Participation, Transparency, and Downward Accountability in District Planning in Mozambique

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<tr>
<td>AD</td>
<td>Administrador Distrital</td>
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<td>CE</td>
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<td>CCD</td>
<td>Conselho Consultivo Distrital</td>
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<td>CCPA</td>
<td>Conselho Consultivo do Posto Administrativo</td>
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<td>CDL</td>
<td>Comissão de Desenvolvimento Local</td>
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<td>DDP</td>
<td>District Development Plan</td>
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<td>DPFP</td>
<td>District Planning and Finance Program</td>
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<td>ET</td>
<td>Equipa Técnica</td>
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<td>FL</td>
<td>Fórum da Localidade</td>
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<td>IG</td>
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<td>LDF/DDF</td>
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<td>MAE</td>
<td>Ministério de Administração Estatal</td>
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<td>MAMM</td>
<td>Moma, Angoche, Mogincual, and Mogovolas</td>
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<td>MPF</td>
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

INTRODUCTION
1. The purpose of this report is to provide diagnostic elements to assist in the design of the participation and downward accountability system of the District Planning and Financing Program that the World Bank and the Government of Mozambique are negotiating for implementation in four provinces of the center region of the country.

2. The report is based on a three-week mission in Mozambique and the review of secondary sources. During the mission I interviewed a broad range of stakeholders which included government officials at the national, provincial, and district levels, donor agencies, consultants, and civil society representatives from communities and NGOs. In addition, I visited three experiences (UNCDF/UNDP’s in Nampula, Concern’s in Machaze, and ADEL’s in Buzi) and reviewed written materials.

ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK
In this section I define three core concepts (participation, accountability, and community) and present a framework for analyzing participation and downward accountability in district planning. The framework is divided in four components, which correspond to the four stages of the planning process:

- First, the rules and processes government applies during the diagnostic stage to gather community preferences regarding local development priorities.
- Second, the rules and processes government uses during plan preparation to translate community input into a district development plan. Important principles here are
- Third, the rules and processes government establishes during plan implementation to elicit community involvement.
- Fourth, the rules and processes government implements during the plan’s monitoring and evaluation to enable communities to hold government accountable for plan implementation.

INSTITUTIONAL CONTEXT FOR LOCAL GOVERNANCE
The institutional context for local governance in Mozambique makes promoting true participation and downward accountability a significant challenge. Key limitations are:

- the absence of elected district authorities and a district budget,
- a very centralized government structure
- poorly trained and equipped staff at the district level
- a thin stock of linking social capital to connect civil society with government decision-making
- a weak democratic culture at the local level, partly due to the recency of independence from colonialism, a protracted civil war, and a very young multi-party democracy

Despite these limitations, Mozambique also counts with positive assets and signals to start the process of building good local governance. Some of them are:

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1 This is a very short summary of the analysis and recommendations contained in the report. A more detailed summary appears in the conclusions and recommendations section.
• government interest in developing a more statutory basis for civil society participation in government decision-making, through Consultative Councils at the District and PA level. Evidence of this are the Decree 15/2000 and a Draft Law of State Local Bodies.
• a thick stock of bonding social capital that could facilitate the thickening of linking social capital, as well as local experiences in developing linking organizations that serve as pilot models to be scaled up.
• a rich array of experiences with participatory district planning that have tested different methodologies and develop some local capacity for conducting them. The most promising of these experiences is the UNCDF/UNDP pilot in Nampula. This pilot has demonstrated that it is possible to mainstream a participatory district planning process managed by public officials using public administration procedures.

STRENGTHS AND LIMITATIONS OF THE NAMPULA PROJECT
The overall conclusion is that the Nampula model has several strengths that need to be preserved as well as several limitations that should be addressed. Key strengths and limitations are analyzed.

ISSUES, OPTIONS, AND MECHANISMS FOR IMPROVED LOCAL GOVERNANCE
Key recommendations to improve the participation and downward accountability component of the DPFP being designed by the WB and the GOM are:
• Develop a strategy for creating linking social capital. The proposed strategy is twofold: create mandatory Forums de Localidades in each localidade and create incentives for the voluntary formation of Commissoes de Desenvolvimento Local (CDLs) at the povoacao level. Section V.1 discusses the advantages of this strategy as well as provides recommendations on who should be responsible for implementing it, on what incentives should be given for organizing, and the risks of this strategy.
• Improve the structures that the Nampula model has piloted for civil society-district government dialogue. It is recommended that the FLs act as an informal structure for this dialogue and that formal dialogue through CCs takes place at the PA and district level. Criteria for civil society representation in CCDs and CCPAs are proposed. Key issues that should be present in the production of the district plan are discussed, such as: (i) including an annex in the DDP where the List of Community Priorities identified in each CCPA is presented; and (ii) developing a plan for community self-help activities.
• Improve participation and downward accountability in subproject implementation by increasing transparency and information release about public procurement, creating community oversight committees and community-based operation and maintenance management committees;
• Creating conditions for downward accountability about plan implementation are suggested. They include: electing civil society representatives to participate in the CCs for a certain period of time and mandating instances for them to report back to their constituencies; ensuring that administrative rules for planning, budgeting, financial management, and procurement are transparent; develop an aggressive communication strategy; and a system of rewards and sanctions that provides incentives both the district staff and the local population to engage in good local governance.
• Strengthening the capacities of provincial and district officials, as well as community leaders and members. I discuss principles for effective capacity building, and make
recommendations for developing a professional development program at the provincial level, a learning program that matches good and bad performing districts to exchange information, the creation of provincial and district participatory development coordinators, and actions to improve community capacities.
I. INTRODUCTION

1. The purpose of this report is to provide diagnostic elements to assist in the design of the participation and downward accountability system of the District Planning and Financing Program that the World Bank and the Government of Mozambique are negotiating for implementation in four provinces of the center region of the country. Specific objectives of the study (see Terms of Reference in Annex) are:

- To review the current rules, regulations and institutional arrangements for community participation and accountability in Mozambique.
- To propose institutional arrangements and mechanisms that will improve people’s participation in decision making during the district planning process and during the implementation of the resulting district plans and projects.
- To review and propose ways (e.g. communication strategy, flow of information) in which the district administration or others handling public resources could report faithfully to beneficiaries on the intended and actual use of resources at the local level.
- To assess and propose institutional mechanisms through which local communities can regulate the behavior of district officials involved in the management of public resources and the provision of public services.
- To propose capacity building needs and institutional arrangements to improve participation, transparency and accountability at community and district levels.

2. The report is based on a three-week mission in Mozambique and the review of secondary sources. During the mission I interviewed a broad range of stakeholders which included government officials at the national, provincial, and district levels, donor agencies, consultants, and civil society representatives from communities and NGOs (see Annex for a detailed list). In my field trips I paid particular attention at three experiences: the UNCDF/UNDP’s funded pilot in Nampula, ADEL’s program in the district of Buzi, province of Sofala; and Concern’s experience in the district of Machaze, province of Manica. I also drew from written material such as mid-term evaluations, consultants reports, and the best practice study on community participation in Mozambique funded as part of the DPFP formulation process \(^2\) (see Annex for a detailed list of the references consulted). By the end of the mission I had meetings to present my preliminary observations with government officials and donors’ representatives. A Draft version of this report has been reviewed and discussed by a large number of people, to whom I want to express my gratitude for their very useful feedback. \(^3\) In particular, I would like to thank Louis Helling for his excellent feedback and contributions to the report. Finally, I would like to thank all those who helped me during my stay in Mozambique

3. The Report is organized in five sections:

- The next section, section two, defines a framework of the key dimensions that affect the quality of a participatory and accountable district planning process;

\(^2\) See Matakala and Cavane (2002).
\(^3\) Ministry of Planning and Finance: Roberto Salomão, Eugénio Simbine and UNDP Technical Advisor Nelson Amaro; Ministry of State Administration: Luciano Norte; Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development: Jose Mathe; Consultants: Eunice Cavane, Patrick Matakala, Anselmo Zimba, Filimone Meigos, and Luis Artur; DPFP Nampula: Castro Sanfins; DPFP Coordination Unit: Custodio dos Mucudos and Taquidir Bacar; Donors: Jan-Willem le Grand (Netherlands Embassy), Havard Hoksnes (Norwegian Embassy), Bernard Weimer (Swiss Cooperation), Rikke Fabienke (UNDP), and Kristin Wambold-Leibling (UNCDF); Aniceto Bila, Louis Helling, and Kate Kuper (World Bank).
• Section three analyzes the institutional context that exists in Mozambique for rural local governance.
• Section four describes the main features of the Nampula Project and analyzes its main strengths and limitations in terms of participation and downward accountability;
• Section five presents options and mechanisms for addressing the limitations of the Nampula Project;
• Section six summarizes the main conclusions and recommendations.

II. ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK
4. In this section I define key terms that are used throughout the paper and present a framework for analyzing the district planning process from a participation and accountability perspective.

1. Key definitions
5. Three concepts that are at the core of this analysis and that require some sort of definition are: participation, accountability, and community.

6. Participation. Despite the multiple definitions of participation, each one with a different emphasis, most scholars agree that it is “a process by which people, specially disadvantaged people, influence decisions that affect them” (World Bank, 1992, p.177) as opposed to one where decisions are imposed on them by hierarchical outside agencies. The rationale for promoting participation is to ensure that communities play an active role in the decisions which affect their lives and to make governments more accountable: “as participation increases, vital information not in the public domain becomes available and the voices of interested parties can help make governments more accountable; both in turn enhance performance” (World Bank 1994, p.3).

7. Accountability. The concept of accountability stands on two pillars: answerability and enforcement:
• Answerability is “the obligation of public officials to inform about and to explain what they are doing” (Schedler 1999, p. 14). Answerability implies a double quest for information and explanation or justification. The informational dimension involves the right to receive information and the corresponding obligation to release all necessary details. It is basically a monitoring activity concerned with obliging power holders to exercise power in transparent ways. The argumentative dimension involves the right to receive an explanation and the corresponding duty to justify one’s conduct. It forces power holders to justify their acts, to give valid reasons.
• Enforcement is “the capacity of accounting agencies to impose sanctions on power holders who have violated their public duties.” (p. 14) The enforcement dimension of accountability implies rewarding good and punishing bad behavior. Depending on the severity of the offense, possible sanctions range from the destruction of reputation through public exposure and removal from office, through legal sanctions.
• There are many types of accountability (vertical, horizontal, political, bureaucratic, etc). This study is concerned with what the terms of reference describe as “downward accountability”. By this I understand (i) the acts of information and justification that district government officials give to the district population about the way in which public decisions are made and public monies are spent, particularly with regards to the welfare and
development of the district; and (ii) the capacity of the local population and higher levels of government to impose sanctions/rewards on district officials in accordance to their performance.

- Viewed from the standpoint of the client or user of a public service there are two basic factors that influence accountability. “One is the extent to which the public has access to alternative suppliers of a given public service. The question here is whether there is potential or scope for the public to exit when dissatisfied with a public service. The second is the degree to which they can influence the final outcome of a service through some form of participation or articulation of protest/feedback irrespective of whether the exit option exists. In other words, can they exert their voice in order to enhance accountability?” (Paul 1992, p. 1048).

8. **Community.** As the Nampula Project’s “Dialogue with Civil Society Manual” states a broad definition of the term community refers to “the group to which a person feels that [he/she] belongs to” (MPF/MAE 2002, ch. 2 p.13). Depending on how the group constitutes its identity a community can refer to an ethnic community, a territorial community, a political community, etc. I will use the term community to refer to a territorially-defined community—i.e., the lowest territorial unit at which citizens feel they belong to a collective entity that conditions key aspects of their everyday life. It seems to me that in Mozambique this unit is generally seen as the “povoação”. PRAs conducted in Machaze by Concern found that the local population feels that the “chefes da povoação” are the civil society leaders that best represent their interests, a finding that reinforces the notion of the povoação as “the community.” Matakala and Cavane come to a similar conclusion.4

2. **A Participation and Accountability Perspective of a District Plan**

9. From a participation and downward accountability perspective, the district planning process can be divided in four components, which correspond to the four stages of the planning process:

- First, the rules and processes government applies during the diagnostic stage to gather community input regarding local development priorities
- Second, the rules and processes government uses during plan preparation to translate community input into a district development plan
- Third, the rules and processes government establishes during plan implementation to elicit community involvement.
- Fourth, the rules and processes government implements during the plan’s monitoring and evaluation to enable communities to hold government accountable for plan implementation. Below I define some of the key features that each of these components. These features constitute the standards with which to judge the quality of the local planning practice.

10. **Gathering Community Preferences**

a. Participation is inclusive; all the local population has the chance to express their preferences.

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4 Some people also refer to “aldeias”. This term was popular after independence, when people were brought together into agglomerates called “aldeias comunais”. These agglomerates were defined according to some sort of land subdivision and roads planning. Povoações, in contrast, only refer to an agglomeration of houses without any land or roads planning.
b. Participation is **equitable**. Minorities and underprivileged groups (the poorest, women, etc) have the chance to express their preferences.

c. Participation respects legitimate existing forms of organizing [as long as it doesn’t contradict the other principles].

d. Participation is **meaningful**, that is, community members have appropriate conditions to exchange ideas and come to a consensus on what their priorities are. These conditions have to do with issues such as the size of the group, and how democratic are the rules for discussing and arriving at decisions.

e. Participation is aimed towards exogenous and endogenous interventions—i.e., it aims to identify not only solutions that should be provided by external actors but also actions that communities themselves can undertake to address their problems.

f. Participation is **sustainable**. The efforts to foster new spaces for civic participation are not confined to the lifespan of a Project but exceed it by becoming institutionalized. Attention should be given to two aspects of the institutionalization of participation: (i) the adoption of rules which structure decision-making processes and the allocation of authority and responsibility among actors, and (ii) the internalization of norms and practices related to civic participation.

g. Communities can express their needs and preferences **freely**, without being constrained by closed menus of options.

h. Community representatives are accountable to its members.

11. **Translating Community Preferences into a District Plan**

i. A transparent process is followed to reconcile the priorities that emerge from the community input with the priorities dictated by government sectoral policies. There are clear criteria to prioritize, and the criteria and results of the prioritization are known.

j. Community representatives have appropriated conditions to assess (and contest) whether government’s proposed plan has adequately reflected community input.

k. The process ensures that sufficient resources are mobilized to attend the main preferences that come out from the participatory exercises. Resources include community contributions, private sector, NGO’s, and government funding.

12. **Involving Communities in Plan Implementation**

l. Community representatives know the key information about the works and services they will receive that year in their community.

m. More advanced forms of community involvement include the community contracting and management of funds for simple works. This, however, is not a requirement.
n. Communities (representatives) have the capacity to monitor the contractor’s performance and have some mechanism to hold the contractor accountable.

o. Communities are trained in the technical skills and management model they need to operate and maintain the facility, and have access to the resources they need for this. Good practice varies significantly according to the nature of the service/good involved.

13. **Accountability about Plan Implementation**

p. Communities know the annual district plan and budget, and who is responsible for what.

q. Government and communities participate in a dialogue where progress in plan implementation is assessed. Government officials provide the information that justifies unfulfilled commitments, slow progress, as well as budgetary expenses (what has been spent and in what items).

r. There are institutional mechanisms for communities to assess government performance, and for government to feed that assessment into its civil servants’ performance assessment. Rewards and sanctions taken as result of community assessment are informed back to communities.

14. **The Institutional Environment.** The effectiveness of the features discussed in the four components is strongly influenced by the degree to which participation and accountability are institutionalized both in the formal laws that regulate civic participation as well as in the norms and practices that regulate daily citizen-government interactions. In general, it is clear that a more favorable institutional environment will be one in which: (a) the local population and local authorities perceive participation as a right rather than a “favor”/concession, and (b) participation and accountability in planning are institutionalized as a form of governance, and there are clear tools to guide the process and ensure minimum performance standards.

III. **THE INSTITUTIONAL CONTEXT FOR LOCAL GOVERNANCE**

15. In this section I analyze key institutional elements of the way government and civil society work in rural Mozambique that condition the quality of local governance.

1. Government

16. Three dimensions of how state and government are organized that influence local governance dynamics are: (i) how decentralized is the structure of government; (ii) how supportive is the policy framework of a decentralized approach; and (iii) what legal and statutory basis there is for civic participation and downward accountability.

1.1. **Government Structure**

17. Deconcentrated government in rural areas. Since the 1996 Constitutional Amendment and the passage of municipal reform legislation in 1997 a dual logic of local administration was established in Mozambique, differentiating between urban and rural areas. Municipal law

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5 For a detailed analysis of the government’s institutional and policy framework see Helling (2000).
provides that all urban areas and some rural conurbations are to be administered by elected local governments (representative assemblies and mayors), with devolved powers to manage the urban environment and to provide basic urban services on the basis of their own budgets, to be funded through own-source revenues and intergovernmental transfers. In contrast, rural areas (where 77% of the country’s population live) have been excluded from the process of political decentralization, and are governed as part of a three-tier deconcentrated system (central government, provincial government, and district administration).

18. **Weak district government.** District administrators (Administrador Distrital-AD) have few clear competencies, and no specialized personnel or structures to deal with planning and management of small scale rural infrastructure. Even though some districts have District Development Plans (DDPs) and District Annual Plans (District PES) there is no legal requirement to prepare them. There is no district budget. Since the district has no budget and all funding decisions are taken either at the national or provincial level it is very hard for the local population to hold district officials accountable. Double subordination (dupla tutela) of district sector staff to the sector and to the district makes it very hard for the AD to hold district level sector staff accountable, weakening even further ADs authority and his/her relevance in front of the local population. The double subordination that happens at the district level replicates the one that takes place at the provincial level where provincial directorates are responsible both to their parent ministries as well as the provincial governor.

19. **High turnover of district officials.** The high turnover of district officials (from the AD to the education sector technician) brings a source of great instability and uncertainty to any effort at building improved capacities for participatory district planning. All reports about the Nampula experience single out this factor as one of the key constraints for good performance. The main cause of this appears to be lack of coordination and information sharing between the provincial directorates. The mid-term evaluation of the Nampula Project summarizes it as follows: “Problems of communication, coordination and information sharing between the provincial directorates continue to impact negatively on the Project. One example is the transfer of district directors and staff programmes without effective consultation between DPAC and the DPPF on the possible consequences for the Project” (p. 21) An illustration of the impact of staff turnover is that the Nampula Project’s staff have observed that when trained staff are transferred a district can go from being “perfectly capable of executing the district planning methodologies” to seeing the planning methodologies as “(almost) a waste of time” (DPFP 1999, p. 35).

20. **Lack of clarity about the status of the locality (localidade).** The status of the locality in the public administration system is unclear and confusing. Even though in legal terms the locality is not a level of government, in practical terms, most (but not all) localities have a “presidente da localidade” who can be a civil servant or a temporary worker, and who is recognized as a government employee. The position of presidentes is a remnant from the post-independence period in which FRELIMO created Assembleias do Povo at the locality level. These assemblies (which are extinct) named a President, which became the presidente de localidade. Some of the current presidentes de localidade are still those that were appointed by the assembleias do povo. In others, FRELIMO or the Administrador Distrital have appointed a successor. This confusion is furthered by the fact that government authorities have produced contradictory proposals of how to formalize the role of the locality. One indicator of this lack of clarity is the substantial
differences that exist between an earlier and a later draft of the Law for Local Organs of State (both produced in 2000) which present different views of the role of the locality. One draft “is fairly general and states that the locality is the territorial unit aimed at ensuring citizen’s participation in solving problems that affect their respective communities and that its head is selected among village or settlement leaders, and aided by two assistants who are also community leaders. The other draft is more specific about the head of the locality being appointed by the governor of the province and being subordinate to the head of the administrative post. In addition, it mentions a consultative council at the locality level which advises the head of the locality and is composed of village leaders, community leaders, traditional chiefs and other acknowledged leaders” (Sterkenburg et al 2000, p. 12). Government officials are currently considering a third draft of this Law.

