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Report No. 14949

IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION REPORT

REPUBLIC OF YEMEN

**TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE PROJECT
(CREDIT NO. 1556-YAR)**

SEPTEMBER 8, 1995

**Country Operations Division
Middle East Department
Middle East and North Africa Region**

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CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS

Currency Unit: Yemeni Rial (YRI)

<u>November 1984</u>	<u>January 1990</u>	<u>February 1995</u>
US\$1 = YRI 5.90	US\$1 = YRI 12.00	US\$1 = YR 12.00
YRI1 = US\$0.17	YRI1 = US\$0.083	YR1 = US\$0.083

ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

AMIDEAST	=	American-Mideast Education and Training Services, Inc.
CIR	=	Country Implementation Review
CPO	=	Central Planning Organization
CSO	=	Central Statistical Office
GDFIB	=	General Department of Follow-up and Investment Budget
GDDBCI	=	General Department of Data Bank and Central Information
GDLPR	=	General Department of Legal Affairs and Public Relations
GDPL	=	General Department of Projects and Loans
GDPR	=	General Department of Planning and Research
GDTC	=	General Department of Technical Cooperation and Conferences
GTZ	=	Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit (German Technical Cooperation)
IDA	=	International Development Association
MPD	=	Ministry of Planning and Development
MSA	=	Management and Other Support Services Agreement
OPS	=	Office for Project Services (of UNDP)
PDRY	=	People's Democratic Republic of Yemen
PIU	=	Project Implementation Unit
ROY	=	Republic of Yemen
UNDP	=	United Nations Development Programme
USAID	=	United States Agency for International Development
YAR	=	Yemen Arab Republic

GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF YEMEN FISCAL YEAR

January 1 - December 31

REPUBLIC OF YEMEN

TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE PROJECT
(CREDIT 1556 YAR)

IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION REPORT

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IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION REPORT

REPUBLIC OF YEMEN

**TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE PROJECT
(CREDIT 1556 YAR)**

Preface

This is the Implementation Completion Report (ICR) for the Technical Assistance Project in the Republic of Yemen, for which Credit 1556 YAR in the amount of US\$4.7 million was approved on March 7, 1985 and made effective on March 4, 1986.

The Credit closed on September 30, 1993, compared with the original closing date of December 31, 1989. Forty-six percent of the Credit was disbursed and the balance of US\$2,865,873 was cancelled.

The ICR was prepared by Kanok Pranich (consultant) under the supervision of Anders Bjorgung (Task Manager) and with additional input by Isik Erim (consultant), Country Operations Division, Middle East Department, Middle East and North Africa Region, and reviewed by Gianni Brizzi (Project Advisor). The beneficiary and implementing agency, the Ministry of Planning and Development, was consulted during report preparation, but did not provide any written comments.

The ICR is based on the project file and interviews with key Government and Bank staff.

REPUBLIC OF YEMEN**TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE PROJECT (CREDIT 1556 YAR)****Evaluation Summary****A. Introduction**

1. The Technical Assistance (TA) Project was the first stand-alone TA operation in Yemen. TA services, including training, were previously provided in the context of investment projects. At the Central Planning Organization (CPO), the need had been expressed for TA to complement the on-going assistance of other donors, to strengthen CPO's key departments and data management capability. The unification of the Yemen Arab Republic (YAR) with the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY) on May 22, 1990, resulted in the merger of the respective planning agencies to form the Ministry of Planning and Development (MPD). The project was implemented by CPO in the beginning and by MPD in the later years.

B. Project Objectives

2. The project, supported by IDA Credit 1556-YAR, aimed to improve staff capability in key departments of the Central Planning Organization (CPO) and to establish procedures that would strengthen CPO's operations and its working relationship with other ministries and agencies.

C. Implementation Experience and Results

3. The achievements of the project were mixed. On the positive side, the project did improve the capability of CPO staff. The target of delivering 324 person-months of training was exceeded by over 40 percent (of which 264 person-months were overseas), and at only half the expenditure allocated for this purpose. The procurement of computer equipment was also successfully completed before the original Credit closing date and at only half of the expected cost. Expert services (156 person-months) contributed to strengthening of CPO departments. In particular two computer specialists trained about 40 staff members for five years in computer data bank technology in the CPO, the Central Statistical Office (CSO), and the Prime Minister's Office. Another seventy staff members were trained overseas in economic planning, investment programming, project evaluation, TA administration, procurement and contract administration, and middle management. Computer systems were procured, installed, and are currently in use.

