General training under asymmetric information (English)

One widely accepted conclusion in the human capital literature on training is that firms will finance only firm-specific training because it is non-transferable to other firms. Firms will not be willing to finance training in general (transferable) skills. In this paper it is argued that a recruiting firm will possess only limited knowledge of the training level in general skills acquired by workers in other firms. Hence a worker with transferable...

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Author

Katz, Eliakim;

Ziderman, Adrian;
Document Date
1989/04/30
Document Type
Policy Research Working Paper
Report Number
WPS170
Volume No
1
Total Volume(s)
1
Disclosure Date
2010/07/01
Doc Name
General training under asymmetric information
Keywords
marginal product

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Citation

Katz, Eliakim; Ziderman, Adrian.

General training under asymmetric information (English). Policy, Planning and Research Department working papers ; no. WPS 170 Washington, D.C. : World Bank Group. http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/302741468764965783

General training under asymmetric information (English)

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