1.2. Policy Framework

21. The current national development planning framework is composed by three instruments: (i) a medium-term (5 years) strategic orientation for all development planning, outlining political and socioeconomic goals and major strategies; (ii) a three-year rolling public investment program (Programa de Investimento Público or Public Investment Program—PIP)\(^6\) to translate the development program into actions and projects; and (iii) the annual Economic and Social Plan (Plano Economico e Social or PES), as an instrument to link planning and budgeting. PIP resources are allocated by the Ministry of Planning and Finance to line agencies or sectors and provincial administrations, which permits provinces to develop provincial PIPs. Ten to fifteen percent of investment resources are decentralized to provincial level. The Provincial Directorate of Planning and Finance is responsible for programming and execution of the decentralized component of the PIP. The PES has traditionally been used as a workplan to be implemented and monitored at provincial level. The districts also produce annual workplans and quarterly reviews that are sent to the province.

22. District budget management is quite limited. Districts neither manage the capital budget nor the civil service component of the recurrent budget. Districts, for the most part, manage their own source revenues for the acquisition of goods and services, though they also have some control over the hiring of contract workers. District recurrent budgets are determined both centrally and locally (legally the district budget has no standing). The personnel component of the budget is determined centrally by the civil service system. Districts have little input into the personnel share of the recurrent budget. On the other hand districts themselves are responsible for developing the goods and services component of their recurrent budgets, mainly because they are responsible for financing their own non-wage recurrent expenditures. With regards to district development budget, each year as part of the annual budget process, the district administration submits capital expenditure proposals to DPPF. As part of the deliberations about the provincial budget, district development allocations are determined. Districts are then informed of the approved and their allocations. The district itself does not administer the funds; rather, funding is transferred to the implementing agency. (WB report, 2002).

23. Although the TORs for this study did not include an analysis of the planning system, it should be noted that the existing system presents serious problems in terms of integrating territorial plans coming from different levels, sectoral and territorial planning, and strategic and

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\(^6\) Formerly known as Plano Trienal de Investimento Público-PTIP.
operational plans. More specifically, there are at least two bottlenecks that the current policy framework presents for local governance are:

- First, there is a tension or discrepancy between territorial and sectoral planning which has not been reconciled yet. It is not clear how district plans integrate into the national planning process. The idea is that strategic district plans will integrate into strategic provincial plans, and that district PES will integrate into provincial PES. However, this is a new planning strategy that is in the process of being discussed and implemented.
- Second, since there is no untied public funding for investments at the district level it is important to survey if there is sectoral funding available in the main policy areas where the local population demands government intervention. The main gap I perceived was in the area of micro-credit for local economic activities—ranging from agricultural activities (small animals, farm infrastructure), to small businesses, etc.

1.3. Statutory Framework

24. There is no legal framework for district planning and investment financing in Mozambique. The only government regulation that exists are a set of Guidelines for District Development Planning issued in September 1998 by the Ministry of Planning and Finance (MPF) and the Ministry of State Administration (MAE). It was on the basis of these Guidelines that the province of Nampula embarked upon a pilot program of decentralization which aims to promote more effective district development planning and community participation through the devolution of increasing administrative and financial responsibilities to the district level. The program is being executed by the provincial Directorate of Planning and Finance.

25. Decree no 15/2000. In June 2000, the GOM approved Decree 15/2000 to “establish the ways to link local organs of state with community authorities.” The Decree was regulated in August of the same year by MAE. Community authorities are defined as “people who exercise a specific form of authority over a specific community or social group.” It identifies three broad categories: traditional chiefs, village secretaries, and other legitimated leaders. The last category is a very broad one that encompasses a wide variety of potential leaders (economic, social, religious or culturally based). Therefore, there is no discrimination.  

26. Main obligations of these authorities are to:
- Disseminate government laws and policies among community members
- Collaborate with government in keeping peace, and fighting crime, including specifically the illegal exploitation of natural resources.
- Mobilize and organize communities for local development activities. This includes: building and maintenance of certain kind of water, education, and health facilities, cemeteries, roads, latrines, agricultural markets and fairs

7 The main problem I found in terms of discrimination is how political party leaders are treated. Everyone knows that “secretarios de bairro” are the political leaders of FRELIMO at the village level. While this kind of leaders are treated as a specific category of community leaders, the village-level leader of RENAMO (delegado) is not mentioned at all. Indeed, according to a chefe do posto administrativo, by law RENAMO’s delegados cannot even convey village-level meetings. This differential treatment of political party local leaders does not appear to be justified. Either both can be recognized as community leaders or none of them can. This kind of inconsistency is part of the entanglement of state and party that was characteristic of the socialist, single party government Mozambique had until the 1990s.
- Participate in the civic education of community members about sustainable natural resource management, premature weddings,
- Mobilize and organize people for tax payment,

27. Community authorities are granted specific privileges as official representatives of their communities, including the right to display official state symbols in their homes/seats and to wear state provided uniforms. In some provinces they are also provided with bicycles and/or radios. In addition, community authorities are authorized to retain a fixed percentage of the taxes they collect, specifically of the “National Reconstruction Tax” levied on a per capita basis on all adults.

28. The most controversial aspect of this decree is the fact that community authorities are also tax collectors. Tax collection is a quintessential government activity. Those who collect taxes, even if it is a private firm, are doing it in representation of government. It is confusing then to mix in the same position the functions of being a representative of civil society and representing government for raising taxes. This role ambiguity can lead to conflicts of interest. For instance, a community authority may restrain himself from holding government accountable on its promises (part of his role as rep of civil society) for fear that government may retaliate trying to change him as the community authority (and thereby losing the income he makes by raising taxes). Since most community authorities are lineage-based traditional authorities changing community authorities will not be so easy for government without losing credibility, but this cannot be ruled out. Given that this decree is in the process of being implemented, it is hard to assess how much this ambiguity in the role of community authorities vis-à-vis state and their local constituencies may compromise the process of fostering legitimate and active community representatives.

29. Since there is no prospect that government will modify this decree, the question for the program is whether there are ways for benefiting from the potential offered by the recognition of the importance of community representation. One way could be to broaden the set of representatives of civil society that participate in the forums and councils so that community authorities do not monopolize the role of civil society representation (I discuss how to do this in section V.1).

30. Draft Law on Local Organs of State. This Law, if approved by the National Assembly, will provide a clear legislative basis for (a) an “integrated model” of local administration which would strengthen the territorial logic of public organization vis-à-vis the sectoral and streamline the administrative structure by consolidating functions in fewer district services or directorates under the supervision of the district administrator, (b) district governments to engage in the preparation, budgeting and implementation of district development plans, and (c) the establishment of Consultative District Councils. It will also strengthen the role of the AD and reduce the inefficiencies generated by the “double subordination” principle. Strengthening the role of AD is critical for creating clearer downward accountability relations.

31. The Draft Law also proposes to establish the level of localidade as the last level of government and to create the position of “chefe da localidade” which does not exist so far. It will

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8 This is based on one of the versions of the Draft Law (November 2000) mentioned before, which was the only one I had direct access to.
create Consultative Councils at the three levels (district, administrative post, and locality). The Law norms the composition, functions, and schedule of each of the three councils (see Table 1).

| Table 1. Features of the Consultative Councils Proposed in the Draft Law of Local Organs of State |
|---------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------|
| **Composition**                                              | **CC Distrito**                                               | **CC Posto Administrativo**                                   | **CC Localidade**                                             |
| • AD                                                         | • Chefe do PA                                                 | • Chefe de localidade                                         |
| • Members of District Govt                                   | • Chefes de localidade                                        | • Community authorities                                       |
| • Chiefs of PA                                               | • Presidents                                                  | • Representatives from economic, professional, social and cultural organizations |
| • Municipal council presidents                               | • Community authorities                                       | • Other social or professional leaders living in the locality |
| • Community authority representatives at the District level, should be invited from every locality. | • Representatives from economic, professional, social and cultural organizations |                                                            |
| • Representatives from economic, professional, social and cultural organizations |                                                               |                                                            |
| **Purpose**                                                  | **Express opinions about:**                                  | **Express opinions to the Chefe do PA on how to address fundamental issues that affect the welfare and living conditions of the local population.** | **Express opinions to the Chefe da localidade on how to address fundamental issues that affect the welfare and living conditions of the local population.** |
| • Cultural, social, and economic issues that require coordination among public agencies or between the latter and local communities. | • Proposed district plan and budget                           | • “balanço” of the annual plan and budget                     |
| • “balanço” of the annual plan and budget                    | • fees to be applied to service provision within district responsibilities |                                                            |
| **Functioning**                                             | • Meets every 3 months                                       | • Meets every month                                          | • Meets every 15 days                                        |
| • Conveyed and presided by the AD                           | • Conveyed and presided by the chefe do PA                    | • Conveyed and presided by the chefe da localidade           |

32. Two comments about this proposal:
- The distinction between the purpose of each of the three councils is not clear, particularly between posto administrativo and localidade. I believe that at the localidade level it will be more productive to have a Forum da Localidade, formed by civil society representatives, rather than a CCL (I explain the reasons for this in section V.). Apparently, this is the position taken in the other version of the Draft Law.
- The frequency of meetings seems too high for the resources and capacities of the different actors. Given the high opportunity cost of holding each of these councils, it is important not to overdo them.

2. Civil Society
33. There are two dimensions of civil society dynamics that are critical for a local governance program: the type and quality of social capital that exists in the rural areas and the quality of the democratic culture at the local level.
2.1. Social Capital

34. In terms of social capital (the capacity for collective action) rural communities in Mozambique display a wide variety of civil society groups (formal and informal). While some of these organizations are present across villages (e.g., traditional authorities) others are very incipient forms of collective action present in only a few villages (e.g., CDLs). The main ones are:

- Community-based Natural Resource Management Committees
- Water user groups
- Women’s groups. Organização da Mulher Moçambicana.
- Farmer organizations (associações de camponeses)
- Micro credit groups, often associated with the local fair
- Religious organizations
- Youth groups (sports,
- Cultural groups (dancing groups
- Grupos dinamizadores
- Political (presidente da célula—FRELIMO, and Delegado da RENAMO)
- Traditional authorities (regulos, chefes de povoação, cabos, sagutas, etc.).
- CDLs (Comissões de Desenvolvimento Local) or other denominations for community (povoação)-wide level organizations. This type of organizations have been promoted by some NGOs.

35. There are two types of social capital that are important for local governance:

- **Bonding social capital**: the strong ties connecting family members, neighbors, close friends, and business associates. These ties connect people who share similar demographic characteristics.

- **Linking social capital**: consists of the vertical ties between poor people and people in positions of influence in formal organizations (banks, agricultural extension offices, the police). This dimension captures a vitally important additional feature of life in poor communities: that their members are usually excluded—by overt discrimination or lack of resources—from the places where major decisions relating to their welfare are made. (WB 2000, p128).  

36. **Thick stock of bonding social capital.** The system of traditional authorities in Mozambique provides a strong foundation for collective action within the community. Traditional authority in Mozambique is a lineage based system of governance rooted in pre-colonial institutions of leadership and social organization. During the period of Portuguese colonial administration, traditional authorities were frequently co-opted through a system of indirect rule in order to maximize social control for forced production, labor mobilization and tax collection at minimum cost to the metropole. As a result, the legitimacy of historically important forms of indigenous social organization was often compromised. The attempt of the post-independence state to

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9 Scholars that prefer to avoid the term social capital refer to linking social capital as the “political capabilities of the poor” (Moore and Putzel 1999).

10 The position of régulo was created by the colonial domination system called Indigenato. The indigenato was a “dualistic system of local government under which Mozambican subjects were governed by chiefs (regulos) and Portuguese citizens by administrators; a correspondingly legal system under which Mozambicans were subject to customary law and citizens to Portuguese civil codes; a dualistic system of land tenure [... ] and of labor regulation.”
eliminate this system and replace it with a politically based organization (secretários de bairro) failed in many parts of Mozambique to create an effective substitute for traditional institutions in providing a consensual authority for maintaining social order and organizing collective action. With Decree 15/2000 the GOM shifted its position towards traditional authorities and started a process of legitimating them as community authorities.

37. The traditional system has three key positions: the most important one is the “régulo” who has authority over a regulado (a territory equal or smaller to a localidade); the povoações within a regulado are controlled by a “chefé da povoação” or cabo, and every ten families in a povoação there is the chefe de família. Both the chefe da povoação and da família are subordinated to the régulo. The attributions of these leaders include some of the ones they had during the colonial period (land allocation for cropping, resolving legal disputes, etc) but also encompass spiritual and cultural aspects of the community life. Traditional authorities do not make decisions on their own but consult with a “council of elders” and other influential persons.

38. Traditional authorities should be the entry point of an approach that seeks to work with communities. Being the entry point doesn’t mean working only with them but through them. The important point is that they provide a social structure through which a development program can mobilize the collective energy that exists at the community level. They are the people who have the authority to convey a community meeting, who, in consultation with other influential people can designate other activists to participate in development activities, etc. So, even if some of these traditional authorities may not represent well their constituencies, they should be the conduits for engaging and linking the community with external actors.

39. One of the key aspects that an approach that aims to work through traditional authorities has to attend to is improving the quality of representation of these leaders. Regulos have a history of locating the investments that come to their region close by to the village where they live. This is what the Portuguese did when regulos worked for them, and NGOs say they have seen this tendency very much alive in recent experiences of community investment prioritization. NGOs have developed ways to minimize this—e.g., taking first a vote only among community members and then asking the régulo for his opinion about the result. What is clear is that, in many cases, the opinion of the régulo alone is not a good proxy for the preferences of his constituency.

40. Thin stock of linking social capital. In contrast to the thick stock of bonding capital that exists in rural communities, the stock of linking capital is much thinner. The rural population has few organizations that enable them to participate in decision-making structures. During the post-independence period there was an attempt to create such structures but they failed. The socialist government created Grupos Dinamizadores at the povoação level and Assembleias do Povo at the localidade level. Some of these structures ceased to function (e.g., nearly all assembleias do povo) and others proved unable to provide benefits to rural communities (e.g., many secretários de bairro). As a result, links between the population and the state progressively weakened and

(O’Laughlin 2000, p. 16). The position of régulo was hereditary and often vested in a lineage of pre-colonial political eminence. “Regulos and cabos were paid by the colonial state through commissions on tax collection, labour recruitment and cash-crop sales within their areas. Within their areas of jurisdiction, [regulos] controlled the distribution of land classes as indigenous reserves, heard cases under evolving but restricted versions of local customary law, organized recruitment of forced labour, and enforced forced cropping” (p.17)
the responsiveness of public decision-making to local concerns and priorities similarly diminished, leaving an increasing deficit in linking social capital in rural Mozambique.

41. In most parts of Mozambique there is no tradition of autonomous rural cooperatives that enable peasants to link with the market on more advantageous terms. Lately, some NGOs (such as OLIPA in Mecuburi) have developed a very interesting work in creating associações de camponeses for marketing crops. Other promising initiatives are the efforts at building community-wide organizations such as SNV’s CDLs in the MAMM region in the province of Nampula. Interestingly, what the CDL members I met with highlighted about the value added of having a CDL was allowing them to link up better with the district government. As I said before, though, these experiences still cover a very limited number of povoações.

42. Building up the stock of linking social capital appears as one of the critical challenges for good local governance. As the WDR 2000 states: “Researchers and practitioners have long recognized that the bonding and bridging social capital in local organizations is necessary but insufficient for long-term development. In Kenya a participatory poverty assessment found more than 200,000 community groups in rural areas, but most were unconnected to outside resources and unable to help poor people rise out of poverty. The creation of linking social capital is essential, and external support has often been important in its emergence.” (WB 2000, p. 129)

2.2. Local Democratic Culture

43. Weak democratic culture in the rural areas. Good local governance requires a democratic political culture at the local level where citizens and government officials perceive participation as a right and accountability as a duty, where opposing views are accepted and even encouraged and addressed through deliberation and bargaining. This democratic ethos is still weak in Mozambique. Democracy is still a very recent phenomenon, being only over ten years since the end of the civil war. Both the socialist post-independence experience and the civil war encouraged a highly hierarchical, military order where deliberation and dissent were not favored.

44. All the field officials I talked to stressed that one of the constraints for downward accountability is that it is not part of the political culture in Mozambique, and specially in the rural areas, that poor people will criticize or question or demand explanations to a government official in relation to his or her performance. In part this is reinforced by another trait of the local polity, which several interviewees mentioned, government intolerance to dissent: “the person who questions anyone from the district government is considered from the opposition, so then people do not want to express their opinions.” Citizens have little confidence in the government’s ability to solve their problems because of the low quality of public service, the top-down culture of party and government representatives, and the weaknesses in the functioning of the police and law enforcement agencies.

45. Community members often express their dissatisfaction in indirect ways, and so it is important to be sensitive to this. For instance, in a group meeting with members of a CDL I asked if they agreed with the fact that the president of the localidade was also the president of the CDL. Rather than saying that they strongly disagreed with this (which according to a local external observer was their real opinion), they made more indirect references saying that the president of the CDL “is very busy”, “he has a lot of other things to do.” Only after I posed the
question of whether they would prefer to elect someone among themselves they openly said that this was their real preference.

46. The absence of elections for local authorities in rural districts eliminates the possibility of political party competition as a realm for building up local democratic practices. Consultative Councils will constitute the main arena for citizens representation and deliberation at the district level. It is important to preserve these Councils as institutions based on a logic of consensual deliberation and avoid the logic of political party competition to take over civic consultative processes.

47. Interesting experiences with community participation and district planning. There is a wealth of experiences, mostly led by NGOs but not only, that are slowly helping to create a more democratic relationship between government and civil society. Matakala and Cavane (2002), for instance, provide a detailed analysis of six important experiences implemented in the country, namely:

i. Projecto de Planificação e Finanças Descentralizadas (UNCDF/PPFD) de Nampula-
   Província de Nampula,

ii. Projecto de Desenvolvimento Local de Milange (Ibis/PDLM)- Província da Zambézia;

iii. Plano de Desenvolvimento Distrital (PDD) de Maganja da Costa- Província da Zambézia;

iv. Projecto de Desenvolvimento Comunitário (DEC), da Cooperação Austríaca em Búzi -
    Província de Sofala;

v. Projecto de Desenvolvimento Rural (PRODER) de Gorongosa - Província de Sofala; and

vi. Programa de Desenvolvimento Humano Local (PDHL) de Guro - Província de Manica.

IV. THE DECENTRALIZED PLANNING AND FINANCING PROGRAM (DPFP) IN NAMPULA – STRENGTHS & LIMITATIONS

48. In this section I describe the main features and analyze the strengths and limitations of the DPFP with respect to participation and downward accountability.