4. However, the project was not able to establish procedures to strengthen CPO's overall operation and working relationship with other ministries and agencies. This is partly due to the fact that the study of CPO organization and methods, which was to serve as the basis for its reform, was not undertaken. Moreover, the Government was not prepared to give CPO an unequivocal role in project selection and portfolio monitoring. In addition, the project

experienced delays comparable to the other projects in the Yemen portfolio. The Credit took almost ten months to become effective, rather than the four originally estimated. Further delays occurred in the appointment of several staff, procurement activities, and Credit disbursement. The project had no separate implementation unit and depended on CPO's own staff to carry out its day-to-day operations. This situation and CPO's delay in making decisions persisted through to the Credit closing date.

5. With the unification in 1990 the project entered a new phase. After the Gulf war later that year, the Kuwait Fund ceased its operation in the Republic of Yemen, thereby discontinuing the TA it provided to CPO/MPD since its establishment. Meanwhile, with the impact of the Gulf crisis Yemen's economy started facing major difficulties and the economic dialogue with the donors took the forefront. In order to fill the TA gap and further strengthen MPD's economic departments, IDA agreed to provide financing for macroeconomists and planners, as well as a statistical analyst, and a national accounts advisor. The Credit closing date was extended six months (to June 30, 1990), and then again for another year (to June 30, 1991) so that a TA action plan including the hiring of such specialists could be prepared and implemented.

6. In line with a two-year action plan agreed with IDA in 1991, MPD signed a contract with AMIDEAST to manage training of ninety staff in various countries; another contract was signed with the UNDP's Office for Project Services (OPS) to recruit and manage the services of needed specialists (para. 5 above); and contracts for the purchase of additional computer systems and office equipment were approved for award by the High Tender Board. A final two-year extension was then granted to cover the action plan. However, none of these contracts had been implemented by the final Credit closing date of September 30, 1993. MPD cancelled the contract with AMIDEAST; did not make effective that with OPS; and did not award the contracts for computer and office equipment. In the end, about SDR 2.52 million, or 53.6 percent of the Credit, had to be cancelled. This substantial credit cancellation is the result of the combined effects of: (i) the non implementation of the above mentioned components and activities; (ii) the rise in value of the SDR during the life of the project; (iii) savings derived from the lower than expected costs of procuring equipment (fall of computer costs) and carrying out training (use of regional rather than international experts); and (iv) donor financing of the experts required to carry out some TA activities;

D. Main Conclusions and Lessons Learned

7. By substantially strengthening CPO's data management department, the project was successful in laying the foundation of what became the Central Statistical Office which has now adequate data management capabilities for national accounts and for surveys such as the national household survey. The MPD departments responsible for project planning, financing and monitoring are capable of carrying out these functions without external assistance and the project has contributed to this through training programs and expert support. A management information system for portfolio implementation was installed but is not operational pending Government action to ensure that the project implementing agencies provide data inputs. As regards the economic departments, MPD wish to secure further assistance for them in its future TA programs.

8. Installing computers, training staff in their use, and establishing a data bank in the Prime Minister's Office were added to the original scope of the project. In this regard, the project set a good example and similar projects are underway in other ministries. The lasting effect of all components, on the other hand, depends on the ability of the Ministry of Planning and Development to substantially retain the staff trained under the project.

9. As for the lessons learned from the project, it should be mentioned that:

- During project implementation, grants could become available and displace IDA resource earmarked for specific project activities. To limit this occurrence, project financing plans should carefully assess the availability of alternative grant financing. Moreover, credit agreements should provide for unilateral cancellation, at IDA's discretion, of any credit funds displaced by grants not included in the financing plan.
- Institutional development components of TA projects should be contingent upon Government agreement on a detailed institutional plan for the ministry or agency concerned. Absence of such an agreement should be considered as a red flag to successful project implementation. Even with such a plan, TA for institutional development will have limited impact if there is no Government commitment to a broader administrative reform.
- In view of rapidly changing conditions and generally slow implementation, TA projects should be kept as small and focussed as possible to avoid long implementation periods; alternatively, when institutional development/administrative reform plans are available, a time-slice or credit line approach could be considered together with a flexible design to tackle institutional needs over a longer time period and under changing conditions.
- Agreement should be reached with the Government that procurement and recruitment steps should be completed during the 9-12 months while effectiveness is pending. Normally, agencies do not act on procurement and recruitment until after credit effectiveness.

