One widely accepted conclusion in the human capital literature on training is that firms will finance only firm-specific training because it is non-transferable to other firms. Firms will not be willing to finance training in general (transferable) skills. In this paper it is argued that a recruiting firm will possess only limited knowledge of the training level in general skills acquired by workers in other firms. Hence a worker with transferable...
See More
DETAILS
-
1989/04/30
-
Policy Research Working Paper
-
WPS170
-
1
-
1
-
2010/07/01
-
General training under asymmetric information
-
marginal product
Citation
Katz, Eliakim; Ziderman, Adrian.
General training under asymmetric information (English). Policy, Planning and Research Department working papers ; no. WPS 170 Washington, D.C. : World Bank Group. http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/302741468764965783