1. The Program in a Nutshell

49. A core principle of the DPFP is to operate within government structures and procedures. Therefore, for the formulation of the District Development Plan (DDP) the program has followed the “Guidelines for District Development Planning” elaborated by MPF and MAE in 1998. These Guidelines outline a four-stage process (table 2).
Table 2. Main Stages of the District Development Plan and Annual Plan Formulation [incomplete]  
(gray areas indicate community participation)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Activity</th>
<th>Purpose</th>
<th>How</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>First Stage—Launching of the District Plan</strong></td>
<td></td>
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</table>
| 1. Formation of the ET | Creating the technical team that will coordinate the formulation of the District Plan | • The AD nominates 5 or 6 persons among the District Directors and technicians.  
• Accountable to the CE |
| 2. Meeting to Launch the Plan |  
• First broad picture of the district  
• Ask CCD members if want to have a DDP  
• Presentation of DDP methodology | • The AD convenes the 1st CCD |
| **Second Stage—Diagnosis of the District (first chapter of the Plan)** | | |
| 3. Public Planning Meeting | Gathering community input about priority problems and solutions | • Each Chefe do PA convenes CCD/PA  
• ET can organize PRAs in some communities |
| 4. Gathering of data | Gather statistical data from the different sectors | • ET gathers data in consultation with the relevant sectors |
| 5. Preparation of Cartographic maps | Generate visual tools to inform decision-making | • ET prepares them. |
| **Third Stage—Definition of the Development Strategy** | | |
| 6. Summary of Problems and Potentialities | Have a picture of the key bottlenecks and most urgent problems in terms of issues and territory | • Based on an analysis of the diagnosis, the ET formulates a summary of the key problems and potentialities of the district |
| 7. Formulation of a Development Strategy Proposal | Identify strategic lines of intervention | • Based on an analysis of the summary of problems and potentialities the CE and ET formulate a Development Strategy Proposal |
| 8. Discussion of the Proposed Strategy | Gather feedback from civil society about district government’s proposal | • The AD convenes the 2nd CCD |
| **Fourth Stage—Identifying the Action Program and Approving the DDP** | | |
| 9. Negotiation | Ensure that the proposed actions will have the support from the relevant actors | • ET and district authority formulate the Matrix of actions and responsibilities after exhaustive consultations and negotiations with all potential funding and implementing agents. |
| 10. Approval of the DDP by the CE and the CCD. | • Consolidate all the different activities in one document and wrap-up the planning process.  
• Ask CCD if it wants to continue meeting to monitor DDP implementation, and if so, how | • CE approves the DDP.  
• The AD convenes the 3rd CCD. |
| **Fifth Stage—Social and Economic Plan for the District (District PES) -- Plano Economico e Social Distrital** | | |
| 11. Formulating the District PES | • Analyze what has been accomplished of the DDP and decide what are realistic goals to achieve in the following year. | • ET leads the formulation process  
• Consults with civil society through CCs  
• ET discusses district priorities with provincial authorities and discusses the priorities of the province for the district. |
| 12. Consulting with civil society | • Civil society gives feedback about the Plan and approves it | • AD conveys a CCD  
• ET modifies the District PES according to CCD feedback |
| 13. Approving District PES | • Ensuring all sectors in the district subscribe to the District PES | • ET presents the District PES to the CE for its revision and approval. |
| 14. Incorporating the District PES in the Provincial PES | • Ensuring that provincial sector directorates have taken into account District PES in their provincial planning | • Meetings with provincial directorates to explain the final version of the District PES and argue the case for its inclusion in Provincial PES |
| 15. Assessing Implementation Performance | • have feedback from civil society about plan implementation | • Organization of CCDs and CCPAs to assess progress achieved in implementation of District PES |

AD: Administrador Distrital; CE: Conselho Executivo; PA: Posto Administrativo; ET: Equipa Técnica; DDP: District Development Plan.
50. As the table shows, there are four instances where communities participate in the formulation of the DDP, and three instances in relation to the District PES. There are two basic instruments for community participation: Consultative Councils and Participatory Rural Appraisals (PRAs).

51. **Consultative Councils.** These councils take place at two levels: District (CCD) and Posto Administrativo (CCPA). During the formulation of the DDP:

- the main role of the CCPAs is to *gather community preferences about priority problems and solutions*. This is why they take place during the diagnosis stage. In some districts, after the DDP is approved, these councils are a platform for dissemination of its contents.

- The main role of the CCDs is to ensure that the community agrees with the way the district government interpreted and *translated community preferences* and diagnosis data into the DDP. This is why each of the three CCDs are scheduled for receiving community feedback about a specific product designed by the District government: on an initial district diagnosis, on a draft of the strategy, and on the final DDP which includes the matrix of actions.

52. During the formulation and evaluation of the District PES, the District government can hold CCDs and CCPAs. These councils have two main roles:

- Assess whether the Annual Plan reflects well the consensus reached in the DDP
- Evaluate plan implementation performance and *hold accountable* those responsible for decisions.

53. Criteria for civil society representation in and overall *composition of the CC* is as follows:

- *comprising in terms of interest groups:* government at the district and administrative post levels; representatives from provincial government; churches; traditional authorities; political parties; voluntary associations; grassroots organizations (grupos dinamizadores, etc); international donors acting in the district; women associations;

- *comprising in terms of geographic areas:* invitations should be extended to all the administrative posts

- *legitimate representatives:* those that attend the meeting should be the person each group/organization recognizes as its leader.

- The CC is an open Forum, anyone interested can attend.

- Invitations are extended to organizations and communities, not to individuals

- Organizations can send more than one representative

54. **Guidelines for organizing the CC are:**

- Take place in the District capital.

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11 The District PES is the Annual Plan the District has to operationalize its DDP. It contains all the goals and activities the district plans to achieve for that year. Public investment proposals for the Provincial PIP are also included in the District PES. Since the District does not have an annual budget, all the activities of the Annual Plan need to include their financing source. District PES in the Nampula Project have three sections: a brief introduction that links the PES with the goals of the DDP; a summary of the district annual plan; and tables that show PES indicators for each sector—e.g., how many students will begin first grade. Throughout the text I use Annual Plan and District PES interchangeably.
• There is no economic compensation for assisting to the CC
• Invitations are made at least two weeks before the CC
• Frequency: it is proposed to have a CCD every 6 months
• Logistics are the responsibility of the District government with the support of civil society. Lunch is offered to the participants.

55. **Participatory Rural Appraisal (PRA) Tools** are the second instrument the program uses to elicit community participation. PRAs are an instrument to identify LDF/DDF investments through the annual planning cycle. In some districts, the results of PRAs were also an input for preparing the DDP. The Nampula Project’s Civil Society Manual includes a Toolkit of PRA methods and encourages the planning team to draw from it as they see fit.

56. Regarding the **implementation of the Actions Plan**:
• Infrastructure is built by contractors hired by the provincial level administration. There is no community involvement in infrastructure building.
• Operation and maintenance are the responsibility of each sector. Community involvement in O&M depends upon each sector policy.

2. **Strengths & Limitations**
57. The DPFP in Nampula offers a strong starting point to promote participatory district development. Some of its key **strengths** are:

(i) Making district administration the driver of the participatory district development plan. This is a significant departure from most district development experiences where NGOs are the drivers. This is very important for (a) generating government ownership about the plan, (b) strengthening the relevance of district government for the local population, and (c) building sustainable capacities in the country’s civil service.

(ii) Following (and influencing) the methodology and guidelines for district planning elaborated by the national government. The best indicator of the institutional impact of the Project is that both government and donors consider it the model on which to build up a national level model of district planning and financing.

(iii) The concept of district planning is solid. It goes beyond the “laundry list” approach of listing community demands which is often found in many participatory planning exercises (in many social funds, for instance). Instead it proposes the development of a strategic vision which drives the prioritization process.

(iv) The Project’s methodology represents a significant departure from the traditional practice of designing top-down plans without citizens input.

(v) The concept of Consultative Councils at the District and Posto Administrativo as an interface between civil society and government is good. It needs to be improved (see below) and the DPFP is working on it, but it is a structure that has been widely accepted

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12 The reason for this is that UNCDF introduced the DDP in 1996 and some districts (such as Mecuburi) had already participated in a UNCDF-funded program (1993-96) during which PRAs were done.
at the government and NGO communities and the effort should be put in strengthening it rather than creating a new one. Moreover, in those districts that are more advanced (Mecuburi) they are becoming an effective vehicle to create a culture of local dialogue between district government and the local population. The AD in Mecuburi has been organizing CC not only for formulating DDP and annual plans but also to deal with unexpected issues. For instance, when more money for building roads became available than what was planned the AD conveyed a CC with all the representatives from groups affected by or interested in the roads. The exchange led not only to substantive discussions about the key places to locate these investments but also to written agreements about counterpart contributions from NGOs, projects and other groups active in the district.

(vi) The representation of civil society respects existing forms of organization and representation.

(vii) When events to gather community preferences are organized, simple rules for having meaningful participation appear to be followed: dividing the participants in smaller discussion groups, focusing on the causes rather than the symptoms of a problem, voting, separating men and women in voting, etc.

(viii) The population is able to express their preferences without apparent distortions, since the menu of options for investments/actions is open. This is important since the experience of some social funds that used closed menus in participatory planning processes has resulted in significant distortions of community preferences (communities ask for schools although this is not their priority because there is funding for that). The fact that there is untied funding available (through the LDF/DDF) is an important enabling condition to prevent this kind of distortions.

(ix) Having organized Consultative Councils at district and/or administrative post level in over a dozen districts, the program has amassed a rich experience on how to organize these events, what works and what does not that should be tapped on.

(x) It has experimented with a rich variety of PRA methods that provide public officials with a complete set of instruments for finding out community preferences and concerns.

(xi) The Project has the position of Participatory Development Technician at the provincial level. For the second phase, this function will be strengthened with an Advisor for Participatory and Gender Methodologies. These are good decisions since provincial and district staff have very little training in participatory methodologies and continuous technical assistance and supervision are needed for a sustainable transfer and build up of these capacities.

(xii) The successes of the Project are due to one of its core organizational strengths: a strong learning capacity and flexibility in confronting the many challenges that emerge during implementation. The Project began as an innovative participatory planning and financing project with a relatively narrow mandate and it was during implementation that its staff
discovered new governance and institutional challenges they needed to address for the Project to perform well. The process of learning and addressing those new challenges led to a project design that has been continually evolving. Therefore, it is important to understand that many of the limitations that I analyze in the next point did not result from failing to execute the original design of the Project but rather they represent the new set of issues or “new frontier” that the Project uncovered during implementation. Many of these new issues are part of the Project’s agenda for its second phase that is currently initiating.

58. Its main limitations are:

**Gathering Community Preferences**

(i) There is no systematic methodology to ensure that the process of gathering community preferences is inclusive enough. There are three key deficiencies:

- the lack of clear and transparent criteria for the “bottom-up” selection of CCD/CCPA members opens up the possibility that not all community representatives are invited—i.e., a District Administrator that does not get along well with certain traditional authorities, for personal or political reasons, may not invite them. According to the Mid-term evaluation, “selection has largely been top-down by the district administrators” (p. 27).

- Those who participate in the CCDs/CCPAs do not necessarily carry a mandate representing the preferences of their constituencies. For instance, the regulos or chefes da povoação—whose presence would guarantee an inclusive territorial coverage—do not have to hold public meetings before going to the CCs to find out what the preferences of their constituencies are. As mentioned before the opinion of these authorities cannot be equaled with their constituencies’ preferences.

- CCDs and CCPAs alone are not enough to ensure inclusive representation—broad-based participation below the PA level is needed to guarantee real inclusion. While PRAs and community meetings allowed a deeper look into community preferences, they only took place in a few communities and not in all districts. Even CCPAs were not held systematically in all PAs in all districts. In Angoche, for instance, there was a CCPA only in one of the three PAs (Aube).

Overcoming these deficiencies means to create a system of participation that is encompassing, transparent, and truly representative.

(ii) The DPFP approach does not ensure that participation is equitable enough. Minorities and underprivileged groups do not have specific mechanisms to make their voices heard. Participation of women in the CCDs and CCPAs has been low (UNCDF 2000, Matakala and Cavane 2002). The poorest among the poor often do not have time to attend meetings, much less at the PA level. Other groups that are not organized may not be able to influence decisions without a conscious effort to listen to them. For instance, a woman in one of the community meetings I had said that no one was taking care of orphans whose parents had died of AIDS. A more sensitive approach to fostering interest-group organization could foster the creation of a group of community members around this issue.
(iii) The approach to plan activities that can represent endogenous solutions to local problems seems underdeveloped. There is no mention in the DDP or the District PES about what are the responsibilities of the communities for local development. The experience of DEC in Buzi offers an interesting model of how to organize and develop a package of community actions for local development (see next section for a description).

(iv) The core and mandatory elements of the process for gathering community preferences is not standardized. There is no Operational Manual outlining the steps, criteria and procedures for community participation. The Manual for Consulting Civil Society (Manual #3) is more a PRA Toolkit than a Manual for Community Participation. It does not specify (i) the scale at which gathering preferences should take place (povoação, localidade, PA), (ii) how encompassing it is (throughout the district, in some regions only), (iii) the instrument (PRA, CCPA, public meeting?) and the rules for applying it, (iv) the product and its format. For instance, Manual 3 (civil society) does not mention any rules for organizing CCPAs or its composition, nor the timing of these events in the planning process.

(v) The program has followed a “learning process” approach which values experimentation. While a learning approach may have made sense in the initial phase of the program, its replication to the national level should not proceed without a clear and detailed set of rules. The lack of an Operational Manual contributes to creating confusion among staff about the purpose of the different instruments. The Mid-Term Evaluation showed that there was confusion about when and why consultative meetings and/or PRAs take place at the Posto Administrative or community level, or how this fits into the planning cycle. Among the district planning team, “some regarded the PRA as a tool to collect data, others to identify development needs and again others regarded PRA as a tool to confirm priorities already set in the district plan. In terms of the ‘dialogue under the tree’ it is possible that there was some confusion between such dialogue as it relates to the preparation of the district development plan, and the dialogue that is part of the annual LDF planning cycle” (Pijnenburg and Artur 2000, p. 6)

(vi) An effort needs to be made to improve the pedagogical aspects of the three Manuals, to make them more user-friendly (more parsimonious, step-by-step explanations, more visual aids, etc). Training manuals at the level of the district staff technicians need to be developed.

Translating Community Preferences into the DDP and the Annual Plan

(vii) As the Matakala and Cavane report say it is difficult to assess the integration of community participation in the planning process (p.8). In my opinion the problem does not lie so much in the fact that decisions are driven by the district government officials (the AD, the ET, etc) as the authors argue but instead in the fact that: there are no clear rules for how community preferences are taken into account in the prioritization process,

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13 This approach coupled with the fact that different districts started at different points explains why districts have followed different processes.
and there are no clear rules for explaining the decision making process to community members.

- There are two important preconditions for taking community preferences into account. First, to have a product that represents the community vision, a product that basically says “in the Posto Administrativo X the community has reached the conclusion that the first problem they want to solve is the lack of water, the second is the inaccessibility of the road x, etc.” As I said before it is not clear whether decision makers have that kind of product in their hands when making decisions. It would be useful to have in the DDP document an Annex where the community vision is presented. This would allow to contrast the vision that emerged from civil society and the one that resulted from government consultation with civil society. A second precondition is to have rules or guidelines for making decisions about the strategy and the matrix of projects. Manual 1 has good advice on this.

- The Manuals do not provide any methodology or guidelines for how the technical team should explain and justify proposed decisions and actions to civil society. The provincial team of the program as well as some district teams have generated a good amount of experience in the dynamics of these events that should be tapped on to produce practical guidelines.

(viii) There are no rules to ensure that the local population is informed about the results of the CCDs. The program does not establish how community representatives should inform back to communities nor does it do any follow up on whether this dissemination took place or not.

**Executing the Actions of the Plan**

(ix) In contrast to the design phase of the DDP, where there are explicit mechanisms to involve the community, when it comes to implementing the planned actions the presence of the community becomes less visible. The reason for this was to balance the trade off between participation and efficiency by emphasizing participation during plan formulation and efficiency during the implementation stage. While this concern is understandable, it is advisable that the balance is attempted within each stage of the planning process (formulation, implementation) rather than between them.

(x) There are no rules for how communities can monitor the performance of contractors.

(xi) Community participation in operation and maintenance also seems weak. Micro-projectos do not have operation and maintenance plans (DPFP 2002, p. 23).

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14 The core sections of the DDP represent the consensual vision of all the actors in the district. The Annex presents the input from Civil Society that was used for generating that vision. Studies of the massive experience with participatory municipal planning implemented in Bolivia have this as one of the key lessons (see Goudsmit and Blackburn 2001).

15 Also, the trade-off between participation and efficiency becomes less clear when one considers that participation during implementation is important for community ownership, and therefore sustainability and effectiveness. Evaluating efficiency not only in terms of the building process but also in terms of the benefits the infrastructure produces changes the cost-benefit equation of participation.
Accountability about Plan Implementation

(xii) The process to inform communities about the content of the DDP and the Annual Plan does not ensure an adequate level of information.

(xiii) The fact that CCDs are open forums rather than councils—i.e., participants are not members that have been elected for a certain period of time—means that participants can change from one CC to the next one. In a forum anyone invited can attend to but they do not hold any responsibility to be held accountable for. This hurts good communication between government and civil society as well as accountability. A representative that has participated throughout the design of the DDP will be in a better position to control its implementation through Annual Plans because will be more in tune with the objectives of the overall strategy. Also these representatives can be held accountable by the CC in relation to their responsibilities of acting as a representative of civil society. Phase two of the Nampula program, which is starting now, is trying to address some of these issues. The technical team is in the phase of thinking through solutions and piloting them in a few districts.\textsuperscript{16}

(xiv) The program does not require nor has it established written guidelines or procedures for communities to assess plan implementation performance. Instead, the program leaves this option open for the CC to decide. If the CC decides to continue meeting to accompany plan implementation “it is up to the council to start discussing the modalities, frequency, and the relationship between the council, the district government and the DDP.” (Manual #3, ch. 5, p. 55). Leaving it as a voluntary act appears more as a formal than a substantive act since it would be unlikely that the CC will decide not to supervise implementation. This is not the more important point, however. What is more important is that the program should have a set of instruments to guide the assessment of plan implementation performance (what has been and what has not been accomplished and why, what has been the government budget for the district and how has it been spent, etc). The Nampula Project is concerned about this issue and has accompanied very closely the one district (Mecuburi) that has had the experience of assessing its Annual Plan through a CCD. The results of this experience are encouraging. Community representatives questioned the decision of the provincial government of stopping building the road due to lack of funding for fuel. These representatives said that there was fuel but that it was sold by the workers assigned to the road. The provincial government made the commitment of looking into that claim and finished the road. The program should have a learning component to find out what conditions facilitated that in cases such as Mecuburi downward accountability worked well.

(xv) There are no mechanisms for government to take the input that comes from civil society assessment of the plan implementation and use it to feed its civil servants’ performance assessment, and to inform back to community about the actions taken.

\textsuperscript{16} Since they are considering different alternatives it is not possible to define yet how the team will address these issues. Rather than presenting here the alternatives they are considering I will bring them in the next section where I refer to the main issues and options that the Decentralized Finance and Planning Program should bear in mind for design.
One of the difficulties that the DPFP in Nampula had with respect to accountability was related to the delays in producing annual plans. Without an annual plan it is very hard to hold anybody accountable for anything since there are no concrete agreements. So far, there is only one district (Mecuburi) that has done it.

V. ISSUES, OPTIONS & MECHANISMS FOR IMPROVED LOCAL GOVERNANCE

59. From a participation and accountability perspective, there is a core tension that runs through the program the GOM and the World Bank are designing, namely, that it aims to improve local governance in a context where some of the key governance reforms (elected local authorities, devolution of certain fiscal and policy powers to the district level, etc.) are not in place and, most likely, will not be during the lifespan of the program. The key question, then, is whether there is room for real enhancement of local governance without putting in place those reforms first. I believe the answer is in the affirmative for two interrelated reasons:

- First, there are significant measures that can be adopted to “democratize” the current deconcentrated system (by improving the participation and control that civil society has on government) which should result in better development outcomes than with the current system.

- Second, the process of democratizing the deconcentrated system can contribute to laying the groundwork for subsequent structural reforms. By fostering a more active and organized civil society, a more responsive civil service, and a culture of local dialogue, the program can ease government fears about decentralization in rural areas as well as improve the chances that it will be successful. This is partly the experience that Bolivia had with its social fund.17

60. The challenge for the program is to try to do both. To meet this challenge the program should support a process of institutional reform of the local governance system in Mozambique. Four overarching principles of this reform process should be:

- Gradualism. Innovations should be tried out first in a limited number of districts and gradually expand them to others.

- Endogeneity. Proposed innovations should draw from and build upon the reservoir of good practices already tried in the country. The main reference here is the Nampula Project but it also includes other experiences tried by different donors and NGOs.

- Sustainability. Institutional innovations should not create ad-hoc structures and processes but rather should develop embryonic components of a future full-fledged local governance system. Given the current context of Mozambique (i.e., a low interest, at least in the short term, in a deep decentralization reform of district administration), the main implication of this is that the chosen structure should work with the current structural conditions that district administration has. This means that the goals of this structure should be such that the current

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17 When the first social emergency fund was created (in the late 1980s), Bolivia was a very centralized country. In 1994 Bolivia launched one of the most radical experiments in decentralization—through the Law of Popular Participation. The social fund’s experience helped allay policymakers’ fears of decentralization by showing the success of the participatory approach in delivering basic services. (Serrano 1999)
administration is capable of accomplishing them with the resources it has. Improvements can be made by improving capacities through training and technical assistance, as well as some administrative reforms to improve planning and accountability procedures. But the Project should restrain from creating an over-ambitious structure that is sustained only on the basis of the Project’s fresh inflow of money, but is not sustainable after the project ends.

- Institutionalization. Related to the previous principle, it is desirable that the proposed innovations are backed up by government regulations, decrees or laws. This not only legitimizes their implementation vis-à-vis those sectors of the civil service that may be more reluctant to them, but also allows for a more harmonious and uniform implementation of them.