REPUBLIC OF YEMEN

TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE PROJECT (CREDIT 1556 YAR)

PART I. IDA PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION ASSESSMENT

A. Background

1. During the late 1970s and early 1980s Yemen benefitted from increasing development assistance provided by OECD countries, Arab/OPEC countries as well as the Socialist block. Availability of resources well exceeded the administration's ability to prepare and implement projects. Many of the ministries/agencies were in the early stages of developing such capabilities and facing an overall shortage of technical and foreign language skills. In 1983, the Government agency responsible for preparing development plans, and promoting and administering external funding for them (the Central Planning Organization-CPO), requested assistance from IDA for an institutional development program that would strengthen its main departments.

B. Project Objectives and Implementation

2. In response to these needs, IDA prepared and financed a technical assistance project (prepared through 1994 and approved on March 7, 1985) aimed at addressing the Government's main objectives, namely to improve economic analysis/planning as well as project programming, financing and monitoring. The project focussed on the following. First, in order to achieve better economic analysis and development planning: (i) CPO's planning and research staff would receive external training, (ii) staff responsible for the data bank would receive external and internal training as well as assistance to prepare and implement an action plan, and (iii) the data bank would be equipped with modern data processing equipment. These activities would be coordinated with those of the Kuwait Fund which provided a senior economist as advisor to the minister. Second, to support project programming, financing and monitoring CPO's General Department of Projects and Loans (GDPL) as well as its Legal Department would receive expert support and overseas training. Areas of emphasis being project costing, cost control, procurement, and contracting. These areas of emphasis were selected not only to meet the needs of the CPO in handling externally financed projects but also to enable CPO assistance to those of the technical ministries/agencies that did not have adequate resources. Other components involved strengthening of the General Department of Technical Assistance and Conferences as well as setting up a methods and organization unit.

3. With respect to the data bank, the implementation proceeded quite well. The project laid down a strong foundation for the present day Central Statistical Office which more than fulfills the institutional objective of the project concerning data management. However, other activities related to planning did not proceed as well, mainly because the economic environment was deteriorating, and, in the face of declining resource availability, the need for structural adjustment was overtaking the need for long term development planning. The project, thanks to its flexible design, could have assisted the Government in gearing for structural adjustment work. However, the Government was not prepared to undertake major economic reforms at the time.

4. As regards CPO's general project preparation and supervision capabilities, the first two years of implementation went well; training programs and expert recruitment took place more or less as planned. Thereafter, the Government began shifting the main responsibility in some of the areas

covered by the project, such as project preparation, procurement and contracting, to technical ministries and a central tender board which began receiving assistance from IDA and other donors for institutional development. As a consequence, project objectives involving GDPS were reevaluated, and their focus was changed to upstream work with donors and monitoring of the development portfolio. By this time, CPO was offered expert support and training programs under bilateral grants. Some of the training recommended under the project was thus financed by grants instead. As a result of both developments, commitment of IDA funds slowed down.

5. By 1989, the original closing date of the project (December 1989) was in sight, with little progress over the preceding year. The completed project activities had cost substantially less than estimates and a large unutilized balance remained. In that same year, the work on unification between former North and South Yemen had taken a serious turn. Since unification implied the amalgamation of the two administrations, most institutional development activities as well as plan preparation had to be deferred. Government wished to maintain the project in order to support institutional needs arising from the merger. IDA agreed with this request based on the following considerations: First, the fundamental objective of the project, strengthening the central development agency, was as valid as ever and strategy reviews in the Bank repeatedly identified institutional reforms (in fact a broader administrative reform) as a very desirable objective for IDA operations. Second, the flexible design of the project would lend itself (without formal restructuring) to further institutional reform. Third, a single extension of about two years and a firm action plan would meet the objective without extending the project's life beyond the average life of projects in Yemen at that time (i.e. seven years).

