The Provisional Environmental Impact Assessment and the Environmental Management Plan are contained in Chapter 7 and Annexes D, E and F of this report. 12. Provisional Environmental Assessment and Environmental Management Plan – undated (Royal Haskoning). This is a free-standing compilation of the pEIA and EMP as presented in the Technical Report, prepared for public disclosure. 13. Report on the Environmental Inspection/Survey of the Two Proposed Dredged Material Disposal Sites Located Outside the Free Port of Monrovia, Liberia – May 2007 (West Atlantic Geomatics). 14. Environmental Soil Investigation, Port of Monrovia, Final Report, March 24, 2006 (Royal Haskoning). 15. Dredging of the Entrance Channel of the Port of Monrovia, Works Completion Report, July 2007 (Royal Haskoning) MAP 44 IBRD 34852 11°W 10°W 9°W 8°W This map was produced by the Map Design Unit of The World Bank. The boundaries, colors, denominations and any other information shown on this map do not imply, on the part of The World Bank Group, any judgment on the legal status of any territory, or any endorsement or acceptance of such boundaries. 9°N 9°N LIBERIA GUINEA SIERRA To Irié LEONE To Voinjama Buedu Kolahun To Mt. Wuteve . Pendembu (1,380 m) ts M 8°N Vahun 8°N i e iz ng g To Kenema Ra i o no Gelahun g iz W Zorzor To o lo Lola a . ey W ts Gb Yekepa M nda fa L O FA Via ba Nia of To im Nzérékoré N L Kongo Gabalatuai Saniquellie To Kahnple Danané To Gahnpa Zimmi GRAND Bopolu BoCAPE Gbarnga 7°N l Palala 7°N P au MOUNT St. Zienzu BONG Yopie Sagleipie Tubmanburg Totota Bong Town NIMBA Robertsport BOMI CÔTE n Klay Botata Gloie Nu o D’IVOIRE Careysburg MARGIBI To hn Tapeta Toulépleu Katkata Jo St. Tobli MONROVIA GRAND Harbel BASSA Guata Poabli Kola Town MONTSERRADO Gaamodebi Hartford 6°N Babu Zwedru 6°N Buchanan Trade RIVERCESS Town Gonglee GRAND GEDEH Dube Pyne tos Ce s Bokoa SINOE River Cess Pelokehn Kopo Juazohn Kahnwia AT L A N TI C OC EAN Sehnkwehn Tawake Tawlokehn 5°N Greenville 5°N M GRAND A Nyaake LIBERIA R Nana Kru K R U Barclayville Y I N F RAS T RUC TU R E R EH AB I LI TATI ON LA Sasstown PR OJ EC T N Grand Cess Plibo D To INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT Tabou MAJOR PORTS Harper SELECTED CITIES AND TOWNS COUNTY CAPITALS 4°N NATIONAL CAPITAL RIVERS 0 20 40 60 80 100 Kilometers MAIN ROADS RAILROADS 0 20 40 60 Miles COUNTY BOUNDARIES INTERNATIONAL BOUNDARIES 10°W 9°W 8°W JUNE 2006