61. In this chapter I will analyze the type of institutional innovations the program should consider to improve participation and accountability in district planning. Following the framework I have been using so far, I will organize the discussion around four sets of issues:
- How should communities be organized for an effective participation in district planning?
- How should the dialogue between government and civil society be structured?
- How to ensure participation and downward accountability in the implementation of subprojects?
- How to ensure accountability about plan implementation?

1. Organizing Communities

62. For the rural population to participate effectively in district planning and local governance it needs to have an organizational infrastructure that enables it to participate in decision-making processes. The analysis of community organizations in Mozambique has produced two important findings: first, that there is a thin stock of linking social capital (see para. ); and second, that the Nampula model needs to be strengthened to attain a more inclusive and equitable system of representing communities in the processes of gathering and translating community preferences into district plans. Based on these findings, I recommend the Program to thicken the stock of linking social capital by fostering the formation of community organizations. Main issues to discuss are:
- What principles should guide the assessment and formation of community organizations?
- What models of community organization exist in Mozambique and which one is more suitable for the program?
- Who should encourage the formation of these organizations and how?
- What incentives are required for these organizations to work well?
- What are the risks of promoting community organizations and how can the program minimize them?
- What minimum standards should the program establish to assess performance?

1.1. Principles for Creating Community Organizations

63. Before analyzing the models of community organizing that exist in Mozambique, it is useful to lay out some principles that should guide both the assessment and the formation of community organizations. Community organizations should be:
- Encompassing and inclusive, all citizens have a chance to participate, and particular attention is paid to enable the participation of disenfranchised groups (poorest, women, etc)
Democratic, all members have the same opportunity to express their opinions, and there are rules to make this effective.

Autonomous, the members of the organization make decisions on their own and based on their best judgment. External actors do not interfere to manipulate decisions for their own advantage.

Internally Accountable, there are rules for representatives to inform and give explanations to members about their performance and for members to sanction/reward representatives.

Binding, representatives are granted certain authority to represent members and the decisions they made are respected by the latter.

Sustainable and institutionalized, citizens view their organizations as legitimate forms for channeling their voice rather than as requirements to access one-time benefits.

1.2. Models of Community Organizing

64. Here I will analyze different forms of linking organization that exist in Mozambique and propose the one that appears more suitable for government to encourage as part of its local governance system.

65. One option could be to rely only on traditional organizations. Although the program should work with traditional authorities it is not advisable to rely only on traditional authorities. These authorities already have a number of responsibilities that they perform and it would be a mistake to overburden them. Rather they should be strategic partners in creating new organizations that complement the roles that these authorities play.

66. Mozambique offers two models of community-wide organization: one that puts more emphasis on territorial-level organization and usually is two-tiered (starts at the povoação level and then goes to the localidade/PA or regulado level), and another that puts more emphasis on interest-group representation at the localidade level.

a. Two-tier territorially-based model:

- Comissões de Desenvolvimento Local (CDLs) in Nampula. This is the model tried by SNV in four districts of Nampula. It basically consists of an organization that represents a minimum of 150 families and a maximum of 500 families—number depends on distances among houses and social relations but they often coincide with a povoação. The CDL is represented by 25 to 35 members\(^\text{18}\) elected by the community who participate in one of 5 sub commissions (family affairs, hygiene and sanitation, maintenance of roads and other infrastructure, youth and sports, and women’s issues). One member of each sub commission occupies a position in the five-member Management Committee (Comité de Gestão). Positions include president, vice-president, secretary, vice-secretary, and treasurer. One third of the total representatives of the CDL has to be women. Every three months each sub commission has to explain in a public meeting what it has been doing during that period. SNV’s proposal is that the president of each CDL will participate in a “Forum of CDLs” but no Forum has been created so far. Forums will be a realm of civil society at the localidade or posto administrativo level from which to participate in the CCPA. SNV is in the process of

\(^{18}\) In contrast to what the SNV official told me in the interview, SNV’s mid-term evaluation says that there are between 12-14 elected members (Sterkenburg et al 2000, p. 36). This discrepancy may be due to changes that were introduced after the mid-term evaluation.
systematizing the methodology to create a CDL. SNV has 2 technicians (called Assistentes de Desenvolvimento Local—ADL) assisting the formation and consolidation of CDLs in each district. Level of effort required to create a CDL takes between three and six months (Sterkenburg et al 2000, p. 37). Even though several years of experimenting with the formation of CDLs have allowed SNV to shorten this time, for a program that wants to start with this it will take them a considerable time to set up these structures.

- **Núcleos de Desenvolvimento da Povoação (NDP) and Núcleos de Desenvolvimento do Regulado (NDR) in Buzi.** This is the model of community representation tried by DEC in Buzi. It consists of a two tier structure. It starts at the povoação level where NDPs are formed in every povoação. An NDP consists basically of a six member committee formed by the chefe da povoação, two activists (young, literate people that act as the secretary of this committee), and three people elected by the community. The six members of each NDP go to a meeting at the sede do regulado where they elect the NDR. The NDR is formed by 11 members of which there are three women and three men that come from the elected members of the NDPs, 2 are activists, the régulo and two of his sagutas (who are chiefs of 10 families). Chefes do posto or presidentes de localidades can also be members of the NDR (see Roque and Tengler 2001 for more details).

*b. Interest-group model:*

- **Comissões de Desenvolvimento da Localidade (CDLs) in Machaze.** This is the model tried by Concern in the district of Machaze, province of Manica. It basically consists of a Forum at the Localidade level where representatives from a wide set of interest groups get together to discuss their problems and possible solutions. The number of interest groups varies according to the localidade but in principle there is no limit to it. In the localidade I visited there were 17 groups. Some of them were: youth, women, health, teachers, Link School-Community (“Ligação Escola-Comunidade,” a sort of PTA), traditional authorities, religious leaders, “curandeiros”, “parteiras tradicionais”, water user groups, merchants, farmers, etc. Each interest group gets together in a public meeting and elects a representative to participate in the monthly meeting of the CDL. Each interest group discusses its own agenda and presents it at the monthly meeting of the CDL. Each interest group presents the concern/proposal that deems more important, the CDL puts them together in a document and sends them to the district government. The representative of each interest group works jointly with chefes da povoação for conveying meetings and reaching out to those community members who might be interested in participating in the meetings of the interest group.

1.3. The Recommended Model

67. Some criteria to evaluate which option to pursue are: (i) the level of effort that it would take to promote such a model and whether the government of Mozambique is capable and willing to make that effort; (ii) how well each model represents the different voices/interests in a community.

68. Before analyzing the pros and cons of each model let me say that what I would propose the program is to pursue a twofold strategy with regards to civil society organization:

- Creating Forum da Localidade in every localidade, and
Having incentives for the voluntary (or optional) creation of CDLs and other types of community organization (peasants associations, natural resource management groups, etc).

69. The main problem with the territorial approach is that it implies a huge level of effort. In any district there could be from fifty to more than a hundred povoações. Mandating the creation of such a number of community organizations would be a very taxing and unfeasible aim given the weak capacities that exist to carry this through. An alternative could be to make level-level organization optional, creating incentives for the voluntary formation of this CDLs and making partnerships with NGOs to promote this effort. This is the route that the Nampula Program is going to follow. Traditional authorities should be key strategic partners to promote CDLs.

70. Focusing the efforts of the program on the localidade has several advantages:
- it will help to make the localidade an effective realm of civil society organization and communication with district governments. This goes in the same direction the government is pursuing through the Law of OLE of giving more relevance to the localidade. So far, it’s status is fuzzy and its relevance is low.
- Its scale for aggregating social interests and demands seems more adequate than povoação and Posto Administrativo. The posto administrativo is too high a level for organizing communities—in some cases the distances are too big for people to go back and forth in the same day. The perspective the community has from the povoação level is very narrow, since most services and infrastructure impact a larger territory than the povoação. The risk is to fall into the problem many social funds have had of funding very small projects to keep many communities satisfied.
- The level of institutional support that it will require from the program seems realistic. According to the Concern technician that supported the Comissões in Machaze it would take four to six months to create this Forums in a District with one or two community facilitators.
- It accommodates well, and indeed potentiates, other community animation efforts. CDLs at the povoação level or associações de camponeses, water user groups, forest management groups, can all participate in the Forum. It also accommodates well the role of traditional authorities since they are also represented as an interest group.
- Since the FL includes a large number of actors it is very likely that people with better than average educational backgrounds will be present (e.g., professors, merchants, religious leaders) who can be important assets for having substantive discussions. [see Helling 1997, p. 6, on the need to include the participation of the better educated elites while preventing them from dominating the process]

71. The main challenges of organizing at the localidade level are:
- There is a risk of creating artificial new interests—e.g., creating a farmers group in a region of fishermen. The methodology should be clear about not forcing or stimulating artificial groups.
- There is a risk that better-off people from the localidade may want to capture the benefits. If the better off are in the “sede da localidade” they may influence the process to concentrate the benefits there.

72. Even though the combined model (interest group at localidades and CDLs at povoações) appears to be more adequate to the goals and constraints of the program, this does not mean that
this should be the only model to adopt in the country. Mozambique is at a stage of its
development of linking organizations at which it will profit from experimenting with different
models of linking organizations, letting these experiences develop, before legislating on the
subject. In Nampula, the territorial approach is already being tried out. The center provinces can
experiment with the combined approach. Five years from now both experiences would have
generated enough lessons to better inform policy-making.

1.4. Who Should Promote Organizing and How?

Who

73. The Nampula Project has two positions at the provincial level (a Participatory Development
Technician and a Participatory Methodology and Gender Advisor). A description of their
responsibilities appears in section V.5.1. This is a good idea that should be maintained in the WB
program. What needs to be added is to have someone at the district level in charge and trained to
be the facilitator of community organization and participation (for a description of his/her profile
see section V.5.2). This person should be part of the District Planning Team. There are two
options to select the person for this position:

- One option is to create a new position and recruit for it. The main drawback of this is that it
  implies extra expenses in a context that is very tight for this type of proposal.

- Another option is to draw from the existing human resources at the district level. The main
  risk of this approach is not finding someone with the minimum required profile among the
district staff. The main advantages of this approach are that: (i) it’s simpler because is
someone that is already living there and knows the district, and (ii) cheaper, because it does
not require extra payments. This would imply adding the task of community animation to the
list of tasks that someone in the district staff already has (as it is done with all the members
of the Equipa Técnica). If the animation task is too time-consuming, it may have to be shared
among two or three people. If the presidentes de localidades or chefes do posto have
individual characteristics that are compatible with the profile of a participation facilitator,
they could also be considered as viable options for the job. In any case, the provincial
coordinator of participation should survey and identify these persons in consultation with the
DA. Those selected should be trained. The content of the training should include PRA tools,
procedures for organizing communities, procedures for developing workplans for community
self-help activities, etc.

74. In those districts where there is an NGO doing community work the district could make a
partnership with the NGO to facilitate the process. Still, it will be important to have someone in
the district government responsible for the liaison with the NGO on this issue.

How

75. General principles that should guide the formation of community organizations have been
already outlined [see V.1.1.]. Here I will propose more concrete guidelines for how to organize
FLs.19

19 Comissões de Desenvolvimento Local can be organized following the model that SNV is developing [see V.1.2
for an overview of this model]. Detailed guidelines for organizing CDLs are being developed by SNV and I will
recommend that the program reviews them when they become available.
76. **Forum da Localidade** can be organized taking into account the following guidelines:

- The District Facilitator of Participation and the traditional authorities of the localidade convey a large meeting at the sede da localidade where leaders from the different povoações are invited (chefes da povoação, religious leaders, farmer groups, LECs, grupos dinamizadores, etc). The objectives and rules of the FL are explained. The existing formal and informal organizations acting in the localidade are identified. Discussion of what groups the participants want to form.

- each “interest group” holds a public meeting with its members where two representatives of each interest group (a man and a woman) are elected to participate as representatives of the group in the FL.

- **Statutes.** The FL should have a statute with the basic rules that regulate FL functioning. A set of rules should concern the rights and obligations of the “group interest” representatives and of the FL representatives in the CCPA and the CCD. Obligations should specify how reps have to report back to their constituencies the content of the meetings where they have represented the community. Procedures for changing reps should also be established. The FL should have authorities (president, vice-president, secretary, vice secretary, treasurer). At least one third should be women.

- **Frequency of meetings.** The frequency of meetings will very likely vary according to the dynamism that FL’s members give to their Forum. Therefore, rather than imposing a fixed frequency, it would be better to keep this flexible—i.e., letting each FL decide on the frequency with which it would meet, taking into account the requirements of the planning cycle and other initiatives that may originate in the interest groups of the locality or in external actors.

1.5. **Incentives**

77. Community organizing needs incentives. Participating in the planning process is good, but not enough. The process of designing district development plans and annual plans takes a long time during which the population’s interest in organizing may falter. Two things that keep communities interested in participating are:

- “Technical assistance”. Poor people appreciate when officials from government or NGOs reach out to them not just to listen to their problems but to give them advice on how to do things differently to improve their lives. For instance, in one of the community meetings I attended a woman said that she had learned many things about health care and nutrition with CARE that she had taught to other women in the community. But after CARE left, she said, “no one from government did any follow up, and I lost my morale. If I had someone leading me, assisting my work, I will have the strength because someone would be appreciating my work and giving me advice”. What this calls for is having sectoral policies with strategies for working with communities (either through community health agents, PTAs, “model” farmers, etc). In some sectors, such as education, this appears to happen to a certain extent through LECs (ligação escola-comunidade). Reviewing sectoral policies from this perspective could help identify how to strengthen existing initiatives and where the main gaps exist.

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20 Initially it took up to two years in Nampula to prepare DDPs, though they were able to reduce this time later on.
• Tangible results. This is why all NGO efforts at community organizing always have a “micro-proyectos component” that allows people to perceive a quick and tangible result of their participation. In the WB program, this role could be played by the Community Infrastructure Improvement Facility. “The objective of this facility would be to build the capacity of district administrations to plan and manage—jointly with communities—simple micro-projects. [...] communities would, with support from NGOs and local officials, prepare proposals for infrastructure improvements—such as structural repairs; small complementary facilities such as latrines, water points, fencing, etc; or the purchase of durable goods such as furniture—and submit them to the district administration.” (Note on FMS, p.3) This is a very good way of providing a quick and tangible product to community participation.

1.6. Risks and Mitigating Measures
78. Two risks of a state-sponsored strategy to promote the creation of linking organizations are:

• Political cooptation and manipulation. This can take place if government officials start meddling with community election of representatives for the FLs or the CCs. Academics are divided over this issue. Some consider that state-sponsored associations are very weak in terms of holding government accountable (Jenkins and Goetz 1999). Others, however, have found out that state-sponsored associations ultimately evolve into autonomous organizations (Fox 1996). While some rural areas in Mozambique do not show strong partisan dynamics, others do—fueled by the possible contestation of community authorities as well as electoral mobilization. NGOs that have facilitated community organizing processes in urban municipalities have reported serious attempts to politically manipulate the election of community representatives. Therefore, it is imperative that the project creates some safeguards to avoid or minimize the politicization of CCs, such as rules specifying that representatives should not be elected based on their political party identity, not allowing openly partisan discussions in meetings, etc. The program should closely monitor this issue during implementation to ensure that these rules are being enforced.

• Communities’ mistrust of government’s community organizing policy. Analysts of the Mozambican experience point out that rural communities are strongly distrustful of government. Indeed, rather than wanting to link with government, some community authorities may want to de-link even more from government. If this sentiment is very pervasive, community organizing efforts may be unsuccessful or take longer than expected. Keeping the FL as an autonomous space of civil society rather than as an interface forum may help mitigate this mistrust. More generally, one way to mitigate this problem is to be very respectful of the opinions and sensitivities of the local population and avoid imposing structures.

1.7. Minimum Standards
79. What indicators could the program establish to find out whether community organizing at the district level has achieved minimum standards of performance? My recommendations, which are based on the FL model but could also be applied to other potential models, are:

• Forum de Localidades have been established in every localidade of the district
• FLs have met with the frequency that they have agreed on
• A sufficiently diverse number of interest groups have been formed in every locality. Although it is not advisable to impose the creation of specific interest groups, at least all those citizens interested in forming interest groups have been able to do so.
• Interest groups have met with the frequency that they have agreed on
• Interest group and FL representatives have been elected in a democratic way—i.e., through secret voting by their peers. If voting is not a practice that community members feel comfortable with, they should propose another method to legitimate their representatives.
• IG and FL meetings are scheduled at a time and location that is accessible to the majority of the citizens of the locality, and information about these meetings is transmitted in advance to allow people to make the needed arrangements to be present.
• The rules for participation and representation are widely disseminated through a public information campaign. At least the traditional authorities of every povoação should be informed about these rules and they should hold a meeting in the povoação to explain these rules to the community.
• There are trained community facilitators working under the supervision of the district administration

2. Structuring the Local Dialogue
80. In the previous section I have discussed an organizational structure for citizens to be able to express their preferences and participate in a dialogue with government. In this section, I will discuss the organizational structure or interface that is needed to sustain the dialogue between citizens and government. The discussion of this topic can be organized around four broad questions:
• What should be the characteristics of the organizational structure that provides the interface?
• What should be the main content of the dialogue and what instruments are needed to generate it?
• What are the main risks involved in the local dialogue and what are some possible mitigating measures?
• What minimum standards should the program adopt?

2.1. Organizational Structure
Levels of Dialogue and Respective Roles
81. A discussion about how to structure the local dialogue should start by clarifying what are the levels at which this dialogue takes place and what are the roles of each level. In Mozambique, there are four territorial levels: povoação, localidade, posto administrativo, and distrito. The first issue to address is which of these levels are realms for civil society to get together and discuss and agree on their main preferences, and which levels are for civil society and government representatives to interact and agree on the district strategy. In my conversations in Mozambique I have noticed that people tend to pose this discussion around two sets of issues:
• One relates to the role of the localidade vis-à-vis the posto administrativo.
• The other relates to the role of the posto administrativo vis-à-vis the distrito.

82. Localidade vs. Posto Administrativo. There are three possible options for defining the roles of localidade and posto administrativo:
(i) The localidade is a space where civil society is represented (e.g., Forum da Localidade) and the CC starts at the PA (CCPA),

(ii) Both the localidade and the PA are an interface between government and civil society (Conselho Consultivo da Localidade-CCL- and CCPA) or

(iii) The combination of the above: the localidade has both an FL and a CCL, and the PA has a CCPA

83. My suggestion is that the best option is the first one. In my consultations in Machaze community members (and the administrador distrital) expressed that it was good to have an instance where civil society could come together without the presence of government. It is a prerequisite for minimum autonomous action and for encouraging people to take responsibility for their own development. If government is present, two things tend to happen: community members have a tendency to see participation as the presentation of demands on government, and they have more reservations about speaking their minds freely. Being a Forum of civil society does not mean that it doesn’t serve as an interface with government. It does, but it is more informal. Every month this Forum can communicate to the district government a summary of their concerns, proposals, results accomplished, etc. Government officials can attend meetings of this Forum on an ad-hoc basis to discuss specific issues, clarify doubts, ask community members to help in specific interventions, etc. It would provide a more informal space for interaction when needed. The formal spaces for interaction (Conselhos Consultivos) would take place at the Posto Administrativo and the District level, and have pre-determined agendas, mainly structured discussions around the planning and monitoring of the Strategic District Plan and the Annual District Plan. The idea is to have a structure that combines formal spaces that provide stable and structured interactions (Conselhos) with informal spaces that provide flexible interactions (Forums).

84. One reason against option (ii) for not having a CCL is that it would raise the question of how different is it from the CCPA. The government is clear that CC should take place at the PA because this is the lower level of government. The risk of adding a CCL to the CCPA is to have too many meetings with overlapping agendas and functions, and to tire people of participation.

85. Option (iii) would not only have the problems of option (ii) but it would make the scheme even more complex and cumbersome, since it would require the creation of another institution (FL) and the functions of the FL and CCL would get mixed up.

86. Posto Administrativo vs. Distrito. The main discussion here is whether it is necessary to have two interfaces between civil society and government (CCPA and CCD) or whether having a CCD is enough; in other words, what would be the added value of having a CCPA?