6. During 1990, the administration was overwhelmed with the logistics of a complicated merger. The additional time provided in 1991, allowed a preliminary institutional survey of the Ministry (by UNDP experts who prepared terms of reference for a study), and the completion of the Action Plan. As a condition for a final two-year extension to implement this Plan, IDA required that the equipment bids be evaluated and approved by all concerned; a training contract be approved with an NGO that handled previous programs successfully; and experts be selected by UNDP to provide support to the economic departments. These prerequisites were met and IDA granted a final two-year extension. After the extension, none of the contracts were implemented and the project had virtually no activity until its closing in 1993. It seems that a divergence of views occurred within the Ministry on all aspects of the action plan and the relevant TA contracts. No further institutional action could be contemplated because of the political difficulties encountered by the public administration, although the Ministry was among the least afflicted. No budget or investment program could be approved on time. Despite further requests for extension, the credit was closed in 1993.

7. The credit amount was SDR 4.7 million, of which SDR 2.18 million was disbursed and the balance was cancelled. Project costs for equipment and training were much lower than the estimates because equipment costs fell dramatically throughout the computer industry, and training—performed in the region—cost far less than had been assumed. Moreover, after the second year of implementation, bilateral donors began offering grants for the kind of training and experts included in the project. The Government preferred grant financing. The rise in value of the SDR also contributed to reduce the financing needs. Closing date extensions were granted four times: for six months (December 31, 1989 to June 30, 1990); for one year (until June 30, 1991); for three months (until September 30, 1991); and for two years (until September 30, 1993). A total of 100 staff weeks were used for project preparation, supervision, and preparation of the Implementation Completion

Report. Overseas training and expert services deployed under the project were 264 and 156 person-months respectively. Total training amounted to about 450 person-months.

C. Impact and Sustainability

8. Support for data management provided results that exceeded the expectations of the original design. The Data Bank evolved into the Central Statistical Office and prepared the first set of national accounts for the unified country; more recently, it conducted major surveys such as the household survey, a useful input for a future poverty assessment. This component had a positive demonstration effect; other branches of the Government, notably the Prime Minister's office, sought to install data management systems of the same kind.

9. The benefits of the training programs and expert services in the domain of project planning, preparation, financing and monitoring remains with the Ministry which no longer needs external assistance to fulfill these functions. Although its role has changed over time, the Department responsible for project related activities is fully capable of fulfilling its functions. Indeed, its technical staff have been quite accurate in identifying projects that would run into implementation problems. Its operational data management needs are being addressed by bilateral assistance. Responsibility for procurement and contracting has been shifted to the technical ministries and the Tender Board. Nevertheless, the Ministry participates in these functions. While there is room for improvement in Government's portfolio implementation, this is more an inter-ministerial issue than one pertaining to the Ministry of Planning alone. For example, a management information system developed under the project for monitoring portfolio implementation remains unutilized because the Government does not require the project implementing ministries/agencies to input data. Hence a global and up to date view of the portfolio(s) cannot be generated internally. Neither can any Government agency supervise the entire portfolio in the absence of implementation data. IDA tries to fill the information void by sharing data through the CPPR reviews, and through its Resident Representative.

10. Method and organization components were not implemented well. However, even if they had been implemented as planned, the merger of the two agencies of planning in 1990 would have changed much of the organizational structure. The merger made available a wider skill pool, but because of the need to accommodate all civil servants and distribute positions evenly between the North and the South, it created a heavy structure. This was anticipated and the project was positioned, through extensions and the preparation of an institutional action plan, to address institutional efficiency; an issue that still prevails. Unfortunately, the action plan was not implemented while administrative reform and institutional development issues remained high in the country's agenda.

11. Key economic decisions are made by the High Economic Council (consisting of the ministers with economic portfolios and the Central Bank Governor) which does not have a permanent secretariat to carry out research and analysis. This task is shared by the Ministry of Planning, The Ministry of Finance and the Central Bank. The project did not achieve noticeable results in building up economic analysis capacity in the Ministry of Planning. Conversely, the Ministry has acquired the capability to prepare public investment programs. Also it has a limited number of staff trained to carry out the basic economic analysis that underpin economic adjustment programs. However, the latter capability is not attributable to the project and it is not sufficiently institutionalized.

D. Bank's and Borrower's Performance

12. To take full advantage of external assistance, Yemen needs to be in a position to prepare and implement development projects and programs. CPO, the government agency that had the statutory mandate to plan investments and to interface with external donors, had a pivotal role in this area as has the MPD today. In 1983-84, CPO and IDA identified the need to strengthen CPO, and together designed a suitable project to that end. The project objectives remained valid throughout implementation and continue to be so. The design was flexible and allowed adjustment under changing circumstances. Had the second project implementation phase (the institutional action plan) taken place, this feature would have born high rewards. Hence, the performance in project design was good.

13. Implementation up to the unification was in line with other projects in the IDA portfolio and shared the same difficulties which are still present today. Beyond unification, the only achievement has been the preparation of the institutional action plan which remains valid in the absence of a broader administrative reform. IDA carried out fourteen supervision missions for a total of about 60 staff weeks monitoring and adjusting the project, designing the institutional review of the Ministry and helping with the action plan. Project problems were discussed at every country implementation review. The results from this effort were not entirely satisfactory but comparable to those from several other projects in the portfolio. IDA staff appear to have underestimated the political/administrative gridlock that followed the unification as did other donors. With hindsight, the project/credit should have been closed when the first extension did not produce an institutional action plan for the Ministry. More specifically, IDA should have set dates for contracts emanating from the action plan to become effective with the added condition that—should these dates not be met—the Credit would be closed.

E. Lessons Learned

14. The lessons learned can be summarized as follows:

- During project implementation, grants could become available and displace IDA resources earmarked for specific project activities. To limit this occurrence, project financing plans should carefully assess the availability of alternative grant financing. Moreover, credit agreements should provide for unilateral cancellation, at IDA's discretion, of any credit funds displaced by grants not included in the financing plan.
- Institutional development components of TA projects should be contingent upon Government agreement on a detailed institutional plan for the ministry or agency concerned. Absence of such an agreement should be considered as a red flag to successful project implementation. Even with such a plan, TA for institutional development will have limited impact if there is no Government commitment to a broader administrative reform.
- In view of rapidly changing conditions and generally slow implementation, TA projects should be kept as small and focussed as possible to avoid long implementation periods; alternatively, when institutional development/administrative reform plans are available, a time-slice or credit line approach could be considered together with a flexible design to tackle institutional needs over a longer time period and under changing conditions.

- Agreement should be reached with the Government that procurement and recruitment steps should be completed during the 9-12 months while effectiveness is pending. Normally, agencies do not act on procurement and recruitment until after credit effectiveness.

PART II: STATISTICAL TABLES

Table 1. Summary of Assessments

Achievement of Objectives	Substantial	Partial	Negligible	Not Applicable
Macroeconomic policies				✓
Sector policies				✓
Financial objectives			✓	
Institutional development		✓		
Physical objectives	✓			
Poverty reduction				✓
Gender issues				✓
Other social objectives				✓
Environmental objectives				✓
Public sector management			✓	
Private sector development				✓
Project Sustainability	Likely	Unlikely	Uncertain	
			✓	
Bank Performance	Highly Satisfactory	Satisfactory	Deficient	
Identification		✓		
Preparation assistance		✓		
Appraisal		✓		
Supervision		✓		
Borrower Performance				
Preparation		✓		
Implementation			✓	
Covenant compliance		✓		
Assessment of Outcome	Highly Satisfactory	Satisfactory	Partial Satisfactory	Highly Unsatisfactory
			✓	

Table 2. Related Bank Loans and Credits

<i>Loan or Credit</i>	<i>Purpose</i>	<i>Year Approved</i>	<i>Status</i>
Preceding Operations		None	
Following Operations Technical Assistance to the Petroleum Sector (Credit 1702-YAR)	To strengthen the technical and managerial capabilities of Ministry of Oil and Mineral Resources	1986	Credit closed Dec. 31, 1993 with significant achievements.
Institutional Development for Public Administration (Credit 2015-YAR)	Same as above for Ministry of Civil Service Administration and Reform and National Institute of Administrative Science	1989	Project under implementation.

Table 3. Project Timetable for Credit 1556 YAR

<i>Steps</i>	<i>Projected Date(s)</i>	<i>Actual Date(s)</i>
<i>Identification (Executive Project Summary)</i>	—	<i>March 1984</i>
<i>Preparation</i>	<i>March 8 to May 84</i>	<i>March 2 to May 29, 1984</i>
<i>Appraisal</i>	<i>July 1984</i>	<i>July 1984</i>
<i>Negotiations</i>	<i>January 1985</i>	<i>January 23-24, 1985</i>
<i>Letter of development policy (if applicable)</i>	—	—
<i>Board presentation</i>	<i>March 7, 1985</i>	<i>March 7, 1985</i>
<i>Signing</i>	<i>May 20, 1985</i>	<i>May 20, 1985</i>
<i>Effectiveness</i>	<i>September 18, 1985</i>	<i>March 4, 1986</i>
<i>First tranche release (if applicable)</i>	—	—
<i>Midterm review (if applicable)</i>	—	—
<i>Second (and third) tranche release (if applicable)</i>	—	—
<i>Project completion</i>	<i>June 30, 1989</i>	<i>September 30, 1993</i>
<i>Loan closing</i>	<i>December 31, 1989</i>	<i>September 30, 1993</i>