87. Two main risks with having CCs at the PA and district level rather than only one at the district level are:

- the risk of overloading the participatory process and participants with too many meetings, discussions and prioritizations. Participation represents an important opportunity cost in terms of time and resources to travel, meet, and write up.

- the risk that if the CCPAs are not well structured the information that comes from the bottom (localidade) may get distorted before reaching the discussion in the district.
88. Arguments in favor of having CCPAs are:

- Mozambican Law recognizes PA as a level of the public sector administration and the
government is interested in dynamizing it as a source of support to the district administration.
An indication of this interest is that the Draft Law of OLE specifies the creation of CCPAs
and has been stated very clearly by government officials when I met with them.
- Some districts in Mozambique are very large and PAs are important structures to help the
district in having a closer interaction with civil society. CCPAs, then, will be a way to widen
the realm of interaction between civil society and government. In large districts, with too
many localities, CCPAs can also provide a filter between FLs and CCD to make the process
of prioritization and discussion more manageable, meaningful, and representative than it
would be if all the localities’ representatives go directly to the CCD.
- Strengthening the PA requires defining a more concrete working plan for the chefe do PA,
who has a very vague work definition so far. CCPAs could be a vehicle for defining that
plan. This plan or agenda should be based on an integrated perspective on the basic problems
and potentialities of the PA, as well as on the cross-sectoral synergies that could be exploited
at the PA.

89. My recommendation is for the Program to build upon government’s interest in
strengthening PA by providing assistance in the development on guidelines and procedures for
CCPAs. These guidelines should:

- specify what is the added value of the CCPAs (e.g., develop a strategic view of the problems
and potentialities of the PA, create synergies between the sectors that are present at the PA,
provide a more concrete working plan for the chefe do posto, etc),
- provide clear rules for aggregation and prioritization of interests and demands that integrate
them without distorting them.
- in addition, the government should have a plan to strengthen the capacities of the PA
including training for PA staff, a budget for minimum operating costs, as well as minimum
infrastructure (equipment, transportation, etc) to be able to work.

90. To sum up, my recommendation for the division of roles across the four territorial levels are
to see povoação and localidade as realms for civil society and both the PA and district as realms
for civil society-government interaction.

Principles for Structuring the Interface between Citizens and Government
91. Here I present some general principles that should be taken into account for creating this
infrastructure. The list of principles that I mention here do not attempt to be a comprehensive list
but rather to highlight some of the ones I consider important.

Definition of roles
92. At a general level, the roles of the different actors in the local dialogue are:

93. Citizens:

- participate in the discussion and implementation of district planning;
- elect the representatives that will interact with government;
• define their own agenda for local development which includes actions that should be implemented by government and others that can be implemented by self-help
• contribute resources for local development

94. The Posto Administrativo:
• develops and implements a development agenda for the posto administrativo, made up with input from civil society and from the district government
• implement directives that come from the DA
• coordinates and facilitates the logistics for CCPAs,
• collaborates in community organizing efforts

95. The District Administration:
• coordinates and leads the elaboration of the DDP and PES distrital
• implements national government’s guidelines for promoting community organizations and for community participation in district planning;
• generates partnerships with NGOs in the district synergies
• promotes coordination of national and provincial interventions in the district
• facilitates dissemination of good practices across the district
• Monitors the implementation of the DDP and PES distrital

96. The National Government:
• provides general guidelines for the composition and rules for district planning; the program should develop detailed rules to implement these guidelines.
• Holds District Administration accountable for implementation of DDP and PES distrital

97. Organization of the Consultative Councils (PA and District)
• Statute. The councils should have a formal document that regulates the role of the councils, the council’s composition, the rights and obligations of its members, the procedures for making decisions, etc.
• Membership. The civil society and government representatives that participate in the councils should have the status of members, meaning that for a certain period of time they will be part of the council and will be bind by certain rights and obligations.
• Composition. The majority of the members should come from civil society. Women should have an adequate representation. Civil society representatives should come from organizations of civil society that fulfill the principles outlined before (section V.1.1.) Government should designate officials from the different areas
• Size. The size of the councils should be such that it strikes a balance between maximizing representation and allowing for meaningful participation and input from all members.
• Autonomy. Councils should not be dominated by any local faction so that its deliberations reflect the real concerns and priorities of the district population.
• Transparency. Information about what happens in the CCs are widely disseminated
• Institutionalization. The roles and functioning of CCs are regulated through decrees/laws.
• Learning. The CCs develop the capacity to reflect upon their practice to identify ways of improving their functioning.
98. *Relationship among levels*

- Iterative: the three levels (localidade, PA, distrito) have to create a cycle of iterative interactions with flows of information that go from the bottom up (the lower level feeds the discussion in the higher level) and flows that are top-down (higher level provide inputs for influencing the agenda at the lower level).
- Mutual Accountability: lower levels are accountable to higher levels and vice versa for the commitments that each level has made.

**A Possible Structure**

99. Based on the previous principles and the experience of the Nampula Project I propose the following organizational structure:

1. FLs at the localidade
2. CC at the PA
3. CC at the District level

100. *Forum da Localidade.* Several aspects of the structure of the FL have been covered in the previous section. Here I will refer only to the linking between the FL and the CCs. There could be between eight to ten people (half men and half women) that represent the localidade in the CCPA. This group should include the president and the secretary of the FL as well as the representative from the “traditional authorities interest group” (if he is not one of them). The other five to seven reps should be elected from different interest groups or elect those that participate in more than one interest group. The FL should also elect those reps that will represent the localidade at the CCD. By having reps from each FL at the CCD (something which the draft OLE law proposes), it becomes easier to report back to communities the result of the CCs.

101. *The Conselho Consultivo do Posto Administrativo*

- Source of the agenda. The agenda for discussion depends on the stage where the planning process is at, but in general it should represent a consensus between government and civil society.
- Who convenes. The chefe do Posto Administrativo (as a delegate of the District Administrator) is responsible for convening the CCPA.
- Composition. *Government:* chaired by the chefe do PA, other participants are presidentes de localidades, as well as other government staff based at the PA (nurse, extensionist). *Civil society:* there will be aprox. 20/21 representatives. If a PA has 2 localidades, each localidade would send 10 reps; if it has 3, it should send 7 reps; if it has 4, it should send 5.
- The CCPA elects eight to twelve people from each posto administrativo that should come in equal proportion from each localidade (if there are three localidades, four reps from each)
- The CCPA should meet at least twice a year.

102. *The Conselho Consultivo Distrital*

- Who convenes: the District Administrator is responsible for convening the CCD.
- Composition: *Government:* Chaired by the AD, other participants are the members of the Conselho Executivo, the chefes do PA, presidentes de localidades, district sector officials, provincial government reps. *Civil society:* 24 community representatives elected by the FLs
(If there are 2 PA, 12 from each; if there are 3 PA, 8 from each; if there are 4 PA, 6 from each).

- The AD and CE invite four “leaders” that are respected in the district because they have shown a commitment to district development (e.g., a priest, the director of an NGO that is very relevant in the district, an influential businessman, etc).  

- The CCD should meet at least three times a year during the formulation of the DDP (to accommodate the 3 CCDs in one year) and at least twice a year in the following years.

2.2. The Content of the Dialogue

103. The dialogue between the local population and government is guided by the DDP and the District PES. These plans contain the agreements reached between government and the local population on the development strategy and actions for the district. Taking as a starting point the five stage framework developed by the Nampula Project (see Table x above) I will suggest the following changes:

First Stage- Launching of the DDP

104. The two key products of this stage are (i) the formation of the District Participatory Planning Team and (ii) the first CCD where the DDP is launched.

105. District Planning Team, Matakala and Cavane (2002) propose to change the name and composition of the Equipa Técnica implemented in Nampula. Their proposal is to name this team “Grupo de Planificação Participativa Distrital” (District Participatory Planning Group) and conform this group with 22 members: District Administration (3), District Directions (5), NGOs (2), PA chiefs (4), localities presidents (4), community authorities (4). (p.46)

106. Their argument for changing the name makes sense, namely, that the current denomination of Technical Team implies that the nature of the planning process is only technical, neglecting the non-technical side of this process—i.e., its community organization and public participation component. (p. 44).

107. As to the proposed composition, I have my reservations. In principle, it is a good idea to make this body more representative. However, the logistics of gathering and communicating within such a large group of people seem quite daunting in the context of rural Mozambique. If chefes do PA often find it difficult going to the district capital, it would be even worse for locality presidents and community authorities. Rather than start by such a large membership, it may be better to define first the ways in which each of these groups would contribute to the substantive work, and then decide what form should their participation take.

108. The Technical Team should have between 6 to 9 people that come from the different sectors that are present at the district level, plus one or two from the NGOs that are more active in the district. One change that is necessary to make to the Nampula ET model is to include a District Facilitator or Coordinator of Community Participation. Two lessons that the Nampula Project learned about the composition of the Technical Team are:

21 This is one of the proposals that the Nampula program is going to test.
• it is preferable that District Directors are not part of the Team since they are very busy and do not have the time that is needed to put together the District Plan. Rather, the Directors should appoint the best candidate from their Direction.

• Team members should be selected based on merit and competence. The Project had problems in some districts because the District Administrators had appointed officials based on “friendship” rather than competence.

First CCD

109. The proposal of creating FLs and of having a more structured representation brings up the issue of whether the FL should be created before or after the 1st CCD. Some ideas:
• Creating the FLs prior to the first CCD. The advantage of doing this is that from the start it will be clear who are the representatives. The disadvantage is that forming the FLs may delay the planning process.
• Creating the FLs after the first CCD. The issue here is what should be the criteria to invite civil society reps. One possibility is to convey community meetings in each localidade to explain the process and ask the community to elect temporary reps to attend the first CCD. Another possibility is to invite only traditional authorities from every localidade. A potential problem with any of these options is if those who participate in the first CCD resent it if they are not elected during the FLs election of reps.

110. In the first CCD the District Planning Team presents a first diagnosis of the district that will then be deepened during the diagnosis stage. This event could be a good opportunity for the planning team to tell community leaders the ways in which interest groups could help in gathering or confirming sector data (users of water pumps, kids at school, etc).

Second Stage—Diagnosis

111. Rules for involving communities in the district diagnosis can include:
• Interest group meetings. each “interest group” holds a public meeting with its members. Each group has two tasks:
  (i) Discuss and identify the priority problems of the group; they identify the three to five top problems and possible actions to address them. Actions should include what the group can do by self-help and the type of assistance they need from external actors.
  (ii) Gather or confirm the information that the District Participatory Planning Team has requested.

• Forum da Localidade meeting. In the monthly meeting of the Forum da Localidade the representatives from each interest group present the group’s conclusions. The secretary of the FL writes them down. A dialogue can take place as to what are the top three to five priorities the FL would like to present at the CCPA. PRA tools are used to structure the discussion.

• CCPA meeting. In the CCPA the president or the secretary of each localidade reads the Act of the FL. PRA tools are used to discuss the problems and priorities presented by the representatives and the top ten priorities for the PA are selected. The other problems and priorities identified by the interest groups are also registered. As a result two lists are generated: one with the top ten priorities of the PA, and another with the other problems and solutions identified by the FLs.
• The List of Community Priorities from each CCPA is included as an annex of the DDP.

Third Stage—Definition of the Development Strategy
112. At this stage takes place the 2nd CCD where the Planning Team presents a strategy proposal for discussion. A possible sequence for this event is:
• first the Civil Society representatives from each CCPA present the top priorities of each PA and the other problems and possible solutions identified in the FLs and CCPAs.
• Afterwards, the Planning Team presents the strategy proposal and gives an explanation of and justification for the strategy. A tentative matrix of actions is presented and explicit references are made to the ways in which the Team took the List of Community Priorities into account.
• Discussion in small groups about the proposed strategy
• Groups feedback and plenary agreements.

Fourth Stage—Identifying the Action Program and approving the DDP
113. This stage involves negotiations between the Planning Team and the array of actors responsible for implementing the actions included in the strategy. With regards to communities, two key actions are:
• Discuss with the beneficiaries that will be receiving public investments about characteristics of the investment (location, possible types of technology, O&M requirements, etc) as well as what would be the counterpart that the community can put (either in of cash or in kind).
• The District Facilitator of Participation helps sector district officials to work with the different FLs to define the self-help activities that would be part of the Matrix of Actions. (see below some recommendations for how to do this).

114. In the Third CCD, the final plan is presented
• After presenting, discussing, and approving the DDP, the facilitator of Participation summarizes for the civil society reps what are the key pieces of information that they should bring back to their constituencies. This information should be written down. If the civil society reps are illiterate they should bring with them an assistant to write them down.
• Civil society reps are required to hold a meeting of the FL within two weeks of the CCD to report back about the contents of the approved DDP.
• Copies of the DDP are sent to each FL. A Jornal da Parede with the basic info of the DDP is posted in a public space in the localidade as well as in the building of the chefe do PA.

115. Toolkits for Mobilizing communities for self-help activities. District governments should have a toolkit for engaging communities in self-help activities. DEC in Buzi has developed a very interesting experience that could serve as a reference for developing such a toolkit. DEC has organized what they call “Civic education campaigns” which is divided in four broad modules (see box 1).

| Box 1. DEC Civic Education Campaigns in Buzi |
| DEC organized its civic education activities around four trimestral campaigns: |
| • Between January-march: a set of activities for cleaning roads, water source, houses, etc. |
Between April-June, this is the time when the “capim” is dry and farmers burn it. Campaigns to burn in controlled and appropriate way and other activities to protect the environment are organized. Between July-September is the time when kids and youth have to go back to school for the second semester and, apparently, a time when many of them don’t do it and drop out of school. Activities to find out who has not returned and why, conscientization of parents about the importance of sending kids to school are organized. Between October-December is the beginning of the rainy season and a time when problems of cholera and malaria increase. Therefore, campaigns to combat these epidemics are organized.

In broad terms, each of these four campaigns falls within the responsibility of a different ministry. Public works (roads, water), agriculture, education, and health. What DEC has done is to develop “toolkits” for each of these campaigns and is in the process of linking with each of the responsible sectors so they become the facilitators of the different campaigns.

116. If the program wants to pursue this option it would need to develop a set of toolkits. The approach could be to work with the different ministries in developing sectoral strategies for the district directions to work with the community in self-help activities. Strategies could consist of a set of training materials that district officials could draw from, depending on the activities that have been agreed on in the DDP and annual plan. These toolkits, therefore, are not a “closed” package that should be applied in a top-down fashion, but rather flexible tools that should facilitate the organization of self-help activities:

- who will develop the toolkit? The nature of this activity suggests that this should be done at the national level to profit from economies of scale. MAE (in coordination with the relevant ministries) can have a bidding process where NGOs, universities, and public agencies can participate.
- Who will implement these campaigns? Staff of the relevant District Directions seem the more appropriate for this. With the exception of Public Works all the other sectors have district directions.
- The organization that develops the education strategy and packages should train provincial-level agents (NGOs and/or government) that will be responsible for training district level officials.

2.3. Risks and Mitigating Measures

117. One of the risks of having a local dialogue is that civil society participation is passive, and not independent. Citizens are accustomed to listen rather than speak up, and government is accustomed to speak and give orders rather than to listen. For each side to learn to do both things at the same time and together, and to create a constructive dialogue will take time. One way to mitigate this is through the creation of an instance for civil society to get together before its interaction with government, such as the proposed FL. Since it is formed by peers only, it is a less intimidating space than a CC, where government is present. In this instance, community members should learn the basics of democratic deliberations. In addition, the program should provide training to community representatives on the nature and goals of the CC and their rights to voice their opinions during meetings. Also, district officials should receive orientations on being respectful of communities opinions. But most of all, it will be important to educate local actors about their roles in the CCs during the CCs themselves. The provincial and district coordinators of participatory development should facilitate these meetings to create an enabling environment.
118. Another risk of a government-civil society dialogue is raising unrealistic community expectations about the solution to their problems. The main incentive for communities to discuss and prioritize their needs and to propose possible solutions is the expectation that some of those problems will be solved. In a comprehensive process like the one proposed here, the magnitude of the needs that come up is overwhelming. Since needs are always larger than resources, and even more so in countries like Mozambique, government resources will be able to attend only a small fraction of those problems. Unless explicit measures are taken to manage community expectations the program runs the risk of generating high levels of community frustration which can hurt the program’s reputation and performance. I recommend the program to define a strategy to manage expectations based on the following principles:

• a prioritization process that filters up to the district a manageable number of community priorities. The fact that community leaders will be participating throughout the whole prioritization process has the advantage that they will be aware of the process followed to aggregate (and reduce) the number of priorities that reach the district level.

• an aggressive communication strategy that creates a conscience among community leaders and members about (a) the magnitude of resources that the district has available for investments (this implies that the district has a rough notion of the district’s “budget constraint”); (b) the meaning of a prioritization process (only some problems go up for consideration while others are left out); (c) the agreements reached and reflected in the final DDP document.

• stress the multi-year nature of the DDP so that communities know that they may not be attended in the first years but they may be later on.

• Increase the “district budget” by coordinating with other investments partners (NGOs, businesses) so that they channel their resources to attend DDP priorities. This includes communities self-help activities.

• Facilitators of community meetings and CCs should be trained to repeat frequently the above information to communities.

• A common mechanism that rural investment programs develop to cope with high expectation levels (and the consequent political pressure) is to finance very small projects so they can cover as much territorial units as possible. The program should try to avoid this since it goes against the notion of having a strategic plan. Some programs have found this acceptable in the initial stages of the program so as to gain credibility and take some of the pressure off, and then slowly moving into larger projects that are more focused on certain areas of the district. My recommendation is for the Program to have this as a “second best” alternative. The program can also use the microprojects approach of the Community Infrastructure Improvement Facility to have a more territorially-balanced response to demands.

2.4. Minimum Standards
119. I have already outlined minimum standards for participation in the FLs (section V.1.7). Here, I will refer only to structure and content of the CCs and DDP:

• At least 70% of the members of the CCs should come from civil society
• At least one third of the members of the CCs are women
• Civil society representatives that form the CC have been elected by the local population

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22 Since districts don’t have a budget in this case it means a rough estimate of the resources the national and provincial administration will allocate to the district, as well as commitments from other partners (NGOs, businesses, etc).
CC dynamics (size, duration, languages, etc) allow for meaningful participation and exchange of ideas. Most of those who attended feel they had a chance to express their opinions and preferences.

- There are written records of the discussions and agreements that took place in every CC, as well as a signed list of those who attended
- Discussions in the CC are not manipulated by any faction in particular
- Most districts complete the DDP within less than a year and a half.
- A majority of the local population finds that the priorities that appear in the DDP reflect well the priorities expressed in the FLs and CCPAs
- Community representatives are capable of explaining what criteria led to the final district strategy
- Community representatives hold community meetings to inform back to the community the basic points that were discussed
- The DDP includes self-help activities that resulted from a consensus with communities.
- NGOs and other actors with investment resources consider the DDP a legitimate and useful instrument and use it to guide their investment decisions.

3. Executing the Action Plan

120. As previously noted this is one of the weaker areas of the DPFP in Nampula. Options for improving community involvement in the implementation of the subprojects included in the Annual Plan can be organized in three subgroups, depending on whether they relate to (i) the contracting process; (ii) the building process; or (iii) the operation and maintenance process.

3.1. Contracting

121. One big divide here relate to who will do the contracting, that is, whether community groups will be involved in any contracting and procurement of works and services or not. In the short term, the government of Mozambique is reluctant to pursue community contracting because of a concern that it will result in low-quality works. Since mounting a community contracting operation requires strong political will to back it up (see de Silva 2000) and given that it is not the only way to elicit community involvement in subproject implementation, this option does not appear worth pursuing.

122. A minimum standard should be that the bidding process follows transparent methods to ensure fairness and quality in government procurement, that the local population is informed about these methods, and has the opportunity to voice its opinion about contract performance. Some measures that can be implemented in this regard are:

- Use the CCD and CCPA to explain government procurement methods in simple terms
- For the Community Infrastructure Improvement Facility, invite 1 or 2 community representatives to the opening of the envelopes in the bidding of the works that will be implemented in the representatives’ communities.
- Establish a database of certified contractors that tracks the performance record of these contractors (whether they have left unfinished infrastructure, or poorly constructed infrastructure). Establish community-based oversight committees (see next point) that can provide feedback on the performance of the contractor.

3.2. Building
123. Two proposed measures are to:

- Create Oversight Committees to complement the work of the Fiscal in monitoring the contractor’s performance [see box 2].
- Give Oversight Committees some leverage, for instance, require the signatures of the committee before approving the next installment to the contractor.

In box 2, my recommendation is the creation of an oversight committee for each subproject. An alternative would be to create a subcommittee of the Forum da Localidade that is responsible for overseeing all subprojects in the locality. The main drawback of this alternative is that the comparative advantages of the oversight committee would be lost, namely, the fact that the overseers live nearby to the construction site and therefore have easy access to monitoring progress on a periodic basis, plus the fact that peer pressure for the committee to perform well is stronger when they belong to the beneficiaries’ community than when they do not.

**Box 2. Guidelines for the Establishment of an Oversight Committee**

The purpose is to oversee the implementation of the subproject, verifying that the works and services are being performed according to what has been agreed in the contract (duration, cost and quality of the service).

**Composition**. It can be formed by 3 people, one of which should be a woman. The beneficiaries of the subproject should elect these three people in a community assembly where the majority of the beneficiaries should be present. This assembly should take place immediately after the provincial government has contracted the implementing firm. The meeting should be recorded in an Act and the District Facilitator of Participation should attend the meeting. The Facilitator should inform beneficiaries about the functions, responsibilities and procedures that regulate the working of the Committee. People selected should have specific skills: be able to read and write, live in the community, be willing and available to perform the work, have some experience or vocation with the activity.

**Training**. The program should develop a booklet or manual of Community Oversight with the basic functions and procedures of the committee. Contents should be communicated in simple, graphic and easy to understand terms. The program should train this Committee on the contents of the Manual before the works start.

**Basic responsibilities** of the Committee are:

- Read the contract signed by the contractor and the provincial government to understand the responsibilities of each entity involved in the implementation of the subproject.
- Know the details of the subproject: (i) type of works to be performed; (ii) types of materials and quantities that will be procured; (iii) timeline for completing the works; (iv) how much would it cost.
- Define a working methodology which should include: times at which the committee would visit the works site; forms that should be filled to register the comments about performance; form of participation in the supervision visits of the fiscal; define procedures to be followed when there are irregularities or problems in subproject execution.
- The Committee should agree with the community on how it will report back to the community on its assessment of the contractor—e.g., a monthly community assembly where the committee presents its report.

### 3.3. Operation and Maintenance

124. Two proposed measures are:

- Each subproject should have an operation and maintenance plan that outlines what are the responsibilities of the different actors, including beneficiaries/users. This plan should be informed by the corresponding sectoral policy. A review of sectoral policies should indicate if reforms are needed.
- Establish Operation and Maintenance Management Committees [see box 3]
Box 3. Guidelines for the Establishment of Operation and Maintenance Management Committees

The **purpose** of these Committees is to coordinate the process of discussing and defining the management model that should be implemented to guarantee the investment’s sustainability.

These committees can be **formed and trained** in a similar fashion to the Oversight Committees.

**Responsibilities** include:

- Know relevant details of the subproject: type of infrastructure; operational capacity; technical standards required by sector regulating agencies; how revenues and expenses are formed; staffing requirements.
- Meet with users to define a working procedures, which should include: management model most adequate to the local reality; norms and rules for operation; staff quantity and selection rules; training requirements; internal accountability and reporting mechanisms.

4. **Accountability about Plan Implementation**

125. Some conditions that facilitate accountability about plan implementation are:

- The existence of an organizational infrastructure (i) for civil society to act collectively when exerting control, and (ii) for government to listen and respond to civil society’s demands
- Have transparent rules for planning, financial management, and procurement
- Have an aggressive communication strategy that ensures that key information is provided to the local population
- Rewards and sanctions.

4.1. **Organizational Infrastructure**

126. The thickening of linking social capital that will come as a result of the creation of Forums da Localidade will have an important effect in creating an organizational infrastructure through which the local population can ask for information and justification about government’s (in)actions. The different interest group organizations, such as parent-teacher associations, farmers group, health center management committees will result in improve communication and accountability. Besides the scheduled events that the Consultative Councils offer for accountability, FLs can also schedule more informal meetings with specific government officials to ask for information or explanation on issues that are a concerned of the population of that localidade.

127. The institutional structure for government to meet with civil society already exists through the CCDs and CCPAs. These Councils are key infrastructures for improved communication and accountability. There are two main improvements that need to be introduced to enable better accountability about plan implementation

- First, transform the CC in real councils instead of forums by establishing a system of representation where the members of the councils are elected for a significant period of time (two years at least). These representatives will have responsibilities with regards to their constituencies and the authorities of the CCs.
- Second, develop written guidelines for conducting these events to ensure that minimum contents of information are transmitted to the population (see below).

4.2. **Transparency & Communication**
128. Transparency and communication are interrelated. Transparent rules for making decisions and releasing information need an effective communication strategy to enable the local population to demand the enforcement of these rules and to act upon the information they receive. An effective communication strategy, in turn, will not lead to increased accountability if the rules for making decisions and releasing information are not clear.

129. Some of the rules that need to be transparent relate to:

1. **Planning.** The rules for planning have been discussed in previous sections.

2. **Budgeting.** Since District government does not have a budget, minimum rules for budgeting imply that district authorities have information about sector allocations for capital investments and recurrent costs with sufficient certainty and anticipation to be able to prepare annual district plans. This does not appear to be the case in the current situation. District staff complain that they are not well informed about national and provincial plans and budgetary commitments. Sometimes, even the sectors at the provincial level are not aware of what their national headquarters have planned and budgeted for the province. This is something that needs to be worked out before the initiation of the program.

3. **Financial management.** Establishing financial management systems at the district and provincial level that allow expenditure monitoring and tracking.

4. **Procurement.** There should be clear rules for the thresholds for direct contracting, private and public bidding.

130. The program should have a strong communication strategy. This strategy should include:

- **The issues** about which the population should be informed:
  1. Plans and budgets. The District Development Plan; the Annual Plan and corresponding budgetary commitments that government and non-government agencies have made. Budget should disaggregate what would be funded through the District Infrastructure Facility, through the Community Infrastructure Improvement Facility, etc. The basics of the Mozambican public investment system is explained (PIP).
  2. Revenue collection. Taxes and fees that are collected in the district and what percentage comes back to the district.
  3. Flow of public and non-government funds. Simple and clear explanations should be given about the origin of the funds (where do NGOs get their resources from, how government raises its revenues) and how the money moves until it gets to the district (transfer mechanisms and responsibilities, whether it stays in a subproject bank account or a general bank account, etc).
  4. Procurement and implementation. Who is the contractor, timetable, cost of each subproject, whether there is any provision for hiring local labor; how government supervises works; community oversight.
  5. Rewards and sanctions. Inform about the mechanisms the local population has to transmit assessment of district performance and the way government will process that input and translate it into rewards and sanctions. (see below).
• **Communication channels.** As part of program design a popular communication specialist should identify what would be the most effective channels to communicate with the population. In many poor countries, radio is an effective means, but apparently it will not be in Mozambique since a very small percentage of the rural population has a radio set. Four possible channels are:

1. Oral communication through the CCDs, CCPAs, FLs, and interest groups. The communication strategy should define what are the best issues to cover in each of these events. Information should be provided in the local languages.
2. Written forms include the “Jornal da Parede” (large pieces of paper posted in strategic places). The communication specialist should suggest what would be strategic places to post the Jornal da Parede. If the Forum da Localidade has a building for community meetings, that would be a good place to post basic information. Again, information should be available in the local languages. Since a large percentage of the rural population is illiterate, written forms of communication should be seen as complementing the other forms.
3. Community radios is an interesting channel that could be piloted in some districts to evaluate their effectiveness.
4. An interesting innovation that the Nampula Project is going to pilot in its second phase is the establishment of Information and Communication Centers (see box 4).

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**Box 4. UNCDF’s Information and Communication Centers**

An innovative development in this respect during the next phase of the NPPFD will be the establishment at the district and administrative post level of Information and Communication Centres, linked to the district planning processes. These will be piloted in a small number of districts, and then extended to all districts at both the district and administrative post level. The centres will be relatively inexpensive structures, built or refurbished with funds and resources from the Programme, NGOs and communities themselves. The centres will be “owned” and operated by the CCDs at the district and administrative post level, with advice and support from NGOs. Running costs will be funded locally rather than by the Programme. Meetings of CCDs and CCD(PA)s will take place in these centres rather than in government buildings as at present. The centres will provide a forum for communication and information sharing on a range of issues related to the district planning processes, including such issues as HIV/AIDS and adult literacy. Consideration will be given to the establishment of community radio in a number of pilot districts to support the work of these centres.

Source: UNCDF (2002)

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• The main responsibility for ensuring that information reaches the communities is of the District Participation Facilitator. The Facilitator should have detailed instruments to assist him/her in this work. The Program should prepare booklets containing the basic information that should be communicated, as well as the formats and channels for communication.

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4.3. **Rewards & Sanctions**

131. As noted before, one of the key weaknesses for downward accountability in Mozambique is the lack of political and fiscal decentralization. Without them the local population cannot vote district authorities out of office if they are unhappy with their performance, or vice versa keep them in office if they are satisfied with authorities performance. The challenge, then, is to find surrogate mechanisms for political accountability. If we put this in terms of a principal-agent framework we see that in Mozambique’ rural areas there are two principal-agent relations:
- in the relationship between rural citizens and the national government, the former act as the principal since they elect the national government and the national government is the agent
- in the relationship between national government and district authorities, the former is the principal since it appoints and controls the performance of the latter who acts as its agent
- therefore, there should be some mechanism for the local population to control if the national government is doing well its job of controlling district government performance. From what I gathered in my field visit, the only mechanism that exists for doing this are the visits that the provincial governor (who act as delegate of the central government) makes to the districts where he has meetings with local citizens and government officials. The provincial Directorate of Apoio e Controle (DPAC) is responsible for the administrative assessment performance of district administration, but apparently it does not include citizens input about district’s performance. Both mechanisms appear insufficient for establishing a system of incentives that promotes good downward accountability.

132. My proposal would be to improve the District Performance Assessment System and establishing an Incentives for Good District Performance System. These systems should have clear responsibilities and indicators.

132. District Performance Assessment System. This system should have output and outcome indicators related to the participation of civil society in local governance.

133. Some of the key Output indicators should include:
- the establishment of Forums da Localidade
- the definition of a Plan for community self-help activities
- the organization of CCPAs and CCDs
- producing the DDP
- producing Annual Plans
- communication events to disseminate planning, budgetary, and service delivery information

134. Outcome indicators should reflect the degree to which the local population is satisfied with public management and service delivery performance. In the last ten years, a wide set of tools have been developed and tested all over the world to measure citizens satisfaction about public action. Three of these are:
- citizen report cards are public accountability mechanisms based on citizen surveys of the performance and quality of government services. They allow citizens to monitor state performance.\(^{23}\) In addition, they:
  - provide quantitative information from the perspective of public service users which can help government agencies make changes and improve service;
  - can assist in prioritizing reform efforts and allocating public services;
  - aggregate and communicate poor people’s realities to government officials, decision makers, and the public;
  - foster voice, discussion, and debate, and build demand for reform;

\(^{23}\) Initially developed in Bangalore, it has since spread and is currently being used countrywide in India as well as in other countries, including Ukraine, the Philippines, Vietnam, Ghana, Canada, Denmark, the United Kingdom and the United States. For more information see Narayan (2002, p. 232-239).
- treat users of public services as clients or customers whose voices matter in the design, delivery, and assessment of government services.

- Participatory monitoring and evaluation. There is great variation in the way organizations and researchers understand the meaning of participatory monitoring and evaluation. Despite the diversity in thinking and practice, a recent literature review identified five general functions of PM&E: impact assessment; project management and planning; organizational strengthening or institutional learning; understanding and negotiating stakeholder perspectives; and public accountability (Estrella and Gaventa, ?). It generally draws from a wide set of participatory learning methodologies that are available, such as PRA tools and others. In the case of impact assessment, for instance, local communities participate in the definition of the impact indicators, the collection of data, the analysis of data, the communication of assessment findings, and in post-assessment actions designed to improve the impact of development interventions.

- Beneficiary Assessments are one of the participatory monitoring and evaluation tools that several WB funded programs have been using. Two interesting experiences to visit are the Zambian Social Investment Fund (ZAMSIF), and the Peruvian Social Investment Fund (FONCODES).

135. Incentives for Good District Performance System. Incentives should operate at two levels, one is the administrative rewards/sanctions that the District Administrator and district staff receive for their performance. The other is the development rewards/sanctions that the district population receive for the performance of both district administration and the local population.

136. Administrative Rewards. Since District administration staff is appointed rather than elected, their incentives for good performance should come from those who control their administrative careers, that is, the provincial administration. Suggested actions include:

- A comprehensive review of the system for administrative promotions should identify key reforms that are needed.

- Making DA responsibilities clearer as well as reinforcing his/her authority over sector staff are necessary. The current ambiguity in the role of the District Administrator is a crucial bottleneck for creating a more accountable district administration.

- The participation of district staff in the Participatory Planning District Team should account for extra points in the assessment of staff’s performance.

- The provincial governor can establish an annual “prize” that is awarded to the District Administrator and the Planning Team that has been more responsive to the local population and more engaged in promoting the development of the district. In the same way that during the socialist period there was something called “emulação (?) socialista” for those officials that performed well the government can establish something as an “emulacao da governação local participativa.”

137. In terms of Development Rewards, provincial government allocations for the District Infrastructure Facility and the Community Infrastructure Improvement Facility represent an opportunity to reward/sanction performance. The agents that will benefit/suffer from this incentive are the district population. This should mobilize the local population not only to become more vocal about district administration performance but also to perform well those actions that are their own responsibility. Two options for using these facilities as incentives are:
• to define minimum performance standards (output and/or outcome related) in order to be eligible for allocations from this facility;
• to define a fixed allocation that all districts receive equally and a variable allocation that depends on performance.

5. Capacity Building and Training
138. Capacity building is a cross-cutting issue that lies at the heart of the program’s goals. The success that the program attains in terms of participation and accountability will depend to a large extent on the degree to which provincial and district officials as well as communities assimilate new skills, develop new habits and norms for interacting with each other as well as new perceptions of their roles and potential.

139. In this section I will outline, first, some key principles for designing effective capacity building initiatives, and second, the main capacities that the different actors involved in the district planning process need to have to carry out this process. I will circumscribe the discussion to those capacities that are related to participation and downward accountability.

5.1. Principles for Effective Capacity Building
140. Important principles for effective capacity building are:
• Ownership and institutionalization. Capacity building efforts should be aimed to the core public administration structure and to legitimate and institutionalized forms of community representation rather than to ad-hoc, project-created government and community structures.
• A demand-driven approach. A key principle in capacity building is the adoption of a demand-driven approach. Many studies have showed that capacity building initiatives often fail because the recipients were not truly interested in being trained or because the contents of the training package was not relevant for the local context. This has led to a consensus that recipients should take a greater role in determining the source and type of training and technical assistance required, and to the importance of institutional analysis and context-specific design of capacity building initiatives.
• Holistic. A holistic approach to capacity building should emphasize the range of capacities needed for effective service delivery and good governance—including budgeting, accounting, communication, internal management, revenue mobilization, and monitoring and evaluation—and extending capacity-building efforts beyond district officials to other actors (provincial officials, private service providers, NGOs, contractors, and community organizations).
• Exploit multiple channels for capacity building. Direct provision of technical assistance and training is not the only channel for capacity building. Other channels include demonstration effects (improve one’s capacities because a peer has done it with positive consequences), competition effects (improve capacities to achieve a gain that otherwise will go to a “competitor”), demand effects (improve capacities because constituents demand it).
• An approach that focuses less on inputs (eg, learning sophisticated techniques of identifying needs), and more on the quality of the outcomes (eg. Do plans recognize the needs of different groups?).

• Linking capacity building to incentives. Often capacity building efforts fail because local actors lack incentives to learn. Some of these incentives can come from demonstration, competition, or demand effects.

• Methodologies should have an on the job, pedagogical, and hands-on approach.

• Measures to retain trainees in their positions are important to preserve the benefits of improved capacities.

5.2. Provincial Administration

141. Recommendations are:

• The provincial administration should have a Professional Development Program. This should provide structured opportunities for participation in longer-term professional development courses, not only for program staff and local counterparts but also provincial and district technicians involved in the district planning processes (within the framework of SIFAP, the Government’s public administration training program linked to the Public Sector Reform Strategy). One of the program components should be devoted to participatory methodologies and downward accountability issues.

• The program should have a Provincial Participatory Development Coordinator/Advisor. For a description of the responsibilities and qualifications for this position see Box 5.

• Relevant sector staff should be trained on the new responsibilities that the program is proposing. For instance, staff from the DPOPH should be trained on the new methodologies for involving communities through Oversight Committees and Operation and Maintenance Committees. Sectors that don’t have a district presence should train their staff on assisting communities to plan and implement self-help activities.

• Best practice and Demonstration effects. The program should establish learning mechanisms at the provincial and national level to identify good performers within the program and create instances to share and exchange experiences and learning. In addition, program’s staff and appropriate provincial technicians should be encouraged to visit other related programs in Mozambique, as well as similar programs in other countries to enable them to gain valuable insights from other models and approaches. This includes not only the Nampula Project but also other WB and UNCDF programs in the region.
Box 5. Draft Terms of Reference for the Provincial Participatory Development Coordinator

Key Responsibilities:

- To take the responsibility for ensuring that the district planning and financing processes supported by the program incorporate effective mechanisms for the active participation of local communities and women.
- To work with the District Technician for Participation and with NGOs to assist in the establishment of consultative councils (CCD) in all districts where the project is operating to ensure that district planning processes are brought closer to the community level to reflect local community needs.
- To work closely with the District Technician for Participation and NGOs to promote the creation of civil society organizations (Forums de Localidade, local development committees and other organizations and associations).
- To facilitate the institutionalisation of community representation on the CCDs at the district level, through assisting in the nomination/selection of representatives from the CCD (PA)s.
- To review the processes at the CCD and CCD(PA) meetings to include more time and greater opportunity for meaningful community interaction, discussion and influence.
- To assist in the establishment of participative systems for the local monitoring and evaluation of district plan implementation, and the feeding of results into the ongoing planning and review process.
- To develop training materials and programmes in participatory methodologies for provincial and district technicians and communities.
- To play a leading role in the development of an effective communications strategy for the program.
- To help ensure that key social issues (such as HIV/AIDS, environmental health, adult literacy, the needs of young people etc.), as well as strategies for addressing them, are reflected in the planning documents and processes.
- To organise a gender analysis and develop a gender strategy for the program.
- To review and update strategic and annual plans to ensure that they have a clear gender focus.
- To organise gender awareness training for program management and staff, as well as all provincial and district decision-makers and officials involved in the program.
- To ensure that gender awareness is included as an important part of the discussions at CCD and PRA meetings.
- To develop strategies to increase the participation and influence of women at CCD and PRA meetings.
- To develop links with UEM and other institutions to provide on-going research, support and advice to the program in the areas of community participation and gender.
- To devise and implement a counterpart capacity building programme for the local Participatory Methodology Specialist within the program team.
- To prepare regular reports on the above activities.

Qualifications, Skills, and Experience

- Degree or equivalent in social sciences or a related field.
- Proven experience in the application of participatory methodologies in local development and planning.
- Proven experience in mainstreaming gender into local development and planning processes.
- Ability to participate constructively in multi-disciplinary teams.
- Experience in the development of training materials and methodologies in the areas of community participation and gender.
- Familiarity with the Mozambican context in relation to public sector decentralisation and community development.
- Experience in working with communities in the area of natural resources management would be an advantage.
- Experience in report writing.
- Fluent written and spoken Portuguese. Reasonable command of written and spoken English. Some knowledge of local languages would be an advantage.

Source: adapted from UNCDF (2002)
5.3. District Administration

142. District Administration’s staff involved in district planning needs to be trained in the methodologies for preparing the District Development Plan, the District PES, and (if it is piloted) also the District Budget. They also need to have a general knowledge of the basic principles underpinning a participatory approach to planning as well as the participatory methodologies that will be used by the Program.