**Table 4. Loan/Credit Disbursements: Cumulative Estimated and Actual
(in SDR and US\$, in thousands)**

IDA FY

<i>Credit Disbursement</i>	<i>1987</i>	<i>1988</i>	<i>1989</i>	<i>1990</i>	<i>1991</i>	<i>1992</i>	<i>1993</i>	<i>1994^a</i>	<i>1995</i>
Appraisal estimate in SDR ^b	1900	3100	4500	4700					
Actual SDR ^c	381	668	805	1258	1539	1801	1801	1801	2180
Actual US\$	491	886	1074	1658	2058	2413	2413	2413	2834
Actual (as percentage of SDR of estimate)	200	21.5	17.9	26.8	32.7	38.3	38.3	38.3	46.4
Actual (as percentage of US\$ estimate)	25.8	28.6	23.9	35.3	43.8	51.3	51.3	51.3	60.3

^a Final disbursement was on November 29, 1994

^b Credit was in SDR, and SDR 1.0 = US\$1.0 equivalent when project was appraised in 1984. Parity value of the SDR increased by 30 percent against the US dollar between 1984 and the end of 1994.

^c Not including SDR 500,000 (US\$593,000) withdrawn in 1986 for the Special Account, which was not a real expenditure. The Special Account was used up during later years, particularly in the last year, fiscal 1995.

Table 5. Key Indicators for Project Implementation

Detailed information not available

Table 6. Key Indicators for Project Operation

Detailed information not available

Table 7. Studies Included in Project

Study	Purpose	Status	Impact
Organization and operations of the CPO	Technical Assistance to help define the responsibilities of various CPO departments and improve their performance.	Not carried out	None

Table 8A. Project Costs

Item	Appraisal Estimate (US\$ Million)			Actual Expenditure (US\$ Million)		
	Local Costs	Foreign Costs	Total	Local Costs	Foreign Costs	Total
Equipment and Materials	0.17	1.58	1.75	0.09	0.79	0.88
Consultants' Services	0.30	1.27	1.57	0.10	1.60	1.70
Training	0.25	0.78	1.03	0.11	0.44	0.55
Support Services	0.20	-	0.20	0.02	-	0.02
Contingencies	0.17	0.66	0.83	-	-	-
Total	1.09	4.29	5.38	0.32	2.83	3.15

Table 8B. Project Financing

Source	Appraisal Estimate (US\$ Million)			Actual Expenditures (US\$ Million)		
	Local Costs	Foreign Costs	Total	Local Costs	Foreign Costs	Total
IDA	0.41	4.29	4.70	-	2.83	2.83
Government	0.68	-	0.68	0.32	-	0.32
Total	1.09	4.29	5.38	0.32	2.83	3.15

Table 9. Economic Costs and Benefits

Detailed information not available

Table 10. Status of Legal Covenants

There is no evidence of non-compliance.

Table 11. Compliance with Operational Manual Statement

There is no evidence of non-compliance.

Table 12. Bank Resources: Staff Inputs and Bank Missions

<i>Stage of Project Cycle</i>	<i>Planned*</i>		<i>Revised*</i>		<i>Actual</i>	
	<i>Weeks</i>	<i>US\$</i>	<i>Weeks</i>	<i>US\$</i>	<i>Weeks</i>	<i>US\$'000**</i>
Lending Preparation					16.3	102
Lending Appraisal					14.7	92
Negotiation					1.3	8
Supervision					60.7	380
Completion					8.0	50
Total					101.0	632

* Information not available

** Assume \$250,000 per staff year.

From preparation to completion of the Implementation Completion Report, the Bank fielded a total of fourteen missions, of which twelve were Supervision Missions totaling 60.7 staff-weeks. Typical Supervision Missions comprised two persons: the Task Manager, and an Information Technology Specialist.

CHAPTER

Report No.
Type: III

1100