143. **District Participatory Development Coordinator (DPDC).** This Coordinator is a key resource for developing community organizations and fostering their effective participation in the planning process. Some of the skills the DPDC should have are:

- It would be a plus if the person has previous experience in participatory methodologies, but making this a requirement does not sound reasonable in the context of Mozambique.
- Operational Manual for Participatory District Planning
- Assisting communities to plan self-help activities
- PRA Techniques
- Know the local languages

144. In addition, the DPDC needs to approach community work with a certain attitude, which includes:

- Have a deep sense of responsibility given that the actions that are carried out will have a strong impact on the well-being of the poor population of the country
- Have a participatory approach, meaning, being able to learn from and with the people
- Be very respectful of the people with whom they work
- Be interested in what community people know, say, and do
- Be sensitive about issues related to gender, environment, and vulnerable groups
- Be sensitive to those who have difficulties to express themselves orally and be able to motivate them to participate in the dialogue
- Be able to listen and be patient
- Be modest about their own knowledge and viewpoints

145. **Limiting Turnover of Trained Staff.** As mentioned before [see section III.1.1.] high turnover of trained district officials has been a serious problem affecting the Nampula Project’s performance. All the capacities that are built through training are lost for the program when the trained staff is transferred. According to the diagnosis of the Nampula Project, the solution to this problem requires a concerted effort in DPAC and the Governors department to avoid the transfer of key staff away from participating districts. Greater political support from the Governors department and improved coordination and information-sharing across provincial directorates should limit this problem.

146. **Demonstration effects.** The program should use the learning mechanisms established at the provincial and national level to identify good performing districts and Planning Teams and create instances for exchange between good and bad performing districts (eg, tour visits).
5.4. Civil Society
147. To ensure the institutionalization of civil society participation in the district planning processes, the program needs to develop an effective program of community capacity building, in such areas as:

- Community organizing
- Community leadership
- Legislation about community participation
- Needs diagnosis
- Democratic processes to discuss community priorities
- Gender awareness
- Sectoral criteria for public investments,
- Importance of community contributions
- Community involvement in Operation and maintenance
- District planning
- Budget oversight

148. Some mechanisms and tools for doing this include:

- The best mechanism to create community capacities is the daily practice of participating in community organizations, in district planning, in project implementation, operation and maintenance, and holding government accountable.
- These practices should be supported by a framework of appropriate legislation and operational tools such as training manuals for the trainers and the trainees that include all the above mentioned issues.
- The District Coordinator for Participation should be the main responsible for training community representatives.
- He/She should organize workshops at the district/posto administrativo to provide this training, and ensure that communities receive the information they need to become actively involved in local development
- The Provincial Coordinator for Participation should support the District Coordinator in some training events.

VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
1. Institutional Context for Local Governance
149. The institutional context for local governance in Mozambique makes promoting true participation and downward accountability a significant challenge. Key limitations are:

- the absence of elected district authorities and a district budget,
- a very centralized government structure
- poorly trained and equipped staff at the district level
- a thin stock of linking social capital to connect civil society with government decision-making
- a weak democratic culture at the local level, partly due to the recency of independence from colonialism, a protracted civil war, and a very young multi-party democracy
150. Despite these limitations, Mozambique also counts with positive assets and signals to start the process of building good local governance. Some of them are:

- government interest in developing a more statutory basis for civil society participation in government decision-making, through Consultative Councils at the District and PA level. Evidence of this are the Decree 15/2000 and a Draft Law of State Local Bodies
- a thick stock of bonding social capital that could facilitate the thickening of linking social capital, as well as local experiences in developing linking organizations that serve as pilot models to be scaled up.
- a rich array of experiences with participatory district planning that have tested different methodologies and develop some local capacity for conducting them. The most promising of these experiences is the UNCDF/UNDP pilot in Nampula. This pilot has demonstrated that it is possible to mainstream a participatory district planning process managed by public officials using public administration procedures.

2. Strengths and Limitations of the Nampula Project

151. Following the TORs, this consultancy has taken the analysis of the DPFP in Nampula as the starting point for recommending an improved model of participation and downward accountability in district planning in Mozambique. The overall conclusion is that the Nampula model has several strengths that need to be preserved as well as several limitations that should be addressed.

152. Some of its key strengths are:

(i) Making district administration the driver of the participatory district development plan.
(ii) Following (and influencing) the methodology and guidelines for district planning elaborated by the national government.
(iii) Going beyond the “laundry list” approach of listing community demands, and instead proposing the development of a strategic vision which drives the prioritization process.
(iv) The Project’s methodology represents a significant departure from the traditional practice of designing top-down plans without citizens input.
(v) The concept of Consultative Councils at the District and Posto Administrativo as an interface between civil society and government is a good instrument to create a culture of local dialogue at the district level.
(vi) The representation of civil society in CCs respects existing forms of organization and representation.
(vii) When events to gather community preferences are organized, simple rules for having meaningful participation appear to be followed.
(viii) The population is able to express their preferences without apparent distortions, since the menu of options for investments/actions is open, and there is untied funding available.
(ix) The project has amassed a rich experience on how to organize CC, what works and what does not, that should be tapped on.
(x) It has experimented with a rich variety of PRA methods that provide public officials with a complete set of instruments for finding out community preferences and concerns.
(xi) The Project has the position of Participatory Development Technician at the provincial level, and recently also a Participatory and Gender Methodologies Advisor. This is a good decision to strengthen the support that the province gives to the districts in this area.
The Project has showed a strong learning capacity and flexibility in confronting the challenges that have emerged during implementation, many of which are being addressed in the second phase.

Its main limitations are:

153. **Gathering Community Preferences**

(xiii) There is no systematic methodology to ensure that the process of gathering community preferences is inclusive enough. There are three key deficiencies: (a) the lack of clear and transparent criteria for the “bottom-up” selection of CCD/CCPA members opens up the possibility that not all community representatives are invited; (b) those who participate in the CCDs/CCPAs do not necessarily carry a mandate representing the preferences of their constituencies; and (c) Overcoming these deficiencies means creating a system of participation that is encompassing, transparent, and truly representative.

(xiv) The DPFP approach does not ensure that participation is equitable enough. Minorities and underprivileged groups do not have specific mechanisms to make their voices heard, which explains why women’s participation has been low.

(xv) Planning activities that represent endogenous solutions to local problems is lacking. There is no mention in the DDP or the Annual Plans about community responsibilities for local development.

(xvi) The core and mandatory elements of the process for gathering community preferences is not standardized. There is no Operational Manual outlining the steps, criteria and procedures for community participation. While a learning approach may have made sense in the initial phase of the program, its replication to the national level should not proceed without a clear and detailed set of rules. The lack of an Operational Manual contributes to creating confusion among staff about the purpose of the different instruments.

(xvii) Pedagogical aspects of the three Operational Manuals need improvement to make them more user-friendly (more parsimonious, step-by-step explanations, more visual aids, etc).

154. **Translating Community Preferences into the DDP and the Annual Plan**

(xviii) It is difficult to assess the integration of community participation in the planning process because there are no clear rules for (a) taking community preferences into account in the prioritization process, and (b) explaining decision making to community members.

(xix) There are no rules for ensuring that the local population is informed about CCD outcomes.

155. **Executing the Actions of the Plan**

(xx) there are no explicit mechanisms for community participation in project implementation.

(xxi) There are no rules for communities to monitor contractors’ performance.

(xxii) Community participation in operation and maintenance is weak. Micro-projectos do not have operation and maintenance plans.

156. **Accountability about Plan Implementation**

(xxiii) The process to inform communities about the content of the DDP and the Annual Plan does not ensure an adequate level of information.

(xxiv) The fact that CCDs are open forums rather than councils—i.e., participants are not members that have been elected for a certain period of time—means that participants can
change from one CC to the next one. In a forum anyone invited can attend to but they do not hold any responsibility to be held accountable for. This hurts good communication between government and civil society as well as accountability.

(xxv) There are no written guidelines or procedures for communities to assess plan implementation performance.

(xxvi) There are no mechanisms for government to take the input that comes from civil society assessment of the plan implementation and use it to feed its civil servants’ performance assessment, and to inform back to community about the actions taken.

(xxvii) Delays in producing District PES have made it difficult to hold government accountable since these are the plans that contain concrete, short-term, commitments.

3. Issues, Options & Mechanisms For Improved Local Governance

157. Despite the absence of a decentralization reform agenda (elected local authorities, devolution of certain fiscal and policy powers to the district level, etc.) there is room for real enhancement of local governance for two interrelated reasons: first, significant measures can be adopted to “democratize” the current deconcentrated system which should result in better development outcomes than with the current system. Second, the process of democratizing the deconcentrated system can contribute to laying the groundwork for subsequent structural reforms.

158. The program should support a process of institutional reform of the local governance system in Mozambique. This reform process should be: (a) gradual: innovations should be tried out first in a limited number of districts and gradually expand them to others; (b) endogenous: proposed innovations should draw from and build upon the reservoir of good practices already tried in the country; (c) sustainable: innovations should not create ad-hoc structures and processes but rather should develop embryonic components of a future full-fledged local governance system. The Project should restrain from creating an over-ambitious structure that is sustained only on the basis of the Project’s fresh inflow of money, but is not sustainable after the project ends; and (d) institutionalized: the proposed innovations should be backed up by government regulations, decrees or laws.

3.1. Organizing Communities

159. The analysis of community organizations in Mozambique has produced two important findings: (a) there is a thin stock of linking social capital; and (b) the Nampula model needs to be strengthened to attain a more inclusive and equitable system of community representation in district planning. Based on these findings, I recommend the Program to thicken the stock of linking social capital by fostering the formation of community organizations.

160. I recommend a set of principles to guide both the assessment and the formation of community organizations. Community organizations should be: encompassing and inclusive, democratic, autonomous, internally accountable, binding, and sustainable and institutionalized [see section V.1.1. for a description of these principles]

3.1.1. What model of community organizing?

161. Three alternative forms of linking citizens to government that exist in the country are analyzed: (a) through traditional authorities, (b) through territorial-level organizations based at the povoação level, and (c) through interest-group organizations based at the localidade level. I
recommend to the program to pursue a twofold strategy with regards to civil society organization:

- Creating Forum da Localidade in every localidade along the lines of the Machaze model, and
- Having incentives for the voluntary (or optional) creation of CDLs and other types of community organization (peasants associations, natural resource management groups, etc) such as in Nampula.
- Seeing traditional authorities as strategic partners in the creation of the above mentioned organizations.

162. This recommendation is based on the following analysis:

- The territorial approach implies a huge level of effort. In any district there could be from fifty to more than a hundred povoacoes. Mandating the creation of such a number of community organizations would be a very taxing and unfeasible aim given the weak capacities that exist to carry this out. An alternative could be to make povoacao-level organization optional, creating incentives for the voluntary formation of CDLs and making partnerships with NGOs to promote this effort. Traditional authorities are key strategic partners to promote CDLs.

163. Focusing the efforts of the program on the localidade has several advantages:

- it will help to make the localidade an effective realm of civil society organization and communication with district government. So far, its status is fuzzy and its relevance is low.
- Its scale for aggregating social interests and demands seems more adequate than povoacao and Posto Administrativo.
- The level of institutional support that it will require from the program seems realistic. According to the Concern technician that supported the Comissões in Machaze it would take four to six months to create this Forums in a District with one or two community facilitators.
- It accommodates well, and indeed potentiates, other community animation efforts. CDLs at the povoacao level or associações de camponeses, water user groups, forest management groups, can all participate in the Forum. It also accommodates well the role of traditional authorities since they are also represented as an interest group.
- Since the FL includes a large number of actors it is very likely that people with better than average educational backgrounds will be present (e.g., professors, merchants, religious leaders) who can be important assets for having substantive discussions.

164. Two risks of organizing at the localidade level are: (a) creating artificial new interests. The methodology should be clear about not forcing or stimulating artificial groups; (b) better-off people or “local elites” from the localidade capturing development benefits. If the better off are in the “sede da localidade” they may influence the process to concentrate the benefits there. Technical assistance for community organizing and training of community leaders should pay attention to this issue.

165. Even though the combined model (interest group at localidades and CDLs at povoacoes) appears to be more adequate to the goals and constraints of the program, Mozambique is at a stage of its development of linking organizations at which it will profit from experimenting with different models of linking organizations. At this point I will recommend passing legislation that provides a framework for a broad set of linking organizations. Later on, government can assess whether it is necessary to create more specific regulations.
3.1.2. Who Should Promote Organizing and How?

166. **Who?** At the Provincial level, I **recommend** the creation of a Provincial Participatory Development Coordinator (a description of his/her responsibilities appears in section V.5.1). If there is no one in the provincial staff that could fill in the requirements for this position, a national-level professional could be hired to train a provincial counterpart. At the District level, I **recommend** the creation of a District Participatory Development Coordinator (for a description of his/her profile see section V.5.2). This person should be part of the District Planning Team. The provincial coordinator should collaborate with the DA in selecting/recruiting the person for this job, and trained him/her. The content of the training should include PRA tools, procedures for organizing communities, procedures for developing workplans for community self-help activities, etc. In those districts where there is an NGO doing community work the district could make a partnership with the NGO to facilitate the process. Still, it will be important to have someone in the district government responsible for the liaison with the NGO on this issue.

167. **How?** General principles that should guide the formation of community organizations have been already outlined [see V.1.1.]. Forum da Localidade can be organized taking into account the following guidelines: (a) localidade’s citizens define interest groups and decide in which one/s they want to participate; (b) each “interest group” elects two representatives (a man and a woman) to participate as representatives in the FL; (c) the FL has a statute to regulate FL functioning; (d) the frequency of meetings varies according to the dynamism of each FL.

3.1.3. Incentives

168. Community organizing needs incentives. Participating in the planning process is good, but receiving its benefits may take a long time during which the population’s interest in organizing may falter. I **recommend** two kinds of incentives:

- “Technical assistance”. Poor people appreciate when officials from government or NGOs reach out to them not just to listen to their problems but to give them advice on how to do things differently to improve their lives. District and provincial sector officials should have strategies for working with communities (either through community health agents, PTAs, “model” farmers, etc). Reviewing sectoral policies from this perspective could help identify how to strengthen existing initiatives and where the main gaps exist.

- Tangible results. An example of this will be a “micro-projectos component” that allows people to perceive a quick and tangible result of their participation. In the WB program, this could be offered by the Community Infrastructure Improvement Facility.

3.1.4. Risks and Mitigating Measures.

169. Two risks of a state-sponsored strategy to promote the creation of linking organizations are:

- Political cooptation and manipulation. This can take place if government officials start meddling with community election of representatives for the FLs or the CCs. While some rural areas in Mozambique do not show strong partisan dynamics, others do—fueled by the possible contestation of community authorities as well as electoral mobilization. Therefore, I **recommend** that the project creates some safeguards to avoid or minimize the politicization of CCs, such as rules specifying that representatives should not be elected based on their political party identity, not allowing openly partisan discussions in meetings, etc. The
program should closely monitor this issue during implementation to ensure that these rules are being enforced.

- Analysts of the Mozambican experience point out that rural communities are strongly distrustful of government. Indeed, rather than wanting to link with government, some community authorities may want to de-link even more from government. If this sentiment is very pervasive, community organizing efforts may be unsuccessful or take longer than expected. I recommend keeping the FL as an autonomous space of civil society rather than as an interface forum to mitigate this mistrust. More generally, one way to mitigate this problem is to be very respectful of the opinions and sensitivities of the local population and avoid imposing structures.

3.1.5. Minimum Standards
170. My recommendations, which are based on the FL model but could also be applied to other potential models, are:

- Forum de Localidades have been established in every localidade of the district
- FLs have met with the frequency that they have agreed on
- A sufficiently diverse number of interest groups have been formed in every locality. Although it is not advisable to impose the creation of specific interest groups, at least all those citizens interested in forming interest groups have been able to do so.
- Interest groups have met with the frequency that they have agreed on
- Interest group and FL representatives have been elected in a democratic way.
- IG and FL meetings are scheduled at a time and location that is accessible to the majority of the citizens of the locality, and information about these meetings is transmitted in advance to allow people to make the needed arrangements to be present.
- The rules for participation and representation are widely disseminated through a public information campaign.
- There are trained community facilitators working under the supervision of the district administration

3.2. Structuring the Local Dialogue
3.2.1. Organizational Structure
171. My main recommendation is that the structure for civil society-district government dialogue should define the roles of the different territorial levels as follows:

- the levels of povoação and localidade as realms for civil society to get together and discuss and agree on their main preferences. Having an instance where civil society could come together without the presence of government is a prerequisite for minimum autonomous action and for encouraging people to take responsibility for their own development.
- the levels of posto administrativo and distrito as realms for civil society and government representatives to interact and agree on the district strategy.
- The added value of having a CCPA in addition to a CCD is to: (a) strengthen PA as a source of support to the district administration; (b) help large districts to have a closer interaction with civil society, and provide a filter between FLs and CCD to make the process of prioritization and discussion more manageable, meaningful, and representative; and (c) define a more concrete working plan for the chefe do PA and a development agenda for the PA, both of which are lacking.
• The Program should assist government in the development of guidelines and procedures for CCPAs that: (a) specify the added value of the CCPAs; (b) provide clear rules for aggregation and prioritization of interests and demands that integrate them without significant distortions; and (c) include a strategy to strengthen the capacities of the PA.

172. I recommend some principles for organizing the Consultative Councils (PA and District) related to their: statutes, membership, composition, size, autonomy, transparency, institutionalization, and learning capacities, as well as principles to guide the relationship among levels.

173. I propose the following organizational structure: FLs at the localidade, CCPA at the posto administrativo, and CCD at the district level.

3.2.2. The Content of the Dialogue.

174. Taking as a starting point the framework developed by the Nampula Project (see Table 2) I will recommend the following changes:

175. First Stage—Launching of the DDP. The two key products of this stage are:
• Formation of the District Participatory Planning Team. The Team should have between 6 to 9 people that come from the different sectors that are present at the district level, plus one or two from the NGOs that are more active in the district, and a District Facilitator or Coordinator of Community Participation. For the composition of the Team: (a) rather than having District Directors as part of the Team (they are very busy) it is better if they appoint the best candidate from their Directions; (b) Team members should be selected based on merit and competence.
• The First CCD where the plan is launched. The program must decide whether the FL should be created before or after the 1st CCD. Pros and cons of each option are analyzed in the main body of the report.

176. Second Stage—Diagnosis. I recommend a process for involving communities in the district diagnosis. The main recommendation is that as a result of this process, each CCPA produces a “List of Community Priorities” which contains the top priorities agreed in the CCPA as well as the other problems and solutions that were not prioritized. This List should be included as an Annex of the DDP.

177. Third Stage—Definition of the Development Strategy. At this stage takes place the 2nd CCD where the Planning Team presents a strategy proposal for discussion. The main recommendation here is that the Team should provide a detailed explanation of and justification for the strategy, as well as explicit references to how the List of Community Priorities was taken into account.

178. Fourth Stage—Identifying the Action Program and approving the DDP. This stage involves negotiations between the Planning Team and the array of actors responsible for implementing the actions included in the strategy. With regards to communities, two specific recommendations are:
• Discuss with the beneficiaries receiving a public investment what are the characteristics of the investment (location, possible types of technology, O&M requirements, etc) as well as what would be the counterpart that the community can contribute (either in of cash or in kind).

• The District Facilitator of Participation helps sector district officials to work with the different FLs to define the self-help activities that would be part of the Matrix of Actions. To do this, district governments should have a toolkit for engaging communities in self-help activities. It is recommended that the Program draws from DEC’s experience in Buzi. DEC has organized what they call “Civic education campaigns” (see box 1). To develop these toolkits the program should work with the different ministries in developing sectoral strategies for the district directions to work with the community in self-help activities. These toolkits are not a “closed” package that should be applied in a top-down fashion, but rather flexible tools that should facilitate the organization of self-help activities.

3.2.3. Risks and Mitigating Measures

179. One of the risks of having a local dialogue is that civil society participation is passive, and not independent. Recommendations to mitigate this are (a) the creation of an instance for civil society to get together before its interaction with government, as a less intimidating space than a CC for community members to learn the basics of democratic deliberations; (b) provide training to community representatives and district officials; and (c) educate local actors about their roles in the CCs during the CCs themselves.

180. Another risk is raising unrealistic community expectations about the solution to their problems. I recommend the program to define a strategy to manage expectations based on the following principles:

• a prioritization process that filters up to the district a manageable number of community priorities.

• an aggressive communication strategy that creates a conscience among community leaders and members about (a) the magnitude of resources that the district has available for investments; (b) the meaning of a prioritization process; and (c) the agreements reached and reflected in the final DDP document.

• stress the multi-year nature of the DDP so that communities know that they may not be attended in the first years but they may be later on.

• Increase the “district budget” by coordinating with other investments partners (NGOs, businesses) so that they channel their resources to attend DDP priorities. This includes communities self-help activities.

• Facilitators of community meetings and CCs should be trained to repeat frequently the above information to communities.

• A common coping response to high community expectations is to spread resources evenly across the district through small projects. The program should try to avoid this since it goes against the notion of having a strategic plan. Some programs follow this approach only during the initial stage so as to gain credibility and take some of the pressure off, and then slowly moving into larger projects that are more focused on certain areas of the district. My recommendation is for the Program to have this as a “second best” alternative. The program can also use the microproyectos approach of the Community Infrastructure Improvement Facility to have a more territorially-balanced response to demands.
3.2.4. Minimum Standards

181. I have already outlined minimum standards for participation in the FLs (section V.1.7). Here, I will refer only to the structure and content of the CCs and DDP:

- At least 70% of the members of the CCs should come from civil society
- At least one third of the members of the CCs are women
- Civil society representatives that form the CC have been elected by the local population
- CC dynamics (size, duration, languages, etc) allow for meaningful participation and exchange of ideas.
- There are written records of the discussions and agreements that took place in every CC, as well as a signed list of those who attended
- Discussions in the CC are not manipulated by any faction in particular
- Most districts complete the DDP within less than a year and a half.
- A majority of the local population finds that the priorities that appear in the DDP reflect well the priorities expressed in the FLs and CCPAs
- Community representatives are capable of explaining what criteria led to the final district strategy
- Community representatives hold community meetings to inform back to the community the basic points that were discussed
- The DDP includes self-help activities that resulted from a consensus with communities.
- NGOs and other actors with investment resources consider the DDP a legitimate and useful instrument and use it to guide their investment decisions.

3.3. Executing the Action Plan

3.3.1. Contracting

182. For the short term, it is not recommended for the program to pursue community contracting since the government resists this approach on the basis that it will result in low-quality works. Since mounting a community contracting operation requires strong political will to back it up and given that it is not the only way to elicit community involvement in subproject implementation, this option does not appear worth pursuing.

183. A minimum standard should be that the bidding process follows transparent methods to ensure fairness and quality in government procurement, that the local population is informed about these methods, and has the opportunity to voice its opinion about contract performance. Some recommended measures that can be implemented in this regard are:

- Use the CCD and CCPA to explain government procurement methods in simple terms
- For the Community Infrastructure Improvement Facility, invite 1 or 2 community representatives to the opening of the envelopes in the bidding of the works that will be implemented in the representatives’ communities.
- Establish a database of certified contractors that tracks the performance record of these contractors (whether they have left unfinished infrastructure, or poorly constructed infrastructure). Establish community-based oversight committees (see next point) that can provide feedback on the performance of the contractor.

3.3.2. Building

184. Two recommended measures are to:
Create Oversight Committees to complement the work of the Fiscal in monitoring the contractor’s performance. Their purpose is to oversee the implementation of the subproject, verifying that the works and services are being performed according to what has been agreed in the contract (duration, cost and quality of the service). The program should develop a booklet or manual of Community Oversight with the basic functions and procedures of the committee. [see box 2 for guidelines on the composition and responsibilities of these committees].

Give Oversight Committees some leverage, for instance, require the signatures of the committee before approving the next installment to the contractor.

3.3.3. Operation and Maintenance
185. Two recommended measures are:

- Each subproject should have an operation and maintenance plan that outlines what are the responsibilities of the different actors, including beneficiaries/users. This plan should be informed by the corresponding sectoral policy. A review of sectoral policies should indicate if reforms are needed.
- Establish Operation and Maintenance Management Committees The purpose of these Committees is to coordinate the process of discussing and defining the management model that should be implemented to guarantee the investment’s sustainability. [see box 3 for guidelines on how to create these committees]

3.4. Accountability about Plan Implementation
3.4.1. Organizational Infrastructure
186. The creation of community organizations will have an important effect in creating an organizational infrastructure through which the local population can ask for information and justification about government’s (in)actions.

187. CCDs and CCPAs are key infrastructures for improved communication and accountability. Two recommendations to enable better accountability about plan implementation are:

- First, transform the CC in real councils instead of forums by establishing a system of representation where the members of the councils are elected for a significant period of time (two years at least). These representatives will have responsibilities with regards to their constituencies and the authorities of the CCs.
- Second, develop written guidelines for conducting these events to ensure that minimum contents of information are transmitted to the population (see below).

3.4.2. Transparency & Communication.
188. Recommended rules to improve transparency are:

- Planning. The rules for planning have been discussed in previous sections.
- Budgeting. District authorities should have timely information about national and provincial sector allocations for capital investments and recurrent costs with sufficient certainty and anticipation to be able to prepare annual district plans. This does not appear to be the case in the current situation and needs to be worked out before the initiation of the program.
- Financial management. Establishing financial management systems at the district and provincial level that allow expenditure monitoring and tracking.
• **Procurement.** There should be clear rules for the thresholds for direct contracting, private and public bidding.

189. It is **recommended** that the program implements a strong **communication** strategy, which should include:

- The **issues** about which the population should be informed: plans and budgets, revenue collection, flow of public and non-governmeant funds, procurement and implementation, and rewards and sanctions system.

- **Communication channels.** It is recommend that the program hires a popular communication specialist to identify what would be the most effective channels to communicate with the population. Four possible channels are: (a) oral communication through the CCDs, CCPAs, FLs, and interest groups; (b) written forms through the “Jornal da Parede” (large pieces of paper posted in strategic places); (c) community radios could be piloted in some districts to evaluate their effectiveness; and (d) Information and Communication Centers (see box 4) as the ones the Nampula Project is piloting. Information should be available in the local languages.

- The main responsibility for ensuring that information reaches the communities is of the District Participation Facilitator. The Facilitator should have detailed instruments to assist him/her in this work. The Program should prepare booklets containing the basic information that should be communicated, as well as the formats and channels for communication.

### 3.4.3. Rewards & Sanctions

190. The lack of political and fiscal decentralization deprives the local population from a key accountability mechanism—i.e., voting. The challenge, then, is to find surrogate mechanisms for political accountability. The two mechanisms that exist in Mozambique appear insufficient: (a) in his visits to the districts, the provincial governor meets with local citizens and government officials, but these meetings are rather ad-hoc; and (b) the provincial Directorate of Apoio e Controle (DPAC) is responsible for the administrative assessment performance of district administration, but apparently it does not include citizens input about district’s performance.

191. My **recommendations** for establishing a system of incentives that promotes good downward accountability are two:

- First, to improve the District Performance Assessment System. This system should have output and outcome indicators related to the participation of civil society in local governance (suggestions are included). In the last ten years, a wide set of tools have been developed and tested all over the world to measure citizens satisfaction about public action. Three of these are: citizen report cards, participatory monitoring and evaluation, and beneficiary assessments.

- Second, to establish an Incentives for Good District Performance System, which should include administrative and development rewards:
  - **Administrative Rewards.** Since District administration staff is appointed rather than elected, their incentives for good performance should come from those who control their administrative careers, that is, the provincial administration. Suggested actions include:
    1. A comprehensive review of the system for administrative promotions should identify key reforms that are needed.
2. Making DA responsibilities clearer as well as reinforcing his/her authority over sector staff are necessary.

3. The participation of district staff in the Participatory Planning District Team should account for extra points in the assessment of staff’s performance.

4. The provincial governor can establish an annual “prize” that is awarded to the District Administrator that has been more responsive to the local population and more engaged in promoting the development of the district. In the same way that during the socialist period there was something called “emulacao socialista” for those officials that performed well the government can establish something as an “emulacao da governação local participativa.”

- Development Rewards, provincial government allocations for the District Infrastructure Facility and the Community Infrastructure Improvement Facility represent an opportunity to reward/sanction performance. The agents that will benefit/suffer from this incentive are the district population. This should mobilize the local population not only to become more vocal about district administration performance but also to perform well those actions that are their own responsibility. Two options for using these facilities as incentives are:
  1. to define minimum performance standards (output and/or outcome related) in order to be eligible for allocations from this facility;
  2. to define a fixed allocation that all districts receive equally and a variable allocation that depends on performance.

3.5. Capacity Building and Training
194. Capacity building is a cross-cutting issue that lies at the heart of the program’s goals. The success that the program attains in terms of participation and accountability will depend to a large extent on the degree to which provincial and district officials as well as communities assimilate new skills, develop new habits and norms for interacting with each other as well as new perceptions of their roles and potential. Capacities that the different actors involved in the district planning process need to have in the area of participation and downward accountability include:

3.5.1. Principles for Effective Capacity Building.
195. Important principles for effective capacity building are: ownership and institutionalization, a demand-driven approach, a holistic approach both in terms of training content and recipients, exploiting multiple channels for capacity building, focusing less on the inputs and more on the quality of the outcomes, linking capacity building to incentives, on the job, pedagogical, and a hands-on approach, and measures to retain trainees in their positions.

3.5.2. Provincial Administration
196. **Recommendations** are:
- The provincial administration should have a Professional Development Program, and one of its components should be devoted to participatory methodologies and downward accountability issues.
- The program should have a Provincial Participatory Development Coordinator/Advisor. For a description of the responsibilities and qualifications for this position see Box 5.
• Relevant sector staff should be trained on the new responsibilities that the program is proposing.
• The program should establish learning mechanisms at the provincial and national level to identify good performers within the program and create instances to share and exchange experiences and learning. Program’s staff and appropriate provincial technicians should be encouraged to visit other related programs in Mozambique, as well as similar programs in other countries.

3.5.3. District Administration.
197. Four recommendations are:
• District Administration’s staff involved in district planning needs to be trained in the methodologies for preparing the District Development Plan, the District PES, and (if it is piloted) also the District Budget. They also need to have a general knowledge of the basic principles underpinning a participatory approach to planning as well as the participatory methodologies that will be used by the Program.
• Create the position of District Participatory Development Coordinator (DPDC). For recommendations on the skills and attitudes that the DPDC should have see the main body of the report.
• Limiting high turnover of trained staff. Based on the experience of the Nampula Project, I recommend that the program takes the following measures to mitigate high turnover rates: (a) convey to the Governor’s Department the importance of putting political pressure on Provincial Directors to avoid the transfer of key staff away from participating districts; and (b) promote effective coordination and information-sharing across provincial directorates.
• Demonstration effects. The program should use the learning mechanisms established at the provincial and national level to identify good performing districts and Planning Teams and create instances for exchange between good and bad performing districts (eg, tour visits).

3.5.4. Civil Society
198. To ensure the institutionalization of civil society participation in the district planning processes, the program needs to develop an effective program of community capacity building, in such areas as: community organizing and leadership, legislation about community participation, needs diagnosis, democratic processes to discuss community priorities, gender awareness, sectoral criteria for public investments, importance of community contributions, community involvement in operation and maintenance, district planning, and budget oversight.

199. Some mechanisms and tools for doing this include:
• The best mechanism to create community capacities is the daily practice of participating in community organizations, in district planning, in project implementation, operation and maintenance, and holding government accountable.
• These practices should be supported by a framework of appropriate legislation and operational tools such as training manuals for the trainers and the trainees that include all the above mentioned issues.
• The District Coordinator for Participation should be the main responsible for training community representatives.
• He/She should organize workshops at the district/posto administrativo to provide this training, and ensure that communities receive the information they need to become actively involved in local development
• The Provincial Coordinator for Participation should support the District Coordinator in some training events.
1. Terms of Reference

Background

1. Since 1998 the Government of Mozambique has been piloting district planning and finance in Nampula province with support from the Netherlands, the United Nations Development Capital Fund and UNDP. The project’s objective is to promote economic development and alleviate poverty by improving the provision and operation and maintenance of small-scale economic and social infrastructure. The basic assumption underlying the project is that the key for successful rural development is the improvement of local governance. Political, administrative and financial decentralization and genuine participation are essential and critical dimensions of this improvement.

2. The Government of Mozambique is developing a national program on Decentralized Planning and Finance and has requested funding from the World Bank to expand the Nampula experience to cover up to four provinces in the central region of the country. The project would have three components (i) Decentralized Planning (District planning), Finance and Works (ii) Capacity Building and (iii) Strengthening the National Policy Framework.

3. Similar to the Nampula pilot, the WB project would finance small public investments in rural areas and start long term capacity building of district and provincial administration. This would involve the strengthening of the capacities of Provincial and District administrations to plan and manage the provision of rural infrastructure, and to assist the central government ministries and agencies to develop national laws, regulations and guidelines for the decentralized management of infrastructure investment programs. The investment programs would be financed by provincially managed facilities using government procedures. Support would be provided to enhance works contracting and supervision, and to establish mechanisms for operation and maintenance.

4. The participation of civil society and communities in the planning and implementation of rural infrastructure and services is one of the main features of the DPFP. Following precedents set in Nampula and reflected in proposed legislation, communities would be organized in “Consultative Councils” at district and at administrative post levels to ensure community representation and participation. The Nampula Project takes in consideration the administrative division of the country up to where the local government is represented (Chefe do Posto Administrativo). Other models of community participation tried elsewhere in the country are structured from the “bottom-up” through Local or Community Development Committees, and it is generally believed that they enable better inclusion of the traditional leaders and minority groups at the grassroots level. There are several limitations to these models: in both it is not clear how the District Councils are formed and how their decision-making processes function, nor are the role, rights and obligations of district administration clear vis-à-vis District Consultative Councils.

Objectives of the study

5. The objective of the Participation, Transparency and Downward Accountability Study is to support the design of the District Planning, Finance and Works Component of DPFP; specifically;

(i) To review the current rules, regulations and institutional arrangements for community participation and accountability in Mozambique.

(ii) To propose institutional arrangements and mechanisms that will improve people’s participation in decision making during the district planning process and during the implementation of the resulting district plans and projects.

(iii) To review and propose ways (e.g. communication strategy, flow of information) in which the district administration or others handling public resources could report faithfully to beneficiaries on the intended and actual use of resources at the local level.

(iv) To assess and propose institutional mechanisms through which local communities can regulate the behavior of district officials involved in the management of public resources and the provision of public services.

(v) To propose capacity building needs and institutional arrangements to improve participation, transparency and accountability at community and district levels.
Scope of the work
6. The consultant will review the community participation and downward accountability under the Nampula pilot project and familiarize him/herself with various relevant studies, especially the “Best Practices for Community Participation in District Planning in Mozambique” undertaken by government in the context of the DPFP formulation and other international best practices in order to carry out the following tasks:

Participation
7. Participation is considered the key element of the planning process and should be inclusive and transparent to ensure that the interest of the poorest and most marginalized groups of society are adequately represented. The consultant will:
   1) Analyze and assess the nature and quality of community participation in district planning in the Nampula Pilot
   2) Identify important actors and groups in the district planning process and propose potential roles and strategies for inclusion in order to ensure equitable participation (who to include) in the DPFP, with special attention to the role of Community Authorities (Autoridades comunitárias)
   3) Define criteria for selecting participants for consultation (how)
   4) Propose institutional arrangements to ensure that participation is an integral part of project planning and implementation
   5) Define several possible approaches for community participation and flow of information that link local populations with district administration in the context of planning and plan implementation and identify their major strengths and weaknesses under Mozambican conditions (options)
   6) Define background information that would be made available to the stakeholders on a timely basis in advance of the consultative events
   7) Discuss with the government and other stakeholders their feasibility and sustainability under Mozambique conditions of such options
   8) Propose minimum standards, processes and mechanisms for community participation in district planning to be applied in the project (e.g. who to include, background information that should be made available by local government to local stakeholders, the criteria used for selecting participants, decision making process, etc.). Special emphasis should be given to community participation on the financing facilities (District Infrastructure and Community Infrastructure facilities) proposed under this project.

Accountability
8. The government is promoting the establishment of Consultative Councils (Conselhos Consultivos) as representatives of communities in the local socio-economic and development initiatives, but the relationship with government needs to be clarified. Based on the field visit to Nampula pilot and to Buzi (ADEL experience) the consultant will:
   1) Identify present (formal and informal) accountability mechanism between local administration and communities in rural Mozambique
   2) Assess the existing accountability relations with specific emphasis on community authorities and identify their strengths and weaknesses
   3) Assess existing experience and proposals (including the proposed Local Administration (OLE) Reform legislation) for the creation and functioning of consultative councils and evaluate their potential contribution to improve downward accountability in the context of District Planning and Implementation
   4) Identify opportunity and constraints for improved accountability of district administration to local communities
   5) Given the constraints, propose viable options for promoting improve accountability in the DPFP
   6) Propose mechanisms and minimum standards for downward accountability for the project with particular emphasis on the allocation and use of resources made available through project financing facilities.( e.g. preparation and handling of annual reports, financial statements, monitoring and evaluation results, etc.)

Output/Products
1  Summary of the current rules and regulations and institutional arrangements for community participation and downward accountability at the District level in Mozambique
2  Issues and options for community participation and downward accountability for DPFP
3 Propose strategy, guidelines, mechanisms and standards for community participation and downward accountability in the DPFP
4 Risk analysis given existing institutional, policy and political environment and possible minimization strategy for community participation and downward accountability
5 Given the existing institutional, policy constraints, propose an incentive system that could promote community participation, transparency and downward accountability for the implementation of DPFP

Level of Effort and Work Plan
18 days in Mozambique
10 days Report Writing (US)

Wk 1 – Maputo, interviews, with government, donors and NGOs
Wk 2 – Field visits: Familiarization with Nampula pilot project and visit to Buzi/ADEL
Wk 3 – Prepare a summary of initial conclusions to present in Seminar on Community Participation in District Planning and Governance, Final Discussions in Maputo
Wks 4/5 - Draft and Revise Report (after departure to US)

The draft report is due by June 30, 2002 and final report (after comments) by July 30, 2002.

Report
The consultant will work closely with Aniceto Bila, Program Officer, WB Mozambique Country Office and Custodio dos Mucudos at UCA, Ministry of Planning and Finance, with ultimate accountability to the Task Team Leader, Alan Carroll, Lead Urban Specialist, Water and Urban Group1, Eastern and Southern Africa, World Bank.
2. List of People Interviewed/Met

National Government
- from the Ministry of Planning and Finance (MPF):
  - Director Domingos Lambo
  - Custodio dos Mucudos
  - Taquidir Bacar
- from the Ministry of State Administration (MAE)
  - Director Lourenço Mavie
- from the National Rural Development Directorate:
  - Director Gabriel Tembe
  - José Mate
  - Romão Cossa

Provincial and District Government
- 2 District Administrators (Mecuburi and Machaze)
- 2 group meetings with District Technical Teams (Angoche and Machaze)
- 1 member of the District Technical Team of Mecuburi
- 1 chefe do posto administrativo (Aúbe)
- 1 presidente da localidade (Machaze)
- Provincial Coordinator of Participation, DPFP Nampula, João Olaia
- Provincial Coordinator of Technical Advisors, DPFP Nampula, Vicente Paulo.

Community Representatives
- 1 Régulo in Machaze
- 1 Religious Leader in Machaze
- Focus group with a CDL in Aube
- Focus group with a Comissão de Desenvolvimento da Localidade in Machaze

Donors, NGOs and Consultants
- Austrian Cooperation, Hemma Tengler
- Swiss Cooperation, Bernhard Weimer
- UNDP, Paolo di Renzio
- Dutch Embassy, First Secretary, Jan Willem le Grand
- SNV in Angoche, Ms. Jose
- Norwegian Cooperation, Second Secretary, Haavard
- Irish Cooperation, Concern, Facilitator in Machaze
- WB, Aniceto Bila, Louis Helling, Kate Kuper.
- Centro de Estudos de Democracia e Desenvolvimento, Carlos Roque
- OLIPA, Coordinator
- Consultant for UCA/MPF responsible for consultations with stakeholders about program design, Anselmo Zimba.
- Consultants responsible for Best Practice on Community Participation in Mozambique: Patrick Matakala and Eunice Cavane.
3. Bibliographical References


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